Pedro Monreal Gonzalez
8c598ed63d
* Add openssl-3-disable-hmac-hw-acceleration-with-engine-digest.patch * Add openssl-3-fix-hmac-digest-detection-s390x.patch * Add openssl-3-fix-memleak-s390x_HMAC_CTX_copy.patch - Add hardware acceleration for full AES-XTS jsc#PED-10273 * Add openssl-3-hw-acceleration-aes-xts-s390x.patch - Support MSA 12 SHA3 on s390x jsc#PED-10280 * Add openssl-3-add_EVP_DigestSqueeze_api.patch * Add openssl-3-support-multiple-sha3_squeeze_s390x.patch * Add openssl-3-add-xof-state-handling-s3_absorb.patch * Add openssl-3-fix-state-handling-sha3_absorb_s390x.patch * Add openssl-3-fix-state-handling-sha3_final_s390x.patch * Add openssl-3-fix-state-handling-shake_final_s390x.patch * Add openssl-3-fix-state-handling-keccak_final_s390x.patch * Add openssl-3-support-EVP_DigestSqueeze-in-digest-prov-s390x.patch * Add openssl-3-add-defines-CPACF-funcs.patch * Add openssl-3-add-hw-acceleration-hmac.patch * Add openssl-3-support-CPACF-sha3-shake-perf-improvement.patch * Add openssl-3-fix-s390x_sha3_absorb.patch * Add openssl-3-fix-s390x_shake_squeeze.patch - Update to 3.2.3: * Changes between 3.2.2 and 3.2.3: - Fixed possible denial of service in X.509 name checks. [CVE-2024-6119] - Fixed possible buffer overread in SSL_select_next_proto(). [CVE-2024-5535] * Changes between 3.2.1 and 3.2.2: - Fixed potential use after free after SSL_free_buffers() is called. [CVE-2024-4741] - Fixed an issue where checking excessively long DSA keys or parameters may OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=121
138 lines
5.4 KiB
Diff
138 lines
5.4 KiB
Diff
Index: openssl-3.2.3/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c
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===================================================================
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--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c
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+++ openssl-3.2.3/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c
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@@ -23,7 +23,14 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_entropy(ossl_unused
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size_t entropy_available;
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RAND_POOL *pool;
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- pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
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+ /*
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+ * OpenSSL still implements an internal entropy pool of
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+ * some size that is hashed to get seed data.
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+ * Note that this is a conditioning step for which SP800-90C requires
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+ * 64 additional bits from the entropy source to claim the requested
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+ * amount of entropy.
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+ */
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+ pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy + 64, 1, min_len, max_len);
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if (pool == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
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return 0;
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Index: openssl-3.2.3/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
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===================================================================
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--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
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+++ openssl-3.2.3/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
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@@ -723,15 +723,7 @@ EVP_RAND_CTX *RAND_get0_primary(OSSL_LIB
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return ret;
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}
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-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
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- if (dgbl->seed == NULL) {
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- ERR_set_mark();
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- dgbl->seed = rand_new_seed(ctx);
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- ERR_pop_to_mark();
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- }
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-#endif
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-
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- ret = dgbl->primary = rand_new_drbg(ctx, dgbl->seed,
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+ ret = dgbl->primary = rand_new_drbg(ctx, NULL,
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PRIMARY_RESEED_INTERVAL,
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PRIMARY_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL, 1);
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/*
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Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c
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===================================================================
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--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c
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+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c
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@@ -133,7 +133,11 @@ size_t ossl_crngt_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG
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* to the nearest byte. If the entropy is of less than full quality,
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* the amount required should be scaled up appropriately here.
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*/
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- bytes_needed = (entropy + 7) / 8;
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+ /*
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+ * FIPS 140-3: the yet draft SP800-90C requires requested entropy
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+ * + 128 bits during initial seeding
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+ */
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+ bytes_needed = (entropy + 128 + 7) / 8;
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if (bytes_needed < min_len)
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bytes_needed = min_len;
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if (bytes_needed > max_len)
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Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c
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===================================================================
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--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c
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+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c
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@@ -569,6 +569,9 @@ static int ossl_prov_drbg_reseed_unlocke
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#endif
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}
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+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
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+ prediction_resistance = 1;
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+#endif
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/* Reseed using our sources in addition */
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entropylen = get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
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drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen,
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@@ -690,8 +693,14 @@ int ossl_prov_drbg_generate(PROV_DRBG *d
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reseed_required = 1;
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}
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if (drbg->parent != NULL
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- && get_parent_reseed_count(drbg) != drbg->parent_reseed_counter)
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+ && get_parent_reseed_count(drbg) != drbg->parent_reseed_counter) {
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+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
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+ /* SUSE patches provide chain reseeding when necessary so just sync counters*/
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+ drbg->parent_reseed_counter = get_parent_reseed_count(drbg);
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+#else
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reseed_required = 1;
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+#endif
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+ }
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if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) {
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if (!ossl_prov_drbg_reseed_unlocked(drbg, prediction_resistance, NULL,
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Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h
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===================================================================
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--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h
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+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h
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@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
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*
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* The value is in bytes.
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*/
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-#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ 16
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+#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ 32
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/*
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* Maximum input size for the DRBG (entropy, nonce, personalization string)
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Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c
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===================================================================
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--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c
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+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c
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@@ -102,7 +102,14 @@ static int seed_src_generate(void *vseed
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return 0;
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}
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- pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(strength, 1, outlen, outlen);
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+ /*
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+ * OpenSSL still implements an internal entropy pool of
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+ * some size that is hashed to get seed data.
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+ * Note that this is a conditioning step for which SP800-90C requires
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+ * 64 additional bits from the entropy source to claim the requested
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+ * amount of entropy.
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+ */
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+ pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(strength + 64, 1, outlen, outlen);
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if (pool == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
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return 0;
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@@ -182,7 +189,14 @@ static size_t seed_get_seed(void *vseed,
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size_t i;
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RAND_POOL *pool;
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- pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
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+ /*
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+ * OpenSSL still implements an internal entropy pool of
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+ * some size that is hashed to get seed data.
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+ * Note that this is a conditioning step for which SP800-90C requires
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+ * 64 additional bits from the entropy source to claim the requested
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+ * amount of entropy.
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+ */
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+ pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy + 64, 1, min_len, max_len);
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if (pool == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
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return 0;
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