Pedro Monreal Gonzalez
6bc57d937f
* SHA-1 is not allowed anymore in FIPS 186-5 for signature
verification operations. After 12/31/2030, NIST will disallow
SHA-1 for all of its usages.
* Add openssl-3-FIPS-Deny-SHA-1-sigver-in-FIPS-provider.patch
- FIPS: RSA keygen PCT requirements.
* Skip the rsa_keygen_pairwise_test() PCT in rsa_keygen() as the
self-test requirements are covered by do_rsa_pct() for both
RSA-OAEP and RSA signatures [bsc#1221760]
* Enforce error state if rsa_keygen PCT is run and fails [bsc#1221753]
* Add openssl-3-FIPS-PCT_rsa_keygen.patch
- FIPS: Check that the fips provider is available before setting
it as the default provider in FIPS mode. [bsc#1220523]
* Rebase openssl-Force-FIPS.patch
- FIPS: Port openssl to use jitterentropy [bsc#1220523]
* Set the module in error state if the jitter RNG fails either on
initialization or entropy gathering because health tests failed.
* Add jitterentropy as a seeding source output also in crypto/info.c
* Move the jitter entropy collector and the associated lock out
of the header file to avoid redefinitions.
* Add the fips_local.cnf symlink to the spec file. This simlink
points to the openssl_fips.config file that is provided by the
crypto-policies package.
* Rebase openssl-3-jitterentropy-3.4.0.patch
* Rebase openssl-FIPS-enforce-EMS-support.patch
- FIPS: Block non-Approved Elliptic Curves [bsc#1221786]
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-3?expand=0&rev=110
70 lines
3.0 KiB
Diff
70 lines
3.0 KiB
Diff
From 915990e450e769e370fcacbfd8ed58ab6afaf2bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||
From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
|
||
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 15:47:55 +0200
|
||
Subject: [PATCH 39/48]
|
||
0084-pbkdf2-Set-minimum-password-length-of-8-bytes.patch
|
||
|
||
Patch-name: 0084-pbkdf2-Set-minimum-password-length-of-8-bytes.patch
|
||
Patch-id: 84
|
||
---
|
||
providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
|
||
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||
|
||
diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
|
||
index 349c3dd657..11820d1e69 100644
|
||
--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
|
||
+++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
|
||
@@ -35,6 +35,21 @@
|
||
#define KDF_PBKDF2_MAX_KEY_LEN_DIGEST_RATIO 0xFFFFFFFF
|
||
#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS 1000
|
||
#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN (128 / 8)
|
||
+/* The Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 says in section D.N
|
||
+ * "Password-Based Key Derivation for Storage Applications" that "the vendor
|
||
+ * shall document in the module’s Security Policy the length of
|
||
+ * a password/passphrase used in key derivation and establish an upper bound
|
||
+ * for the probability of having this parameter guessed at random. This
|
||
+ * probability shall take into account not only the length of the
|
||
+ * password/passphrase, but also the difficulty of guessing it. The decision on
|
||
+ * the minimum length of a password used for key derivation is the vendor’s,
|
||
+ * but the vendor shall at a minimum informally justify the decision."
|
||
+ *
|
||
+ * We are choosing a minimum password length of 8 bytes, because NIST's ACVP
|
||
+ * testing uses passwords as short as 8 bytes, and requiring longer passwords
|
||
+ * combined with an implicit indicator (i.e., returning an error) would cause
|
||
+ * the module to fail ACVP testing. */
|
||
+#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN (20)
|
||
|
||
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_new;
|
||
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_dupctx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_dup;
|
||
@@ -219,9 +234,15 @@ static int kdf_pbkdf2_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
||
ctx->lower_bound_checks = pkcs5 == 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL)
|
||
+ if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL) {
|
||
+ if (ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0
|
||
+ && p->data_size < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN) {
|
||
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||
+ return 0;
|
||
+ }
|
||
if (!pbkdf2_set_membuf(&ctx->pass, &ctx->pass_len, p))
|
||
return 0;
|
||
+ }
|
||
|
||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL) {
|
||
if (ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0
|
||
@@ -331,6 +352,10 @@ static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (lower_bound_checks) {
|
||
+ if (passlen < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN) {
|
||
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||
+ return 0;
|
||
+ }
|
||
if ((keylen * 8) < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS) {
|
||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
|
||
return 0;
|
||
--
|
||
2.41.0
|
||
|