3d5fb0946f
for update_git.sh OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Virtualization/qemu?expand=0&rev=62
86 lines
2.8 KiB
Diff
86 lines
2.8 KiB
Diff
From a1508f441692e958ee11ac10648ed7941c242be8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
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Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2011 09:23:23 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH] linux-user: add open() hijack infrastructure
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There are a number of files in /proc that expose host information
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to the guest program. This patch adds infrastructure to override
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the open() syscall for guest programs to enable us to on the fly
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generate guest sensible files.
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Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
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---
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linux-user/syscall.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
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1 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/linux-user/syscall.c b/linux-user/syscall.c
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index f170724..1ecc0e1 100644
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--- a/linux-user/syscall.c
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+++ b/linux-user/syscall.c
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@@ -4603,6 +4603,52 @@ int get_osversion(void)
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return osversion;
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}
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+static int do_open(void *cpu_env, const char *pathname, int flags, mode_t mode)
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+{
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+ struct fake_open {
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+ const char *filename;
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+ int (*fill)(void *cpu_env, int fd);
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+ };
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+ const struct fake_open *fake_open;
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+ static const struct fake_open fakes[] = {
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+ { NULL, NULL }
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+ };
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+
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+ for (fake_open = fakes; fake_open->filename; fake_open++) {
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+ if (!strncmp(pathname, fake_open->filename,
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+ strlen(fake_open->filename))) {
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+ break;
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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+ if (fake_open->filename) {
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+ const char *tmpdir;
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+ char filename[PATH_MAX];
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+ int fd, r;
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+
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+ /* create temporary file to map stat to */
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+ tmpdir = getenv("TMPDIR");
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+ if (!tmpdir)
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+ tmpdir = "/tmp";
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+ snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/qemu-open.XXXXXX", tmpdir);
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+ fd = mkstemp(filename);
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+ if (fd < 0) {
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+ return fd;
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+ }
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+ unlink(filename);
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+
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+ if ((r = fake_open->fill(cpu_env, fd))) {
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+ close(fd);
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+ return r;
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+ }
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+ lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
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+
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+ return fd;
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+ }
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+
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+ return get_errno(open(path(pathname), flags, mode));
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+}
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+
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/* do_syscall() should always have a single exit point at the end so
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that actions, such as logging of syscall results, can be performed.
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All errnos that do_syscall() returns must be -TARGET_<errcode>. */
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@@ -4688,9 +4734,9 @@ abi_long do_syscall(void *cpu_env, int num, abi_long arg1,
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case TARGET_NR_open:
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if (!(p = lock_user_string(arg1)))
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goto efault;
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- ret = get_errno(open(path(p),
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- target_to_host_bitmask(arg2, fcntl_flags_tbl),
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- arg3));
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+ ret = get_errno(do_open(cpu_env, p,
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+ target_to_host_bitmask(arg2, fcntl_flags_tbl),
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+ arg3));
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unlock_user(p, arg1, 0);
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break;
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#if defined(TARGET_NR_openat) && defined(__NR_openat)
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