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Accepting request 1189541 from security:tls

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OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1189541
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-1_1?expand=0&rev=61
This commit is contained in:
Dominique Leuenberger 2024-07-26 14:14:59 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
commit 5c42b46766
4 changed files with 302 additions and 0 deletions
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22
openssl-1_1.changes
View File

@ -1,3 +1,15 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Jul 22 16:42:52 UTC 2024 - Pedro Monreal <pmonreal@suse.com>
- Build with no-afalgeng [bsc#1226463]
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Jul 22 08:30:16 UTC 2024 - Pedro Monreal <pmonreal@suse.com>
- Security fix: [bsc#1227138, CVE-2024-5535]
* SSL_select_next_proto buffer overread
* Add openssl-CVE-2024-5535.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tue Jun 18 15:52:49 UTC 2024 - Martin Jambor <mjambor@suse.com>
@ -7,6 +19,16 @@ Tue Jun 18 15:52:49 UTC 2024 - Martin Jambor <mjambor@suse.com>
(missing include) to allow the package to build with GCC 14.
[boo#1225907]
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Jun 6 15:12:10 UTC 2024 - Peter Simons <psimons@suse.com>
- Apply "openssl-CVE-2024-4741.patch" to fix a use-after-free
security vulnerability. Calling the function SSL_free_buffers()
potentially caused memory to be accessed that was previously
freed in some situations and a malicious attacker could attempt
to engineer a stituation where this occurs to facilitate a
denial-of-service attack. [CVE-2024-4741, bsc#1225551]
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon May 6 12:11:02 UTC 2024 - Otto Hollmann <otto.hollmann@suse.com>

5
openssl-1_1.spec
View File

@ -196,6 +196,10 @@ Patch116: openssl-Skip_SHA1-test-in-FIPS-mode.patch
Patch117: openssl-CVE-2024-0727.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM: bsc#1222548 CVE-2024-2511: Unbounded memory growth with session handling in TLSv1.3
Patch118: openssl-CVE-2024-2511.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM bsc#1225551 CVE-2024-4741: use After Free with SSL_free_buffers
Patch119: openssl-CVE-2024-4741.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM: bsc#1227138 CVE-2024-5535: SSL_select_next_proto buffer overread
Patch120: openssl-CVE-2024-5535.patch
BuildRequires: jitterentropy-devel >= 3.4.0
BuildRequires: pkgconfig
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(zlib)
@ -285,6 +289,7 @@ export MACHINE=armv6l
./config \
no-idea \
no-afalgeng \
enable-rfc3779 \
%ifarch x86_64 aarch64 ppc64le
enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 \

41
openssl-CVE-2024-4741.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
@@ -, +, @@
---
ssl/record/methods/tls_common.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
Index: openssl-1.1.1w/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.1.1w.orig/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c 2023-09-11 14:08:11.000000000 +0000
+++ openssl-1.1.1w/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c 2024-06-12 07:58:27.817211675 +0000
@@ -179,5 +179,7 @@ int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s)
b = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
OPENSSL_free(b->buf);
b->buf = NULL;
+ s->rlayer.packet = NULL;
+ s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
return 1;
}
Index: openssl-1.1.1w/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.1.1w.orig/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c 2023-09-11 14:08:11.000000000 +0000
+++ openssl-1.1.1w/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c 2024-06-12 07:58:27.817211675 +0000
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include "record_local.h"
#include "../packet_local.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
!( defined(AESNI_ASM) && ( \
@@ -238,6 +239,12 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t
s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
/* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
}
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->rlayer.packet != NULL)) {
+ /* does not happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
pkt = rb->buf + align;

234
openssl-CVE-2024-5535.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
From 4ada436a1946cbb24db5ab4ca082b69c1bc10f37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:14:33 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix SSL_select_next_proto
Ensure that the provided client list is non-NULL and starts with a valid
entry. When called from the ALPN callback the client list should already
have been validated by OpenSSL so this should not cause a problem. When
called from the NPN callback the client list is locally configured and
will not have already been validated. Therefore SSL_select_next_proto
should not assume that it is correctly formatted.
We implement stricter checking of the client protocol list. We also do the
same for the server list while we are about it.
CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24718)
---
ssl/ssl_lib.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
Index: openssl-1.1.1w/ssl/ssl_lib.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.1.1w.orig/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ openssl-1.1.1w/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -2761,37 +2761,54 @@ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char
unsigned int server_len,
const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
{
- unsigned int i, j;
- const unsigned char *result;
- int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
+ PACKET cpkt, csubpkt, spkt, ssubpkt;
+
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt) == 0) {
+ *out = NULL;
+ *outlen = 0;
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the default opportunistic protocol. Will be overwritten if we find
+ * a match.
+ */
+ *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&csubpkt);
+ *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt);
/*
* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
*/
- for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
- for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
- if (server[i] == client[j] &&
- memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
- /* We found a match */
- result = &server[i];
- status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
- goto found;
+ if (PACKET_buf_init(&spkt, server, server_len)) {
+ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&spkt, &ssubpkt)) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) == 0)
+ continue; /* Invalid - ignore it */
+ if (PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)) {
+ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)) {
+ if (PACKET_equal(&csubpkt, PACKET_data(&ssubpkt),
+ PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt))) {
+ /* We found a match */
+ *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&ssubpkt);
+ *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt);
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the client list */
+ } else {
+ /* This should never happen */
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
}
- j += client[j];
- j++;
}
- i += server[i];
- i++;
+ /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the server list */
}
- /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
- result = client;
- status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
-
- found:
- *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
- *outlen = result[0];
- return status;
+ /*
+ * There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. We use
+ * the default opportunistic protocol selected earlier
+ */
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
Index: openssl-1.1.1w/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.1.1w.orig/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+++ openssl-1.1.1w/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
@@ -1599,7 +1599,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *p
PACKET_data(pkt),
PACKET_remaining(pkt),
s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
- SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+ SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
+ || selected_len == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
@@ -1630,6 +1631,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *
size_t chainidx)
{
size_t len;
+ PACKET confpkt, protpkt;
+ int valid = 0;
/* We must have requested it. */
if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
@@ -1650,6 +1653,30 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
+
+ /* It must be a protocol that we sent */
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&confpkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&confpkt, &protpkt)) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&protpkt) != len)
+ continue;
+ if (memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_data(&protpkt), len) == 0) {
+ /* Valid protocol found */
+ valid = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!valid) {
+ /* The protocol sent from the server does not match one we advertised */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
Index: openssl-1.1.1w/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.1.1w.orig/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
+++ openssl-1.1.1w/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ SSL_select_next_proto, SSL_get0_alpn_sel
SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos() and SSL_set_alpn_protos() are used by the client to
set the list of protocols available to be negotiated. The B<protos> must be in
protocol-list format, described below. The length of B<protos> is specified in
-B<protos_len>.
+B<protos_len>. Setting B<protos_len> to 0 clears any existing list of ALPN
+protocols and no ALPN extension will be sent to the server.
SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb() sets the application callback B<cb> used by a
server to select which protocol to use for the incoming connection. When B<cb>
@@ -73,9 +74,16 @@ B<server_len> and B<client>, B<client_le
described below. The first item in the B<server>, B<server_len> list that
matches an item in the B<client>, B<client_len> list is selected, and returned
in B<out>, B<outlen>. The B<out> value will point into either B<server> or
-B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. If no match is found, the first
-item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>. This
-function can also be used in the NPN callback.
+B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. The client list must include at
+least one valid (nonempty) protocol entry in the list.
+
+The SSL_select_next_proto() helper function can be useful from either the ALPN
+callback or the NPN callback (described below). If no match is found, the first
+item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen> and
+B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> is returned. This can be useful when implementating
+the NPN callback. In the ALPN case, the value returned in B<out> and B<outlen>
+must be ignored if B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> has been returned from
+SSL_select_next_proto().
SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called when a
client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list, and a
@@ -85,9 +93,10 @@ must be set to point to the selected pro
The length of the protocol name must be written into B<outlen>. The
server's advertised protocols are provided in B<in> and B<inlen>. The
callback can assume that B<in> is syntactically valid. The client must
-select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns
-a value other than B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK>. The B<arg> parameter is the pointer
-set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
+select a protocol (although it may be an empty, zero length protocol). It is
+fatal to the connection if this callback returns a value other than
+B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK> or if the zero length protocol is selected. The B<arg>
+parameter is the pointer set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called
when a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
@@ -149,7 +158,8 @@ A match was found and is returned in B<o
=item OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP
No match was found. The first item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in
-B<out>, B<outlen>.
+B<out>, B<outlen> (or B<NULL> and 0 in the case where the first entry in
+B<client> is invalid).
=back
Index: openssl-1.1.1w/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.1.1w.orig/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
+++ openssl-1.1.1w/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
@@ -1558,9 +1558,10 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
- return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
#endif