Pedro Monreal Gonzalez
8c598ed63d
* Add openssl-3-disable-hmac-hw-acceleration-with-engine-digest.patch
* Add openssl-3-fix-hmac-digest-detection-s390x.patch
* Add openssl-3-fix-memleak-s390x_HMAC_CTX_copy.patch
- Add hardware acceleration for full AES-XTS jsc#PED-10273
* Add openssl-3-hw-acceleration-aes-xts-s390x.patch
- Support MSA 12 SHA3 on s390x jsc#PED-10280
* Add openssl-3-add_EVP_DigestSqueeze_api.patch
* Add openssl-3-support-multiple-sha3_squeeze_s390x.patch
* Add openssl-3-add-xof-state-handling-s3_absorb.patch
* Add openssl-3-fix-state-handling-sha3_absorb_s390x.patch
* Add openssl-3-fix-state-handling-sha3_final_s390x.patch
* Add openssl-3-fix-state-handling-shake_final_s390x.patch
* Add openssl-3-fix-state-handling-keccak_final_s390x.patch
* Add openssl-3-support-EVP_DigestSqueeze-in-digest-prov-s390x.patch
* Add openssl-3-add-defines-CPACF-funcs.patch
* Add openssl-3-add-hw-acceleration-hmac.patch
* Add openssl-3-support-CPACF-sha3-shake-perf-improvement.patch
* Add openssl-3-fix-s390x_sha3_absorb.patch
* Add openssl-3-fix-s390x_shake_squeeze.patch
- Update to 3.2.3:
* Changes between 3.2.2 and 3.2.3:
- Fixed possible denial of service in X.509 name checks. [CVE-2024-6119]
- Fixed possible buffer overread in SSL_select_next_proto(). [CVE-2024-5535]
* Changes between 3.2.1 and 3.2.2:
- Fixed potential use after free after SSL_free_buffers() is called. [CVE-2024-4741]
- Fixed an issue where checking excessively long DSA keys or parameters may
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=121
67 lines
3.0 KiB
Diff
67 lines
3.0 KiB
Diff
From 915990e450e769e370fcacbfd8ed58ab6afaf2bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
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Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 15:47:55 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 39/48]
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0084-pbkdf2-Set-minimum-password-length-of-8-bytes.patch
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Patch-name: 0084-pbkdf2-Set-minimum-password-length-of-8-bytes.patch
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Patch-id: 84
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---
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providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
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1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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Index: openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
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===================================================================
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--- openssl-3.2.3.orig/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
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+++ openssl-3.2.3/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
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@@ -35,6 +35,21 @@
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#define KDF_PBKDF2_MAX_KEY_LEN_DIGEST_RATIO 0xFFFFFFFF
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#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS 1000
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#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN (128 / 8)
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+/* The Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 says in section D.N
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+ * "Password-Based Key Derivation for Storage Applications" that "the vendor
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+ * shall document in the module’s Security Policy the length of
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+ * a password/passphrase used in key derivation and establish an upper bound
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+ * for the probability of having this parameter guessed at random. This
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+ * probability shall take into account not only the length of the
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+ * password/passphrase, but also the difficulty of guessing it. The decision on
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+ * the minimum length of a password used for key derivation is the vendor’s,
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+ * but the vendor shall at a minimum informally justify the decision."
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+ *
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+ * We are choosing a minimum password length of 8 bytes, because NIST's ACVP
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+ * testing uses passwords as short as 8 bytes, and requiring longer passwords
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+ * combined with an implicit indicator (i.e., returning an error) would cause
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+ * the module to fail ACVP testing. */
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+#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN (8)
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static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_new;
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static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_dupctx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_dup;
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@@ -215,9 +230,15 @@ static int kdf_pbkdf2_set_ctx_params(voi
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ctx->lower_bound_checks = pkcs5 == 0;
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}
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- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL)
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+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL) {
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+ if (ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0
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+ && p->data_size < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN) {
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+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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if (!pbkdf2_set_membuf(&ctx->pass, &ctx->pass_len, p))
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return 0;
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+ }
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if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL) {
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if (ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0
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@@ -327,6 +348,10 @@ static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pas
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}
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if (lower_bound_checks) {
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+ if (passlen < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN) {
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+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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if ((keylen * 8) < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
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return 0;
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