e2a042f066
Fix CVE-2013-4148 (bnc#864812), CVE-2013-4149 (bnc#864649), CVE-2013-4150 (bnc#864650), CVE-2013-4151 (bnc#864653), CVE-2013-4526 (bnc#864671), CVE-2013-4527 (bnc#864673), CVE-2013-4529 (bnc#864678), CVE-2013-4530 (bnc#864682), CVE-2013-4531 (bnc#864796), CVE-2013-4533 (bnc#864655), CVE-2013-4534 (bnc#864811), CVE-2013-4535 / CVE-2013-4536 (bnc#864665), CVE-2013-4537 (bnc#864391), CVE-2013-4538 (bnc#864769), CVE-2013-4539 (bnc#864805), CVE-2013-4540 (bnc#864801), CVE-2013-4541 (bnc#864802), CVE-2013-4542 (bnc#864804), CVE-2013-6399 (bnc#864814), CVE-2014-0182 (bnc#874788) OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/235280 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Virtualization/qemu?expand=0&rev=211
61 lines
2.3 KiB
Diff
61 lines
2.3 KiB
Diff
From 2eae80d0ad4c9d0de849fbe8ad6d7d5fa788fdfb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
|
From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
|
|
Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2014 16:08:21 +0300
|
|
Subject: [PATCH] virtio-net: out-of-bounds buffer write on load
|
|
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
|
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
|
|
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
|
|
|
CVE-2013-4149 QEMU 1.3.0 out-of-bounds buffer write in
|
|
virtio_net_load()@hw/net/virtio-net.c
|
|
|
|
> } else if (n->mac_table.in_use) {
|
|
> uint8_t *buf = g_malloc0(n->mac_table.in_use);
|
|
|
|
We are allocating buffer of size n->mac_table.in_use
|
|
|
|
> qemu_get_buffer(f, buf, n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);
|
|
|
|
and read to the n->mac_table.in_use size buffer n->mac_table.in_use *
|
|
ETH_ALEN bytes, corrupting memory.
|
|
|
|
If adversary controls state then memory written there is controlled
|
|
by adversary.
|
|
|
|
Reviewed-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
|
|
(cherry picked from commit 98f93ddd84800f207889491e0b5d851386b459cf)
|
|
[AF: BNC#864649]
|
|
Signed-off-by: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
|
|
---
|
|
hw/net/virtio-net.c | 15 +++++++++++----
|
|
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
|
|
|
diff --git a/hw/net/virtio-net.c b/hw/net/virtio-net.c
|
|
index 0a8cb40..940a7cf 100644
|
|
--- a/hw/net/virtio-net.c
|
|
+++ b/hw/net/virtio-net.c
|
|
@@ -1362,10 +1362,17 @@ static int virtio_net_load(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, int version_id)
|
|
if (n->mac_table.in_use <= MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES) {
|
|
qemu_get_buffer(f, n->mac_table.macs,
|
|
n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);
|
|
- } else if (n->mac_table.in_use) {
|
|
- uint8_t *buf = g_malloc0(n->mac_table.in_use);
|
|
- qemu_get_buffer(f, buf, n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);
|
|
- g_free(buf);
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
+ int64_t i;
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* Overflow detected - can happen if source has a larger MAC table.
|
|
+ * We simply set overflow flag so there's no need to maintain the
|
|
+ * table of addresses, discard them all.
|
|
+ * Note: 64 bit math to avoid integer overflow.
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ for (i = 0; i < (int64_t)n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN; ++i) {
|
|
+ qemu_get_byte(f);
|
|
+ }
|
|
n->mac_table.multi_overflow = n->mac_table.uni_overflow = 1;
|
|
n->mac_table.in_use = 0;
|
|
}
|