openssl-1_1/openssl-1.1.1-fips-post-rand.patch

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Index: openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/fips/fips.c
2020-01-24 12:52:58 +01:00
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.1.1i.orig/crypto/fips/fips.c 2020-12-08 16:46:23.666760618 +0100
+++ openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/fips/fips.c 2020-12-08 16:46:25.626772700 +0100
2020-01-24 12:52:58 +01:00
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
# include <openssl/fips.h>
# include "internal/thread_once.h"
Accepting request 786956 from home:vitezslav_cizek:branches:security:tls - Update to 1.1.1e * Properly detect EOF while reading in libssl. Previously if we hit an EOF while reading in libssl then we would report an error back to the application (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) but errno would be 0. We now add an error to the stack (which means we instead return SSL_ERROR_SSL) and therefore give a hint as to what went wrong. * Check that ed25519 and ed448 are allowed by the security level. Previously signature algorithms not using an MD were not being checked that they were allowed by the security level. * Fixed SSL_get_servername() behaviour. The behaviour of SSL_get_servername() was not quite right. The behaviour was not consistent between resumption and normal handshakes, and also not quite consistent with historical behaviour. The behaviour in various scenarios has been clarified and it has been updated to make it match historical behaviour as closely as possible. * Corrected the documentation of the return values from the EVP_DigestSign* set of functions. The documentation mentioned negative values for some errors, but this was never the case, so the mention of negative values was removed. * Added a new method to gather entropy on VMS, based on SYS$GET_ENTROPY. The presence of this system service is determined at run-time. * Added newline escaping functionality to a filename when using openssl dgst. This output format is to replicate the output format found in the '*sum' checksum programs. This aims to preserve backward compatibility. * Print all values for a PKCS#12 attribute with 'openssl pkcs12', not just the first value. - Update bunch of patches as the internal crypto headers got reorganized - drop openssl-1_1-CVE-2019-1551.patch (upstream) - openssl dgst: default to SHA256 only when called without a digest, OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/786956 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-1_1?expand=0&rev=65
2020-03-20 18:43:35 +01:00
+# include "crypto/rand.h"
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# ifndef PATH_MAX
# define PATH_MAX 1024
@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@
static int fips_selftest_fail = 0;
static int fips_mode = 0;
static int fips_started = 0;
+static int fips_post = 0;
static int fips_is_owning_thread(void);
static int fips_set_owning_thread(void);
@@ -158,6 +160,11 @@ void fips_set_selftest_fail(void)
fips_selftest_fail = 1;
}
+int fips_in_post(void)
+{
+ return fips_post;
+}
+
/* we implement what libfipscheck does ourselves */
static int
@@ -445,6 +452,8 @@ int FIPS_module_mode_set(int onoff)
}
# endif
+ fips_post = 1;
+
if (!FIPS_selftest()) {
fips_selftest_fail = 1;
ret = 0;
@@ -459,7 +468,12 @@ int FIPS_module_mode_set(int onoff)
goto end;
}
+ fips_post = 0;
+
fips_set_mode(onoff);
+ /* force RNG reseed with entropy from getrandom() on next call */
+ rand_force_reseed();
+
ret = 1;
goto end;
}
Index: openssl-1.1.1i/include/crypto/fips_int.h
2020-01-24 12:52:58 +01:00
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.1.1i.orig/include/crypto/fips_int.h 2020-12-08 16:46:23.666760618 +0100
+++ openssl-1.1.1i/include/crypto/fips_int.h 2020-12-08 16:46:25.626772700 +0100
2020-01-24 12:52:58 +01:00
@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ int FIPS_selftest_hmac(void);
int FIPS_selftest_drbg(void);
int FIPS_selftest_cmac(void);
+int fips_in_post(void);
+
int fips_pkey_signature_test(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
const unsigned char *tbs, int tbslen,
const unsigned char *kat,
Index: openssl-1.1.1i/include/crypto/rand.h
2020-01-24 12:52:58 +01:00
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.1.1i.orig/include/crypto/rand.h 2020-12-08 16:46:23.670760642 +0100
+++ openssl-1.1.1i/include/crypto/rand.h 2020-12-08 16:46:25.626772700 +0100
2020-01-24 12:52:58 +01:00
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
typedef struct rand_pool_st RAND_POOL;
void rand_cleanup_int(void);
+void rand_force_reseed(void);
void rand_drbg_cleanup_int(void);
void drbg_delete_thread_state(void);
Index: openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
2020-01-24 12:52:58 +01:00
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.1.1i.orig/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c 2020-12-08 16:46:23.670760642 +0100
+++ openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c 2020-12-08 16:46:25.626772700 +0100
@@ -1005,6 +1005,20 @@ size_t rand_drbg_seedlen(RAND_DRBG *drbg
2020-01-24 12:52:58 +01:00
return min_entropy > min_entropylen ? min_entropy : min_entropylen;
}
+void rand_force_reseed(void)
+{
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg;
+
+ drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
+ drbg->fork_id = 0;
+
+ drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_private();
+ drbg->fork_id = 0;
+
+ drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_public();
+ drbg->fork_id = 0;
+}
+
/* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_add() method */
static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
{
Index: openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
2020-01-24 12:52:58 +01:00
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.1.1i.orig/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c 2020-12-08 16:46:23.670760642 +0100
+++ openssl-1.1.1i/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c 2020-12-08 16:47:33.695192297 +0100
2020-01-24 12:52:58 +01:00
@@ -17,10 +17,12 @@
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
Accepting request 786956 from home:vitezslav_cizek:branches:security:tls - Update to 1.1.1e * Properly detect EOF while reading in libssl. Previously if we hit an EOF while reading in libssl then we would report an error back to the application (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) but errno would be 0. We now add an error to the stack (which means we instead return SSL_ERROR_SSL) and therefore give a hint as to what went wrong. * Check that ed25519 and ed448 are allowed by the security level. Previously signature algorithms not using an MD were not being checked that they were allowed by the security level. * Fixed SSL_get_servername() behaviour. The behaviour of SSL_get_servername() was not quite right. The behaviour was not consistent between resumption and normal handshakes, and also not quite consistent with historical behaviour. The behaviour in various scenarios has been clarified and it has been updated to make it match historical behaviour as closely as possible. * Corrected the documentation of the return values from the EVP_DigestSign* set of functions. The documentation mentioned negative values for some errors, but this was never the case, so the mention of negative values was removed. * Added a new method to gather entropy on VMS, based on SYS$GET_ENTROPY. The presence of this system service is determined at run-time. * Added newline escaping functionality to a filename when using openssl dgst. This output format is to replicate the output format found in the '*sum' checksum programs. This aims to preserve backward compatibility. * Print all values for a PKCS#12 attribute with 'openssl pkcs12', not just the first value. - Update bunch of patches as the internal crypto headers got reorganized - drop openssl-1_1-CVE-2019-1551.patch (upstream) - openssl dgst: default to SHA256 only when called without a digest, OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/786956 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-1_1?expand=0&rev=65
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#include "rand_local.h"
#include "crypto/rand.h"
+#include "crypto/fips_int.h"
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#include <stdio.h>
#include "internal/dso.h"
#ifdef __linux
# include <sys/syscall.h>
+# include <sys/random.h>
# ifdef DEVRANDOM_WAIT
# include <sys/shm.h>
# include <sys/utsname.h>
@@ -344,7 +346,7 @@ static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf,
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* syscall_random(): Try to get random data using a system call
* returns the number of bytes returned in buf, or < 0 on error.
*/
-static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
+static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen, int nonblock)
{
/*
* Note: 'buflen' equals the size of the buffer which is used by the
@@ -369,6 +371,7 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf,
* Note: Sometimes getentropy() can be provided but not implemented
* internally. So we need to check errno for ENOSYS
2020-01-24 12:52:58 +01:00
*/
+# if 0
# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux)
extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
@@ -394,10 +397,10 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf,
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if (p_getentropy.p != NULL)
return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
# endif
-
+# endif
/* Linux supports this since version 3.17 */
-# if defined(__linux) && defined(__NR_getrandom)
- return syscall(__NR_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
+# if defined(__linux) && defined(SYS_getrandom)
+ return syscall(SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, nonblock?GRND_NONBLOCK:0);
# elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
return sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
# else
@@ -633,6 +636,9 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_PO
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size_t entropy_available;
# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM)
+ int in_post;
+
+ for (in_post = fips_in_post(); in_post >= 0; --in_post) {
{
size_t bytes_needed;
unsigned char *buffer;
@@ -643,7 +649,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_PO
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bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
- bytes = syscall_random(buffer, bytes_needed);
+ bytes = syscall_random(buffer, bytes_needed, in_post);
if (bytes > 0) {
rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
bytes_needed -= bytes;
@@ -678,8 +684,10 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_PO
2020-01-24 12:52:58 +01:00
int attempts = 3;
const int fd = get_random_device(i);
- if (fd == -1)
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ OPENSSL_showfatal("Random device %s cannot be opened.\n", random_device_paths[i]);
continue;
+ }
while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
@@ -742,7 +750,9 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_PO
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return entropy_available;
}
# endif
-
+# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM
+ }
+# endif
return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
# endif
}