Pedro Monreal Gonzalez
6e95485a74
* Major changes between OpenSSL 3.1.6 and OpenSSL 3.1.7 [3 Sep 2024]
- Fixed possible denial of service in X.509 name checks (CVE-2024-6119)
- Fixed possible buffer overread in SSL_select_next_proto()
(CVE-2024-5535)
* Major changes between OpenSSL 3.1.5 and OpenSSL 3.1.6 [4 Jun 2024]
- Fixed potential use after free after SSL_free_buffers() is
called (CVE-2024-4741)
- Fixed an issue where checking excessively long DSA keys or
parameters may be very slow (CVE-2024-4603)
- Fixed unbounded memory growth with session handling in TLSv1.3
(CVE-2024-2511)
* Major changes between OpenSSL 3.1.4 and OpenSSL 3.1.5 [30 Jan 2024]
- Fixed PKCS12 Decoding crashes (CVE-2024-0727)
- Fixed Excessive time spent checking invalid RSA public keys
[CVE-2023-6237)
- Fixed POLY1305 MAC implementation corrupting vector registers
on PowerPC CPUs which support PowerISA 2.07 (CVE-2023-6129)
- Fix excessive time spent in DH check / generation with large
Q parameter value (CVE-2023-5678)
* Update openssl.keyring with BA5473A2B0587B07FB27CF2D216094DFD0CB81EF
* Rebase patches:
- openssl-Force-FIPS.patch
- openssl-FIPS-embed-hmac.patch
- openssl-FIPS-services-minimize.patch
- openssl-FIPS-RSA-disable-shake.patch
- openssl-CVE-2023-50782.patch
* Remove patches fixed in the update:
- openssl-Improve-performance-for-6x-unrolling-with-vpermxor-i.patch
- openssl-CVE-2024-6119.patch openssl-CVE-2024-5535.patch
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=119
70 lines
3.0 KiB
Diff
70 lines
3.0 KiB
Diff
From 915990e450e769e370fcacbfd8ed58ab6afaf2bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
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Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 15:47:55 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 39/48]
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0084-pbkdf2-Set-minimum-password-length-of-8-bytes.patch
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Patch-name: 0084-pbkdf2-Set-minimum-password-length-of-8-bytes.patch
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Patch-id: 84
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---
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providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
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1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
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index 349c3dd657..11820d1e69 100644
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--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
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+++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
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@@ -35,6 +35,21 @@
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#define KDF_PBKDF2_MAX_KEY_LEN_DIGEST_RATIO 0xFFFFFFFF
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#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS 1000
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#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN (128 / 8)
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+/* The Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 says in section D.N
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+ * "Password-Based Key Derivation for Storage Applications" that "the vendor
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+ * shall document in the module’s Security Policy the length of
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+ * a password/passphrase used in key derivation and establish an upper bound
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+ * for the probability of having this parameter guessed at random. This
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+ * probability shall take into account not only the length of the
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+ * password/passphrase, but also the difficulty of guessing it. The decision on
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+ * the minimum length of a password used for key derivation is the vendor’s,
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+ * but the vendor shall at a minimum informally justify the decision."
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+ *
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+ * We are choosing a minimum password length of 8 bytes, because NIST's ACVP
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+ * testing uses passwords as short as 8 bytes, and requiring longer passwords
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+ * combined with an implicit indicator (i.e., returning an error) would cause
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+ * the module to fail ACVP testing. */
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+#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN (20)
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static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_new;
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static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_dupctx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_dup;
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@@ -219,9 +234,15 @@ static int kdf_pbkdf2_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
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ctx->lower_bound_checks = pkcs5 == 0;
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}
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- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL)
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+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL) {
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+ if (ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0
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+ && p->data_size < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN) {
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+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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if (!pbkdf2_set_membuf(&ctx->pass, &ctx->pass_len, p))
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return 0;
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+ }
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if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL) {
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if (ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0
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@@ -331,6 +352,10 @@ static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
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}
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if (lower_bound_checks) {
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+ if (passlen < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN) {
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+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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if ((keylen * 8) < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
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return 0;
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--
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2.41.0
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