Pedro Monreal Gonzalez
6bc57d937f
* SHA-1 is not allowed anymore in FIPS 186-5 for signature
verification operations. After 12/31/2030, NIST will disallow
SHA-1 for all of its usages.
* Add openssl-3-FIPS-Deny-SHA-1-sigver-in-FIPS-provider.patch
- FIPS: RSA keygen PCT requirements.
* Skip the rsa_keygen_pairwise_test() PCT in rsa_keygen() as the
self-test requirements are covered by do_rsa_pct() for both
RSA-OAEP and RSA signatures [bsc#1221760]
* Enforce error state if rsa_keygen PCT is run and fails [bsc#1221753]
* Add openssl-3-FIPS-PCT_rsa_keygen.patch
- FIPS: Check that the fips provider is available before setting
it as the default provider in FIPS mode. [bsc#1220523]
* Rebase openssl-Force-FIPS.patch
- FIPS: Port openssl to use jitterentropy [bsc#1220523]
* Set the module in error state if the jitter RNG fails either on
initialization or entropy gathering because health tests failed.
* Add jitterentropy as a seeding source output also in crypto/info.c
* Move the jitter entropy collector and the associated lock out
of the header file to avoid redefinitions.
* Add the fips_local.cnf symlink to the spec file. This simlink
points to the openssl_fips.config file that is provided by the
crypto-policies package.
* Rebase openssl-3-jitterentropy-3.4.0.patch
* Rebase openssl-FIPS-enforce-EMS-support.patch
- FIPS: Block non-Approved Elliptic Curves [bsc#1221786]
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=110
17 lines
697 B
Diff
17 lines
697 B
Diff
Index: openssl-3.1.4/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
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===================================================================
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--- openssl-3.1.4.orig/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
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+++ openssl-3.1.4/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
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@@ -405,7 +405,10 @@ int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair(con
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return 0;
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}
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/* (Step 3.b): check the modulus */
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- if (nbits != BN_num_bits(rsa->n)) {
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+ /* If nBits is not a positive even integer, output an indication of an
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+ * invalid key pair, and exit without further processing.
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+ */
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+ if (nbits <= 0 || nbits % 2 || nbits != BN_num_bits(rsa->n)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR);
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return 0;
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}
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