151 Commits

Author SHA256 Message Date
afe8736aba Accepting request 1297961 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1297961
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=45
2025-08-09 17:57:12 +00:00
97acb0832f Accepting request 1296523 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1296523
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=44
2025-07-31 15:45:52 +00:00
6046fdcaeb - Disable LTO for userspace livepatching [jsc#PED-13245]
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=151
2025-07-30 09:28:14 +00:00
66e88c4add - Use termios instead of obsolete termio
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=150
2025-07-29 08:21:34 +00:00
3b25bca574 Accepting request 1291169 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1291169
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=43
2025-07-09 15:25:32 +00:00
2ae28710e3 Accepting request 1291089 from home:lmulling:branches:security:tls
- Update to 3.5.1:
  * Fix x509 application adds trusted use instead of rejected use.
    [bsc#1243564, CVE-2025-4575]
- Remove patches:
  * openssl-Fix-P384-on-P8-targets.patch
  * openssl-CVE-2025-4575.patch
- Rebase patches:
  * openssl-Allow-disabling-of-SHA1-signatures.patch
  * openssl-FIPS-Allow-SHA1-in-seclevel-2-if-rh-allow-sha1-signatures.patch
  * openssl-FIPS-NO-DES-support.patch
- Fix a bogus warning caused by -Wfree-nonheap-object
  * Add patch openssl-Fix-Wfree-nonheap-object-warning.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1291089
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=148
2025-07-08 06:49:27 +00:00
20fff9f8c0 Accepting request 1281096 from security:tls
- Fix P-384 curve on lower-than-P9 PPC64 targets [bsc#1243014]
  * Add openssl-Fix-P384-on-P8-targets.patch [a72f753c]

- Security fix: [bsc#1243564, CVE-2025-4575]
  * Fix the x509 application adding trusted use instead of rejected use
  * Add openssl-CVE-2025-4575.patch

  * Security fixes:
    - [bsc#1243459, CVE-2025-27587] Minerva side channel vulnerability in P-384

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1281096
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=42
2025-05-30 12:20:40 +00:00
92e37434ce - Fix P-384 curve on lower-than-P9 PPC64 targets [bsc#1243014]
* Add openssl-Fix-P384-on-P8-targets.patch [a72f753c]

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=146
2025-05-29 09:27:54 +00:00
76538713a2 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=145 2025-05-28 09:26:43 +00:00
24d6d64b5c - Fixed CVE-2025-27587
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=144
2025-05-28 06:57:23 +00:00
cbc553d55a - bsc#1243564 CVE-2025-4575: Fix the x509 application adding trusted use instead of rejected use
* Add openssl-CVE-2025-4575.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=143
2025-05-27 09:21:22 +00:00
2dc845ffe5 Accepting request 1278744 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1278744
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=41
2025-05-23 12:26:45 +00:00
002501c0b8 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=141 2025-05-20 13:04:16 +00:00
5d3e6b585a Accepting request 1270033 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1270033
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=40
2025-04-29 14:39:52 +00:00
8a00581af4 - Update to 3.5.0:
* Changes:
    - Default encryption cipher for the req, cms, and smime applications
      changed from des-ede3-cbc to aes-256-cbc.
    - The default TLS supported groups list has been changed to include
      and prefer hybrid PQC KEM groups. Some practically unused groups
      were removed from the default list.
    - The default TLS keyshares have been changed to offer X25519MLKEM768
      and and X25519.
    - All BIO_meth_get_*() functions were deprecated.
  * New features:
    - Support for server side QUIC (RFC 9000)
    - Support for 3rd party QUIC stacks including 0-RTT support
    - Support for PQC algorithms (ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA)
    - A new configuration option no-tls-deprecated-ec to disable support
      for TLS groups deprecated in RFC8422
    - A new configuration option enable-fips-jitter to make the FIPS
      provider to use the JITTER seed source
    - Support for central key generation in CMP
    - Support added for opaque symmetric key objects (EVP_SKEY)
    - Support for multiple TLS keyshares and improved TLS key establishment
      group configurability
    - API support for pipelining in provided cipher algorithms
  * Remove patches:
    - openssl-3-disable-hmac-hw-acceleration-with-engine-digest.patch
    - openssl-3-support-CPACF-sha3-shake-perf-improvement.patch
    - openssl-3-add-defines-CPACF-funcs.patch
    - openssl-3-fix-memleak-s390x_HMAC_CTX_copy.patch
    - openssl-3-add-xof-state-handling-s3_absorb.patch
    - openssl-3-fix-state-handling-sha3_absorb_s390x.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=139
2025-04-16 13:02:20 +00:00
a91f523eac Accepting request 1255522 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1255522
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=39
2025-03-27 21:31:30 +00:00
fc3cc89792 Accepting request 1255099 from home:lmulling:branches:security:tls
- FIPS: Mark SHA-1 as non-approved in the SLI. [jsc#PED-12224]
  * Add openssl-FIPS-Mark-SHA1-as-nonapproved.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1255099
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=137
2025-03-24 08:13:44 +00:00
ab574f714d Accepting request 1251128 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1251128
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=38
2025-03-08 16:51:16 +00:00
d801e4b1ff - Introduce --without lto. When %{optflags} contains -flto=*, tests cases are
also built using -flto=* which significantly increases build times, this
  option disables lto which improve iteration times when developing.

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=135
2025-03-07 08:17:54 +00:00
e992b24c38 Accepting request 1245244 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1245244
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=37
2025-02-12 20:30:27 +00:00
76e0808cc2 expected. [bsc#1236599, CVE-2024-12797]
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=133
2025-02-12 07:58:33 +00:00
ef668cd7fa - Update to 3.2.4:
* Fixed RFC7250 handshakes with unauthenticated servers don't abort as
    expected. [CVE-2024-12797]
  * Fixed timing side-channel in ECDSA signature computation. [CVE-2024-13176]
  * Fixed possible OOB memory access with invalid low-level GF(2^m) elliptic
    curve parameters. [CVE-2024-9143]
- Remove patch openssl-CVE-2024-13176.patch
- Rebase patches:
  * openssl-3-add_EVP_DigestSqueeze_api.patch
  * openssl-DH-Disable-FIPS-186-4-type-parameters-in-FIPS-mode.patch
  * openssl-FIPS-RSA-encapsulate.patch
  * openssl-disable-fipsinstall.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=132
2025-02-12 07:49:34 +00:00
e1389a0ce1 Accepting request 1240110 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1240110
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=36
2025-01-25 18:09:48 +00:00
e5f6af2c44 - bsc#1236136 CVE-2024-13176: Fix timing side-channel in ECDSA signature computation
* Add patch openssl-CVE-2024-13176.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=130
2025-01-24 08:48:18 +00:00
8853ae0bcf Accepting request 1234617 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1234617
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=35
2025-01-05 14:27:00 +00:00
b062a1d507 - Add support for userspace livepatching on ppc64le (jsc#PED-11850).
- Fix evp_properties section in the openssl.cnf file [bsc#1234647]
  * Rebase patches:
    - openssl-Add-support-for-PROFILE-SYSTEM-system-default-cipher.patch
    - openssl-TESTS-Disable-default-provider-crypto-policies.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=128
2025-01-02 18:17:13 +00:00
5afc4138ca - Add support for userspace livepatching on ppc64le (jsc#PED-10952).
- Use gcc-13 for ppc64le.

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=127
2025-01-02 08:25:49 +00:00
b3fd9c08d5 Accepting request 1223748 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1223748
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=34
2024-11-13 14:26:48 +00:00
de90bec471 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=125 2024-11-12 16:03:34 +00:00
5683a46d7c OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=124 2024-11-11 09:13:41 +00:00
a17015e560 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=123 2024-11-11 07:53:58 +00:00
45b932767a Accepting request 1221596 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1221596
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=33
2024-11-06 15:49:16 +00:00
8c598ed63d - Support MSA 11 HMAC on s390x jsc#PED-10273
* Add openssl-3-disable-hmac-hw-acceleration-with-engine-digest.patch
  * Add openssl-3-fix-hmac-digest-detection-s390x.patch
  * Add openssl-3-fix-memleak-s390x_HMAC_CTX_copy.patch

- Add hardware acceleration for full AES-XTS  jsc#PED-10273
  * Add openssl-3-hw-acceleration-aes-xts-s390x.patch

- Support MSA 12 SHA3 on s390x jsc#PED-10280
  * Add openssl-3-add_EVP_DigestSqueeze_api.patch
  * Add openssl-3-support-multiple-sha3_squeeze_s390x.patch
  * Add openssl-3-add-xof-state-handling-s3_absorb.patch
  * Add openssl-3-fix-state-handling-sha3_absorb_s390x.patch
  * Add openssl-3-fix-state-handling-sha3_final_s390x.patch
  * Add openssl-3-fix-state-handling-shake_final_s390x.patch
  * Add openssl-3-fix-state-handling-keccak_final_s390x.patch
  * Add openssl-3-support-EVP_DigestSqueeze-in-digest-prov-s390x.patch
  * Add openssl-3-add-defines-CPACF-funcs.patch
  * Add openssl-3-add-hw-acceleration-hmac.patch
  * Add openssl-3-support-CPACF-sha3-shake-perf-improvement.patch
  * Add openssl-3-fix-s390x_sha3_absorb.patch
  * Add openssl-3-fix-s390x_shake_squeeze.patch

- Update to 3.2.3:
  * Changes between 3.2.2 and 3.2.3:
    - Fixed possible denial of service in X.509 name checks. [CVE-2024-6119]
    - Fixed possible buffer overread in SSL_select_next_proto(). [CVE-2024-5535]
  * Changes between 3.2.1 and 3.2.2:
    - Fixed potential use after free after SSL_free_buffers() is called. [CVE-2024-4741]
    - Fixed an issue where checking excessively long DSA keys or parameters may

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=121
2024-11-05 19:08:08 +00:00
dcc7abb986 Accepting request 1217013 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1217013
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=32
2024-10-29 13:32:23 +00:00
6e95485a74 - Update to 3.1.7:
* Major changes between OpenSSL 3.1.6 and OpenSSL 3.1.7 [3 Sep 2024]
    - Fixed possible denial of service in X.509 name checks (CVE-2024-6119)
    - Fixed possible buffer overread in SSL_select_next_proto()
      (CVE-2024-5535)
  * Major changes between OpenSSL 3.1.5 and OpenSSL 3.1.6 [4 Jun 2024]
    - Fixed potential use after free after SSL_free_buffers() is
      called (CVE-2024-4741)
    - Fixed an issue where checking excessively long DSA keys or
      parameters may be very slow (CVE-2024-4603)
    - Fixed unbounded memory growth with session handling in TLSv1.3
      (CVE-2024-2511)
  * Major changes between OpenSSL 3.1.4 and OpenSSL 3.1.5 [30 Jan 2024]
    - Fixed PKCS12 Decoding crashes (CVE-2024-0727)
    - Fixed Excessive time spent checking invalid RSA public keys
      [CVE-2023-6237)
    - Fixed POLY1305 MAC implementation corrupting vector registers
      on PowerPC CPUs which support PowerISA 2.07 (CVE-2023-6129)
    - Fix excessive time spent in DH check / generation with large
      Q parameter value (CVE-2023-5678)
  * Update openssl.keyring with BA5473A2B0587B07FB27CF2D216094DFD0CB81EF
  * Rebase patches:
    - openssl-Force-FIPS.patch
    - openssl-FIPS-embed-hmac.patch
    - openssl-FIPS-services-minimize.patch
    - openssl-FIPS-RSA-disable-shake.patch
    - openssl-CVE-2023-50782.patch
  * Remove patches fixed in the update:
    - openssl-Improve-performance-for-6x-unrolling-with-vpermxor-i.patch
    - openssl-CVE-2024-6119.patch openssl-CVE-2024-5535.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=119
2024-10-22 12:02:36 +00:00
f15b6cf3be Accepting request 1208827 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1208827
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=31
2024-10-20 08:02:58 +00:00
05037720cc * Added openssl-CVE-2024-41996.patch
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=117
2024-10-18 08:58:53 +00:00
aaffc1c436 - Security fix: [bsc#1231741, CVE-2024-9143]
* Low-level invalid GF(2^m) parameters lead to OOB memory access
  * Add openssl-CVE-2024-9143.patch

- Security fix: [bsc#1220262, CVE-2023-50782]
  * Implicit rejection in PKCS#1 v1.5
  * Add openssl-CVE-2023-50782.patch

  * Validating the order of the public keys in the Diffie-Hellman
    Key Agreement Protocol, when an approved safe prime is used.
  * Added openssl-3-CVE-2024-41996.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=116
2024-10-18 08:55:02 +00:00
0ed017ed4c Accepting request 1202944 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1202944
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=30
2024-09-25 19:51:14 +00:00
e20eeb46a1 - Security fix: [bsc#1230698, CVE-2024-41996]
* Validating the order of the public keys in the Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol, when an approved safe prime is used
  * Added openssl-CVE-2024-41996.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=114
2024-09-24 12:22:05 +00:00
625347398c Accepting request 1198659 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1198659
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=29
2024-09-05 13:45:58 +00:00
b76e72dd67 - Security fix: [bsc#1229465, CVE-2024-6119]
* possible denial of service in X.509 name checks
  * openssl-CVE-2024-6119.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=112
2024-09-04 08:01:42 +00:00
544f685d38 Accepting request 1192379 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1192379
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=28
2024-08-14 12:14:36 +00:00
6bc57d937f - FIPS: Deny SHA-1 signature verification in FIPS provider [bsc#1221365]
* SHA-1 is not allowed anymore in FIPS 186-5 for signature
    verification operations. After 12/31/2030, NIST will disallow
    SHA-1 for all of its usages.
  * Add openssl-3-FIPS-Deny-SHA-1-sigver-in-FIPS-provider.patch

- FIPS: RSA keygen PCT requirements.
  * Skip the rsa_keygen_pairwise_test() PCT in rsa_keygen() as the
    self-test requirements are covered by do_rsa_pct() for both
    RSA-OAEP and RSA signatures [bsc#1221760]
  * Enforce error state if rsa_keygen PCT is run and fails [bsc#1221753]
  * Add openssl-3-FIPS-PCT_rsa_keygen.patch

- FIPS: Check that the fips provider is available before setting
  it as the default provider in FIPS mode. [bsc#1220523]
  * Rebase openssl-Force-FIPS.patch

- FIPS: Port openssl to use jitterentropy [bsc#1220523]
  * Set the module in error state if the jitter RNG fails either on
    initialization or entropy gathering because health tests failed.
  * Add jitterentropy as a seeding source output also in crypto/info.c
  * Move the jitter entropy collector and the associated lock out
    of the header file to avoid redefinitions.
  * Add the fips_local.cnf symlink to the spec file. This simlink
    points to the openssl_fips.config file that is provided by the
    crypto-policies package.
  * Rebase openssl-3-jitterentropy-3.4.0.patch
  * Rebase openssl-FIPS-enforce-EMS-support.patch

- FIPS: Block non-Approved Elliptic Curves [bsc#1221786]

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=110
2024-08-07 21:54:42 +00:00
0101050f9d Accepting request 1189313 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1189313
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=27
2024-07-26 14:12:26 +00:00
078276e0f4 Accepting request 1189310 from home:pmonrealgonzalez:branches:security:tls
- Build with no-afalgeng [bsc#1226463]

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1189310
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=108
2024-07-24 06:29:07 +00:00
4bad59c768 Accepting request 1189030 from home:pmonrealgonzalez:branches:security:tls
- Apply "openssl-CVE-2024-4741.patch" to fix a use-after-free
  security vulnerability. Calling the function SSL_free_buffers()
  potentially caused memory to be accessed that was previously
  freed in some situations and a malicious attacker could attempt
  to engineer a stituation where this occurs to facilitate a
  denial-of-service attack. [CVE-2024-4741, bsc#1225551]

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1189030
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=107
2024-07-22 13:04:55 +00:00
aa970d108e Accepting request 1188975 from home:pmonrealgonzalez:branches:security:tls
- Security fix: [bsc#1227138, CVE-2024-5535]
  * SSL_select_next_proto buffer overread
  * Add openssl-CVE-2024-5535.patch

- Build with enabled sm2 and sm4 support [bsc#1222899]

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1188975
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=106
2024-07-22 09:57:50 +00:00
2d6b81ba83 Accepting request 1187470 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1187470
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=26
2024-07-16 20:02:07 +00:00
8889b85855 Add reproducible.patch to fix bsc#1223336
aes-gcm-avx512.pl: fix non-reproducibility issue

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=104
2024-07-15 06:38:50 +00:00
3597e0200f Accepting request 1178897 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1178897
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=25
2024-06-07 13:01:41 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
894b22b184 Accepting request 1178810 from home:mwilck:branches:security:tls
- Fix HDKF key derivation (bsc#1225291, gh#openssl/openssl#23448,
  gh#openssl/openssl#23456)
  * Add openssl-Fix-EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info-behavior.patch
  * Add openssl-Handle-empty-param-in-EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1178810
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=102
2024-06-06 06:49:30 +00:00
82987bb3e6 Accepting request 1175444 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1175444
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=24
2024-05-23 13:34:05 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
d526b57c70 Accepting request 1175345 from home:ohollmann:branches:security:tls
- Security fix: [bsc#1224388, CVE-2024-4603]
  * Check DSA parameters for excessive sizes before validating
  * Add openssl-CVE-2024-4603.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1175345
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=100
2024-05-21 07:20:01 +00:00
9076d418a2 Accepting request 1172941 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1172941
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=23
2024-05-11 16:18:55 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
6ed66302c1 Accepting request 1172786 from home:gbelinassi:branches:security:tls
- Enable livepatching support (bsc#1223428)

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1172786
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=98
2024-05-09 13:24:04 +00:00
a1a6f75253 Accepting request 1172431 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1172431
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=22
2024-05-09 10:07:13 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
b5e1eac45b Accepting request 1172425 from home:ohollmann:branches:security:tls
- Add ktls capability [bsc#1216950]
  Already added in January, but not mentioned in this changelog.

- Security fix: [bsc#1222548, CVE-2024-2511]
  * Fix unconstrained session cache growth in TLSv1.3
  * Add openssl-CVE-2024-2511.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1172425
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=96
2024-05-07 12:41:18 +00:00
d42e251a7a Accepting request 1153155 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1153155
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=21
2024-03-01 22:33:54 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
dd8f6feed8 Accepting request 1149993 from home:pmonrealgonzalez:branches:security:tls
- Build the 32bit flavor of libopenssl-3-fips-provider [bsc#1220232]
  * Update baselibs.conf

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1149993
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=94
2024-02-29 10:11:22 +00:00
5ddfcb3ad7 Accepting request 1144625 from security:tls
- Add migration script to move old files (bsc#1219562)
  /etc/ssl/engines.d/* -> /etc/ssl/engines1.1.d.rpmsave
  /etc/ssl/engdef.d/* -> /etc/ssl/engdef1.1.d.rpmsave
  They will be later restored by openssl-1_1 package
  to engines1.1.d and engdef1.1.d

- Security fix: [bsc#1219243, CVE-2024-0727]
  * Add NULL checks where ContentInfo data can be NULL
  * Add openssl-CVE-2024-0727.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1144625
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=20
2024-02-08 18:01:58 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
2376921425 Accepting request 1144624 from home:ohollmann:branches:security:tls
/etc/ssl/engines.d/* -> /etc/ssl/engines1.1.d.rpmsave
  /etc/ssl/engdef.d/* -> /etc/ssl/engdef1.1.d.rpmsave
  They will be later restored by openssl-1_1 package
  to engines1.1.d and engdef1.1.d

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1144624
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=92
2024-02-06 14:05:56 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
1708d586dc Accepting request 1144347 from home:ohollmann:branches:security:tls
- Add migration script to move old files (bsc#1219562)
  /etc/ssl/engines.d/* -> /etc/ssl/engines1.1.d
  /etc/ssl/engdef.d/* -> /etc/ssl/engdef1.1.d

- Security fix: [bsc#1219243, CVE-2024-0727]
  * Add NULL checks where ContentInfo data can be NULL
  * Add openssl-CVE-2024-0727.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1144347
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=91
2024-02-06 12:39:08 +00:00
f329bbc5a1 Accepting request 1142584 from security:tls
- Encapsulate the fips provider into a new package called
  libopenssl-3-fips-provider.

- Added openssl-3-use-include-directive.patch so that the default
  /etc/ssl/openssl.cnf file will include any configuration files that
  other packages might place into /etc/ssl/engines3.d/ and
  /etc/ssl/engdef3.d/. Also create symbolic links /etc/ssl/engines.d/
  and /etc/ssl/engdef.d/ to above versioned directories.
- Updated spec file to create the two new necessary directores for
  the above patch and two symbolic links to above directories.
  [bsc#1194187, bsc#1207472, bsc#1218933]

- Security fix: [bsc#1218810, CVE-2023-6237]
  * Limit the execution time of RSA public key check
  * Add openssl-CVE-2023-6237.patch

- Rename openssl-Override-default-paths-for-the-CA-directory-tree.patch
  to openssl-crypto-policies-support.patch

- Embed the FIPS hmac. Add openssl-FIPS-embed-hmac.patch

- Load the FIPS provider and set FIPS properties implicitly.
  * Add openssl-Force-FIPS.patch [bsc#1217934]
- Disable the fipsinstall command-line utility.
  * Add openssl-disable-fipsinstall.patch
- Add instructions to load legacy provider in openssl.cnf.
  * openssl-load-legacy-provider.patch
- Disable the default provider for the test suite.
  * openssl-Disable-default-provider-for-test-suite.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1142584
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=19
2024-01-30 17:25:01 +00:00
215566de79 Accepting request 1142575 from home:pmonrealgonzalez:branches:security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1142575
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=89
2024-01-29 15:53:58 +00:00
be2dc0eb62 Accepting request 1141236 from home:ohollmann:branches:security:tls
- Added openssl-3-use-include-directive.patch so that the default
  /etc/ssl/openssl.cnf file will include any configuration files that
  other packages might place into /etc/ssl/engines3.d/ and
  /etc/ssl/engdef3.d/. Also create symbolic links /etc/ssl/engines.d/
  and /etc/ssl/engdef.d/ to above versioned directories.
- Updated spec file to create the two new necessary directores for
  the above patch and two symbolic links to above directories.
  [bsc#1194187, bsc#1207472, bsc#1218933]

- Replace our reverted commit with an upstream version
  * rename openssl-Revert-Makefile-Call-mknum.pl-on-make-ordinals-only-if.patch
  to openssl-Remove-the-source-directory-.num-targets.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1141236
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=88
2024-01-24 12:36:32 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
53a0a66cd9 to openssl-crypto-policies-support.patch
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=87
2024-01-18 16:19:01 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
376f963558 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=86 2024-01-18 16:11:44 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
7957f2e845 Accepting request 1139750 from security:tls:unstable
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1139750
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=85
2024-01-18 15:17:04 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
dd8139948c Accepting request 1139148 from home:ohollmann:branches:security:tls
- Security fix: [bsc#1218810, CVE-2023-6237]
  * Limit the execution time of RSA public key check
  * Add openssl-CVE-2023-6237.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1139148
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=84
2024-01-16 11:34:56 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
818a99a4d6 Accepting request 1138127 from home:ohollmann:branches:security:tls
- Security fix: [bsc#1218690, CVE-2023-6129]
  * POLY1305: Fix vector register clobbering on PowerPC
  * Add openssl-CVE-2023-6129.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1138127
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=83
2024-01-11 13:07:56 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
9825851069 Accepting request 1131607 from home:Guillaume_G:PAC_BTI
- Add patch to fix BTI enablement on aarch64:
  * openssl-Enable-BTI-feature-for-md5-on-aarch64.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1131607
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=82
2023-12-08 07:15:05 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
b29904586e Accepting request 1130970 from home:ohollmann:branches:security:tls
- Add openssl-Fix_test_symbol_presence.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1130970
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=81
2023-12-05 11:55:06 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
259f0441ec Accepting request 1129505 from home:ohollmann:branches:security:tls
- Update to 3.2.0:
  * The BLAKE2b hash algorithm supports a configurable output length
    by setting the "size" parameter.
  * Enable extra Arm64 optimization on Windows for GHASH, RAND and
    AES.
  * Added a function to delete objects from store by URI -
    OSSL_STORE_delete() and the corresponding provider-storemgmt API
    function OSSL_FUNC_store_delete().
  * Added OSSL_FUNC_store_open_ex() provider-storemgmt API function to
    pass a passphrase callback when opening a store.
  * Changed the default salt length used by PBES2 KDF's (PBKDF2 and
    scrypt) from 8 bytes to 16 bytes. The PKCS5 (RFC 8018) standard
    uses a 64 bit salt length for PBE, and recommends a minimum of 64
    bits for PBES2. For FIPS compliance PBKDF2 requires a salt length
    of 128 bits. This affects OpenSSL command line applications such
    as "genrsa" and "pkcs8" and API's such as
    PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey() that are reliant on the default value.
    The additional commandline option 'saltlen' has been added to the
    OpenSSL command line applications for "pkcs8" and "enc" to allow
    the salt length to be set to a non default value.
  * Changed the default value of the ess_cert_id_alg configuration
    option which is used to calculate the TSA's public key
    certificate identifier. The default algorithm is updated to be
    sha256 instead of sha1.
  * Added optimization for SM2 algorithm on aarch64. It uses a huge
    precomputed table for point multiplication of the base point,
    which increases the size of libcrypto from 4.4 MB to 4.9 MB. A
    new configure option no-sm2-precomp has been added to disable the
    precomputed table.
  * Added client side support for QUIC

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1129505
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=80
2023-11-28 11:04:23 +00:00
1bae1185e6 Accepting request 1126784 from security:tls
- Security fix: [bsc#1216922, CVE-2023-5678]
  * Fix excessive time spent in DH check / generation with large Q
    parameter value.
  * Applications that use the functions DH_generate_key() to generate
    an X9.42 DH key may experience long delays. Likewise,
    applications that use DH_check_pub_key(), DH_check_pub_key_ex
    () or EVP_PKEY_public_check() to check an X9.42 DH key or X9.42
    DH parameters may experience long delays. Where the key or
    parameters that are being checked have been obtained from an
    untrusted source this may lead to a Denial of Service.
  * Add openssl-CVE-2023-5678.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1126784
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=18
2023-11-17 19:47:55 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
737365e2ce Accepting request 1126089 from home:ohollmann:branches:security:tls
- Security fix: [bsc#1216922, CVE-2023-5678]
  * Fix excessive time spent in DH check / generation with large Q
    parameter value.
  * Applications that use the functions DH_generate_key() to generate
    an X9.42 DH key may experience long delays. Likewise,
    applications that use DH_check_pub_key(), DH_check_pub_key_ex
    () or EVP_PKEY_public_check() to check an X9.42 DH key or X9.42
    DH parameters may experience long delays. Where the key or
    parameters that are being checked have been obtained from an
    untrusted source this may lead to a Denial of Service.
  * Add openssl-CVE-2023-5678.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1126089
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=78
2023-11-15 09:54:25 +00:00
6c66e1ec52 Accepting request 1120189 from security:tls
- Update to 3.1.4:
  * Fix incorrect key and IV resizing issues when calling
    EVP_EncryptInit_ex2(), EVP_DecryptInit_ex2() or EVP_CipherInit_ex2()
    with OSSL_PARAM parameters that alter the key or IV length
    [bsc#1216163, CVE-2023-5363].

- Performance enhancements for cryptography from OpenSSL 3.2
  [jsc#PED-5086, jsc#PED-3514]
  * Add patches:
    - openssl-ec-Use-static-linkage-on-nistp521-felem_-square-mul-.patch
    - openssl-ec-56-bit-Limb-Solinas-Strategy-for-secp384r1.patch
    - openssl-ec-powerpc64le-Add-asm-implementation-of-felem_-squa.patch
    - openssl-ecc-Remove-extraneous-parentheses-in-secp384r1.patch
    - openssl-powerpc-ecc-Fix-stack-allocation-secp384r1-asm.patch
    - openssl-Improve-performance-for-6x-unrolling-with-vpermxor-i.patch

- FIPS: Add the FIPS_mode() compatibility macro and flag support.
  * Add patches:
    - openssl-Add-FIPS_mode-compatibility-macro.patch
    - openssl-Add-Kernel-FIPS-mode-flag-support.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1120189
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=17
2023-10-27 20:27:00 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
69a932c2a0 Accepting request 1120051 from security:tls:unstable
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1120051
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=76
2023-10-24 16:01:48 +00:00
75ca6a87ba Accepting request 1118892 from security:tls
Automatic submission by obs-autosubmit

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1118892
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=16
2023-10-20 21:17:16 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
6fa380a834 Accepting request 1117440 from home:jengelh:man
spin large manpage set off to -doc package

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1117440
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=74
2023-10-19 09:40:34 +00:00
4500e3f99f Accepting request 1113690 from security:tls
Automatic submission by obs-autosubmit

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1113690
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=15
2023-09-29 19:12:21 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
dff8b6b524 Accepting request 1112471 from home:ohollmann:branches:security:tls
- Update to 3.1.3:
  * Fix POLY1305 MAC implementation corrupting XMM registers on
    Windows (CVE-2023-4807)

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1112471
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=72
2023-09-20 07:23:48 +00:00
26aeca1040 Accepting request 1101934 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1101934
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=14
2023-08-04 13:02:42 +00:00
ae873c4025 Accepting request 1101930 from home:pmonrealgonzalez:branches:security:tls
- Update to 3.1.2:
  * Fix excessive time spent checking DH q parameter value
    (bsc#1213853, CVE-2023-3817). The function DH_check() performs
    various checks on DH parameters. After fixing CVE-2023-3446 it
    was discovered that a large q parameter value can also trigger
    an overly long computation during some of these checks. A
    correct q value, if present, cannot be larger than the modulus
    p parameter, thus it is unnecessary to perform these checks if
    q is larger than p. If DH_check() is called with such q parameter
    value, DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE return flag is set and the
    computationally intensive checks are skipped.
  * Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus
    (bsc#1213487, CVE-2023-3446). The function DH_check() performs
    various checks on DH parameters. One of those checks confirms
    that the modulus ("p" parameter) is not too large. Trying to use
    a very large modulus is slow and OpenSSL will not normally use
    a modulus which is over 10,000 bits in length. However the
    DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or
    parameters that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the
    supplied modulus value even if it has already been found to be
    too large. A new limit has been added to DH_check of 32,768 bits.
    Supplying a key/parameters with a modulus over this size will
    simply cause DH_check() to fail.
  * Do not ignore empty associated data entries with AES-SIV
    (bsc#1213383, CVE-2023-2975). The AES-SIV algorithm allows for
    authentication of multiple associated data entries along with the
    encryption. To authenticate empty data the application has to call
    EVP_EncryptUpdate() (or EVP_CipherUpdate()) with NULL pointer as
    the output buffer and 0 as the input buffer length. The AES-SIV
    implementation in OpenSSL just returns success for such call

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1101930
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=70
2023-08-02 10:04:19 +00:00
a9ef9b6a79 Accepting request 1099669 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1099669
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=13
2023-07-24 16:11:36 +00:00
79c28ad03b Accepting request 1099662 from home:pmonrealgonzalez:branches:security:tls
- Security fix: [bsc#1213487, CVE-2023-3446]
  * Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus.
  * The function DH_check() performs various checks on DH parameters.
    One of those checks confirms that the modulus ("p" parameter) is
    not too large. Trying to use a very large modulus is slow and
    OpenSSL will not normally use a modulus which is over 10,000 bits
    in length.
    However the DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the
    key or parameters that have been supplied. Some of those checks
    use the supplied modulus value even if it has already been found
    to be too large.
    A new limit has been added to DH_check of 32,768 bits. Supplying
    a key/parameters with a modulus over this size will simply cause
    DH_check() to fail.
  * Add openssl-CVE-2023-3446.patch openssl-CVE-2023-3446-test.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1099662
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=68
2023-07-20 08:41:29 +00:00
0ed0686753 Accepting request 1099214 from home:pmonrealgonzalez:branches:security:tls
- Security fix: [bsc#1213383, CVE-2023-2975]
  * AES-SIV implementation ignores empty associated data entries
  * Add openssl-CVE-2023-2975.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1099214
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=67
2023-07-18 09:07:15 +00:00
a48883733f Accepting request 1095607 from security:tls
- Improve cross-package provides/conflicts [boo#1210313]
  * Add Provides/Conflicts: ssl-devel
  * Remove explicit conflicts with other devel-libraries
  * Remove Provides: openssl(cli) - it's managed by meta package

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1095607
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=12
2023-06-29 15:27:49 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
b496b916bd - Improve cross-package provides/conflicts [boo#1210313]
* Add Provides/Conflicts: ssl-devel
  * Remove explicit conflicts with other devel-libraries
  * Remove Provides: openssl(cli) - it's managed by meta package

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=65
2023-06-21 13:05:11 +00:00
ad1bcf2871 Accepting request 1089933 from security:tls
- Update to 3.1.1:
  * Restrict the size of OBJECT IDENTIFIERs that OBJ_obj2txt will translate
    (CVE-2023-2650, bsc#1211430)
  * Multiple algorithm implementation fixes for ARM BE platforms.
  * Added a -pedantic option to fipsinstall that adjusts the various settings
    to ensure strict FIPS compliance rather than backwards compatibility.
  * Fixed buffer overread in AES-XTS decryption on ARM 64 bit platforms which
    happens if the buffer size is 4 mod 5 in 16 byte AES blocks. This can
    trigger a crash of an application using AES-XTS decryption if the memory
    just after the buffer being decrypted is not mapped. Thanks to Anton
    Romanov (Amazon) for discovering the issue. (CVE-2023-1255, bsc#1210714)
  * Add FIPS provider configuration option to disallow the use of truncated
    digests with Hash and HMAC DRBGs (q.v. FIPS 140-3 IG D.R.). The
    option '-no_drbg_truncated_digests' can optionally be supplied
    to 'openssl fipsinstall'.
  * Corrected documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() to mention that
    it does not enable policy checking. Thanks to David Benjamin for
    discovering this issue. (CVE-2023-0466, bsc#1209873)
  * Fixed an issue where invalid certificate policies in leaf certificates are
    silently ignored by OpenSSL and other certificate policy checks are
    skipped for that certificate. A malicious CA could use this to
    deliberately assert invalid certificate policies in order to circumvent
    policy checking on the certificate altogether. (CVE-2023-0465, bsc#1209878)
  * Limited the number of nodes created in a policy tree to mitigate against
    CVE-2023-0464. The default limit is set to 1000 nodes, which should be
    sufficient for most installations. If required, the limit can be adjusted
    by setting the OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX build time define to a
    desired maximum number of nodes or zero to allow unlimited growth.
    (CVE-2023-0464, bsc#1209624)
  * Update openssl.keyring with key

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1089933
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=11
2023-06-01 15:18:42 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
e5f5639ff0 Accepting request 1089931 from security:tls:unstable
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1089931
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=63
2023-05-31 07:04:29 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
a451b8be27 Accepting request 1089847 from security:tls:unstable
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1089847
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=62
2023-05-30 16:00:51 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
0ddca788f5 Accepting request 1075338 from home:ohollmann:branches:security:tls
- Security Fix: [CVE-2023-0465, bsc#1209878]
  * Invalid certificate policies in leaf certificates are silently ignored
  * Add openssl-CVE-2023-0465.patch
- Security Fix: [CVE-2023-0466, bsc#1209873]
  * Certificate policy check not enabled
  * Add openssl-CVE-2023-0466.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1075338
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=61
2023-03-29 19:28:53 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
835b3ad63f Accepting request 1075073 from security:tls:unstable
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1075073
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=60
2023-03-29 07:57:50 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
e4ef647823 Accepting request 1074731 from home:ohollmann:branches:security:tls
- Fix compiler error "initializer element is not constant" on s390
  * Add openssl-z16-s390x.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1074731
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=59
2023-03-27 15:13:59 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
bcd1eb4d85 Accepting request 1074653 from home:ohollmann:branches:security:tls
- Security Fix: [CVE-2023-0464, bsc#1209624]
  * Excessive Resource Usage Verifying X.509 Policy Constraints
  * Add openssl-CVE-2023-0464.patch

- Pass over with spec-cleaner

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1074653
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=58
2023-03-27 11:56:02 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
b14bb06ffe Accepting request 1071820 from security:tls:unstable
- Update to 3.1.0:
  * Add FIPS provider configuration option to enforce the Extended Master
    Secret (EMS) check during the TLS1_PRF KDF. The option '-ems-check' can
    optionally be supplied to 'openssl fipsinstall'.
  * The FIPS provider includes a few non-approved algorithms for backward
    compatibility purposes and the "fips=yes" property query must be used for
    all algorithm fetches to ensure FIPS compliance. The algorithms that are
    included but not approved are Triple DES ECB, Triple DES CBC and EdDSA.
  * Added support for KMAC in KBKDF.
  * RNDR and RNDRRS support in provider functions to provide random number
    generation for Arm CPUs (aarch64).
  * s_client and s_server apps now explicitly say when the TLS version does not
    include the renegotiation mechanism. This avoids confusion between that
    scenario versus when the TLS version includes secure renegotiation but the
    peer lacks support for it.
  * AES-GCM enabled with AVX512 vAES and vPCLMULQDQ.
  * The various OBJ_* functions have been made thread safe.
  * Parallel dual-prime 1536/2048-bit modular exponentiation for AVX512_IFMA
    capable processors.
  * The functions OPENSSL_LH_stats, OPENSSL_LH_node_stats,
    OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats, OPENSSL_LH_stats_bio,
    OPENSSL_LH_node_stats_bio and OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats_bio are now
    marked deprecated from OpenSSL 3.1 onwards and can be disabled by defining
    OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_1. The macro DEFINE_LHASH_OF is now deprecated in
    favour of the macro DEFINE_LHASH_OF_EX, which omits the corresponding
    type-specific function definitions for these functions regardless of
    whether OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_1 is defined. Users of DEFINE_LHASH_OF may
    start receiving deprecation warnings for these functions regardless of
    whether they are using them. It is recommended that users transition to the
    new macro, DEFINE_LHASH_OF_EX.

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1071820
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=57
2023-03-14 16:01:30 +00:00
7fbc471cd4 Accepting request 1070585 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1070585
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=10
2023-03-12 15:22:18 +00:00
Otto Hollmann
56c4e29a8b Accepting request 1070146 from home:pluskalm:branches:security:tls
- Build AVX2 enabled hwcaps library for x86_64-v3

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1070146
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=55
2023-03-10 05:38:15 +00:00
f22f0fb79f Accepting request 1063740 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1063740
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=9
2023-02-20 16:45:03 +00:00
Martin Pluskal
0620c0c33d Accepting request 1063662 from home:ohollmann:branches:security:tls
- Update to 3.0.8:
  * Fixed NULL dereference during PKCS7 data verification.
    A NULL pointer can be dereferenced when signatures are being
    verified on PKCS7 signed or signedAndEnveloped data. In case the hash
    algorithm used for the signature is known to the OpenSSL library but
    the implementation of the hash algorithm is not available the digest
    initialization will fail. There is a missing check for the return
    value from the initialization function which later leads to invalid
    usage of the digest API most likely leading to a crash.
    ([bsc#1207541, CVE-2023-0401])
    PKCS7 data is processed by the SMIME library calls and also by the
    time stamp (TS) library calls. The TLS implementation in OpenSSL does
    not call these functions however third party applications would be
    affected if they call these functions to verify signatures on untrusted
    data.
  * Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName.
    There is a type confusion vulnerability relating to X.400 address processing
    inside an X.509 GeneralName. X.400 addresses were parsed as an ASN1_STRING
    but the public structure definition for GENERAL_NAME incorrectly specified
    the type of the x400Address field as ASN1_TYPE. This field is subsequently
    interpreted by the OpenSSL function GENERAL_NAME_cmp as an ASN1_TYPE rather
    than an ASN1_STRING.
    When CRL checking is enabled (i.e. the application sets the
    X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK flag), this vulnerability may allow an attacker to
    pass arbitrary pointers to a memcmp call, enabling them to read memory
    contents or enact a denial of service.
    ([bsc#1207533, CVE-2023-0286])
  * Fixed NULL dereference validating DSA public key.
    An invalid pointer dereference on read can be triggered when an
    application tries to check a malformed DSA public key by the

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1063662
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=53
2023-02-08 08:07:42 +00:00
8042c39fa8 Accepting request 1062224 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1062224
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=8
2023-02-02 17:08:02 +00:00
9250deebcd Accepting request 1062222 from security:tls:unstable
- Relax the crypto-policies requirements for the regression tests

- Set OpenSSL 3.0.7 as the default openssl [bsc#1205042]
  * Rename openssl-1.1.0-no-html.patch to openssl-no-html-docs.patch
  * Rebase openssl-Add-support-for-PROFILE-SYSTEM-system-default-cipher.patch
  * Package a copy of the original default config file called
    openssl.cnf and name it as openssl-orig.cnf and warn the user
    if the files differ.
  * Add openssl-3-devel as conflicting with libopenssl-1_1-devel
  * Remove patches:
    - fix-config-in-tests.patch
    - openssl-use-versioned-config.patch

- Create the openssl ca-certificates directory in case the
  ca-certificates package is not installed. This directory is
  required by the nodejs regression tests. [bsc#1207484]

- Compute the hmac files for FIPS 140-3 integrity checking of the
  openssl shared libraries using the brp-50-generate-fips-hmac
  script. Also computed for the 32bit package.

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1062222
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=51
2023-01-31 12:15:10 +00:00
2eb8c9a8d3 Accepting request 1042989 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1042989
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=7
2022-12-16 16:50:53 +00:00
0028006287 Accepting request 1042985 from home:ohollmann:branches:security:tls
- Fix X.509 Policy Constraints Double Locking [bsc#1206374, CVE-2022-3996]
  * Add patch: openssl-3-Fix-double-locking-problem.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1042985
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=49
2022-12-14 20:21:17 +00:00
984a274482 Accepting request 1032748 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1032748
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=6
2022-11-03 18:13:01 +00:00
c7c7fd87d3 Accepting request 1032747 from home:ohollmann:branches:security:tls
- Temporary disable tests test_ssl_new and test_sslapi because they are
  failing in openSUSE_Tumbleweed

- Update to 3.0.7: [bsc#1204714, CVE-2022-3602,CVE-2022-3786]
  * Fixed two buffer overflows in punycode decoding functions.
    A buffer overrun can be triggered in X.509 certificate verification,
    specifically in name constraint checking. Note that this occurs after
    certificate chain signature verification and requires either a CA to
    have signed the malicious certificate or for the application to continue
    certificate verification despite failure to construct a path to a trusted
    issuer.
    In a TLS client, this can be triggered by connecting to a malicious
    server.  In a TLS server, this can be triggered if the server requests
    client authentication and a malicious client connects.
    An attacker can craft a malicious email address to overflow
    an arbitrary number of bytes containing the `.`  character (decimal 46)
    on the stack.  This buffer overflow could result in a crash (causing a
    denial of service).
    ([CVE-2022-3786])
    An attacker can craft a malicious email address to overflow four
    attacker-controlled bytes on the stack.  This buffer overflow could
    result in a crash (causing a denial of service) or potentially remote code
    execution depending on stack layout for any given platform/compiler.
    ([CVE-2022-3602])
  * Removed all references to invalid OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA names for CRT
    parameters in OpenSSL code.
    Applications should not use the names OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR,
    OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT and OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_COEFFICIENT.
    Use the numbered names such as OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1 instead.
    Using these invalid names may cause algorithms to use slower methods

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1032747
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=47
2022-11-01 20:31:17 +00:00
5c0b2f75a9 Accepting request 1003956 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1003956
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=5
2022-09-15 21:00:15 +00:00
2e9643fcf8 Accepting request 1003954 from home:pmonrealgonzalez:branches:security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1003954
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=45
2022-09-15 18:27:20 +00:00
07571e5415 Accepting request 1003620 from home:dziobian
- Do not make libopenssl3-32bit obsolete libopenssl1_1-32bit.
  They are independent libraries and can be installed simultaneously.

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1003620
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=44
2022-09-15 18:24:37 +00:00
249602c696 Accepting request 990536 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/990536
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=4
2022-07-22 17:20:36 +00:00
9bc98986ac Accepting request 990534 from security:tls:unstable
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/990534
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=42
2022-07-21 11:29:20 +00:00
896b1d2d57 Accepting request 964296 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/964296
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=3
2022-03-23 19:19:11 +00:00
455c14e4eb Accepting request 963758 from home:pmonrealgonzalez:branches:security:tls
- Enable zlib compression support [bsc#1195149]

- Add crypto-policies support.
  * Fix some tests that couldn't find the openssl3.cnf location
  * Rebase patch:
    openssl-Add-support-for-PROFILE-SYSTEM-system-default-cipher.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/963758
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=40
2022-03-23 12:54:06 +00:00
7eec039543 Accepting request 962004 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/962004
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=2
2022-03-16 19:20:36 +00:00
2f2f23d69b Accepting request 962003 from home:pmonrealgonzalez:branches:security:tls
- Update to 3.0.2: [bsc#1196877, CVE-2022-0778]
  * Security fix [CVE-2022-0778]: Infinite loop for non-prime moduli
    in BN_mod_sqrt() reachable when parsing certificates.
  * Add ciphersuites based on DHE_PSK (RFC 4279) and ECDHE_PSK
    (RFC 5489) to the list of ciphersuites providing Perfect Forward
    Secrecy as required by SECLEVEL >= 3.
  * Made the AES constant time code for no-asm configurations
    optional due to the resulting 95% performance degradation.
    The AES constant time code can be enabled, for no assembly
    builds, with: ./config no-asm -DOPENSSL_AES_CONST_TIME
  * Fixed PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey() to make it possible to
    use empty passphrase strings.
  * The negative return value handling of the certificate
    verification callback was reverted. The replacement is to set
    the verification retry state with the SSL_set_retry_verify()
    function.
  * Rebase openssl-use-versioned-config.patch

- Keep CA_default and tsa_config1 default paths in openssl3.cnf
- Rebase patches:
  * openssl-Override-default-paths-for-the-CA-directory-tree.patch
  * openssl-use-versioned-config.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/962003
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=38
2022-03-15 19:28:22 +00:00
82eca4c62a Accepting request 950776 from security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/950776
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=1
2022-02-02 21:40:04 +00:00
718b16a5a2 Accepting request 950770 from home:dspinella:branches:security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/950770
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=36
2022-02-02 15:43:26 +00:00
cc146bda3a Accepting request 950769 from home:dspinella:branches:security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/950769
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=35
2022-02-02 15:34:23 +00:00
3453bdccd1 Accepting request 950451 from home:dspinella:branches:security:tls
- Fix conflict with openssl and libressl

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/950451
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=34
2022-02-01 15:09:19 +00:00
c3d5c867a1 Accepting request 949760 from security:tls:unstable
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/949760
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=33
2022-01-28 19:30:29 +00:00
0a6677bc99 Accepting request 947645 from security:tls:unstable
- Update to 3.0.1: [bsc#1193740, CVE-2021-4044]

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/947645
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=32
2022-01-20 12:28:06 +00:00
38921057de Accepting request 946113 from security:tls:unstable
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/946113
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=31
2022-01-13 17:50:59 +00:00
68b1d788c0 Accepting request 917522 from security:tls:unstable
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/917522
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=30
2021-09-08 09:17:59 +00:00
278e4a3148 Accepting request 909235 from security:tls:unstable
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/909235
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=29
2021-07-29 18:29:14 +00:00
dac9bbe2ba Accepting request 908852 from security:tls:unstable
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/908852
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=28
2021-07-28 10:42:52 +00:00
687459c580 Accepting request 906781 from security:tls:unstable
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/906781
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=27
2021-07-17 09:30:23 +00:00
Jason Sikes
2830ba6131 Accepting request 893363 from security:tls:unstable
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/893363
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=24
2021-05-17 22:28:37 +00:00
Jason Sikes
fc84692df0 Accepting request 873726 from security:tls:unstable
- Update to 3.0.0 Alpha 12
  * The SRP APIs have been deprecated. The old APIs do not work via
    providers, and there is no EVP interface to them. Unfortunately
    there is no replacement for these APIs at this time.
  * Add a compile time option to prevent the caching of provider
    fetched algorithms. This is enabled by including the
    no-cached-fetch option at configuration time.
  * Combining the Configure options no-ec and no-dh no longer
    disables TLSv1.3. Typically if OpenSSL has no EC or DH algorithms
    then it cannot support connections with TLSv1.3. However OpenSSL
    now supports "pluggable" groups through providers.
  * The undocumented function X509_certificate_type() has been
    deprecated; applications can use X509_get0_pubkey() and
    X509_get0_signature() to get the same information.
  * Deprecated the obsolete BN_pseudo_rand() and BN_pseudo_rand_range()
    functions. They are identical to BN_rand() and BN_rand_range()
    respectively.
  * The default key generation method for the regular 2-prime RSA keys
    was changed to the FIPS 186-4 B.3.6 method (Generation of Probable
    Primes with Conditions Based on Auxiliary Probable Primes). This
    method is slower than the original method.
  * Deprecated the BN_is_prime_ex() and BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex()
    functions. They are replaced with the BN_check_prime() function
    that avoids possible misuse and always uses at least 64 rounds of
    the Miller-Rabin primality test.
  * Deprecated EVP_MD_CTX_set_update_fn() and EVP_MD_CTX_update_fn()
    as they are not useful with non-deprecated functions.

- Update to 3.0.0 Alpha 11
  * Deprecated the obsolete X9.31 RSA key generation related

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/873726
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=23
2021-02-22 15:21:06 +00:00
037d3fe84f - Update to 3.0.0 Alpha 9
* See also https://www.openssl.org/news/changelog.html
  * Deprecated all the libcrypto and libssl error string loading
    functions. Calling these functions is not necessary since
    OpenSSL 1.1.0, as OpenSSL now loads error strings automatically.
  * The functions SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback and SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback, as
    well as the macros SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() and SSL_set_tmp_dh() have been
    deprecated. These are used to set the Diffie-Hellman (DH) parameters that
    are to be used by servers requiring ephemeral DH keys. Instead applications
    should consider using the built-in DH parameters that are available by
    calling SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto() or SSL_set_dh_auto().
  * The -crypt option to the passwd command line tool has been removed.
  * The -C option to the x509, dhparam, dsaparam, and ecparam commands
    has been removed.
  * Added several checks to X509_verify_cert() according to requirements in
    RFC 5280 in case 'X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT' is set (which may be done by
    using the CLI option '-x509_strict'):
    - The basicConstraints of CA certificates must be marked critical.
    - CA certificates must explicitly include the keyUsage extension.
    - If a pathlenConstraint is given the key usage keyCertSign must be allowed.
    - The issuer name of any certificate must not be empty.
    - The subject name of CA certs, certs with keyUsage crlSign,
      and certs without subjectAlternativeName must not be empty.
    - If a subjectAlternativeName extension is given it must not be empty.
    - The signatureAlgorithm field and the cert signature must be consistent.
    - Any given authorityKeyIdentifier and any given subjectKeyIdentifier
      must not be marked critical.
    - The authorityKeyIdentifier must be given for X.509v3 certs
      unless they are self-signed.
    - The subjectKeyIdentifier must be given for all X.509v3 CA certs.

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=22
2020-12-17 11:11:02 +00:00
fb5273867b Accepting request 846431 from security:tls:unstable
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/846431
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=21
2020-11-06 13:11:59 +00:00
a7eccb4727 Accepting request 844996 from home:pmonrealgonzalez:branches:security:tls
* Fix tests failing: 30-test_acvp.t and 30-test_evp.t
- Add openssl-AES_XTS.patch for ppc64, ppc64le and aarch64

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/844996
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=20
2020-10-30 09:36:36 +00:00
8a70474d1d Accepting request 844831 from home:pmonrealgonzalez:branches:security:tls
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/844831
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=19
2020-10-29 10:19:45 +00:00
Tomáš Chvátal
f44a780c3e Accepting request 842137 from home:pmonrealgonzalez:branches:security:tls
- Fix build on ppc* architectures
  * Tests failing: 30-test_acvp.t and 30-test_evp.t
  * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13133
- Add openssl-AES_XTS.patch ppc64, ppc64le and aarch64

- Re-enable test 81-test_cmp_cli.t fixed upstream

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/842137
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=18
2020-10-17 06:43:41 +00:00
Vítězslav Čížek
3008f4bc60 Accepting request 841985 from home:pmonrealgonzalez:branches:security:tls
- Update to 3.0.0 Alpha 7
  * Add PKCS7_get_octet_string() and PKCS7_type_is_other() to the public
    interface. Their functionality remains unchanged.
  * Deprecated EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type(). This function was previously
    needed as a workaround to recognise SM2 keys. With OpenSSL 3.0, this key
    type is internally recognised so the workaround is no longer needed.
  * Deprecated EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp() & introduced
    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(), which is now preferred.
  * Changed all "STACK" functions to be macros instead of inline functions.
    Macro parameters are still checked for type safety at compile time via
    helper inline functions.
  * Remove the RAND_DRBG API:
    The RAND_DRBG API did not fit well into the new provider concept as
    implemented by EVP_RAND and EVP_RAND_CTX. The main reason is that the
    RAND_DRBG API is a mixture of 'front end' and 'back end' API calls
    and some of its API calls are rather low-level. This holds in particular
    for the callback mechanism (RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks()).
    Adding a compatibility layer to continue supporting the RAND_DRBG API as
    a legacy API for a regular deprecation period turned out to come at the
    price of complicating the new provider API unnecessarily. Since the
    RAND_DRBG API exists only since version 1.1.1, it was decided by the OMC
    to drop it entirely.
  * Added the options '-crl_lastupdate' and '-crl_nextupdate' to 'openssl ca',
    allowing the 'lastUpdate' and 'nextUpdate' fields in the generated CRL to
    be set explicitly.
  * 'PKCS12_parse' now maintains the order of the parsed certificates
    when outputting them via '*ca' (rather than reversing it).
- Update openssl-DEFAULT_SUSE_cipher.patch

  contained in upstream.

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/841985
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=17
2020-10-15 19:22:03 +00:00
Vítězslav Čížek
e5a0c2d0fd Accepting request 824882 from home:gmbr3:openssl
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/824882
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=16
2020-08-17 09:37:15 +00:00
Tomáš Chvátal
2d441cd663 Accepting request 826265 from home:pmonrealgonzalez:branches:security:tls
- Update to 3.0.0 Alpha 6
  * Allow SSL_set1_host() and SSL_add1_host() to take IP literal
    addresses as well as actual hostnames. (David Woodhouse)
  * The 'MinProtocol' and 'MaxProtocol' configuration commands now
    silently ignore TLS protocol version bounds when configuring
    DTLS-based contexts, and conversely, silently ignore DTLS protocol
    version bounds when configuring TLS-based contexts. The commands
    can be repeated to set bounds of both types. The same applies with
    the corresponding 'min_protocol' and 'max_protocol' command-line
    switches, in case some application uses both TLS and DTLS.
  * SSL_CTX instances that are created for a fixed protocol version
    (e.g. TLSv1_server_method()) also silently ignore version bounds.
    Previously attempts to apply bounds to these protocol versions
    would result in an error. Now only the 'version-flexible' SSL_CTX
    instances are subject to limits in configuration files in
    command-line options. (Viktor Dukhovni)
- Add lsof dependency during build to fix tests failures
- Enable test 81-test_cmp_cli.t fixed upstream
- Remove 0001-Fix-typo-for-SSL_get_peer_certificate.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/826265
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=15
2020-08-13 20:20:33 +00:00
Vítězslav Čížek
bda45a31f3 - Fix linking when the deprecated SSL_get_per_certificate() is in use
* https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12468
  * add 0001-Fix-typo-for-SSL_get_peer_certificate.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=14
2020-07-20 09:26:52 +00:00
Tomáš Chvátal
0a9d203a57 Accepting request 821489 from home:pmonrealgonzalez:branches:security:tls
- Update to 3.0.0 Alpha 5
  * Deprecated the 'ENGINE' API. Engines should be replaced with
    providers going forward.
  * Reworked the recorded ERR codes to make better space for system errors.
    To distinguish them, the macro 'ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR()' indicates
    if the given code is a system error (true) or an OpenSSL error (false).
  * Reworked the test perl framework to better allow parallel testing.
  * Added ciphertext stealing algorithms AES-128-CBC-CTS, AES-192-CBC-CTS and
    AES-256-CBC-CTS to the providers. CS1, CS2 and CS3 variants are supported.
  * 'Configure' has been changed to figure out the configuration target if
    none is given on the command line. Consequently, the 'config' script is
    now only a mere wrapper. All documentation is changed to only mention
    'Configure'.
  * Added a library context that applications as well as other libraries can use
    to form a separate context within which libcrypto operations are performed.
    - There are two ways this can be used:
      1) Directly, by passing a library context to functions that take
         such an argument, such as 'EVP_CIPHER_fetch' and similar algorithm
         fetching functions.
      2) Indirectly, by creating a new library context and then assigning
         it as the new default, with 'OPENSSL_CTX_set0_default'.
    - All public OpenSSL functions that take an 'OPENSSL_CTX' pointer,
      apart from the functions directly related to 'OPENSSL_CTX', accept
      NULL to indicate that the default library context should be used.
    - Library code that changes the default library context using
      'OPENSSL_CTX_set0_default' should take care to restore it with a
      second call before returning to the caller.
  * The security strength of SHA1 and MD5 based signatures in TLS has been
    reduced. This results in SSL 3, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 and DTLS 1.0 no longer
    working at the default security level of 1 and instead requires security

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/821489
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=13
2020-07-17 11:26:23 +00:00
Tomáš Chvátal
18e44c466b Accepting request 817891 from home:vitezslav_cizek:branches:security:tls
* general improvements to the built-in providers, the providers API and the internal plumbing and the provider-aware mechanisms for libssl
  * general improvements and fixes in the CLI apps
  * support for Automated Cryptographic Validation Protocol (ACVP) tests
  * fully pluggable TLS key exchange capability from providers
  * finalization of the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) contribution, adding an impressive amount of tests for the new features
  * default to the newer SP800-56B compliant algorithm for RSA keygen
  * provider-rand: PRNG functionality backed by providers
  * refactored naming scheme for dispatched functions (#12222)
  * fixes for various issues
  * extended and improved test coverage
  * additions and improvements to the documentations
- Fix license: Apache-2.0

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/817891
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=12
2020-07-01 07:09:05 +00:00
Vítězslav Čížek
d257654006 Accepting request 817865 from home:vitezslav_cizek:branches:security:tls
- Update to 3.0.0 Alpha 4
  * No changelog available
- The license is now Apache-2.0
- temporarily disable broken 81-test_cmp_cli.t test
  * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/12324

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/817865
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=11
2020-06-30 12:20:26 +00:00
Vítězslav Čížek
1e33ca551f Update changelogs from openssl blogs
* general improvements to the built-in providers, the providers API and the internal plumbing and the provider-aware mechanisms for libssl;
  * general improvements and fixes in the CLI apps;
  * cleanup of the EC API:
    EC_METHOD became an internal-only concept, and functions using or returning EC_METHOD arguments have been deprecated;
    EC_POINT_make_affine() and EC_POINTs_make_affine() have been deprecated in favor of automatic internal handling of conversions when needed;
    EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(), EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(), and EC_KEY_precompute_mult() have been deprecated, as such precomputation data is now rarely used;
    EC_POINTs_mul() has been deprecated, as for cryptographic applications EC_POINT_mul() is enough.
  * the CMS API got support for CAdES-BES signature verification;
  * introduction of a new SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF option;
  * improvements to the RSA OAEP support;
  * FFDH support in the speed app;
  * CI: added external testing through the GOST engine;
  * fixes for various issues;
  * extended and improved test coverage;
  * additions and improvements to the documentations.
  * general improvements to the built-in providers, the providers API and the internal plumbing;
  * the removal of legacy API functions related to FIPS mode, replaced by new provider-based mechanisms;
  * the addition of a new cmp app for RFC 4210;
  * extended and improved test coverage;
  * improvements to the documentations;
  * fixes for various issues.

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=10
2020-06-05 12:22:29 +00:00
Vítězslav Čížek
370de93354 - Update to 3.0.0 Alpha 3
* No changelog available

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=9
2020-06-04 20:25:17 +00:00
Tomáš Chvátal
1a7003e813 Accepting request 808417 from home:jengelh:branches:security:tls
- Use find -exec +. Replace `pwd` by simply $PWD.
- Drop Obsoletes on libopenssl1*. libopenssl3 has a new SONAME and
  does not conflict with anything previously.

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/808417
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=8
2020-05-24 07:32:32 +00:00
Vítězslav Čížek
6596d9810e - Set man page permissions to 644
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=7
2020-05-22 12:52:31 +00:00
Vítězslav Čížek
bbde3bbda5 - Fix file permissions
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=6
2020-05-21 14:09:51 +00:00
Vítězslav Čížek
e195012a52 - Update baselibs.conf
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=5
2020-05-20 14:04:31 +00:00
Vítězslav Čížek
d69e9971a8 Fix versioning
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=4
2020-05-20 13:10:34 +00:00
Vítězslav Čížek
703666d411 - Obsolete openssl 1.1
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=3
2020-05-20 12:46:55 +00:00
Vítězslav Čížek
2ca2d6a366 Accepting request 805880 from home:vitezslav_cizek:branches:security:tls
- Update to 3.0.0 Alpha 2
- drop obsolete version.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/805880
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=2
2020-05-15 16:11:43 +00:00
Martin Pluskal
ce587b2631 Accepting request 796816 from home:vitezslav_cizek
enable tests

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/796816
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=1
2020-04-24 08:03:40 +00:00
78 changed files with 0 additions and 17265 deletions

View File

@@ -1,570 +0,0 @@
From 5f4f350ce797a7cd2fdca84c474ee196da9d6fae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 18 May 2022 17:25:59 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Deny SHA-1 signature verification in FIPS provider
For RHEL, we already disable SHA-1 signatures by default in the default
provider, so it is unexpected that the FIPS provider would have a more
lenient configuration in this regard. Additionally, we do not think
continuing to accept SHA-1 signatures is a good idea due to the
published chosen-prefix collision attacks.
As a consequence, disable verification of SHA-1 signatures in the FIPS
provider.
This requires adjusting a few tests that would otherwise fail:
- 30-test_acvp: Remove the test vectors that use SHA-1.
- 30-test_evp: Mark tests in evppkey_rsa_common.txt and
evppkey_ecdsa.txt that use SHA-1 digests as "Availablein = default",
which will not run them when the FIPS provider is enabled.
- 80-test_cms: Re-create all certificates in test/smime-certificates
with SHA256 signatures while keeping the same private keys. These
certificates were signed with SHA-1 and thus fail verification in the
FIPS provider.
Fix some other tests by explicitly running them in the default
provider, where SHA-1 is available.
- 80-test_ssl_old: Skip tests that rely on SSLv3 and SHA-1 when run with
the FIPS provider.
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
---
providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c | 4 --
.../implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c | 4 --
providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 8 +--
test/acvp_test.inc | 20 -------
.../30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt | 7 +++
.../30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt | 51 +++++++++++++++-
test/recipes/80-test_cms.t | 4 +-
test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t | 4 ++
test/smime-certs/smdh.pem | 18 +++---
test/smime-certs/smdsa1.pem | 60 +++++++++----------
test/smime-certs/smdsa2.pem | 60 +++++++++----------
test/smime-certs/smdsa3.pem | 60 +++++++++----------
test/smime-certs/smec1.pem | 30 +++++-----
test/smime-certs/smec2.pem | 30 +++++-----
test/smime-certs/smec3.pem | 30 +++++-----
test/smime-certs/smroot.pem | 38 ++++++------
test/smime-certs/smrsa1.pem | 38 ++++++------
test/smime-certs/smrsa2.pem | 38 ++++++------
test/smime-certs/smrsa3.pem | 38 ++++++------
19 files changed, 286 insertions(+), 256 deletions(-)
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
@@ -129,11 +129,7 @@ static int dsa_setup_md(PROV_DSA_CTX *ct
EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
int md_nid;
size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
-#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
- int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
-#else
int sha1_allowed = 0;
-#endif
md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
sha1_allowed);
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
@@ -247,11 +247,7 @@ static int ecdsa_setup_md(PROV_ECDSA_CTX
"%s could not be fetched", mdname);
return 0;
}
-#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
- sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
-#else
sha1_allowed = 0;
-#endif
md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
sha1_allowed);
if (md_nid < 0) {
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
@@ -321,11 +321,7 @@ static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ct
EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
int md_nid;
size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
-#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
- int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
-#else
int sha1_allowed = 0;
-#endif
md_nid = ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(ctx->libctx, md,
sha1_allowed);
@@ -1416,8 +1412,10 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprs
if (prsactx->md == NULL && pmdname == NULL
&& pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME_NONLEGACY;
+#else
pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME;
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(prsactx->libctx, 0)) {
pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME_NONLEGACY;
}
Index: openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt
+++ openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt
@@ -37,12 +37,14 @@ PrivPubKeyPair = P-256:P-256-PUBLIC
Title = ECDSA tests
+Availablein = default
Verify = P-256
Ctrl = digest:SHA1
Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e15202201898cdd52b41ca502098184b409cf83a21bc945006746e3b7cea52234e043ec8
# Digest too long
+Availablein = default
Verify = P-256
Ctrl = digest:SHA1
Input = "0123456789ABCDEF12345"
@@ -50,6 +52,7 @@ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a
Result = VERIFY_ERROR
# Digest too short
+Availablein = default
Verify = P-256
Ctrl = digest:SHA1
Input = "0123456789ABCDEF123"
@@ -57,6 +60,7 @@ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a
Result = VERIFY_ERROR
# Digest invalid
+Availablein = default
Verify = P-256
Ctrl = digest:SHA1
Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1235"
@@ -64,6 +68,7 @@ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a
Result = VERIFY_ERROR
# Invalid signature
+Availablein = default
Verify = P-256
Ctrl = digest:SHA1
Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
@@ -79,12 +84,14 @@ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a
Result = VERIFY_ERROR
# BER signature
+Availablein = default
Verify = P-256
Ctrl = digest:SHA1
Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
Output = 3080022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e15202201898cdd52b41ca502098184b409cf83a21bc945006746e3b7cea52234e043ec80000
Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+Availablein = default
Verify = P-256-PUBLIC
Ctrl = digest:SHA1
Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
Index: openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+++ openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ NDL6WCBbets=
Title = RSA tests
+Availablein = default
Verify = RSA-2048
Ctrl = digest:SHA1
Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
@@ -112,24 +113,28 @@ Ctrl = digest:SHA512-224
Input = "0123456789ABCDEF123456789ABC"
Output = 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
+Availablein = default
VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
Ctrl = digest:SHA1
Input = 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
Output = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
# Leading zero in the signature
+Availablein = default
Verify = RSA-2048
Ctrl = digest:SHA1
Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
Output = 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
Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+Availablein = default
VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
Ctrl = digest:SHA1
Input = 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
Result = KEYOP_ERROR
# Mismatched digest
+Availablein = default
Verify = RSA-2048
Ctrl = digest:SHA1
Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1233"
@@ -137,6 +142,7 @@ Output = c09d402423cbf233d26cae21f954547
Result = VERIFY_ERROR
# Corrupted signature
+Availablein = default
Verify = RSA-2048
Ctrl = digest:SHA1
Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1233"
@@ -144,6 +150,7 @@ Output = c09d402423cbf233d26cae21f954547
Result = VERIFY_ERROR
# parameter is not NULLt
+Availablein = default
Verify = RSA-2048
Ctrl = digest:sha1
Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
@@ -151,42 +158,49 @@ Output = 3ec3fc29eb6e122bd7aa361cd09fe1b
Result = VERIFY_ERROR
# embedded digest too long
+Availablein = default
Verify = RSA-2048
Ctrl = digest:sha1
Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
Output = 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
Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+Availablein = default
VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
Ctrl = digest:sha1
Input = 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
Result = KEYOP_ERROR
# embedded digest too short
+Availablein = default
Verify = RSA-2048
Ctrl = digest:sha1
Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
Output = 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
Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+Availablein = default
VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
Ctrl = digest:sha1
Input = 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
Result = KEYOP_ERROR
# Garbage after DigestInfo
+Availablein = default
Verify = RSA-2048
Ctrl = digest:sha1
Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
Output = 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
Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+Availablein = default
VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
Ctrl = digest:sha1
Input = 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
Result = KEYOP_ERROR
# invalid tag for parameter
+Availablein = default
Verify = RSA-2048
Ctrl = digest:sha1
Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
@@ -195,6 +209,7 @@ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
# Verify using public key
+Availablein = default
Verify = RSA-2048-PUBLIC
Ctrl = digest:SHA1
Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
@@ -858,6 +873,8 @@ Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF"
Output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
# Verify using salt length auto detect
+# In the FIPS provider on SUSE/openSUSE, the default digest for PSS signatures is SHA-256
+Availablein = default
Verify = RSA-2048-PUBLIC
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:auto
@@ -892,6 +909,10 @@ Output=4DE433D5844043EF08D354DA03CB29068
Result = VERIFY_ERROR
# Verify using default parameters, explicitly setting parameters
+# NOTE: RSA-PSS-DEFAULT contains a restriction to use SHA1 as digest, which
+# SUSE/openSUSE do not support in FIPS mode; all these tests are thus marked
+# Availablein = default.
+Availablein = default
Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:20
@@ -900,6 +921,7 @@ Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123"
Output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
# Verify explicitly setting parameters "digest" salt length
+Availablein = default
Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:digest
@@ -908,18 +930,21 @@ Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123"
Output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
# Verify using salt length larger than minimum
+Availablein = default
Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:30
Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123"
Output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
# Verify using maximum salt length
+Availablein = default
Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:max
Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123"
Output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
# Attempt to change salt length below minimum
+Availablein = default
Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:0
Result = PKEY_CTRL_ERROR
@@ -927,21 +952,25 @@ Result = PKEY_CTRL_ERROR
# Attempt to change padding mode
# Note this used to return PKEY_CTRL_INVALID
# but it is limited because setparams only returns 0 or 1.
+Availablein = default
Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pkcs1
Result = PKEY_CTRL_ERROR
# Attempt to change digest
+Availablein = default
Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
Ctrl = digest:sha256
Result = PKEY_CTRL_ERROR
# Invalid key: rejected when we try to init
+Availablein = default
Verify = RSA-PSS-BAD
Result = KEYOP_INIT_ERROR
Reason = invalid salt length
# Invalid key: rejected when we try to init
+Availablein = default
Verify = RSA-PSS-BAD2
Result = KEYOP_INIT_ERROR
Reason = invalid salt length
@@ -960,36 +989,42 @@ CAltWyuLbfXWce9jd8CSHLI8Jwpw4lmOb/idGfEF
4fINDOjP+yJJvZohNwIDAQAB
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+Availablein = default
Verify=RSA-PSS-1
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
Input=cd8b6538cb8e8de566b68bd067569dbf1ee2718e
Output=9074308fb598e9701b2294388e52f971faac2b60a5145af185df5287b5ed2887e57ce7fd44dc8634e407c8e0e4360bc226f3ec227f9d9e54638e8d31f5051215df6ebb9c2f9579aa77598a38f914b5b9c1bd83c4e2f9f382a0d0aa3542ffee65984a601bc69eb28deb27dca12c82c2d4c3f66cd500f1ff2b994d8a4e30cbb33c
+Availablein = default
Verify=RSA-PSS-1
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
Input=e35befc17a1d160b9ce35fbd8eb16e7ee491d3fd
Output=3ef7f46e831bf92b32274142a585ffcefbdca7b32ae90d10fb0f0c729984f04ef29a9df0780775ce43739b97838390db0a5505e63de927028d9d29b219ca2c4517832558a55d694a6d25b9dab66003c4cccd907802193be5170d26147d37b93590241be51c25055f47ef62752cfbe21418fafe98c22c4d4d47724fdb5669e843
+Availablein = default
Verify=RSA-PSS-1
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
Input=0652ec67bcee30f9d2699122b91c19abdba89f91
Output=666026fba71bd3e7cf13157cc2c51a8e4aa684af9778f91849f34335d141c00154c4197621f9624a675b5abc22ee7d5baaffaae1c9baca2cc373b3f33e78e6143c395a91aa7faca664eb733afd14d8827259d99a7550faca501ef2b04e33c23aa51f4b9e8282efdb728cc0ab09405a91607c6369961bc8270d2d4f39fce612b1
+Availablein = default
Verify=RSA-PSS-1
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
Input=39c21c4cceda9c1adf839c744e1212a6437575ec
Output=4609793b23e9d09362dc21bb47da0b4f3a7622649a47d464019b9aeafe53359c178c91cd58ba6bcb78be0346a7bc637f4b873d4bab38ee661f199634c547a1ad8442e03da015b136e543f7ab07c0c13e4225b8de8cce25d4f6eb8400f81f7e1833b7ee6e334d370964ca79fdb872b4d75223b5eeb08101591fb532d155a6de87
+Availablein = default
Verify=RSA-PSS-1
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
Input=36dae913b77bd17cae6e7b09453d24544cebb33c
Output=1d2aad221ca4d31ddf13509239019398e3d14b32dc34dc5af4aeaea3c095af73479cf0a45e5629635a53a018377615b16cb9b13b3e09d671eb71e387b8545c5960da5a64776e768e82b2c93583bf104c3fdb23512b7b4e89f633dd0063a530db4524b01c3f384c09310e315a79dcd3d684022a7f31c865a664e316978b759fad
+Availablein = default
Verify=RSA-PSS-1
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -1005,36 +1040,42 @@ swU7R97S7NSkyu/WFIM9yLtiLzF+0Ha4BX/o3j+E
0w5GMTmBXG/U/VrFuBcqRSMOy2MYoE8UVdhOWosCAwEAAQ==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+Availablein = default
Verify=RSA-PSS-9
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
Input=2715a49b8b0012cd7aee84c116446e6dfe3faec0
Output=586107226c3ce013a7c8f04d1a6a2959bb4b8e205ba43a27b50f124111bc35ef589b039f5932187cb696d7d9a32c0c38300a5cdda4834b62d2eb240af33f79d13dfbf095bf599e0d9686948c1964747b67e89c9aba5cd85016236f566cc5802cb13ead51bc7ca6bef3b94dcbdbb1d570469771df0e00b1a8a06777472d2316279edae86474668d4e1efff95f1de61c6020da32ae92bbf16520fef3cf4d88f61121f24bbd9fe91b59caf1235b2a93ff81fc403addf4ebdea84934a9cdaf8e1a9e
+Availablein = default
Verify=RSA-PSS-9
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
Input=2dac956d53964748ac364d06595827c6b4f143cd
Output=80b6d643255209f0a456763897ac9ed259d459b49c2887e5882ecb4434cfd66dd7e1699375381e51cd7f554f2c271704b399d42b4be2540a0eca61951f55267f7c2878c122842dadb28b01bd5f8c025f7e228418a673c03d6bc0c736d0a29546bd67f786d9d692ccea778d71d98c2063b7a71092187a4d35af108111d83e83eae46c46aa34277e06044589903788f1d5e7cee25fb485e92949118814d6f2c3ee361489016f327fb5bc517eb50470bffa1afa5f4ce9aa0ce5b8ee19bf5501b958
+Availablein = default
Verify=RSA-PSS-9
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
Input=28d98c46cccafbd3bc04e72f967a54bd3ea12298
Output=484408f3898cd5f53483f80819efbf2708c34d27a8b2a6fae8b322f9240237f981817aca1846f1084daa6d7c0795f6e5bf1af59c38e1858437ce1f7ec419b98c8736adf6dd9a00b1806d2bd3ad0a73775e05f52dfef3a59ab4b08143f0df05cd1ad9d04bececa6daa4a2129803e200cbc77787caf4c1d0663a6c5987b605952019782caf2ec1426d68fb94ed1d4be816a7ed081b77e6ab330b3ffc073820fecde3727fcbe295ee61a050a343658637c3fd659cfb63736de32d9f90d3c2f63eca
+Availablein = default
Verify=RSA-PSS-9
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
Input=0866d2ff5a79f25ef668cd6f31b42dee421e4c0e
Output=84ebeb481be59845b46468bafb471c0112e02b235d84b5d911cbd1926ee5074ae0424495cb20e82308b8ebb65f419a03fb40e72b78981d88aad143053685172c97b29c8b7bf0ae73b5b2263c403da0ed2f80ff7450af7828eb8b86f0028bd2a8b176a4d228cccea18394f238b09ff758cc00bc04301152355742f282b54e663a919e709d8da24ade5500a7b9aa50226e0ca52923e6c2d860ec50ff480fa57477e82b0565f4379f79c772d5c2da80af9fbf325ece6fc20b00961614bee89a183e
+Availablein = default
Verify=RSA-PSS-9
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
Input=6a5b4be4cd36cc97dfde9995efbf8f097a4a991a
Output=82102df8cb91e7179919a04d26d335d64fbc2f872c44833943241de8454810274cdf3db5f42d423db152af7135f701420e39b494a67cbfd19f9119da233a23da5c6439b5ba0d2bc373eee3507001378d4a4073856b7fe2aba0b5ee93b27f4afec7d4d120921c83f606765b02c19e4d6a1a3b95fa4c422951be4f52131077ef17179729cddfbdb56950dbaceefe78cb16640a099ea56d24389eef10f8fecb31ba3ea3b227c0a86698bb89e3e9363905bf22777b2a3aa521b65b4cef76d83bde4c
+Availablein = default
Verify=RSA-PSS-9
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -1052,36 +1093,42 @@ F7jfF3jbOB3OCctK0FilEQAac4GY7ifPVaE7dUU5
BQIDAQAB
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+Availablein = default
Verify=RSA-PSS-10
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
Input=9596bb630cf6a8d4ea4600422b9eba8b13675dd4
Output=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
+Availablein = default
Verify=RSA-PSS-10
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
Input=b503319399277fd6c1c8f1033cbf04199ea21716
Output=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
+Availablein = default
Verify=RSA-PSS-10
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
Input=50aaede8536b2c307208b275a67ae2df196c7628
Output=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
+Availablein = default
Verify=RSA-PSS-10
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
Input=aa0b72b8b371ddd10c8ae474425ccccf8842a294
Output=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
+Availablein = default
Verify=RSA-PSS-10
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
Input=fad3902c9750622a2bc672622c48270cc57d3ea8
Output=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
+Availablein = default
Verify=RSA-PSS-10
Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
@@ -1817,11 +1864,13 @@ Title = RSA FIPS tests
# FIPS tests
-# Verifying with SHA1 is permitted in fips mode for older applications
+# Verifying with SHA1 is not permitted on SUSE/openSUSE in FIPS mode
+Availablein = fips
DigestVerify = SHA1
Key = RSA-2048
Input = "Hello "
Output = 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
+Result = DIGESTVERIFYINIT_ERROR
# Verifying with a 1024 bit key is permitted in fips mode for older applications
DigestVerify = SHA256
Index: openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+++ openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
[ "{cmd1}", @defaultprov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-md", "sha1",
"-certfile", $smroot,
"-signer", $smrsa1, "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
- [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms",
+ [ "{cmd2}", @defaultprov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms",
"-CAfile", $smroot, "-out", "{output}.txt" ],
\&final_compare
],
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
[ "signed zero-length content S/MIME format, RSA key SHA1",
[ "{cmd1}", @defaultprov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont_zero, "-md", "sha1",
"-certfile", $smroot, "-signer", $smrsa1, "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
- [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms",
+ [ "{cmd2}", @defaultprov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms",
"-CAfile", $smroot, "-out", "{output}.txt" ],
\&zero_compare
],
Index: openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
+++ openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
@@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ sub testssl {
'test sslv2/sslv3 with 1024bit DHE via BIO pair');
}
+ SKIP: {
+ skip "SSLv3 is not supported by the FIPS provider", 4
+ if $provider eq "fips";
ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-server_auth", @CA])),
'test sslv2/sslv3 with server authentication');
ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-client_auth", @CA])),
@@ -402,6 +405,7 @@ sub testssl {
'test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair');
ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-server_auth", "-client_auth", "-app_verify", @CA])),
'test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair and app verify');
+ }
SKIP: {
skip "No IPv4 available on this machine", 4
Index: openssl-3.2.3/test/acvp_test.inc
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/test/acvp_test.inc
+++ openssl-3.2.3/test/acvp_test.inc
@@ -1844,17 +1844,6 @@ static const struct rsa_sigver_st rsa_si
{
"x931",
3072,
- "SHA1",
- ITM(rsa_sigverx931_0_msg),
- ITM(rsa_sigverx931_0_n),
- ITM(rsa_sigverx931_0_e),
- ITM(rsa_sigverx931_0_sig),
- NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
- PASS
- },
- {
- "x931",
- 3072,
"SHA256",
ITM(rsa_sigverx931_1_msg),
ITM(rsa_sigverx931_1_n),

View File

@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
From 589eb3898896c1ac916bc20069ecd5adb8534850 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2023 15:31:08 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] GCM: Implement explicit FIPS indicator for IV gen
Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
Verification Program, Section C.H requires guarantees about the
uniqueness of key/iv pairs, and proposes a few approaches to ensure
this. Provide an indicator for option 2 "The IV may be generated
internally at its entirety randomly."
Resolves: rhbz#2168289
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
---
include/openssl/core_names.h | 1 +
include/openssl/evp.h | 4 +++
.../implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c | 4 +++
.../ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
Index: openssl-3.2.3/include/openssl/evp.h
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/include/openssl/evp.h
+++ openssl-3.2.3/include/openssl/evp.h
@@ -753,6 +753,10 @@ void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER
void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_clear_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags);
int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags);
+# define EVP_CIPHER_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
+# define EVP_CIPHER_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED 1
+# define EVP_CIPHER_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
+
__owur int EVP_EncryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv);
__owur int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c
@@ -152,6 +152,10 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM cipher_aead_know
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_PAD, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_GET_IV_GEN, NULL, 0),
+ /* normally we would hide this under an #ifdef FIPS_MODULE, but that does
+ * not work in ciphercommon.c because it is compiled only once into
+ * libcommon.a */
+ OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
const OSSL_PARAM *ossl_cipher_aead_gettable_ctx_params(
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c
@@ -238,6 +238,31 @@ int ossl_gcm_get_ctx_params(void *vctx,
break;
}
}
+
+ /* We would usually hide this under #ifdef FIPS_MODULE, but
+ * ciphercommon_gcm.c is only compiled once into libcommon.a, so ifdefs do
+ * not work here. */
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ int fips_indicator = EVP_CIPHER_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
+
+ /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
+ * Verification Program, Section C.H requires guarantees about the
+ * uniqueness of key/iv pairs, and proposes a few approaches to ensure
+ * this. This provides an indicator for option 2 "The IV may be
+ * generated internally at its entirety randomly." Note that one of the
+ * conditions of this option is that "The IV length shall be at least
+ * 96 bits (per SP 800-38D)." We do not specically check for this
+ * condition here, because gcm_iv_generate will fail in this case. */
+ if (ctx->enc && !ctx->iv_gen_rand)
+ fips_indicator = EVP_CIPHER_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
return 1;
}
Index: openssl-3.2.3/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
+++ openssl-3.2.3/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ my %params = (
'CIPHER_PARAM_CTS_MODE' => "cts_mode", # utf8_string
# For passing the AlgorithmIdentifier parameter in DER form
'CIPHER_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID_PARAMS' => "alg_id_param",# octet_string
+ 'CIPHER_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR' => "suse-fips-indicator",# int
'CIPHER_PARAM_XTS_STANDARD' => "xts_standard",# utf8_string
'CIPHER_PARAM_TLS1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT' => "tls1multi_maxsndfrag",# uint

View File

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
Index: openssl-3.1.4/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.1.4.orig/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+++ openssl-3.1.4/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@@ -428,7 +428,12 @@ static int rsa_keygen(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libc
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
ok = ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_generate_key(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
- pairwise_test = 1; /* FIPS MODE needs to always run the pairwise test */
+ /* FIPS MODE needs to always run the pairwise test. But, the
+ * rsa_keygen_pairwise_test() PCT as self-test requirements will be
+ * covered by do_rsa_pct() for both RSA-OAEP and RSA signatures and
+ * this PCT can be skipped here. See bsc#1221760 for more info.
+ */
+ pairwise_test = 0;
#else
/*
* Only multi-prime keys or insecure keys with a small key length or a
@@ -463,6 +468,9 @@ static int rsa_keygen(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libc
rsa->dmp1 = NULL;
rsa->dmq1 = NULL;
rsa->iqmp = NULL;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ abort();
+#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
}
}
return ok;

View File

@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
commit 518b53b139d7b4ac082ccedd401d2ee08fc66985
Author: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed Jan 31 16:26:52 2024 +0100
s390x: Add defines for new CPACF functions
Add defines for new CPACF functions codes, its required MSA levels, and
document how to disable these functions via the OPENSSL_s390xcap environment
variable.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25161)
diff --git a/crypto/s390x_arch.h b/crypto/s390x_arch.h
index fdc682af06..88ed866b0d 100644
--- a/crypto/s390x_arch.h
+++ b/crypto/s390x_arch.h
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 2017-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2017-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ extern int OPENSSL_s390xcex;
# define S390X_MSA5 57 /* message-security-assist-ext. 5 */
# define S390X_MSA3 76 /* message-security-assist-ext. 3 */
# define S390X_MSA4 77 /* message-security-assist-ext. 4 */
+# define S390X_MSA12 86 /* message-security-assist-ext. 12 */
# define S390X_VX 129 /* vector */
# define S390X_VXD 134 /* vector packed decimal */
# define S390X_VXE 135 /* vector enhancements 1 */
@@ -150,6 +151,14 @@ extern int OPENSSL_s390xcex;
/* km */
# define S390X_XTS_AES_128 50
# define S390X_XTS_AES_256 52
+# define S390X_XTS_AES_128_MSA10 82
+# define S390X_XTS_AES_256_MSA10 84
+
+/* kmac */
+# define S390X_HMAC_SHA_224 112
+# define S390X_HMAC_SHA_256 113
+# define S390X_HMAC_SHA_384 114
+# define S390X_HMAC_SHA_512 115
/* prno */
# define S390X_SHA_512_DRNG 3
diff --git a/doc/man3/OPENSSL_s390xcap.pod b/doc/man3/OPENSSL_s390xcap.pod
index d7185530ec..363003d8d3 100644
--- a/doc/man3/OPENSSL_s390xcap.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/OPENSSL_s390xcap.pod
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ the numbering is continuous across 64-bit mask boundaries.
:
# 76 1<<51 message-security assist extension 3
# 77 1<<50 message-security assist extension 4
+ # 86 1<<41 message-security-assist extension 12
:
#129 1<<62 vector facility
#134 1<<57 vector packed decimal facility
@@ -110,6 +111,8 @@ the numbering is continuous across 64-bit mask boundaries.
# 50 1<<13 KM-XTS-AES-128
# 52 1<<11 KM-XTS-AES-256
:
+ # 82 1<<45 KM-XTS-AES-128-MSA10
+ # 84 1<<43 KM-XTS-AES-256-MSA10
kmc :
# 18 1<<45 KMC-AES-128
@@ -122,6 +125,10 @@ the numbering is continuous across 64-bit mask boundaries.
# 19 1<<44 KMAC-AES-192
# 20 1<<43 KMAC-AES-256
:
+ # 112 1<<15 KMAC-SHA-224
+ # 113 1<<14 KMAC-SHA-256
+ # 114 1<<13 KMAC-SHA-384
+ # 115 1<<12 KMAC-SHA-512
kmctr:
:

View File

@@ -1,506 +0,0 @@
commit 0499de5adda26b1ef09660f70c12b4710b5f7c8a
Author: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Thu Feb 1 15:15:27 2024 +0100
s390x: Add hardware acceleration for HMAC
The CPACF instruction KMAC provides support for accelerating the HMAC
algorithm on newer machines for HMAC with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and
SHA-512.
Preliminary measurements showed performance improvements of up to a factor
of 2, dependent on the message size, whether chunking is used and the size
of the chunks.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25161)
Index: openssl-3.2.3/crypto/hmac/build.info
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/crypto/hmac/build.info
+++ openssl-3.2.3/crypto/hmac/build.info
@@ -2,5 +2,22 @@ LIBS=../../libcrypto
$COMMON=hmac.c
-SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=$COMMON
-SOURCE[../../providers/libfips.a]=$COMMON
+IF[{- !$disabled{asm} -}]
+ IF[{- ($target{perlasm_scheme} // '') ne '31' -}]
+ $HMACASM_s390x=hmac_s390x.c
+ $HMACDEF_s390x=OPENSSL_HMAC_S390X
+ ENDIF
+
+ # Now that we have defined all the arch specific variables, use the
+ # appropriate ones, and define the appropriate macros
+ IF[$HMACASM_{- $target{asm_arch} -}]
+ $HMACASM=$HMACASM_{- $target{asm_arch} -}
+ $HMACDEF=$HMACDEF_{- $target{asm_arch} -}
+ ENDIF
+ENDIF
+
+DEFINE[../../libcrypto]=$HMACDEF
+DEFINE[../../providers/libfips.a]=$HMACDEF
+
+SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=$COMMON $HMACASM
+SOURCE[../../providers/libfips.a]=$COMMON $HMACASM
Index: openssl-3.2.3/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -49,6 +49,12 @@ int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const vo
if ((EVP_MD_get_flags(md) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) != 0)
return 0;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HMAC_S390X
+ rv = s390x_HMAC_init(ctx, key, len, impl);
+ if (rv >= 1)
+ return rv;
+#endif
+
if (key != NULL) {
reset = 1;
@@ -111,6 +117,12 @@ int HMAC_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const uns
{
if (!ctx->md)
return 0;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HMAC_S390X
+ if (ctx->plat.s390x.fc)
+ return s390x_HMAC_update(ctx, data, len);
+#endif
+
return EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->md_ctx, data, len);
}
@@ -122,6 +134,11 @@ int HMAC_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned c
if (!ctx->md)
goto err;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HMAC_S390X
+ if (ctx->plat.s390x.fc)
+ return s390x_HMAC_final(ctx, md, len);
+#endif
+
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->md_ctx, buf, &i))
goto err;
if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx->md_ctx, ctx->o_ctx))
@@ -161,6 +178,10 @@ static void hmac_ctx_cleanup(HMAC_CTX *c
EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx->o_ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx->md_ctx);
ctx->md = NULL;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HMAC_S390X
+ s390x_HMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+#endif
}
void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx)
@@ -212,6 +233,12 @@ int HMAC_CTX_copy(HMAC_CTX *dctx, HMAC_C
if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dctx->md_ctx, sctx->md_ctx))
goto err;
dctx->md = sctx->md;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HMAC_S390X
+ if (s390x_HMAC_CTX_copy(dctx, sctx) == 0)
+ goto err;
+#endif
+
return 1;
err:
hmac_ctx_cleanup(dctx);
Index: openssl-3.2.3/crypto/hmac/hmac_local.h
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/crypto/hmac/hmac_local.h
+++ openssl-3.2.3/crypto/hmac/hmac_local.h
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@
#ifndef OSSL_CRYPTO_HMAC_LOCAL_H
# define OSSL_CRYPTO_HMAC_LOCAL_H
+# include "internal/common.h"
+# include "internal/numbers.h"
+# include "openssl/sha.h"
+
/* The current largest case is for SHA3-224 */
#define HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK_SIZE 144
@@ -18,6 +22,45 @@ struct hmac_ctx_st {
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
EVP_MD_CTX *i_ctx;
EVP_MD_CTX *o_ctx;
+
+ /* Platform specific data */
+ union {
+ int dummy;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HMAC_S390X
+ struct {
+ unsigned int fc; /* 0 if not supported by kmac instruction */
+ int blk_size;
+ int ikp;
+ int iimp;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t size; /* must be multiple of digest block size */
+ size_t num;
+ union {
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
+ struct {
+ uint32_t h[8];
+ uint64_t imbl;
+ unsigned char key[64];
+ } hmac_224_256;
+ struct {
+ uint64_t h[8];
+ uint128_t imbl;
+ unsigned char key[128];
+ } hmac_384_512;
+ } param;
+ } s390x;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HMAC_S390X */
+ } plat;
};
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HMAC_S390X
+# define HMAC_S390X_BUF_NUM_BLOCKS 64
+
+int s390x_HMAC_init(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int key_len, ENGINE *impl);
+int s390x_HMAC_update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len);
+int s390x_HMAC_final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len);
+int s390x_HMAC_CTX_copy(HMAC_CTX *dctx, HMAC_CTX *sctx);
+int s390x_HMAC_CTX_cleanup(HMAC_CTX *ctx);
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HMAC_S390X */
+
#endif
Index: openssl-3.2.3/crypto/hmac/hmac_s390x.c
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ openssl-3.2.3/crypto/hmac/hmac_s390x.c
@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "crypto/s390x_arch.h"
+#include "hmac_local.h"
+#include "openssl/obj_mac.h"
+#include "openssl/evp.h"
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HMAC_S390X
+
+static int s390x_fc_from_md(const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ int fc;
+
+ switch (EVP_MD_get_type(md)) {
+ case NID_sha224:
+ fc = S390X_HMAC_SHA_224;
+ break;
+ case NID_sha256:
+ fc = S390X_HMAC_SHA_256;
+ break;
+ case NID_sha384:
+ fc = S390X_HMAC_SHA_384;
+ break;
+ case NID_sha512:
+ fc = S390X_HMAC_SHA_512;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmac[1] & S390X_CAPBIT(fc)) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ return fc;
+}
+
+static void s390x_call_kmac(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned int fc = ctx->plat.s390x.fc;
+
+ if (ctx->plat.s390x.ikp)
+ fc |= S390X_KMAC_IKP;
+
+ if (ctx->plat.s390x.iimp)
+ fc |= S390X_KMAC_IIMP;
+
+ switch (ctx->plat.s390x.fc) {
+ case S390X_HMAC_SHA_224:
+ case S390X_HMAC_SHA_256:
+ ctx->plat.s390x.param.hmac_224_256.imbl += ((uint64_t)len * 8);
+ break;
+ case S390X_HMAC_SHA_384:
+ case S390X_HMAC_SHA_512:
+ ctx->plat.s390x.param.hmac_384_512.imbl += ((uint128_t)len * 8);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ s390x_kmac(in, len, fc, &ctx->plat.s390x.param);
+
+ ctx->plat.s390x.ikp = 1;
+}
+
+int s390x_HMAC_init(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int key_len, ENGINE *impl)
+{
+ unsigned char *key_param;
+ unsigned int key_param_len;
+
+ ctx->plat.s390x.fc = s390x_fc_from_md(ctx->md);
+ if (ctx->plat.s390x.fc == 0)
+ return -1; /* Not supported by kmac instruction */
+
+ ctx->plat.s390x.blk_size = EVP_MD_get_block_size(ctx->md);
+ if (ctx->plat.s390x.blk_size < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ctx->plat.s390x.size !=
+ (size_t)(ctx->plat.s390x.blk_size * HMAC_S390X_BUF_NUM_BLOCKS)) {
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->plat.s390x.buf, ctx->plat.s390x.size);
+ ctx->plat.s390x.size = 0;
+ ctx->plat.s390x.buf = OPENSSL_zalloc(ctx->plat.s390x.blk_size *
+ HMAC_S390X_BUF_NUM_BLOCKS);
+ if (ctx->plat.s390x.buf == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->plat.s390x.size = ctx->plat.s390x.blk_size *
+ HMAC_S390X_BUF_NUM_BLOCKS;
+ }
+ ctx->plat.s390x.num = 0;
+
+ ctx->plat.s390x.ikp = 0;
+ ctx->plat.s390x.iimp = 1;
+
+ switch (ctx->plat.s390x.fc) {
+ case S390X_HMAC_SHA_224:
+ case S390X_HMAC_SHA_256:
+ ctx->plat.s390x.param.hmac_224_256.imbl = 0;
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->plat.s390x.param.hmac_224_256.h,
+ sizeof(ctx->plat.s390x.param.hmac_224_256.h));
+ break;
+ case S390X_HMAC_SHA_384:
+ case S390X_HMAC_SHA_512:
+ ctx->plat.s390x.param.hmac_384_512.imbl = 0;
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->plat.s390x.param.hmac_384_512.h,
+ sizeof(ctx->plat.s390x.param.hmac_384_512.h));
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (key != NULL) {
+ switch (ctx->plat.s390x.fc) {
+ case S390X_HMAC_SHA_224:
+ case S390X_HMAC_SHA_256:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(&ctx->plat.s390x.param.hmac_224_256.key,
+ sizeof(ctx->plat.s390x.param.hmac_224_256.key));
+ key_param = ctx->plat.s390x.param.hmac_224_256.key;
+ key_param_len = sizeof(ctx->plat.s390x.param.hmac_224_256.key);
+ break;
+ case S390X_HMAC_SHA_384:
+ case S390X_HMAC_SHA_512:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(&ctx->plat.s390x.param.hmac_384_512.key,
+ sizeof(ctx->plat.s390x.param.hmac_384_512.key));
+ key_param = ctx->plat.s390x.param.hmac_384_512.key;
+ key_param_len = sizeof(ctx->plat.s390x.param.hmac_384_512.key);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!ossl_assert(ctx->plat.s390x.blk_size <= (int)key_param_len))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (key_len > ctx->plat.s390x.blk_size) {
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx->md_ctx, ctx->md, impl)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->md_ctx, key, key_len)
+ || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->md_ctx, key_param,
+ &key_param_len))
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ if (key_len < 0 || key_len > (int)key_param_len)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(key_param, key, key_len);
+ /* remaining key bytes already zeroed out above */
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int s390x_HMAC_update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t remain, num;
+
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* buffer is full, process it now */
+ if (ctx->plat.s390x.num == ctx->plat.s390x.size) {
+ s390x_call_kmac(ctx, ctx->plat.s390x.buf, ctx->plat.s390x.num);
+
+ ctx->plat.s390x.num = 0;
+ }
+
+ remain = ctx->plat.s390x.size - ctx->plat.s390x.num;
+ if (len > remain) {
+ /* data does not fit into buffer */
+ if (ctx->plat.s390x.num > 0) {
+ /* first fill buffer and process it */
+ memcpy(&ctx->plat.s390x.buf[ctx->plat.s390x.num], data, remain);
+ ctx->plat.s390x.num += remain;
+
+ s390x_call_kmac(ctx, ctx->plat.s390x.buf, ctx->plat.s390x.num);
+
+ ctx->plat.s390x.num = 0;
+
+ data += remain;
+ len -= remain;
+ }
+
+ if (!ossl_assert(ctx->plat.s390x.num == 0))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (len > ctx->plat.s390x.size) {
+ /*
+ * remaining data is still larger than buffer, process remaining
+ * full blocks of input directly
+ */
+ remain = len % ctx->plat.s390x.blk_size;
+ num = len - remain;
+
+ s390x_call_kmac(ctx, data, num);
+
+ data += num;
+ len -= num;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* add remaining input data (which is < buffer size) to buffer */
+ if (!ossl_assert(len <= ctx->plat.s390x.size))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (len > 0) {
+ memcpy(&ctx->plat.s390x.buf[ctx->plat.s390x.num], data, len);
+ ctx->plat.s390x.num += len;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int s390x_HMAC_final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len)
+{
+ void *result;
+ unsigned int res_len;
+
+ ctx->plat.s390x.iimp = 0; /* last block */
+ s390x_call_kmac(ctx, ctx->plat.s390x.buf, ctx->plat.s390x.num);
+
+ ctx->plat.s390x.num = 0;
+
+ switch (ctx->plat.s390x.fc) {
+ case S390X_HMAC_SHA_224:
+ result = &ctx->plat.s390x.param.hmac_224_256.h[0];
+ res_len = SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ break;
+ case S390X_HMAC_SHA_256:
+ result = &ctx->plat.s390x.param.hmac_224_256.h[0];
+ res_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ break;
+ case S390X_HMAC_SHA_384:
+ result = &ctx->plat.s390x.param.hmac_384_512.h[0];
+ res_len = SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ break;
+ case S390X_HMAC_SHA_512:
+ result = &ctx->plat.s390x.param.hmac_384_512.h[0];
+ res_len = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(md, result, res_len);
+ if (len != NULL)
+ *len = res_len;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int s390x_HMAC_CTX_copy(HMAC_CTX *dctx, HMAC_CTX *sctx)
+{
+ dctx->plat.s390x.fc = sctx->plat.s390x.fc;
+ dctx->plat.s390x.blk_size = sctx->plat.s390x.blk_size;
+ dctx->plat.s390x.ikp = sctx->plat.s390x.ikp;
+ dctx->plat.s390x.iimp = sctx->plat.s390x.iimp;
+
+ memcpy(&dctx->plat.s390x.param, &sctx->plat.s390x.param,
+ sizeof(dctx->plat.s390x.param));
+
+ dctx->plat.s390x.buf = NULL;
+ if (sctx->plat.s390x.buf != NULL) {
+ dctx->plat.s390x.buf = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->plat.s390x.buf,
+ sctx->plat.s390x.size);
+ if (dctx->plat.s390x.buf == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ dctx->plat.s390x.size = sctx->plat.s390x.size;
+ dctx->plat.s390x.num = sctx->plat.s390x.num;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int s390x_HMAC_CTX_cleanup(HMAC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->plat.s390x.buf, ctx->plat.s390x.size);
+ ctx->plat.s390x.buf = NULL;
+ ctx->plat.s390x.size = 0;
+ ctx->plat.s390x.num = 0;
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(&ctx->plat.s390x.param, sizeof(ctx->plat.s390x.param));
+
+ ctx->plat.s390x.blk_size = 0;
+ ctx->plat.s390x.ikp = 0;
+ ctx->plat.s390x.iimp = 1;
+
+ ctx->plat.s390x.fc = 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#endif
Index: openssl-3.2.3/crypto/s390x_arch.h
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/crypto/s390x_arch.h
+++ openssl-3.2.3/crypto/s390x_arch.h
@@ -192,5 +192,8 @@ extern int OPENSSL_s390xcex;
# define S390X_KMA_HS 0x400
# define S390X_KDSA_D 0x80
# define S390X_KLMD_PS 0x100
+# define S390X_KMAC_IKP 0x8000
+# define S390X_KMAC_IIMP 0x4000
+# define S390X_KMAC_CCUP 0x2000
#endif

View File

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
commit 1337b50936ed190a98af1ee6601d857b42a3d296
Author: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed Sep 27 21:54:34 2023 +0200
Add xof state handing for generic sha3 absorb.
The digest life-cycle diagram specifies state transitions to `updated`
(aka XOF_STATE_ABSORB) only from `initialised` and `updated`. Add this
checking to the generic sha3 absorb implementation.
Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22221)
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
@@ -143,6 +143,10 @@ static size_t generic_sha3_absorb(void *
{
KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx = vctx;
+ if (!(ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_INIT ||
+ ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_ABSORB))
+ return 0;
+ ctx->xof_state = XOF_STATE_ABSORB;
return SHA3_absorb(ctx->A, inp, len, ctx->block_size);
}

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
commit a75d62637aa165a7f37e39a3a36e2a8b089913bc
Author: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Mon Aug 26 11:26:03 2024 +0200
s390x: Disable HMAC hardware acceleration when an engine is used for the digest
The TLSProxy uses the 'ossltest' engine to produce known output for digests
and HMAC calls. However, when running on a s390x system that supports
hardware acceleration of HMAC, the engine is not used for calculating HMACs,
but the s390x specific HMAC implementation is used, which does produce correct
output, but not the known output that the engine would produce. This causes
some tests (i.e. test_key_share, test_sslextension, test_sslrecords,
test_sslvertol, and test_tlsextms) to fail.
Disable the s390x HMAC hardware acceleration if an engine is used for the
digest of the HMAC calculation. This provides compatibility for engines that
provide digest implementations, and assume that these implementations are also
used when calculating an HMAC.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25287)
diff --git a/crypto/hmac/hmac_s390x.c b/crypto/hmac/hmac_s390x.c
index 5db7e9a221..02e1cd1dd6 100644
--- a/crypto/hmac/hmac_s390x.c
+++ b/crypto/hmac/hmac_s390x.c
@@ -7,10 +7,16 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+/* We need to use some engine deprecated APIs */
+#define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
+
#include "crypto/s390x_arch.h"
#include "hmac_local.h"
#include "openssl/obj_mac.h"
#include "openssl/evp.h"
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_HMAC_S390X
@@ -63,6 +69,31 @@ static void s390x_call_kmac(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
ctx->plat.s390x.ikp = 1;
}
+static int s390x_check_engine_used(const EVP_MD *md, ENGINE *impl)
+{
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
+ const EVP_MD *d;
+
+ if (impl != NULL) {
+ if (!ENGINE_init(impl))
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ impl = ENGINE_get_digest_engine(EVP_MD_get_type(md));
+ }
+
+ if (impl == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ d = ENGINE_get_digest(impl, EVP_MD_get_type(md));
+ ENGINE_finish(impl);
+
+ if (d != NULL)
+ return 1;
+# endif
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
int s390x_HMAC_init(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int key_len, ENGINE *impl)
{
unsigned char *key_param;
@@ -72,6 +103,11 @@ int s390x_HMAC_init(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int key_len, ENGINE *impl)
if (ctx->plat.s390x.fc == 0)
return -1; /* Not supported by kmac instruction */
+ if (s390x_check_engine_used(ctx->md, impl)) {
+ ctx->plat.s390x.fc = 0;
+ return -1; /* An engine handles the digest, disable acceleration */
+ }
+
ctx->plat.s390x.blk_size = EVP_MD_get_block_size(ctx->md);
if (ctx->plat.s390x.blk_size < 0)
return 0;

View File

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
commit d5b3c0e24bc56614e92ffafdd705622beaef420a
Author: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed Aug 28 14:56:33 2024 +0200
s390x: Fix HMAC digest detection
Use EVP_MD_is_a() instead of EVP_MD_get_type() to detect the digest
type. EVP_MD_get_type() does not always return the expected NID, e.g.
when running in the FIPS provider, EVP_MD_get_type() returns zero,
causing to skip the HMAC acceleration path.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25304)
diff --git a/crypto/hmac/hmac_s390x.c b/crypto/hmac/hmac_s390x.c
index 8b0da0d59d..5db7e9a221 100644
--- a/crypto/hmac/hmac_s390x.c
+++ b/crypto/hmac/hmac_s390x.c
@@ -18,22 +18,16 @@ static int s390x_fc_from_md(const EVP_MD *md)
{
int fc;
- switch (EVP_MD_get_type(md)) {
- case NID_sha224:
+ if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-224"))
fc = S390X_HMAC_SHA_224;
- break;
- case NID_sha256:
+ else if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-256"))
fc = S390X_HMAC_SHA_256;
- break;
- case NID_sha384:
+ else if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-384"))
fc = S390X_HMAC_SHA_384;
- break;
- case NID_sha512:
+ else if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-512"))
fc = S390X_HMAC_SHA_512;
- break;
- default:
+ else
return 0;
- }
if ((OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmac[1] & S390X_CAPBIT(fc)) == 0)
return 0;

View File

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
commit 19b87d2d2b022c20dd9043c3b6d021315011b45f
Author: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue Aug 20 11:35:20 2024 +0200
s390x: Fix memory leak in s390x_HMAC_CTX_copy()
When s390x_HMAC_CTX_copy() is called, but the destination context already
has a buffer allocated, it is not freed before duplicating the buffer from
the source context.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25238)
diff --git a/crypto/hmac/hmac_s390x.c b/crypto/hmac/hmac_s390x.c
index 1124d9bc5d..8b0da0d59d 100644
--- a/crypto/hmac/hmac_s390x.c
+++ b/crypto/hmac/hmac_s390x.c
@@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ int s390x_HMAC_CTX_copy(HMAC_CTX *dctx, HMAC_CTX *sctx)
memcpy(&dctx->plat.s390x.param, &sctx->plat.s390x.param,
sizeof(dctx->plat.s390x.param));
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(dctx->plat.s390x.buf, dctx->plat.s390x.size);
dctx->plat.s390x.buf = NULL;
if (sctx->plat.s390x.buf != NULL) {
dctx->plat.s390x.buf = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->plat.s390x.buf,

View File

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
From b5795e3ed3ec38ef4686a5b7ff03bfd60183cb71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Randall S. Becker" <randall.becker@nexbridge.ca>
Date: Mon, 20 May 2024 22:23:04 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Added an explicit yield (OP_SLEEP) to QUIC testing for
cooperative threading.
Fixes: #24442
Signed-off-by: Randall S. Becker <randall.becker@nexbridge.ca>
---
test/quic_multistream_test.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
Index: openssl-3.2.3/test/quic_multistream_test.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/test/quic_multistream_test.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/test/quic_multistream_test.c
@@ -2397,6 +2397,7 @@ static const struct script_op script_13_
OP_C_ACCEPT_STREAM_WAIT (a)
OP_C_READ_EXPECT (a, "foo", 3)
+ OP_SLEEP (10)
OP_C_EXPECT_FIN (a)
OP_C_FREE_STREAM (a)

View File

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
From 979dc530010e3c0f045edf6e38c7ab894ffba7f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2024 08:45:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] s390x: Fix s390x_sha3_absorb() when no data is processed by
KIMD
If the data to absorb is less than a block, then the KIMD instruction is
called with zero bytes. This is superfluous, and causes incorrect hash
output later on if this is the very first absorb call, i.e. when the
xof_state is still XOF_STATE_INIT and MSA 12 is available. In this case
the NIP flag is set in the function code for KIMD, but KIMD ignores the
NIP flag when it is called with zero bytes to process.
Skip any KIMD calls for zero length data. Also do not set the xof_state
to XOF_STATE_ABSORB until the first call to KIMD with data. That way,
the next KIMD (with non-zero length data) or KLMD call will get the NIP
flag set and will then honor it to produce correct output.
Fixes: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/25f5d7b85f6657cd2f9f1ab7ae87f319d9bafe54
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25388)
---
providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c | 10 ++++++----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
@@ -192,10 +192,12 @@ static size_t s390x_sha3_absorb(void *vc
if (!(ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_INIT ||
ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_ABSORB))
return 0;
- fc = ctx->pad;
- fc |= ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_INIT ? S390X_KIMD_NIP : 0;
- ctx->xof_state = XOF_STATE_ABSORB;
- s390x_kimd(inp, len - rem, fc, ctx->A);
+ if (len - rem > 0) {
+ fc = ctx->pad;
+ fc |= ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_INIT ? S390X_KIMD_NIP : 0;
+ ctx->xof_state = XOF_STATE_ABSORB;
+ s390x_kimd(inp, len - rem, fc, ctx->A);
+ }
return rem;
}

View File

@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
From dc5afb7e87ee448f4fecad0dc624c643505ba7f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2024 13:42:09 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] s390x: Fix s390x_shake_squeeze() when MSA 12 is available
On the first squeeze call, when finishing the absorb process, also set
the NIP flag, if we are still in XOF_STATE_INIT state. When MSA 12 is
available, the state buffer A has not been zeroed during initialization,
thus we must also pass the NIP flag here. This situation can happen
when a squeeze is performed without a preceding absorb (i.e. a SHAKE
of the empty message).
Add a test that performs a squeeze without a preceding absorb and check
if the result is correct.
Fixes: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/25f5d7b85f6657cd2f9f1ab7ae87f319d9bafe54
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25388)
---
providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c | 5 +++-
test/evp_xof_test.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
@@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ static int s390x_shake_final(void *vctx,
static int s390x_shake_squeeze(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx = vctx;
+ unsigned int fc;
size_t len;
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
@@ -249,8 +250,10 @@ static int s390x_shake_squeeze(void *vct
* On the first squeeze call, finish the absorb process (incl. padding).
*/
if (ctx->xof_state != XOF_STATE_SQUEEZE) {
+ fc = ctx->pad;
+ fc |= ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_INIT ? S390X_KLMD_NIP : 0;
ctx->xof_state = XOF_STATE_SQUEEZE;
- s390x_klmd(ctx->buf, ctx->bufsz, out, outlen, ctx->pad, ctx->A);
+ s390x_klmd(ctx->buf, ctx->bufsz, out, outlen, fc, ctx->A);
ctx->bufsz = outlen % ctx->block_size;
/* reuse ctx->bufsz to count bytes squeezed from current sponge */
return 1;
Index: openssl-3.2.3/test/evp_xof_test.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/test/evp_xof_test.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/test/evp_xof_test.c
@@ -479,6 +479,34 @@ err:
return ret;
}
+/* Test that a squeeze without a preceding absorb works */
+static int shake_squeeze_no_absorb_test(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ unsigned char out[1000];
+ unsigned char out2[1000];
+ const char *alg = "SHAKE128";
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = shake_setup(alg))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestFinalXOF(ctx, out, sizeof(out))))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(EVP_DigestInit_ex2(ctx, NULL, NULL))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestSqueeze(ctx, out2, sizeof(out2) / 2))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestSqueeze(ctx, out2 + sizeof(out2) / 2,
+ sizeof(out2) / 2)))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!TEST_mem_eq(out2, sizeof(out2), out, sizeof(out)))
+ goto err;
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
int setup_tests(void)
{
ADD_TEST(shake_kat_test);
@@ -488,5 +516,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_ALL_TESTS(shake_squeeze_kat_test, OSSL_NELEM(stride_tests));
ADD_ALL_TESTS(shake_squeeze_large_test, OSSL_NELEM(stride_tests));
ADD_ALL_TESTS(shake_squeeze_dup_test, OSSL_NELEM(dupoffset_tests));
+ ADD_TEST(shake_squeeze_no_absorb_test);
+
return 1;
}

View File

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
commit ed5e478261127cafe9c3f86c4992eab1e5c7ebb1
Author: Rohan McLure <rmclure@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue Nov 14 14:14:33 2023 +1100
ppc64: Fix SHA3_squeeze
Fix the conditional on the 'next' parameter passed into SHA3_squeeze.
Reported-by: David Benjamin <davidben@davidben.net>
Signed-off-by: Rohan McLure <rmclure@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22722)
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/keccak1600-ppc64.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/keccak1600-ppc64.pl
index 3f8ba817f8..fe7d6db20e 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/keccak1600-ppc64.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/keccak1600-ppc64.pl
@@ -668,8 +668,8 @@ SHA3_squeeze:
subi $out,r4,1 ; prepare for stbu
mr $len,r5
mr $bsz,r6
- ${UCMP}i r7,1 ; r7 = 'next' argument
- blt .Lnext_block
+ ${UCMP}i r7,0 ; r7 = 'next' argument
+ bne .Lnext_block
b .Loop_squeeze
.align 4

View File

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
commit 1022131d16e30cfbf896e02419019de48e8e1149
Author: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed Sep 27 15:43:18 2023 +0200
Fix state handling of keccak_final for s390x.
The digest life-cycle state diagram has been updated for XOF. Fix the
state handling in s390x_keccac_final() according to the updated state
diagram.
Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22221)
diff --git a/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c b/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
index 34620cf95a..f691273baf 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
@@ -235,6 +235,10 @@ static int s390x_keccakc_final(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return 0;
+ if (!(ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_INIT ||
+ ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_ABSORB))
+ return 0;
+ ctx->xof_state = XOF_STATE_FINAL;
if (outlen == 0)
return 1;
memset(ctx->buf + num, 0, bsz - num);

View File

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
commit 7aa45b8bb3269e881d0378aa785ff344efdd2897
Author: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed Sep 27 15:36:23 2023 +0200
Fix state handling of sha3_absorb for s390x.
The digest life-cycle state diagram has been updated for XOF. Fix the
state handling in s390x_sha3_aborb() according to the updated state
diagram.
Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22221)
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
@@ -188,6 +188,10 @@ static size_t s390x_sha3_absorb(void *vc
KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx = vctx;
size_t rem = len % ctx->block_size;
+ if (!(ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_INIT ||
+ ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_ABSORB))
+ return 0;
+ ctx->xof_state = XOF_STATE_ABSORB;
s390x_kimd(inp, len - rem, ctx->pad, ctx->A);
return rem;
}

View File

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
commit 017acc58f6b67d5b347db411a7a1c4e890434f42
Author: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed Sep 27 15:36:59 2023 +0200
Fix state handling of sha3_final for s390x.
The digest life-cycle state diagram has been updated for XOF. Fix the
state handling in s390x_sha3_final() according to the updated state
diagram.
Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22221)
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
@@ -202,6 +202,10 @@ static int s390x_sha3_final(void *vctx,
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return 0;
+ if (!(ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_INIT ||
+ ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_ABSORB))
+ return 0;
+ ctx->xof_state = XOF_STATE_FINAL;
s390x_klmd(ctx->buf, ctx->bufsz, NULL, 0, ctx->pad, ctx->A);
memcpy(out, ctx->A, outlen);
return 1;

View File

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
commit 288fbb4b71343516cee6f6a44b9ec55d82fb1532
Author: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed Sep 27 15:37:29 2023 +0200
Fix state handling of shake_final for s390x.
The digest life-cycle state diagram has been updated for XOF. Fix the
state handling in s390x_shake_final() according to the updated state
diagram.
Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22221)
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
@@ -217,6 +217,10 @@ static int s390x_shake_final(void *vctx,
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return 0;
+ if (!(ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_INIT ||
+ ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_ABSORB))
+ return 0;
+ ctx->xof_state = XOF_STATE_FINAL;
s390x_klmd(ctx->buf, ctx->bufsz, out, outlen, ctx->pad, ctx->A);
return 1;
}

View File

@@ -1,327 +0,0 @@
commit 9cd4051e47c8da8398f93f42f0f56750552965f4
Author: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue Aug 6 14:00:49 2024 +0200
s390x: Add hardware acceleration for full AES-XTS
The CPACF instruction KM provides support for accelerating the full
AES-XTS algorithm on newer machines for AES_XTS_128 and AES_XTS_256.
Preliminary measurements showed performance improvements of up to 50%,
dependent on the message size.
Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25414)
diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/build.info b/providers/implementations/ciphers/build.info
index 5eb705969f..1837070c21 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/build.info
+++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/build.info
@@ -71,6 +71,19 @@ IF[{- !$disabled{asm} -}]
ENDIF
ENDIF
+IF[{- !$disabled{asm} -}]
+ IF[{- ($target{perlasm_scheme} // '') ne '31' -}]
+ $AESXTSDEF_s390x=AES_XTS_S390X
+ ENDIF
+
+ # Now that we have defined all the arch specific variables, use the
+ # appropriate one, and define the appropriate macros
+
+ IF[$AESXTSDEF_{- $target{asm_arch} -}]
+ $AESXTSDEF=$AESXTSDEF_{- $target{asm_arch} -}
+ ENDIF
+ENDIF
+
# This source is common building blocks for all ciphers in all our providers.
SOURCE[$COMMON_GOAL]=\
ciphercommon.c ciphercommon_hw.c ciphercommon_block.c \
@@ -93,6 +106,7 @@ SOURCE[$AES_GOAL]=\
cipher_aes_cbc_hmac_sha.c \
cipher_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256_hw.c cipher_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1_hw.c \
cipher_cts.c
+DEFINE[$AES_GOAL]=$AESXTSDEF
# Extra code to satisfy the FIPS and non-FIPS separation.
# When the AES-xxx-XTS moves to legacy, cipher_aes_xts_fips.c can be removed.
diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_xts.c b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_xts.c
index cce2537ea7..2287834d62 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_xts.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_xts.c
@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@ static int aes_xts_check_keys_differ(const unsigned char *key, size_t bytes,
return 1;
}
+#ifdef AES_XTS_S390X
+# include "cipher_aes_xts_s390x.inc"
+#endif
+
/*-
* Provider dispatch functions
*/
@@ -98,6 +102,10 @@ static int aes_xts_einit(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
+#ifdef AES_XTS_S390X
+ if (s390x_aes_xts_einit(vctx, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, params) == 1)
+ return 1;
+#endif
return aes_xts_init(vctx, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, params, 1);
}
@@ -105,6 +113,10 @@ static int aes_xts_dinit(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
+#ifdef AES_XTS_S390X
+ if (s390x_aes_xts_dinit(vctx, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, params) == 1)
+ return 1;
+#endif
return aes_xts_init(vctx, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, params, 0);
}
@@ -137,6 +149,11 @@ static void *aes_xts_dupctx(void *vctx)
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return NULL;
+#ifdef AES_XTS_S390X
+ if (in->plat.s390x.fc)
+ return s390x_aes_xts_dupctx(vctx);
+#endif
+
if (in->xts.key1 != NULL) {
if (in->xts.key1 != &in->ks1)
return NULL;
@@ -157,6 +174,11 @@ static int aes_xts_cipher(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
{
PROV_AES_XTS_CTX *ctx = (PROV_AES_XTS_CTX *)vctx;
+#ifdef AES_XTS_S390X
+ if (ctx->plat.s390x.fc)
+ return s390x_aes_xts_cipher(vctx, out, outl, outsize, in, inl);
+#endif
+
if (!ossl_prov_is_running()
|| ctx->xts.key1 == NULL
|| ctx->xts.key2 == NULL
diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_xts.h b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_xts.h
index afc42ef444..56891ca98c 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_xts.h
+++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_xts.h
@@ -22,6 +22,14 @@ PROV_CIPHER_FUNC(void, xts_stream,
const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
const unsigned char iv[16]));
+#if defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && defined(__s390__)
+typedef struct S390X_km_xts_params_st {
+ unsigned char key[64];
+ unsigned char tweak[16];
+ unsigned char nap[16];
+} S390X_KM_XTS_PARAMS;
+#endif
+
typedef struct prov_aes_xts_ctx_st {
PROV_CIPHER_CTX base; /* Must be first */
union {
@@ -30,6 +38,23 @@ typedef struct prov_aes_xts_ctx_st {
} ks1, ks2; /* AES key schedules to use */
XTS128_CONTEXT xts;
OSSL_xts_stream_fn stream;
+
+ /* Platform specific data */
+ union {
+ int dummy;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && defined(__s390__)
+ struct {
+ union {
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
+ S390X_KM_XTS_PARAMS km;
+ } param;
+ size_t offset;
+ unsigned int fc;
+ unsigned int iv_set : 1;
+ unsigned int key_set : 1;
+ } s390x;
+#endif
+ } plat;
} PROV_AES_XTS_CTX;
const PROV_CIPHER_HW *ossl_prov_cipher_hw_aes_xts(size_t keybits);
diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_xts_s390x.inc b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_xts_s390x.inc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..77341b3bbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_xts_s390x.inc
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "crypto/s390x_arch.h"
+
+static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_encrypt_init_fn s390x_aes_xts_einit;
+static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_decrypt_init_fn s390x_aes_xts_dinit;
+static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_cipher_fn s390x_aes_xts_cipher;
+static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_dupctx_fn s390x_aes_xts_dupctx;
+
+static int s390x_aes_xts_init(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ size_t keylen, const unsigned char *iv,
+ size_t ivlen, const OSSL_PARAM params[],
+ unsigned int dec)
+{
+ PROV_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = (PROV_AES_XTS_CTX *)vctx;
+ S390X_KM_XTS_PARAMS *km = &xctx->plat.s390x.param.km;
+ unsigned int fc, offs;
+
+ switch (xctx->base.keylen) {
+ case 128 / 8 * 2:
+ fc = S390X_XTS_AES_128_MSA10;
+ offs = 32;
+ break;
+ case 256 / 8 * 2:
+ fc = S390X_XTS_AES_256_MSA10;
+ offs = 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto not_supported;
+ }
+
+ if (!(OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.km[1] && S390X_CAPBIT(fc)))
+ goto not_supported;
+
+ if (iv != NULL) {
+ if (ivlen != xctx->base.ivlen
+ || ivlen > sizeof(km->tweak)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(km->tweak, iv, ivlen);
+ xctx->plat.s390x.iv_set = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (key != NULL) {
+ if (keylen != xctx->base.keylen) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!aes_xts_check_keys_differ(key, keylen / 2, !dec))
+ return 0;
+
+ memcpy(km->key + offs, key, keylen);
+ xctx->plat.s390x.key_set = 1;
+ }
+
+ xctx->plat.s390x.fc = fc | dec;
+ xctx->plat.s390x.offset = offs;
+
+ memset(km->nap, 0, sizeof(km->nap));
+ km->nap[0] = 0x1;
+
+ return aes_xts_set_ctx_params(xctx, params);
+
+not_supported:
+ xctx->plat.s390x.fc = 0;
+ xctx->plat.s390x.offset = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int s390x_aes_xts_einit(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ size_t keylen, const unsigned char *iv,
+ size_t ivlen, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ return s390x_aes_xts_init(vctx, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, params, 0);
+}
+
+static int s390x_aes_xts_dinit(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ size_t keylen, const unsigned char *iv,
+ size_t ivlen, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ return s390x_aes_xts_init(vctx, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, params,
+ S390X_DECRYPT);
+}
+
+static void *s390x_aes_xts_dupctx(void *vctx)
+{
+ PROV_AES_XTS_CTX *in = (PROV_AES_XTS_CTX *)vctx;
+ PROV_AES_XTS_CTX *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*in));
+
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ *ret = *in;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int s390x_aes_xts_cipher(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
+ size_t outsize, const unsigned char *in,
+ size_t inl)
+{
+ PROV_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = (PROV_AES_XTS_CTX *)vctx;
+ S390X_KM_XTS_PARAMS *km = &xctx->plat.s390x.param.km;
+ unsigned char *param = (unsigned char *)km + xctx->plat.s390x.offset;
+ unsigned int fc = xctx->plat.s390x.fc;
+ unsigned char tmp[2][AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char nap_n1[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char drop[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ size_t len_incomplete, len_complete;
+
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running()
+ || inl < AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ || in == NULL
+ || out == NULL
+ || !xctx->plat.s390x.iv_set
+ || !xctx->plat.s390x.key_set)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Impose a limit of 2^20 blocks per data unit as specified by
+ * IEEE Std 1619-2018. The earlier and obsolete IEEE Std 1619-2007
+ * indicated that this was a SHOULD NOT rather than a MUST NOT.
+ * NIST SP 800-38E mandates the same limit.
+ */
+ if (inl > XTS_MAX_BLOCKS_PER_DATA_UNIT * AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_XTS_DATA_UNIT_IS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ len_incomplete = inl % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ len_complete = (len_incomplete == 0) ? inl :
+ (inl / AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1) * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+ if (len_complete > 0)
+ s390x_km(in, len_complete, out, fc, param);
+ if (len_incomplete == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ memcpy(tmp, in + len_complete, AES_BLOCK_SIZE + len_incomplete);
+ /* swap NAP for decrypt */
+ if (fc & S390X_DECRYPT) {
+ memcpy(nap_n1, km->nap, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ s390x_km(tmp[0], AES_BLOCK_SIZE, drop, fc, param);
+ }
+ s390x_km(tmp[0], AES_BLOCK_SIZE, tmp[0], fc, param);
+ if (fc & S390X_DECRYPT)
+ memcpy(km->nap, nap_n1, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ memcpy(tmp[1] + len_incomplete, tmp[0] + len_incomplete,
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE - len_incomplete);
+ s390x_km(tmp[1], AES_BLOCK_SIZE, out + len_complete, fc, param);
+ memcpy(out + len_complete + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, tmp[0], len_incomplete);
+
+ /* do not expose temporary data */
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+out:
+ memcpy(xctx->base.iv, km->tweak, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ *outl = inl;
+
+ return 1;
+}

View File

@@ -1,364 +0,0 @@
Index: openssl-3.2.3/Configurations/00-base-templates.conf
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/Configurations/00-base-templates.conf
+++ openssl-3.2.3/Configurations/00-base-templates.conf
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ my %targets=(
sub {
my @libs = ();
push(@libs, "-lz") if !defined($disabled{zlib}) && defined($disabled{"zlib-dynamic"});
+ push(@libs, "-ljitterentropy") if !defined($disabled{jitterentropy});
if (!defined($disabled{brotli}) && defined($disabled{"brotli-dynamic"})) {
push(@libs, "-lbrotlienc");
push(@libs, "-lbrotlidec");
Index: openssl-3.2.3/crypto/rand/rand_jitter_entropy.c
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ openssl-3.2.3/crypto/rand/rand_jitter_entropy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+# include "jitterentropy.h"
+# include "prov/jitter_entropy.h"
+
+struct rand_data* ec = NULL;
+CRYPTO_RWLOCK *jent_lock = NULL;
+int stop = 0;
+
+struct rand_data* FIPS_entropy_init(void)
+{
+ if (ec != NULL) {
+ /* Entropy source has been initiated and collector allocated */
+ return ec;
+ }
+ if (stop != 0) {
+ /* FIPS_entropy_cleanup() already called, don't initialize it again */
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (jent_lock == NULL) {
+ /* Allocates a new lock to serialize access to jent library */
+ jent_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (jent_lock == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(jent_lock) == 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* If the initialization is successful, the call returns with 0 */
+ if (jent_entropy_init_ex(1, JENT_FORCE_FIPS) == 0) {
+ /* Allocate entropy collector */
+ ec = jent_entropy_collector_alloc(1, JENT_FORCE_FIPS);
+ } else {
+ /* abort if jitter rng fails initialization */
+ abort();
+ }
+ if (ec == NULL) {
+ /* abort if jitter rng fails initialization */
+ abort();
+ }
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(jent_lock);
+
+ return ec;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following error codes can be returned by jent_read_entropy_safe():
+ * -1 entropy_collector is NULL
+ * -2 RCT failed
+ * -3 APT failed
+ * -4 The timer cannot be initialized
+ * -5 LAG failure
+ * -6 RCT permanent failure
+ * -7 APT permanent failure
+ * -8 LAG permanent failure
+ */
+ssize_t FIPS_jitter_entropy(unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ ssize_t ent_bytes = -1;
+
+ /*
+ * Order is important. We need to call FIPS_entropy_init() before we
+ * acquire jent_lock, otherwise it can lead to deadlock. Once we have
+ * jent_lock, we need to ensure that FIPS_entropy_cleanup() was not called
+ * in the meantime. Then it's safe to read entropy.
+ */
+ if (buf != NULL
+ && buflen != 0
+ && FIPS_entropy_init()
+ && CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(jent_lock) != 0
+ && stop == 0) {
+ /* Get entropy */
+ ent_bytes = jent_read_entropy_safe(&ec, (char *)buf, buflen);
+ if (ent_bytes < 0) {
+ /* abort if jitter rng fails entropy gathering because health tests failed. */
+ abort();
+ }
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(jent_lock);
+ }
+
+ return ent_bytes;
+}
+
+void FIPS_entropy_cleanup(void)
+{
+ if (jent_lock != NULL && stop == 0) {
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(jent_lock);
+ }
+ /* Disable re-initialization in FIPS_entropy_init() */
+ stop = 1;
+ /* Free entropy collector */
+ if (ec != NULL) {
+ jent_entropy_collector_free(ec);
+ ec = NULL;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(jent_lock);
+ jent_lock = NULL;
+}
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include "internal/dso.h"
#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include "prov/seeding.h"
+#include "prov/jitter_entropy.h"
#ifdef __linux
# include <sys/syscall.h>
@@ -633,6 +634,31 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_PO
(void)entropy_available; /* avoid compiler warning */
+ /* Use jitter entropy in FIPS mode */
+ if (EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL))
+ {
+ size_t bytes_needed;
+ unsigned char *buffer;
+ ssize_t bytes;
+ /* Maximum allowed number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */
+ int attempts = 3;
+
+ bytes_needed = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
+ while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
+ buffer = ossl_rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
+ bytes = FIPS_jitter_entropy(buffer, bytes_needed);
+ if (bytes > 0) {
+ ossl_rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ bytes_needed -= bytes;
+ attempts = 3; /* reset counter after successful attempt */
+ } else if (bytes < 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ entropy_available = ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
+ return entropy_available;
+ }
+
# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM)
{
size_t bytes_needed;
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/include/prov/jitter_entropy.h
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/include/prov/jitter_entropy.h
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#ifndef OSSL_PROVIDERS_JITTER_ENTROPY_H
+# define OSSL_PROVIDERS_JITTER_ENTROPY_H
+
+# include <openssl/core.h>
+# include <openssl/types.h>
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# include <openssl/fips.h>
+
+extern struct rand_data* ec;
+extern CRYPTO_RWLOCK *jent_lock;
+extern int stop;
+
+struct rand_data* FIPS_entropy_init(void);
+ssize_t FIPS_jitter_entropy(unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen);
+void FIPS_entropy_cleanup(void);
+
+#endif
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/fips/self_test.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/fips/self_test.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/fips/self_test.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include "internal/tsan_assist.h"
#include "prov/providercommon.h"
#include "crypto/rand.h"
+#include "prov/jitter_entropy.h"
/*
* We're cheating here. Normally we don't allow RUN_ONCE usage inside the FIPS
@@ -498,6 +499,11 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS
return 0;
}
+ if (!FIPS_entropy_init()) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FIPS_ENTROPY_INIT_FAILED);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
if (st == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CONFIG_DATA);
goto end;
Index: openssl-3.2.3/include/openssl/proverr.h
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/include/openssl/proverr.h
+++ openssl-3.2.3/include/openssl/proverr.h
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
# define PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER 103
# define PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER 104
# define PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SIGN 175
+# define PROV_R_FIPS_ENTROPY_INIT_FAILED 234
# define PROV_R_FIPS_MODULE_CONDITIONAL_ERROR 227
# define PROV_R_FIPS_MODULE_ENTERING_ERROR_STATE 224
# define PROV_R_FIPS_MODULE_IN_ERROR_STATE 225
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/common/provider_err.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/common/provider_err.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/common/provider_err.c
@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA PROV_str_re
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER),
"failed to set parameter"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SIGN), "failed to sign"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_FIPS_ENTROPY_INIT_FAILED),
+ "fips module jitter entropy init failed"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_FIPS_MODULE_CONDITIONAL_ERROR),
"fips module conditional error"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_FIPS_MODULE_ENTERING_ERROR_STATE),
Index: openssl-3.2.3/crypto/rand/build.info
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/crypto/rand/build.info
+++ openssl-3.2.3/crypto/rand/build.info
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
LIBS=../../libcrypto
-$COMMON=rand_lib.c
+$COMMON=rand_lib.c rand_jitter_entropy.c
$CRYPTO=randfile.c rand_err.c rand_deprecated.c prov_seed.c rand_pool.c \
rand_uniform.c
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include "crypto/context.h"
#include "internal/core.h"
#include "indicator.h"
+#include "prov/jitter_entropy.h"
static const char FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES[] = "provider=fips,fips=yes";
static const char FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES[] = "provider=fips,fips=no";
@@ -609,6 +610,7 @@ const OSSL_SUSE_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM
static void fips_teardown(void *provctx)
{
+ FIPS_entropy_cleanup();
OSSL_LIB_CTX_free(PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx));
ossl_prov_ctx_free(provctx);
}
Index: openssl-3.2.3/util/libcrypto.num
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/util/libcrypto.num
+++ openssl-3.2.3/util/libcrypto.num
@@ -5539,3 +5539,5 @@ BIO_ADDR_copy
ossl_safe_getenv ? 3_2_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed ? 3_0_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set ? 3_0_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+FIPS_entropy_init ? 3_1_4 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+FIPS_entropy_cleanup ? 3_1_4 EXIST::FUNCTION:
Index: openssl-3.2.3/Configure
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/Configure
+++ openssl-3.2.3/Configure
@@ -469,6 +469,7 @@ my @disablables = (
"gost",
"http",
"idea",
+ "jitterentropy",
"ktls",
"legacy",
"loadereng",
@@ -573,6 +574,7 @@ our %disabled = ( # "what" => "c
"external-tests" => "default",
"fuzz-afl" => "default",
"fuzz-libfuzzer" => "default",
+ "jitterentropy" => "default",
"ktls" => "default",
"md2" => "default",
"msan" => "default",
@@ -801,7 +803,7 @@ my %cmdvars = (); # Stores
my %unsupported_options = ();
my %deprecated_options = ();
# If you change this, update apps/version.c
-my @known_seed_sources = qw(getrandom devrandom os egd none rdcpu librandom);
+my @known_seed_sources = qw(getrandom devrandom os egd none rdcpu librandom jitterentropy);
my @seed_sources = ();
while (@argvcopy)
{
@@ -1291,6 +1293,9 @@ if (scalar(@seed_sources) == 0) {
if (scalar(grep { $_ eq 'egd' } @seed_sources) > 0) {
delete $disabled{'egd'};
}
+if (scalar(grep { $_ eq 'jitterentropy' } @seed_sources) > 0) {
+ delete $disabled{'jitterentropy'};
+}
if (scalar(grep { $_ eq 'none' } @seed_sources) > 0) {
die "Cannot seed with none and anything else" if scalar(@seed_sources) > 1;
warn <<_____ if scalar(@seed_sources) == 1;
Index: openssl-3.2.3/crypto/info.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/crypto/info.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/crypto/info.c
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
#include "internal/e_os.h"
#include "buildinf.h"
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <jitterentropy.h>
+
#if defined(__arm__) || defined(__arm) || defined(__aarch64__)
# include "arm_arch.h"
# define CPU_INFO_STR_LEN 128
@@ -128,6 +131,14 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(init_info_strings
OPENSSL_strlcat(seeds, ")", sizeof(seeds)); \
} while (0)
+ /* In FIPS mode, only jitterentropy is used for seeding and
+ * reseeding the primary DRBG.
+ */
+ if (EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL)) {
+ char jent_version_string[32];
+ sprintf(jent_version_string, "jitterentropy (%d)", jent_version());
+ add_seeds_string(jent_version_string);
+ } else {
#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE
add_seeds_string("none");
#endif
@@ -156,6 +167,7 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(init_info_strings
#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
add_seeds_string("os-specific");
#endif
+ }
seed_sources = seeds;
}
return 1;
Index: openssl-3.2.3/INSTALL.md
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/INSTALL.md
+++ openssl-3.2.3/INSTALL.md
@@ -511,6 +511,12 @@ if provided by the CPU.
Use librandom (not implemented yet).
This source is ignored by the FIPS provider.
+### jitterentropy
+
+Use [jitterentropy-library](https://github.com/smuellerDD/jitterentropy-library)
+dynamically linked. In FIPS mode, only the jitter RNG is used to seed and reseed
+the primary DRBG.
+
### none
Disable automatic seeding. This is the default on some operating systems where

View File

@@ -1,196 +0,0 @@
From 25f5d7b85f6657cd2f9f1ab7ae87f319d9bafe54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Feb 2024 12:50:05 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] s390x: support CPACF sha3/shake performance improvements
On newer machines the SHA3/SHAKE performance of CPACF instructions KIMD and KLMD
can be enhanced by using additional modifier bits. This allows the application
to omit initializing the ICV, but also affects the internal processing of the
instructions. Performance is mostly gained when processing short messages.
The new CPACF feature is backwards compatible with older machines, i.e. the new
modifier bits are ignored on older machines. However, to save the ICV
initialization, the application must detect the MSA level and omit the ICV
initialization only if this feature is supported.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25235)
---
crypto/s390x_arch.h | 3 ++
crypto/s390xcpuid.pl | 4 +--
crypto/sha/sha3.c | 8 +++++-
providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c | 28 +++++++++++++++----
4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Index: openssl-3.2.3/crypto/s390x_arch.h
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/crypto/s390x_arch.h
+++ openssl-3.2.3/crypto/s390x_arch.h
@@ -191,6 +191,9 @@ extern int OPENSSL_s390xcex;
# define S390X_KMA_LAAD 0x200
# define S390X_KMA_HS 0x400
# define S390X_KDSA_D 0x80
+# define S390X_KIMD_NIP 0x8000
+# define S390X_KLMD_DUFOP 0x4000
+# define S390X_KLMD_NIP 0x8000
# define S390X_KLMD_PS 0x100
# define S390X_KMAC_IKP 0x8000
# define S390X_KMAC_IIMP 0x4000
Index: openssl-3.2.3/crypto/s390xcpuid.pl
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/crypto/s390xcpuid.pl
+++ openssl-3.2.3/crypto/s390xcpuid.pl
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ s390x_kimd:
llgfr %r0,$fc
lgr %r1,$param
- .long 0xb93e0002 # kimd %r0,%r2
+ .long 0xb93e8002 # kimd %r0,%r2[,M3]
brc 1,.-4 # pay attention to "partial completion"
br $ra
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ s390x_klmd:
llgfr %r0,$fc
l${g} %r1,$stdframe($sp)
- .long 0xb93f0042 # klmd %r4,%r2
+ .long 0xb93f8042 # klmd %r4,%r2[,M3]
brc 1,.-4 # pay attention to "partial completion"
br $ra
Index: openssl-3.2.3/crypto/sha/sha3.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/crypto/sha/sha3.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/crypto/sha/sha3.c
@@ -8,13 +8,19 @@
*/
#include <string.h>
+#if defined(__s390x__) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ)
+# include "crypto/s390x_arch.h"
+#endif
#include "internal/sha3.h"
void SHA3_squeeze(uint64_t A[5][5], unsigned char *out, size_t len, size_t r, int next);
void ossl_sha3_reset(KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx)
{
- memset(ctx->A, 0, sizeof(ctx->A));
+#if defined(__s390x__) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ)
+ if (!(OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.stfle[1] & S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA12)))
+#endif
+ memset(ctx->A, 0, sizeof(ctx->A));
ctx->bufsz = 0;
ctx->xof_state = XOF_STATE_INIT;
}
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
@@ -187,26 +187,32 @@ static size_t s390x_sha3_absorb(void *vc
{
KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx = vctx;
size_t rem = len % ctx->block_size;
+ unsigned int fc;
if (!(ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_INIT ||
ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_ABSORB))
return 0;
+ fc = ctx->pad;
+ fc |= ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_INIT ? S390X_KIMD_NIP : 0;
ctx->xof_state = XOF_STATE_ABSORB;
- s390x_kimd(inp, len - rem, ctx->pad, ctx->A);
+ s390x_kimd(inp, len - rem, fc, ctx->A);
return rem;
}
static int s390x_sha3_final(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx = vctx;
+ unsigned int fc;
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return 0;
if (!(ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_INIT ||
ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_ABSORB))
return 0;
+ fc = ctx->pad | S390X_KLMD_DUFOP;
+ fc |= ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_INIT ? S390X_KLMD_NIP : 0;
ctx->xof_state = XOF_STATE_FINAL;
- s390x_klmd(ctx->buf, ctx->bufsz, NULL, 0, ctx->pad, ctx->A);
+ s390x_klmd(ctx->buf, ctx->bufsz, NULL, 0, fc, ctx->A);
memcpy(out, ctx->A, outlen);
return 1;
}
@@ -214,14 +220,17 @@ static int s390x_sha3_final(void *vctx,
static int s390x_shake_final(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx = vctx;
+ unsigned int fc;
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return 0;
if (!(ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_INIT ||
ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_ABSORB))
return 0;
+ fc = ctx->pad | S390X_KLMD_DUFOP;
+ fc |= ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_INIT ? S390X_KLMD_NIP : 0;
ctx->xof_state = XOF_STATE_FINAL;
- s390x_klmd(ctx->buf, ctx->bufsz, out, outlen, ctx->pad, ctx->A);
+ s390x_klmd(ctx->buf, ctx->bufsz, out, outlen, fc, ctx->A);
return 1;
}
@@ -271,24 +280,28 @@ static int s390x_keccakc_final(void *vct
size_t bsz = ctx->block_size;
size_t num = ctx->bufsz;
size_t needed = outlen;
+ unsigned int fc;
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return 0;
if (!(ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_INIT ||
ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_ABSORB))
return 0;
+ fc = ctx->pad;
+ fc |= ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_INIT ? S390X_KIMD_NIP : 0;
ctx->xof_state = XOF_STATE_FINAL;
if (outlen == 0)
return 1;
memset(ctx->buf + num, 0, bsz - num);
ctx->buf[num] = padding;
ctx->buf[bsz - 1] |= 0x80;
- s390x_kimd(ctx->buf, bsz, ctx->pad, ctx->A);
+ s390x_kimd(ctx->buf, bsz, fc, ctx->A);
num = needed > bsz ? bsz : needed;
memcpy(out, ctx->A, num);
needed -= num;
if (needed > 0)
- s390x_klmd(NULL, 0, out + bsz, needed, ctx->pad | S390X_KLMD_PS, ctx->A);
+ s390x_klmd(NULL, 0, out + bsz, needed,
+ ctx->pad | S390X_KLMD_PS | S390X_KLMD_DUFOP, ctx->A);
return 1;
}
@@ -308,6 +321,7 @@ static int s390x_keccakc_squeeze(void *v
{
KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx = vctx;
size_t len;
+ unsigned int fc;
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return 0;
@@ -323,7 +337,9 @@ static int s390x_keccakc_squeeze(void *v
memset(ctx->buf + ctx->bufsz, 0, len);
ctx->buf[ctx->bufsz] = padding;
ctx->buf[ctx->block_size - 1] |= 0x80;
- s390x_kimd(ctx->buf, ctx->block_size, ctx->pad, ctx->A);
+ fc = ctx->pad;
+ fc |= ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_INIT ? S390X_KIMD_NIP : 0;
+ s390x_kimd(ctx->buf, ctx->block_size, fc, ctx->A);
ctx->bufsz = 0;
/* reuse ctx->bufsz to count bytes squeezed from current sponge */
}

View File

@@ -1,160 +0,0 @@
commit 94898923538f686b74b6ddef34571f804d9b3811
Author: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed Sep 27 15:40:47 2023 +0200
Support EVP_DigestSqueeze() for in the digest provider for s390x.
The new EVP_DigestSqueeze() API requires changes to all keccak-based
digest provider implementations. Update the s390x-part of the SHA3
digest provider.
Squeeze for SHA3 is not supported, so add an empty function pointer
(NULL).
Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22221)
diff --git a/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c b/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
index f691273baf..2fd0f928e7 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
@@ -225,6 +225,45 @@ static int s390x_shake_final(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
return 1;
}
+static int s390x_shake_squeeze(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+{
+ KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx = vctx;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+ if (ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_FINAL)
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * On the first squeeze call, finish the absorb process (incl. padding).
+ */
+ if (ctx->xof_state != XOF_STATE_SQUEEZE) {
+ ctx->xof_state = XOF_STATE_SQUEEZE;
+ s390x_klmd(ctx->buf, ctx->bufsz, out, outlen, ctx->pad, ctx->A);
+ ctx->bufsz = outlen % ctx->block_size;
+ /* reuse ctx->bufsz to count bytes squeezed from current sponge */
+ return 1;
+ }
+ ctx->xof_state = XOF_STATE_SQUEEZE;
+ if (ctx->bufsz != 0) {
+ len = ctx->block_size - ctx->bufsz;
+ if (outlen < len)
+ len = outlen;
+ memcpy(out, (char *)ctx->A + ctx->bufsz, len);
+ out += len;
+ outlen -= len;
+ ctx->bufsz += len;
+ if (ctx->bufsz == ctx->block_size)
+ ctx->bufsz = 0;
+ }
+ if (outlen == 0)
+ return 1;
+ s390x_klmd(NULL, 0, out, outlen, ctx->pad | S390X_KLMD_PS, ctx->A);
+ ctx->bufsz = outlen % ctx->block_size;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int s390x_keccakc_final(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
int padding)
{
@@ -264,28 +303,86 @@ static int s390x_kmac_final(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
return s390x_keccakc_final(vctx, out, outlen, 0x04);
}
+static int s390x_keccakc_squeeze(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
+ int padding)
+{
+ KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx = vctx;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+ if (ctx->xof_state == XOF_STATE_FINAL)
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * On the first squeeze call, finish the absorb process
+ * by adding the trailing padding and then doing
+ * a final absorb.
+ */
+ if (ctx->xof_state != XOF_STATE_SQUEEZE) {
+ len = ctx->block_size - ctx->bufsz;
+ memset(ctx->buf + ctx->bufsz, 0, len);
+ ctx->buf[ctx->bufsz] = padding;
+ ctx->buf[ctx->block_size - 1] |= 0x80;
+ s390x_kimd(ctx->buf, ctx->block_size, ctx->pad, ctx->A);
+ ctx->bufsz = 0;
+ /* reuse ctx->bufsz to count bytes squeezed from current sponge */
+ }
+ if (ctx->bufsz != 0 || ctx->xof_state != XOF_STATE_SQUEEZE) {
+ len = ctx->block_size - ctx->bufsz;
+ if (outlen < len)
+ len = outlen;
+ memcpy(out, (char *)ctx->A + ctx->bufsz, len);
+ out += len;
+ outlen -= len;
+ ctx->bufsz += len;
+ if (ctx->bufsz == ctx->block_size)
+ ctx->bufsz = 0;
+ }
+ ctx->xof_state = XOF_STATE_SQUEEZE;
+ if (outlen == 0)
+ return 1;
+ s390x_klmd(NULL, 0, out, outlen, ctx->pad | S390X_KLMD_PS, ctx->A);
+ ctx->bufsz = outlen % ctx->block_size;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int s390x_keccak_squeeze(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+{
+ return s390x_keccakc_squeeze(vctx, out, outlen, 0x01);
+}
+
+static int s390x_kmac_squeeze(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+{
+ return s390x_keccakc_squeeze(vctx, out, outlen, 0x04);
+}
+
static PROV_SHA3_METHOD sha3_s390x_md =
{
s390x_sha3_absorb,
- s390x_sha3_final
+ s390x_sha3_final,
+ NULL,
};
static PROV_SHA3_METHOD keccak_s390x_md =
{
s390x_sha3_absorb,
s390x_keccak_final,
+ s390x_keccak_squeeze,
};
static PROV_SHA3_METHOD shake_s390x_md =
{
s390x_sha3_absorb,
- s390x_shake_final
+ s390x_shake_final,
+ s390x_shake_squeeze,
};
static PROV_SHA3_METHOD kmac_s390x_md =
{
s390x_sha3_absorb,
- s390x_kmac_final
+ s390x_kmac_final,
+ s390x_kmac_squeeze,
};
# define SHAKE_SET_MD(uname, typ) \

View File

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
commit bff62480333680463c82e88fdc67ed5ec14a0017
Author: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed Sep 27 11:18:18 2023 +0200
Support multiple calls of low level SHA3_squeeze() for s390x.
The low level SHA3_Squeeze() function needed to change slightly so
that it can handle multiple squeezes. Support this on s390x
architecture as well.
Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22221)
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/keccak1600-s390x.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/keccak1600-s390x.pl
index 86233c7e38..7d5ebde117 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/keccak1600-s390x.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/keccak1600-s390x.pl
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ SHA3_absorb:
.size SHA3_absorb,.-SHA3_absorb
___
}
-{ my ($A_flat,$out,$len,$bsz) = map("%r$_",(2..5));
+{ my ($A_flat,$out,$len,$bsz,$next) = map("%r$_",(2..6));
$code.=<<___;
.globl SHA3_squeeze
@@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ SHA3_squeeze:
lghi %r14,8
st${g} $bsz,5*$SIZE_T($sp)
la %r1,0($A_flat)
+ cijne $next,0,.Lnext_block
j .Loop_squeeze
@@ -501,6 +502,7 @@ SHA3_squeeze:
brct $bsz,.Loop_squeeze # bsz--
+.Lnext_block:
stm${g} $out,$len,3*$SIZE_T($sp)
bras %r14,.LKeccakF1600
lm${g} $out,$bsz,3*$SIZE_T($sp)

View File

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
---
apps/openssl.cnf | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
Index: openssl-3.1.4/apps/openssl.cnf
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.1.4.orig/apps/openssl.cnf
+++ openssl-3.1.4/apps/openssl.cnf
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ openssl_conf = openssl_init
# Comment out the next line to ignore configuration errors
config_diagnostics = 1
+[ oid_section ]
# Extra OBJECT IDENTIFIER info:
# oid_file = $ENV::HOME/.oid
oid_section = new_oids
@@ -47,6 +48,18 @@ providers = provider_sect
# Load default TLS policy configuration
ssl_conf = ssl_module
+engines = engine_section
+
+[ engine_section ]
+
+# This include will look through the directory that will contain the
+# engine declarations for any engines provided by other packages.
+.include /etc/ssl/engines3.d
+
+# This include will look through the directory that will contain the
+# definitions of the engines declared in the engine section.
+.include /etc/ssl/engdef3.d
+
# Uncomment the sections that start with ## below to enable the legacy provider.
# Loading the legacy provider enables support for the following algorithms:
# Hashing Algorithms / Message Digests: MD2, MD4, MDC2, WHIRLPOOL, RIPEMD160

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@@ -1,911 +0,0 @@
From 2290280617183863eb15425b8925765966723725 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 09:27:12 +0200
Subject: KDF: Add FIPS indicators
FIPS requires a number of restrictions on the parameters of the various
key derivation functions implemented in OpenSSL. The KDFs that use
digest algorithms usually should not allow SHAKE (due to FIPS 140-3 IG
C.C). Additionally, some application-specific KDFs have further
restrictions defined in SP 800-135r1.
Generally, all KDFs shall use a key-derivation key length of at least
112 bits due to SP 800-131Ar2 section 8. Additionally any use of a KDF
to generate and output length of less than 112 bits will also set the
indicator to unapproved.
Add explicit indicators to all KDFs usable in FIPS mode except for
PBKDF2 (which has its specific FIPS limits already implemented). The
indicator can be queried using EVP_KDF_CTX_get_params() after setting
the required parameters and keys for the KDF.
Our FIPS provider implements SHA1, SHA2 (both -256 and -512, and the
truncated variants -224 and -384) and SHA3 (-256 and -512, and the
truncated versions -224 and -384), as well as SHAKE-128 and -256.
The SHAKE functions are generally not allowed in KDFs. For the rest, the
support matrix is:
KDF | SHA-1 | SHA-2 | SHA-2 truncated | SHA-3 | SHA-3 truncated
==========================================================================
KBKDF | x | x | x | x | x
HKDF | x | x | x | x | x
TLS1PRF | | SHA-{256,384,512} only | |
SSHKDF | x | x | x | |
SSKDF | x | x | x | x | x
X9.63KDF | | x | x | x | x
X9.42-ASN1 | x | x | x | x | x
TLS1.3PRF | | SHA-{256,384} only | |
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Resolves: rhbz#2160733 rhbz#2164763
Related: rhbz#2114772 rhbz#2141695
---
include/crypto/evp.h | 7 ++
include/openssl/kdf.h | 4 +
providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++-
providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++--
providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c | 75 +++++++++++++++-
providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++-
providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c | 74 +++++++++++++++-
providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c | 66 +++++++++++++-
util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm | 1 +
9 files changed, 487 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/crypto/evp.h b/include/crypto/evp.h
index e70d8e9e84..76fb990de4 100644
--- a/include/crypto/evp.h
+++ b/include/crypto/evp.h
@@ -219,6 +219,13 @@ struct evp_mac_st {
OSSL_FUNC_mac_set_ctx_params_fn *set_ctx_params;
};
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+/* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8: Deriving
+ * Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of the
+ * key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112 bits". */
+# define EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN (112 / 8)
+#endif
+
struct evp_kdf_st {
OSSL_PROVIDER *prov;
int name_id;
diff --git a/include/openssl/kdf.h b/include/openssl/kdf.h
index 0983230a48..86171635ea 100644
--- a/include/openssl/kdf.h
+++ b/include/openssl/kdf.h
@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ int EVP_KDF_names_do_all(const EVP_KDF *kdf,
# define EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY 1
# define EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY 2
+# define EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
+# define EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED 1
+# define EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
+
#define EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_INITIAL_IV_CLI_TO_SRV 65
#define EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_INITIAL_IV_SRV_TO_CLI 66
#define EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_CLI_TO_SRV 67
diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
index dfa7786bde..f01e40ff5a 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_tls1_3_new;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_derive_fn kdf_tls1_3_derive;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_3_settable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_3_set_ctx_params;
@@ -85,6 +86,10 @@ typedef struct {
size_t data_len;
unsigned char *info;
size_t info_len;
+ int is_tls13;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ int fips_indicator;
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
} KDF_HKDF;
static void *kdf_hkdf_new(void *provctx)
@@ -170,6 +175,11 @@ static int kdf_hkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
return 0;
}
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
+ ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+
switch (ctx->mode) {
case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND:
default:
@@ -318,22 +318,85 @@ static int kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params(void
{
KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
size_t sz = kdf_hkdf_size(ctx);
+ any_valid = 1;
if (sz == 0)
return 0;
return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sz);
}
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO)) != NULL) {
+ any_valid = 1;
if (ctx->info == NULL || ctx->info_len == 0) {
p->return_size = 0;
return 1;
}
return OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, ctx->info, ctx->info_len);
}
- return -2;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR))
+ != NULL) {
+ int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
+ const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
+
+ any_valid = 1;
+
+ /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
+ * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
+ * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
+ * bits". */
+ if (ctx->key_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
+ fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+
+ /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
+ * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
+ * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
+ * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
+ * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
+ * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
+ * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
+ if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
+ fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+
+ if (ctx->is_tls13) {
+ if (md != NULL
+ && !EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-256")
+ && !EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-384")) {
+ /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic
+ * Module Validation Program, Section 2.4.B, (5): "The TLS 1.3
+ * key derivation function documented in Section 7.1 of RFC
+ * 8446. This is considered an approved CVL because the
+ * underlying functions performed within the TLS 1.3 KDF map to
+ * NIST approved standards, namely: SP 800-133rev2 (Section 6.3
+ * Option #3), SP 800-56Crev2, and SP 800-108."
+ *
+ * RFC 8446 appendix B.4 only lists SHA-256 and SHA-384. */
+ fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (md != NULL
+ && (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-128") ||
+ EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-256"))) {
+ /* HKDF is a SP 800-56Cr2 TwoStep KDF, for which all SHA-1,
+ * SHA-2 and SHA-3 are approved. SHAKE is not approved, because
+ * of FIPS 140-3 IG, section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
+ * extendable-output functions may only be used as the
+ * standalone algorithms." */
+ fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+
+ if (!any_valid)
+ return -2;
+
+ return 1;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
@@ -348,6 +421,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, NULL, 0),
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
@@ -677,6 +753,17 @@ static int prov_tls13_hkdf_generate_secret(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
return ret;
}
+static void *kdf_tls1_3_new(void *provctx)
+{
+ KDF_HKDF *hkdf = kdf_hkdf_new(provctx);
+
+ if (hkdf != NULL)
+ hkdf->is_tls13 = 1;
+
+ return hkdf;
+}
+
+
static int kdf_tls1_3_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
@@ -692,6 +779,11 @@ static int kdf_tls1_3_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
return 0;
}
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
+ ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+
switch (ctx->mode) {
default:
return 0;
@@ -769,7 +861,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_3_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
}
const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_tls1_3_kdf_functions[] = {
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_new },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_3_new },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DUPCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_dup },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_free },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_reset },
diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c
index a542f84dfa..6b6dfb94ac 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c
@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ typedef struct {
kbkdf_mode mode;
EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init;
+ /* HMAC digest algorithm, if any; used to compute FIPS indicator */
+ PROV_DIGEST digest;
+
/* Names are lowercased versions of those found in SP800-108. */
int r;
unsigned char *ki;
@@ -73,6 +76,9 @@ typedef struct {
int use_l;
int is_kmac;
int use_separator;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ int fips_indicator;
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
} KBKDF;
/* Definitions needed for typechecking. */
@@ -138,6 +144,7 @@ static void kbkdf_reset(void *vctx)
void *provctx = ctx->provctx;
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx_init);
+ ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->context, ctx->context_len);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->label, ctx->label_len);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->ki, ctx->ki_len);
@@ -240,6 +247,11 @@ static int kbkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
goto done;
}
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
+ ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+
h = EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx->ctx_init);
if (h == 0)
goto done;
@@ -297,6 +309,9 @@ static int kbkdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
}
}
+ if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, libctx))
+ return 0;
+
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE);
if (p != NULL
&& OPENSSL_strncasecmp("counter", p->data, p->data_size) == 0) {
@@ -363,20 +378,77 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kbkdf_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
static int kbkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE);
- if (p == NULL)
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ any_valid = 1;
+
+ /* KBKDF can produce results as large as you like. */
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx;
+ int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
+
+ any_valid = 1;
+
+ /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
+ * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
+ * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
+ * bits". */
+ if (ctx->ki_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
+ fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+
+ /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
+ * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
+ * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
+ * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
+ * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
+ * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
+ * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
+ if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
+ fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+
+ /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
+ * Validation Program, Section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
+ * extendable-output functions may only be used as the standalone
+ * algorithms." Note that the digest is only used when the MAC
+ * algorithm is HMAC. */
+ if (ctx->ctx_init != NULL
+ && EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_get0_mac(ctx->ctx_init), OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC)) {
+ const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
+ if (md != NULL
+ && (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-256"))) {
+ fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (!any_valid)
return -2;
- /* KBKDF can produce results as large as you like. */
- return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
+ return 1;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *kbkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
ossl_unused void *provctx)
{
- static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] =
- { OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL), OSSL_PARAM_END };
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}
diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c
index c592ba72f1..4a52b38266 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ typedef struct {
char type; /* X */
unsigned char *session_id;
size_t session_id_len;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ int fips_indicator;
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
} KDF_SSHKDF;
static void *kdf_sshkdf_new(void *provctx)
@@ -126,6 +129,12 @@ static int kdf_sshkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_TYPE);
return 0;
}
+
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
+ ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+
return SSHKDF(md, ctx->key, ctx->key_len,
ctx->xcghash, ctx->xcghash_len,
ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len,
@@ -194,10 +203,67 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
static int kdf_sshkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
- return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
- return -2;
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
+ any_valid = 1;
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = vctx;
+ int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
+
+ any_valid = 1;
+
+ /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
+ * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
+ * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
+ * bits". */
+ if (ctx->key_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
+ fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+
+ /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
+ * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
+ * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
+ * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
+ * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
+ * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
+ * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
+ if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
+ fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+
+ /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
+ * Validation Program, Section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
+ * extendable-output functions may only be used as the standalone
+ * algorithms."
+ *
+ * Additionally, SP 800-135r1 section 5.2 specifies that the hash
+ * function used in SSHKDF "is one of the hash functions specified in
+ * FIPS 180-3.", which rules out SHA-3 and truncated variants of SHA-2.
+ * */
+ if (ctx->digest.md != NULL
+ && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA-1")
+ && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-224")
+ && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-256")
+ && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-384")
+ && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-512")) {
+ fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+ }
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (!any_valid)
+ return -2;
+
+ return 1;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
@@ -205,6 +271,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c
index eb54972e1c..23865cd70f 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c
@@ -64,6 +64,10 @@ typedef struct {
size_t salt_len;
size_t out_len; /* optional KMAC parameter */
int is_kmac;
+ int is_x963kdf;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ int fips_indicator;
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
} KDF_SSKDF;
#define SSKDF_MAX_INLEN (1<<30)
@@ -73,6 +77,7 @@ typedef struct {
static const unsigned char kmac_custom_str[] = { 0x4B, 0x44, 0x46 };
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn sskdf_new;
+static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn x963kdf_new;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_dupctx_fn sskdf_dup;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_freectx_fn sskdf_free;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_reset_fn sskdf_reset;
@@ -296,6 +301,16 @@ static void *sskdf_new(void *provctx)
return ctx;
}
+static void *x963kdf_new(void *provctx)
+{
+ KDF_SSKDF *ctx = sskdf_new(provctx);
+
+ if (ctx)
+ ctx->is_x963kdf = 1;
+
+ return ctx;
+}
+
static void sskdf_reset(void *vctx)
{
KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
@@ -361,6 +376,11 @@ static int sskdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
}
md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
+ ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+
if (ctx->macctx != NULL) {
/* H(x) = KMAC or H(x) = HMAC */
int ret;
@@ -442,6 +462,11 @@ static int x963kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
return 0;
}
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
+ ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+
return SSKDF_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
ctx->info, ctx->info_len, 1, key, keylen);
}
@@ -514,10 +539,74 @@ static int sskdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
+ any_valid = 1;
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sskdf_size(ctx)))
+ return 0;
+ }
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
- return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sskdf_size(ctx));
- return -2;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
+
+ any_valid = 1;
+
+ /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
+ * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
+ * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
+ * bits". */
+ if (ctx->secret_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
+ fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+
+ /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
+ * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
+ * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
+ * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
+ * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
+ * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
+ * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
+ if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
+ fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+
+ /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
+ * Validation Program, Section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
+ * extendable-output functions may only be used as the standalone
+ * algorithms." */
+ if (ctx->macctx == NULL
+ || (ctx->macctx != NULL &&
+ EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_get0_mac(ctx->macctx), OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC))) {
+ if (ctx->digest.md != NULL
+ && (EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHAKE-128") ||
+ EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHAKE-256"))) {
+ fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+ }
+
+ /* Table H-3 in ANS X9.63-2001 says that 160-bit hash functions
+ * should only be used for 80-bit key agreement, but FIPS 140-3
+ * requires a security strength of 112 bits, so SHA-1 cannot be
+ * used with X9.63. See the discussion in
+ * https://github.com/usnistgov/ACVP/issues/1403#issuecomment-1435300395.
+ */
+ if (ctx->is_x963kdf
+ && ctx->digest.md != NULL
+ && EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA-1")) {
+ fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (!any_valid)
+ return -2;
+
+ return 1;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *sskdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
@@ -525,6 +614,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *sskdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR, 0),
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
@@ -545,7 +637,7 @@ const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_sskdf_functions[] = {
};
const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_x963_kdf_functions[] = {
- { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_new },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))x963kdf_new },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DUPCTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_dup },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_free },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))sskdf_reset },
diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
index a4d64b9352..f6782a6ca2 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
@@ -93,6 +93,13 @@ typedef struct {
/* Buffer of concatenated seed data */
unsigned char seed[TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF];
size_t seedlen;
+
+ /* MAC digest algorithm; used to compute FIPS indicator */
+ PROV_DIGEST digest;
+
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ int fips_indicator;
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
} TLS1_PRF;
static void *kdf_tls1_prf_new(void *provctx)
@@ -129,6 +136,7 @@ static void kdf_tls1_prf_reset(void *vctx)
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->P_sha1);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->sec, ctx->seclen);
OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen);
+ ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
ctx->provctx = provctx;
}
@@ -157,6 +165,10 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
+ ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
/*
* The seed buffer is prepended with a label.
@@ -191,6 +203,9 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
}
}
+ if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, libctx))
+ return 0;
+
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL) {
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->sec, ctx->seclen);
ctx->sec = NULL;
@@ -232,10 +247,60 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params(
static int kdf_tls1_prf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
OSSL_PARAM *p;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ TLS1_PRF *ctx = vctx;
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
+ any_valid = 1;
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
+
+ any_valid = 1;
+
+ /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
+ * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
+ * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
+ * bits". */
+ if (ctx->seclen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
+ fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+
+ /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
+ * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
+ * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
+ * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
+ * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
+ * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
+ * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
+ if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
+ fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+
+ /* SP 800-135r1 section 4.2.2 says TLS 1.2 KDF is approved when "(3)
+ * P_HASH uses either SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512." */
+ if (ctx->digest.md != NULL
+ && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-256")
+ && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-384")
+ && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-512")) {
+ fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+ }
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
- return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
- return -2;
+ if (!any_valid)
+ return -2;
+
+ return 1;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params(
@@ -243,6 +308,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params(
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR, 0),
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c
index b1bc6f7e1b..8173fc2cc7 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c
@@ -13,11 +13,13 @@
#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include <openssl/params.h>
#include <openssl/proverr.h>
#include "internal/packet.h"
#include "internal/der.h"
#include "internal/nelem.h"
+#include "crypto/evp.h"
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
#include "prov/providercommon.h"
#include "prov/implementations.h"
@@ -47,6 +50,9 @@ typedef struct {
const unsigned char *cek_oid;
size_t cek_oid_len;
int use_keybits;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ int fips_indicator;
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
} KDF_X942;
/*
@@ -460,6 +466,10 @@ static int x942kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_ENCODING);
return 0;
}
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
+ ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
ret = x942kdf_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
der, der_len, ctr, key, keylen);
OPENSSL_free(der);
@@ -563,10 +573,58 @@ static int x942kdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
- return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, x942kdf_size(ctx));
- return -2;
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
+ any_valid = 1;
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, x942kdf_size(ctx)))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
+
+ any_valid = 1;
+
+ /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
+ * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
+ * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
+ * bits". */
+ if (ctx->secret_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
+ fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+
+ /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
+ * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
+ * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
+ * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
+ * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
+ * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
+ * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
+ if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
+ fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+
+ /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
+ * Validation Program, Section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
+ * extendable-output functions may only be used as the standalone
+ * algorithms." */
+ if (ctx->digest.md != NULL
+ && (EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHAKE-128") ||
+ EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHAKE-256"))) {
+ fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+ }
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (!any_valid)
+ return -2;
+
+ return 1;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
@@ -574,6 +632,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR, 0),
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
diff --git a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
index 70f7c50fe4..6618122417 100644
--- a/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
+++ b/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
@@ -183,6 +183,7 @@ my %params = (
'KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PUBINFO' => "supp-pubinfo",
'KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PRIVINFO' => "supp-privinfo",
'KDF_PARAM_X942_USE_KEYBITS' => "use-keybits",
+ 'KDF_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR' => "suse-fips-indicator",
'KDF_PARAM_HMACDRBG_ENTROPY' => "entropy",
'KDF_PARAM_HMACDRBG_NONCE' => "nonce",
'KDF_PARAM_THREADS' => "threads", # uint32_t
--
2.39.2

View File

@@ -1,743 +0,0 @@
From 2a071544f7d2e963a1f68f266f4e375568909d38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 13:10:52 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/8] Fix URI handling in SSL_CERT_DIR/introduce SSL_CERT_URI
env
Fixes #18068.
---
CHANGES.md | 21
Configure | 7
crypto/x509/by_dir.c | 17
crypto/x509/by_store.c | 14
crypto/x509/x509_def.c | 15
doc/build.info | 6
doc/man3/X509_get_default_cert_file.pod | 113 +++++
include/internal/cryptlib.h | 11
include/internal/e_os.h | 2
include/openssl/x509.h.in | 3
providers/implementations/include/prov/implementations.h | 1
providers/implementations/storemgmt/build.info | 3
providers/implementations/storemgmt/winstore_store.c | 327 +++++++++++++++
providers/stores.inc | 3
util/libcrypto.num | 3
util/missingcrypto.txt | 4
16 files changed, 536 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/CHANGES.md
+++ b/CHANGES.md
@@ -24,6 +24,27 @@ OpenSSL 3.1
### Changes between 3.1.0 and 3.1.1 [30 May 2023]
+ * The `SSL_CERT_PATH` and `SSL_CERT_URI` environment variables are introduced.
+ `SSL_CERT_URI` can be used to specify a URI for a root certificate store. The
+ `SSL_CERT_PATH` environment variable specifies a delimiter-separated list of
+ paths which are searched for root certificates.
+
+ The existing `SSL_CERT_DIR` environment variable is deprecated.
+ `SSL_CERT_DIR` was previously used to specify either a delimiter-separated
+ list of paths or an URI, which is ambiguous. Setting `SSL_CERT_PATH` causes
+ `SSL_CERT_DIR` to be ignored for the purposes of determining root certificate
+ directories, and setting `SSL_CERT_URI` causes `SSL_CERT_DIR` to be ignored
+ for the purposes of determining root certificate stores.
+
+ *Hugo Landau*
+
+ * Support for loading root certificates from the Windows certificate store
+ has been added. The support is in the form of a store which recognises the
+ URI string of `org.openssl.winstore://`. This store is enabled by default and
+ can be disabled using the new compile-time option `no-winstore`.
+
+ *Hugo Landau*
+
* Mitigate for the time it takes for `OBJ_obj2txt` to translate gigantic
OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identifiers to canonical numeric text form.
--- a/Configure
+++ b/Configure
@@ -420,6 +420,7 @@ my @disablables = (
"cached-fetch",
"camellia",
"capieng",
+ "winstore",
"cast",
"chacha",
"cmac",
@@ -1726,6 +1727,12 @@ unless ($disabled{ktls}) {
}
}
+unless ($disabled{winstore}) {
+ unless ($target =~ /^(?:Cygwin|mingw|VC-|BC-)/) {
+ disable('not-windows', 'winstore');
+ }
+}
+
push @{$config{openssl_other_defines}}, "OPENSSL_NO_KTLS" if ($disabled{ktls});
# Get the extra flags used when building shared libraries and modules. We
--- a/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
@@ -88,13 +88,18 @@ static int dir_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, in
switch (cmd) {
case X509_L_ADD_DIR:
if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT) {
- const char *dir = ossl_safe_getenv(X509_get_default_cert_dir_env());
+ /* If SSL_CERT_PATH is provided and non-empty, use that. */
+ const char *dir = ossl_safe_getenv(X509_get_default_cert_path_env());
- if (dir)
- ret = add_cert_dir(ld, dir, X509_FILETYPE_PEM);
- else
- ret = add_cert_dir(ld, X509_get_default_cert_dir(),
- X509_FILETYPE_PEM);
+ /* Fallback to SSL_CERT_DIR. */
+ if (dir == NULL)
+ dir = ossl_safe_getenv(X509_get_default_cert_dir_env());
+
+ /* Fallback to built-in default. */
+ if (dir == NULL)
+ dir = X509_get_default_cert_dir();
+
+ ret = add_cert_dir(ld, dir, X509_FILETYPE_PEM);
if (!ret) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_LOADING_CERT_DIR);
}
--- a/crypto/x509/by_store.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/by_store.c
@@ -111,11 +111,21 @@ static int by_store_ctrl_ex(X509_LOOKUP
{
switch (cmd) {
case X509_L_ADD_STORE:
- /* If no URI is given, use the default cert dir as default URI */
+ /* First try the newer default cert URI envvar. */
+ if (argp == NULL)
+ argp = ossl_safe_getenv(X509_get_default_cert_uri_env());
+
+ /* If not set, see if we have a URI in the older cert dir envvar. */
if (argp == NULL)
argp = ossl_safe_getenv(X509_get_default_cert_dir_env());
+
+ /* Fallback to default store URI. */
if (argp == NULL)
- argp = X509_get_default_cert_dir();
+ argp = X509_get_default_cert_uri();
+
+ /* No point adding an empty URI. */
+ if (!*argp)
+ return 1;
{
STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *uris = X509_LOOKUP_get_method_data(ctx);
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_def.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_def.c
@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@ const char *X509_get_default_cert_area(v
return X509_CERT_AREA;
}
+const char *X509_get_default_cert_uri(void)
+{
+ return X509_CERT_URI;
+}
+
const char *X509_get_default_cert_dir(void)
{
return X509_CERT_DIR;
@@ -32,6 +37,16 @@ const char *X509_get_default_cert_file(v
return X509_CERT_FILE;
}
+const char *X509_get_default_cert_uri_env(void)
+{
+ return X509_CERT_URI_EVP;
+}
+
+const char *X509_get_default_cert_path_env(void)
+{
+ return X509_CERT_PATH_EVP;
+}
+
const char *X509_get_default_cert_dir_env(void)
{
return X509_CERT_DIR_EVP;
--- a/doc/build.info
+++ b/doc/build.info
@@ -2791,6 +2791,10 @@ DEPEND[html/man3/X509_get0_uids.html]=ma
GENERATE[html/man3/X509_get0_uids.html]=man3/X509_get0_uids.pod
DEPEND[man/man3/X509_get0_uids.3]=man3/X509_get0_uids.pod
GENERATE[man/man3/X509_get0_uids.3]=man3/X509_get0_uids.pod
+DEPEND[html/man3/X509_get_default_cert_file.html]=man3/X509_get_default_cert_file.pod
+GENERATE[html/man3/X509_get_default_cert_file.html]=man3/X509_get_default_cert_file.pod
+DEPEND[man/man3/X509_get_default_cert_file.3]=man3/X509_get_default_cert_file.pod
+GENERATE[man/man3/X509_get_default_cert_file.3]=man3/X509_get_default_cert_file.pod
DEPEND[html/man3/X509_get_extension_flags.html]=man3/X509_get_extension_flags.pod
GENERATE[html/man3/X509_get_extension_flags.html]=man3/X509_get_extension_flags.pod
DEPEND[man/man3/X509_get_extension_flags.3]=man3/X509_get_extension_flags.pod
@@ -3461,6 +3465,7 @@ html/man3/X509_get0_distinguishing_id.ht
html/man3/X509_get0_notBefore.html \
html/man3/X509_get0_signature.html \
html/man3/X509_get0_uids.html \
+html/man3/X509_get_default_cert_file.html \
html/man3/X509_get_extension_flags.html \
html/man3/X509_get_pubkey.html \
html/man3/X509_get_serialNumber.html \
@@ -4064,6 +4069,7 @@ man/man3/X509_get0_distinguishing_id.3 \
man/man3/X509_get0_notBefore.3 \
man/man3/X509_get0_signature.3 \
man/man3/X509_get0_uids.3 \
+man/man3/X509_get_default_cert_file.3 \
man/man3/X509_get_extension_flags.3 \
man/man3/X509_get_pubkey.3 \
man/man3/X509_get_serialNumber.3 \
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/man3/X509_get_default_cert_file.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_get_default_cert_file, X509_get_default_cert_file_env,
+X509_get_default_cert_path_env,
+X509_get_default_cert_dir, X509_get_default_cert_dir_env,
+X509_get_default_cert_uri, X509_get_default_cert_uri_env -
+retrieve default locations for trusted CA certificates
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ const char *X509_get_default_cert_file(void);
+ const char *X509_get_default_cert_dir(void);
+ const char *X509_get_default_cert_uri(void);
+
+ const char *X509_get_default_cert_file_env(void);
+ const char *X509_get_default_cert_path_env(void);
+ const char *X509_get_default_cert_dir_env(void);
+ const char *X509_get_default_cert_uri_env(void);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The X509_get_default_cert_file() function returns the default path
+to a file containing trusted CA certificates. OpenSSL will use this as
+the default path when it is asked to load trusted CA certificates
+from a file and no other path is specified. If the file exists, CA certificates
+are loaded from the file.
+
+The X509_get_default_cert_dir() function returns a default delimeter-separated
+list of paths to a directories containing trusted CA certificates named in the
+hashed format. OpenSSL will use this as the default list of paths when it is
+asked to load trusted CA certificates from a directory and no other path is
+specified. If a given directory in the list exists, OpenSSL attempts to lookup
+CA certificates in this directory by calculating a filename based on a hash of
+the certificate's subject name.
+
+The X509_get_default_cert_uri() function returns the default URI for a
+certificate store accessed programmatically via an OpenSSL provider. If there is
+no default store applicable to the system for which OpenSSL was compiled, this
+returns an empty string.
+
+X509_get_default_cert_file_env() and X509_get_default_cert_uri_env() return
+environment variable names which are recommended to specify nondefault values to
+be used instead of the values returned by X509_get_default_cert_file() and
+X509_get_default_cert_uri() respectively. The values returned by the latter
+functions are not affected by these environment variables; you must check for
+these environment variables yourself, using these functions to retrieve the
+correct environment variable names. If an environment variable is not set, the
+value returned by the corresponding function above should be used.
+
+X509_get_default_cert_path_env() returns the environment variable name which is
+recommended to specify a nondefault value to be used instead of the value
+returned by X509_get_default_cert_dir(). This environment variable supercedes
+the deprecated environment variable whose name is returned by
+X509_get_default_cert_dir_env(). This environment variable was deprecated as its
+contents can be interpreted ambiguously; see NOTES.
+
+By default, OpenSSL uses the path list specified in the environment variable
+whose name is returned by X509_get_default_cert_path_env() if it is set;
+otherwise, it uses the path list specified in the environment variable whose
+name is returned by X509_get_default_cert_dir_env() if it is set; otherwise, it
+uses the value returned by X509_get_default_cert_dir()).
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+X509_get_default_cert_uri(), X509_get_default_cert_uri_env() and
+X509_get_default_cert_path_env() were introduced in OpenSSL 3.1. Prior to this
+release, store URIs were expressed via the environment variable returned by
+X509_get_default_cert_dir_env(); this environment variable could be used to
+specify either a list of directories or a store URI. This creates an ambiguity
+in which the environment variable returned by X509_get_default_cert_dir_env() is
+interpreted both as a list of directories and as a store URI.
+
+This usage and the environment variable returned by
+X509_get_default_cert_dir_env() are now deprecated; to specify a store URI, use
+the environment variable returned by X509_get_default_cert_uri_env(), and to
+specify a list of directories, use the environment variable returned by
+X509_get_default_cert_path_env().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+These functions return pointers to constant strings with static storage
+duration.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509_LOOKUP(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_file(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_dir(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_store(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_file(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_dir(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_store(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+X509_get_default_cert_uri(), X509_get_default_cert_path_env() and
+X509_get_default_cert_uri_env() were introduced in OpenSSL 3.1.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut
--- a/include/internal/cryptlib.h
+++ b/include/internal/cryptlib.h
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
# include <stdlib.h>
# include <string.h>
+# include "openssl/configuration.h"
+# include "internal/e_os.h" /* ossl_inline in many files */
# ifdef OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK
# define BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK_INTERNAL 0x8000
@@ -77,6 +79,14 @@ DEFINE_LHASH_OF_EX(MEM);
# define CTLOG_FILE "OSSL$DATAROOT:[000000]ct_log_list.cnf"
# endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WINSTORE
+# define X509_CERT_URI "org.openssl.winstore://"
+#else
+# define X509_CERT_URI ""
+#endif
+
+# define X509_CERT_URI_EVP "SSL_CERT_URI"
+# define X509_CERT_PATH_EVP "SSL_CERT_PATH"
# define X509_CERT_DIR_EVP "SSL_CERT_DIR"
# define X509_CERT_FILE_EVP "SSL_CERT_FILE"
# define CTLOG_FILE_EVP "CTLOG_FILE"
@@ -240,5 +250,4 @@ static ossl_inline int ossl_is_absolute_
# endif
return path[0] == '/';
}
-
#endif
--- a/include/internal/e_os.h
+++ b/include/internal/e_os.h
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ FILE *__iob_func();
/***********************************************/
# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
-# if (_MSC_VER >= 1310) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
+# if defined(_MSC_VER) && (_MSC_VER >= 1310) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
# define open _open
# define fdopen _fdopen
# define close _close
--- a/include/openssl/x509.h.in
+++ b/include/openssl/x509.h.in
@@ -491,8 +491,11 @@ ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s
ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj);
const char *X509_get_default_cert_area(void);
+const char *X509_get_default_cert_uri(void);
const char *X509_get_default_cert_dir(void);
const char *X509_get_default_cert_file(void);
+const char *X509_get_default_cert_uri_env(void);
+const char *X509_get_default_cert_path_env(void);
const char *X509_get_default_cert_dir_env(void);
const char *X509_get_default_cert_file_env(void);
const char *X509_get_default_private_dir(void);
--- a/providers/implementations/include/prov/implementations.h
+++ b/providers/implementations/include/prov/implementations.h
@@ -517,3 +517,4 @@ extern const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_SubjectP
extern const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_pem_to_der_decoder_functions[];
extern const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_file_store_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_winstore_store_functions[];
--- a/providers/implementations/storemgmt/build.info
+++ b/providers/implementations/storemgmt/build.info
@@ -4,3 +4,6 @@
$STORE_GOAL=../../libdefault.a
SOURCE[$STORE_GOAL]=file_store.c file_store_any2obj.c
+IF[{- !$disabled{winstore} -}]
+ SOURCE[$STORE_GOAL]=winstore_store.c
+ENDIF
--- /dev/null
+++ b/providers/implementations/storemgmt/winstore_store.c
@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+#include <openssl/store.h>
+#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/core_object.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/params.h>
+#include <openssl/decoder.h>
+#include <openssl/proverr.h>
+#include <openssl/store.h> /* The OSSL_STORE_INFO type numbers */
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/o_dir.h"
+#include "crypto/decoder.h"
+#include "crypto/ctype.h" /* ossl_isdigit() */
+#include "prov/implementations.h"
+#include "prov/bio.h"
+#include "file_store_local.h"
+
+#include <wincrypt.h>
+
+enum {
+ STATE_IDLE,
+ STATE_READ,
+ STATE_EOF,
+};
+
+struct winstore_ctx_st {
+ void *provctx;
+ char *propq;
+ unsigned char *subject;
+ size_t subject_len;
+
+ HCERTSTORE win_store;
+ const CERT_CONTEXT *win_ctx;
+ int state;
+
+ OSSL_DECODER_CTX *dctx;
+};
+
+static void winstore_win_reset(struct winstore_ctx_st *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->win_ctx != NULL) {
+ CertFreeCertificateContext(ctx->win_ctx);
+ ctx->win_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+
+ ctx->state = STATE_IDLE;
+}
+
+static void winstore_win_advance(struct winstore_ctx_st *ctx)
+{
+ CERT_NAME_BLOB name = {0};
+
+ if (ctx->state == STATE_EOF)
+ return;
+
+ name.cbData = ctx->subject_len;
+ name.pbData = ctx->subject;
+
+ ctx->win_ctx = (name.cbData == 0 ? NULL :
+ CertFindCertificateInStore(ctx->win_store,
+ X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING,
+ 0, CERT_FIND_SUBJECT_NAME,
+ &name, ctx->win_ctx));
+
+ ctx->state = (ctx->win_ctx == NULL) ? STATE_EOF : STATE_READ;
+}
+
+static void *winstore_open(void *provctx, const char *uri)
+{
+ struct winstore_ctx_st *ctx = NULL;
+
+ if (!HAS_CASE_PREFIX(uri, "org.openssl.winstore:"))
+ return NULL;
+
+ ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ctx->provctx = provctx;
+ ctx->win_store = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, L"ROOT");
+ if (ctx->win_store == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ winstore_win_reset(ctx);
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void *winstore_attach(void *provctx, OSSL_CORE_BIO *cin)
+{
+ return NULL; /* not supported */
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *winstore_settable_ctx_params(void *loaderctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_STORE_PARAM_SUBJECT, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_STORE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int winstore_set_ctx_params(void *loaderctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ struct winstore_ctx_st *ctx = loaderctx;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ int do_reset = 0;
+
+ if (params == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_STORE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ do_reset = 1;
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->propq);
+ ctx->propq = NULL;
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &ctx->propq, 0))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_STORE_PARAM_SUBJECT);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ const unsigned char *der = NULL;
+ size_t der_len = 0;
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string_ptr(p, (const void **)&der, &der_len))
+ return 0;
+
+ do_reset = 1;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->subject);
+
+ ctx->subject = OPENSSL_malloc(der_len);
+ if (ctx->subject == NULL) {
+ ctx->subject_len = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ctx->subject_len = der_len;
+ memcpy(ctx->subject, der, der_len);
+ }
+
+ if (do_reset) {
+ winstore_win_reset(ctx);
+ winstore_win_advance(ctx);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+struct load_data_st {
+ OSSL_CALLBACK *object_cb;
+ void *object_cbarg;
+};
+
+static int load_construct(OSSL_DECODER_INSTANCE *decoder_inst,
+ const OSSL_PARAM *params, void *construct_data)
+{
+ struct load_data_st *data = construct_data;
+ return data->object_cb(params, data->object_cbarg);
+}
+
+static void load_cleanup(void *construct_data)
+{
+ /* No-op. */
+}
+
+static int setup_decoder(struct winstore_ctx_st *ctx)
+{
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = ossl_prov_ctx_get0_libctx(ctx->provctx);
+ const OSSL_ALGORITHM *to_algo = NULL;
+
+ if (ctx->dctx != NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ ctx->dctx = OSSL_DECODER_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx->dctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!OSSL_DECODER_CTX_set_input_type(ctx->dctx, "DER")) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_OSSL_DECODER_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!OSSL_DECODER_CTX_set_input_structure(ctx->dctx, "Certificate")) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_OSSL_DECODER_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (to_algo = ossl_any_to_obj_algorithm;
+ to_algo->algorithm_names != NULL;
+ to_algo++) {
+ OSSL_DECODER *to_obj = NULL;
+ OSSL_DECODER_INSTANCE *to_obj_inst = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Create the internal last resort decoder implementation
+ * together with a "decoder instance".
+ * The decoder doesn't need any identification or to be
+ * attached to any provider, since it's only used locally.
+ */
+ to_obj = ossl_decoder_from_algorithm(0, to_algo, NULL);
+ if (to_obj != NULL)
+ to_obj_inst = ossl_decoder_instance_new(to_obj, ctx->provctx);
+
+ OSSL_DECODER_free(to_obj);
+ if (to_obj_inst == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!ossl_decoder_ctx_add_decoder_inst(ctx->dctx,
+ to_obj_inst)) {
+ ossl_decoder_instance_free(to_obj_inst);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_OSSL_DECODER_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!OSSL_DECODER_CTX_add_extra(ctx->dctx, libctx, ctx->propq)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_OSSL_DECODER_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!OSSL_DECODER_CTX_set_construct(ctx->dctx, load_construct)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_OSSL_DECODER_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!OSSL_DECODER_CTX_set_cleanup(ctx->dctx, load_cleanup)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_OSSL_DECODER_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ OSSL_DECODER_CTX_free(ctx->dctx);
+ ctx->dctx = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int winstore_load_using(struct winstore_ctx_st *ctx,
+ OSSL_CALLBACK *object_cb, void *object_cbarg,
+ OSSL_PASSPHRASE_CALLBACK *pw_cb, void *pw_cbarg,
+ const void *der, size_t der_len)
+{
+ struct load_data_st data;
+ const unsigned char *der_ = der;
+ size_t der_len_ = der_len;
+
+ if (setup_decoder(ctx) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ data.object_cb = object_cb;
+ data.object_cbarg = object_cbarg;
+
+ OSSL_DECODER_CTX_set_construct_data(ctx->dctx, &data);
+ OSSL_DECODER_CTX_set_passphrase_cb(ctx->dctx, pw_cb, pw_cbarg);
+
+ if (OSSL_DECODER_from_data(ctx->dctx, &der_, &der_len_) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int winstore_load(void *loaderctx,
+ OSSL_CALLBACK *object_cb, void *object_cbarg,
+ OSSL_PASSPHRASE_CALLBACK *pw_cb, void *pw_cbarg)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct winstore_ctx_st *ctx = loaderctx;
+
+ if (ctx->state != STATE_READ)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = winstore_load_using(ctx, object_cb, object_cbarg, pw_cb, pw_cbarg,
+ ctx->win_ctx->pbCertEncoded,
+ ctx->win_ctx->cbCertEncoded);
+
+ if (ret == 1)
+ winstore_win_advance(ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int winstore_eof(void *loaderctx)
+{
+ struct winstore_ctx_st *ctx = loaderctx;
+
+ return ctx->state != STATE_READ;
+}
+
+static int winstore_close(void *loaderctx)
+{
+ struct winstore_ctx_st *ctx = loaderctx;
+
+ winstore_win_reset(ctx);
+ CertCloseStore(ctx->win_store, 0);
+ OSSL_DECODER_CTX_free(ctx->dctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->propq);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->subject);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_winstore_store_functions[] = {
+ { OSSL_FUNC_STORE_OPEN, (void (*)(void))winstore_open },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_STORE_ATTACH, (void (*)(void))winstore_attach },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_STORE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))winstore_settable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_STORE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))winstore_set_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_STORE_LOAD, (void (*)(void))winstore_load },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_STORE_EOF, (void (*)(void))winstore_eof },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_STORE_CLOSE, (void (*)(void))winstore_close },
+ { 0, NULL },
+};
--- a/providers/stores.inc
+++ b/providers/stores.inc
@@ -12,3 +12,6 @@
#endif
STORE("file", "yes", ossl_file_store_functions)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WINSTORE
+STORE("org.openssl.winstore", "yes", ossl_winstore_store_functions)
+#endif
--- a/util/libcrypto.num
+++ b/util/libcrypto.num
@@ -5435,4 +5435,7 @@ EVP_MD_CTX_dup
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup 5563 3_1_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
BN_are_coprime 5564 3_1_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
OSSL_CMP_MSG_update_recipNonce 5565 3_0_9 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMP
+X509_get_default_cert_uri ? 3_1_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get_default_cert_uri_env ? 3_1_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_get_default_cert_path_env ? 3_1_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
ossl_safe_getenv ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
--- a/util/missingcrypto.txt
+++ b/util/missingcrypto.txt
@@ -1273,10 +1273,6 @@ X509_get0_trust_objects(3)
X509_get1_email(3)
X509_get1_ocsp(3)
X509_get_default_cert_area(3)
-X509_get_default_cert_dir(3)
-X509_get_default_cert_dir_env(3)
-X509_get_default_cert_file(3)
-X509_get_default_cert_file_env(3)
X509_get_default_private_dir(3)
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(3)
X509_get_signature_type(3)

View File

@@ -1,217 +0,0 @@
From f470b130139919f32926b3f5a75ba4d161cbcf88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2022 15:44:18 +0100
Subject: Allow SHA1 in seclevel 1 if rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes
NOTE: This patch is ported from CentOS 9 / RHEL 9, where it allows SHA1
in seclevel 2 if rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes. This was chosen because
on CentOS 9 and RHEL 9, the LEGACY crypto policy sets the security level
to 2.
On Fedora 35 (with OpenSSL 1.1) the legacy crypto policy uses security
level 1. Because Fedora 36 supports both OpenSSL 1.1 and OpenSSL 3, and
we want the legacy crypto policy to allow SHA-1 in TLS, the only option
to make this happen consistently in both OpenSSL 1.1 and OpenSSL 3 is
SECLEVEL=1 (which will allow SHA-1 in OpenSSL 1.1) and this change to
allow SHA-1 in SECLEVEL=1 with rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes (which
will allow SHA-1 in OpenSSL 3).
The change from CentOS 9 / RHEL 9 cannot be applied unmodified, because
rh-allow-sha1-signatures will default to yes in Fedora (according to our
current plans including until F38), and the security level in the
DEFAULT crypto policy is 2, i.e., the unmodified change would weaken the
default configuration.
Related: rhbz#2055796
Related: rhbz#2070977
---
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 20 ++++++++++-
doc/man5/config.pod | 7 ++++
ssl/t1_lib.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
test/recipes/25-test_verify.t | 4 +--
4 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
Index: openssl-3.1.4/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.1.4.orig/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ openssl-3.1.4/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include "internal/dane.h"
+#include "internal/sslconf.h"
#include "crypto/x509.h"
#include "x509_local.h"
@@ -3438,14 +3439,31 @@ static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CT
{
int secbits = -1;
int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
+ int nid;
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NULL;
if (level <= 0)
return 1;
if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
- if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL))
+ if (ctx->libctx)
+ libctx = ctx->libctx;
+ else if (cert->libctx)
+ libctx = cert->libctx;
+ else
+ libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_get0_global_default();
+
+ if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, &nid, NULL, &secbits, NULL))
return 0;
+ if ((nid == NID_sha1 || nid == NID_md5_sha1)
+ && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(libctx, 0)
+ && ctx->param->auth_level < 2)
+ /* When rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 1,
+ * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility. Also allow
+ * MD5-SHA1 because TLS 1.0 is still supported, which uses it. */
+ return 1;
+
return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
}
Index: openssl-3.1.4/doc/man5/config.pod
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.1.4.orig/doc/man5/config.pod
+++ openssl-3.1.4/doc/man5/config.pod
@@ -317,6 +317,13 @@ this option is set to B<no>. Because TL
pseudorandom function (PRF) to derive key material, disabling
B<rh-allow-sha1-signatures> requires the use of TLS 1.2 or newer.
+Note that enabling B<rh-allow-sha1-signatures> will allow TLS signature
+algorithms that use SHA1 in security level 1, despite the definition of
+security level 1 of 80 bits of security, which SHA1 and MD5-SHA1 do not meet.
+This allows using SHA1 and MD5-SHA1 in TLS in the LEGACY crypto-policy on
+Fedora without requiring to set the security level to 0, which would include
+further insecure algorithms, and thus restores support for TLS 1.0 and 1.1.
+
This is a downstream specific option, and normally it should be set up via crypto-policies.
=item B<fips_mode> (deprecated)
Index: openssl-3.1.4/ssl/t1_lib.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.1.4.orig/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ openssl-3.1.4/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/provider.h>
#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
#include "internal/sslconf.h"
#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include "internal/sizes.h"
@@ -1588,19 +1589,28 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
- /*
- * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
- * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
- */
- sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
- sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
- secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
- if (secbits == 0 ||
- !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
- md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
- (void *)sigalgstr)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
- return 0;
+
+ if ((lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_md5_sha1)
+ && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(s->ctx->libctx, 0)
+ && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 2) {
+ /* When rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 1,
+ * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility. Also allow
+ * MD5-SHA1 because TLS 1.0 is still supported, which uses it. */
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
+ * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
+ */
+ sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
+ sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
+ secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
+ if (secbits == 0 ||
+ !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
+ md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
+ (void *)sigalgstr)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
/* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
@@ -2138,6 +2148,15 @@ static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SS
}
}
+ if ((lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_md5_sha1)
+ && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(s->ctx->libctx, 0)
+ && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 2) {
+ /* When rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 1,
+ * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility. Also allow
+ * MD5-SHA1 because TLS 1.0 is still supported, which uses it. */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
/* Finally see if security callback allows it */
secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
@@ -3007,6 +3026,8 @@ static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s,
{
/* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
int secbits, nid, pknid;
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NULL;
+
/* Don't check signature if self signed */
if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
return 1;
@@ -3015,6 +3036,26 @@ static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s,
/* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
if (nid == NID_undef)
nid = pknid;
+
+ if (x && x->libctx)
+ libctx = x->libctx;
+ else if (ctx && ctx->libctx)
+ libctx = ctx->libctx;
+ else if (s && s->ctx && s->ctx->libctx)
+ libctx = s->ctx->libctx;
+ else
+ libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_get0_global_default();
+
+ if ((nid == NID_sha1 || nid == NID_md5_sha1)
+ && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(libctx, 0)
+ && ((s != NULL && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 2)
+ || (ctx != NULL && SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx) < 2)
+ ))
+ /* When rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 1,
+ * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility. Also allow
+ * MD5-SHA1 because TLS 1.0 is still supported, which uses it. */
+ return 1;
+
if (s)
return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
else
Index: openssl-3.1.4/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.1.4.orig/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
+++ openssl-3.1.4/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
@@ -439,8 +439,8 @@ ok(verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "", ["root
ok(verify("ee-pss-sha256-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], ),
"CA with PSS signature using SHA256");
-ok(!verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "1"),
- "Reject PSS signature using SHA1 and auth level 1");
+ok(!verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "2"),
+ "Reject PSS signature using SHA1 and auth level 2");
ok(verify("ee-pss-sha256-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "2"),
"PSS signature using SHA256 and auth level 2");

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,172 +0,0 @@
From ddeb4b6c6d527e54ce9a99cba785c0f7776e54b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2023 09:18:19 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Make DH_check_pub_key() and DH_generate_key() safer yet
We already check for an excessively large P in DH_generate_key(), but not in
DH_check_pub_key(), and none of them check for an excessively large Q.
This change adds all the missing excessive size checks of P and Q.
It's to be noted that behaviours surrounding excessively sized P and Q
differ. DH_check() raises an error on the excessively sized P, but only
sets a flag for the excessively sized Q. This behaviour is mimicked in
DH_check_pub_key().
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22518)
---
crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 12 ++++++++++++
crypto/dh/dh_err.c | 3 ++-
crypto/dh/dh_key.c | 12 ++++++++++++
crypto/err/openssl.txt | 1 +
include/crypto/dherr.h | 2 +-
include/openssl/dh.h | 6 +++---
include/openssl/dherr.h | 3 ++-
7 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
index 7ba2beae7fd6b..e20eb62081c5e 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -249,6 +249,18 @@ int DH_check_pub_key_ex(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key)
*/
int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
{
+ /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (dh->params.q != NULL && BN_ucmp(dh->params.p, dh->params.q) < 0) {
+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
return ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(&dh->params, pub_key, ret);
}
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
index 4152397426cc9..f76ac0dd1463f 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/*
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
- * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR),
"parameter encoding error"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR), "peer key error"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE), "q too large"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR), "shared info error"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR),
"unable to check generator"},
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
index d84ea99241b9e..afc49f5cdc87d 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
@@ -49,6 +49,12 @@ int ossl_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
goto err;
}
+ if (dh->params.q != NULL
+ && BN_num_bits(dh->params.q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) < DH_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
@@ -267,6 +273,12 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
return 0;
}
+ if (dh->params.q != NULL
+ && BN_num_bits(dh->params.q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) < DH_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
index a1e6bbb617fcb..69e4f61aa1801 100644
--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
@@ -513,6 +513,7 @@ DH_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET:107:no parameters set
DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE:100:no private value
DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR:105:parameter encoding error
DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR:111:peer key error
+DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE:130:q too large
DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR:113:shared info error
DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR:121:unable to check generator
DSA_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS:114:bad ffc parameters
diff --git a/include/crypto/dherr.h b/include/crypto/dherr.h
index bb24d131eb887..519327f795742 100644
--- a/include/crypto/dherr.h
+++ b/include/crypto/dherr.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/*
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
- * Copyright 2020-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2020-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
index 8bc17448a0817..f1c0ed06b375a 100644
--- a/include/openssl/dh.h
+++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(DHparams)
# define DH_GENERATOR_3 3
# define DH_GENERATOR_5 5
-/* DH_check error codes */
+/* DH_check error codes, some of them shared with DH_check_pub_key */
/*
* NB: These values must align with the equivalently named macros in
* internal/ffc.h.
@@ -154,10 +154,10 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(DHparams)
# define DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR 0x04
# define DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR 0x08
# define DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME 0x10
-# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE 0x20
+# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE 0x20 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE 0x40
# define DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL 0x80
-# define DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE 0x100
+# define DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE 0x100 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
/* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL 0x01
diff --git a/include/openssl/dherr.h b/include/openssl/dherr.h
index 5d2a762a96f8c..074a70145f9f5 100644
--- a/include/openssl/dherr.h
+++ b/include/openssl/dherr.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/*
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
- * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
# define DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE 100
# define DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR 105
# define DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR 111
+# define DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE 130
# define DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR 113
# define DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR 121

View File

@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
From 050d26383d4e264966fb83428e72d5d48f402d35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rohan McLure <rmclure@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 10:25:50 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] poly1305-ppc.pl: Fix vector register clobbering
Fixes CVE-2023-6129
The POLY1305 MAC (message authentication code) implementation in OpenSSL for
PowerPC CPUs saves the the contents of vector registers in different order
than they are restored. Thus the contents of some of these vector registers
is corrupted when returning to the caller. The vulnerable code is used only
on newer PowerPC processors supporting the PowerISA 2.07 instructions.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23200)
(cherry picked from commit 8d847a3ffd4f0b17ee33962cf69c36224925b34f)
---
crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl | 42 ++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl b/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl
index 9f86134d923fb..2e601bb9c24be 100755
--- a/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl
+++ b/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl
@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@
my $LOCALS= 6*$SIZE_T;
my $VSXFRAME = $LOCALS + 6*$SIZE_T;
$VSXFRAME += 128; # local variables
- $VSXFRAME += 13*16; # v20-v31 offload
+ $VSXFRAME += 12*16; # v20-v31 offload
my $BIG_ENDIAN = ($flavour !~ /le/) ? 4 : 0;
@@ -919,12 +919,12 @@
addi r11,r11,32
stvx v22,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
- stvx v23,r10,$sp
- addi r10,r10,32
- stvx v24,r11,$sp
+ stvx v23,r11,$sp
addi r11,r11,32
- stvx v25,r10,$sp
+ stvx v24,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
+ stvx v25,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
stvx v26,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
stvx v27,r11,$sp
@@ -1153,12 +1153,12 @@
addi r11,r11,32
stvx v22,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
- stvx v23,r10,$sp
- addi r10,r10,32
- stvx v24,r11,$sp
+ stvx v23,r11,$sp
addi r11,r11,32
- stvx v25,r10,$sp
+ stvx v24,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
+ stvx v25,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
stvx v26,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
stvx v27,r11,$sp
@@ -1899,26 +1899,26 @@
mtspr 256,r12 # restore vrsave
lvx v20,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
- lvx v21,r10,$sp
- addi r10,r10,32
- lvx v22,r11,$sp
+ lvx v21,r11,$sp
addi r11,r11,32
- lvx v23,r10,$sp
+ lvx v22,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
- lvx v24,r11,$sp
+ lvx v23,r11,$sp
addi r11,r11,32
- lvx v25,r10,$sp
+ lvx v24,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
- lvx v26,r11,$sp
+ lvx v25,r11,$sp
addi r11,r11,32
- lvx v27,r10,$sp
+ lvx v26,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
- lvx v28,r11,$sp
+ lvx v27,r11,$sp
addi r11,r11,32
- lvx v29,r10,$sp
+ lvx v28,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
- lvx v30,r11,$sp
- lvx v31,r10,$sp
+ lvx v29,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
+ lvx v30,r10,$sp
+ lvx v31,r11,$sp
$POP r27,`$VSXFRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
$POP r28,`$VSXFRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
$POP r29,`$VSXFRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)

View File

@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
From 18c02492138d1eb8b6548cb26e7b625fb2414a2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 16:25:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Limit the execution time of RSA public key check
Fixes CVE-2023-6237
If a large and incorrect RSA public key is checked with
EVP_PKEY_public_check() the computation could take very long time
due to no limit being applied to the RSA public key size and
unnecessarily high number of Miller-Rabin algorithm rounds
used for non-primality check of the modulus.
Now the keys larger than 16384 bits (OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
will fail the check with RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE error reason.
Also the number of Miller-Rabin rounds was set to 5.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23243)
(cherry picked from commit e09fc1d746a4fd15bb5c3d7bbbab950aadd005db)
---
crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c | 8 +++-
test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t | 2 +-
.../91-test_pkey_check_data/rsapub_17k.pem | 48 +++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/rsapub_17k.pem
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
index fc8f19b48770b..bcbdd24fb8199 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
@@ -289,6 +289,11 @@ int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_public(const RSA *rsa)
return 0;
nbits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
+ if (nbits > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
/*
* (Step a): modulus must be 2048 or 3072 (caveat from SP800-56Br1)
@@ -324,7 +329,8 @@ int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_public(const RSA *rsa)
goto err;
}
- ret = ossl_bn_miller_rabin_is_prime(rsa->n, 0, ctx, NULL, 1, &status);
+ /* Highest number of MR rounds from FIPS 186-5 Section B.3 Table B.1 */
+ ret = ossl_bn_miller_rabin_is_prime(rsa->n, 5, ctx, NULL, 1, &status);
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
if (ret != 1 || status != BN_PRIMETEST_COMPOSITE_NOT_POWER_OF_PRIME) {
#else
diff --git a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
index dc7cc64533af2..f8088df14d36c 100644
--- a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
+++ b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ push(@positive_tests, (
"dhpkey.pem"
)) unless disabled("dh");
-my @negative_pubtests = ();
+my @negative_pubtests = ("rsapub_17k.pem"); # Too big RSA public key
push(@negative_pubtests, (
"dsapub_noparam.der"
diff --git a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/rsapub_17k.pem b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/rsapub_17k.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..9a2eaedaf1b22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/rsapub_17k.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----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+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

View File

@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
From 09df4395b5071217b76dc7d3d2e630eb8c5a79c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 11:28:58 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Add NULL checks where ContentInfo data can be NULL
PKCS12 structures contain PKCS7 ContentInfo fields. These fields are
optional and can be NULL even if the "type" is a valid value. OpenSSL
was not properly accounting for this and a NULL dereference can occur
causing a crash.
CVE-2024-0727
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23362)
(cherry picked from commit d135eeab8a5dbf72b3da5240bab9ddb7678dbd2c)
---
crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c | 5 +++++
crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c | 5 +++--
crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c | 7 +++++--
4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
index 6fd4184af5a52..80ce31b3bca66 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
@@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7data(PKCS7 *p7)
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
return NULL;
}
+
+ if (p7->d.data == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
return ASN1_item_unpack(p7->d.data, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS));
}
@@ -150,6 +156,12 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(PKCS7 *p7, const char *pass,
{
if (!PKCS7_type_is_encrypted(p7))
return NULL;
+
+ if (p7->d.encrypted == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
return PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i_ex(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS),
pass, passlen,
@@ -188,6 +200,12 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS7) *PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(const PKCS12 *p12)
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
return NULL;
}
+
+ if (p12->authsafes->d.data == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
p7s = ASN1_item_unpack(p12->authsafes->d.data,
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES));
if (p7s != NULL) {
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
index 67a885a45f89e..68ff54d0e90ee 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
@@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
return 0;
}
+ if (p12->authsafes->d.data == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
salt = p12->mac->salt->data;
saltlen = p12->mac->salt->length;
if (p12->mac->iter == NULL)
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
index 62230bc6187ff..1e5b5495991a4 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
@@ -77,8 +77,9 @@ static int newpass_p12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass)
bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
} else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, oldpass, -1);
- if (!alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
- &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen))
+ if (p7->d.encrypted == NULL
+ || !alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
+ &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen))
goto err;
} else {
continue;
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
index 49a0da5f819c4..8228315eeaa3a 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
@@ -33,10 +33,13 @@ int SMIME_write_PKCS7(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags)
int ctype_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
const PKCS7_CTX *ctx = ossl_pkcs7_get0_ctx(p7);
- if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed)
+ if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
+ if (p7->d.sign == NULL)
+ return 0;
mdalgs = p7->d.sign->md_algs;
- else
+ } else {
mdalgs = NULL;
+ }
flags ^= SMIME_OLDMIME;

View File

@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
From 7e4d731b1c07201ad9374c1cd9ac5263bdf35bce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 15:43:53 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix unconstrained session cache growth in TLSv1.3
In TLSv1.3 we create a new session object for each ticket that we send.
We do this by duplicating the original session. If SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is in
use then the new session will be added to the session cache. However, if
early data is not in use (and therefore anti-replay protection is being
used), then multiple threads could be resuming from the same session
simultaneously. If this happens and a problem occurs on one of the threads,
then the original session object could be marked as not_resumable. When we
duplicate the session object this not_resumable status gets copied into the
new session object. The new session object is then added to the session
cache even though it is not_resumable.
Subsequently, another bug means that the session_id_length is set to 0 for
sessions that are marked as not_resumable - even though that session is
still in the cache. Once this happens the session can never be removed from
the cache. When that object gets to be the session cache tail object the
cache never shrinks again and grows indefinitely.
CVE-2024-2511
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24044)
---
ssl/ssl_lib.c | 5 +++--
ssl/ssl_sess.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++------
ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c | 5 ++---
3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index b5cc4af2f0302..e747b7f90aa71 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -3737,9 +3737,10 @@ void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode)
/*
* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it
- * would be rather hard to do anyway :-)
+ * would be rather hard to do anyway :-). Also if the session has already
+ * been marked as not_resumable we should not cache it for later reuse.
*/
- if (s->session->session_id_length == 0)
+ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0 || s->session->not_resumable)
return;
/*
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
index bf84e792251b8..241cf43c46296 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
@@ -154,16 +154,11 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
return ss;
}
-SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src)
-{
- return ssl_session_dup(src, 1);
-}
-
/*
* Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If
* ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is.
*/
-SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
+static SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup_intern(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
{
SSL_SESSION *dest;
@@ -287,6 +282,27 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
return NULL;
}
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src)
+{
+ return ssl_session_dup_intern(src, 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Used internally when duplicating a session which might be already shared.
+ * We will have resumed the original session. Subsequently we might have marked
+ * it as non-resumable (e.g. in another thread) - but this copy should be ok to
+ * resume from.
+ */
+SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
+{
+ SSL_SESSION *sess = ssl_session_dup_intern(src, ticket);
+
+ if (sess != NULL)
+ sess->not_resumable = 0;
+
+ return sess;
+}
+
const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len)
{
if (len)
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
index 5d59d53563ed8..8e493176f658e 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
@@ -2338,9 +2338,8 @@ int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
* so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
* to send back.
*/
- if (s->session->not_resumable ||
- (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
- && !s->hit))
+ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
+ && !s->hit)
s->session->session_id_length = 0;
if (usetls13) {

View File

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
From e70e34d857d4003199bcb5d3b52ca8102ccc1b98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2024 17:54:14 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] dh_kmgmt.c: Avoid expensive public key validation for known
safe-prime groups
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The partial validation is fully sufficient to check the key validity.
Thanks to Szilárd Pfeiffer for reporting the issue.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25088)
---
providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c | 8 +++++---
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
index 82c3093b122c2..ebdce767102ee 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
@@ -388,9 +388,11 @@ static int dh_validate_public(const DH *dh, int checktype)
if (pub_key == NULL)
return 0;
- /* The partial test is only valid for named group's with q = (p - 1) / 2 */
- if (checktype == OSSL_KEYMGMT_VALIDATE_QUICK_CHECK
- && ossl_dh_is_named_safe_prime_group(dh))
+ /*
+ * The partial test is only valid for named group's with q = (p - 1) / 2
+ * but for that case it is also fully sufficient to check the key validity.
+ */
+ if (ossl_dh_is_named_safe_prime_group(dh))
return ossl_dh_check_pub_key_partial(dh, pub_key, &res);
return DH_check_pub_key_ex(dh, pub_key);

View File

@@ -1,199 +0,0 @@
From 9c39b3858091c152f52513c066ff2c5a47969f0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Wed, 8 May 2024 15:23:45 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Check DSA parameters for excessive sizes before validating
This avoids overly long computation of various validation
checks.
Fixes CVE-2024-4603
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24346)
(cherry picked from commit 85ccbab216da245cf9a6503dd327072f21950d9b)
---
CHANGES.md | 17 ++++++
crypto/dsa/dsa_check.c | 44 ++++++++++++--
.../invalid/p10240_q256_too_big.pem | 57 +++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 test/recipes/15-test_dsaparam_data/invalid/p10240_q256_too_big.pem
Index: openssl-3.1.4/crypto/dsa/dsa_check.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.1.4.orig/crypto/dsa/dsa_check.c
+++ openssl-3.1.4/crypto/dsa/dsa_check.c
@@ -19,8 +19,34 @@
#include "dsa_local.h"
#include "crypto/dsa.h"
+static int dsa_precheck_params(const DSA *dsa, int *ret)
+{
+ if (dsa->params.p == NULL || dsa->params.q == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS);
+ *ret = FFC_CHECK_INVALID_PQ;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_num_bits(dsa->params.p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ *ret = FFC_CHECK_INVALID_PQ;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_num_bits(dsa->params.q) >= BN_num_bits(dsa->params.p)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
+ *ret = FFC_CHECK_INVALID_PQ;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
int ossl_dsa_check_params(const DSA *dsa, int checktype, int *ret)
{
+ if (!dsa_precheck_params(dsa, ret))
+ return 0;
+
if (checktype == OSSL_KEYMGMT_VALIDATE_QUICK_CHECK)
return ossl_ffc_params_simple_validate(dsa->libctx, &dsa->params,
FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DSA, ret);
@@ -39,6 +65,9 @@ int ossl_dsa_check_params(const DSA *dsa
*/
int ossl_dsa_check_pub_key(const DSA *dsa, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
{
+ if (!dsa_precheck_params(dsa, ret))
+ return 0;
+
return ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(&dsa->params, pub_key, ret)
&& *ret == 0;
}
@@ -50,6 +79,9 @@ int ossl_dsa_check_pub_key(const DSA *ds
*/
int ossl_dsa_check_pub_key_partial(const DSA *dsa, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
{
+ if (!dsa_precheck_params(dsa, ret))
+ return 0;
+
return ossl_ffc_validate_public_key_partial(&dsa->params, pub_key, ret)
&& *ret == 0;
}
@@ -58,8 +90,10 @@ int ossl_dsa_check_priv_key(const DSA *d
{
*ret = 0;
- return (dsa->params.q != NULL
- && ossl_ffc_validate_private_key(dsa->params.q, priv_key, ret));
+ if (!dsa_precheck_params(dsa, ret))
+ return 0;
+
+ return ossl_ffc_validate_private_key(dsa->params.q, priv_key, ret);
}
/*
@@ -72,8 +106,10 @@ int ossl_dsa_check_pairwise(const DSA *d
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL;
- if (dsa->params.p == NULL
- || dsa->params.g == NULL
+ if (!dsa_precheck_params(dsa, &ret))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dsa->params.g == NULL
|| dsa->priv_key == NULL
|| dsa->pub_key == NULL)
return 0;
Index: openssl-3.1.4/test/recipes/15-test_dsaparam_data/invalid/p10240_q256_too_big.pem
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ openssl-3.1.4/test/recipes/15-test_dsaparam_data/invalid/p10240_q256_too_big.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PARAMETERS-----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+-----END DSA PARAMETERS-----
Index: openssl-3.1.4/CHANGES.md
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.1.4.orig/CHANGES.md
+++ openssl-3.1.4/CHANGES.md
@@ -22,6 +22,23 @@ OpenSSL Releases
OpenSSL 3.1
-----------
+ * Fixed an issue where checking excessively long DSA keys or parameters may
+ be very slow.
+
+ Applications that use the functions EVP_PKEY_param_check() or
+ EVP_PKEY_public_check() to check a DSA public key or DSA parameters may
+ experience long delays. Where the key or parameters that are being checked
+ have been obtained from an untrusted source this may lead to a Denial of
+ Service.
+
+ To resolve this issue DSA keys larger than OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+ will now fail the check immediately with a DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE error
+ reason.
+
+ ([CVE-2024-4603])
+
+ *Tomáš Mráz*
+
### Changes between 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 [24 Oct 2023]
* Fix incorrect key and IV resizing issues when calling EVP_EncryptInit_ex2(),

View File

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
@@ -, +, @@
---
ssl/record/methods/tls_common.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
--- openssl-3.0.8/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c
+++ openssl-3.0.8/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c
@@ -186,5 +186,7 @@ int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s)
OPENSSL_cleanse(b->buf, b->len);
OPENSSL_free(b->buf);
b->buf = NULL;
+ s->rlayer.packet = NULL;
+ s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
return 1;
}
--- openssl-3.0.8/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c
+++ openssl-3.0.8/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c
@@ -238,6 +238,11 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t
s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
/* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
}
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->rlayer.packet != NULL)) {
+ /* does not happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
pkt = rb->buf + align;

View File

@@ -1,326 +0,0 @@
From 4ada436a1946cbb24db5ab4ca082b69c1bc10f37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:14:33 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix SSL_select_next_proto
Ensure that the provided client list is non-NULL and starts with a valid
entry. When called from the ALPN callback the client list should already
have been validated by OpenSSL so this should not cause a problem. When
called from the NPN callback the client list is locally configured and
will not have already been validated. Therefore SSL_select_next_proto
should not assume that it is correctly formatted.
We implement stricter checking of the client protocol list. We also do the
same for the server list while we are about it.
CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24718)
---
ssl/ssl_lib.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index 5493d9b9c7..f218dcf1db 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -2953,37 +2953,54 @@ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
unsigned int server_len,
const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
{
- unsigned int i, j;
- const unsigned char *result;
- int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
+ PACKET cpkt, csubpkt, spkt, ssubpkt;
+
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt) == 0) {
+ *out = NULL;
+ *outlen = 0;
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the default opportunistic protocol. Will be overwritten if we find
+ * a match.
+ */
+ *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&csubpkt);
+ *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt);
/*
* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
*/
- for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
- for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
- if (server[i] == client[j] &&
- memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
- /* We found a match */
- result = &server[i];
- status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
- goto found;
+ if (PACKET_buf_init(&spkt, server, server_len)) {
+ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&spkt, &ssubpkt)) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) == 0)
+ continue; /* Invalid - ignore it */
+ if (PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)) {
+ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)) {
+ if (PACKET_equal(&csubpkt, PACKET_data(&ssubpkt),
+ PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt))) {
+ /* We found a match */
+ *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&ssubpkt);
+ *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt);
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the client list */
+ } else {
+ /* This should never happen */
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
}
- j += client[j];
- j++;
}
- i += server[i];
- i++;
+ /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the server list */
}
- /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
- result = client;
- status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
-
- found:
- *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
- *outlen = result[0];
- return status;
+ /*
+ * There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. We use
+ * the default opportunistic protocol selected earlier
+ */
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
--
2.45.2
From 4279c89a726025c758db3dafb263b17e52211304 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:18:27 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] More correctly handle a selected_len of 0 when
processing NPN
In the case where the NPN callback returns with SSL_TLEXT_ERR_OK, but
the selected_len is 0 we should fail. Previously this would fail with an
internal_error alert because calling OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len) will
return NULL when selected_len is 0. We make this error detection more
explicit and return a handshake failure alert.
Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24718)
---
ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
index 842be0722b..a07dc62e9a 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
@@ -1536,7 +1536,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
PACKET_data(pkt),
PACKET_remaining(pkt),
s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
- SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+ SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
+ || selected_len == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
--
2.45.2
From 889ed19ba25abebd2690997acd6d4791cbe5c493 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:46:38 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Clarify the SSL_select_next_proto() documentation
We clarify the input preconditions and the expected behaviour in the event
of no overlap.
Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24718)
---
doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod | 26 +++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
index 102e657851..a29557dd91 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ SSL_select_next_proto, SSL_get0_alpn_selected, SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated
SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos() and SSL_set_alpn_protos() are used by the client to
set the list of protocols available to be negotiated. The B<protos> must be in
protocol-list format, described below. The length of B<protos> is specified in
-B<protos_len>.
+B<protos_len>. Setting B<protos_len> to 0 clears any existing list of ALPN
+protocols and no ALPN extension will be sent to the server.
SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb() sets the application callback B<cb> used by a
server to select which protocol to use for the incoming connection. When B<cb>
@@ -73,9 +74,16 @@ B<server_len> and B<client>, B<client_len> must be in the protocol-list format
described below. The first item in the B<server>, B<server_len> list that
matches an item in the B<client>, B<client_len> list is selected, and returned
in B<out>, B<outlen>. The B<out> value will point into either B<server> or
-B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. If no match is found, the first
-item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>. This
-function can also be used in the NPN callback.
+B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. The client list must include at
+least one valid (nonempty) protocol entry in the list.
+
+The SSL_select_next_proto() helper function can be useful from either the ALPN
+callback or the NPN callback (described below). If no match is found, the first
+item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen> and
+B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> is returned. This can be useful when implementating
+the NPN callback. In the ALPN case, the value returned in B<out> and B<outlen>
+must be ignored if B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> has been returned from
+SSL_select_next_proto().
SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called when a
client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list, and a
@@ -85,9 +93,10 @@ must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within B<in>).
The length of the protocol name must be written into B<outlen>. The
server's advertised protocols are provided in B<in> and B<inlen>. The
callback can assume that B<in> is syntactically valid. The client must
-select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns
-a value other than B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK>. The B<arg> parameter is the pointer
-set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
+select a protocol (although it may be an empty, zero length protocol). It is
+fatal to the connection if this callback returns a value other than
+B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK> or if the zero length protocol is selected. The B<arg>
+parameter is the pointer set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called
when a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
@@ -149,7 +158,8 @@ A match was found and is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>.
=item OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP
No match was found. The first item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in
-B<out>, B<outlen>.
+B<out>, B<outlen> (or B<NULL> and 0 in the case where the first entry in
+B<client> is invalid).
=back
--
2.45.2
From 087501b4f572825e27ca8cc2c5874fcf6fd47cf7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 10:41:55 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Correct return values for
tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg
Return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT in the event that we don't send the extension,
rather than EXT_RETURN_SENT. This actually makes no difference at all to
the current control flow since this return value is ignored in this case
anyway. But lets make it correct anyway.
Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24718)
---
ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
index 4ea085e1a1..2da880450f 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
@@ -1476,9 +1476,10 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
s->s3.npn_seen = 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
- return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
#endif
--
2.45.2
From 017e54183b95617825fb9316d618c154a34c634e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 11:51:54 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Add ALPN validation in the client
The ALPN protocol selected by the server must be one that we originally
advertised. We should verify that it is.
Follow on from CVE-2024-5535
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24718)
---
ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
index a07dc62e9a..b21ccf9273 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
@@ -1566,6 +1566,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
size_t len;
+ PACKET confpkt, protpkt;
+ int valid = 0;
/* We must have requested it. */
if (!s->s3.alpn_sent) {
@@ -1584,6 +1586,28 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
+
+ /* It must be a protocol that we sent */
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&confpkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&confpkt, &protpkt)) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&protpkt) != len)
+ continue;
+ if (memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_data(&protpkt), len) == 0) {
+ /* Valid protocol found */
+ valid = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!valid) {
+ /* The protocol sent from the server does not match one we advertised */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
--
2.45.2

View File

@@ -1,255 +0,0 @@
commit 97ebe37033e8884f4cca5544a74376633c665e11
Author: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Date: Wed Jun 19 21:04:11 2024 +1000
Avoid type errors in EAI-related name check logic.
The incorrectly typed data is read only, used in a compare operation, so
neither remote code execution, nor memory content disclosure were possible.
However, applications performing certificate name checks were vulnerable to
denial of service.
The GENERAL_TYPE data type is a union, and we must take care to access the
correct member, based on `gen->type`, not all the member fields have the same
structure, and a segfault is possible if the wrong member field is read.
The code in question was lightly refactored with the intent to make it more
obviously correct.
CVE-2024-6119
(cherry picked from commit 1486960d6cdb052e4fc0109a56a0597b4e902ba1)
diff --git a/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c b/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c
index 1a18174995..a09414c972 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/v3_utl.c
@@ -916,36 +916,64 @@ static int do_x509_check(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen,
ASN1_STRING *cstr;
gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
- if ((gen->type == GEN_OTHERNAME) && (check_type == GEN_EMAIL)) {
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(gen->d.otherName->type_id) ==
- NID_id_on_SmtpUTF8Mailbox) {
- san_present = 1;
-
- /*
- * If it is not a UTF8String then that is unexpected and we
- * treat it as no match
- */
- if (gen->d.otherName->value->type == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
- cstr = gen->d.otherName->value->value.utf8string;
-
- /* Positive on success, negative on error! */
- if ((rv = do_check_string(cstr, 0, equal, flags,
- chk, chklen, peername)) != 0)
- break;
- }
- } else
+ switch (gen->type) {
+ default:
+ continue;
+ case GEN_OTHERNAME:
+ switch (OBJ_obj2nid(gen->d.otherName->type_id)) {
+ default:
continue;
- } else {
- if ((gen->type != check_type) && (gen->type != GEN_OTHERNAME))
+ case NID_id_on_SmtpUTF8Mailbox:
+ /*-
+ * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8398#section-3
+ *
+ * Due to name constraint compatibility reasons described
+ * in Section 6, SmtpUTF8Mailbox subjectAltName MUST NOT
+ * be used unless the local-part of the email address
+ * contains non-ASCII characters. When the local-part is
+ * ASCII, rfc822Name subjectAltName MUST be used instead
+ * of SmtpUTF8Mailbox. This is compatible with legacy
+ * software that supports only rfc822Name (and not
+ * SmtpUTF8Mailbox). [...]
+ *
+ * SmtpUTF8Mailbox is encoded as UTF8String.
+ *
+ * If it is not a UTF8String then that is unexpected, and
+ * we ignore the invalid SAN (neither set san_present nor
+ * consider it a candidate for equality). This does mean
+ * that the subject CN may be considered, as would be the
+ * case when the malformed SmtpUtf8Mailbox SAN is instead
+ * simply absent.
+ *
+ * When CN-ID matching is not desirable, applications can
+ * choose to turn it off, doing so is at this time a best
+ * practice.
+ */
+ if (check_type != GEN_EMAIL
+ || gen->d.otherName->value->type != V_ASN1_UTF8STRING)
+ continue;
+ alt_type = 0;
+ cstr = gen->d.otherName->value->value.utf8string;
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case GEN_EMAIL:
+ if (check_type != GEN_EMAIL)
continue;
- }
- san_present = 1;
- if (check_type == GEN_EMAIL)
cstr = gen->d.rfc822Name;
- else if (check_type == GEN_DNS)
+ break;
+ case GEN_DNS:
+ if (check_type != GEN_DNS)
+ continue;
cstr = gen->d.dNSName;
- else
+ break;
+ case GEN_IPADD:
+ if (check_type != GEN_IPADD)
+ continue;
cstr = gen->d.iPAddress;
+ break;
+ }
+ san_present = 1;
/* Positive on success, negative on error! */
if ((rv = do_check_string(cstr, alt_type, equal, flags,
chk, chklen, peername)) != 0)
diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data.t b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data.t
index 522982ddfb..e18735d89a 100644
--- a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data.t
+++ b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data.t
@@ -21,16 +21,18 @@ setup("test_eai_data");
#./util/wrap.pl apps/openssl verify -nameopt utf8 -no_check_time -CAfile test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/utf8_chain.pem test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/ascii_leaf.pem
#./util/wrap.pl apps/openssl verify -nameopt utf8 -no_check_time -CAfile test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/ascii_chain.pem test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/utf8_leaf.pem
-plan tests => 12;
+plan tests => 16;
require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl'));
my $folder = "test/recipes/25-test_eai_data";
my $ascii_pem = srctop_file($folder, "ascii_leaf.pem");
my $utf8_pem = srctop_file($folder, "utf8_leaf.pem");
+my $kdc_pem = srctop_file($folder, "kdc-cert.pem");
my $ascii_chain_pem = srctop_file($folder, "ascii_chain.pem");
my $utf8_chain_pem = srctop_file($folder, "utf8_chain.pem");
+my $kdc_chain_pem = srctop_file($folder, "kdc-root-cert.pem");
my $out;
my $outcnt = 0;
@@ -56,10 +58,18 @@ SKIP: {
ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $ascii_chain_pem, $ascii_pem])));
ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $utf8_chain_pem, $utf8_pem])));
+ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $kdc_chain_pem, $kdc_pem])));
ok(!run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $ascii_chain_pem, $utf8_pem])));
ok(!run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-CAfile", $utf8_chain_pem, $ascii_pem])));
+# Check an otherName does not get misparsed as an DNS name, (should trigger ASAN errors if violated).
+ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-verify_hostname", 'mx1.example.com', "-CAfile", $kdc_chain_pem, $kdc_pem])));
+# Check an otherName does not get misparsed as an email address, (should trigger ASAN errors if violated).
+ok(run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-verify_email", 'joe@example.com', "-CAfile", $kdc_chain_pem, $kdc_pem])));
+# We expect SmtpUTF8Mailbox to be a UTF8 String, not an IA5String.
+ok(!run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-nameopt", "utf8", "-no_check_time", "-verify_email", 'moe@example.com', "-CAfile", $kdc_chain_pem, $kdc_pem])));
+
#Check that we get the expected failure return code
with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 2; } },
sub {
diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-cert.pem b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e8a2c6f55d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDbDCCAlSgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDDARSb290
+MCAXDTI0MDYyMDA2MTQxNVoYDzIxMjQwNjIwMDYxNDE1WjAXMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxU
+RVNULkVYQU1QTEUwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQC6wfP+
+6go79dkpo/dGLMlPZ7Gw/Q6gUYrCWZWUEgEeRVHCrqOlgUEyA+PcWas/XDPUxXry
+BQlJHLvlqamAQn8gs4QPBARFYWKNiTVGyaRkgNA1N5gqyZdrP9UE+ZJmdqxRAAe8
+vvpGZWSgevPhLUiSCFYDiD0Rtji2Hm3rGUrReQFBQDEw2pNGwz9zIaxUs08kQZcx
+Yzyiplz5Oau+R/6sAgUwDlrD9xOlUxx/tA/MSDIfkK8qioU11uUZtO5VjkNQy/bT
+7zQMmXxWgm2MIgOs1u4YN7YGOtgqHE9v9iPHHfgrkbQDtVDGQsa8AQEhkUDSCtW9
+3VFAKx6dGNXYzFwfAgMBAAGjgcgwgcUwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFR5tZycW19DmtbL4Zqj
+te1c2vZLMAkGA1UdIwQCMAAwCQYDVR0TBAIwADCBjQYDVR0RBIGFMIGCoD8GBisG
+AQUCAqA1MDOgDhsMVEVTVC5FWEFNUExFoSEwH6ADAgEBoRgwFhsGa3JidGd0GwxU
+RVNULkVYQU1QTEWgHQYIKwYBBQUHCAmgERYPbW9lQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tgQ9qb2VA
+ZXhhbXBsZS5jb22CD214MS5leGFtcGxlLmNvbTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEA
+T0xzVtVpRtaOzIhgzw7XQUdzWD5UEGSJJ1cBCOmKUWwDLTAouCYLFB4TbEE7MMUb
+iuMy60bjmVtvfJIXorGUgSadRe5RWJ5DamJWvPA0Q9x7blnEcXqEF+9Td+ypevgU
+UYHFmg83OYwxOsFXZ5cRuXMk3WCsDHQIBi6D1L6oDDZ2pfArs5mqm3thQKVlqyl1
+El3XRYEdqAz/5eCOFNfwxF0ALxjxVr/Z50StUZU8I7Zfev6+kHhyrR7dqzYJImv9
+0fTCOBEMjIETDsrA70OxAMu4V16nrWZdJdvzblS2qrt97Omkj+2kiPAJFB76RpwI
+oDQ9fKfUOAmUFth2/R/eGA==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-root-cert.pem b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-root-cert.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a74c96bf31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc-root-cert.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIICnDCCAYQCCQCBswYcrlZSHjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDDARS
+b290MCAXDTI0MDYyMDA2MTQxNVoYDzIxMjQwNjIwMDYxNDE1WjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQD
+DARSb290MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAqRj8S4kBbIUj
+61kZfi6nE35Q38U140+qt4uAiwAhKumfVHlBM0zQ98WFt5zMHIBQwIb3yjc2zj+0
+qzUnQfwm1r/RfcMmBPEti9Ge+aEMSsds2gMXziOFM8wd2aAFPy7UVE0XpEWofsRK
+MGi61MKVdPSbGIxBwY9VW38/7D/wf1HtJe7y0xpuecR7GB2XAs+qST59NjuF+7wS
+dLM8Hb3TATgeYbXXWsRJgwz+SPzExg5WmLnU+7y4brZ32dHtdSmkRVSgSlaIf7Xj
+3Tc6Zi7I+W/JYk7hy1zUexVdWCak4PHcoWrXe0gNNN/t8VfLfMExt5z/HIylXnU7
+pGUyqZlTGQIDAQABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQAHpLF1UCRy7b6Hk0rLokxI
+lgwiH9BU9mktigAGASvkbllpt+YbUbWnuYAvpHBGiP1qZtfX2r96UrSJaGO9BEzT
+Gp9ThnSjoj4Srul0+s/NArU22irFLmDzbalgevAmm9gMGkdqkiIm/mXbwrPj0ncl
+KGicevXryVpvaP62eZ8cc3C4p97frMmXxRX8sTdQpD/gRI7prdEILRSKveqT+AEW
+7rFGM5AOevb4U8ddop8A3D/kX0wcCAIBF6jCNk3uEJ57jVcagL04kPnVfdRiedTS
+vfq1DRNcD29d1H/9u0fHdSn1/+8Ep3X+afQ3C6//5NvOEaXcIGO4QSwkprQydfv8
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc.sh b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000000..7a8dbc719f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/recipes/25-test_eai_data/kdc.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env bash
+
+# Create a root CA, signing a leaf cert with a KDC principal otherName SAN, and
+# also a non-UTF8 smtpUtf8Mailbox SAN followed by an rfc822Name SAN and a DNS
+# name SAN. In the vulnerable EAI code, the KDC principal `otherName` should
+# trigger ASAN errors in DNS name checks, while the non-UTF8 `smtpUtf8Mailbox`
+# should likewise lead to ASAN issues with email name checks.
+
+rm -f root-key.pem root-cert.pem
+openssl req -nodes -new -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout kdc-root-key.pem \
+ -x509 -subj /CN=Root -days 36524 -out kdc-root-cert.pem
+
+exts=$(
+ printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n%s = " \
+ "subjectKeyIdentifier = hash" \
+ "authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid" \
+ "basicConstraints = CA:false" \
+ "subjectAltName"
+ printf "%s, " "otherName:1.3.6.1.5.2.2;SEQUENCE:kdc_princ_name"
+ printf "%s, " "otherName:1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.9;IA5:moe@example.com"
+ printf "%s, " "email:joe@example.com"
+ printf "%s\n" "DNS:mx1.example.com"
+ printf "[kdc_princ_name]\n"
+ printf "realm = EXP:0, GeneralString:TEST.EXAMPLE\n"
+ printf "principal_name = EXP:1, SEQUENCE:kdc_principal_seq\n"
+ printf "[kdc_principal_seq]\n"
+ printf "name_type = EXP:0, INTEGER:1\n"
+ printf "name_string = EXP:1, SEQUENCE:kdc_principal_components\n"
+ printf "[kdc_principal_components]\n"
+ printf "princ1 = GeneralString:krbtgt\n"
+ printf "princ2 = GeneralString:TEST.EXAMPLE\n"
+ )
+
+printf "%s\n" "$exts"
+
+openssl req -nodes -new -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout kdc-key.pem \
+ -subj "/CN=TEST.EXAMPLE" |
+ openssl x509 -req -out kdc-cert.pem \
+ -CA "kdc-root-cert.pem" -CAkey "kdc-root-key.pem" \
+ -set_serial 2 -days 36524 \
+ -extfile <(printf "%s\n" "$exts")

View File

@@ -1,198 +0,0 @@
From fdf6723362ca51bd883295efe206cb5b1cfa5154 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2024 01:02:40 +1000
Subject: [PATCH] Harden BN_GF2m_poly2arr against misuse.
The BN_GF2m_poly2arr() function converts characteristic-2 field
(GF_{2^m}) Galois polynomials from a representation as a BIGNUM bitmask,
to a compact array with just the exponents of the non-zero terms.
These polynomials are then used in BN_GF2m_mod_arr() to perform modular
reduction. A precondition of calling BN_GF2m_mod_arr() is that the
polynomial must have a non-zero constant term (i.e. the array has `0` as
its final element).
Internally, callers of BN_GF2m_poly2arr() did not verify that
precondition, and binary EC curve parameters with an invalid polynomial
could lead to out of bounds memory reads and writes in BN_GF2m_mod_arr().
The precondition is always true for polynomials that arise from the
standard form of EC parameters for characteristic-two fields (X9.62).
See the "Finite Field Identification" section of:
https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/formal-language/itu-t/x/x894/2018-cor1/ANSI-X9-62.html
The OpenSSL GF(2^m) code supports only the trinomial and pentanomial
basis X9.62 forms.
This commit updates BN_GF2m_poly2arr() to return `0` (failure) when
the constant term is zero (i.e. the input bitmask BIGNUM is not odd).
Additionally, the return value is made unambiguous when there is not
enough space to also pad the array with a final `-1` sentinel value.
The return value is now always the number of elements (including the
final `-1`) that would be filled when the output array is sufficiently
large. Previously the same count was returned both when the array has
just enough room for the final `-1` and when it had only enough space
for non-sentinel values.
Finally, BN_GF2m_poly2arr() is updated to reject polynomials whose
degree exceeds `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against
CPU exhausition attacks via excessively large inputs.
The above issues do not arise in processing X.509 certificates. These
generally have EC keys from "named curves", and RFC5840 (Section 2.1.1)
disallows explicit EC parameters. The TLS code in OpenSSL enforces this
constraint only after the certificate is decoded, but, even if explicit
parameters are specified, they are in X9.62 form, which cannot represent
problem values as noted above.
Initially reported as oss-fuzz issue 71623.
A closely related issue was earlier reported in
<https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/19826>.
Severity: Low, CVE-2024-9143
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25639)
(cherry picked from commit 8e008cb8b23ec7dc75c45a66eeed09c815b11cd2)
---
crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c | 28 +++++++++++++++-------
test/ec_internal_test.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
index c811ae82d6b15..bcc66613cc14d 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include "bn_local.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
/*
* Maximum number of iterations before BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr should
@@ -1140,16 +1141,26 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
/*
* Convert the bit-string representation of a polynomial ( \sum_{i=0}^n a_i *
* x^i) into an array of integers corresponding to the bits with non-zero
- * coefficient. Array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements of the array
- * will be filled. Return value is total number of array elements that would
- * be filled if array was large enough.
+ * coefficient. The array is intended to be suitable for use with
+ * `BN_GF2m_mod_arr()`, and so the constant term of the polynomial must not be
+ * zero. This translates to a requirement that the input BIGNUM `a` is odd.
+ *
+ * Given sufficient room, the array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements
+ * of the array will be filled.
+ *
+ * The return value is total number of array elements that would be filled if
+ * array was large enough, including the terminating `-1`. It is `0` when `a`
+ * is not odd or the constant term is zero contrary to requirement.
+ *
+ * The return value is also `0` when the leading exponent exceeds
+ * `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against CPU exhaustion attacks,
*/
int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max)
{
int i, j, k = 0;
BN_ULONG mask;
- if (BN_is_zero(a))
+ if (!BN_is_odd(a))
return 0;
for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
@@ -1167,12 +1178,13 @@ int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max)
}
}
- if (k < max) {
+ if (k > 0 && p[0] > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (k < max)
p[k] = -1;
- k++;
- }
- return k;
+ return k + 1;
}
/*
diff --git a/test/ec_internal_test.c b/test/ec_internal_test.c
index 8c2cd05631696..02cfd4e9d8858 100644
--- a/test/ec_internal_test.c
+++ b/test/ec_internal_test.c
@@ -155,6 +155,56 @@ static int field_tests_ecp_mont(void)
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+/* Test that decoding of invalid GF2m field parameters fails. */
+static int ec2m_field_sanity(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ BIGNUM *p, *a, *b;
+ EC_GROUP *group1 = NULL, *group2 = NULL, *group3 = NULL;
+
+ TEST_info("Testing GF2m hardening\n");
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (!TEST_ptr(b = BN_CTX_get(ctx))
+ || !TEST_true(BN_one(a))
+ || !TEST_true(BN_one(b)))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Even pentanomial value should be rejected */
+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf2)))
+ goto out;
+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group1 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)))
+ TEST_error("Zero constant term accepted in GF2m polynomial");
+
+ /* Odd hexanomial should also be rejected */
+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf3)))
+ goto out;
+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group2 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)))
+ TEST_error("Hexanomial accepted as GF2m polynomial");
+
+ /* Excessive polynomial degree should also be rejected */
+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0x71))
+ || !TEST_true(BN_set_bit(p, OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS + 1)))
+ goto out;
+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group3 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)))
+ TEST_error("GF2m polynomial degree > %d accepted",
+ OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS);
+
+ ret = group1 == NULL && group2 == NULL && group3 == NULL;
+
+ out:
+ EC_GROUP_free(group1);
+ EC_GROUP_free(group2);
+ EC_GROUP_free(group3);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/* test EC_GF2m_simple_method directly */
static int field_tests_ec2_simple(void)
{
@@ -443,6 +493,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_simple);
ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_mont);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ ADD_TEST(ec2m_field_sanity);
ADD_TEST(field_tests_ec2_simple);
#endif
ADD_ALL_TESTS(field_tests_default, crv_len);

View File

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
From 0eb9acc24febb1f3f01f0320cfba9654cf66b0ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Tue, 20 May 2025 16:34:10 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] apps/x509.c: Fix the -addreject option adding trust instead
of rejection
Fixes CVE-2025-4575
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/27672)
Signed-off-by: Lucas Mulling <lucas.mulling@suse.com>
---
apps/x509.c | 2 +-
test/recipes/25-test_x509.t | 12 +++++++++++-
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Index: openssl-3.5.0/apps/x509.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.5.0.orig/apps/x509.c
+++ openssl-3.5.0/apps/x509.c
@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ int x509_main(int argc, char **argv)
prog, opt_arg());
goto opthelp;
}
- if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(trust, objtmp))
+ if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(reject, objtmp))
goto end;
trustout = 1;
break;
Index: openssl-3.5.0/test/recipes/25-test_x509.t
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.5.0.orig/test/recipes/25-test_x509.t
+++ openssl-3.5.0/test/recipes/25-test_x509.t
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_fil
setup("test_x509");
-plan tests => 134;
+plan tests => 138;
# Prevent MSys2 filename munging for arguments that look like file paths but
# aren't
@@ -110,6 +110,16 @@ ok(run(app(["openssl", "x509", "-new", "
&& run(app(["openssl", "verify", "-no_check_time",
"-trusted", $ca, "-partial_chain", $caout])));
+# test trust decoration
+ok(run(app(["openssl", "x509", "-in", $ca, "-addtrust", "emailProtection",
+ "-out", "ca-trusted.pem"])));
+cert_contains("ca-trusted.pem", "Trusted Uses: E-mail Protection",
+ 1, 'trusted use - E-mail Protection');
+ok(run(app(["openssl", "x509", "-in", $ca, "-addreject", "emailProtection",
+ "-out", "ca-rejected.pem"])));
+cert_contains("ca-rejected.pem", "Rejected Uses: E-mail Protection",
+ 1, 'rejected use - E-mail Protection');
+
subtest 'x509 -- x.509 v1 certificate' => sub {
tconversion( -type => 'x509', -prefix => 'x509v1',
-in => srctop_file("test", "testx509.pem") );

View File

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
Index: openssl-3.0.0-alpha7/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.0.0-alpha7.orig/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ openssl-3.0.0-alpha7/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -1592,7 +1592,14 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_
*/
ok = 1;
rule_p = rule_str;
- if (strncmp(rule_str, "DEFAULT", 7) == 0) {
+ if (strncmp(rule_str,"DEFAULT_SUSE", 12) == 0) {
+ ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(SSL_DEFAULT_SUSE_CIPHER_LIST,
+ &head, &tail, ca_list, c);
+ rule_p += 12;
+ if (*rule_p == ':')
+ rule_p++;
+ }
+ else if (strncmp(rule_str, "DEFAULT", 7) == 0) {
ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(OSSL_default_cipher_list(),
&head, &tail, ca_list, c);
rule_p += 7;
Index: openssl-3.0.0-alpha7/test/recipes/99-test_suse_default_ciphers.t
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ openssl-3.0.0-alpha7/test/recipes/99-test_suse_default_ciphers.t
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT/;
+use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+
+setup("test_default_ciphersuites");
+
+plan tests => 6;
+
+my @cipher_suites = ("DEFAULT_SUSE", "DEFAULT");
+
+foreach my $cipherlist (@cipher_suites) {
+ ok(run(app(["openssl", "ciphers", "-s", $cipherlist])),
+ "openssl ciphers works with ciphersuite $cipherlist");
+ ok(!grep(/(MD5|RC4|DES)/, run(app(["openssl", "ciphers", "-s", $cipherlist]), capture => 1)),
+ "$cipherlist shouldn't contain MD5, DES or RC4\n");
+ ok(grep(/(TLSv1.3)/, run(app(["openssl", "ciphers", "-tls1_3", "-s", "-v", $cipherlist]), capture => 1)),
+ "$cipherlist should contain TLSv1.3 ciphers\n");
+}
+
Index: openssl-3.0.0-alpha7/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.0.0-alpha7.orig/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
+++ openssl-3.0.0-alpha7/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
@@ -189,6 +189,11 @@ extern "C" {
*/
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "ALL:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT:!eNULL"
+# define SSL_DEFAULT_SUSE_CIPHER_LIST "ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:"\
+ "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:"\
+ "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:"\
+ "DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:"\
+ "AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES256-SHA256:AES256-SHA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES128-SHA256:AES128-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA"
/*
* This is the default set of TLSv1.3 ciphersuites
* DEPRECATED IN 3.0.0, in favor of OSSL_default_ciphersuites()

View File

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
Index: openssl-3.1.4/apps/openssl.cnf
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.1.4.orig/apps/openssl.cnf
+++ openssl-3.1.4/apps/openssl.cnf
@@ -70,11 +70,11 @@ engines = engine_section
# to side-channel attacks and as such have been deprecated.
[provider_sect]
-default = default_sect
+##default = default_sect
##legacy = legacy_sect
-[default_sect]
-activate = 1
+##[default_sect]
+##activate = 1
##[legacy_sect]
##activate = 1

View File

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
From d2bfec6e464aeb247a2d6853668d4e473f19e15f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "fangming.fang" <fangming.fang@arm.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2023 06:17:51 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Enable BTI feature for md5 on aarch64
Fixes: #22959
---
crypto/md5/asm/md5-aarch64.pl | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/md5/asm/md5-aarch64.pl b/crypto/md5/asm/md5-aarch64.pl
index 3200a0fa9bff0..5a8608069691d 100755
--- a/crypto/md5/asm/md5-aarch64.pl
+++ b/crypto/md5/asm/md5-aarch64.pl
@@ -28,10 +28,13 @@
*STDOUT=*OUT;
$code .= <<EOF;
+#include "arm_arch.h"
+
.text
.globl ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order
.type ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order,\@function
ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order:
+ AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET
// Save all callee-saved registers
stp x19,x20,[sp,#-80]!
stp x21,x22,[sp,#16]

View File

@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
Index: openssl-3.2.3/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c
@@ -23,7 +23,14 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_entropy(ossl_unused
size_t entropy_available;
RAND_POOL *pool;
- pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
+ /*
+ * OpenSSL still implements an internal entropy pool of
+ * some size that is hashed to get seed data.
+ * Note that this is a conditioning step for which SP800-90C requires
+ * 64 additional bits from the entropy source to claim the requested
+ * amount of entropy.
+ */
+ pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy + 64, 1, min_len, max_len);
if (pool == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
return 0;
Index: openssl-3.2.3/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -723,15 +723,7 @@ EVP_RAND_CTX *RAND_get0_primary(OSSL_LIB
return ret;
}
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
- if (dgbl->seed == NULL) {
- ERR_set_mark();
- dgbl->seed = rand_new_seed(ctx);
- ERR_pop_to_mark();
- }
-#endif
-
- ret = dgbl->primary = rand_new_drbg(ctx, dgbl->seed,
+ ret = dgbl->primary = rand_new_drbg(ctx, NULL,
PRIMARY_RESEED_INTERVAL,
PRIMARY_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL, 1);
/*
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c
@@ -133,7 +133,11 @@ size_t ossl_crngt_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG
* to the nearest byte. If the entropy is of less than full quality,
* the amount required should be scaled up appropriately here.
*/
- bytes_needed = (entropy + 7) / 8;
+ /*
+ * FIPS 140-3: the yet draft SP800-90C requires requested entropy
+ * + 128 bits during initial seeding
+ */
+ bytes_needed = (entropy + 128 + 7) / 8;
if (bytes_needed < min_len)
bytes_needed = min_len;
if (bytes_needed > max_len)
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c
@@ -569,6 +569,9 @@ static int ossl_prov_drbg_reseed_unlocke
#endif
}
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ prediction_resistance = 1;
+#endif
/* Reseed using our sources in addition */
entropylen = get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen,
@@ -690,8 +693,14 @@ int ossl_prov_drbg_generate(PROV_DRBG *d
reseed_required = 1;
}
if (drbg->parent != NULL
- && get_parent_reseed_count(drbg) != drbg->parent_reseed_counter)
+ && get_parent_reseed_count(drbg) != drbg->parent_reseed_counter) {
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ /* SUSE patches provide chain reseeding when necessary so just sync counters*/
+ drbg->parent_reseed_counter = get_parent_reseed_count(drbg);
+#else
reseed_required = 1;
+#endif
+ }
if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) {
if (!ossl_prov_drbg_reseed_unlocked(drbg, prediction_resistance, NULL,
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
*
* The value is in bytes.
*/
-#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ 16
+#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ 32
/*
* Maximum input size for the DRBG (entropy, nonce, personalization string)
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c
@@ -102,7 +102,14 @@ static int seed_src_generate(void *vseed
return 0;
}
- pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(strength, 1, outlen, outlen);
+ /*
+ * OpenSSL still implements an internal entropy pool of
+ * some size that is hashed to get seed data.
+ * Note that this is a conditioning step for which SP800-90C requires
+ * 64 additional bits from the entropy source to claim the requested
+ * amount of entropy.
+ */
+ pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(strength + 64, 1, outlen, outlen);
if (pool == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
return 0;
@@ -182,7 +189,14 @@ static size_t seed_get_seed(void *vseed,
size_t i;
RAND_POOL *pool;
- pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
+ /*
+ * OpenSSL still implements an internal entropy pool of
+ * some size that is hashed to get seed data.
+ * Note that this is a conditioning step for which SP800-90C requires
+ * 64 additional bits from the entropy source to claim the requested
+ * amount of entropy.
+ */
+ pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy + 64, 1, min_len, max_len);
if (pool == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
return 0;

View File

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
Index: openssl-3.2.3/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
@@ -743,12 +743,16 @@ EC_POINT *EC_POINT_new(const EC_GROUP *g
void EC_POINT_free(EC_POINT *point)
{
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ EC_POINT_clear_free(point);
+#else
if (point == NULL)
return;
if (point->meth->point_finish != 0)
point->meth->point_finish(point);
OPENSSL_free(point);
+#endif
}
void EC_POINT_clear_free(EC_POINT *point)
Index: openssl-3.2.3/crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c
@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ void ossl_ffc_params_init(FFC_PARAMS *pa
void ossl_ffc_params_cleanup(FFC_PARAMS *params)
{
- BN_free(params->p);
- BN_free(params->q);
- BN_free(params->g);
- BN_free(params->j);
+ BN_clear_free(params->p);
+ BN_clear_free(params->q);
+ BN_clear_free(params->g);
+ BN_clear_free(params->j);
OPENSSL_free(params->seed);
ossl_ffc_params_init(params);
}
Index: openssl-3.2.3/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
@@ -159,8 +159,8 @@ void RSA_free(RSA *r)
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
CRYPTO_FREE_REF(&r->references);
- BN_free(r->n);
- BN_free(r->e);
+ BN_clear_free(r->n);
+ BN_clear_free(r->e);
BN_clear_free(r->d);
BN_clear_free(r->p);
BN_clear_free(r->q);
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static void kdf_hkdf_reset(void *vctx)
void *provctx = ctx->provctx;
ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
- OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->prefix);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->label);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->data, ctx->data_len);
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ static void *kdf_pbkdf2_new(void *provct
static void kdf_pbkdf2_cleanup(KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx)
{
ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
- OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len);
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
}

View File

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
From e1eba21921ceeffa45ffd2115868c14e4c7fb8d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 18:08:24 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] hmac: Add explicit FIPS indicator for key length
NIST SP 800-131Ar2, table 9 "Approval Status of MAC Algorithms"
specifies key lengths < 112 bytes are disallowed for HMAC generation and
are legacy use for HMAC verification.
Add an explicit indicator that will mark shorter key lengths as
unsupported. The indicator can be queries from the EVP_MAC_CTX object
using EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params() with the
OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR
parameter.
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
---
include/crypto/evp.h | 7 +++++++
include/openssl/evp.h | 3 +++
providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
Index: openssl-3.2.3/include/crypto/evp.h
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/include/crypto/evp.h
+++ openssl-3.2.3/include/crypto/evp.h
@@ -206,6 +206,13 @@ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_ed448_pkey_m
const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pkey_method(void);
const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pss_pkey_method(void);
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+/* NIST SP 800-131Ar2, Table 9: Approval Status of MAC Algorithms specifies key
+ * lengths < 112 bytes are disallowed for HMAC generation and legacy use for
+ * HMAC verification. */
+# define EVP_HMAC_GEN_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN (112 / 8)
+#endif
+
struct evp_mac_st {
OSSL_PROVIDER *prov;
int name_id;
Index: openssl-3.2.3/include/openssl/evp.h
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/include/openssl/evp.h
+++ openssl-3.2.3/include/openssl/evp.h
@@ -1199,6 +1199,9 @@ void EVP_MD_do_all_provided(OSSL_LIB_CTX
void *arg);
/* MAC stuff */
+# define EVP_MAC_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
+# define EVP_MAC_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED 1
+# define EVP_MAC_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
EVP_MAC *EVP_MAC_fetch(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *algorithm,
const char *properties);
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
#include "internal/ssl3_cbc.h"
+#include "crypto/evp.h"
+
#include "prov/implementations.h"
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
#include "prov/provider_util.h"
@@ -235,6 +237,9 @@ static int hmac_final(void *vmacctx, uns
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_BLOCK_SIZE, NULL),
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
static const OSSL_PARAM *hmac_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
@@ -256,6 +261,18 @@ static int hmac_get_ctx_params(void *vma
&& !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, hmac_block_size(macctx)))
return 0;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR)) != NULL) {
+ int fips_indicator = EVP_MAC_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
+ /* NIST SP 800-131Ar2, Table 9: Approval Status of MAC Algorithms
+ * specifies key lengths < 112 bytes are disallowed for HMAC generation
+ * and legacy use for HMAC verification. */
+ if (macctx->keylen < EVP_HMAC_GEN_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
+ fips_indicator = EVP_MAC_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+ return OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator);
+ }
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+
return 1;
}
Index: openssl-3.2.3/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
+++ openssl-3.2.3/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ my %params = (
'MAC_PARAM_SIZE' => "size", # size_t
'MAC_PARAM_BLOCK_SIZE' => "block-size", # size_t
'MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE' => "tls-data-size", # size_t
+ 'MAC_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR' => "suse-fips-indicator", # size_t
# KDF / PRF parameters
'KDF_PARAM_SECRET' => "secret", # octet string

View File

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
Index: openssl-3.2.4/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.4.orig/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
+++ openssl-3.2.4/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ static int fips_self_test(void *provctx)
*/
static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_digests[] = {
/* Our primary name:NiST name[:our older names] */
- { PROV_NAMES_SHA1, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_sha1_functions },
+ { PROV_NAMES_SHA1, FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES, ossl_sha1_functions },
{ PROV_NAMES_SHA2_224, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_sha224_functions },
{ PROV_NAMES_SHA2_256, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_sha256_functions },
{ PROV_NAMES_SHA2_384, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_sha384_functions },
@@ -355,9 +355,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM_CAPABLE fips
ALG(PROV_NAMES_AES_256_WRAP_PAD_INV, ossl_aes256wrappadinv_functions),
ALG(PROV_NAMES_AES_192_WRAP_PAD_INV, ossl_aes192wrappadinv_functions),
ALG(PROV_NAMES_AES_128_WRAP_PAD_INV, ossl_aes128wrappadinv_functions),
- ALGC(PROV_NAMES_AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA1, ossl_aes128cbc_hmac_sha1_functions,
+ UNAPPROVED_ALGC(PROV_NAMES_AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA1, ossl_aes128cbc_hmac_sha1_functions,
ossl_cipher_capable_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1),
- ALGC(PROV_NAMES_AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA1, ossl_aes256cbc_hmac_sha1_functions,
+ UNAPPROVED_ALGC(PROV_NAMES_AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA1, ossl_aes256cbc_hmac_sha1_functions,
ossl_cipher_capable_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1),
ALGC(PROV_NAMES_AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA256, ossl_aes128cbc_hmac_sha256_functions,
ossl_cipher_capable_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256),

View File

@@ -1,378 +0,0 @@
From e385647549c467fe263b68b72dd21bdfb875ee88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 17:51:16 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] FIPS: Use FFDHE2048 in self test
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
---
providers/fips/self_test_data.inc | 342 +++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 172 insertions(+), 170 deletions(-)
diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
index a29cc650b5..1b5623833f 100644
--- a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
+++ b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
@@ -821,188 +821,190 @@ static const ST_KAT_DRBG st_kat_drbg_tests[] =
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
/* DH KAT */
+/* RFC7919 FFDHE2048 p */
static const unsigned char dh_p[] = {
- 0xdc, 0xca, 0x15, 0x11, 0xb2, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25,
- 0xf5, 0x21, 0x16, 0xe1, 0x54, 0x27, 0x89, 0xe0,
- 0x01, 0xf0, 0x42, 0x5b, 0xcc, 0xc7, 0xf3, 0x66,
- 0xf7, 0x40, 0x64, 0x07, 0xf1, 0xc9, 0xfa, 0x8b,
- 0xe6, 0x10, 0xf1, 0x77, 0x8b, 0xb1, 0x70, 0xbe,
- 0x39, 0xdb, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0x85, 0xbf, 0x24, 0xce,
- 0x68, 0x80, 0xad, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x9f, 0x7c, 0x6d,
- 0x01, 0x5e, 0x61, 0xd4, 0x3f, 0xa3, 0xee, 0x4d,
- 0xe1, 0x85, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0x41, 0xff, 0xde,
- 0x9d, 0x41, 0x84, 0x07, 0xe1, 0x51, 0x38, 0xbb,
- 0x02, 0x1d, 0xae, 0xb3, 0x5f, 0x76, 0x2d, 0x17,
- 0x82, 0xac, 0xc6, 0x58, 0xd3, 0x2b, 0xd4, 0xb0,
- 0x23, 0x2c, 0x92, 0x7d, 0xd3, 0x8f, 0xa0, 0x97,
- 0xb3, 0xd1, 0x85, 0x9f, 0xa8, 0xac, 0xaf, 0xb9,
- 0x8f, 0x06, 0x66, 0x08, 0xfc, 0x64, 0x4e, 0xc7,
- 0xdd, 0xb6, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x99, 0xf9, 0x2a, 0xc1,
- 0xb5, 0x98, 0x25, 0xda, 0x84, 0x32, 0x07, 0x7d,
- 0xef, 0x69, 0x56, 0x46, 0x06, 0x3c, 0x20, 0x82,
- 0x3c, 0x95, 0x07, 0xab, 0x6f, 0x01, 0x76, 0xd4,
- 0x73, 0x0d, 0x99, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0xe6, 0x36, 0x1c,
- 0xd8, 0xb2, 0xb9, 0x4d, 0x3d, 0x2f, 0x32, 0x9b,
- 0x82, 0x09, 0x9b, 0xd6, 0x61, 0xf4, 0x29, 0x50,
- 0xf4, 0x03, 0xdf, 0x3e, 0xde, 0x62, 0xa3, 0x31,
- 0x88, 0xb0, 0x27, 0x98, 0xba, 0x82, 0x3f, 0x44,
- 0xb9, 0x46, 0xfe, 0x9d, 0xf6, 0x77, 0xa0, 0xc5,
- 0xa1, 0x23, 0x8e, 0xaa, 0x97, 0xb7, 0x0f, 0x80,
- 0xda, 0x8c, 0xac, 0x88, 0xe0, 0x92, 0xb1, 0x12,
- 0x70, 0x60, 0xff, 0xbf, 0x45, 0x57, 0x99, 0x94,
- 0x01, 0x1d, 0xc2, 0xfa, 0xa5, 0xe7, 0xf6, 0xc7,
- 0x62, 0x45, 0xe1, 0xcc, 0x31, 0x22, 0x31, 0xc1,
- 0x7d, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb1, 0x90, 0x07, 0xef, 0x0d,
- 0xb9, 0x9f, 0x9c, 0xb6, 0x0e, 0x1d, 0x5f, 0x69
-};
+ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+ 0xad, 0xf8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xa2, 0xbb, 0x4a, 0x9a,
+ 0xaf, 0xdc, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3d, 0x3c, 0xf1,
+ 0xd8, 0xb9, 0xc5, 0x83, 0xce, 0x2d, 0x36, 0x95,
+ 0xa9, 0xe1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xfb,
+ 0xcc, 0x93, 0x9d, 0xce, 0x24, 0x9b, 0x3e, 0xf9,
+ 0x7d, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0c, 0x75, 0xd8,
+ 0xf6, 0x81, 0xb2, 0x02, 0xae, 0xc4, 0x61, 0x7a,
+ 0xd3, 0xdf, 0x1e, 0xd5, 0xd5, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x61,
+ 0x24, 0x33, 0xf5, 0x1f, 0x5f, 0x06, 0x6e, 0xd0,
+ 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3d, 0xed, 0x1a, 0xf3,
+ 0xb5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5e, 0x7f, 0x57, 0xc9, 0x35,
+ 0x98, 0x4f, 0x0c, 0x70, 0xe0, 0xe6, 0x8b, 0x77,
+ 0xe2, 0xa6, 0x89, 0xda, 0xf3, 0xef, 0xe8, 0x72,
+ 0x1d, 0xf1, 0x58, 0xa1, 0x36, 0xad, 0xe7, 0x35,
+ 0x30, 0xac, 0xca, 0x4f, 0x48, 0x3a, 0x79, 0x7a,
+ 0xbc, 0x0a, 0xb1, 0x82, 0xb3, 0x24, 0xfb, 0x61,
+ 0xd1, 0x08, 0xa9, 0x4b, 0xb2, 0xc8, 0xe3, 0xfb,
+ 0xb9, 0x6a, 0xda, 0xb7, 0x60, 0xd7, 0xf4, 0x68,
+ 0x1d, 0x4f, 0x42, 0xa3, 0xde, 0x39, 0x4d, 0xf4,
+ 0xae, 0x56, 0xed, 0xe7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xbb, 0x19,
+ 0x0b, 0x07, 0xa7, 0xc8, 0xee, 0x0a, 0x6d, 0x70,
+ 0x9e, 0x02, 0xfc, 0xe1, 0xcd, 0xf7, 0xe2, 0xec,
+ 0xc0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xcd, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2f, 0x61,
+ 0x91, 0x72, 0xfe, 0x9c, 0xe9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xff,
+ 0x8e, 0x4f, 0x12, 0x32, 0xee, 0xf2, 0x81, 0x83,
+ 0xc3, 0xfe, 0x3b, 0x1b, 0x4c, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x73,
+ 0x3b, 0xb5, 0xfc, 0xbc, 0x2e, 0xc2, 0x20, 0x05,
+ 0xc5, 0x8e, 0xf1, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x16, 0x83, 0xb2,
+ 0xc6, 0xf3, 0x4a, 0x26, 0xc1, 0xb2, 0xef, 0xfa,
+ 0x88, 0x6b, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x28, 0x5c, 0x97,
+ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
+};
+/* RFC7919 FFDHE2048 q */
static const unsigned char dh_q[] = {
- 0x89, 0x8b, 0x22, 0x67, 0x17, 0xef, 0x03, 0x9e,
- 0x60, 0x3e, 0x82, 0xe5, 0xc7, 0xaf, 0xe4, 0x83,
- 0x74, 0xac, 0x5f, 0x62, 0x5c, 0x54, 0xf1, 0xea,
- 0x11, 0xac, 0xb5, 0x7d
-};
+ 0x7f, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+ 0xd6, 0xfc, 0x2a, 0x2c, 0x51, 0x5d, 0xa5, 0x4d,
+ 0x57, 0xee, 0x2b, 0x10, 0x13, 0x9e, 0x9e, 0x78,
+ 0xec, 0x5c, 0xe2, 0xc1, 0xe7, 0x16, 0x9b, 0x4a,
+ 0xd4, 0xf0, 0x9b, 0x20, 0x8a, 0x32, 0x19, 0xfd,
+ 0xe6, 0x49, 0xce, 0xe7, 0x12, 0x4d, 0x9f, 0x7c,
+ 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf1, 0xb1, 0xb1, 0x86, 0x3a, 0xec,
+ 0x7b, 0x40, 0xd9, 0x01, 0x57, 0x62, 0x30, 0xbd,
+ 0x69, 0xef, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0xea, 0xfe, 0xb2, 0xb0,
+ 0x92, 0x19, 0xfa, 0x8f, 0xaf, 0x83, 0x37, 0x68,
+ 0x42, 0xb1, 0xb2, 0xaa, 0x9e, 0xf6, 0x8d, 0x79,
+ 0xda, 0xab, 0x89, 0xaf, 0x3f, 0xab, 0xe4, 0x9a,
+ 0xcc, 0x27, 0x86, 0x38, 0x70, 0x73, 0x45, 0xbb,
+ 0xf1, 0x53, 0x44, 0xed, 0x79, 0xf7, 0xf4, 0x39,
+ 0x0e, 0xf8, 0xac, 0x50, 0x9b, 0x56, 0xf3, 0x9a,
+ 0x98, 0x56, 0x65, 0x27, 0xa4, 0x1d, 0x3c, 0xbd,
+ 0x5e, 0x05, 0x58, 0xc1, 0x59, 0x92, 0x7d, 0xb0,
+ 0xe8, 0x84, 0x54, 0xa5, 0xd9, 0x64, 0x71, 0xfd,
+ 0xdc, 0xb5, 0x6d, 0x5b, 0xb0, 0x6b, 0xfa, 0x34,
+ 0x0e, 0xa7, 0xa1, 0x51, 0xef, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xfa,
+ 0x57, 0x2b, 0x76, 0xf3, 0xb1, 0xb9, 0x5d, 0x8c,
+ 0x85, 0x83, 0xd3, 0xe4, 0x77, 0x05, 0x36, 0xb8,
+ 0x4f, 0x01, 0x7e, 0x70, 0xe6, 0xfb, 0xf1, 0x76,
+ 0x60, 0x1a, 0x02, 0x66, 0x94, 0x1a, 0x17, 0xb0,
+ 0xc8, 0xb9, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x74, 0xc2, 0xc1, 0xff,
+ 0xc7, 0x27, 0x89, 0x19, 0x77, 0x79, 0x40, 0xc1,
+ 0xe1, 0xff, 0x1d, 0x8d, 0xa6, 0x37, 0xd6, 0xb9,
+ 0x9d, 0xda, 0xfe, 0x5e, 0x17, 0x61, 0x10, 0x02,
+ 0xe2, 0xc7, 0x78, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0x8b, 0x41, 0xd9,
+ 0x63, 0x79, 0xa5, 0x13, 0x60, 0xd9, 0x77, 0xfd,
+ 0x44, 0x35, 0xa1, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x94, 0x2e, 0x4b,
+ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
+};
+/* RFC7919 FFDHE2048 g */
static const unsigned char dh_g[] = {
- 0x5e, 0xf7, 0xb8, 0x8f, 0x2d, 0xf6, 0x01, 0x39,
- 0x35, 0x1d, 0xfb, 0xfe, 0x12, 0x66, 0x80, 0x5f,
- 0xdf, 0x35, 0x6c, 0xdf, 0xd1, 0x3a, 0x4d, 0xa0,
- 0x05, 0x0c, 0x7e, 0xde, 0x24, 0x6d, 0xf5, 0x9f,
- 0x6a, 0xbf, 0x96, 0xad, 0xe5, 0xf2, 0xb2, 0x8f,
- 0xfe, 0x88, 0xd6, 0xbc, 0xe7, 0xf7, 0x89, 0x4a,
- 0x3d, 0x53, 0x5f, 0xc8, 0x21, 0x26, 0xdd, 0xd4,
- 0x24, 0x87, 0x2e, 0x16, 0xb8, 0x38, 0xdf, 0x8c,
- 0x51, 0xe9, 0x01, 0x6f, 0x88, 0x9c, 0x7c, 0x20,
- 0x3e, 0x98, 0xa8, 0xb6, 0x31, 0xf9, 0xc7, 0x25,
- 0x63, 0xd3, 0x8a, 0x49, 0x58, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x53,
- 0xd3, 0x58, 0xe7, 0x83, 0x31, 0x8c, 0xef, 0xd9,
- 0x67, 0x7c, 0x7b, 0x2d, 0xbb, 0x77, 0xd6, 0xdc,
- 0xe2, 0xa1, 0x96, 0x37, 0x95, 0xca, 0x64, 0xb9,
- 0x2d, 0x1c, 0x9a, 0xac, 0x6d, 0x0e, 0x8d, 0x43,
- 0x1d, 0xe5, 0xe5, 0x00, 0x60, 0xdf, 0xf7, 0x86,
- 0x89, 0xc9, 0xec, 0xa1, 0xc1, 0x24, 0x8c, 0x16,
- 0xed, 0x09, 0xc7, 0xad, 0x41, 0x2a, 0x17, 0x40,
- 0x6d, 0x2b, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xa1, 0xca, 0xbb, 0x23,
- 0x7b, 0x97, 0x34, 0xec, 0x7b, 0x8c, 0xe3, 0xfa,
- 0xe0, 0x2f, 0x29, 0xc5, 0xef, 0xed, 0x30, 0xd6,
- 0x91, 0x87, 0xda, 0x10, 0x9c, 0x2c, 0x9f, 0xe2,
- 0xaa, 0xdb, 0xb0, 0xc2, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0x4c, 0x61,
- 0x66, 0x55, 0x00, 0x0c, 0x43, 0x1c, 0x6b, 0x4a,
- 0x37, 0x97, 0x63, 0xb0, 0xa9, 0x16, 0x58, 0xef,
- 0xc8, 0x4e, 0x8b, 0x06, 0x35, 0x8c, 0x8b, 0x4f,
- 0x21, 0x37, 0x10, 0xfd, 0x10, 0x17, 0x2c, 0xf3,
- 0x9b, 0x83, 0x0c, 0x2d, 0xd8, 0x4a, 0x0c, 0x8a,
- 0xb8, 0x25, 0x16, 0xec, 0xab, 0x99, 0x5f, 0xa4,
- 0x21, 0x5e, 0x02, 0x3e, 0x4e, 0xcf, 0x80, 0x74,
- 0xc3, 0x9d, 0x6c, 0x88, 0xb7, 0x0d, 0x1e, 0xe4,
- 0xe9, 0x6f, 0xdc, 0x20, 0xea, 0x11, 0x5c, 0x32
+ 0x02
};
static const unsigned char dh_priv[] = {
- 0x14, 0x33, 0xe0, 0xb5, 0xa9, 0x17, 0xb6, 0x0a,
- 0x30, 0x23, 0xf2, 0xf8, 0xaa, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x70,
- 0xd2, 0x96, 0x8a, 0xba, 0x9a, 0xea, 0xc8, 0x15,
- 0x40, 0xb8, 0xfc, 0xe6
+ 0x01, 0xdc, 0x2a, 0xb9, 0x87, 0x71, 0x57, 0x0f,
+ 0xcd, 0x93, 0x65, 0x4c, 0xa1, 0xd6, 0x56, 0x6d,
+ 0xc5, 0x35, 0xd5, 0xcb, 0x4c, 0xb8, 0xad, 0x8d,
+ 0x6c, 0xdc, 0x5d, 0x6e, 0x94
};
static const unsigned char dh_pub[] = {
- 0x95, 0xdd, 0x33, 0x8d, 0x29, 0xe5, 0x71, 0x04,
- 0x92, 0xb9, 0x18, 0x31, 0x7b, 0x72, 0xa3, 0x69,
- 0x36, 0xe1, 0x95, 0x1a, 0x2e, 0xe5, 0xa5, 0x59,
- 0x16, 0x99, 0xc0, 0x48, 0x6d, 0x0d, 0x4f, 0x9b,
- 0xdd, 0x6d, 0x5a, 0x3f, 0x6b, 0x98, 0x89, 0x0c,
- 0x62, 0xb3, 0x76, 0x52, 0xd3, 0x6e, 0x71, 0x21,
- 0x11, 0xe6, 0x8a, 0x73, 0x55, 0x37, 0x25, 0x06,
- 0x99, 0xef, 0xe3, 0x30, 0x53, 0x73, 0x91, 0xfb,
- 0xc2, 0xc5, 0x48, 0xbc, 0x5a, 0xc3, 0xe5, 0xb2,
- 0x33, 0x86, 0xc3, 0xee, 0xf5, 0xeb, 0x43, 0xc0,
- 0x99, 0xd7, 0x0a, 0x52, 0x02, 0x68, 0x7e, 0x83,
- 0x96, 0x42, 0x48, 0xfc, 0xa9, 0x1f, 0x40, 0x90,
- 0x8e, 0x8f, 0xb3, 0x31, 0x93, 0x15, 0xf6, 0xd2,
- 0x60, 0x6d, 0x7f, 0x7c, 0xd5, 0x2c, 0xc6, 0xe7,
- 0xc5, 0x84, 0x3a, 0xfb, 0x22, 0x51, 0x9c, 0xf0,
- 0xf0, 0xf9, 0xd3, 0xa0, 0xa4, 0xe8, 0xc8, 0x88,
- 0x99, 0xef, 0xed, 0xe7, 0x36, 0x43, 0x51, 0xfb,
- 0x6a, 0x36, 0x3e, 0xe7, 0x17, 0xe5, 0x44, 0x5a,
- 0xda, 0xb4, 0xc9, 0x31, 0xa6, 0x48, 0x39, 0x97,
- 0xb8, 0x7d, 0xad, 0x83, 0x67, 0x7e, 0x4d, 0x1d,
- 0x3a, 0x77, 0x75, 0xe0, 0xf6, 0xd0, 0x0f, 0xdf,
- 0x73, 0xc7, 0xad, 0x80, 0x1e, 0x66, 0x5a, 0x0e,
- 0x5a, 0x79, 0x6d, 0x0a, 0x03, 0x80, 0xa1, 0x9f,
- 0xa1, 0x82, 0xef, 0xc8, 0xa0, 0x4f, 0x5e, 0x4d,
- 0xb9, 0x0d, 0x1a, 0x86, 0x37, 0xf9, 0x5d, 0xb1,
- 0x64, 0x36, 0xbd, 0xc8, 0xf3, 0xfc, 0x09, 0x6c,
- 0x4f, 0xf7, 0xf2, 0x34, 0xbe, 0x8f, 0xef, 0x47,
- 0x9a, 0xc4, 0xb0, 0xdc, 0x4b, 0x77, 0x26, 0x3e,
- 0x07, 0xd9, 0x95, 0x9d, 0xe0, 0xf1, 0xbf, 0x3f,
- 0x0a, 0xe3, 0xd9, 0xd5, 0x0e, 0x4b, 0x89, 0xc9,
- 0x9e, 0x3e, 0xa1, 0x21, 0x73, 0x43, 0xdd, 0x8c,
- 0x65, 0x81, 0xac, 0xc4, 0x95, 0x9c, 0x91, 0xd3
+ 0x00, 0xc4, 0x82, 0x14, 0x69, 0x16, 0x4c, 0x05,
+ 0x55, 0x2a, 0x7e, 0x55, 0x6d, 0x02, 0xbb, 0x7f,
+ 0xcc, 0x63, 0x74, 0xee, 0xcb, 0xb4, 0x98, 0x43,
+ 0x0e, 0x29, 0x43, 0x0d, 0x44, 0xc7, 0xf1, 0x23,
+ 0x81, 0xca, 0x1c, 0x5c, 0xc3, 0xff, 0x01, 0x4a,
+ 0x1a, 0x03, 0x9e, 0x5f, 0xd1, 0x4e, 0xa0, 0x0b,
+ 0xb9, 0x5c, 0x0d, 0xef, 0x14, 0x01, 0x62, 0x3c,
+ 0x8a, 0x8e, 0x60, 0xbb, 0x39, 0xd6, 0x38, 0x63,
+ 0xb7, 0x65, 0xd0, 0x0b, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0x53, 0x38,
+ 0x10, 0x0f, 0x3e, 0xeb, 0x9d, 0x0c, 0x24, 0xf6,
+ 0xe3, 0x70, 0x08, 0x8a, 0x4d, 0x01, 0xf8, 0x7a,
+ 0x87, 0x49, 0x64, 0x72, 0xb1, 0x75, 0x3b, 0x94,
+ 0xc8, 0x09, 0x2d, 0x6a, 0x63, 0xd8, 0x9a, 0x92,
+ 0xb9, 0x5b, 0x1a, 0xc3, 0x47, 0x0b, 0x63, 0x44,
+ 0x3b, 0xe3, 0xc0, 0x09, 0xc9, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x53,
+ 0xd8, 0xfb, 0x06, 0x44, 0xdb, 0xdf, 0xe8, 0x13,
+ 0x2b, 0x40, 0x6a, 0xd4, 0x13, 0x4e, 0x52, 0x30,
+ 0xd6, 0xc1, 0xd8, 0x59, 0x9d, 0x59, 0xba, 0x1b,
+ 0xbf, 0xaa, 0x6f, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x01,
+ 0x0b, 0x54, 0xe0, 0x6a, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x2b, 0x3d,
+ 0xe8, 0xef, 0xb0, 0xbe, 0x52, 0xc3, 0x52, 0x18,
+ 0x6f, 0xa3, 0x27, 0xab, 0x6c, 0x12, 0xc3, 0x81,
+ 0xcb, 0xae, 0x23, 0x11, 0xa0, 0x5d, 0xc3, 0x6f,
+ 0x23, 0x17, 0x40, 0xb3, 0x05, 0x4f, 0x5d, 0xb7,
+ 0x34, 0xbe, 0x87, 0x2c, 0xa9, 0x9e, 0x98, 0x39,
+ 0xbf, 0x2e, 0x9d, 0xad, 0x4f, 0x70, 0xad, 0xed,
+ 0x1b, 0x5e, 0x47, 0x90, 0x49, 0x2e, 0x61, 0x71,
+ 0x5f, 0x07, 0x0b, 0x35, 0x04, 0xfc, 0x53, 0xce,
+ 0x58, 0x60, 0x6c, 0x5b, 0x8b, 0xfe, 0x70, 0x04,
+ 0x2a, 0x6a, 0x98, 0x0a, 0xd0, 0x80, 0xae, 0x69,
+ 0x95, 0xf9, 0x99, 0x18, 0xfc, 0xe4, 0x8e, 0xed,
+ 0x61, 0xd9, 0x02, 0x9d, 0x4e, 0x05, 0xe9, 0xf2,
+ 0x32
};
static const unsigned char dh_peer_pub[] = {
- 0x1f, 0xc1, 0xda, 0x34, 0x1d, 0x1a, 0x84, 0x6a,
- 0x96, 0xb7, 0xbe, 0x24, 0x34, 0x0f, 0x87, 0x7d,
- 0xd0, 0x10, 0xaa, 0x03, 0x56, 0xd5, 0xad, 0x58,
- 0xaa, 0xe9, 0xc7, 0xb0, 0x8f, 0x74, 0x9a, 0x32,
- 0x23, 0x51, 0x10, 0xb5, 0xd8, 0x8e, 0xb5, 0xdb,
- 0xfa, 0x97, 0x8d, 0x27, 0xec, 0xc5, 0x30, 0xf0,
- 0x2d, 0x31, 0x14, 0x00, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xb1, 0xc0,
- 0xe0, 0x24, 0xcb, 0x8a, 0xe2, 0x16, 0x98, 0xbc,
- 0xa9, 0xe6, 0x0d, 0x42, 0x80, 0x86, 0x22, 0xf1,
- 0x81, 0xc5, 0x6e, 0x1d, 0xe7, 0xa9, 0x6e, 0x6e,
- 0xfe, 0xe9, 0xd6, 0x65, 0x67, 0xe9, 0x1b, 0x97,
- 0x70, 0x42, 0xc7, 0xe3, 0xd0, 0x44, 0x8f, 0x05,
- 0xfb, 0x77, 0xf5, 0x22, 0xb9, 0xbf, 0xc8, 0xd3,
- 0x3c, 0xc3, 0xc3, 0x1e, 0xd3, 0xb3, 0x1f, 0x0f,
- 0xec, 0xb6, 0xdb, 0x4f, 0x6e, 0xa3, 0x11, 0xe7,
- 0x7a, 0xfd, 0xbc, 0xd4, 0x7a, 0xee, 0x1b, 0xb1,
- 0x50, 0xf2, 0x16, 0x87, 0x35, 0x78, 0xfb, 0x96,
- 0x46, 0x8e, 0x8f, 0x9f, 0x3d, 0xe8, 0xef, 0xbf,
- 0xce, 0x75, 0x62, 0x4b, 0x1d, 0xf0, 0x53, 0x22,
- 0xa3, 0x4f, 0x14, 0x63, 0xe8, 0x39, 0xe8, 0x98,
- 0x4c, 0x4a, 0xd0, 0xa9, 0x6e, 0x1a, 0xc8, 0x42,
- 0xe5, 0x31, 0x8c, 0xc2, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x8c,
- 0xa1, 0x71, 0xb8, 0xd5, 0x75, 0x98, 0x0d, 0xde,
- 0x7f, 0xc5, 0x6f, 0x15, 0x36, 0x52, 0x38, 0x20,
- 0xd4, 0x31, 0x92, 0xbf, 0xd5, 0x1e, 0x8e, 0x22,
- 0x89, 0x78, 0xac, 0xa5, 0xb9, 0x44, 0x72, 0xf3,
- 0x39, 0xca, 0xeb, 0x99, 0x31, 0xb4, 0x2b, 0xe3,
- 0x01, 0x26, 0x8b, 0xc9, 0x97, 0x89, 0xc9, 0xb2,
- 0x55, 0x71, 0xc3, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0xcb, 0x3f, 0x00,
- 0x7f, 0x1a, 0x51, 0x1c, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xc8, 0x51,
- 0x9c, 0xdd, 0x13, 0x02, 0xab, 0xca, 0x6c, 0x0f,
- 0x34, 0xf9, 0x67, 0x39, 0xf1, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x8b
+ 0x00, 0xef, 0x15, 0x02, 0xf5, 0x56, 0xa3, 0x79,
+ 0x40, 0x58, 0xbc, 0xeb, 0x56, 0xad, 0xcb, 0xda,
+ 0x8c, 0xda, 0xb8, 0xd1, 0xda, 0x6f, 0x25, 0x29,
+ 0x9e, 0x43, 0x76, 0x2d, 0xb2, 0xd8, 0xbc, 0x84,
+ 0xbc, 0x85, 0xd0, 0x94, 0x8d, 0x44, 0x27, 0x57,
+ 0xe4, 0xdf, 0xc1, 0x78, 0x42, 0x8f, 0x08, 0xf5,
+ 0x74, 0xfe, 0x02, 0x56, 0xd2, 0x09, 0xc8, 0x68,
+ 0xef, 0xed, 0x18, 0xc9, 0xfd, 0x2e, 0x95, 0x6c,
+ 0xba, 0x6c, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xf5, 0xd1, 0x1b, 0xf6,
+ 0x15, 0x14, 0x5b, 0x67, 0x22, 0x7c, 0x6a, 0x20,
+ 0x76, 0x43, 0x51, 0xef, 0x5e, 0x1e, 0xf9, 0x2d,
+ 0xd6, 0xb4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0x18, 0x33, 0xd1, 0xa3,
+ 0x3b, 0xe6, 0xdd, 0x57, 0x9d, 0xad, 0x13, 0x7a,
+ 0x53, 0xde, 0xb3, 0x97, 0xc0, 0x7e, 0xd7, 0x77,
+ 0x6b, 0xf8, 0xbd, 0x13, 0x70, 0x8c, 0xba, 0x73,
+ 0x80, 0xb3, 0x80, 0x6f, 0xfb, 0x1c, 0xda, 0x53,
+ 0x4d, 0x3c, 0x8a, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x37, 0xce, 0xb1,
+ 0xde, 0x45, 0x97, 0x58, 0x65, 0x4d, 0xcf, 0x05,
+ 0xbb, 0xc3, 0xd7, 0x38, 0x6d, 0x0a, 0x59, 0x7a,
+ 0x99, 0x15, 0xb7, 0x9a, 0x3d, 0xfd, 0x61, 0xe5,
+ 0x1a, 0xa2, 0xcc, 0xf6, 0xfe, 0xb1, 0xee, 0xe9,
+ 0xa9, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x06, 0xbc, 0x14, 0x6e, 0x91,
+ 0x0d, 0xf1, 0xe3, 0xbb, 0xe0, 0x7e, 0x1d, 0x31,
+ 0x79, 0xf1, 0x6d, 0x5f, 0xcb, 0xaf, 0xb2, 0x4f,
+ 0x22, 0x12, 0xbf, 0x72, 0xbd, 0xd0, 0x30, 0xe4,
+ 0x1c, 0x35, 0x96, 0x61, 0x98, 0x39, 0xfb, 0x7e,
+ 0x6d, 0x66, 0xc4, 0x69, 0x41, 0x0d, 0x0d, 0x59,
+ 0xbb, 0xa7, 0xbf, 0x34, 0xe0, 0x39, 0x36, 0x84,
+ 0x5e, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x2d, 0xcf, 0xaa, 0x02, 0x8a,
+ 0xba, 0x59, 0x88, 0x47, 0xc4, 0x4d, 0xd7, 0xbd,
+ 0x78, 0x76, 0x24, 0xf1, 0x45, 0x56, 0x44, 0xc2,
+ 0x4a, 0xc2, 0xd5, 0x3a, 0x59, 0x40, 0xab, 0x87,
+ 0x64
};
static const unsigned char dh_secret_expected[] = {
- 0x08, 0xff, 0x33, 0xbb, 0x2e, 0xcf, 0xf4, 0x9a,
- 0x7d, 0x4a, 0x79, 0x12, 0xae, 0xb1, 0xbb, 0x6a,
- 0xb5, 0x11, 0x64, 0x1b, 0x4a, 0x76, 0x77, 0x0c,
- 0x8c, 0xc1, 0xbc, 0xc2, 0x33, 0x34, 0x3d, 0xfe,
- 0x70, 0x0d, 0x11, 0x81, 0x3d, 0x2c, 0x9e, 0xd2,
- 0x3b, 0x21, 0x1c, 0xa9, 0xe8, 0x78, 0x69, 0x21,
- 0xed, 0xca, 0x28, 0x3c, 0x68, 0xb1, 0x61, 0x53,
- 0xfa, 0x01, 0xe9, 0x1a, 0xb8, 0x2c, 0x90, 0xdd,
- 0xab, 0x4a, 0x95, 0x81, 0x67, 0x70, 0xa9, 0x87,
- 0x10, 0xe1, 0x4c, 0x92, 0xab, 0x83, 0xb6, 0xe4,
- 0x6e, 0x1e, 0x42, 0x6e, 0xe8, 0x52, 0x43, 0x0d,
- 0x61, 0x87, 0xda, 0xa3, 0x72, 0x0a, 0x6b, 0xcd,
- 0x73, 0x23, 0x5c, 0x6b, 0x0f, 0x94, 0x1f, 0x33,
- 0x64, 0xf5, 0x04, 0x20, 0x55, 0x1a, 0x4b, 0xfe,
- 0xaf, 0xe2, 0xbc, 0x43, 0x85, 0x05, 0xa5, 0x9a,
- 0x4a, 0x40, 0xda, 0xca, 0x7a, 0x89, 0x5a, 0x73,
- 0xdb, 0x57, 0x5c, 0x74, 0xc1, 0x3a, 0x23, 0xad,
- 0x88, 0x32, 0x95, 0x7d, 0x58, 0x2d, 0x38, 0xf0,
- 0xa6, 0x16, 0x5f, 0xb0, 0xd7, 0xe9, 0xb8, 0x79,
- 0x9e, 0x42, 0xfd, 0x32, 0x20, 0xe3, 0x32, 0xe9,
- 0x81, 0x85, 0xa0, 0xc9, 0x42, 0x97, 0x57, 0xb2,
- 0xd0, 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x17, 0xdb, 0xaa, 0x1f, 0xf6,
- 0xed, 0x93, 0xd7, 0xe7, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x1e, 0xae,
- 0xd9, 0x0c, 0xaf, 0x39, 0x4d, 0x2b, 0xc6, 0x57,
- 0x0f, 0x18, 0xc8, 0x1f, 0x2b, 0xe5, 0xd0, 0x1a,
- 0x2c, 0xa9, 0x9f, 0xf1, 0x42, 0xb5, 0xd9, 0x63,
- 0xf9, 0xf5, 0x00, 0x32, 0x5e, 0x75, 0x56, 0xf9,
- 0x58, 0x49, 0xb3, 0xff, 0xc7, 0x47, 0x94, 0x86,
- 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x45, 0x96, 0xa3, 0x10, 0x6b, 0xd5,
- 0xcb, 0x4f, 0x61, 0xc5, 0x7e, 0xc5, 0xf1, 0x00,
- 0xfb, 0x7a, 0x0c, 0x82, 0xa1, 0x0b, 0x82, 0x52,
- 0x6a, 0x97, 0xd1, 0xd9, 0x7d, 0x98, 0xea, 0xf6
+ 0x56, 0x13, 0xe3, 0x12, 0x6b, 0x5f, 0x67, 0xe5,
+ 0x08, 0xe5, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x11, 0x90, 0x9d, 0xf5,
+ 0x1a, 0x24, 0xfa, 0x42, 0xd1, 0x4a, 0x50, 0x93,
+ 0x5b, 0xf4, 0x11, 0x6f, 0xd0, 0xc3, 0xc5, 0xa5,
+ 0x80, 0xae, 0x01, 0x3d, 0x66, 0x92, 0xc0, 0x3e,
+ 0x5f, 0xe9, 0x75, 0xb6, 0x5b, 0x37, 0x82, 0x39,
+ 0x72, 0x66, 0x0b, 0xa2, 0x73, 0x94, 0xe5, 0x04,
+ 0x7c, 0x0c, 0x19, 0x9a, 0x03, 0x53, 0xc4, 0x9d,
+ 0xc1, 0x0f, 0xc3, 0xec, 0x0e, 0x2e, 0xa3, 0x7c,
+ 0x07, 0x0e, 0xaf, 0x18, 0x1d, 0xc7, 0x8b, 0x47,
+ 0x4b, 0x94, 0x05, 0x6d, 0xec, 0xdd, 0xa1, 0xae,
+ 0x7b, 0x21, 0x86, 0x53, 0xd3, 0x62, 0x38, 0x08,
+ 0xea, 0xda, 0xdc, 0xb2, 0x5a, 0x7c, 0xef, 0x19,
+ 0xf8, 0x29, 0xef, 0xf8, 0xd0, 0xfb, 0xde, 0xe8,
+ 0xb8, 0x2f, 0xb3, 0xa1, 0x16, 0xa2, 0xd0, 0x8f,
+ 0x48, 0xdc, 0x7d, 0xcb, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x06, 0x1e,
+ 0x2a, 0x66, 0xe8, 0x1f, 0xdb, 0x18, 0xe9, 0xd2,
+ 0xfd, 0xa2, 0x4e, 0x39, 0xa3, 0x2e, 0x88, 0x3d,
+ 0x7d, 0xac, 0x15, 0x18, 0x25, 0xe6, 0xba, 0xd4,
+ 0x0e, 0x89, 0x26, 0x60, 0x8f, 0xdc, 0x4a, 0xb4,
+ 0x49, 0x8f, 0x98, 0xe8, 0x62, 0x8c, 0xc6, 0x66,
+ 0x20, 0x4c, 0xe1, 0xed, 0xfc, 0x01, 0x88, 0x46,
+ 0xa7, 0x67, 0x48, 0x39, 0xc5, 0x22, 0x95, 0xa0,
+ 0x23, 0xb9, 0xd1, 0xed, 0x87, 0xcf, 0xa7, 0x70,
+ 0x1c, 0xac, 0xd3, 0xaf, 0x5c, 0x26, 0x50, 0x3c,
+ 0xe4, 0x23, 0xb6, 0xcc, 0xd7, 0xc5, 0xda, 0x2f,
+ 0xf4, 0x45, 0xf1, 0xe4, 0x40, 0xb5, 0x0a, 0x25,
+ 0x86, 0xe6, 0xde, 0x11, 0x3c, 0x46, 0x16, 0xbc,
+ 0x41, 0xc2, 0x28, 0x19, 0x81, 0x5a, 0x46, 0x02,
+ 0x87, 0xd0, 0x15, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0xfe, 0x75, 0x04,
+ 0x82, 0xd2, 0x0a, 0xb7, 0xbc, 0xc5, 0x6c, 0xb1,
+ 0x41, 0xa8, 0x2b, 0x28, 0xbb, 0x86, 0x0c, 0x89
};
static const ST_KAT_PARAM dh_group[] = {
--
2.35.3

View File

@@ -1,312 +0,0 @@
From dc41625dc4a793f0e21188165711181ca085339b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 19:17:16 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 28/49]
0074-FIPS-Use-digest_sign-digest_verify-in-self-test.patch
Patch-name: 0074-FIPS-Use-digest_sign-digest_verify-in-self-test.patch
Patch-id: 74
Patch-status: |
# [PATCH 29/46]
# 0074-FIPS-Use-digest_sign-digest_verify-in-self-test.patch
From-dist-git-commit: 4334bc837fbc64d14890fdc51679a80770d498ce
---
crypto/evp/m_sigver.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
providers/fips/self_test_kats.c | 43 +++++++++++++++-----------
2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
Index: openssl-3.2.3/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_ONLY_ONESHOT_SUPPORTED);
return 0;
}
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
/*
* If we get the "NULL" md then the name comes back as "UNDEF". We want to use
@@ -121,8 +122,10 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ct
reinit = 0;
if (e == NULL)
ctx->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, pkey, props);
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
else
ctx->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, e);
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
}
if (ctx->pctx == NULL)
return 0;
@@ -132,8 +135,10 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ct
locpctx = ctx->pctx;
ERR_set_mark();
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_legacy(locpctx))
goto legacy;
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
/* do not reinitialize if pkey is set or operation is different */
if (reinit
@@ -218,8 +223,10 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ct
signature =
evp_signature_fetch_from_prov((OSSL_PROVIDER *)tmp_prov,
supported_sig, locpctx->propquery);
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (signature == NULL)
goto legacy;
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
break;
}
if (signature == NULL)
@@ -303,6 +310,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ct
ctx->fetched_digest = EVP_MD_fetch(locpctx->libctx, mdname, props);
if (ctx->fetched_digest != NULL) {
ctx->digest = ctx->reqdigest = ctx->fetched_digest;
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
} else {
/* legacy engine support : remove the mark when this is deleted */
ctx->reqdigest = ctx->digest = EVP_get_digestbyname(mdname);
@@ -311,11 +319,13 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ct
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
goto err;
}
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
}
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
}
}
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (ctx->reqdigest != NULL
&& !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_hmac)
&& !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_tls1_prf)
@@ -327,6 +337,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ct
goto err;
}
}
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
if (ver) {
if (signature->digest_verify_init == NULL) {
@@ -359,6 +370,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ct
EVP_KEYMGMT_free(tmp_keymgmt);
return 0;
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
legacy:
/*
* If we don't have the full support we need with provided methods,
@@ -430,6 +442,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ct
ctx->pctx->flag_call_digest_custom = 1;
ret = 1;
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
end:
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
@@ -472,7 +485,6 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx
return do_sigver_init(ctx, pctx, type, NULL, NULL, NULL, e, pkey, 1,
NULL);
}
-#endif /* FIPS_MDOE */
int EVP_DigestSignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t dsize)
{
@@ -544,24 +556,30 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *c
return EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data, dsize);
}
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
size_t *siglen)
{
- int sctx = 0, r = 0;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx = NULL, *pctx = ctx->pctx;
+ int r = 0;
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ int sctx = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx = NULL;
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = ctx->pctx;
if ((ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISED) != 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_FINAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (pctx == NULL
|| pctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNCTX
|| pctx->op.sig.algctx == NULL
|| pctx->op.sig.signature == NULL)
goto legacy;
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (sigret != NULL && (ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE) == 0) {
/* try dup */
dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(pctx);
@@ -576,7 +594,14 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
else
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dctx);
return r;
+#else
+ r = pctx->op.sig.signature->digest_sign_final(pctx->op.sig.algctx,
+ sigret, siglen,
+ sigret == NULL ? 0 : *siglen);
+ return r;
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
legacy:
if (pctx == NULL || pctx->pmeth == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
@@ -649,6 +674,7 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
}
}
return 1;
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
}
int EVP_DigestSign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen,
@@ -687,23 +713,29 @@ int EVP_DigestSign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsi
int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
size_t siglen)
{
- unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
int r = 0;
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int mdlen = 0;
int vctx = 0;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx = NULL, *pctx = ctx->pctx;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx = NULL;
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = ctx->pctx;
if ((ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISED) != 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_FINAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (pctx == NULL
|| pctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYCTX
|| pctx->op.sig.algctx == NULL
|| pctx->op.sig.signature == NULL)
goto legacy;
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if ((ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE) == 0) {
/* try dup */
dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(pctx);
@@ -717,7 +749,13 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ct
else
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dctx);
return r;
+#else
+ r = pctx->op.sig.signature->digest_verify_final(pctx->op.sig.algctx,
+ sig, siglen);
+ return r;
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
legacy:
if (pctx == NULL || pctx->pmeth == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
@@ -758,6 +796,7 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ct
if (vctx || !r)
return r;
return EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, sig, siglen, md, mdlen);
+#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
}
int EVP_DigestVerify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sigret,
@@ -790,4 +829,3 @@ int EVP_DigestVerify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, co
return -1;
return EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sigret, siglen);
}
-#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
@@ -450,10 +450,13 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_S
int ret = 0;
OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL, *params_sig = NULL;
OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld = NULL;
+ EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *sctx = NULL, *kctx = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- unsigned char sig[256];
BN_CTX *bnctx = NULL;
+ const char *msg = "Hello World!";
+ unsigned char sig[256];
size_t siglen = sizeof(sig);
static const unsigned char dgst[] = {
0x7f, 0x83, 0xb1, 0x65, 0x7f, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x53, 0xb9, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0x81,
@@ -487,23 +490,26 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_S
|| EVP_PKEY_fromdata(kctx, &pkey, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) <= 0)
goto err;
- /* Create a EVP_PKEY_CTX to use for the signing operation */
- sctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, pkey, NULL);
- if (sctx == NULL
- || EVP_PKEY_sign_init(sctx) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- /* set signature parameters */
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(bld, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST,
- t->mdalgorithm,
- strlen(t->mdalgorithm) + 1))
- goto err;
+ /* Create a EVP_MD_CTX to use for the signature operation, assign signature
+ * parameters and sign */
params_sig = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld);
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(sctx, params_sig) <= 0)
+ md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, "SHA256", NULL);
+ ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (md == NULL || ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE | EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT);
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, &sctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(sctx, params_sig) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSign(ctx, sig, &siglen, (const unsigned char *)msg, strlen(msg)) <= 0
+ || EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx) <= 0)
goto err;
- if (EVP_PKEY_sign(sctx, sig, &siglen, dgst, sizeof(dgst)) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_verify_init(sctx) <= 0
+ /* sctx is not freed automatically inside the FIPS module */
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(sctx);
+ sctx = NULL;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE | EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT);
+ if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &sctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(sctx, params_sig) <= 0)
goto err;
@@ -513,14 +519,17 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_S
goto err;
OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(st, sig);
- if (EVP_PKEY_verify(sctx, sig, siglen, dgst, sizeof(dgst)) <= 0)
+ if (EVP_DigestVerify(ctx, sig, siglen, (const unsigned char *)msg, strlen(msg)) <= 0)
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kctx);
+ EVP_MD_free(md);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ /* sctx is not freed automatically inside the FIPS module */
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(sctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kctx);
OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
OSSL_PARAM_free(params_sig);
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(bld);

View File

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
Index: openssl-3.1.4/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.1.4.orig/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
+++ openssl-3.1.4/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ void *ossl_fips_prov_ossl_ctx_new(OSSL_L
return NULL;
init_fips_option(&fgbl->fips_security_checks, 1);
init_fips_option(&fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check, 1); /* Enabled by default */
- init_fips_option(&fgbl->fips_restricted_drgb_digests, 0);
+ init_fips_option(&fgbl->fips_restricted_drgb_digests, 1); /* Enabled by default */
return fgbl;
}
@@ -820,8 +820,6 @@ int OSSL_provider_init_int(const OSSL_CO
if (fgbl->field.option != NULL) { \
if (strcmp(fgbl->field.option, "1") == 0) \
fgbl->field.enabled = 1; \
- else if (strcmp(fgbl->field.option, "0") == 0) \
- fgbl->field.enabled = 0; \
else \
goto err; \
}

View File

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
Index: openssl-3.1.4/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.1.4.orig/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
+++ openssl-3.1.4/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
@@ -194,18 +194,19 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *fips_gettable_p
static int fips_get_params(void *provctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
+#define SUSE_OPENSSL_VERSION_STR OPENSSL_VERSION_STR " SUSE release " SUSE_OPENSSL_RELEASE
OSSL_PARAM *p;
FIPS_GLOBAL *fgbl = ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(ossl_prov_ctx_get0_libctx(provctx),
OSSL_LIB_CTX_FIPS_PROV_INDEX);
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_NAME);
- if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, "OpenSSL FIPS Provider"))
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, "SUSE Linux Enterprise - OpenSSL FIPS Provider"))
return 0;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_VERSION);
- if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, OPENSSL_VERSION_STR))
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, SUSE_OPENSSL_VERSION_STR))
return 0;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_BUILDINFO);
- if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, OPENSSL_FULL_VERSION_STR))
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, SUSE_OPENSSL_VERSION_STR))
return 0;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_STATUS);
if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, ossl_prov_is_running()))

View File

@@ -1,782 +0,0 @@
From e25b25227043a2b2cf156527c31d7686a4265bf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 19:17:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 20/49] 0045-FIPS-services-minimize.patch
Patch-name: 0045-FIPS-services-minimize.patch
Patch-id: 45
Patch-status: |
# # Minimize fips services
From-dist-git-commit: 4334bc837fbc64d14890fdc51679a80770d498ce
---
apps/ecparam.c | 7 +++
apps/req.c | 2 +-
providers/common/capabilities.c | 2 +-
providers/fips/fipsprov.c | 44 +++++++++++--------
providers/fips/self_test_data.inc | 9 +++-
providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 26 +++++++++++
ssl/ssl_ciph.c | 3 ++
test/acvp_test.c | 2 +
test/endecode_test.c | 4 ++
test/evp_libctx_test.c | 9 +++-
test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t | 2 +-
test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t | 3 +-
test/recipes/30-test_evp.t | 20 ++++-----
.../30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt | 22 ++++++++++
test/recipes/80-test_cms.t | 22 +++++-----
test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t | 2 +-
16 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
Index: openssl-3.2.3/apps/ecparam.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/apps/ecparam.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/apps/ecparam.c
@@ -79,6 +79,13 @@ static int list_builtin_curves(BIO *out)
const char *comment = curves[n].comment;
const char *sname = OBJ_nid2sn(curves[n].nid);
+ if (((curves[n].nid == NID_secp256k1) || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP256r1)
+ || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP256t1) || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP320r1)
+ || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP320t1) || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP384r1)
+ || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP384t1) || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP512r1)
+ || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP512t1)) && EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL))
+ continue;
+
if (comment == NULL)
comment = "CURVE DESCRIPTION NOT AVAILABLE";
if (sname == NULL)
Index: openssl-3.2.3/apps/req.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/apps/req.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/apps/req.c
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ int req_main(int argc, char **argv)
unsigned long chtype = MBSTRING_ASC, reqflag = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
- cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
+ cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_aes_256_cbc();
#endif
opt_set_unknown_name("digest");
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/common/capabilities.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/common/capabilities.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/common/capabilities.c
@@ -189,9 +189,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM param_group_list
TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("brainpoolP256r1", "brainpoolP256r1", "EC", 25),
TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("brainpoolP384r1", "brainpoolP384r1", "EC", 26),
TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("brainpoolP512r1", "brainpoolP512r1", "EC", 27),
-# endif
TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("x25519", "X25519", "X25519", 28),
TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("x448", "X448", "X448", 29),
+# endif
# ifndef FIPS_MODULE
TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("brainpoolP256r1tls13", "brainpoolP256r1", "EC", 30),
TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("brainpoolP384r1tls13", "brainpoolP384r1", "EC", 31),
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
@@ -194,18 +194,19 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *fips_gettable_p
static int fips_get_params(void *provctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
+#define SUSE_OPENSSL_VERSION_STR OPENSSL_VERSION_STR " SUSE release " SUSE_OPENSSL_RELEASE
OSSL_PARAM *p;
FIPS_GLOBAL *fgbl = ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(ossl_prov_ctx_get0_libctx(provctx),
OSSL_LIB_CTX_FIPS_PROV_INDEX);
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_NAME);
- if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, "OpenSSL FIPS Provider"))
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, "SUSE Linux Enterprise - OpenSSL FIPS Provider"))
return 0;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_VERSION);
- if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, OPENSSL_VERSION_STR))
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, SUSE_OPENSSL_VERSION_STR))
return 0;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_BUILDINFO);
- if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, OPENSSL_FULL_VERSION_STR))
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, SUSE_OPENSSL_VERSION_STR))
return 0;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_STATUS);
if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, ossl_prov_is_running()))
@@ -298,10 +299,11 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_digests
* KECCAK-KMAC-128 and KECCAK-KMAC-256 as hashes are mostly useful for
* KMAC128 and KMAC256.
*/
- { PROV_NAMES_KECCAK_KMAC_128, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
+ /* We don't certify KECCAK in our FIPS provider */
+ /* { PROV_NAMES_KECCAK_KMAC_128, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
ossl_keccak_kmac_128_functions },
{ PROV_NAMES_KECCAK_KMAC_256, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
- ossl_keccak_kmac_256_functions },
+ ossl_keccak_kmac_256_functions }, */
{ NULL, NULL, NULL }
};
@@ -360,8 +362,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM_CAPABLE fips
ALGC(PROV_NAMES_AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA256, ossl_aes256cbc_hmac_sha256_functions,
ossl_cipher_capable_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256),
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
- UNAPPROVED_ALG(PROV_NAMES_DES_EDE3_ECB, ossl_tdes_ede3_ecb_functions),
- UNAPPROVED_ALG(PROV_NAMES_DES_EDE3_CBC, ossl_tdes_ede3_cbc_functions),
+ /* We don't certify 3DES in our FIPS provider */
+ /* UNAPPROVED_ALG(PROV_NAMES_DES_EDE3_ECB, ossl_tdes_ede3_ecb_functions),
+ UNAPPROVED_ALG(PROV_NAMES_DES_EDE3_CBC, ossl_tdes_ede3_cbc_functions), */
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DES */
{ { NULL, NULL, NULL }, NULL }
};
@@ -373,8 +376,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_macs[]
#endif
{ PROV_NAMES_GMAC, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_gmac_functions },
{ PROV_NAMES_HMAC, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_hmac_functions },
- { PROV_NAMES_KMAC_128, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kmac128_functions },
- { PROV_NAMES_KMAC_256, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kmac256_functions },
+ /* We don't certify KMAC in our FIPS provider */
+ /*{ PROV_NAMES_KMAC_128, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kmac128_functions },
+ { PROV_NAMES_KMAC_256, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kmac256_functions }, */
{ NULL, NULL, NULL }
};
@@ -410,8 +414,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keyexch
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
{ PROV_NAMES_ECDH, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ecdh_keyexch_functions },
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECX
- { PROV_NAMES_X25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x25519_keyexch_functions },
- { PROV_NAMES_X448, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x448_keyexch_functions },
+ /* We don't certify Edwards curves in our FIPS provider */
+ /*{ PROV_NAMES_X25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x25519_keyexch_functions },
+ { PROV_NAMES_X448, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x448_keyexch_functions },*/
# endif
#endif
{ PROV_NAMES_TLS1_PRF, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
@@ -422,14 +427,16 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keyexch
static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_signature[] = {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- { PROV_NAMES_DSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_dsa_signature_functions },
+ /* We don't certify DSA in our FIPS provider */
+ /* { PROV_NAMES_DSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_dsa_signature_functions },*/
#endif
{ PROV_NAMES_RSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_rsa_signature_functions },
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECX
- { PROV_NAMES_ED25519, FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES,
+ /* We don't certify Edwards curves in our FIPS provider */
+ /* { PROV_NAMES_ED25519, FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES,
ossl_ed25519_signature_functions },
- { PROV_NAMES_ED448, FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed448_signature_functions },
+ { PROV_NAMES_ED448, FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed448_signature_functions },*/
# endif
{ PROV_NAMES_ECDSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ecdsa_signature_functions },
#endif
@@ -460,8 +467,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keymgmt
PROV_DESCS_DHX },
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- { PROV_NAMES_DSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_dsa_keymgmt_functions,
- PROV_DESCS_DSA },
+ /* We don't certify DSA in our FIPS provider */
+ /* { PROV_NAMES_DSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_dsa_keymgmt_functions,
+ PROV_DESCS_DSA }, */
#endif
{ PROV_NAMES_RSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_rsa_keymgmt_functions,
PROV_DESCS_RSA },
@@ -471,14 +479,15 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keymgmt
{ PROV_NAMES_EC, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ec_keymgmt_functions,
PROV_DESCS_EC },
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECX
- { PROV_NAMES_X25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x25519_keymgmt_functions,
+ /* We don't certify Edwards curves in our FIPS provider */
+ /* { PROV_NAMES_X25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x25519_keymgmt_functions,
PROV_DESCS_X25519 },
{ PROV_NAMES_X448, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x448_keymgmt_functions,
PROV_DESCS_X448 },
{ PROV_NAMES_ED25519, FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed25519_keymgmt_functions,
PROV_DESCS_ED25519 },
{ PROV_NAMES_ED448, FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed448_keymgmt_functions,
- PROV_DESCS_ED448 },
+ PROV_DESCS_ED448 }, */
# endif
#endif
{ PROV_NAMES_TLS1_PRF, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kdf_keymgmt_functions,
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ static const ST_KAT_DIGEST st_kat_digest
/*- CIPHER TEST DATA */
/* DES3 test data */
+#if 0
static const unsigned char des_ede3_cbc_pt[] = {
0x6B, 0xC1, 0xBE, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x40, 0x9F, 0x96,
0xE9, 0x3D, 0x7E, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2A,
@@ -197,7 +198,7 @@ static const unsigned char des_ede3_cbc_
0x51, 0x65, 0x70, 0x48, 0x1F, 0x25, 0xB5, 0x0F,
0x73, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0xA8, 0x5C, 0x8E, 0x0D, 0xA7
};
-
+#endif
/* AES-256 GCM test data */
static const unsigned char aes_256_gcm_key[] = {
0x92, 0xe1, 0x1d, 0xcd, 0xaa, 0x86, 0x6f, 0x5c,
@@ -1454,8 +1455,9 @@ static const ST_KAT_PARAM ecdsa_bin_key[
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC2M */
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
/* dsa 2048 */
+#if 0
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
static const unsigned char dsa_p[] = {
0xa2, 0x9b, 0x88, 0x72, 0xce, 0x8b, 0x84, 0x23,
0xb7, 0xd5, 0xd2, 0x1d, 0x4b, 0x02, 0xf5, 0x7e,
@@ -1590,6 +1592,7 @@ static const ST_KAT_PARAM dsa_key[] = {
ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
};
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#endif
/* Hash DRBG inputs for signature KATs */
static const unsigned char sig_kat_entropyin[] = {
@@ -1642,6 +1645,7 @@ static const ST_KAT_SIGN st_kat_sign_tes
},
# endif
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#if 0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
{
OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_SIGN_DSA,
@@ -1654,6 +1658,7 @@ static const ST_KAT_SIGN st_kat_sign_tes
ITM(dsa_expected_sig)
},
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#endif
};
static const ST_KAT_ASYM_CIPHER st_kat_asym_cipher_tests[] = {
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
@@ -702,6 +702,19 @@ static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprs
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
int ret;
+# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ size_t rsabits = RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa);
+
+ if (rsabits < 2048) {
+ if (rsabits != 1024
+ && rsabits != 1280
+ && rsabits != 1536
+ && rsabits != 1792) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_FIPS, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return 0;
@@ -790,6 +803,19 @@ static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, co
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
size_t rslen;
+# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ size_t rsabits = RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa);
+
+ if (rsabits < 2048) {
+ if (rsabits != 1024
+ && rsabits != 1280
+ && rsabits != 1536
+ && rsabits != 1792) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_FIPS, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return 0;
Index: openssl-3.2.3/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -356,6 +356,9 @@ int ssl_load_ciphers(SSL_CTX *ctx)
ctx->disabled_mkey_mask = 0;
ctx->disabled_auth_mask = 0;
+ if (EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(ctx->libctx))
+ ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK;
+
/*
* We ignore any errors from the fetches below. They are expected to fail
* if these algorithms are not available.
Index: openssl-3.2.3/test/acvp_test.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/test/acvp_test.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/test/acvp_test.c
@@ -1478,6 +1478,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
OSSL_NELEM(dh_safe_prime_keyver_data));
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+#if 0 /* SUSE FIPS provider doesn't have fips=yes property on DSA */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
ADD_ALL_TESTS(dsa_keygen_test, OSSL_NELEM(dsa_keygen_data));
ADD_ALL_TESTS(dsa_paramgen_test, OSSL_NELEM(dsa_paramgen_data));
@@ -1485,6 +1486,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_ALL_TESTS(dsa_siggen_test, OSSL_NELEM(dsa_siggen_data));
ADD_ALL_TESTS(dsa_sigver_test, OSSL_NELEM(dsa_sigver_data));
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
ADD_ALL_TESTS(ecdsa_keygen_test, OSSL_NELEM(ecdsa_keygen_data));
Index: openssl-3.2.3/test/endecode_test.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/test/endecode_test.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/test/endecode_test.c
@@ -1424,6 +1424,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
* so no legacy tests.
*/
#endif
+ if (is_fips == 0) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
ADD_TEST_SUITE(DSA);
ADD_TEST_SUITE_PARAMS(DSA);
@@ -1434,6 +1435,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_TEST_SUITE_PROTECTED_PVK(DSA);
# endif
#endif
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
ADD_TEST_SUITE(EC);
ADD_TEST_SUITE_PARAMS(EC);
@@ -1454,10 +1456,12 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_TEST_SUITE(SM2);
}
# endif
+ if (is_fips == 0) {
ADD_TEST_SUITE(ED25519);
ADD_TEST_SUITE(ED448);
ADD_TEST_SUITE(X25519);
ADD_TEST_SUITE(X448);
+ }
/*
* ED25519, ED448, X25519 and X448 have no support for
* PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional(), so no legacy tests.
Index: openssl-3.2.3/test/evp_libctx_test.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/test/evp_libctx_test.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/test/evp_libctx_test.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/provider.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
@@ -726,7 +727,9 @@ int setup_tests(void)
return 0;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
- ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_dsa_param_keygen, 3 * 3 * 3);
+ if (strcmp(prov_name, "fips") != 0) {
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_dsa_param_keygen, 3 * 3 * 3);
+ }
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_dh_safeprime_param_keygen, 3 * 3 * 3);
@@ -746,7 +749,9 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_TEST(kem_invalid_keytype);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
- ADD_TEST(test_cipher_tdes_randkey);
+ if (strcmp(prov_name, "fips") != 0) {
+ ADD_TEST(test_cipher_tdes_randkey);
+ }
#endif
return 1;
}
Index: openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t
+++ openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ use lib bldtop_dir('.');
plan skip_all => "This test is unsupported in a no-dsa build"
if disabled("dsa");
-my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
+my $no_fips = 1;
plan tests =>
($no_fips ? 0 : 2) # FIPS related tests
Index: openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t
+++ openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t
@@ -278,8 +278,7 @@ SKIP: {
}
SKIP : {
- skip "FIPS DSA tests because of no dsa in this build", 1
- if disabled("dsa");
+ skip "FIPS DSA tests because of no dsa in this build", 1;
subtest DSA => sub {
my $testtext_prefix = 'DSA';
Index: openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t
+++ openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t
@@ -46,10 +46,8 @@ my @files = qw(
evpciph_aes_cts.txt
evpciph_aes_wrap.txt
evpciph_aes_stitched.txt
- evpciph_des3_common.txt
evpkdf_hkdf.txt
evpkdf_kbkdf_counter.txt
- evpkdf_kbkdf_kmac.txt
evpkdf_pbkdf1.txt
evpkdf_pbkdf2.txt
evpkdf_ss.txt
@@ -70,15 +68,6 @@ push @files, qw(
evppkey_dh.txt
) unless $no_dh;
push @files, qw(
- evpkdf_x942_des.txt
- evpmac_cmac_des.txt
- ) unless $no_des;
-push @files, qw(evppkey_dsa.txt) unless $no_dsa;
-push @files, qw(
- evppkey_ecx.txt
- evppkey_mismatch_ecx.txt
- ) unless $no_ecx;
-push @files, qw(
evppkey_ecc.txt
evppkey_ecdh.txt
evppkey_ecdsa.txt
@@ -97,6 +86,7 @@ my @defltfiles = qw(
evpciph_cast5.txt
evpciph_chacha.txt
evpciph_des.txt
+ evpciph_des3_common.txt
evpciph_idea.txt
evpciph_rc2.txt
evpciph_rc4.txt
@@ -121,13 +111,19 @@ my @defltfiles = qw(
evpmd_whirlpool.txt
evppbe_scrypt.txt
evppbe_pkcs12.txt
+ evpkdf_kbkdf_kmac.txt
evppkey_kdf_scrypt.txt
evppkey_kdf_tls1_prf.txt
evppkey_rsa.txt
);
+push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_dsa.txt) unless $no_dsa;
+push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_ecx.txt) unless $no_ec;
+push @defltfiles, qw(
+ evpkdf_x942_des.txt
+ evpmac_cmac_des.txt
+ ) unless $no_des;
push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_brainpool.txt) unless $no_ec;
push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_ecdsa_rfc6979.txt) unless $no_ec;
-push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_dsa_rfc6979.txt) unless $no_dsa;
push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_sm2.txt) unless $no_sm2;
push @defltfiles, qw(evpciph_aes_gcm_siv.txt) unless $no_siv;
push @defltfiles, qw(evpciph_aes_siv.txt) unless $no_siv;
Index: openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt
+++ openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt
@@ -363,6 +363,7 @@ IV = 7AE8E2CA4EC500012E58495C
Input = 68F2E77696CE7AE8E2CA4EC588E541002E58495C08000F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D0007
Result = MAC_INIT_ERROR
+Availablein = default
Title = KMAC Tests (From NIST)
MAC = KMAC128
Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
@@ -373,12 +374,14 @@ Ctrl = xof:0
OutputSize = 32
BlockSize = 168
+Availablein = default
MAC = KMAC128
Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
Input = 00010203
Custom = "My Tagged Application"
Output = 3B1FBA963CD8B0B59E8C1A6D71888B7143651AF8BA0A7070C0979E2811324AA5
+Availablein = default
MAC = KMAC128
Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -386,6 +389,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
Output = 1F5B4E6CCA02209E0DCB5CA635B89A15E271ECC760071DFD805FAA38F9729230
Ctrl = size:32
+Availablein = default
MAC = KMAC256
Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
Input = 00010203
@@ -394,12 +398,14 @@ Output = 20C570C31346F703C9AC36C61C03CB6
OutputSize = 64
BlockSize = 136
+Availablein = default
MAC = KMAC256
Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
Custom = ""
Output = 75358CF39E41494E949707927CEE0AF20A3FF553904C86B08F21CC414BCFD691589D27CF5E15369CBBFF8B9A4C2EB17800855D0235FF635DA82533EC6B759B69
+Availablein = default
MAC = KMAC256
Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -409,12 +415,14 @@ Ctrl = size:64
Title = KMAC XOF Tests (From NIST)
+Availablein = default
MAC = KMAC128
Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
Input = 00010203
Output = CD83740BBD92CCC8CF032B1481A0F4460E7CA9DD12B08A0C4031178BACD6EC35
XOF = 1
+Availablein = default
MAC = KMAC128
Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
Input = 00010203
@@ -422,6 +430,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
Output = 31A44527B4ED9F5C6101D11DE6D26F0620AA5C341DEF41299657FE9DF1A3B16C
XOF = 1
+Availablein = default
MAC = KMAC128
Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -430,6 +439,7 @@ Output = 47026C7CD793084AA0283C253EF6584
XOF = 1
Ctrl = size:32
+Availablein = default
MAC = KMAC256
Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
Input = 00010203
@@ -437,6 +447,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
Output = 1755133F1534752AAD0748F2C706FB5C784512CAB835CD15676B16C0C6647FA96FAA7AF634A0BF8FF6DF39374FA00FAD9A39E322A7C92065A64EB1FB0801EB2B
XOF = 1
+Availablein = default
MAC = KMAC256
Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -444,6 +455,7 @@ Custom = ""
Output = FF7B171F1E8A2B24683EED37830EE797538BA8DC563F6DA1E667391A75EDC02CA633079F81CE12A25F45615EC89972031D18337331D24CEB8F8CA8E6A19FD98B
XOF = 1
+Availablein = default
MAC = KMAC256
Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -454,6 +466,7 @@ XOF = 1
Title = KMAC long customisation string (from NIST ACVP)
+Availablein = default
MAC = KMAC256
Key = 9743DBF93102FAF11227B154B8ACD16CF142671F7AA16C559A393A38B4CEF461ED29A6A328D7379C99718790E38B54CA25E9E831CBEA463EE704D1689F94629AB795DF0C77F756DA743309C0E054596BA2D9CC1768ACF7CD351D9A7EB1ABD0A3
Input = BA63AC9C711F143CCE7FF92D0322649D1BE437D805FD225C0A2879A008373EC3BCCDB09971FAD2BCE5F4347AF7E5238EF01A90ED34193D6AFC1D
@@ -464,12 +477,14 @@ XOF = 1
Title = KMAC XOF Tests via ctrl (From NIST)
+Availablein = default
MAC = KMAC128
Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
Input = 00010203
Output = CD83740BBD92CCC8CF032B1481A0F4460E7CA9DD12B08A0C4031178BACD6EC35
Ctrl = xof:1
+Availablein = default
MAC = KMAC128
Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
Input = 00010203
@@ -477,6 +492,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
Output = 31A44527B4ED9F5C6101D11DE6D26F0620AA5C341DEF41299657FE9DF1A3B16C
Ctrl = xof:1
+Availablein = default
MAC = KMAC128
Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -485,6 +501,7 @@ Output = 47026C7CD793084AA0283C253EF6584
Ctrl = xof:1
Ctrl = size:32
+Availablein = default
MAC = KMAC256
Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
Input = 00010203
@@ -492,6 +509,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
Output = 1755133F1534752AAD0748F2C706FB5C784512CAB835CD15676B16C0C6647FA96FAA7AF634A0BF8FF6DF39374FA00FAD9A39E322A7C92065A64EB1FB0801EB2B
Ctrl = xof:1
+Availablein = default
MAC = KMAC256
Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -499,6 +517,7 @@ Custom = ""
Output = FF7B171F1E8A2B24683EED37830EE797538BA8DC563F6DA1E667391A75EDC02CA633079F81CE12A25F45615EC89972031D18337331D24CEB8F8CA8E6A19FD98B
Ctrl = xof:1
+Availablein = default
MAC = KMAC256
Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -509,6 +528,7 @@ Ctrl = xof:1
Title = KMAC long customisation string via ctrl (from NIST ACVP)
+Availablein = default
MAC = KMAC256
Key = 9743DBF93102FAF11227B154B8ACD16CF142671F7AA16C559A393A38B4CEF461ED29A6A328D7379C99718790E38B54CA25E9E831CBEA463EE704D1689F94629AB795DF0C77F756DA743309C0E054596BA2D9CC1768ACF7CD351D9A7EB1ABD0A3
Input = BA63AC9C711F143CCE7FF92D0322649D1BE437D805FD225C0A2879A008373EC3BCCDB09971FAD2BCE5F4347AF7E5238EF01A90ED34193D6AFC1D
@@ -519,6 +539,7 @@ Ctrl = xof:1
Title = KMAC long customisation string negative test
+Availablein = default
MAC = KMAC128
Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
@@ -527,6 +548,7 @@ Result = MAC_INIT_ERROR
Title = KMAC output is too large
+Availablein = default
MAC = KMAC256
Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
Index: openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+++ openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
\&final_compare
],
- [ "signed content DER format, DSA key",
+ [ "signed content DER format, DSA key, no SUSE FIPS",
[ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER", "-nodetach",
"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
[ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms", "-inform", "DER",
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
\&final_compare
],
- [ "signed detached content DER format, DSA key",
+ [ "signed detached content DER format, DSA key, no SUSE FIPS",
[ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
[ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms", "-inform", "DER",
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
\&final_compare
],
- [ "signed detached content DER format, add RSA signer (with DSA existing)",
+ [ "signed detached content DER format, add RSA signer (with DSA existing), no SUSE FIPS",
[ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
[ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-resign", "-in", "{output}.cms", "-inform", "DER", "-outform", "DER",
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
\&final_compare
],
- [ "signed content test streaming BER format, DSA key",
+ [ "signed content test streaming BER format, DSA key, no SUSE FIPS",
[ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
"-nodetach", "-stream",
"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
\&final_compare
],
- [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
+ [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no SUSE FIPS",
[ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
"-nodetach", "-stream",
"-signer", $smrsa1,
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
\&final_compare
],
- [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no attributes",
+ [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no attributes, no SUSE FIPS",
[ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
"-noattr", "-nodetach", "-stream",
"-signer", $smrsa1,
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
\&zero_compare
],
- [ "signed content test streaming S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
+ [ "signed content test streaming S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no SUSE FIPS",
[ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-nodetach",
"-signer", $smrsa1,
"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
\&final_compare
],
- [ "signed content test streaming multipart S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
+ [ "signed content test streaming multipart S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no SUSE FIPS",
[ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont,
"-signer", $smrsa1,
"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
my @smime_cms_tests = (
- [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, keyid",
+ [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, keyid, no SUSE FIPS",
[ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
"-nodetach", "-keyid",
"-signer", $smrsa1,
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ my @smime_cms_tests = (
\&final_compare
],
- [ "signed content test streaming PEM format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
+ [ "signed content test streaming PEM format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no SUSE FIPS",
[ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-nodetach",
"-signer", $smrsa1,
"-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ my @smime_cms_tests = (
\&final_compare
],
- [ "encrypted content test streaming PEM format, triple DES key",
+ [ "encrypted content test streaming PEM format, triple DES key, no SUSE FIPS",
[ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-EncryptedData_encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM",
"-des3", "-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617",
"-stream", "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
Index: openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
+++ openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ sub testssl {
my @exkeys = ();
my $ciphers = '-PSK:-SRP:@SECLEVEL=0';
- if (!$no_dsa) {
+ if (!$no_dsa && $provider ne "fips") {
push @exkeys, "-s_cert", "certD.ss", "-s_key", $Dkey;
}

View File

@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
From a325a23bc83f4efd60130001c417ca5b96bdbff1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 19:33:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] signature: Add indicator for PSS salt length
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection
5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS [...] the length (in bytes) of the
salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where hLen is the length of
the hash function output block (in bytes)."
It is not exactly clear from this text whether hLen refers to the
message digest or the hash function used for the mask generation
function MGF1. PKCS#1 v2.1 suggests it is the former:
| Typical salt lengths in octets are hLen (the length of the output of
| the hash function Hash) and 0. In both cases the security of
| RSASSA-PSS can be closely related to the hardness of inverting RSAVP1.
| Bellare and Rogaway [4] give a tight lower bound for the security of
| the original RSA-PSS scheme, which corresponds roughly to the former
| case, while Coron [12] gives a lower bound for the related Full Domain
| Hashing scheme, which corresponds roughly to the latter case. In [13]
| Coron provides a general treatment with various salt lengths ranging
| from 0 to hLen; see [27] for discussion. See also [31], which adapts
| the security proofs in [4][13] to address the differences between the
| original and the present version of RSA-PSS as listed in Note 1 above.
Since OpenSSL defaults to creating signatures with the maximum salt
length, blocking the use of longer salts would probably lead to
significant problems in practice. Instead, introduce an explicit
indicator that can be obtained from the EVP_PKEY_CTX object using
EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params() with the
OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR
parameter.
We also add indicator for RSA_NO_PADDING here to avoid patch-over-patch.
Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
---
include/openssl/evp.h | 4 ++++
providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++
util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm | 23 ++++++++++---------
3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
Index: openssl-3.2.3/include/openssl/evp.h
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/include/openssl/evp.h
+++ openssl-3.2.3/include/openssl/evp.h
@@ -804,6 +804,10 @@ __owur int EVP_CipherFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CT
__owur int EVP_CipherFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
int *outl);
+# define EVP_SIGNATURE_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
+# define EVP_SIGNATURE_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED 1
+# define EVP_SIGNATURE_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
+
__owur int EVP_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *s,
EVP_PKEY *pkey);
__owur int EVP_SignFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *s,
Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
@@ -1185,6 +1185,24 @@ static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprs
}
}
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ int fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
+ if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ if (prsactx->md == NULL) {
+ fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED;
+ } else if (rsa_pss_compute_saltlen(prsactx) > EVP_MD_get_size(prsactx->md)) {
+ fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+ }
+ } else if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
+ if (prsactx->md == NULL) /* Should always be the case */
+ fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+ }
+ return OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator);
+ }
+#endif
+
return 1;
}
@@ -1194,6 +1212,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_c
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
+#endif
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
Index: openssl-3.2.3/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
+++ openssl-3.2.3/util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
@@ -386,6 +386,7 @@ my %params = (
'SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES' => '*PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES',
'SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE' => '*PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE',
'SIGNATURE_PARAM_NONCE_TYPE' => "nonce-type",
+ 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR' => "suse-fips-indicator",
'SIGNATURE_PARAM_INSTANCE' => "instance",
'SIGNATURE_PARAM_CONTEXT_STRING' => "context-string",

View File

@@ -1,309 +0,0 @@
From 4580c303fa88f77a98461fee5fe26b5db725967c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 23:09:38 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info() behavior
Fix #23448
`EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info()` behaves like a `set1` function.
Fix the setting of the parameter in the params code.
Update the TLS_PRF code to also use the params code.
Add tests.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23456)
(cherry picked from commit 6b566687b58fde08b28e3331377f050768fad89b)
---
crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++-
providers/implementations/exchange/kdf_exch.c | 42 ++++++++++++
providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c | 8 +++
test/pkey_meth_kdf_test.c | 53 +++++++++++----
4 files changed, 156 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
index ba1971c..d0eeaf7 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
@@ -1028,6 +1028,69 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_set1_octet_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int fallback,
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, octet_string_params);
}
+static int evp_pkey_ctx_add1_octet_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int fallback,
+ const char *param, int op, int ctrl,
+ const unsigned char *data,
+ int datalen)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM os_params[2];
+ unsigned char *info = NULL;
+ size_t info_len = 0;
+ size_t info_alloc = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || (ctx->operation & op) == 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* Code below to be removed when legacy support is dropped. */
+ if (fallback)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, op, ctrl, datalen, (void *)(data));
+ /* end of legacy support */
+
+ if (datalen < 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the original value length */
+ os_params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(param, NULL, 0);
+ os_params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, os_params))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Older provider that doesn't support getting this parameter */
+ if (os_params[0].return_size == OSSL_PARAM_UNMODIFIED)
+ return evp_pkey_ctx_set1_octet_string(ctx, fallback, param, op, ctrl, data, datalen);
+
+ info_alloc = os_params[0].return_size + datalen;
+ if (info_alloc == 0)
+ return 0;
+ info = OPENSSL_zalloc(info_alloc);
+ if (info == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ info_len = os_params[0].return_size;
+
+ os_params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(param, info, info_alloc);
+
+ /* if we have data, then go get it */
+ if (info_len > 0) {
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, os_params))
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy the input data */
+ memcpy(&info[info_len], data, datalen);
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, os_params);
+
+ error:
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(info, info_alloc);
+ return ret;
+}
+
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_tls1_prf_secret(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *sec, int seclen)
{
@@ -1078,7 +1141,7 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *info, int infolen)
{
- return evp_pkey_ctx_set1_octet_string(ctx, ctx->op.kex.algctx == NULL,
+ return evp_pkey_ctx_add1_octet_string(ctx, ctx->op.kex.algctx == NULL,
OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO,
EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_INFO,
diff --git a/providers/implementations/exchange/kdf_exch.c b/providers/implementations/exchange/kdf_exch.c
index 527a866..4bc8102 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/exchange/kdf_exch.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/exchange/kdf_exch.c
@@ -28,9 +28,13 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_keyexch_derive_fn kdf_derive;
static OSSL_FUNC_keyexch_freectx_fn kdf_freectx;
static OSSL_FUNC_keyexch_dupctx_fn kdf_dupctx;
static OSSL_FUNC_keyexch_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_keyexch_get_ctx_params_fn kdf_get_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_keyexch_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_keyexch_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_keyexch_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_scrypt_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_keyexch_gettable_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_keyexch_gettable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_keyexch_gettable_ctx_params_fn kdf_scrypt_gettable_ctx_params;
typedef struct {
void *provctx;
@@ -169,6 +173,13 @@ static int kdf_set_ctx_params(void *vpkdfctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
return EVP_KDF_CTX_set_params(pkdfctx->kdfctx, params);
}
+static int kdf_get_ctx_params(void *vpkdfctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ PROV_KDF_CTX *pkdfctx = (PROV_KDF_CTX *)vpkdfctx;
+
+ return EVP_KDF_CTX_get_params(pkdfctx->kdfctx, params);
+}
+
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vpkdfctx,
void *provctx,
const char *kdfname)
@@ -197,6 +208,34 @@ KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS(tls1_prf, "TLS1-PRF")
KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS(hkdf, "HKDF")
KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS(scrypt, "SCRYPT")
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vpkdfctx,
+ void *provctx,
+ const char *kdfname)
+{
+ EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx), kdfname,
+ NULL);
+ const OSSL_PARAM *params;
+
+ if (kdf == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ params = EVP_KDF_gettable_ctx_params(kdf);
+ EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
+
+ return params;
+}
+
+#define KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS(funcname, kdfname) \
+ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_##funcname##_gettable_ctx_params(void *vpkdfctx, \
+ void *provctx) \
+ { \
+ return kdf_gettable_ctx_params(vpkdfctx, provctx, kdfname); \
+ }
+
+KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS(tls1_prf, "TLS1-PRF")
+KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS(hkdf, "HKDF")
+KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS(scrypt, "SCRYPT")
+
#define KDF_KEYEXCH_FUNCTIONS(funcname) \
const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_##funcname##_keyexch_functions[] = { \
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))kdf_##funcname##_newctx }, \
@@ -205,8 +244,11 @@ KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS(scrypt, "SCRYPT")
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))kdf_freectx }, \
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))kdf_dupctx }, \
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))kdf_set_ctx_params }, \
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))kdf_get_ctx_params }, \
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, \
(void (*)(void))kdf_##funcname##_settable_ctx_params }, \
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, \
+ (void (*)(void))kdf_##funcname##_gettable_ctx_params }, \
{ 0, NULL } \
};
diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
index daa619b..dd65a2a 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
@@ -371,6 +371,13 @@ static int kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
return 0;
return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sz);
}
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO)) != NULL) {
+ if (ctx->info == NULL || ctx->info_len == 0) {
+ p->return_size = 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, ctx->info, ctx->info_len);
+ }
return -2;
}
@@ -379,6 +386,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
diff --git a/test/pkey_meth_kdf_test.c b/test/pkey_meth_kdf_test.c
index f816d24..c09e2f3 100644
--- a/test/pkey_meth_kdf_test.c
+++ b/test/pkey_meth_kdf_test.c
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include "testutil.h"
-static int test_kdf_tls1_prf(void)
+static int test_kdf_tls1_prf(int index)
{
int ret = 0;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
@@ -40,10 +40,23 @@ static int test_kdf_tls1_prf(void)
TEST_error("EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_tls1_prf_secret");
goto err;
}
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx,
- (unsigned char *)"seed", 4) <= 0) {
- TEST_error("EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed");
- goto err;
+ if (index == 0) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx,
+ (unsigned char *)"seed", 4) <= 0) {
+ TEST_error("EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx,
+ (unsigned char *)"se", 2) <= 0) {
+ TEST_error("EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx,
+ (unsigned char *)"ed", 2) <= 0) {
+ TEST_error("EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed");
+ goto err;
+ }
}
if (EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &outlen) <= 0) {
TEST_error("EVP_PKEY_derive");
@@ -65,7 +78,7 @@ err:
return ret;
}
-static int test_kdf_hkdf(void)
+static int test_kdf_hkdf(int index)
{
int ret = 0;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
@@ -94,10 +107,23 @@ static int test_kdf_hkdf(void)
TEST_error("EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key");
goto err;
}
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info(pctx, (const unsigned char *)"label", 5)
+ if (index == 0) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info(pctx, (const unsigned char *)"label", 5)
<= 0) {
- TEST_error("EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_info");
- goto err;
+ TEST_error("EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info(pctx, (const unsigned char *)"lab", 3)
+ <= 0) {
+ TEST_error("EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info(pctx, (const unsigned char *)"el", 2)
+ <= 0) {
+ TEST_error("EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info");
+ goto err;
+ }
}
if (EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &outlen) <= 0) {
TEST_error("EVP_PKEY_derive");
@@ -195,8 +221,13 @@ err:
int setup_tests(void)
{
- ADD_TEST(test_kdf_tls1_prf);
- ADD_TEST(test_kdf_hkdf);
+ int tests = 1;
+
+ if (fips_provider_version_ge(NULL, 3, 3, 1))
+ tests = 2;
+
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_kdf_tls1_prf, tests);
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_kdf_hkdf, tests);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
ADD_TEST(test_kdf_scrypt);
#endif
--
2.45.1

View File

@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
From a72f753cc5a43e58087358317975f6be46c15e01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "A. Wilcox" <AWilcox@Wilcox-Tech.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Apr 2025 08:51:53 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Fix P-384 curve on lower-than-P9 PPC64 targets
The change adding an asm implementation of p384_felem_reduce incorrectly
uses the accelerated version on both targets that support the intrinsics
*and* targets that don't, instead of falling back to the generics on older
targets. This results in crashes when trying to use P-384 on < Power9.
Signed-off-by: Anna Wilcox <AWilcox@Wilcox-Tech.com>
Closes: #27350
Fixes: 85cabd94 ("Fix Minerva timing side-channel signal for P-384 curve on PPC")
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/27429)
(cherry picked from commit 29864f2b0f1046177e8048a5b17440893d3f9425)
---
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c
index 2ceb94fe33b7e..9d682f5a02cce 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c
@@ -684,6 +684,22 @@ static void felem_reduce_ref(felem out, const widefelem in)
out[i] = acc[i];
}
+static ossl_inline void felem_square_reduce_ref(felem out, const felem in)
+{
+ widefelem tmp;
+
+ felem_square_ref(tmp, in);
+ felem_reduce_ref(out, tmp);
+}
+
+static ossl_inline void felem_mul_reduce_ref(felem out, const felem in1, const felem in2)
+{
+ widefelem tmp;
+
+ felem_mul_ref(tmp, in1, in2);
+ felem_reduce_ref(out, tmp);
+}
+
#if defined(ECP_NISTP384_ASM)
static void felem_square_wrapper(widefelem out, const felem in);
static void felem_mul_wrapper(widefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2);
@@ -695,10 +711,18 @@ static void (*felem_mul_p)(widefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2) =
static void (*felem_reduce_p)(felem out, const widefelem in) = felem_reduce_ref;
+static void (*felem_square_reduce_p)(felem out, const felem in) =
+ felem_square_reduce_ref;
+static void (*felem_mul_reduce_p)(felem out, const felem in1, const felem in2) =
+ felem_mul_reduce_ref;
+
void p384_felem_square(widefelem out, const felem in);
void p384_felem_mul(widefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2);
void p384_felem_reduce(felem out, const widefelem in);
+void p384_felem_square_reduce(felem out, const felem in);
+void p384_felem_mul_reduce(felem out, const felem in1, const felem in2);
+
# if defined(_ARCH_PPC64)
# include "crypto/ppc_arch.h"
# endif
@@ -710,6 +734,8 @@ static void felem_select(void)
felem_square_p = p384_felem_square;
felem_mul_p = p384_felem_mul;
felem_reduce_p = p384_felem_reduce;
+ felem_square_reduce_p = p384_felem_square_reduce;
+ felem_mul_reduce_p = p384_felem_mul_reduce;
return;
}
@@ -718,7 +744,9 @@ static void felem_select(void)
/* Default */
felem_square_p = felem_square_ref;
felem_mul_p = felem_mul_ref;
- felem_reduce_p = p384_felem_reduce;
+ felem_reduce_p = felem_reduce_ref;
+ felem_square_reduce_p = felem_square_reduce_ref;
+ felem_mul_reduce_p = felem_mul_reduce_ref;
}
static void felem_square_wrapper(widefelem out, const felem in)
@@ -737,31 +765,15 @@ static void felem_mul_wrapper(widefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2)
# define felem_mul felem_mul_p
# define felem_reduce felem_reduce_p
-void p384_felem_square_reduce(felem out, const felem in);
-void p384_felem_mul_reduce(felem out, const felem in1, const felem in2);
-
-# define felem_square_reduce p384_felem_square_reduce
-# define felem_mul_reduce p384_felem_mul_reduce
+# define felem_square_reduce felem_square_reduce_p
+# define felem_mul_reduce felem_mul_reduce_p
#else
# define felem_square felem_square_ref
# define felem_mul felem_mul_ref
# define felem_reduce felem_reduce_ref
-static ossl_inline void felem_square_reduce(felem out, const felem in)
-{
- widefelem tmp;
-
- felem_square(tmp, in);
- felem_reduce(out, tmp);
-}
-
-static ossl_inline void felem_mul_reduce(felem out, const felem in1, const felem in2)
-{
- widefelem tmp;
-
- felem_mul(tmp, in1, in2);
- felem_reduce(out, tmp);
-}
+# define felem_square_reduce felem_square_reduce_ref
+# define felem_mul_reduce felem_mul_reduce_ref
#endif
/*-

View File

@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
From d6a9c21302e01c33a9a919e7ba380ba3b0ed65b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: trinity-1686a <trinity@deuxfleurs.fr>
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2024 11:13:14 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Handle empty param in EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info
Fixes #24130
The regression was introduced in PR #23456.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24141)
(cherry picked from commit 299996fb1fcd76eeadfd547958de2a1b822f37f5)
---
crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c | 2 ++
test/evp_extra_test.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
index d0eeaf7..bce1ebc 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
@@ -1053,6 +1053,8 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_add1_octet_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int fallback,
if (datalen < 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
return 0;
+ } else if (datalen == 0) {
+ return 1;
}
/* Get the original value length */
diff --git a/test/evp_extra_test.c b/test/evp_extra_test.c
index 9b3bee7..22121ce 100644
--- a/test/evp_extra_test.c
+++ b/test/evp_extra_test.c
@@ -2565,6 +2565,47 @@ static int test_emptyikm_HKDF(void)
return ret;
}
+static int test_empty_salt_info_HKDF(void)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+ unsigned char out[20];
+ size_t outlen;
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned char salt[] = "";
+ unsigned char key[] = "012345678901234567890123456789";
+ unsigned char info[] = "";
+ const unsigned char expected[] = {
+ 0x67, 0x12, 0xf9, 0x27, 0x8a, 0x8a, 0x3a, 0x8f, 0x7d, 0x2c, 0xa3, 0x6a,
+ 0xaa, 0xe9, 0xb3, 0xb9, 0x52, 0x5f, 0xe0, 0x06,
+ };
+ size_t expectedlen = sizeof(expected);
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(testctx, "HKDF", testpropq)))
+ goto done;
+
+ outlen = sizeof(out);
+ memset(out, 0, outlen);
+
+ if (!TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx), 0)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(pctx, EVP_sha256()), 0)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_salt(pctx, salt,
+ sizeof(salt) - 1), 0)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key(pctx, key,
+ sizeof(key) - 1), 0)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info(pctx, info,
+ sizeof(info) - 1), 0)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &outlen), 0)
+ || !TEST_mem_eq(out, outlen, expected, expectedlen))
+ goto done;
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ done:
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
static int test_X509_PUBKEY_inplace(void)
{
@@ -5166,6 +5207,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
#endif
ADD_TEST(test_HKDF);
ADD_TEST(test_emptyikm_HKDF);
+ ADD_TEST(test_empty_salt_info_HKDF);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
ADD_TEST(test_X509_PUBKEY_inplace);
ADD_TEST(test_X509_PUBKEY_dup);
--
2.45.1

View File

@@ -1,495 +0,0 @@
From 3d3a7ecd1ae5ab08d22041f7b3b035c34f12fa02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Danny Tsen <dtsen@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2023 15:58:53 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Improve performance for 6x unrolling with vpermxor
instruction
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21812)
---
crypto/aes/asm/aesp8-ppc.pl | 145 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 95 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesp8-ppc.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesp8-ppc.pl
index 60cf86f52aed2..38b9405a283b7 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesp8-ppc.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesp8-ppc.pl
@@ -99,11 +99,12 @@
.long 0x1b000000, 0x1b000000, 0x1b000000, 0x1b000000 ?rev
.long 0x0d0e0f0c, 0x0d0e0f0c, 0x0d0e0f0c, 0x0d0e0f0c ?rev
.long 0,0,0,0 ?asis
+.long 0x0f102132, 0x43546576, 0x8798a9ba, 0xcbdcedfe
Lconsts:
mflr r0
bcl 20,31,\$+4
mflr $ptr #vvvvv "distance between . and rcon
- addi $ptr,$ptr,-0x48
+ addi $ptr,$ptr,-0x58
mtlr r0
blr
.long 0
@@ -2405,7 +2406,7 @@ ()
my $key_=$key2;
my ($x00,$x10,$x20,$x30,$x40,$x50,$x60,$x70)=map("r$_",(0,3,26..31));
$x00=0 if ($flavour =~ /osx/);
-my ($in0, $in1, $in2, $in3, $in4, $in5 )=map("v$_",(0..5));
+my ($in0, $in1, $in2, $in3, $in4, $in5)=map("v$_",(0..5));
my ($out0, $out1, $out2, $out3, $out4, $out5)=map("v$_",(7,12..16));
my ($twk0, $twk1, $twk2, $twk3, $twk4, $twk5)=map("v$_",(17..22));
my $rndkey0="v23"; # v24-v25 rotating buffer for first found keys
@@ -2460,6 +2461,18 @@ ()
li $x70,0x70
mtspr 256,r0
+ # Reverse eighty7 to 0x010101..87
+ xxlor 2, 32+$eighty7, 32+$eighty7
+ vsldoi $eighty7,$tmp,$eighty7,1 # 0x010101..87
+ xxlor 1, 32+$eighty7, 32+$eighty7
+
+ # Load XOR contents. 0xf102132435465768798a9bacbdcedfe
+ mr $x70, r6
+ bl Lconsts
+ lxvw4x 0, $x40, r6 # load XOR contents
+ mr r6, $x70
+ li $x70,0x70
+
subi $rounds,$rounds,3 # -4 in total
lvx $rndkey0,$x00,$key1 # load key schedule
@@ -2502,69 +2515,77 @@ ()
?vperm v31,v31,$twk5,$keyperm
lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # pre-load round[2]
+ # Switch to use the following codes with 0x010101..87 to generate tweak.
+ # eighty7 = 0x010101..87
+ # vsrab tmp, tweak, seven # next tweak value, right shift 7 bits
+ # vand tmp, tmp, eighty7 # last byte with carry
+ # vaddubm tweak, tweak, tweak # left shift 1 bit (x2)
+ # xxlor vsx, 0, 0
+ # vpermxor tweak, tweak, tmp, vsx
+
vperm $in0,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm
subi $inp,$inp,31 # undo "caller"
vxor $twk0,$tweak,$rndkey0
vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
vxor $out0,$in0,$twk0
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in1, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in1
lvx_u $in1,$x10,$inp
vxor $twk1,$tweak,$rndkey0
vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
le?vperm $in1,$in1,$in1,$leperm
vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
vxor $out1,$in1,$twk1
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in2, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in2
lvx_u $in2,$x20,$inp
andi. $taillen,$len,15
vxor $twk2,$tweak,$rndkey0
vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
le?vperm $in2,$in2,$in2,$leperm
vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
vxor $out2,$in2,$twk2
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in3, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in3
lvx_u $in3,$x30,$inp
sub $len,$len,$taillen
vxor $twk3,$tweak,$rndkey0
vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
le?vperm $in3,$in3,$in3,$leperm
vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
vxor $out3,$in3,$twk3
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in4, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in4
lvx_u $in4,$x40,$inp
subi $len,$len,0x60
vxor $twk4,$tweak,$rndkey0
vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
le?vperm $in4,$in4,$in4,$leperm
vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
vxor $out4,$in4,$twk4
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in5, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in5
lvx_u $in5,$x50,$inp
addi $inp,$inp,0x60
vxor $twk5,$tweak,$rndkey0
vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
le?vperm $in5,$in5,$in5,$leperm
vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
vxor $out5,$in5,$twk5
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in0, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in0
vxor v31,v31,$rndkey0
mtctr $rounds
@@ -2590,6 +2611,8 @@ ()
lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # round[4]
bdnz Loop_xts_enc6x
+ xxlor 32+$eighty7, 1, 1 # 0x010101..87
+
subic $len,$len,96 # $len-=96
vxor $in0,$twk0,v31 # xor with last round key
vcipher $out0,$out0,v24
@@ -2599,7 +2622,6 @@ ()
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
vcipher $out2,$out2,v24
vcipher $out3,$out3,v24
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
vcipher $out4,$out4,v24
vcipher $out5,$out5,v24
@@ -2607,7 +2629,8 @@ ()
vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
vcipher $out0,$out0,v25
vcipher $out1,$out1,v25
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in1, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in1
vcipher $out2,$out2,v25
vcipher $out3,$out3,v25
vxor $in1,$twk1,v31
@@ -2618,13 +2641,13 @@ ()
and r0,r0,$len
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
vcipher $out0,$out0,v26
vcipher $out1,$out1,v26
vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
vcipher $out2,$out2,v26
vcipher $out3,$out3,v26
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in2, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in2
vcipher $out4,$out4,v26
vcipher $out5,$out5,v26
@@ -2638,7 +2661,6 @@ ()
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
vcipher $out0,$out0,v27
vcipher $out1,$out1,v27
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
vcipher $out2,$out2,v27
vcipher $out3,$out3,v27
vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
@@ -2646,7 +2668,8 @@ ()
vcipher $out5,$out5,v27
addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in3, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in3
vcipher $out0,$out0,v28
vcipher $out1,$out1,v28
vxor $in3,$twk3,v31
@@ -2655,7 +2678,6 @@ ()
vcipher $out2,$out2,v28
vcipher $out3,$out3,v28
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
vcipher $out4,$out4,v28
vcipher $out5,$out5,v28
lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # re-pre-load round[1]
@@ -2663,7 +2685,8 @@ ()
vcipher $out0,$out0,v29
vcipher $out1,$out1,v29
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in4, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in4
vcipher $out2,$out2,v29
vcipher $out3,$out3,v29
vxor $in4,$twk4,v31
@@ -2673,14 +2696,14 @@ ()
vcipher $out5,$out5,v29
lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # re-pre-load round[2]
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
vcipher $out0,$out0,v30
vcipher $out1,$out1,v30
vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
vcipher $out2,$out2,v30
vcipher $out3,$out3,v30
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in5, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in5
vcipher $out4,$out4,v30
vcipher $out5,$out5,v30
vxor $in5,$twk5,v31
@@ -2690,7 +2713,6 @@ ()
vcipherlast $out0,$out0,$in0
lvx_u $in0,$x00,$inp # load next input block
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
vcipherlast $out1,$out1,$in1
lvx_u $in1,$x10,$inp
vcipherlast $out2,$out2,$in2
@@ -2703,7 +2725,10 @@ ()
vcipherlast $out4,$out4,$in4
le?vperm $in2,$in2,$in2,$leperm
lvx_u $in4,$x40,$inp
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 10, 32+$in0, 32+$in0
+ xxlor 32+$in0, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in0
+ xxlor 32+$in0, 10, 10
vcipherlast $tmp,$out5,$in5 # last block might be needed
# in stealing mode
le?vperm $in3,$in3,$in3,$leperm
@@ -2736,6 +2761,8 @@ ()
mtctr $rounds
beq Loop_xts_enc6x # did $len-=96 borrow?
+ xxlor 32+$eighty7, 2, 2 # 0x870101..01
+
addic. $len,$len,0x60
beq Lxts_enc6x_zero
cmpwi $len,0x20
@@ -3112,6 +3139,18 @@ ()
li $x70,0x70
mtspr 256,r0
+ # Reverse eighty7 to 0x010101..87
+ xxlor 2, 32+$eighty7, 32+$eighty7
+ vsldoi $eighty7,$tmp,$eighty7,1 # 0x010101..87
+ xxlor 1, 32+$eighty7, 32+$eighty7
+
+ # Load XOR contents. 0xf102132435465768798a9bacbdcedfe
+ mr $x70, r6
+ bl Lconsts
+ lxvw4x 0, $x40, r6 # load XOR contents
+ mr r6, $x70
+ li $x70,0x70
+
subi $rounds,$rounds,3 # -4 in total
lvx $rndkey0,$x00,$key1 # load key schedule
@@ -3159,64 +3198,64 @@ ()
vxor $twk0,$tweak,$rndkey0
vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
vxor $out0,$in0,$twk0
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in1, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in1
lvx_u $in1,$x10,$inp
vxor $twk1,$tweak,$rndkey0
vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
le?vperm $in1,$in1,$in1,$leperm
vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
vxor $out1,$in1,$twk1
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in2, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in2
lvx_u $in2,$x20,$inp
andi. $taillen,$len,15
vxor $twk2,$tweak,$rndkey0
vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
le?vperm $in2,$in2,$in2,$leperm
vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
vxor $out2,$in2,$twk2
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in3, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in3
lvx_u $in3,$x30,$inp
sub $len,$len,$taillen
vxor $twk3,$tweak,$rndkey0
vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
le?vperm $in3,$in3,$in3,$leperm
vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
vxor $out3,$in3,$twk3
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in4, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in4
lvx_u $in4,$x40,$inp
subi $len,$len,0x60
vxor $twk4,$tweak,$rndkey0
vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
le?vperm $in4,$in4,$in4,$leperm
vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
vxor $out4,$in4,$twk4
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in5, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in5
lvx_u $in5,$x50,$inp
addi $inp,$inp,0x60
vxor $twk5,$tweak,$rndkey0
vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
le?vperm $in5,$in5,$in5,$leperm
vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
vxor $out5,$in5,$twk5
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in0, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in0
vxor v31,v31,$rndkey0
mtctr $rounds
@@ -3242,6 +3281,8 @@ ()
lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # round[4]
bdnz Loop_xts_dec6x
+ xxlor 32+$eighty7, 1, 1
+
subic $len,$len,96 # $len-=96
vxor $in0,$twk0,v31 # xor with last round key
vncipher $out0,$out0,v24
@@ -3251,7 +3292,6 @@ ()
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
vncipher $out2,$out2,v24
vncipher $out3,$out3,v24
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
vncipher $out4,$out4,v24
vncipher $out5,$out5,v24
@@ -3259,7 +3299,8 @@ ()
vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
vncipher $out0,$out0,v25
vncipher $out1,$out1,v25
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in1, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in1
vncipher $out2,$out2,v25
vncipher $out3,$out3,v25
vxor $in1,$twk1,v31
@@ -3270,13 +3311,13 @@ ()
and r0,r0,$len
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
vncipher $out0,$out0,v26
vncipher $out1,$out1,v26
vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
vncipher $out2,$out2,v26
vncipher $out3,$out3,v26
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in2, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in2
vncipher $out4,$out4,v26
vncipher $out5,$out5,v26
@@ -3290,7 +3331,6 @@ ()
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
vncipher $out0,$out0,v27
vncipher $out1,$out1,v27
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
vncipher $out2,$out2,v27
vncipher $out3,$out3,v27
vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
@@ -3298,7 +3338,8 @@ ()
vncipher $out5,$out5,v27
addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in3, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in3
vncipher $out0,$out0,v28
vncipher $out1,$out1,v28
vxor $in3,$twk3,v31
@@ -3307,7 +3348,6 @@ ()
vncipher $out2,$out2,v28
vncipher $out3,$out3,v28
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
vncipher $out4,$out4,v28
vncipher $out5,$out5,v28
lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # re-pre-load round[1]
@@ -3315,7 +3355,8 @@ ()
vncipher $out0,$out0,v29
vncipher $out1,$out1,v29
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in4, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in4
vncipher $out2,$out2,v29
vncipher $out3,$out3,v29
vxor $in4,$twk4,v31
@@ -3325,14 +3366,14 @@ ()
vncipher $out5,$out5,v29
lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # re-pre-load round[2]
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
vncipher $out0,$out0,v30
vncipher $out1,$out1,v30
vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
vncipher $out2,$out2,v30
vncipher $out3,$out3,v30
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 32+$in5, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in5
vncipher $out4,$out4,v30
vncipher $out5,$out5,v30
vxor $in5,$twk5,v31
@@ -3342,7 +3383,6 @@ ()
vncipherlast $out0,$out0,$in0
lvx_u $in0,$x00,$inp # load next input block
vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
- vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
vncipherlast $out1,$out1,$in1
lvx_u $in1,$x10,$inp
vncipherlast $out2,$out2,$in2
@@ -3355,7 +3395,10 @@ ()
vncipherlast $out4,$out4,$in4
le?vperm $in2,$in2,$in2,$leperm
lvx_u $in4,$x40,$inp
- vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ xxlor 10, 32+$in0, 32+$in0
+ xxlor 32+$in0, 0, 0
+ vpermxor $tweak, $tweak, $tmp, $in0
+ xxlor 32+$in0, 10, 10
vncipherlast $out5,$out5,$in5
le?vperm $in3,$in3,$in3,$leperm
lvx_u $in5,$x50,$inp
@@ -3386,6 +3429,8 @@ ()
mtctr $rounds
beq Loop_xts_dec6x # did $len-=96 borrow?
+ xxlor 32+$eighty7, 2, 2
+
addic. $len,$len,0x60
beq Lxts_dec6x_zero
cmpwi $len,0x20

View File

@@ -1,267 +0,0 @@
From 4a275f852b61238161c053774736dc07b3ade200 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 11:46:40 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 11/48] 0011-Remove-EC-curves.patch
Patch-name: 0011-Remove-EC-curves.patch
Patch-id: 11
Patch-status: |
# remove unsupported EC curves
---
apps/speed.c | 8 +---
crypto/evp/ec_support.c | 87 ------------------------------------
test/acvp_test.inc | 9 ----
test/ecdsatest.h | 17 -------
test/recipes/15-test_genec.t | 27 -----------
5 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 147 deletions(-)
Index: openssl-3.2.3/apps/speed.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/apps/speed.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/apps/speed.c
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ static double ffdh_results[FFDH_NUM][1];
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
enum ec_curves_t {
- R_EC_P160, R_EC_P192, R_EC_P224, R_EC_P256, R_EC_P384, R_EC_P521,
+ R_EC_P224, R_EC_P256, R_EC_P384, R_EC_P521,
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
R_EC_K163, R_EC_K233, R_EC_K283, R_EC_K409, R_EC_K571,
R_EC_B163, R_EC_B233, R_EC_B283, R_EC_B409, R_EC_B571,
@@ -411,8 +411,6 @@ enum ec_curves_t {
};
/* list of ecdsa curves */
static const OPT_PAIR ecdsa_choices[ECDSA_NUM] = {
- {"ecdsap160", R_EC_P160},
- {"ecdsap192", R_EC_P192},
{"ecdsap224", R_EC_P224},
{"ecdsap256", R_EC_P256},
{"ecdsap384", R_EC_P384},
@@ -445,8 +443,6 @@ enum {
};
/* list of ecdh curves, extension of |ecdsa_choices| list above */
static const OPT_PAIR ecdh_choices[EC_NUM] = {
- {"ecdhp160", R_EC_P160},
- {"ecdhp192", R_EC_P192},
{"ecdhp224", R_EC_P224},
{"ecdhp256", R_EC_P256},
{"ecdhp384", R_EC_P384},
@@ -1781,8 +1777,6 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
*/
static const EC_CURVE ec_curves[EC_NUM] = {
/* Prime Curves */
- {"secp160r1", NID_secp160r1, 160},
- {"nistp192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 192},
{"nistp224", NID_secp224r1, 224},
{"nistp256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 256},
{"nistp384", NID_secp384r1, 384},
Index: openssl-3.2.3/crypto/evp/ec_support.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/crypto/evp/ec_support.c
+++ openssl-3.2.3/crypto/evp/ec_support.c
@@ -20,89 +20,15 @@ typedef struct ec_name2nid_st {
static const EC_NAME2NID curve_list[] = {
/* prime field curves */
/* secg curves */
- {"secp112r1", NID_secp112r1 },
- {"secp112r2", NID_secp112r2 },
- {"secp128r1", NID_secp128r1 },
- {"secp128r2", NID_secp128r2 },
- {"secp160k1", NID_secp160k1 },
- {"secp160r1", NID_secp160r1 },
- {"secp160r2", NID_secp160r2 },
- {"secp192k1", NID_secp192k1 },
- {"secp224k1", NID_secp224k1 },
{"secp224r1", NID_secp224r1 },
{"secp256k1", NID_secp256k1 },
{"secp384r1", NID_secp384r1 },
{"secp521r1", NID_secp521r1 },
/* X9.62 curves */
- {"prime192v1", NID_X9_62_prime192v1 },
- {"prime192v2", NID_X9_62_prime192v2 },
- {"prime192v3", NID_X9_62_prime192v3 },
- {"prime239v1", NID_X9_62_prime239v1 },
- {"prime239v2", NID_X9_62_prime239v2 },
- {"prime239v3", NID_X9_62_prime239v3 },
{"prime256v1", NID_X9_62_prime256v1 },
/* characteristic two field curves */
/* NIST/SECG curves */
- {"sect113r1", NID_sect113r1 },
- {"sect113r2", NID_sect113r2 },
- {"sect131r1", NID_sect131r1 },
- {"sect131r2", NID_sect131r2 },
- {"sect163k1", NID_sect163k1 },
- {"sect163r1", NID_sect163r1 },
- {"sect163r2", NID_sect163r2 },
- {"sect193r1", NID_sect193r1 },
- {"sect193r2", NID_sect193r2 },
- {"sect233k1", NID_sect233k1 },
- {"sect233r1", NID_sect233r1 },
- {"sect239k1", NID_sect239k1 },
- {"sect283k1", NID_sect283k1 },
- {"sect283r1", NID_sect283r1 },
- {"sect409k1", NID_sect409k1 },
- {"sect409r1", NID_sect409r1 },
- {"sect571k1", NID_sect571k1 },
- {"sect571r1", NID_sect571r1 },
- /* X9.62 curves */
- {"c2pnb163v1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v1 },
- {"c2pnb163v2", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v2 },
- {"c2pnb163v3", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v3 },
- {"c2pnb176v1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb176v1 },
- {"c2tnb191v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v1 },
- {"c2tnb191v2", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v2 },
- {"c2tnb191v3", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v3 },
- {"c2pnb208w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb208w1 },
- {"c2tnb239v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v1 },
- {"c2tnb239v2", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v2 },
- {"c2tnb239v3", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v3 },
- {"c2pnb272w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb272w1 },
- {"c2pnb304w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb304w1 },
- {"c2tnb359v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb359v1 },
- {"c2pnb368w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb368w1 },
- {"c2tnb431r1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb431r1 },
- /*
- * the WAP/WTLS curves [unlike SECG, spec has its own OIDs for curves
- * from X9.62]
- */
- {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1 },
- {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3 },
- {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4 },
- {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5 },
- {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6 },
- {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7 },
- {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8 },
- {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9 },
- {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10 },
- {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11 },
- {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 },
- /* IPSec curves */
- {"Oakley-EC2N-3", NID_ipsec3 },
- {"Oakley-EC2N-4", NID_ipsec4 },
/* brainpool curves */
- {"brainpoolP160r1", NID_brainpoolP160r1 },
- {"brainpoolP160t1", NID_brainpoolP160t1 },
- {"brainpoolP192r1", NID_brainpoolP192r1 },
- {"brainpoolP192t1", NID_brainpoolP192t1 },
- {"brainpoolP224r1", NID_brainpoolP224r1 },
- {"brainpoolP224t1", NID_brainpoolP224t1 },
{"brainpoolP256r1", NID_brainpoolP256r1 },
{"brainpoolP256t1", NID_brainpoolP256t1 },
{"brainpoolP320r1", NID_brainpoolP320r1 },
@@ -150,17 +76,6 @@ int ossl_ec_curve_name2nid(const char *n
/* Functions to translate between common NIST curve names and NIDs */
static const EC_NAME2NID nist_curves[] = {
- {"B-163", NID_sect163r2},
- {"B-233", NID_sect233r1},
- {"B-283", NID_sect283r1},
- {"B-409", NID_sect409r1},
- {"B-571", NID_sect571r1},
- {"K-163", NID_sect163k1},
- {"K-233", NID_sect233k1},
- {"K-283", NID_sect283k1},
- {"K-409", NID_sect409k1},
- {"K-571", NID_sect571k1},
- {"P-192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1},
{"P-224", NID_secp224r1},
{"P-256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
{"P-384", NID_secp384r1},
Index: openssl-3.2.3/test/acvp_test.inc
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/test/acvp_test.inc
+++ openssl-3.2.3/test/acvp_test.inc
@@ -212,15 +212,6 @@ static const unsigned char ecdsa_sigver_
};
static const struct ecdsa_sigver_st ecdsa_sigver_data[] = {
{
- "SHA-1",
- "P-192",
- ITM(ecdsa_sigver_msg0),
- ITM(ecdsa_sigver_pub0),
- ITM(ecdsa_sigver_r0),
- ITM(ecdsa_sigver_s0),
- PASS,
- },
- {
"SHA2-512",
"P-521",
ITM(ecdsa_sigver_msg1),
Index: openssl-3.2.3/test/ecdsatest.h
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/test/ecdsatest.h
+++ openssl-3.2.3/test/ecdsatest.h
@@ -32,23 +32,6 @@ typedef struct {
} ecdsa_cavs_kat_t;
static const ecdsa_cavs_kat_t ecdsa_cavs_kats[] = {
- /* prime KATs from X9.62 */
- {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, NID_sha1,
- "616263", /* "abc" */
- "1a8d598fc15bf0fd89030b5cb1111aeb92ae8baf5ea475fb",
- "0462b12d60690cdcf330babab6e69763b471f994dd702d16a563bf5ec08069705ffff65e"
- "5ca5c0d69716dfcb3474373902",
- "fa6de29746bbeb7f8bb1e761f85f7dfb2983169d82fa2f4e",
- "885052380ff147b734c330c43d39b2c4a89f29b0f749fead",
- "e9ecc78106def82bf1070cf1d4d804c3cb390046951df686"},
- {NID_X9_62_prime239v1, NID_sha1,
- "616263", /* "abc" */
- "7ef7c6fabefffdea864206e80b0b08a9331ed93e698561b64ca0f7777f3d",
- "045b6dc53bc61a2548ffb0f671472de6c9521a9d2d2534e65abfcbd5fe0c707fd9f1ed2e"
- "65f09f6ce0893baf5e8e31e6ae82ea8c3592335be906d38dee",
- "656c7196bf87dcc5d1f1020906df2782360d36b2de7a17ece37d503784af",
- "2cb7f36803ebb9c427c58d8265f11fc5084747133078fc279de874fbecb0",
- "2eeae988104e9c2234a3c2beb1f53bfa5dc11ff36a875d1e3ccb1f7e45cf"},
/* prime KATs from NIST CAVP */
{NID_secp224r1, NID_sha224,
"699325d6fc8fbbb4981a6ded3c3a54ad2e4e3db8a5669201912064c64e700c139248cdc1"
Index: openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t
+++ openssl-3.2.3/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t
@@ -41,37 +41,11 @@ plan skip_all => "This test is unsupport
if disabled("ec");
my @prime_curves = qw(
- secp112r1
- secp112r2
- secp128r1
- secp128r2
- secp160k1
- secp160r1
- secp160r2
- secp192k1
- secp224k1
secp224r1
secp256k1
secp384r1
secp521r1
- prime192v1
- prime192v2
- prime192v3
- prime239v1
- prime239v2
- prime239v3
prime256v1
- wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6
- wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7
- wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8
- wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9
- wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12
- brainpoolP160r1
- brainpoolP160t1
- brainpoolP192r1
- brainpoolP192t1
- brainpoolP224r1
- brainpoolP224t1
brainpoolP256r1
brainpoolP256t1
brainpoolP320r1
@@ -136,7 +110,6 @@ push(@other_curves, 'SM2')
if !disabled("sm2");
my @curve_aliases = qw(
- P-192
P-224
P-256
P-384

View File

@@ -1,171 +0,0 @@
Subject: [PATCH] Revert "Improve FIPS RSA keygen performance."
This reverts commit 3431dd4b3ee7933822586aab62972de4d8c0e9e5.
---
crypto/bn/bn_prime.c | 11 --------
crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c | 49 ++++++------------------------------
include/crypto/bn.h | 2 --
3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c b/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
index 79776f1ce5..ddd31a0252 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
@@ -252,17 +252,6 @@ int ossl_bn_check_prime(const BIGNUM *w, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx,
return bn_is_prime_int(w, checks, ctx, do_trial_division, cb);
}
-/*
- * Use this only for key generation.
- * It always uses trial division. The number of checks
- * (MR rounds) passed in is used without being clamped to a minimum value.
- */
-int ossl_bn_check_generated_prime(const BIGNUM *w, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx,
- BN_GENCB *cb)
-{
- return bn_is_prime_int(w, checks, ctx, 1, cb);
-}
-
int BN_check_prime(const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb)
{
return ossl_bn_check_prime(p, 0, ctx, 1, cb);
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c b/crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c
index e9f0d4038c..8a7b2ecf2f 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c
@@ -48,34 +48,6 @@ const BIGNUM ossl_bn_inv_sqrt_2 = {
BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
};
-/*
- * Refer to FIPS 186-5 Table B.1 for minimum rounds of Miller Rabin
- * required for generation of RSA aux primes (p1, p2, q1 and q2).
- */
-static int bn_rsa_fips186_5_aux_prime_MR_rounds(int nbits)
-{
- if (nbits >= 4096)
- return 44;
- if (nbits >= 3072)
- return 41;
- if (nbits >= 2048)
- return 38;
- return 0; /* Error */
-}
-
-/*
- * Refer to FIPS 186-5 Table B.1 for minimum rounds of Miller Rabin
- * required for generation of RSA primes (p and q)
- */
-static int bn_rsa_fips186_5_prime_MR_rounds(int nbits)
-{
- if (nbits >= 3072)
- return 4;
- if (nbits >= 2048)
- return 5;
- return 0; /* Error */
-}
-
/*
* FIPS 186-5 Table A.1. "Min length of auxiliary primes p1, p2, q1, q2".
* (FIPS 186-5 has an entry for >= 4096 bits).
@@ -125,13 +97,11 @@ static int bn_rsa_fips186_5_aux_prime_max_sum_size_for_prob_primes(int nbits)
* Xp1 The passed in starting point to find a probably prime.
* p1 The returned probable prime (first odd integer >= Xp1)
* ctx A BN_CTX object.
- * rounds The number of Miller Rabin rounds
* cb An optional BIGNUM callback.
* Returns: 1 on success otherwise it returns 0.
*/
static int bn_rsa_fips186_4_find_aux_prob_prime(const BIGNUM *Xp1,
BIGNUM *p1, BN_CTX *ctx,
- int rounds,
BN_GENCB *cb)
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -147,7 +117,7 @@ static int bn_rsa_fips186_4_find_aux_prob_prime(const BIGNUM *Xp1,
i++;
BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, i);
/* MR test with trial division */
- tmp = ossl_bn_check_generated_prime(p1, rounds, ctx, cb);
+ tmp = BN_check_prime(p1, ctx, cb);
if (tmp > 0)
break;
if (tmp < 0)
@@ -190,7 +160,7 @@ int ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *Xpout,
{
int ret = 0;
BIGNUM *p1i = NULL, *p2i = NULL, *Xp1i = NULL, *Xp2i = NULL;
- int bitlen, rounds;
+ int bitlen;
if (p == NULL || Xpout == NULL)
return 0;
@@ -207,7 +177,6 @@ int ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *Xpout,
bitlen = bn_rsa_fips186_5_aux_prime_min_size(nlen);
if (bitlen == 0)
goto err;
- rounds = bn_rsa_fips186_5_aux_prime_MR_rounds(nlen);
/* (Steps 4.1/5.1): Randomly generate Xp1 if it is not passed in */
if (Xp1 == NULL) {
@@ -225,8 +194,8 @@ int ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *Xpout,
}
/* (Steps 4.2/5.2) - find first auxiliary probable primes */
- if (!bn_rsa_fips186_4_find_aux_prob_prime(Xp1i, p1i, ctx, rounds, cb)
- || !bn_rsa_fips186_4_find_aux_prob_prime(Xp2i, p2i, ctx, rounds, cb))
+ if (!bn_rsa_fips186_4_find_aux_prob_prime(Xp1i, p1i, ctx, cb)
+ || !bn_rsa_fips186_4_find_aux_prob_prime(Xp2i, p2i, ctx, cb))
goto err;
/* (Table B.1) auxiliary prime Max length check */
if ((BN_num_bits(p1i) + BN_num_bits(p2i)) >=
@@ -274,11 +243,11 @@ err:
*/
int ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_derive_prime(BIGNUM *Y, BIGNUM *X, const BIGNUM *Xin,
const BIGNUM *r1, const BIGNUM *r2,
- int nlen, const BIGNUM *e,
- BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb)
+ int nlen, const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_GENCB *cb)
{
int ret = 0;
- int i, imax, rounds;
+ int i, imax;
int bits = nlen >> 1;
BIGNUM *tmp, *R, *r1r2x2, *y1, *r1x2;
BIGNUM *base, *range;
@@ -348,7 +317,6 @@ int ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_derive_prime(BIGNUM *Y, BIGNUM *X, const BIGNUM *Xin,
* The number has been updated to 20 * nlen/2 as used in
* FIPS186-5 Appendix B.9 Step 9.
*/
- rounds = bn_rsa_fips186_5_prime_MR_rounds(nlen);
imax = 20 * bits; /* max = 20/2 * nbits */
for (;;) {
if (Xin == NULL) {
@@ -378,9 +346,8 @@ int ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_derive_prime(BIGNUM *Y, BIGNUM *X, const BIGNUM *Xin,
if (BN_copy(y1, Y) == NULL
|| !BN_sub_word(y1, 1))
goto err;
-
if (BN_are_coprime(y1, e, ctx)) {
- int rv = ossl_bn_check_generated_prime(Y, rounds, ctx, cb);
+ int rv = BN_check_prime(Y, ctx, cb);
if (rv > 0)
goto end;
diff --git a/include/crypto/bn.h b/include/crypto/bn.h
index 4d11e0e4b1..cf69bea848 100644
--- a/include/crypto/bn.h
+++ b/include/crypto/bn.h
@@ -95,8 +95,6 @@ int bn_div_fixed_top(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,
int ossl_bn_miller_rabin_is_prime(const BIGNUM *w, int iterations, BN_CTX *ctx,
BN_GENCB *cb, int enhanced, int *status);
-int ossl_bn_check_generated_prime(const BIGNUM *w, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx,
- BN_GENCB *cb);
const BIGNUM *ossl_bn_get0_small_factors(void);
--
2.44.0

View File

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
Add default section to load crypto-policies configuration for TLS.
It needs to be reverted before running tests.
---
apps/openssl.cnf | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Index: openssl-3.2.0/apps/openssl.cnf
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.2.0.orig/apps/openssl.cnf
+++ openssl-3.2.0/apps/openssl.cnf
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7
[openssl_init]
providers = provider_sect
+# Load default TLS policy configuration
+ssl_conf = ssl_module
# List of providers to load
[provider_sect]
@@ -71,6 +73,13 @@ default = default_sect
[default_sect]
# activate = 1
+[ ssl_module ]
+
+system_default = crypto_policy
+
+[ crypto_policy ]
+
+.include = /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config
####################################################################
[ ca ]

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
From 3e47a286dc3274bda72a196c3a4030a1fc8302f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rohan McLure <rohanmclure@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2023 16:41:48 +1000
Subject: [PATCH] ec: Use static linkage on nistp521 felem_{square,mul}
wrappers
Runtime selection of implementations for felem_{square,mul} depends on
felem_{square,mul}_wrapper functions, which overwrite function points in
a similar design to that of .plt.got sections used by program loaders
during dynamic linking.
There's no reason why these functions need to have external linkage.
Mark static.
Signed-off-by: Rohan McLure <rohanmclure@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21471)
---
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
index 97815cac1f13..32a9268ecf17 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
@@ -676,8 +676,8 @@ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const largefelem in)
}
#if defined(ECP_NISTP521_ASM)
-void felem_square_wrapper(largefelem out, const felem in);
-void felem_mul_wrapper(largefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2);
+static void felem_square_wrapper(largefelem out, const felem in);
+static void felem_mul_wrapper(largefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2);
static void (*felem_square_p)(largefelem out, const felem in) =
felem_square_wrapper;
@@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ void p521_felem_mul(largefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2);
# include "crypto/ppc_arch.h"
# endif
-void felem_select(void)
+static void felem_select(void)
{
# if defined(_ARCH_PPC64)
if ((OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_MADD300) && (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_ALTIVEC)) {
@@ -707,13 +707,13 @@ void felem_select(void)
felem_mul_p = felem_mul_ref;
}
-void felem_square_wrapper(largefelem out, const felem in)
+static void felem_square_wrapper(largefelem out, const felem in)
{
felem_select();
felem_square_p(out, in);
}
-void felem_mul_wrapper(largefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2)
+static void felem_mul_wrapper(largefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2)
{
felem_select();
felem_mul_p(out, in1, in2);

View File

@@ -1,428 +0,0 @@
From 966047ee13188e8634af25af348940acceb9316d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rohan McLure <rohanmclure@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 31 May 2023 14:32:26 +1000
Subject: [PATCH] ec: powerpc64le: Add asm implementation of felem_{square,mul}
Add an assembly implementation of felem_{square,mul}, which will be
implemented whenever Altivec support is present and the core implements
ISA 3.0 (Power 9) or greater.
Signed-off-by: Rohan McLure <rohanmclure@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21471)
---
crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl | 355 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
crypto/ec/build.info | 6 +-
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c | 9 +
3 files changed, 368 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100755 crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl
diff --git a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..3f86b391af69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,355 @@
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Rohan McLure <rmclure@linux.ibm.com> for the OpenSSL
+# project.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# p384 lower-level primitives for PPC64 using vector instructions.
+#
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+
+my $flavour = shift;
+my $output = "";
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+if (!$output) {
+ $output = "-";
+}
+
+my ($xlate, $dir);
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+my $code = "";
+
+my ($sp, $outp, $savelr, $savesp) = ("r1", "r3", "r10", "r12");
+
+my $vzero = "v32";
+
+sub startproc($)
+{
+ my ($name) = @_;
+
+ $code.=<<___;
+ .globl ${name}
+ .align 5
+${name}:
+
+___
+}
+
+sub endproc($)
+{
+ my ($name) = @_;
+
+ $code.=<<___;
+ blr
+ .size ${name},.-${name}
+
+___
+}
+
+
+sub push_vrs($$)
+{
+ my ($min, $max) = @_;
+
+ my $count = $max - $min + 1;
+
+ $code.=<<___;
+ mr $savesp,$sp
+ stdu $sp,-16*`$count+1`($sp)
+
+___
+ for (my $i = $min; $i <= $max; $i++) {
+ my $mult = $max - $i + 1;
+ $code.=<<___;
+ stxv $i,-16*$mult($savesp)
+___
+
+ }
+
+ $code.=<<___;
+
+___
+}
+
+sub pop_vrs($$)
+{
+ my ($min, $max) = @_;
+
+ $code.=<<___;
+ ld $savesp,0($sp)
+___
+ for (my $i = $min; $i <= $max; $i++) {
+ my $mult = $max - $i + 1;
+ $code.=<<___;
+ lxv $i,-16*$mult($savesp)
+___
+ }
+
+ $code.=<<___;
+ mr $sp,$savesp
+
+___
+}
+
+sub load_vrs($$)
+{
+ my ($pointer, $reg_list) = @_;
+
+ for (my $i = 0; $i <= 6; $i++) {
+ my $offset = $i * 8;
+ $code.=<<___;
+ lxsd $reg_list->[$i],$offset($pointer)
+___
+ }
+
+ $code.=<<___;
+
+___
+}
+
+sub store_vrs($$)
+{
+ my ($pointer, $reg_list) = @_;
+
+ for (my $i = 0; $i <= 12; $i++) {
+ my $offset = $i * 16;
+ $code.=<<___;
+ stxv $reg_list->[$i],$offset($pointer)
+___
+ }
+
+ $code.=<<___;
+
+___
+}
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.machine "any"
+.text
+
+___
+
+{
+ # mul/square common
+ my ($t1, $t2, $t3, $t4) = ("v33", "v34", "v42", "v43");
+ my ($zero, $one) = ("r8", "r9");
+ my $out = "v51";
+
+ {
+ #
+ # p384_felem_mul
+ #
+
+ my ($in1p, $in2p) = ("r4", "r5");
+ my @in1 = map("v$_",(44..50));
+ my @in2 = map("v$_",(35..41));
+
+ startproc("p384_felem_mul");
+
+ push_vrs(52, 63);
+
+ $code.=<<___;
+ vspltisw $vzero,0
+
+___
+
+ load_vrs($in1p, \@in1);
+ load_vrs($in2p, \@in2);
+
+ $code.=<<___;
+ vmsumudm $out,$in1[0],$in2[0],$vzero
+ stxv $out,0($outp)
+
+ xxpermdi $t1,$in1[0],$in1[1],0b00
+ xxpermdi $t2,$in2[1],$in2[0],0b00
+ vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+ stxv $out,16($outp)
+
+ xxpermdi $t2,$in2[2],$in2[1],0b00
+ vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+ vmsumudm $out,$in1[2],$in2[0],$out
+ stxv $out,32($outp)
+
+ xxpermdi $t2,$in2[1],$in2[0],0b00
+ xxpermdi $t3,$in1[2],$in1[3],0b00
+ xxpermdi $t4,$in2[3],$in2[2],0b00
+ vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t4,$vzero
+ vmsumudm $out,$t3,$t2,$out
+ stxv $out,48($outp)
+
+ xxpermdi $t2,$in2[4],$in2[3],0b00
+ xxpermdi $t4,$in2[2],$in2[1],0b00
+ vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+ vmsumudm $out,$t3,$t4,$out
+ vmsumudm $out,$in1[4],$in2[0],$out
+ stxv $out,64($outp)
+
+ xxpermdi $t2,$in2[5],$in2[4],0b00
+ xxpermdi $t4,$in2[3],$in2[2],0b00
+ vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+ vmsumudm $out,$t3,$t4,$out
+ xxpermdi $t4,$in2[1],$in2[0],0b00
+ xxpermdi $t1,$in1[4],$in1[5],0b00
+ vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t4,$out
+ stxv $out,80($outp)
+
+ xxpermdi $t1,$in1[0],$in1[1],0b00
+ xxpermdi $t2,$in2[6],$in2[5],0b00
+ xxpermdi $t4,$in2[4],$in2[3],0b00
+ vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+ vmsumudm $out,$t3,$t4,$out
+ xxpermdi $t2,$in2[2],$in2[1],0b00
+ xxpermdi $t1,$in1[4],$in1[5],0b00
+ vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$out
+ vmsumudm $out,$in1[6],$in2[0],$out
+ stxv $out,96($outp)
+
+ xxpermdi $t1,$in1[1],$in1[2],0b00
+ xxpermdi $t2,$in2[6],$in2[5],0b00
+ xxpermdi $t3,$in1[3],$in1[4],0b00
+ vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+ vmsumudm $out,$t3,$t4,$out
+ xxpermdi $t3,$in2[2],$in2[1],0b00
+ xxpermdi $t1,$in1[5],$in1[6],0b00
+ vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t3,$out
+ stxv $out,112($outp)
+
+ xxpermdi $t1,$in1[2],$in1[3],0b00
+ xxpermdi $t3,$in1[4],$in1[5],0b00
+ vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+ vmsumudm $out,$t3,$t4,$out
+ vmsumudm $out,$in1[6],$in2[2],$out
+ stxv $out,128($outp)
+
+ xxpermdi $t1,$in1[3],$in1[4],0b00
+ vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+ xxpermdi $t1,$in1[5],$in1[6],0b00
+ vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t4,$out
+ stxv $out,144($outp)
+
+ vmsumudm $out,$t3,$t2,$vzero
+ vmsumudm $out,$in1[6],$in2[4],$out
+ stxv $out,160($outp)
+
+ vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+ stxv $out,176($outp)
+
+ vmsumudm $out,$in1[6],$in2[6],$vzero
+ stxv $out,192($outp)
+___
+
+ endproc("p384_felem_mul");
+ }
+
+ {
+ #
+ # p384_felem_square
+ #
+
+ my ($inp) = ("r4");
+ my @in = map("v$_",(44..50));
+ my @inx2 = map("v$_",(35..41));
+
+ startproc("p384_felem_square");
+
+ push_vrs(52, 63);
+
+ $code.=<<___;
+ vspltisw $vzero,0
+
+___
+
+ load_vrs($inp, \@in);
+
+ $code.=<<___;
+ li $zero,0
+ li $one,1
+ mtvsrdd $t1,$one,$zero
+___
+
+ for (my $i = 0; $i <= 6; $i++) {
+ $code.=<<___;
+ vsld $inx2[$i],$in[$i],$t1
+___
+ }
+
+ $code.=<<___;
+ vmsumudm $out,$in[0],$in[0],$vzero
+ stxv $out,0($outp)
+
+ vmsumudm $out,$in[0],$inx2[1],$vzero
+ stxv $out,16($outp)
+
+ vmsumudm $out,$in[0],$inx2[2],$vzero
+ vmsumudm $out,$in[1],$in[1],$out
+ stxv $out,32($outp)
+
+ xxpermdi $t1,$in[0],$in[1],0b00
+ xxpermdi $t2,$inx2[3],$inx2[2],0b00
+ vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+ stxv $out,48($outp)
+
+ xxpermdi $t4,$inx2[4],$inx2[3],0b00
+ vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t4,$vzero
+ vmsumudm $out,$in[2],$in[2],$out
+ stxv $out,64($outp)
+
+ xxpermdi $t2,$inx2[5],$inx2[4],0b00
+ vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+ vmsumudm $out,$in[2],$inx2[3],$out
+ stxv $out,80($outp)
+
+ xxpermdi $t2,$inx2[6],$inx2[5],0b00
+ vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+ vmsumudm $out,$in[2],$inx2[4],$out
+ vmsumudm $out,$in[3],$in[3],$out
+ stxv $out,96($outp)
+
+ xxpermdi $t3,$in[1],$in[2],0b00
+ vmsumudm $out,$t3,$t2,$vzero
+ vmsumudm $out,$in[3],$inx2[4],$out
+ stxv $out,112($outp)
+
+ xxpermdi $t1,$in[2],$in[3],0b00
+ vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+ vmsumudm $out,$in[4],$in[4],$out
+ stxv $out,128($outp)
+
+ xxpermdi $t1,$in[3],$in[4],0b00
+ vmsumudm $out,$t1,$t2,$vzero
+ stxv $out,144($outp)
+
+ vmsumudm $out,$in[4],$inx2[6],$vzero
+ vmsumudm $out,$in[5],$in[5],$out
+ stxv $out,160($outp)
+
+ vmsumudm $out,$in[5],$inx2[6],$vzero
+ stxv $out,176($outp)
+
+ vmsumudm $out,$in[6],$in[6],$vzero
+ stxv $out,192($outp)
+___
+
+ endproc("p384_felem_square");
+ }
+}
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT or die "error closing STDOUT: $!";
diff --git a/crypto/ec/build.info b/crypto/ec/build.info
index 1fa60a1deddd..4077bead7bdb 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/build.info
+++ b/crypto/ec/build.info
@@ -39,8 +39,9 @@ IF[{- !$disabled{asm} -}]
$ECASM_ppc64=ecp_nistz256.c ecp_ppc.c ecp_nistz256-ppc64.s x25519-ppc64.s
$ECDEF_ppc64=ECP_NISTZ256_ASM X25519_ASM
IF[{- !$disabled{'ec_nistp_64_gcc_128'} -}]
- $ECASM_ppc64=$ECASM_ppc64 ecp_nistp521-ppc64.s
- $ECDEF_ppc64=$ECDEF_ppc64 ECP_NISTP521_ASM
+ $ECASM_ppc64=$ECASM_ppc64 ecp_nistp384-ppc64.s ecp_nistp521-ppc64.s
+ $ECDEF_ppc64=$ECDEF_ppc64 ECP_NISTP384_ASM ECP_NISTP521_ASM
+ INCLUDE[ecp_nistp384.o]=..
INCLUDE[ecp_nistp521.o]=..
ENDIF
@@ -119,6 +120,7 @@ GENERATE[ecp_nistz256-armv8.S]=asm/ecp_nistz256-armv8.pl
INCLUDE[ecp_nistz256-armv8.o]=..
GENERATE[ecp_nistz256-ppc64.s]=asm/ecp_nistz256-ppc64.pl
+GENERATE[ecp_nistp384-ppc64.s]=asm/ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl
GENERATE[ecp_nistp521-ppc64.s]=asm/ecp_nistp521-ppc64.pl
GENERATE[x25519-x86_64.s]=asm/x25519-x86_64.pl
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c
index a0559487ed4e..14f9530d07c6 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c
@@ -691,6 +691,15 @@ void p384_felem_mul(widefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2);
static void felem_select(void)
{
+# if defined(_ARCH_PPC64)
+ if ((OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_MADD300) && (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_ALTIVEC)) {
+ felem_square_p = p384_felem_square;
+ felem_mul_p = p384_felem_mul;
+
+ return;
+ }
+# endif
+
/* Default */
felem_square_p = felem_square_ref;
felem_mul_p = felem_mul_ref;

View File

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
From 670e73d9084465384b11ef24802ca4a313e1d2f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rohan McLure <rohanmclure@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2023 15:20:20 +1000
Subject: [PATCH] ecc: Remove extraneous parentheses in secp384r1
Substitutions in the felem_reduce() method feature unecessary
parentheses, remove them.
Signed-off-by: Rohan McLure <rohan.mclure@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21749)
---
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c | 12 ++++++------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c
index 14f9530d07c6..ff68f9cc7ad0 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp384.c
@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const widefelem in)
acc[7] += in[12] >> 8;
acc[6] += (in[12] & 0xff) << 48;
acc[6] -= in[12] >> 16;
- acc[5] -= ((in[12] & 0xffff) << 40);
+ acc[5] -= (in[12] & 0xffff) << 40;
acc[6] += in[12] >> 48;
acc[5] += (in[12] & 0xffffffffffff) << 8;
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const widefelem in)
acc[6] += in[11] >> 8;
acc[5] += (in[11] & 0xff) << 48;
acc[5] -= in[11] >> 16;
- acc[4] -= ((in[11] & 0xffff) << 40);
+ acc[4] -= (in[11] & 0xffff) << 40;
acc[5] += in[11] >> 48;
acc[4] += (in[11] & 0xffffffffffff) << 8;
@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const widefelem in)
acc[5] += in[10] >> 8;
acc[4] += (in[10] & 0xff) << 48;
acc[4] -= in[10] >> 16;
- acc[3] -= ((in[10] & 0xffff) << 40);
+ acc[3] -= (in[10] & 0xffff) << 40;
acc[4] += in[10] >> 48;
acc[3] += (in[10] & 0xffffffffffff) << 8;
@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const widefelem in)
acc[4] += in[9] >> 8;
acc[3] += (in[9] & 0xff) << 48;
acc[3] -= in[9] >> 16;
- acc[2] -= ((in[9] & 0xffff) << 40);
+ acc[2] -= (in[9] & 0xffff) << 40;
acc[3] += in[9] >> 48;
acc[2] += (in[9] & 0xffffffffffff) << 8;
@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const widefelem in)
acc[3] += acc[8] >> 8;
acc[2] += (acc[8] & 0xff) << 48;
acc[2] -= acc[8] >> 16;
- acc[1] -= ((acc[8] & 0xffff) << 40);
+ acc[1] -= (acc[8] & 0xffff) << 40;
acc[2] += acc[8] >> 48;
acc[1] += (acc[8] & 0xffffffffffff) << 8;
@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const widefelem in)
acc[2] += acc[7] >> 8;
acc[1] += (acc[7] & 0xff) << 48;
acc[1] -= acc[7] >> 16;
- acc[0] -= ((acc[7] & 0xffff) << 40);
+ acc[0] -= (acc[7] & 0xffff) << 40;
acc[1] += acc[7] >> 48;
acc[0] += (acc[7] & 0xffffffffffff) << 8;

View File

@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
From 48c763ed9cc889806bc01222382ce6f918a408a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 16:12:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 46/48]
0112-pbdkf2-Set-indicator-if-pkcs5-param-disabled-checks.patch
Patch-name: 0112-pbdkf2-Set-indicator-if-pkcs5-param-disabled-checks.patch
Patch-id: 112
---
providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
index 11820d1e69..bae2238ab5 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
@@ -284,11 +284,42 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
static int kdf_pbkdf2_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx = (KDF_PBKDF2 *)vctx;
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
+
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
+ any_valid = 1;
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR))
+ != NULL) {
+ int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
+
+ /* The lower_bound_checks parameter enables checks required by FIPS. If
+ * those checks are disabled, the PBKDF2 implementation will also
+ * support non-approved parameters (e.g., salt lengths < 16 bytes, see
+ * NIST SP 800-132 section 5.1). */
+ if (!ctx->lower_bound_checks)
+ fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
- return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
- return -2;
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
+ return 0;
+
+ any_valid = 1;
+ }
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+
+ if (!any_valid)
+ return -2;
+
+ return 1;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
@@ -296,6 +327,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SUSE_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
--
2.41.0

View File

@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
From 50f8b936b00dc18ce1f622a7a6aa46daf03da48b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rohan McLure <rohanmclure@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2023 16:52:47 +1000
Subject: [PATCH] powerpc: ecc: Fix stack allocation secp384r1 asm
Assembly acceleration secp384r1 opts to not use any callee-save VSRs, as
VSX enabled systems make extensive use of renaming, and so writebacks in
felem_{mul,square}() can be reordered for best cache effects.
Remove stack allocations. This in turn fixes unmatched push/pops in
felem_{mul,square}().
Signed-off-by: Rohan McLure <rohan.mclure@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21749)
---
crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl | 49 -----------------------------
1 file changed, 49 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl
index 3f86b391af69..28f4168e5218 100755
--- a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl
+++ b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistp384-ppc64.pl
@@ -62,51 +62,6 @@ ($)
___
}
-
-sub push_vrs($$)
-{
- my ($min, $max) = @_;
-
- my $count = $max - $min + 1;
-
- $code.=<<___;
- mr $savesp,$sp
- stdu $sp,-16*`$count+1`($sp)
-
-___
- for (my $i = $min; $i <= $max; $i++) {
- my $mult = $max - $i + 1;
- $code.=<<___;
- stxv $i,-16*$mult($savesp)
-___
-
- }
-
- $code.=<<___;
-
-___
-}
-
-sub pop_vrs($$)
-{
- my ($min, $max) = @_;
-
- $code.=<<___;
- ld $savesp,0($sp)
-___
- for (my $i = $min; $i <= $max; $i++) {
- my $mult = $max - $i + 1;
- $code.=<<___;
- lxv $i,-16*$mult($savesp)
-___
- }
-
- $code.=<<___;
- mr $sp,$savesp
-
-___
-}
-
sub load_vrs($$)
{
my ($pointer, $reg_list) = @_;
@@ -162,8 +117,6 @@ ($$)
startproc("p384_felem_mul");
- push_vrs(52, 63);
-
$code.=<<___;
vspltisw $vzero,0
@@ -268,8 +221,6 @@ ($$)
startproc("p384_felem_square");
- push_vrs(52, 63);
-
$code.=<<___;
vspltisw $vzero,0

View File

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
Index: openssl-3.5.0/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.5.0.orig/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
+++ openssl-3.5.0/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/sslconf.h"
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
@@ -57,6 +58,15 @@ static int alg_module_init(CONF_IMODULE
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_SET_DEFAULT_PROPERTY_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
+ } else if (strcmp(oval->name, "rh-allow-sha1-signatures") == 0) {
+ int m;
+
+ /* Detailed error already reported. */
+ if (!X509V3_get_value_bool(oval, &m))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* NO-OP */
+
} else {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION,
"name=%s, value=%s", oval->name, oval->value);
Index: openssl-3.5.0/doc/man5/config.pod
===================================================================
--- openssl-3.5.0.orig/doc/man5/config.pod
+++ openssl-3.5.0/doc/man5/config.pod
@@ -315,6 +315,21 @@ Within the algorithm properties section,
The value may be anything that is acceptable as a property query
string for EVP_set_default_properties().
+=item B<rh-allow-sha1-signatures> (NOOP)
+
+The value is a boolean that can be B<yes> or B<no>. If the value is not set,
+it behaves as if it was set to B<yes>.
+
+When set to B<no>, any attempt to create or verify a signature with a SHA1
+digest will fail. To test whether your software will work with future versions
+of OpenSSL, set this option to B<no>. This setting also affects TLS, where
+signature algorithms that use SHA1 as digest will no longer be supported if
+this option is set to B<no>. Because TLS 1.1 or lower use MD5-SHA1 as
+pseudorandom function (PRF) to derive key material, disabling
+B<rh-allow-sha1-signatures> requires the use of TLS 1.2 or newer.
+
+This option is not implemented in this build.
+
=item B<fips_mode> (deprecated)
The value is a boolean that can be B<yes> or B<no>. If the value is

View File

@@ -1,929 +0,0 @@
commit 0fbc50ef0cb8894973d4739af62e95be825b7ccf
Author: trigpolynom <trigpolynom@gmail.com>
Date: Tue Oct 17 22:44:45 2023 -0400
aes-gcm-avx512.pl: fix non-reproducibility issue
Replace the random suffix with a counter, to make the
build reproducible.
Fixes #20954
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22415)
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/aes-gcm-avx512.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/aes-gcm-avx512.pl
index afd2af941a..9f9124373b 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/aes-gcm-avx512.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/aes-gcm-avx512.pl
@@ -155,6 +155,9 @@ my $STACK_LOCAL_OFFSET = ($STACK_HKEYS_OFFSET + $HKEYS_STORAGE);
# ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
my ($arg1, $arg2, $arg3, $arg4, $arg5, $arg6, $arg7, $arg8, $arg9, $arg10, $arg11);
+# ; Counter used for assembly label generation
+my $label_count = 0;
+
# ; This implementation follows the convention: for non-leaf functions (they
# ; must call PROLOG) %rbp is used as a frame pointer, and has fixed offset from
# ; the function entry: $GP_STORAGE + [8 bytes alignment (Windows only)]. This
@@ -200,15 +203,6 @@ my $CTX_OFFSET_HTable = (16 * 6); # ; (Htable) Precomputed table (a
# ;;; Helper functions
# ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
-# ; Generates "random" local labels
-sub random_string() {
- my @chars = ('a' .. 'z', 'A' .. 'Z', '0' .. '9', '_');
- my $length = 15;
- my $str;
- map { $str .= $chars[rand(33)] } 1 .. $length;
- return $str;
-}
-
sub BYTE {
my ($reg) = @_;
if ($reg =~ /%r[abcd]x/i) {
@@ -417,7 +411,7 @@ ___
sub EPILOG {
my ($hkeys_storage_on_stack, $payload_len) = @_;
- my $rndsuffix = &random_string();
+ my $label_suffix = $label_count++;
if ($hkeys_storage_on_stack && $CLEAR_HKEYS_STORAGE_ON_EXIT) {
@@ -425,13 +419,13 @@ sub EPILOG {
# ; were stored in the local frame storage
$code .= <<___;
cmpq \$`16*16`,$payload_len
- jbe .Lskip_hkeys_cleanup_${rndsuffix}
+ jbe .Lskip_hkeys_cleanup_${label_suffix}
vpxor %xmm0,%xmm0,%xmm0
___
for (my $i = 0; $i < int($HKEYS_STORAGE / 64); $i++) {
$code .= "vmovdqa64 %zmm0,`$STACK_HKEYS_OFFSET + 64*$i`(%rsp)\n";
}
- $code .= ".Lskip_hkeys_cleanup_${rndsuffix}:\n";
+ $code .= ".Lskip_hkeys_cleanup_${label_suffix}:\n";
}
if ($CLEAR_SCRATCH_REGISTERS) {
@@ -537,11 +531,11 @@ sub precompute_hkeys_on_stack {
&& $HKEYS_RANGE ne "first32"
&& $HKEYS_RANGE ne "last32");
- my $rndsuffix = &random_string();
+ my $label_suffix = $label_count++;
$code .= <<___;
test $HKEYS_READY,$HKEYS_READY
- jnz .L_skip_hkeys_precomputation_${rndsuffix}
+ jnz .L_skip_hkeys_precomputation_${label_suffix}
___
if ($HKEYS_RANGE eq "first16" || $HKEYS_RANGE eq "first32" || $HKEYS_RANGE eq "all") {
@@ -615,7 +609,7 @@ ___
}
}
- $code .= ".L_skip_hkeys_precomputation_${rndsuffix}:\n";
+ $code .= ".L_skip_hkeys_precomputation_${label_suffix}:\n";
}
# ;; =============================================================================
@@ -1418,20 +1412,20 @@ sub CALC_AAD_HASH {
my $SHFMSK = $ZT13;
- my $rndsuffix = &random_string();
+ my $label_suffix = $label_count++;
$code .= <<___;
mov $A_IN,$T1 # ; T1 = AAD
mov $A_LEN,$T2 # ; T2 = aadLen
or $T2,$T2
- jz .L_CALC_AAD_done_${rndsuffix}
+ jz .L_CALC_AAD_done_${label_suffix}
xor $HKEYS_READY,$HKEYS_READY
vmovdqa64 SHUF_MASK(%rip),$SHFMSK
-.L_get_AAD_loop48x16_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_get_AAD_loop48x16_${label_suffix}:
cmp \$`(48*16)`,$T2
- jl .L_exit_AAD_loop48x16_${rndsuffix}
+ jl .L_exit_AAD_loop48x16_${label_suffix}
___
$code .= <<___;
@@ -1499,15 +1493,15 @@ ___
$code .= <<___;
sub \$`(48*16)`,$T2
- je .L_CALC_AAD_done_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_CALC_AAD_done_${label_suffix}
add \$`(48*16)`,$T1
- jmp .L_get_AAD_loop48x16_${rndsuffix}
+ jmp .L_get_AAD_loop48x16_${label_suffix}
-.L_exit_AAD_loop48x16_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_exit_AAD_loop48x16_${label_suffix}:
# ; Less than 48x16 bytes remaining
cmp \$`(32*16)`,$T2
- jl .L_less_than_32x16_${rndsuffix}
+ jl .L_less_than_32x16_${label_suffix}
___
$code .= <<___;
@@ -1556,14 +1550,14 @@ ___
$code .= <<___;
sub \$`(32*16)`,$T2
- je .L_CALC_AAD_done_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_CALC_AAD_done_${label_suffix}
add \$`(32*16)`,$T1
- jmp .L_less_than_16x16_${rndsuffix}
+ jmp .L_less_than_16x16_${label_suffix}
-.L_less_than_32x16_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_less_than_32x16_${label_suffix}:
cmp \$`(16*16)`,$T2
- jl .L_less_than_16x16_${rndsuffix}
+ jl .L_less_than_16x16_${label_suffix}
# ; Get next 16 blocks
vmovdqu64 `64*0`($T1),$ZT1
vmovdqu64 `64*1`($T1),$ZT2
@@ -1588,11 +1582,11 @@ ___
$code .= <<___;
sub \$`(16*16)`,$T2
- je .L_CALC_AAD_done_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_CALC_AAD_done_${label_suffix}
add \$`(16*16)`,$T1
# ; Less than 16x16 bytes remaining
-.L_less_than_16x16_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_less_than_16x16_${label_suffix}:
# ;; prep mask source address
lea byte64_len_to_mask_table(%rip),$T3
lea ($T3,$T2,8),$T3
@@ -1601,28 +1595,28 @@ ___
add \$15,@{[DWORD($T2)]}
shr \$4,@{[DWORD($T2)]}
cmp \$2,@{[DWORD($T2)]}
- jb .L_AAD_blocks_1_${rndsuffix}
- je .L_AAD_blocks_2_${rndsuffix}
+ jb .L_AAD_blocks_1_${label_suffix}
+ je .L_AAD_blocks_2_${label_suffix}
cmp \$4,@{[DWORD($T2)]}
- jb .L_AAD_blocks_3_${rndsuffix}
- je .L_AAD_blocks_4_${rndsuffix}
+ jb .L_AAD_blocks_3_${label_suffix}
+ je .L_AAD_blocks_4_${label_suffix}
cmp \$6,@{[DWORD($T2)]}
- jb .L_AAD_blocks_5_${rndsuffix}
- je .L_AAD_blocks_6_${rndsuffix}
+ jb .L_AAD_blocks_5_${label_suffix}
+ je .L_AAD_blocks_6_${label_suffix}
cmp \$8,@{[DWORD($T2)]}
- jb .L_AAD_blocks_7_${rndsuffix}
- je .L_AAD_blocks_8_${rndsuffix}
+ jb .L_AAD_blocks_7_${label_suffix}
+ je .L_AAD_blocks_8_${label_suffix}
cmp \$10,@{[DWORD($T2)]}
- jb .L_AAD_blocks_9_${rndsuffix}
- je .L_AAD_blocks_10_${rndsuffix}
+ jb .L_AAD_blocks_9_${label_suffix}
+ je .L_AAD_blocks_10_${label_suffix}
cmp \$12,@{[DWORD($T2)]}
- jb .L_AAD_blocks_11_${rndsuffix}
- je .L_AAD_blocks_12_${rndsuffix}
+ jb .L_AAD_blocks_11_${label_suffix}
+ je .L_AAD_blocks_12_${label_suffix}
cmp \$14,@{[DWORD($T2)]}
- jb .L_AAD_blocks_13_${rndsuffix}
- je .L_AAD_blocks_14_${rndsuffix}
+ jb .L_AAD_blocks_13_${label_suffix}
+ je .L_AAD_blocks_14_${label_suffix}
cmp \$15,@{[DWORD($T2)]}
- je .L_AAD_blocks_15_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_AAD_blocks_15_${label_suffix}
___
# ;; fall through for 16 blocks
@@ -1635,7 +1629,7 @@ ___
# ;; - jump to reduction code
for (my $aad_blocks = 16; $aad_blocks > 0; $aad_blocks--) {
- $code .= ".L_AAD_blocks_${aad_blocks}_${rndsuffix}:\n";
+ $code .= ".L_AAD_blocks_${aad_blocks}_${label_suffix}:\n";
if ($aad_blocks > 12) {
$code .= "sub \$`12*16*8`, $T3\n";
} elsif ($aad_blocks > 8) {
@@ -1656,11 +1650,11 @@ ___
if ($aad_blocks > 1) {
# ;; fall through to CALC_AAD_done in 1 block case
- $code .= "jmp .L_CALC_AAD_done_${rndsuffix}\n";
+ $code .= "jmp .L_CALC_AAD_done_${label_suffix}\n";
}
}
- $code .= ".L_CALC_AAD_done_${rndsuffix}:\n";
+ $code .= ".L_CALC_AAD_done_${label_suffix}:\n";
# ;; result in AAD_HASH
}
@@ -1710,13 +1704,13 @@ sub PARTIAL_BLOCK {
my $IA1 = $GPTMP2;
my $IA2 = $GPTMP0;
- my $rndsuffix = &random_string();
+ my $label_suffix = $label_count++;
$code .= <<___;
# ;; if no partial block present then LENGTH/DATA_OFFSET will be set to zero
mov ($PBLOCK_LEN),$LENGTH
or $LENGTH,$LENGTH
- je .L_partial_block_done_${rndsuffix} # ;Leave Macro if no partial blocks
+ je .L_partial_block_done_${label_suffix} # ;Leave Macro if no partial blocks
___
&READ_SMALL_DATA_INPUT($XTMP0, $PLAIN_CIPH_IN, $PLAIN_CIPH_LEN, $IA0, $IA2, $MASKREG);
@@ -1755,9 +1749,9 @@ ___
}
$code .= <<___;
sub \$16,$IA1
- jge .L_no_extra_mask_${rndsuffix}
+ jge .L_no_extra_mask_${label_suffix}
sub $IA1,$IA0
-.L_no_extra_mask_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_no_extra_mask_${label_suffix}:
# ;; get the appropriate mask to mask out bottom $LENGTH bytes of $XTMP1
# ;; - mask out bottom $LENGTH bytes of $XTMP1
# ;; sizeof(SHIFT_MASK) == 16 bytes
@@ -1781,7 +1775,7 @@ ___
}
$code .= <<___;
cmp \$0,$IA1
- jl .L_partial_incomplete_${rndsuffix}
+ jl .L_partial_incomplete_${label_suffix}
___
# ;; GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block
@@ -1793,9 +1787,9 @@ ___
mov $LENGTH,$IA0
mov \$16,$LENGTH
sub $IA0,$LENGTH
- jmp .L_enc_dec_done_${rndsuffix}
+ jmp .L_enc_dec_done_${label_suffix}
-.L_partial_incomplete_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_partial_incomplete_${label_suffix}:
___
if ($win64) {
$code .= <<___;
@@ -1808,7 +1802,7 @@ ___
$code .= <<___;
mov $PLAIN_CIPH_LEN,$LENGTH
-.L_enc_dec_done_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_enc_dec_done_${label_suffix}:
# ;; output encrypted Bytes
lea byte_len_to_mask_table(%rip),$IA0
@@ -1826,7 +1820,7 @@ ___
$code .= <<___;
mov $CIPH_PLAIN_OUT,$IA0
vmovdqu8 $XTMP1,($IA0){$MASKREG}
-.L_partial_block_done_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_partial_block_done_${label_suffix}:
___
}
@@ -2016,7 +2010,7 @@ sub INITIAL_BLOCKS_PARTIAL_GHASH {
my $GM = $_[23]; # [in] ZMM with mid prodcut part
my $GL = $_[24]; # [in] ZMM with lo product part
- my $rndsuffix = &random_string();
+ my $label_suffix = $label_count++;
# ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
# ;;; - Hash all but the last partial block of data
@@ -2034,7 +2028,7 @@ sub INITIAL_BLOCKS_PARTIAL_GHASH {
# ;; NOTE: the 'jl' is always taken for num_initial_blocks = 16.
# ;; This is run in the context of GCM_ENC_DEC_SMALL for length < 256.
cmp \$16,$LENGTH
- jl .L_small_initial_partial_block_${rndsuffix}
+ jl .L_small_initial_partial_block_${label_suffix}
# ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
# ;;; Handle a full length final block - encrypt and hash all blocks
@@ -2056,11 +2050,11 @@ ___
&GHASH_1_TO_16($GCM128_CTX, $HASH_IN_OUT, $ZT0, $ZT1, $ZT2, $ZT3, $ZT4,
$ZT5, $ZT6, $ZT7, $ZT8, &ZWORD($HASH_IN_OUT), $DAT0, $DAT1, $DAT2, $DAT3, $NUM_BLOCKS, $GH, $GM, $GL);
}
- $code .= "jmp .L_small_initial_compute_done_${rndsuffix}\n";
+ $code .= "jmp .L_small_initial_compute_done_${label_suffix}\n";
}
$code .= <<___;
-.L_small_initial_partial_block_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_small_initial_partial_block_${label_suffix}:
# ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
# ;;; Handle ghash for a <16B final block
@@ -2125,7 +2119,7 @@ ___
# ;; a partial block of data, so xor that into the hash.
vpxorq $LAST_GHASH_BLK,$HASH_IN_OUT,$HASH_IN_OUT
# ;; The result is in $HASH_IN_OUT
- jmp .L_after_reduction_${rndsuffix}
+ jmp .L_after_reduction_${label_suffix}
___
}
@@ -2133,7 +2127,7 @@ ___
# ;;; After GHASH reduction
# ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
- $code .= ".L_small_initial_compute_done_${rndsuffix}:\n";
+ $code .= ".L_small_initial_compute_done_${label_suffix}:\n";
# ;; If using init/update/finalize, we need to xor any partial block data
# ;; into the hash.
@@ -2144,13 +2138,13 @@ ___
$code .= <<___;
# ;; NOTE: for $NUM_BLOCKS = 16, $LENGTH, stored in [PBlockLen] is never zero
or $LENGTH,$LENGTH
- je .L_after_reduction_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_after_reduction_${label_suffix}
___
}
$code .= "vpxorq $LAST_GHASH_BLK,$HASH_IN_OUT,$HASH_IN_OUT\n";
}
- $code .= ".L_after_reduction_${rndsuffix}:\n";
+ $code .= ".L_after_reduction_${label_suffix}:\n";
# ;; Final hash is now in HASH_IN_OUT
}
@@ -2266,7 +2260,7 @@ sub GHASH_16_ENCRYPT_N_GHASH_N {
die "GHASH_16_ENCRYPT_N_GHASH_N: num_blocks is out of bounds = $NUM_BLOCKS\n"
if ($NUM_BLOCKS > 16 || $NUM_BLOCKS < 0);
- my $rndsuffix = &random_string();
+ my $label_suffix = $label_count++;
my $GH1H = $HASH_IN_OUT;
@@ -2326,16 +2320,16 @@ ___
$code .= <<___;
cmp \$`(256 - $NUM_BLOCKS)`,@{[DWORD($CTR_CHECK)]}
- jae .L_16_blocks_overflow_${rndsuffix}
+ jae .L_16_blocks_overflow_${label_suffix}
___
&ZMM_OPCODE3_DSTR_SRC1R_SRC2R_BLOCKS_0_16(
$NUM_BLOCKS, "vpaddd", $B00_03, $B04_07, $B08_11, $B12_15, $CTR_BE,
$B00_03, $B04_07, $B08_11, $ADDBE_1234, $ADDBE_4x4, $ADDBE_4x4, $ADDBE_4x4);
$code .= <<___;
- jmp .L_16_blocks_ok_${rndsuffix}
+ jmp .L_16_blocks_ok_${label_suffix}
-.L_16_blocks_overflow_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_16_blocks_overflow_${label_suffix}:
vpshufb $SHFMSK,$CTR_BE,$CTR_BE
vpaddd ddq_add_1234(%rip),$CTR_BE,$B00_03
___
@@ -2355,7 +2349,7 @@ ___
$NUM_BLOCKS, "vpshufb", $B00_03, $B04_07, $B08_11, $B12_15, $B00_03,
$B04_07, $B08_11, $B12_15, $SHFMSK, $SHFMSK, $SHFMSK, $SHFMSK);
$code .= <<___;
-.L_16_blocks_ok_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_16_blocks_ok_${label_suffix}:
# ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
# ;; - pre-load constants
@@ -2805,53 +2799,53 @@ sub GCM_ENC_DEC_LAST {
my $MASKREG = $_[44]; # [clobbered] mask register
my $PBLOCK_LEN = $_[45]; # [in] partial block length
- my $rndsuffix = &random_string();
+ my $label_suffix = $label_count++;
$code .= <<___;
mov @{[DWORD($LENGTH)]},@{[DWORD($IA0)]}
add \$15,@{[DWORD($IA0)]}
shr \$4,@{[DWORD($IA0)]}
- je .L_last_num_blocks_is_0_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_last_num_blocks_is_0_${label_suffix}
cmp \$8,@{[DWORD($IA0)]}
- je .L_last_num_blocks_is_8_${rndsuffix}
- jb .L_last_num_blocks_is_7_1_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_last_num_blocks_is_8_${label_suffix}
+ jb .L_last_num_blocks_is_7_1_${label_suffix}
cmp \$12,@{[DWORD($IA0)]}
- je .L_last_num_blocks_is_12_${rndsuffix}
- jb .L_last_num_blocks_is_11_9_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_last_num_blocks_is_12_${label_suffix}
+ jb .L_last_num_blocks_is_11_9_${label_suffix}
# ;; 16, 15, 14 or 13
cmp \$15,@{[DWORD($IA0)]}
- je .L_last_num_blocks_is_15_${rndsuffix}
- ja .L_last_num_blocks_is_16_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_last_num_blocks_is_15_${label_suffix}
+ ja .L_last_num_blocks_is_16_${label_suffix}
cmp \$14,@{[DWORD($IA0)]}
- je .L_last_num_blocks_is_14_${rndsuffix}
- jmp .L_last_num_blocks_is_13_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_last_num_blocks_is_14_${label_suffix}
+ jmp .L_last_num_blocks_is_13_${label_suffix}
-.L_last_num_blocks_is_11_9_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_last_num_blocks_is_11_9_${label_suffix}:
# ;; 11, 10 or 9
cmp \$10,@{[DWORD($IA0)]}
- je .L_last_num_blocks_is_10_${rndsuffix}
- ja .L_last_num_blocks_is_11_${rndsuffix}
- jmp .L_last_num_blocks_is_9_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_last_num_blocks_is_10_${label_suffix}
+ ja .L_last_num_blocks_is_11_${label_suffix}
+ jmp .L_last_num_blocks_is_9_${label_suffix}
-.L_last_num_blocks_is_7_1_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_last_num_blocks_is_7_1_${label_suffix}:
cmp \$4,@{[DWORD($IA0)]}
- je .L_last_num_blocks_is_4_${rndsuffix}
- jb .L_last_num_blocks_is_3_1_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_last_num_blocks_is_4_${label_suffix}
+ jb .L_last_num_blocks_is_3_1_${label_suffix}
# ;; 7, 6 or 5
cmp \$6,@{[DWORD($IA0)]}
- ja .L_last_num_blocks_is_7_${rndsuffix}
- je .L_last_num_blocks_is_6_${rndsuffix}
- jmp .L_last_num_blocks_is_5_${rndsuffix}
+ ja .L_last_num_blocks_is_7_${label_suffix}
+ je .L_last_num_blocks_is_6_${label_suffix}
+ jmp .L_last_num_blocks_is_5_${label_suffix}
-.L_last_num_blocks_is_3_1_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_last_num_blocks_is_3_1_${label_suffix}:
# ;; 3, 2 or 1
cmp \$2,@{[DWORD($IA0)]}
- ja .L_last_num_blocks_is_3_${rndsuffix}
- je .L_last_num_blocks_is_2_${rndsuffix}
+ ja .L_last_num_blocks_is_3_${label_suffix}
+ je .L_last_num_blocks_is_2_${label_suffix}
___
# ;; fall through for `jmp .L_last_num_blocks_is_1`
@@ -2859,7 +2853,7 @@ ___
# ;; Use rep to generate different block size variants
# ;; - one block size has to be the first one
for my $num_blocks (1 .. 16) {
- $code .= ".L_last_num_blocks_is_${num_blocks}_${rndsuffix}:\n";
+ $code .= ".L_last_num_blocks_is_${num_blocks}_${label_suffix}:\n";
&GHASH_16_ENCRYPT_N_GHASH_N(
$AES_KEYS, $GCM128_CTX, $CIPH_PLAIN_OUT, $PLAIN_CIPH_IN, $DATA_OFFSET,
$LENGTH, $CTR_BE, $CTR_CHECK, $HASHKEY_OFFSET, $GHASHIN_BLK_OFFSET,
@@ -2872,10 +2866,10 @@ ___
$ENC_DEC, $HASH_IN_OUT, $IA0, $IA1, $MASKREG,
$num_blocks, $PBLOCK_LEN);
- $code .= "jmp .L_last_blocks_done_${rndsuffix}\n";
+ $code .= "jmp .L_last_blocks_done_${label_suffix}\n";
}
- $code .= ".L_last_num_blocks_is_0_${rndsuffix}:\n";
+ $code .= ".L_last_num_blocks_is_0_${label_suffix}:\n";
# ;; if there is 0 blocks to cipher then there are only 16 blocks for ghash and reduction
# ;; - convert mid into end_reduce
@@ -2891,7 +2885,7 @@ ___
$GHASHIN_BLK_OFFSET, 0, "%rsp", $HASHKEY_OFFSET, 0, $HASH_IN_OUT, $ZT00, $ZT01,
$ZT02, $ZT03, $ZT04, $ZT05, $ZT06, $ZT07, $ZT08, $ZT09);
- $code .= ".L_last_blocks_done_${rndsuffix}:\n";
+ $code .= ".L_last_blocks_done_${label_suffix}:\n";
}
# ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
@@ -2985,20 +2979,20 @@ sub GHASH_16_ENCRYPT_16_PARALLEL {
my $GHDAT1 = $ZT21;
my $GHDAT2 = $ZT22;
- my $rndsuffix = &random_string();
+ my $label_suffix = $label_count++;
# ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
# ;; prepare counter blocks
$code .= <<___;
cmpb \$`(256 - 16)`,@{[BYTE($CTR_CHECK)]}
- jae .L_16_blocks_overflow_${rndsuffix}
+ jae .L_16_blocks_overflow_${label_suffix}
vpaddd $ADDBE_1234,$CTR_BE,$B00_03
vpaddd $ADDBE_4x4,$B00_03,$B04_07
vpaddd $ADDBE_4x4,$B04_07,$B08_11
vpaddd $ADDBE_4x4,$B08_11,$B12_15
- jmp .L_16_blocks_ok_${rndsuffix}
-.L_16_blocks_overflow_${rndsuffix}:
+ jmp .L_16_blocks_ok_${label_suffix}
+.L_16_blocks_overflow_${label_suffix}:
vpshufb $SHFMSK,$CTR_BE,$CTR_BE
vmovdqa64 ddq_add_4444(%rip),$B12_15
vpaddd ddq_add_1234(%rip),$CTR_BE,$B00_03
@@ -3009,7 +3003,7 @@ sub GHASH_16_ENCRYPT_16_PARALLEL {
vpshufb $SHFMSK,$B04_07,$B04_07
vpshufb $SHFMSK,$B08_11,$B08_11
vpshufb $SHFMSK,$B12_15,$B12_15
-.L_16_blocks_ok_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_16_blocks_ok_${label_suffix}:
___
# ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
@@ -3338,25 +3332,25 @@ sub ENCRYPT_SINGLE_BLOCK {
my $XMM0 = $_[1]; # ; [in/out]
my $GPR1 = $_[2]; # ; [clobbered]
- my $rndsuffix = &random_string();
+ my $label_suffix = $label_count++;
$code .= <<___;
# ; load number of rounds from AES_KEY structure (offset in bytes is
# ; size of the |rd_key| buffer)
mov `4*15*4`($AES_KEY),@{[DWORD($GPR1)]}
cmp \$9,@{[DWORD($GPR1)]}
- je .Laes_128_${rndsuffix}
+ je .Laes_128_${label_suffix}
cmp \$11,@{[DWORD($GPR1)]}
- je .Laes_192_${rndsuffix}
+ je .Laes_192_${label_suffix}
cmp \$13,@{[DWORD($GPR1)]}
- je .Laes_256_${rndsuffix}
- jmp .Lexit_aes_${rndsuffix}
+ je .Laes_256_${label_suffix}
+ jmp .Lexit_aes_${label_suffix}
___
for my $keylen (sort keys %aes_rounds) {
my $nr = $aes_rounds{$keylen};
$code .= <<___;
.align 32
-.Laes_${keylen}_${rndsuffix}:
+.Laes_${keylen}_${label_suffix}:
___
$code .= "vpxorq `16*0`($AES_KEY),$XMM0, $XMM0\n\n";
for (my $i = 1; $i <= $nr; $i++) {
@@ -3364,10 +3358,10 @@ ___
}
$code .= <<___;
vaesenclast `16*($nr+1)`($AES_KEY),$XMM0,$XMM0
- jmp .Lexit_aes_${rndsuffix}
+ jmp .Lexit_aes_${label_suffix}
___
}
- $code .= ".Lexit_aes_${rndsuffix}:\n\n";
+ $code .= ".Lexit_aes_${label_suffix}:\n\n";
}
sub CALC_J0 {
@@ -3562,52 +3556,52 @@ sub GCM_ENC_DEC_SMALL {
my $SHUFMASK = $_[29]; # [in] ZMM with BE/LE shuffle mask
my $PBLOCK_LEN = $_[30]; # [in] partial block length
- my $rndsuffix = &random_string();
+ my $label_suffix = $label_count++;
$code .= <<___;
cmp \$8,$NUM_BLOCKS
- je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_8_${rndsuffix}
- jl .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_7_1_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_8_${label_suffix}
+ jl .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_7_1_${label_suffix}
cmp \$12,$NUM_BLOCKS
- je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_12_${rndsuffix}
- jl .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_11_9_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_12_${label_suffix}
+ jl .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_11_9_${label_suffix}
# ;; 16, 15, 14 or 13
cmp \$16,$NUM_BLOCKS
- je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_16_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_16_${label_suffix}
cmp \$15,$NUM_BLOCKS
- je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_15_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_15_${label_suffix}
cmp \$14,$NUM_BLOCKS
- je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_14_${rndsuffix}
- jmp .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_13_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_14_${label_suffix}
+ jmp .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_13_${label_suffix}
-.L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_11_9_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_11_9_${label_suffix}:
# ;; 11, 10 or 9
cmp \$11,$NUM_BLOCKS
- je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_11_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_11_${label_suffix}
cmp \$10,$NUM_BLOCKS
- je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_10_${rndsuffix}
- jmp .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_9_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_10_${label_suffix}
+ jmp .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_9_${label_suffix}
-.L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_7_1_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_7_1_${label_suffix}:
cmp \$4,$NUM_BLOCKS
- je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_4_${rndsuffix}
- jl .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_3_1_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_4_${label_suffix}
+ jl .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_3_1_${label_suffix}
# ;; 7, 6 or 5
cmp \$7,$NUM_BLOCKS
- je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_7_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_7_${label_suffix}
cmp \$6,$NUM_BLOCKS
- je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_6_${rndsuffix}
- jmp .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_5_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_6_${label_suffix}
+ jmp .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_5_${label_suffix}
-.L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_3_1_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_3_1_${label_suffix}:
# ;; 3, 2 or 1
cmp \$3,$NUM_BLOCKS
- je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_3_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_3_${label_suffix}
cmp \$2,$NUM_BLOCKS
- je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_2_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_2_${label_suffix}
# ;; for $NUM_BLOCKS == 1, just fall through and no 'jmp' needed
@@ -3616,7 +3610,7 @@ sub GCM_ENC_DEC_SMALL {
___
for (my $num_blocks = 1; $num_blocks <= 16; $num_blocks++) {
- $code .= ".L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_${num_blocks}_${rndsuffix}:\n";
+ $code .= ".L_small_initial_num_blocks_is_${num_blocks}_${label_suffix}:\n";
&INITIAL_BLOCKS_PARTIAL(
$AES_KEYS, $GCM128_CTX, $CIPH_PLAIN_OUT, $PLAIN_CIPH_IN, $LENGTH, $DATA_OFFSET,
$num_blocks, $CTR, $HASH_IN_OUT, $ENC_DEC, $ZTMP0, $ZTMP1,
@@ -3625,11 +3619,11 @@ ___
$ZTMP14, $IA0, $IA1, $MASKREG, $SHUFMASK, $PBLOCK_LEN);
if ($num_blocks != 16) {
- $code .= "jmp .L_small_initial_blocks_encrypted_${rndsuffix}\n";
+ $code .= "jmp .L_small_initial_blocks_encrypted_${label_suffix}\n";
}
}
- $code .= ".L_small_initial_blocks_encrypted_${rndsuffix}:\n";
+ $code .= ".L_small_initial_blocks_encrypted_${label_suffix}:\n";
}
# ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
@@ -3710,7 +3704,7 @@ sub GCM_ENC_DEC {
my $MASKREG = "%k1";
- my $rndsuffix = &random_string();
+ my $label_suffix = $label_count++;
# ;; reduction every 48 blocks, depth 32 blocks
# ;; @note 48 blocks is the maximum capacity of the stack frame
@@ -3751,7 +3745,7 @@ sub GCM_ENC_DEC {
} else {
$code .= "or $PLAIN_CIPH_LEN,$PLAIN_CIPH_LEN\n";
}
- $code .= "je .L_enc_dec_done_${rndsuffix}\n";
+ $code .= "je .L_enc_dec_done_${label_suffix}\n";
# Length value from context $CTX_OFFSET_InLen`($GCM128_CTX) is updated in
# 'providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_gcm_hw_vaes_avx512.inc'
@@ -3778,12 +3772,12 @@ sub GCM_ENC_DEC {
# ;; There may be no more data if it was consumed in the partial block.
$code .= <<___;
sub $DATA_OFFSET,$LENGTH
- je .L_enc_dec_done_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_enc_dec_done_${label_suffix}
___
$code .= <<___;
cmp \$`(16 * 16)`,$LENGTH
- jbe .L_message_below_equal_16_blocks_${rndsuffix}
+ jbe .L_message_below_equal_16_blocks_${label_suffix}
vmovdqa64 SHUF_MASK(%rip),$SHUF_MASK
vmovdqa64 ddq_addbe_4444(%rip),$ADDBE_4x4
@@ -3815,7 +3809,7 @@ ___
$code .= <<___;
cmp \$`(32 * 16)`,$LENGTH
- jb .L_message_below_32_blocks_${rndsuffix}
+ jb .L_message_below_32_blocks_${label_suffix}
___
# ;; ==== AES-CTR - next 16 blocks
@@ -3836,13 +3830,13 @@ ___
sub \$`(32 * 16)`,$LENGTH
cmp \$`($big_loop_nblocks * 16)`,$LENGTH
- jb .L_no_more_big_nblocks_${rndsuffix}
+ jb .L_no_more_big_nblocks_${label_suffix}
___
# ;; ====
# ;; ==== AES-CTR + GHASH - 48 blocks loop
# ;; ====
- $code .= ".L_encrypt_big_nblocks_${rndsuffix}:\n";
+ $code .= ".L_encrypt_big_nblocks_${label_suffix}:\n";
# ;; ==== AES-CTR + GHASH - 16 blocks, start
$aesout_offset = ($STACK_LOCAL_OFFSET + (32 * 16));
@@ -3893,15 +3887,15 @@ ___
add \$`($big_loop_nblocks * 16)`,$DATA_OFFSET
sub \$`($big_loop_nblocks * 16)`,$LENGTH
cmp \$`($big_loop_nblocks * 16)`,$LENGTH
- jae .L_encrypt_big_nblocks_${rndsuffix}
+ jae .L_encrypt_big_nblocks_${label_suffix}
-.L_no_more_big_nblocks_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_no_more_big_nblocks_${label_suffix}:
cmp \$`(32 * 16)`,$LENGTH
- jae .L_encrypt_32_blocks_${rndsuffix}
+ jae .L_encrypt_32_blocks_${label_suffix}
cmp \$`(16 * 16)`,$LENGTH
- jae .L_encrypt_16_blocks_${rndsuffix}
+ jae .L_encrypt_16_blocks_${label_suffix}
___
# ;; =====================================================
@@ -3909,7 +3903,7 @@ ___
# ;; ==== GHASH 1 x 16 blocks
# ;; ==== GHASH 1 x 16 blocks (reduction) & encrypt N blocks
# ;; ==== then GHASH N blocks
- $code .= ".L_encrypt_0_blocks_ghash_32_${rndsuffix}:\n";
+ $code .= ".L_encrypt_0_blocks_ghash_32_${label_suffix}:\n";
# ;; calculate offset to the right hash key
$code .= <<___;
@@ -3937,7 +3931,7 @@ ___
$IA0, $IA5, $MASKREG, $PBLOCK_LEN);
$code .= "vpshufb @{[XWORD($SHUF_MASK)]},$CTR_BLOCKx,$CTR_BLOCKx\n";
- $code .= "jmp .L_ghash_done_${rndsuffix}\n";
+ $code .= "jmp .L_ghash_done_${label_suffix}\n";
# ;; =====================================================
# ;; =====================================================
@@ -3946,7 +3940,7 @@ ___
# ;; ==== GHASH 1 x 16 blocks (reduction)
# ;; ==== GHASH 1 x 16 blocks (reduction) & encrypt N blocks
# ;; ==== then GHASH N blocks
- $code .= ".L_encrypt_32_blocks_${rndsuffix}:\n";
+ $code .= ".L_encrypt_32_blocks_${label_suffix}:\n";
# ;; ==== AES-CTR + GHASH - 16 blocks, start
$aesout_offset = ($STACK_LOCAL_OFFSET + (32 * 16));
@@ -4007,7 +4001,7 @@ ___
$IA0, $IA5, $MASKREG, $PBLOCK_LEN);
$code .= "vpshufb @{[XWORD($SHUF_MASK)]},$CTR_BLOCKx,$CTR_BLOCKx\n";
- $code .= "jmp .L_ghash_done_${rndsuffix}\n";
+ $code .= "jmp .L_ghash_done_${label_suffix}\n";
# ;; =====================================================
# ;; =====================================================
@@ -4015,7 +4009,7 @@ ___
# ;; ==== GHASH 1 x 16 blocks
# ;; ==== GHASH 1 x 16 blocks (reduction) & encrypt N blocks
# ;; ==== then GHASH N blocks
- $code .= ".L_encrypt_16_blocks_${rndsuffix}:\n";
+ $code .= ".L_encrypt_16_blocks_${label_suffix}:\n";
# ;; ==== AES-CTR + GHASH - 16 blocks, start
$aesout_offset = ($STACK_LOCAL_OFFSET + (32 * 16));
@@ -4059,9 +4053,9 @@ ___
$code .= "vpshufb @{[XWORD($SHUF_MASK)]},$CTR_BLOCKx,$CTR_BLOCKx\n";
$code .= <<___;
- jmp .L_ghash_done_${rndsuffix}
+ jmp .L_ghash_done_${label_suffix}
-.L_message_below_32_blocks_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_message_below_32_blocks_${label_suffix}:
# ;; 32 > number of blocks > 16
sub \$`(16 * 16)`,$LENGTH
@@ -4094,9 +4088,9 @@ ___
$code .= "vpshufb @{[XWORD($SHUF_MASK)]},$CTR_BLOCKx,$CTR_BLOCKx\n";
$code .= <<___;
- jmp .L_ghash_done_${rndsuffix}
+ jmp .L_ghash_done_${label_suffix}
-.L_message_below_equal_16_blocks_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_message_below_equal_16_blocks_${label_suffix}:
# ;; Determine how many blocks to process
# ;; - process one additional block if there is a partial block
mov @{[DWORD($LENGTH)]},@{[DWORD($IA1)]}
@@ -4113,13 +4107,13 @@ ___
# ;; fall through to exit
- $code .= ".L_ghash_done_${rndsuffix}:\n";
+ $code .= ".L_ghash_done_${label_suffix}:\n";
# ;; save the last counter block
$code .= "vmovdqu64 $CTR_BLOCKx,`$CTX_OFFSET_CurCount`($GCM128_CTX)\n";
$code .= <<___;
vmovdqu64 $AAD_HASHx,`$CTX_OFFSET_AadHash`($GCM128_CTX)
-.L_enc_dec_done_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_enc_dec_done_${label_suffix}:
___
}
@@ -4155,7 +4149,7 @@ sub INITIAL_BLOCKS_16 {
my $B08_11 = $T7;
my $B12_15 = $T8;
- my $rndsuffix = &random_string();
+ my $label_suffix = $label_count++;
my $stack_offset = $BLK_OFFSET;
$code .= <<___;
@@ -4163,13 +4157,13 @@ sub INITIAL_BLOCKS_16 {
# ;; prepare counter blocks
cmpb \$`(256 - 16)`,@{[BYTE($CTR_CHECK)]}
- jae .L_next_16_overflow_${rndsuffix}
+ jae .L_next_16_overflow_${label_suffix}
vpaddd $ADDBE_1234,$CTR,$B00_03
vpaddd $ADDBE_4x4,$B00_03,$B04_07
vpaddd $ADDBE_4x4,$B04_07,$B08_11
vpaddd $ADDBE_4x4,$B08_11,$B12_15
- jmp .L_next_16_ok_${rndsuffix}
-.L_next_16_overflow_${rndsuffix}:
+ jmp .L_next_16_ok_${label_suffix}
+.L_next_16_overflow_${label_suffix}:
vpshufb $SHUF_MASK,$CTR,$CTR
vmovdqa64 ddq_add_4444(%rip),$B12_15
vpaddd ddq_add_1234(%rip),$CTR,$B00_03
@@ -4180,7 +4174,7 @@ sub INITIAL_BLOCKS_16 {
vpshufb $SHUF_MASK,$B04_07,$B04_07
vpshufb $SHUF_MASK,$B08_11,$B08_11
vpshufb $SHUF_MASK,$B12_15,$B12_15
-.L_next_16_ok_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_next_16_ok_${label_suffix}:
vshufi64x2 \$0b11111111,$B12_15,$B12_15,$CTR
addb \$16,@{[BYTE($CTR_CHECK)]}
# ;; === load 16 blocks of data
@@ -4264,7 +4258,7 @@ sub GCM_COMPLETE {
my $GCM128_CTX = $_[0];
my $PBLOCK_LEN = $_[1];
- my $rndsuffix = &random_string();
+ my $label_suffix = $label_count++;
$code .= <<___;
vmovdqu @{[HashKeyByIdx(1,$GCM128_CTX)]},%xmm2
@@ -4276,14 +4270,14 @@ ___
# ;; Process the final partial block.
cmp \$0,$PBLOCK_LEN
- je .L_partial_done_${rndsuffix}
+ je .L_partial_done_${label_suffix}
___
# ;GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block
&GHASH_MUL("%xmm4", "%xmm2", "%xmm0", "%xmm16", "%xmm17");
$code .= <<___;
-.L_partial_done_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_partial_done_${label_suffix}:
vmovq `$CTX_OFFSET_InLen`($GCM128_CTX), %xmm5
vpinsrq \$1, `$CTX_OFFSET_AadLen`($GCM128_CTX), %xmm5, %xmm5 # ; xmm5 = len(A)||len(C)
vpsllq \$3, %xmm5, %xmm5 # ; convert bytes into bits
@@ -4297,7 +4291,7 @@ ___
vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip),%xmm4,%xmm4 # ; perform a 16Byte swap
vpxor %xmm4,%xmm3,%xmm3
-.L_return_T_${rndsuffix}:
+.L_return_T_${label_suffix}:
vmovdqu %xmm3,`$CTX_OFFSET_AadHash`($GCM128_CTX)
___
}