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Accepting request 1197437 from devel:languages:python:Factory

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- Add CVE-2024-8088-inf-loop-zipfile_Path.patch to prevent
  malformed payload to cause infinite loops in zipfile.Path
  (bsc#1229704, CVE-2024-8088).

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1197437
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/python310?expand=0&rev=48
This commit is contained in:
Dominique Leuenberger 2024-08-30 11:29:22 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
commit b05afb7bf2
3 changed files with 147 additions and 0 deletions
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136
CVE-2024-8088-inf-loop-zipfile_Path.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
---
Lib/test/test_zipfile.py | 75 ++++++++++
Lib/zipfile.py | 10 +
Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-08-11-14-08-04.gh-issue-122905.7tDsxA.rst | 1
Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-08-26-13-45-20.gh-issue-123270.gXHvNJ.rst | 3
4 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/Lib/test/test_zipfile.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_zipfile.py
@@ -3280,6 +3280,81 @@ with zipfile.ZipFile(io.BytesIO(), "w")
zipfile.Path(zf)
zf.extractall(source_path.parent)
+ def test_malformed_paths(self):
+ """
+ Path should handle malformed paths gracefully.
+
+ Paths with leading slashes are not visible.
+
+ Paths with dots are treated like regular files.
+ """
+ data = io.BytesIO()
+ zf = zipfile.ZipFile(data, "w")
+ zf.writestr("../parent.txt", b"content")
+ zf.filename = ''
+ root = zipfile.Path(zf)
+ assert list(map(str, root.iterdir())) == ['../']
+ assert root.joinpath('..').joinpath('parent.txt').read_bytes() == b'content'
+
+ def test_unsupported_names(self):
+ """
+ Path segments with special characters are readable.
+
+ On some platforms or file systems, characters like
+ ``:`` and ``?`` are not allowed, but they are valid
+ in the zip file.
+ """
+ data = io.BytesIO()
+ zf = zipfile.ZipFile(data, "w")
+ zf.writestr("path?", b"content")
+ zf.writestr("V: NMS.flac", b"fLaC...")
+ zf.filename = ''
+ root = zipfile.Path(zf)
+ contents = root.iterdir()
+ assert next(contents).name == 'path?'
+ assert next(contents).name == 'V: NMS.flac'
+ assert root.joinpath('V: NMS.flac').read_bytes() == b"fLaC..."
+
+ def test_backslash_not_separator(self):
+ """
+ In a zip file, backslashes are not separators.
+ """
+ data = io.BytesIO()
+ zf = zipfile.ZipFile(data, "w")
+ zf.writestr(DirtyZipInfo.for_name("foo\\bar", zf), b"content")
+ zf.filename = ''
+ root = zipfile.Path(zf)
+ (first,) = root.iterdir()
+ assert not first.is_dir()
+ assert first.name == 'foo\\bar'
+
+
+class DirtyZipInfo(zipfile.ZipInfo):
+ """
+ Bypass name sanitization.
+ """
+
+ def __init__(self, filename, *args, **kwargs):
+ super().__init__(filename, *args, **kwargs)
+ self.filename = filename
+
+ @classmethod
+ def for_name(cls, name, archive):
+ """
+ Construct the same way that ZipFile.writestr does.
+
+ TODO: extract this functionality and re-use
+ """
+ self = cls(filename=name, date_time=time.localtime(time.time())[:6])
+ self.compress_type = archive.compression
+ self.compress_level = archive.compresslevel
+ if self.filename.endswith('/'): # pragma: no cover
+ self.external_attr = 0o40775 << 16 # drwxrwxr-x
+ self.external_attr |= 0x10 # MS-DOS directory flag
+ else:
+ self.external_attr = 0o600 << 16 # ?rw-------
+ return self
+
class StripExtraTests(unittest.TestCase):
# Note: all of the "z" characters are technically invalid, but up
--- a/Lib/zipfile.py
+++ b/Lib/zipfile.py
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import io
import itertools
import os
import posixpath
+import re
import shutil
import stat
import struct
@@ -2151,7 +2152,7 @@ def _parents(path):
def _ancestry(path):
"""
Given a path with elements separated by
- posixpath.sep, generate all elements of that path
+ posixpath.sep, generate all elements of that path.
>>> list(_ancestry('b/d'))
['b/d', 'b']
@@ -2163,9 +2164,14 @@ def _ancestry(path):
['b']
>>> list(_ancestry(''))
[]
+
+ Multiple separators are treated like a single.
+
+ >>> list(_ancestry('//b//d///f//'))
+ ['//b//d///f', '//b//d', '//b']
"""
path = path.rstrip(posixpath.sep)
- while path and path != posixpath.sep:
+ while path.rstrip(posixpath.sep):
yield path
path, tail = posixpath.split(path)
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-08-11-14-08-04.gh-issue-122905.7tDsxA.rst
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+:class:`zipfile.Path` objects now sanitize names from the zipfile.
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-08-26-13-45-20.gh-issue-123270.gXHvNJ.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Applied a more surgical fix for malformed payloads in :class:`zipfile.Path`
+causing infinite loops (gh-122905) without breaking contents using
+legitimate characters.

7
python310.changes
View File

@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Wed Aug 28 16:54:34 UTC 2024 - Matej Cepl <mcepl@cepl.eu>
- Add CVE-2024-8088-inf-loop-zipfile_Path.patch to prevent
malformed payload to cause infinite loops in zipfile.Path
(bsc#1229704, CVE-2024-8088).
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Wed Aug 7 13:40:44 UTC 2024 - Matej Cepl <mcepl@cepl.eu>

4
python310.spec
View File

@ -209,6 +209,9 @@ Patch24: bso1227999-reproducible-builds.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2024-6923-email-hdr-inject.patch bsc#1228780 mcepl@suse.com
# prevent email header injection, patch from gh#python/cpython!122608
Patch25: CVE-2024-6923-email-hdr-inject.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2024-8088-inf-loop-zipfile_Path.patch bsc#1229704 mcepl@suse.com
# avoid denial of service in zipfile
Patch26: CVE-2024-8088-inf-loop-zipfile_Path.patch
BuildRequires: autoconf-archive
BuildRequires: automake
BuildRequires: fdupes
@ -489,6 +492,7 @@ other applications.
%patch -p1 -P 23
%patch -p1 -P 24
%patch -p1 -P 25
%patch -p1 -P 26
# drop Autoconf version requirement
sed -i 's/^AC_PREREQ/dnl AC_PREREQ/' configure.ac