Matej Cepl
00fe94daed
CVE-2022-45061 (bsc#1205244) allowing DoS by IDNA decoding extremely long domain names. OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/devel:languages:python:Factory/python310?expand=0&rev=66
89 lines
4.1 KiB
Diff
89 lines
4.1 KiB
Diff
From b8f89940de09a51fdbd8fe4705d3d1d7f1bb0c6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
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<31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
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Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2022 18:57:10 -0800
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Subject: [PATCH] [3.11] gh-98433: Fix quadratic time idna decoding. (GH-99092)
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(GH-99222)
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There was an unnecessary quadratic loop in idna decoding. This restores
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the behavior to linear.
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(cherry picked from commit d315722564927c7202dd6e111dc79eaf14240b0d)
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(cherry picked from commit a6f6c3a3d6f2b580f2d87885c9b8a9350ad7bf15)
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Co-authored-by: Miss Islington (bot) <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
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Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org>
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---
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Lib/encodings/idna.py | 32 ++++------
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Lib/test/test_codecs.py | 6 +
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Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst | 6 +
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3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
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create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst
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--- a/Lib/encodings/idna.py
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+++ b/Lib/encodings/idna.py
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@@ -39,23 +39,21 @@ def nameprep(label):
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# Check bidi
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RandAL = [stringprep.in_table_d1(x) for x in label]
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- for c in RandAL:
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- if c:
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- # There is a RandAL char in the string. Must perform further
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- # tests:
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- # 1) The characters in section 5.8 MUST be prohibited.
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- # This is table C.8, which was already checked
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- # 2) If a string contains any RandALCat character, the string
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- # MUST NOT contain any LCat character.
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- if any(stringprep.in_table_d2(x) for x in label):
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- raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 2")
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-
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- # 3) If a string contains any RandALCat character, a
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- # RandALCat character MUST be the first character of the
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- # string, and a RandALCat character MUST be the last
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- # character of the string.
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- if not RandAL[0] or not RandAL[-1]:
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- raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 3")
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+ if any(RandAL):
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+ # There is a RandAL char in the string. Must perform further
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+ # tests:
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+ # 1) The characters in section 5.8 MUST be prohibited.
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+ # This is table C.8, which was already checked
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+ # 2) If a string contains any RandALCat character, the string
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+ # MUST NOT contain any LCat character.
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+ if any(stringprep.in_table_d2(x) for x in label):
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+ raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 2")
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+ # 3) If a string contains any RandALCat character, a
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+ # RandALCat character MUST be the first character of the
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+ # string, and a RandALCat character MUST be the last
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+ # character of the string.
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+ if not RandAL[0] or not RandAL[-1]:
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+ raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 3")
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return label
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--- a/Lib/test/test_codecs.py
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+++ b/Lib/test/test_codecs.py
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@@ -1534,6 +1534,12 @@ class IDNACodecTest(unittest.TestCase):
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self.assertEqual("pyth\xf6n.org".encode("idna"), b"xn--pythn-mua.org")
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self.assertEqual("pyth\xf6n.org.".encode("idna"), b"xn--pythn-mua.org.")
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+ def test_builtin_decode_length_limit(self):
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+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(UnicodeError, "too long"):
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+ (b"xn--016c"+b"a"*1100).decode("idna")
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+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(UnicodeError, "too long"):
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+ (b"xn--016c"+b"a"*70).decode("idna")
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+
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def test_stream(self):
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r = codecs.getreader("idna")(io.BytesIO(b"abc"))
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r.read(3)
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--- /dev/null
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+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst
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@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
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+The IDNA codec decoder used on DNS hostnames by :mod:`socket` or :mod:`asyncio`
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+related name resolution functions no longer involves a quadratic algorithm.
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+This prevents a potential CPU denial of service if an out-of-spec excessive
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+length hostname involving bidirectional characters were decoded. Some protocols
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+such as :mod:`urllib` http ``3xx`` redirects potentially allow for an attacker
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+to supply such a name.
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