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Accepting request 1201476 from devel:languages:python:Factory

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OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1201476
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/python38?expand=0&rev=54
This commit is contained in:
Ana Guerrero 2024-09-17 16:18:12 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
commit 387acaaa01
13 changed files with 146 additions and 1683 deletions
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462
CVE-2023-27043-email-parsing-errors.patch
View File

@ -1,462 +0,0 @@
---
Doc/library/email.utils.rst | 19 -
Lib/email/utils.py | 151 +++++++-
Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py | 187 +++++++++-
Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2023-10-20-15-28-08.gh-issue-102988.dStNO7.rst | 8
4 files changed, 344 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
--- a/Doc/library/email.utils.rst
+++ b/Doc/library/email.utils.rst
@@ -60,13 +60,18 @@ of the new API.
begins with angle brackets, they are stripped off.
-.. function:: parseaddr(address)
+.. function:: parseaddr(address, *, strict=True)
Parse address -- which should be the value of some address-containing field such
as :mailheader:`To` or :mailheader:`Cc` -- into its constituent *realname* and
*email address* parts. Returns a tuple of that information, unless the parse
fails, in which case a 2-tuple of ``('', '')`` is returned.
+ If *strict* is true, use a strict parser which rejects malformed inputs.
+
+ .. versionchanged:: 3.13
+ Add *strict* optional parameter and reject malformed inputs by default.
+
.. function:: formataddr(pair, charset='utf-8')
@@ -84,12 +89,15 @@ of the new API.
Added the *charset* option.
-.. function:: getaddresses(fieldvalues)
+.. function:: getaddresses(fieldvalues, *, strict=True)
This method returns a list of 2-tuples of the form returned by ``parseaddr()``.
*fieldvalues* is a sequence of header field values as might be returned by
- :meth:`Message.get_all <email.message.Message.get_all>`. Here's a simple
- example that gets all the recipients of a message::
+ :meth:`Message.get_all <email.message.Message.get_all>`.
+
+ If *strict* is true, use a strict parser which rejects malformed inputs.
+
+ Here's a simple example that gets all the recipients of a message::
from email.utils import getaddresses
@@ -99,6 +107,9 @@ of the new API.
resent_ccs = msg.get_all('resent-cc', [])
all_recipients = getaddresses(tos + ccs + resent_tos + resent_ccs)
+ .. versionchanged:: 3.13
+ Add *strict* optional parameter and reject malformed inputs by default.
+
.. function:: parsedate(date)
--- a/Lib/email/utils.py
+++ b/Lib/email/utils.py
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ TICK = "'"
specialsre = re.compile(r'[][\\()<>@,:;".]')
escapesre = re.compile(r'[\\"]')
+
def _has_surrogates(s):
"""Return True if s contains surrogate-escaped binary data."""
# This check is based on the fact that unless there are surrogates, utf8
@@ -105,13 +106,128 @@ def formataddr(pair, charset='utf-8'):
return '%s%s%s <%s>' % (quotes, name, quotes, address)
return address
+
+def _iter_escaped_chars(addr):
+ pos = 0
+ escape = False
+ for pos, ch in enumerate(addr):
+ if escape:
+ yield (pos, '\\' + ch)
+ escape = False
+ elif ch == '\\':
+ escape = True
+ else:
+ yield (pos, ch)
+ if escape:
+ yield (pos, '\\')
+
+
+def _strip_quoted_realnames(addr):
+ """Strip real names between quotes."""
+ if '"' not in addr:
+ # Fast path
+ return addr
+
+ start = 0
+ open_pos = None
+ result = []
+ for pos, ch in _iter_escaped_chars(addr):
+ if ch == '"':
+ if open_pos is None:
+ open_pos = pos
+ else:
+ if start != open_pos:
+ result.append(addr[start:open_pos])
+ start = pos + 1
+ open_pos = None
+
+ if start < len(addr):
+ result.append(addr[start:])
+
+ return ''.join(result)
+
+
+supports_strict_parsing = True
+def getaddresses(fieldvalues, *, strict=True):
+ """Return a list of (REALNAME, EMAIL) or ('','') for each fieldvalue.
-def getaddresses(fieldvalues):
- """Return a list of (REALNAME, EMAIL) for each fieldvalue."""
- all = COMMASPACE.join(fieldvalues)
- a = _AddressList(all)
- return a.addresslist
+ When parsing fails for a fieldvalue, a 2-tuple of ('', '') is returned in
+ its place.
+
+ If strict is true, use a strict parser which rejects malformed inputs.
+ """
+
+ # If strict is true, if the resulting list of parsed addresses is greater
+ # than the number of fieldvalues in the input list, a parsing error has
+ # occurred and consequently a list containing a single empty 2-tuple [('',
+ # '')] is returned in its place. This is done to avoid invalid output.
+ #
+ # Malformed input: getaddresses(['alice@example.com <bob@example.com>'])
+ # Invalid output: [('', 'alice@example.com'), ('', 'bob@example.com')]
+ # Safe output: [('', '')]
+
+ if not strict:
+ all = COMMASPACE.join(str(v) for v in fieldvalues)
+ a = _AddressList(all)
+ return a.addresslist
+
+ fieldvalues = [str(v) for v in fieldvalues]
+ fieldvalues = _pre_parse_validation(fieldvalues)
+ addr = COMMASPACE.join(fieldvalues)
+ a = _AddressList(addr)
+ result = _post_parse_validation(a.addresslist)
+
+ # Treat output as invalid if the number of addresses is not equal to the
+ # expected number of addresses.
+ n = 0
+ for v in fieldvalues:
+ # When a comma is used in the Real Name part it is not a deliminator.
+ # So strip those out before counting the commas.
+ v = _strip_quoted_realnames(v)
+ # Expected number of addresses: 1 + number of commas
+ n += 1 + v.count(',')
+ if len(result) != n:
+ return [('', '')]
+
+ return result
+
+
+def _check_parenthesis(addr):
+ # Ignore parenthesis in quoted real names.
+ addr = _strip_quoted_realnames(addr)
+
+ opens = 0
+ for pos, ch in _iter_escaped_chars(addr):
+ if ch == '(':
+ opens += 1
+ elif ch == ')':
+ opens -= 1
+ if opens < 0:
+ return False
+ return (opens == 0)
+
+
+def _pre_parse_validation(email_header_fields):
+ accepted_values = []
+ for v in email_header_fields:
+ if not _check_parenthesis(v):
+ v = "('', '')"
+ accepted_values.append(v)
+
+ return accepted_values
+
+
+def _post_parse_validation(parsed_email_header_tuples):
+ accepted_values = []
+ # The parser would have parsed a correctly formatted domain-literal
+ # The existence of an [ after parsing indicates a parsing failure
+ for v in parsed_email_header_tuples:
+ if '[' in v[1]:
+ v = ('', '')
+ accepted_values.append(v)
+
+ return accepted_values
def _format_timetuple_and_zone(timetuple, zone):
@@ -202,16 +318,33 @@ def parsedate_to_datetime(data):
tzinfo=datetime.timezone(datetime.timedelta(seconds=tz)))
-def parseaddr(addr):
+def parseaddr(addr, *, strict=True):
"""
Parse addr into its constituent realname and email address parts.
Return a tuple of realname and email address, unless the parse fails, in
which case return a 2-tuple of ('', '').
+
+ If strict is True, use a strict parser which rejects malformed inputs.
"""
- addrs = _AddressList(addr).addresslist
- if not addrs:
- return '', ''
+ if not strict:
+ addrs = _AddressList(addr).addresslist
+ if not addrs:
+ return ('', '')
+ return addrs[0]
+
+ if isinstance(addr, list):
+ addr = addr[0]
+
+ if not isinstance(addr, str):
+ return ('', '')
+
+ addr = _pre_parse_validation([addr])[0]
+ addrs = _post_parse_validation(_AddressList(addr).addresslist)
+
+ if not addrs or len(addrs) > 1:
+ return ('', '')
+
return addrs[0]
--- a/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ from unittest.mock import patch
import email
import email.policy
+import email.utils
from email.charset import Charset
from email.header import Header, decode_header, make_header
@@ -3248,15 +3249,137 @@ Foo
[('Al Person', 'aperson@dom.ain'),
('Bud Person', 'bperson@dom.ain')])
+ def test_parsing_errors(self):
+ """Test for parsing errors from CVE-2023-27043 and CVE-2019-16056"""
+ alice = 'alice@example.org'
+ bob = 'bob@example.com'
+ empty = ('', '')
+
+ # Test utils.getaddresses() and utils.parseaddr() on malformed email
+ # addresses: default behavior (strict=True) rejects malformed address,
+ # and strict=False which tolerates malformed address.
+ for invalid_separator, expected_non_strict in (
+ ('(', [(f'<{bob}>', alice)]),
+ (')', [('', alice), empty, ('', bob)]),
+ ('<', [('', alice), empty, ('', bob), empty]),
+ ('>', [('', alice), empty, ('', bob)]),
+ ('[', [('', f'{alice}[<{bob}>]')]),
+ (']', [('', alice), empty, ('', bob)]),
+ ('@', [empty, empty, ('', bob)]),
+ (';', [('', alice), empty, ('', bob)]),
+ (':', [('', alice), ('', bob)]),
+ ('.', [('', alice + '.'), ('', bob)]),
+ ('"', [('', alice), ('', f'<{bob}>')]),
+ ):
+ address = f'{alice}{invalid_separator}<{bob}>'
+ with self.subTest(address=address):
+ self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address]),
+ [empty])
+ self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address], strict=False),
+ expected_non_strict)
+
+ self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address]),
+ empty)
+ self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address], strict=False),
+ ('', address))
+
+ # Comma (',') is treated differently depending on strict parameter.
+ # Comma without quotes.
+ address = f'{alice},<{bob}>'
+ self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address]),
+ [('', alice), ('', bob)])
+ self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address], strict=False),
+ [('', alice), ('', bob)])
+ self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address]),
+ empty)
+ self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address], strict=False),
+ ('', address))
+
+ # Real name between quotes containing comma.
+ address = '"Alice, alice@example.org" <bob@example.com>'
+ expected_strict = ('Alice, alice@example.org', 'bob@example.com')
+ self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address]), [expected_strict])
+ self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address], strict=False), [expected_strict])
+ self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address]), expected_strict)
+ self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address], strict=False),
+ ('', address))
+
+ # Valid parenthesis in comments.
+ address = 'alice@example.org (Alice)'
+ expected_strict = ('Alice', 'alice@example.org')
+ self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address]), [expected_strict])
+ self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address], strict=False), [expected_strict])
+ self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address]), expected_strict)
+ self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address], strict=False),
+ ('', address))
+
+ # Invalid parenthesis in comments.
+ address = 'alice@example.org )Alice('
+ self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address]), [empty])
+ self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address], strict=False),
+ [('', 'alice@example.org'), ('', ''), ('', 'Alice')])
+ self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address]), empty)
+ self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address], strict=False),
+ ('', address))
+
+ # Two addresses with quotes separated by comma.
+ address = '"Jane Doe" <jane@example.net>, "John Doe" <john@example.net>'
+ self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address]),
+ [('Jane Doe', 'jane@example.net'),
+ ('John Doe', 'john@example.net')])
+ self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address], strict=False),
+ [('Jane Doe', 'jane@example.net'),
+ ('John Doe', 'john@example.net')])
+ self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address]), empty)
+ self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address], strict=False),
+ ('', address))
+
+ # Test email.utils.supports_strict_parsing attribute
+ self.assertEqual(email.utils.supports_strict_parsing, True)
+
def test_getaddresses_nasty(self):
- eq = self.assertEqual
- eq(utils.getaddresses(['foo: ;']), [('', '')])
- eq(utils.getaddresses(
- ['[]*-- =~$']),
- [('', ''), ('', ''), ('', '*--')])
- eq(utils.getaddresses(
- ['foo: ;', '"Jason R. Mastaler" <jason@dom.ain>']),
- [('', ''), ('Jason R. Mastaler', 'jason@dom.ain')])
+ for addresses, expected in (
+ (['"Sürname, Firstname" <to@example.com>'],
+ [('Sürname, Firstname', 'to@example.com')]),
+
+ (['foo: ;'],
+ [('', '')]),
+
+ (['foo: ;', '"Jason R. Mastaler" <jason@dom.ain>'],
+ [('', ''), ('Jason R. Mastaler', 'jason@dom.ain')]),
+
+ ([r'Pete(A nice \) chap) <pete(his account)@silly.test(his host)>'],
+ [('Pete (A nice ) chap his account his host)', 'pete@silly.test')]),
+
+ (['(Empty list)(start)Undisclosed recipients :(nobody(I know))'],
+ [('', '')]),
+
+ (['Mary <@machine.tld:mary@example.net>, , jdoe@test . example'],
+ [('Mary', 'mary@example.net'), ('', ''), ('', 'jdoe@test.example')]),
+
+ (['John Doe <jdoe@machine(comment). example>'],
+ [('John Doe (comment)', 'jdoe@machine.example')]),
+
+ (['"Mary Smith: Personal Account" <smith@home.example>'],
+ [('Mary Smith: Personal Account', 'smith@home.example')]),
+
+ (['Undisclosed recipients:;'],
+ [('', '')]),
+
+ ([r'<boss@nil.test>, "Giant; \"Big\" Box" <bob@example.net>'],
+ [('', 'boss@nil.test'), ('Giant; "Big" Box', 'bob@example.net')]),
+ ):
+ with self.subTest(addresses=addresses):
+ self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses(addresses),
+ expected)
+ self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses(addresses, strict=False),
+ expected)
+
+ addresses = ['[]*-- =~$']
+ self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses(addresses),
+ [('', '')])
+ self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses(addresses, strict=False),
+ [('', ''), ('', ''), ('', '*--')])
def test_getaddresses_embedded_comment(self):
"""Test proper handling of a nested comment"""
@@ -3440,6 +3563,54 @@ multipart/report
m = cls(*constructor, policy=email.policy.default)
self.assertIs(m.policy, email.policy.default)
+ def test_iter_escaped_chars(self):
+ self.assertEqual(list(utils._iter_escaped_chars(r'a\\b\"c\\"d')),
+ [(0, 'a'),
+ (2, '\\\\'),
+ (3, 'b'),
+ (5, '\\"'),
+ (6, 'c'),
+ (8, '\\\\'),
+ (9, '"'),
+ (10, 'd')])
+ self.assertEqual(list(utils._iter_escaped_chars('a\\')),
+ [(0, 'a'), (1, '\\')])
+
+ def test_strip_quoted_realnames(self):
+ def check(addr, expected):
+ self.assertEqual(utils._strip_quoted_realnames(addr), expected)
+
+ check('"Jane Doe" <jane@example.net>, "John Doe" <john@example.net>',
+ ' <jane@example.net>, <john@example.net>')
+ check(r'"Jane \"Doe\"." <jane@example.net>',
+ ' <jane@example.net>')
+
+ # special cases
+ check(r'before"name"after', 'beforeafter')
+ check(r'before"name"', 'before')
+ check(r'b"name"', 'b') # single char
+ check(r'"name"after', 'after')
+ check(r'"name"a', 'a') # single char
+ check(r'"name"', '')
+
+ # no change
+ for addr in (
+ 'Jane Doe <jane@example.net>, John Doe <john@example.net>',
+ 'lone " quote',
+ ):
+ self.assertEqual(utils._strip_quoted_realnames(addr), addr)
+
+
+ def test_check_parenthesis(self):
+ addr = 'alice@example.net'
+ self.assertTrue(utils._check_parenthesis(f'{addr} (Alice)'))
+ self.assertFalse(utils._check_parenthesis(f'{addr} )Alice('))
+ self.assertFalse(utils._check_parenthesis(f'{addr} (Alice))'))
+ self.assertFalse(utils._check_parenthesis(f'{addr} ((Alice)'))
+
+ # Ignore real name between quotes
+ self.assertTrue(utils._check_parenthesis(f'")Alice((" {addr}'))
+
# Test the iterator/generators
class TestIterators(TestEmailBase):
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2023-10-20-15-28-08.gh-issue-102988.dStNO7.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+:func:`email.utils.getaddresses` and :func:`email.utils.parseaddr` now
+return ``('', '')`` 2-tuples in more situations where invalid email
+addresses are encountered instead of potentially inaccurate values. Add
+optional *strict* parameter to these two functions: use ``strict=False`` to
+get the old behavior, accept malformed inputs.
+``getattr(email.utils, 'supports_strict_parsing', False)`` can be use to check
+if the *strict* paramater is available. Patch by Thomas Dwyer and Victor
+Stinner to improve the CVE-2023-27043 fix.

173
CVE-2024-0397-memrace_ssl.SSLContext_cert_store.patch
View File

@ -1,173 +0,0 @@
From 732c7d512e7cdf656a3f02a38c329b14a14a8573 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Seth Michael Larson <seth@python.org>
Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2024 11:21:40 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] [3.9] gh-114572: Fix locking in cert_store_stats and
get_ca_certs
---
Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-04-19-11-21-13.gh-issue-114572.t1QMQD.rst | 4
Modules/_ssl.c | 91 +++++++++-
2 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-04-19-11-21-13.gh-issue-114572.t1QMQD.rst
Index: Python-3.8.19/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-04-19-11-21-13.gh-issue-114572.t1QMQD.rst
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ Python-3.8.19/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-04-19-11-21-13.gh-issue-114572.t1QMQD.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+:meth:`ssl.SSLContext.cert_store_stats` and
+:meth:`ssl.SSLContext.get_ca_certs` now correctly lock access to the
+certificate store, when the :class:`ssl.SSLContext` is shared across
+multiple threads.
Index: Python-3.8.19/Modules/_ssl.c
===================================================================
--- Python-3.8.19.orig/Modules/_ssl.c
+++ Python-3.8.19/Modules/_ssl.c
@@ -168,6 +168,10 @@ extern const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(
# define PY_OPENSSL_1_1_API 1
#endif
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30300000L) && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_3_3 1
+#endif
+
/* SNI support (client- and server-side) appeared in OpenSSL 1.0.0 and 0.9.8f
* This includes the SSL_set_SSL_CTX() function.
*/
@@ -212,6 +216,16 @@ extern const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(
#define HAVE_OPENSSL_CRYPTO_LOCK
#endif
+/* OpenSSL 1.1+ allows locking X509_STORE, 1.0.2 doesn't. */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_VERSION_1_1
+#define HAVE_OPENSSL_X509_STORE_LOCK
+#endif
+
+/* OpenSSL 3.3 added the X509_STORE_get1_objects API */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_VERSION_3_3
+#define HAVE_OPENSSL_X509_STORE_GET1_OBJECTS 1
+#endif
+
#if defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_1_1) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
#define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
#endif
@@ -4678,6 +4692,54 @@ set_sni_callback(PySSLContext *self, PyO
#endif
}
+/* Shim of X509_STORE_get1_objects API from OpenSSL 3.3
+ * Only available with the X509_STORE_lock() API */
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_X509_STORE_LOCK) && !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_3_3)
+#define HAVE_OPENSSL_X509_STORE_GET1_OBJECTS 1
+
+static X509_OBJECT *x509_object_dup(const X509_OBJECT *obj)
+{
+ int ok;
+ X509_OBJECT *ret = X509_OBJECT_new();
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ switch (X509_OBJECT_get_type(obj)) {
+ case X509_LU_X509:
+ ok = X509_OBJECT_set1_X509(ret, X509_OBJECT_get0_X509(obj));
+ break;
+ case X509_LU_CRL:
+ /* X509_OBJECT_get0_X509_CRL was not const-correct prior to 3.0.*/
+ ok = X509_OBJECT_set1_X509_CRL(
+ ret, X509_OBJECT_get0_X509_CRL((X509_OBJECT *)obj));
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* We cannot duplicate unrecognized types in a polyfill, but it is
+ * safe to leave an empty object. The caller will ignore it. */
+ ok = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!ok) {
+ X509_OBJECT_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *
+X509_STORE_get1_objects(X509_STORE *store)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *ret;
+ if (!X509_STORE_lock(store)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret = sk_X509_OBJECT_deep_copy(X509_STORE_get0_objects(store),
+ x509_object_dup, X509_OBJECT_free);
+ X509_STORE_unlock(store);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
PyDoc_STRVAR(PySSLContext_sni_callback_doc,
"Set a callback that will be called when a server name is provided by the SSL/TLS client in the SNI extension.\n\
\n\
@@ -4707,7 +4769,15 @@ _ssl__SSLContext_cert_store_stats_impl(P
int x509 = 0, crl = 0, ca = 0, i;
store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(self->ctx);
+#if HAVE_OPENSSL_X509_STORE_GET1_OBJECTS
+ objs = X509_STORE_get1_objects(store);
+ if (objs == NULL) {
+ PyErr_SetString(PyExc_MemoryError, "failed to query cert store");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+#else
objs = X509_STORE_get0_objects(store);
+#endif
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(objs); i++) {
obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(objs, i);
switch (X509_OBJECT_get_type(obj)) {
@@ -4721,12 +4791,13 @@ _ssl__SSLContext_cert_store_stats_impl(P
crl++;
break;
default:
- /* Ignore X509_LU_FAIL, X509_LU_RETRY, X509_LU_PKEY.
- * As far as I can tell they are internal states and never
- * stored in a cert store */
+ /* Ignore unrecognized types. */
break;
}
}
+#if HAVE_OPENSSL_X509_STORE_GET1_OBJECTS
+ sk_X509_OBJECT_pop_free(objs, X509_OBJECT_free);
+#endif
return Py_BuildValue("{sisisi}", "x509", x509, "crl", crl,
"x509_ca", ca);
}
@@ -4758,7 +4829,15 @@ _ssl__SSLContext_get_ca_certs_impl(PySSL
}
store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(self->ctx);
+#if HAVE_OPENSSL_X509_STORE_GET1_OBJECTS
+ objs = X509_STORE_get1_objects(store);
+ if (objs == NULL) {
+ PyErr_SetString(PyExc_MemoryError, "failed to query cert store");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+#else
objs = X509_STORE_get0_objects(store);
+#endif
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(objs); i++) {
X509_OBJECT *obj;
X509 *cert;
@@ -4786,9 +4865,15 @@ _ssl__SSLContext_get_ca_certs_impl(PySSL
}
Py_CLEAR(ci);
}
+#if HAVE_OPENSSL_X509_STORE_GET1_OBJECTS
+ sk_X509_OBJECT_pop_free(objs, X509_OBJECT_free);
+#endif
return rlist;
error:
+#if HAVE_OPENSSL_X509_STORE_GET1_OBJECTS
+ sk_X509_OBJECT_pop_free(objs, X509_OBJECT_free);
+#endif
Py_XDECREF(ci);
Py_XDECREF(rlist);
return NULL;

444
CVE-2024-4032-private-IP-addrs.patch
View File

@ -1,444 +0,0 @@
From 05a14677846ed0a35773cd2ba582f9a65a3dfa48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Petr Viktorin <encukou@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2024 14:29:30 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] gh-113171: gh-65056: Fix "private" (non-global) IP
address ranges (GH-113179) (GH-113186) (GH-118177)
* GH-113171: Fix "private" (non-global) IP address ranges (GH-113179)
The _private_networks variables, used by various is_private
implementations, were missing some ranges and at the same time had
overly strict ranges (where there are more specific ranges considered
globally reachable by the IANA registries).
This patch updates the ranges with what was missing or otherwise
incorrect.
100.64.0.0/10 is left alone, for now, as it's been made special in [1].
The _address_exclude_many() call returns 8 networks for IPv4, 121
networks for IPv6.
[1] https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/61602
* GH-65056: Improve the IP address' is_global/is_private documentation (GH-113186)
It wasn't clear what the semantics of is_global/is_private are and, when
one gets to the bottom of it, it's not quite so simple (hence the
exceptions listed).
(cherry picked from commit 2a4cbf17af19a01d942f9579342f77c39fbd23c4)
(cherry picked from commit 40d75c2b7f5c67e254d0a025e0f2e2c7ada7f69f)
---------
(cherry picked from commit f86b17ac511e68192ba71f27e752321a3252cee3)
Co-authored-by: Jakub Stasiak <jakub@stasiak.at>
---
Doc/library/ipaddress.rst | 43 ++++++++-
Doc/whatsnew/3.8.rst | 9 ++
Lib/ipaddress.py | 95 +++++++++++++++----
Lib/test/test_ipaddress.py | 52 ++++++++++
...-03-14-01-38-44.gh-issue-113171.VFnObz.rst | 9 ++
5 files changed, 187 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-03-14-01-38-44.gh-issue-113171.VFnObz.rst
diff --git a/Doc/library/ipaddress.rst b/Doc/library/ipaddress.rst
index 5e21d5db2ed9c3..5944e33bb1b339 100644
--- a/Doc/library/ipaddress.rst
+++ b/Doc/library/ipaddress.rst
@@ -179,18 +179,53 @@ write code that handles both IP versions correctly. Address objects are
.. attribute:: is_private
- ``True`` if the address is allocated for private networks. See
+ ``True`` if the address is defined as not globally reachable by
iana-ipv4-special-registry_ (for IPv4) or iana-ipv6-special-registry_
- (for IPv6).
+ (for IPv6) with the following exceptions:
+
+ * ``is_private`` is ``False`` for the shared address space (``100.64.0.0/10``)
+ * For IPv4-mapped IPv6-addresses the ``is_private`` value is determined by the
+ semantics of the underlying IPv4 addresses and the following condition holds
+ (see :attr:`IPv6Address.ipv4_mapped`)::
+
+ address.is_private == address.ipv4_mapped.is_private
+
+ ``is_private`` has value opposite to :attr:`is_global`, except for the shared address space
+ (``100.64.0.0/10`` range) where they are both ``False``.
+
+ .. versionchanged:: 3.8.20
+
+ Fixed some false positives and false negatives.
+
+ * ``192.0.0.0/24`` is considered private with the exception of ``192.0.0.9/32`` and
+ ``192.0.0.10/32`` (previously: only the ``192.0.0.0/29`` sub-range was considered private).
+ * ``64:ff9b:1::/48`` is considered private.
+ * ``2002::/16`` is considered private.
+ * There are exceptions within ``2001::/23`` (otherwise considered private): ``2001:1::1/128``,
+ ``2001:1::2/128``, ``2001:3::/32``, ``2001:4:112::/48``, ``2001:20::/28``, ``2001:30::/28``.
+ The exceptions are not considered private.
.. attribute:: is_global
- ``True`` if the address is allocated for public networks. See
+ ``True`` if the address is defined as globally reachable by
iana-ipv4-special-registry_ (for IPv4) or iana-ipv6-special-registry_
- (for IPv6).
+ (for IPv6) with the following exception:
+
+ For IPv4-mapped IPv6-addresses the ``is_private`` value is determined by the
+ semantics of the underlying IPv4 addresses and the following condition holds
+ (see :attr:`IPv6Address.ipv4_mapped`)::
+
+ address.is_global == address.ipv4_mapped.is_global
+
+ ``is_global`` has value opposite to :attr:`is_private`, except for the shared address space
+ (``100.64.0.0/10`` range) where they are both ``False``.
.. versionadded:: 3.4
+ .. versionchanged:: 3.8.20
+
+ Fixed some false positives and false negatives, see :attr:`is_private` for details.
+
.. attribute:: is_unspecified
``True`` if the address is unspecified. See :RFC:`5735` (for IPv4)
diff --git a/Doc/whatsnew/3.8.rst b/Doc/whatsnew/3.8.rst
index e5278da3f6a5be..de4dd856877543 100644
--- a/Doc/whatsnew/3.8.rst
+++ b/Doc/whatsnew/3.8.rst
@@ -2355,3 +2355,12 @@ tarfile
:exc:`DeprecationWarning`.
In Python 3.14, the default will switch to ``'data'``.
(Contributed by Petr Viktorin in :pep:`706`.)
+
+Notable changes in 3.8.20
+=========================
+
+ipaddress
+---------
+
+* Fixed ``is_global`` and ``is_private`` behavior in ``IPv4Address``,
+ ``IPv6Address``, ``IPv4Network`` and ``IPv6Network``.
diff --git a/Lib/ipaddress.py b/Lib/ipaddress.py
index d351f07a5bd960..142c3b13b1617e 100644
--- a/Lib/ipaddress.py
+++ b/Lib/ipaddress.py
@@ -1275,18 +1275,41 @@ def is_reserved(self):
@property
@functools.lru_cache()
def is_private(self):
- """Test if this address is allocated for private networks.
+ """``True`` if the address is defined as not globally reachable by
+ iana-ipv4-special-registry_ (for IPv4) or iana-ipv6-special-registry_
+ (for IPv6) with the following exceptions:
- Returns:
- A boolean, True if the address is reserved per
- iana-ipv4-special-registry.
+ * ``is_private`` is ``False`` for ``100.64.0.0/10``
+ * For IPv4-mapped IPv6-addresses the ``is_private`` value is determined by the
+ semantics of the underlying IPv4 addresses and the following condition holds
+ (see :attr:`IPv6Address.ipv4_mapped`)::
+
+ address.is_private == address.ipv4_mapped.is_private
+ ``is_private`` has value opposite to :attr:`is_global`, except for the ``100.64.0.0/10``
+ IPv4 range where they are both ``False``.
"""
- return any(self in net for net in self._constants._private_networks)
+ return (
+ any(self in net for net in self._constants._private_networks)
+ and all(self not in net for net in self._constants._private_networks_exceptions)
+ )
@property
@functools.lru_cache()
def is_global(self):
+ """``True`` if the address is defined as globally reachable by
+ iana-ipv4-special-registry_ (for IPv4) or iana-ipv6-special-registry_
+ (for IPv6) with the following exception:
+
+ For IPv4-mapped IPv6-addresses the ``is_private`` value is determined by the
+ semantics of the underlying IPv4 addresses and the following condition holds
+ (see :attr:`IPv6Address.ipv4_mapped`)::
+
+ address.is_global == address.ipv4_mapped.is_global
+
+ ``is_global`` has value opposite to :attr:`is_private`, except for the ``100.64.0.0/10``
+ IPv4 range where they are both ``False``.
+ """
return self not in self._constants._public_network and not self.is_private
@property
@@ -1490,13 +1513,15 @@ class _IPv4Constants:
_public_network = IPv4Network('100.64.0.0/10')
+ # Not globally reachable address blocks listed on
+ # https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml
_private_networks = [
IPv4Network('0.0.0.0/8'),
IPv4Network('10.0.0.0/8'),
IPv4Network('127.0.0.0/8'),
IPv4Network('169.254.0.0/16'),
IPv4Network('172.16.0.0/12'),
- IPv4Network('192.0.0.0/29'),
+ IPv4Network('192.0.0.0/24'),
IPv4Network('192.0.0.170/31'),
IPv4Network('192.0.2.0/24'),
IPv4Network('192.168.0.0/16'),
@@ -1507,6 +1532,11 @@ class _IPv4Constants:
IPv4Network('255.255.255.255/32'),
]
+ _private_networks_exceptions = [
+ IPv4Network('192.0.0.9/32'),
+ IPv4Network('192.0.0.10/32'),
+ ]
+
_reserved_network = IPv4Network('240.0.0.0/4')
_unspecified_address = IPv4Address('0.0.0.0')
@@ -1897,23 +1927,42 @@ def is_site_local(self):
@property
@functools.lru_cache()
def is_private(self):
- """Test if this address is allocated for private networks.
+ """``True`` if the address is defined as not globally reachable by
+ iana-ipv4-special-registry_ (for IPv4) or iana-ipv6-special-registry_
+ (for IPv6) with the following exceptions:
- Returns:
- A boolean, True if the address is reserved per
- iana-ipv6-special-registry.
+ * ``is_private`` is ``False`` for ``100.64.0.0/10``
+ * For IPv4-mapped IPv6-addresses the ``is_private`` value is determined by the
+ semantics of the underlying IPv4 addresses and the following condition holds
+ (see :attr:`IPv6Address.ipv4_mapped`)::
+
+ address.is_private == address.ipv4_mapped.is_private
+ ``is_private`` has value opposite to :attr:`is_global`, except for the ``100.64.0.0/10``
+ IPv4 range where they are both ``False``.
"""
- return any(self in net for net in self._constants._private_networks)
+ ipv4_mapped = self.ipv4_mapped
+ if ipv4_mapped is not None:
+ return ipv4_mapped.is_private
+ return (
+ any(self in net for net in self._constants._private_networks)
+ and all(self not in net for net in self._constants._private_networks_exceptions)
+ )
@property
def is_global(self):
- """Test if this address is allocated for public networks.
+ """``True`` if the address is defined as globally reachable by
+ iana-ipv4-special-registry_ (for IPv4) or iana-ipv6-special-registry_
+ (for IPv6) with the following exception:
- Returns:
- A boolean, true if the address is not reserved per
- iana-ipv6-special-registry.
+ For IPv4-mapped IPv6-addresses the ``is_private`` value is determined by the
+ semantics of the underlying IPv4 addresses and the following condition holds
+ (see :attr:`IPv6Address.ipv4_mapped`)::
+
+ address.is_global == address.ipv4_mapped.is_global
+ ``is_global`` has value opposite to :attr:`is_private`, except for the ``100.64.0.0/10``
+ IPv4 range where they are both ``False``.
"""
return not self.is_private
@@ -2154,19 +2203,31 @@ class _IPv6Constants:
_multicast_network = IPv6Network('ff00::/8')
+ # Not globally reachable address blocks listed on
+ # https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv6-special-registry/iana-ipv6-special-registry.xhtml
_private_networks = [
IPv6Network('::1/128'),
IPv6Network('::/128'),
IPv6Network('::ffff:0:0/96'),
+ IPv6Network('64:ff9b:1::/48'),
IPv6Network('100::/64'),
IPv6Network('2001::/23'),
- IPv6Network('2001:2::/48'),
IPv6Network('2001:db8::/32'),
- IPv6Network('2001:10::/28'),
+ # IANA says N/A, let's consider it not globally reachable to be safe
+ IPv6Network('2002::/16'),
IPv6Network('fc00::/7'),
IPv6Network('fe80::/10'),
]
+ _private_networks_exceptions = [
+ IPv6Network('2001:1::1/128'),
+ IPv6Network('2001:1::2/128'),
+ IPv6Network('2001:3::/32'),
+ IPv6Network('2001:4:112::/48'),
+ IPv6Network('2001:20::/28'),
+ IPv6Network('2001:30::/28'),
+ ]
+
_reserved_networks = [
IPv6Network('::/8'), IPv6Network('100::/8'),
IPv6Network('200::/7'), IPv6Network('400::/6'),
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_ipaddress.py b/Lib/test/test_ipaddress.py
index 1297b8371d8583..46002111b3270a 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_ipaddress.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_ipaddress.py
@@ -1761,6 +1761,10 @@ def testReservedIpv4(self):
self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_address(
'172.31.255.255').is_private)
self.assertEqual(False, ipaddress.ip_address('172.32.0.0').is_private)
+ self.assertFalse(ipaddress.ip_address('192.0.0.0').is_global)
+ self.assertTrue(ipaddress.ip_address('192.0.0.9').is_global)
+ self.assertTrue(ipaddress.ip_address('192.0.0.10').is_global)
+ self.assertFalse(ipaddress.ip_address('192.0.0.255').is_global)
self.assertEqual(True,
ipaddress.ip_address('169.254.100.200').is_link_local)
@@ -1776,6 +1780,40 @@ def testReservedIpv4(self):
self.assertEqual(False, ipaddress.ip_address('128.0.0.0').is_loopback)
self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network('0.0.0.0').is_unspecified)
+ def testPrivateNetworks(self):
+ self.assertEqual(False, ipaddress.ip_network("0.0.0.0/0").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(False, ipaddress.ip_network("1.0.0.0/8").is_private)
+
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("0.0.0.0/8").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.0/8").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("127.0.0.0/8").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("169.254.0.0/16").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("172.16.0.0/12").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("192.0.0.0/29").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(False, ipaddress.ip_network("192.0.0.9/32").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("192.0.0.170/31").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("192.0.2.0/24").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("192.168.0.0/16").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("198.18.0.0/15").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("198.51.100.0/24").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("203.0.113.0/24").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("240.0.0.0/4").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("255.255.255.255/32").is_private)
+
+ self.assertEqual(False, ipaddress.ip_network("::/0").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(False, ipaddress.ip_network("::ff/128").is_private)
+
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("::1/128").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("::/128").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("::ffff:0:0/96").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("100::/64").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("2001:2::/48").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(False, ipaddress.ip_network("2001:3::/48").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("2001:db8::/32").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("2001:10::/28").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("fc00::/7").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("fe80::/10").is_private)
+
def testReservedIpv6(self):
self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network('ffff::').is_multicast)
@@ -1849,6 +1887,20 @@ def testReservedIpv6(self):
self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_address('0::0').is_unspecified)
self.assertEqual(False, ipaddress.ip_address('::1').is_unspecified)
+ self.assertFalse(ipaddress.ip_address('64:ff9b:1::').is_global)
+ self.assertFalse(ipaddress.ip_address('2001::').is_global)
+ self.assertTrue(ipaddress.ip_address('2001:1::1').is_global)
+ self.assertTrue(ipaddress.ip_address('2001:1::2').is_global)
+ self.assertFalse(ipaddress.ip_address('2001:2::').is_global)
+ self.assertTrue(ipaddress.ip_address('2001:3::').is_global)
+ self.assertFalse(ipaddress.ip_address('2001:4::').is_global)
+ self.assertTrue(ipaddress.ip_address('2001:4:112::').is_global)
+ self.assertFalse(ipaddress.ip_address('2001:10::').is_global)
+ self.assertTrue(ipaddress.ip_address('2001:20::').is_global)
+ self.assertTrue(ipaddress.ip_address('2001:30::').is_global)
+ self.assertFalse(ipaddress.ip_address('2001:40::').is_global)
+ self.assertFalse(ipaddress.ip_address('2002::').is_global)
+
# some generic IETF reserved addresses
self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_address('100::').is_reserved)
self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network('4000::1/128').is_reserved)
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-03-14-01-38-44.gh-issue-113171.VFnObz.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-03-14-01-38-44.gh-issue-113171.VFnObz.rst
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000000..f9a72473be4e2c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-03-14-01-38-44.gh-issue-113171.VFnObz.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+Fixed various false positives and false negatives in
+
+* :attr:`ipaddress.IPv4Address.is_private` (see these docs for details)
+* :attr:`ipaddress.IPv4Address.is_global`
+* :attr:`ipaddress.IPv6Address.is_private`
+* :attr:`ipaddress.IPv6Address.is_global`
+
+Also in the corresponding :class:`ipaddress.IPv4Network` and :class:`ipaddress.IPv6Network`
+attributes.
From 2e92223a4298fbf18c1c7f853b6d883943c00c52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Petr Viktorin <encukou@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2024 15:16:13 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Adjust test for 3.10 semantics of is_private on networks
In 3.10 and below, is_private checks whether the network and broadcast
address are both private.
In later versions (where the test wss backported from), it checks
whether they both are in the same private network.
For 0.0.0.0/0, both 0.0.0.0 and 255.225.255.255 are private,
but one is in 0.0.0.0/8 ("This network") and the other in
255.255.255.255/32 ("Limited broadcast").
---
Lib/test/test_ipaddress.py | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_ipaddress.py b/Lib/test/test_ipaddress.py
index 46002111b3270a..fad40334f0d317 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_ipaddress.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_ipaddress.py
@@ -1781,7 +1781,7 @@ def testReservedIpv4(self):
self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network('0.0.0.0').is_unspecified)
def testPrivateNetworks(self):
- self.assertEqual(False, ipaddress.ip_network("0.0.0.0/0").is_private)
+ self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("0.0.0.0/0").is_private)
self.assertEqual(False, ipaddress.ip_network("1.0.0.0/8").is_private)
self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("0.0.0.0/8").is_private)
From e366724f6e290b71ec49005079e8472c3cac2594 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Petr Viktorin <encukou@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 1 May 2024 15:29:13 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Add IPv6 addresses to suspignore.csv
That's a lot of semicolons!
---
Doc/tools/susp-ignored.csv | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Doc/tools/susp-ignored.csv b/Doc/tools/susp-ignored.csv
index dd6aa38d72adcc..fadeab3f98f2d7 100644
--- a/Doc/tools/susp-ignored.csv
+++ b/Doc/tools/susp-ignored.csv
@@ -158,6 +158,14 @@ library/ipaddress,,:db00,2001:db00::0/24
library/ipaddress,,::,2001:db00::0/24
library/ipaddress,,:db00,2001:db00::0/ffff:ff00::
library/ipaddress,,::,2001:db00::0/ffff:ff00::
+library/ipaddress,,:ff9b,64:ff9b:1::/48
+library/ipaddress,,::,64:ff9b:1::/48
+library/ipaddress,,::,2001::
+library/ipaddress,,::,2001:1::
+library/ipaddress,,::,2001:3::
+library/ipaddress,,::,2001:4:112::
+library/ipaddress,,::,2001:20::
+library/ipaddress,,::,2001:30::
library/itertools,,:step,elements from seq[start:stop:step]
library/itertools,,:stop,elements from seq[start:stop:step]
library/logging.handlers,,:port,host:port

338
CVE-2024-6923-email-hdr-inject.patch
View File

@ -1,338 +0,0 @@
From d7cf62cf9f630975a0e876708c4a23907a23aba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Petr Viktorin <encukou@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2024 00:19:48 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] [3.8] gh-121650: Encode newlines in headers, and verify
headers are sound (GH-122233)
Per RFC 2047:
> [...] these encoding schemes allow the
> encoding of arbitrary octet values, mail readers that implement this
> decoding should also ensure that display of the decoded data on the
> recipient's terminal will not cause unwanted side-effects
It seems that the "quoted-word" scheme is a valid way to include
a newline character in a header value, just like we already allow
undecodable bytes or control characters.
They do need to be properly quoted when serialized to text, though.
This should fail for custom fold() implementations that aren't careful
about newlines.
(cherry picked from commit 097633981879b3c9de9a1dd120d3aa585ecc2384)
Co-authored-by: Petr Viktorin <encukou@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Bas Bloemsaat <bas@bloemsaat.org>
Co-authored-by: Serhiy Storchaka <storchaka@gmail.com>
---
Doc/library/email.errors.rst | 6
Doc/library/email.policy.rst | 18 ++
Doc/whatsnew/3.8.rst | 12 +
Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py | 12 +
Lib/email/_policybase.py | 8 +
Lib/email/errors.py | 4
Lib/email/generator.py | 16 ++
Lib/test/test_email/test_generator.py | 62 ++++++++++
Lib/test/test_email/test_policy.py | 26 ++++
Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-07-27-16-10-41.gh-issue-121650.nf6oc9.rst | 5
10 files changed, 165 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-07-27-16-10-41.gh-issue-121650.nf6oc9.rst
--- a/Doc/library/email.errors.rst
+++ b/Doc/library/email.errors.rst
@@ -59,6 +59,12 @@ The following exception classes are defi
:class:`~email.mime.image.MIMEImage`).
+.. exception:: HeaderWriteError()
+
+ Raised when an error occurs when the :mod:`~email.generator` outputs
+ headers.
+
+
Here is the list of the defects that the :class:`~email.parser.FeedParser`
can find while parsing messages. Note that the defects are added to the message
where the problem was found, so for example, if a message nested inside a
--- a/Doc/library/email.policy.rst
+++ b/Doc/library/email.policy.rst
@@ -229,6 +229,24 @@ added matters. To illustrate::
.. versionadded:: 3.6
+
+ .. attribute:: verify_generated_headers
+
+ If ``True`` (the default), the generator will raise
+ :exc:`~email.errors.HeaderWriteError` instead of writing a header
+ that is improperly folded or delimited, such that it would
+ be parsed as multiple headers or joined with adjacent data.
+ Such headers can be generated by custom header classes or bugs
+ in the ``email`` module.
+
+ As it's a security feature, this defaults to ``True`` even in the
+ :class:`~email.policy.Compat32` policy.
+ For backwards compatible, but unsafe, behavior, it must be set to
+ ``False`` explicitly.
+
+ .. versionadded:: 3.8.20
+
+
The following :class:`Policy` method is intended to be called by code using
the email library to create policy instances with custom settings:
--- a/Doc/whatsnew/3.8.rst
+++ b/Doc/whatsnew/3.8.rst
@@ -2364,3 +2364,15 @@ ipaddress
* Fixed ``is_global`` and ``is_private`` behavior in ``IPv4Address``,
``IPv6Address``, ``IPv4Network`` and ``IPv6Network``.
+
+email
+-----
+
+* Headers with embedded newlines are now quoted on output.
+
+ The :mod:`~email.generator` will now refuse to serialize (write) headers
+ that are improperly folded or delimited, such that they would be parsed as
+ multiple headers or joined with adjacent data.
+ If you need to turn this safety feature off,
+ set :attr:`~email.policy.Policy.verify_generated_headers`.
+ (Contributed by Bas Bloemsaat and Petr Viktorin in :gh:`121650`.)
--- a/Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py
+++ b/Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py
@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ TOKEN_ENDS = TSPECIALS | WSP
ASPECIALS = TSPECIALS | set("*'%")
ATTRIBUTE_ENDS = ASPECIALS | WSP
EXTENDED_ATTRIBUTE_ENDS = ATTRIBUTE_ENDS - set('%')
+NLSET = {'\n', '\r'}
+SPECIALSNL = SPECIALS | NLSET
def quote_string(value):
return '"'+str(value).replace('\\', '\\\\').replace('"', r'\"')+'"'
@@ -2778,9 +2780,13 @@ def _refold_parse_tree(parse_tree, *, po
wrap_as_ew_blocked -= 1
continue
tstr = str(part)
- if part.token_type == 'ptext' and set(tstr) & SPECIALS:
- # Encode if tstr contains special characters.
- want_encoding = True
+ if not want_encoding:
+ if part.token_type == 'ptext':
+ # Encode if tstr contains special characters.
+ want_encoding = not SPECIALSNL.isdisjoint(tstr)
+ else:
+ # Encode if tstr contains newlines.
+ want_encoding = not NLSET.isdisjoint(tstr)
try:
tstr.encode(encoding)
charset = encoding
--- a/Lib/email/_policybase.py
+++ b/Lib/email/_policybase.py
@@ -157,6 +157,13 @@ class Policy(_PolicyBase, metaclass=abc.
message_factory -- the class to use to create new message objects.
If the value is None, the default is Message.
+ verify_generated_headers
+ -- if true, the generator verifies that each header
+ they are properly folded, so that a parser won't
+ treat it as multiple headers, start-of-body, or
+ part of another header.
+ This is a check against custom Header & fold()
+ implementations.
"""
raise_on_defect = False
@@ -165,6 +172,7 @@ class Policy(_PolicyBase, metaclass=abc.
max_line_length = 78
mangle_from_ = False
message_factory = None
+ verify_generated_headers = True
def handle_defect(self, obj, defect):
"""Based on policy, either raise defect or call register_defect.
--- a/Lib/email/errors.py
+++ b/Lib/email/errors.py
@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ class CharsetError(MessageError):
"""An illegal charset was given."""
+class HeaderWriteError(MessageError):
+ """Error while writing headers."""
+
+
# These are parsing defects which the parser was able to work around.
class MessageDefect(ValueError):
"""Base class for a message defect."""
--- a/Lib/email/generator.py
+++ b/Lib/email/generator.py
@@ -14,12 +14,14 @@ import random
from copy import deepcopy
from io import StringIO, BytesIO
from email.utils import _has_surrogates
+from email.errors import HeaderWriteError
UNDERSCORE = '_'
NL = '\n' # XXX: no longer used by the code below.
NLCRE = re.compile(r'\r\n|\r|\n')
fcre = re.compile(r'^From ', re.MULTILINE)
+NEWLINE_WITHOUT_FWSP = re.compile(r'\r\n[^ \t]|\r[^ \n\t]|\n[^ \t]')
@@ -223,7 +225,19 @@ class Generator:
def _write_headers(self, msg):
for h, v in msg.raw_items():
- self.write(self.policy.fold(h, v))
+ folded = self.policy.fold(h, v)
+ if self.policy.verify_generated_headers:
+ linesep = self.policy.linesep
+ if not folded.endswith(self.policy.linesep):
+ raise HeaderWriteError(
+ f'folded header does not end with {linesep!r}: {folded!r}')
+ folded_no_linesep = folded
+ if folded.endswith(linesep):
+ folded_no_linesep = folded[:-len(linesep)]
+ if NEWLINE_WITHOUT_FWSP.search(folded_no_linesep):
+ raise HeaderWriteError(
+ f'folded header contains newline: {folded!r}')
+ self.write(folded)
# A blank line always separates headers from body
self.write(self._NL)
--- a/Lib/test/test_email/test_generator.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_email/test_generator.py
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from email.message import EmailMessage
from email.generator import Generator, BytesGenerator
from email.headerregistry import Address
from email import policy
+import email.errors
from test.test_email import TestEmailBase, parameterize
@@ -216,6 +217,44 @@ class TestGeneratorBase:
g.flatten(msg)
self.assertEqual(s.getvalue(), self.typ(expected))
+ def test_keep_encoded_newlines(self):
+ msg = self.msgmaker(self.typ(textwrap.dedent("""\
+ To: nobody
+ Subject: Bad subject=?UTF-8?Q?=0A?=Bcc: injection@example.com
+
+ None
+ """)))
+ expected = textwrap.dedent("""\
+ To: nobody
+ Subject: Bad subject=?UTF-8?Q?=0A?=Bcc: injection@example.com
+
+ None
+ """)
+ s = self.ioclass()
+ g = self.genclass(s, policy=self.policy.clone(max_line_length=80))
+ g.flatten(msg)
+ self.assertEqual(s.getvalue(), self.typ(expected))
+
+ def test_keep_long_encoded_newlines(self):
+ msg = self.msgmaker(self.typ(textwrap.dedent("""\
+ To: nobody
+ Subject: Bad subject=?UTF-8?Q?=0A?=Bcc: injection@example.com
+
+ None
+ """)))
+ expected = textwrap.dedent("""\
+ To: nobody
+ Subject: Bad subject
+ =?utf-8?q?=0A?=Bcc:
+ injection@example.com
+
+ None
+ """)
+ s = self.ioclass()
+ g = self.genclass(s, policy=self.policy.clone(max_line_length=30))
+ g.flatten(msg)
+ self.assertEqual(s.getvalue(), self.typ(expected))
+
class TestGenerator(TestGeneratorBase, TestEmailBase):
@@ -224,6 +263,29 @@ class TestGenerator(TestGeneratorBase, T
ioclass = io.StringIO
typ = str
+ def test_verify_generated_headers(self):
+ """gh-121650: by default the generator prevents header injection"""
+ class LiteralHeader(str):
+ name = 'Header'
+ def fold(self, **kwargs):
+ return self
+
+ for text in (
+ 'Value\r\nBad Injection\r\n',
+ 'NoNewLine'
+ ):
+ with self.subTest(text=text):
+ message = message_from_string(
+ "Header: Value\r\n\r\nBody",
+ policy=self.policy,
+ )
+
+ del message['Header']
+ message['Header'] = LiteralHeader(text)
+
+ with self.assertRaises(email.errors.HeaderWriteError):
+ message.as_string()
+
class TestBytesGenerator(TestGeneratorBase, TestEmailBase):
--- a/Lib/test/test_email/test_policy.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_email/test_policy.py
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ class PolicyAPITests(unittest.TestCase):
'raise_on_defect': False,
'mangle_from_': True,
'message_factory': None,
+ 'verify_generated_headers': True,
}
# These default values are the ones set on email.policy.default.
# If any of these defaults change, the docs must be updated.
@@ -277,6 +278,31 @@ class PolicyAPITests(unittest.TestCase):
with self.assertRaises(email.errors.HeaderParseError):
policy.fold("Subject", subject)
+ def test_verify_generated_headers(self):
+ """Turning protection off allows header injection"""
+ policy = email.policy.default.clone(verify_generated_headers=False)
+ for text in (
+ 'Header: Value\r\nBad: Injection\r\n',
+ 'Header: NoNewLine'
+ ):
+ with self.subTest(text=text):
+ message = email.message_from_string(
+ "Header: Value\r\n\r\nBody",
+ policy=policy,
+ )
+ class LiteralHeader(str):
+ name = 'Header'
+ def fold(self, **kwargs):
+ return self
+
+ del message['Header']
+ message['Header'] = LiteralHeader(text)
+
+ self.assertEqual(
+ message.as_string(),
+ f"{text}\nBody",
+ )
+
# XXX: Need subclassing tests.
# For adding subclassed objects, make sure the usual rules apply (subclass
# wins), but that the order still works (right overrides left).
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-07-27-16-10-41.gh-issue-121650.nf6oc9.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+:mod:`email` headers with embedded newlines are now quoted on output. The
+:mod:`~email.generator` will now refuse to serialize (write) headers that
+are unsafely folded or delimited; see
+:attr:`~email.policy.Policy.verify_generated_headers`. (Contributed by Bas
+Bloemsaat and Petr Viktorin in :gh:`121650`.)

142
CVE-2024-8088-inf-loop-zipfile_Path.patch
View File

@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
From dcb320a0c85713c5dfe89a83d6eb295ad1511be8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason R. Coombs" <jaraco@jaraco.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2024 17:10:30 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] [3.8] [3.9] [3.11] gh-123270: Replaced SanitizedNames with a
more surgical fix. (GH-123354)
Applies changes from zipp 3.20.1 and jaraco/zippGH-124
(cherry picked from commit 2231286d78d328c2f575e0b05b16fe447d1656d6)
(cherry picked from commit 17b77bb41409259bad1cd6c74761c18b6ab1e860)
(cherry picked from commit 66d3383)
Co-authored-by: Jason R. Coombs <jaraco@jaraco.com>
---
Lib/test/test_zipfile.py | 75 ++++++++++
Lib/zipfile.py | 9 -
Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-08-26-13-45-20.gh-issue-123270.gXHvNJ.rst | 3
3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-08-26-13-45-20.gh-issue-123270.gXHvNJ.rst
Index: Python-3.8.19/Lib/test/test_zipfile.py
===================================================================
--- Python-3.8.19.orig/Lib/test/test_zipfile.py
+++ Python-3.8.19/Lib/test/test_zipfile.py
@@ -3007,6 +3007,81 @@ class TestPath(unittest.TestCase):
data = ['/'.join(string.ascii_lowercase + str(n)) for n in range(10000)]
zipfile.CompleteDirs._implied_dirs(data)
+ def test_malformed_paths(self):
+ """
+ Path should handle malformed paths gracefully.
+
+ Paths with leading slashes are not visible.
+
+ Paths with dots are treated like regular files.
+ """
+ data = io.BytesIO()
+ zf = zipfile.ZipFile(data, "w")
+ zf.writestr("../parent.txt", b"content")
+ zf.filename = ''
+ root = zipfile.Path(zf)
+ assert list(map(str, root.iterdir())) == ['../']
+ assert root.joinpath('..').joinpath('parent.txt').read_bytes() == b'content'
+
+ def test_unsupported_names(self):
+ """
+ Path segments with special characters are readable.
+
+ On some platforms or file systems, characters like
+ ``:`` and ``?`` are not allowed, but they are valid
+ in the zip file.
+ """
+ data = io.BytesIO()
+ zf = zipfile.ZipFile(data, "w")
+ zf.writestr("path?", b"content")
+ zf.writestr("V: NMS.flac", b"fLaC...")
+ zf.filename = ''
+ root = zipfile.Path(zf)
+ contents = root.iterdir()
+ assert next(contents).name == 'path?'
+ assert next(contents).name == 'V: NMS.flac'
+ assert root.joinpath('V: NMS.flac').read_bytes() == b"fLaC..."
+
+ def test_backslash_not_separator(self):
+ """
+ In a zip file, backslashes are not separators.
+ """
+ data = io.BytesIO()
+ zf = zipfile.ZipFile(data, "w")
+ zf.writestr(DirtyZipInfo.for_name("foo\\bar", zf), b"content")
+ zf.filename = ''
+ root = zipfile.Path(zf)
+ (first,) = root.iterdir()
+ assert not first.is_dir()
+ assert first.name == 'foo\\bar'
+
+
+class DirtyZipInfo(zipfile.ZipInfo):
+ """
+ Bypass name sanitization.
+ """
+
+ def __init__(self, filename, *args, **kwargs):
+ super().__init__(filename, *args, **kwargs)
+ self.filename = filename
+
+ @classmethod
+ def for_name(cls, name, archive):
+ """
+ Construct the same way that ZipFile.writestr does.
+
+ TODO: extract this functionality and re-use
+ """
+ self = cls(filename=name, date_time=time.localtime(time.time())[:6])
+ self.compress_type = archive.compression
+ self.compress_level = archive.compresslevel
+ if self.filename.endswith('/'): # pragma: no cover
+ self.external_attr = 0o40775 << 16 # drwxrwxr-x
+ self.external_attr |= 0x10 # MS-DOS directory flag
+ else:
+ self.external_attr = 0o600 << 16 # ?rw-------
+ return self
+
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
Index: Python-3.8.19/Lib/zipfile.py
===================================================================
--- Python-3.8.19.orig/Lib/zipfile.py
+++ Python-3.8.19/Lib/zipfile.py
@@ -2161,7 +2161,7 @@ def _parents(path):
def _ancestry(path):
"""
Given a path with elements separated by
- posixpath.sep, generate all elements of that path
+ posixpath.sep, generate all elements of that path.
>>> list(_ancestry('b/d'))
['b/d', 'b']
@@ -2173,9 +2173,14 @@ def _ancestry(path):
['b']
>>> list(_ancestry(''))
[]
+
+ Multiple separators are treated like a single.
+
+ >>> list(_ancestry('//b//d///f//'))
+ ['//b//d///f', '//b//d', '//b']
"""
path = path.rstrip(posixpath.sep)
- while path and path != posixpath.sep:
+ while path.rstrip(posixpath.sep):
yield path
path, tail = posixpath.split(path)
Index: Python-3.8.19/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-08-26-13-45-20.gh-issue-123270.gXHvNJ.rst
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ Python-3.8.19/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-08-26-13-45-20.gh-issue-123270.gXHvNJ.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Applied a more surgical fix for malformed payloads in :class:`zipfile.Path`
+causing infinite loops (gh-122905) without breaking contents using
+legitimate characters.

3
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31
gh120226-fix-sendfile-test-kernel-610.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
From 1b3f6523a5c83323cdc44031b33a1c062e5dc698 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2024 23:51:32 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] gh-120226: Fix
test_sendfile_close_peer_in_the_middle_of_receiving on Linux >= 6.10
(GH-120227)
The worst case is that the kernel buffers 17 pages with a page size of 64k.
(cherry picked from commit a7584245661102a5768c643fbd7db8395fd3c90e)
Co-authored-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
---
Lib/test/test_asyncio/test_sendfile.py | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/Lib/test/test_asyncio/test_sendfile.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_asyncio/test_sendfile.py
@@ -86,9 +86,10 @@ class MyProto(asyncio.Protocol):
class SendfileBase:
- # 128 KiB plus small unaligned to buffer chunk
- DATA = b"SendfileBaseData" * (1024 * 8 + 1)
-
+ # Linux >= 6.10 seems buffering up to 17 pages of data.
+ # So DATA should be large enough to make this test reliable even with a
+ # 64 KiB page configuration.
+ DATA = b"x" * (1024 * 17 * 64 + 1)
# Reduce socket buffer size to test on relative small data sets.
BUF_SIZE = 4 * 1024 # 4 KiB

79
old-libexpat.patch
View File

@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
---
Lib/test/test_sax.py | 10 +++++-----
Lib/test/test_xml_etree.py | 17 ++++++++---------
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/Lib/test/test_sax.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_sax.py
@@ -1207,10 +1207,9 @@ class ExpatReaderTest(XmlTestBase):
self.assertEqual(result.getvalue(), start + b"<doc>text</doc>")
+ @unittest.skipIf(pyexpat.version_info < (2, 6, 0),
+ "Reparse deferral not defined for libexpat < 2.6.0")
def test_flush_reparse_deferral_enabled(self):
- if pyexpat.version_info < (2, 6, 0):
- self.skipTest(f'Expat {pyexpat.version_info} does not support reparse deferral')
-
result = BytesIO()
xmlgen = XMLGenerator(result)
parser = create_parser()
@@ -1232,6 +1231,8 @@ class ExpatReaderTest(XmlTestBase):
self.assertEqual(result.getvalue(), start + b"<doc></doc>")
+ @unittest.skipIf(pyexpat.version_info < (2, 6, 0),
+ "Reparse deferral not defined for libexpat < 2.6.0")
def test_flush_reparse_deferral_disabled(self):
result = BytesIO()
xmlgen = XMLGenerator(result)
@@ -1241,8 +1242,7 @@ class ExpatReaderTest(XmlTestBase):
for chunk in ("<doc", ">"):
parser.feed(chunk)
- if pyexpat.version_info >= (2, 6, 0):
- parser._parser.SetReparseDeferralEnabled(False)
+ parser._parser.SetReparseDeferralEnabled(False)
self.assertEqual(result.getvalue(), start) # i.e. no elements started
self.assertFalse(parser._parser.GetReparseDeferralEnabled())
--- a/Lib/test/test_xml_etree.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_xml_etree.py
@@ -1494,11 +1494,9 @@ class XMLPullParserTest(unittest.TestCas
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
ET.XMLPullParser(events=('start', 'end', 'bogus'))
+ @unittest.skipIf(pyexpat.version_info < (2, 6, 0),
+ "Reparse deferral not defined for libexpat < 2.6.0")
def test_flush_reparse_deferral_enabled(self):
- if pyexpat.version_info < (2, 6, 0):
- self.skipTest(f'Expat {pyexpat.version_info} does not '
- 'support reparse deferral')
-
parser = ET.XMLPullParser(events=('start', 'end'))
for chunk in ("<doc", ">"):
@@ -1519,17 +1517,18 @@ class XMLPullParserTest(unittest.TestCas
self.assert_event_tags(parser, [('end', 'doc')])
+ @unittest.skipIf(pyexpat.version_info < (2, 6, 0),
+ "Reparse deferral not defined for libexpat < 2.6.0")
def test_flush_reparse_deferral_disabled(self):
parser = ET.XMLPullParser(events=('start', 'end'))
for chunk in ("<doc", ">"):
parser.feed(chunk)
- if pyexpat.version_info >= (2, 6, 0):
- if not ET is pyET:
- self.skipTest(f'XMLParser.(Get|Set)ReparseDeferralEnabled '
- 'methods not available in C')
- parser._parser._parser.SetReparseDeferralEnabled(False)
+ if not ET is pyET:
+ self.skipTest(f'XMLParser.(Get|Set)ReparseDeferralEnabled '
+ 'methods not available in C')
+ parser._parser._parser.SetReparseDeferralEnabled(False)
self.assert_event_tags(parser, []) # i.e. no elements started
if ET is pyET:

90
python38.changes
View File

@ -1,3 +1,93 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Sep 9 20:27:46 UTC 2024 - Matej Cepl <mcepl@cepl.eu>
- Update to 3.8.20:
- Tests
- gh-112769: The tests now correctly compare zlib version when
:const:`zlib.ZLIB_RUNTIME_VERSION` contains non-integer suffixes. For
example zlib-ng defines the version as ``1.3.0.zlib-ng``.
- gh-117187: Fix XML tests for vanilla Expat <2.6.0.
- Security
- gh-123678: Upgrade libexpat to 2.6.3
- gh-121957: Fixed missing audit events around interactive use of Python,
now also properly firing for ``python -i``, as well as for ``python -m
asyncio``. The event in question is ``cpython.run_stdin``.
- gh-122133: Authenticate the socket connection for the
``socket.socketpair()`` fallback on platforms where ``AF_UNIX`` is not
available like Windows.
Patch by Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org> and Seth Larson
<seth@python.org>. Reported by Ellie <el@horse64.org>
- gh-121285: Remove backtracking from tarfile header parsing for
``hdrcharset``, PAX, and GNU sparse headers
(bsc#1230227, CVE-2024-6232).
- gh-118486: :func:`os.mkdir` on Windows now accepts *mode* of ``0o700`` to
restrict the new directory to the current user. This fixes CVE-2024-4030
affecting :func:`tempfile.mkdtemp` in scenarios where the base temporary
directory is more permissive than the default.
- gh-114572: :meth:`ssl.SSLContext.cert_store_stats` and
:meth:`ssl.SSLContext.get_ca_certs` now correctly lock access to the
certificate store, when the :class:`ssl.SSLContext` is shared across
multiple threads (bsc#1226447, CVE-2024-0397).
- gh-116741: Update bundled libexpat to 2.6.2
- Library
- gh-123270: Applied a more surgical fix for malformed payloads in
:class:`zipfile.Path` causing infinite loops (gh-122905) without breaking
contents using legitimate characters (bsc#1229704, CVE-2024-8088).
- gh-123067: Fix quadratic complexity in parsing ``"``-quoted cookie values
with backslashes by :mod:`http.cookies`.
- gh-121650: :mod:`email` headers with embedded newlines are now quoted on
output. The :mod:`~email.generator` will now refuse to serialize (write)
headers that are unsafely folded or delimited; see
:attr:`~email.policy.Policy.verify_generated_headers`. (Contributed by Bas
Bloemsaat and Petr Viktorin in :gh:`121650`; CVE-2024-6923, bsc#1228780).
- gh-113171: Fixed various false positives and false negatives in
* :attr:`ipaddress.IPv4Address.is_private` (see these docs for details)
* :attr:`ipaddress.IPv4Address.is_global`
* :attr:`ipaddress.IPv6Address.is_private`
* :attr:`ipaddress.IPv6Address.is_global`
Also in the corresponding :class:`ipaddress.IPv4Network` and
:class:`ipaddress.IPv6Network` attributes.
Fixes bsc#1226448 (CVE-2024-4032).
- gh-102988: :func:`email.utils.getaddresses` and
:func:`email.utils.parseaddr` now return ``('', '')`` 2-tuples in more
situations where invalid email addresses are encountered instead of
potentially inaccurate values. Add optional *strict* parameter to these
two functions: use ``strict=False`` to get the old behavior, accept
malformed inputs. ``getattr(email.utils, 'supports_strict_parsing',
False)`` can be use to check if the *strict* paramater is available. Patch
by Thomas Dwyer and Victor Stinner to improve the CVE-2023-27043 fix
(bsc#1210638).
- gh-67693: Fix :func:`urllib.parse.urlunparse` and
:func:`urllib.parse.urlunsplit` for URIs with path starting with multiple
slashes and no authority. Based on patch by Ashwin Ramaswami.
- Core and Builtins
- gh-112275: A deadlock involving ``pystate.c``'s ``HEAD_LOCK`` in
``posixmodule.c`` at fork is now fixed. Patch by ChuBoning based on
previous Python 3.12 fix by Victor Stinner.
- Remove upstreamed patches:
- old-libexpat.patch
- CVE-2024-4032-private-IP-addrs.patch
- CVE-2024-6923-email-hdr-inject.patch
- CVE-2024-6232-cookies-quad-complex.patch
- CVE-2023-27043-email-parsing-errors.patch
- CVE-2024-8088-inf-loop-zipfile_Path.patch
- CVE-2024-0397-memrace_ssl.SSLContext_cert_store.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Sep 5 13:44:48 UTC 2024 - Matej Cepl <mcepl@cepl.eu>
- Add CVE-2024-6232-cookies-quad-complex.patch to avoid quadratic
complexity in parsing "-quoted cookie values with backslashes
(bsc#1229596, CVE-2024-6232).
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Sep 2 09:44:26 UTC 2024 - Matej Cepl <mcepl@cepl.eu>
- Add gh120226-fix-sendfile-test-kernel-610.patch to avoid
failing test_sendfile_close_peer_in_the_middle_of_receiving
tests on Linux >= 6.10 (GH-120227).
------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------
Wed Aug 28 16:54:34 UTC 2024 - Matej Cepl <mcepl@cepl.eu> Wed Aug 28 16:54:34 UTC 2024 - Matej Cepl <mcepl@cepl.eu>

32
python38.spec
View File

@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
%define dynlib() %{sitedir}/lib-dynload/%{1}.cpython-%{abi_tag}-%{archname}-%{_os}%{?_gnu}%{?armsuffix}.so %define dynlib() %{sitedir}/lib-dynload/%{1}.cpython-%{abi_tag}-%{archname}-%{_os}%{?_gnu}%{?armsuffix}.so
%bcond_without profileopt %bcond_without profileopt
Name: %{python_pkg_name}%{psuffix} Name: %{python_pkg_name}%{psuffix}
Version: 3.8.19 Version: 3.8.20
Release: 0 Release: 0
Summary: Python 3 Interpreter Summary: Python 3 Interpreter
License: Python-2.0 License: Python-2.0
@ -185,31 +185,16 @@ Patch38: 98437-sphinx.locale._-as-gettext-in-pyspecific.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM 99366-patch.dict-can-decorate-async.patch bsc#[0-9]+ mcepl@suse.com # PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM 99366-patch.dict-can-decorate-async.patch bsc#[0-9]+ mcepl@suse.com
# Patch for gh#python/cpython#98086 # Patch for gh#python/cpython#98086
Patch41: 99366-patch.dict-can-decorate-async.patch Patch41: 99366-patch.dict-can-decorate-async.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2023-27043-email-parsing-errors.patch bsc#1210638 mcepl@suse.com
# Detect email address parsing errors and return empty tuple to
# indicate the parsing error (old API), from gh#python/cpython!105127
Patch42: CVE-2023-27043-email-parsing-errors.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM old-libexpat.patch gh#python/cpython#117187 mcepl@suse.com
# Make the test suite work with libexpat < 2.6.0
Patch43: old-libexpat.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2024-0397-memrace_ssl.SSLContext_cert_store.patch bsc#1226447 mcepl@suse.com
# removes memory race condition in ssl.SSLContext certificate store methods
Patch44: CVE-2024-0397-memrace_ssl.SSLContext_cert_store.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2024-4032-private-IP-addrs.patch bsc#1226448 mcepl@suse.com
# rearrange definition of private v global IP addresses
Patch45: CVE-2024-4032-private-IP-addrs.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM bso1227999-reproducible-builds.patch bsc#1227999 mcepl@suse.com # PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM bso1227999-reproducible-builds.patch bsc#1227999 mcepl@suse.com
# reproducibility patches # reproducibility patches
Patch46: bso1227999-reproducible-builds.patch Patch46: bso1227999-reproducible-builds.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2024-6923-email-hdr-inject.patch bsc#1228780 mcepl@suse.com
# prevent email header injection, patch from gh#python/cpython!122608
Patch47: CVE-2024-6923-email-hdr-inject.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2024-5642-OpenSSL-API-buf-overread-NPN.patch bsc#1227233 mcepl@suse.com # PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2024-5642-OpenSSL-API-buf-overread-NPN.patch bsc#1227233 mcepl@suse.com
# Remove for support for anything but OpenSSL 1.1.1 or newer # Remove for support for anything but OpenSSL 1.1.1 or newer
Patch48: CVE-2024-5642-OpenSSL-API-buf-overread-NPN.patch Patch48: CVE-2024-5642-OpenSSL-API-buf-overread-NPN.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2024-8088-inf-loop-zipfile_Path.patch bsc#1229704 mcepl@suse.com # PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM gh120226-fix-sendfile-test-kernel-610.patch gh#python/cpython#120226 mcepl@suse.com
# avoid denial of service in zipfile # Fix test_sendfile_close_peer_in_the_middle_of_receiving on Linux >= 6.10 (GH-120227)
Patch49: CVE-2024-8088-inf-loop-zipfile_Path.patch Patch50: gh120226-fix-sendfile-test-kernel-610.patch
BuildRequires: autoconf-archive BuildRequires: autoconf-archive
BuildRequires: automake BuildRequires: automake
BuildRequires: fdupes BuildRequires: fdupes
@ -480,14 +465,9 @@ other applications.
%patch -p1 -P 37 %patch -p1 -P 37
%patch -p1 -P 38 %patch -p1 -P 38
%patch -p1 -P 41 %patch -p1 -P 41
%patch -p1 -P 42
%patch -p1 -P 43
%patch -p1 -P 44
%patch -p1 -P 45
%patch -p1 -P 46 %patch -p1 -P 46
%patch -p1 -P 47
%patch -p1 -P 48 %patch -p1 -P 48
%patch -p1 -P 49 %patch -p1 -P 50
# drop Autoconf version requirement # drop Autoconf version requirement
sed -i 's/^AC_PREREQ/dnl AC_PREREQ/' configure.ac sed -i 's/^AC_PREREQ/dnl AC_PREREQ/' configure.ac