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Accepting request 1035798 from home:joeyli:branches:devel:openSUSE:Factory

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Add shim-jscPED-127-upgrade-shim-in-SLE15-SP5.patch for backporting the following patches between 15.6 with aa1b289a1a (jsc#PED-127)

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1035798
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/devel:openSUSE:Factory/shim?expand=0&rev=194
This commit is contained in:
Joey Lee 2022-11-15 09:50:55 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
parent 63e4498fc9
commit e8b8c97820
5 changed files with 1028 additions and 21 deletions
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240
shim-Enable-TDX-measurement-to-RTMR-register.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
From 4fd484e4c29364b4fdf4d043556fa0a210c5fdfc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lu Ken <ken.lu@intel.com>
Date: Sun, 22 May 2022 16:02:20 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] Enable TDX measurement to RTMR register
Intel Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX) extends Virtual Machine
Extensions (VMX) and Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption (MK-TME) with a
new kind of virtual machine guest called a Trust Domain(TD)[1]. A TD
runs in a CPU mode that is designed to protect the confidentiality of
its memory contents and its CPU state from any other software, including
the hosting Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM).
Trust Domain Virtual Firmware (TDVF) is required to provide Intel TDX
implementation and service for EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL[2]. The bugzilla
for TDVF is at https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3625.
To support CC measurement/attestation with Intel TDX technology, these 4
RTMR registers will be extended by TDX service like TPM/TPM2 PCR:
- RTMR[0] for TDVF configuration
- RTMR[1] for the TD OS loader and kernel
- RTMR[2] for the OS application
- RTMR[3] reserved for special usage only
Add a TDX Implementation for CC Measurement protocol along with
TPM/TPM2 protocol.
References:
[1] https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-whitepaper-v4.pdf
[2] https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-virtual-firmware-design-guide-rev-1.pdf
[3] https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-tdx-guest-hypervisor-communication-interface-1.0-344426-002.pdf
Signed-off-by: Lu Ken <ken.lu@intel.com>
[rharwood: style pass on code and commit message]
Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
---
include/cc.h | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/guid.h | 1 +
lib/guid.c | 1 +
shim.h | 1 +
tpm.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 136 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 include/cc.h
diff --git a/include/cc.h b/include/cc.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8b12720
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/cc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+
+#ifndef SHIM_CC_H
+#define SHIM_CC_H
+
+typedef struct {
+ uint8_t Major;
+ uint8_t Minor;
+} EFI_CC_VERSION;
+
+#define EFI_CC_TYPE_NONE 0
+#define EFI_CC_TYPE_SEV 1
+#define EFI_CC_TYPE_TDX 2
+
+typedef struct {
+ uint8_t Type;
+ uint8_t SubType;
+} EFI_CC_TYPE;
+
+typedef uint32_t EFI_CC_EVENT_LOG_BITMAP;
+typedef uint32_t EFI_CC_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT;
+typedef uint32_t EFI_CC_EVENT_ALGORITHM_BITMAP;
+typedef uint32_t EFI_CC_MR_INDEX;
+
+#define TDX_MR_INDEX_MRTD 0
+#define TDX_MR_INDEX_RTMR0 1
+#define TDX_MR_INDEX_RTMR1 2
+#define TDX_MR_INDEX_RTMR2 3
+#define TDX_MR_INDEX_RTMR3 4
+
+#define EFI_CC_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2 0x00000002
+#define EFI_CC_BOOT_HASH_ALG_SHA384 0x00000004
+#define EFI_CC_EVENT_HEADER_VERSION 1
+
+typedef struct tdEFI_CC_EVENT_HEADER {
+ uint32_t HeaderSize;
+ uint16_t HeaderVersion;
+ EFI_CC_MR_INDEX MrIndex;
+ uint32_t EventType;
+} __attribute__((packed)) EFI_CC_EVENT_HEADER;
+
+typedef struct tdEFI_CC_EVENT {
+ uint32_t Size;
+ EFI_CC_EVENT_HEADER Header;
+ uint8_t Event[1];
+} __attribute__((packed)) EFI_CC_EVENT;
+
+typedef struct tdEFI_CC_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY {
+ uint8_t Size;
+ EFI_CC_VERSION StructureVersion;
+ EFI_CC_VERSION ProtocolVersion;
+ EFI_CC_EVENT_ALGORITHM_BITMAP HashAlgorithmBitmap;
+ EFI_CC_EVENT_LOG_BITMAP SupportedEventLogs;
+ EFI_CC_TYPE CcType;
+} EFI_CC_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY;
+
+struct efi_cc_protocol
+{
+ EFI_STATUS (EFIAPI *get_capability) (
+ struct efi_cc_protocol *this,
+ EFI_CC_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY *ProtocolCapability);
+ EFI_STATUS (EFIAPI *get_event_log) (
+ struct efi_cc_protocol *this,
+ EFI_CC_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT EventLogFormat,
+ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS *EventLogLocation,
+ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS *EventLogLastEntry,
+ BOOLEAN *EventLogTruncated);
+ EFI_STATUS (EFIAPI *hash_log_extend_event) (
+ struct efi_cc_protocol *this,
+ uint64_t Flags,
+ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS DataToHash,
+ uint64_t DataToHashLen,
+ EFI_CC_EVENT *EfiCcEvent);
+ EFI_STATUS (EFIAPI *map_pcr_to_mr_index) (
+ struct efi_cc_protocol *this,
+ uint32_t PcrIndex,
+ EFI_CC_MR_INDEX *MrIndex);
+};
+
+typedef struct efi_cc_protocol efi_cc_protocol_t;
+
+#define EFI_CC_FLAG_PE_COFF_IMAGE 0x0000000000000010
+
+#endif /* SHIM_CC_H */
+// vim:fenc=utf-8:tw=75
diff --git a/include/guid.h b/include/guid.h
index d9910ff..dad63f0 100644
--- a/include/guid.h
+++ b/include/guid.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ extern EFI_GUID EFI_IP6_CONFIG_GUID;
extern EFI_GUID EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_GUID;
extern EFI_GUID EFI_TPM_GUID;
extern EFI_GUID EFI_TPM2_GUID;
+extern EFI_GUID EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL_GUID;
extern EFI_GUID EFI_SECURE_BOOT_DB_GUID;
extern EFI_GUID EFI_SIMPLE_FILE_SYSTEM_GUID;
extern EFI_GUID SECURITY_PROTOCOL_GUID;
diff --git a/lib/guid.c b/lib/guid.c
index e100c92..904629e 100644
--- a/lib/guid.c
+++ b/lib/guid.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ EFI_GUID EFI_IP6_CONFIG_GUID = { 0x937fe521, 0x95ae, 0x4d1a, {0x89, 0x29, 0x48,
EFI_GUID EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_GUID = EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL_GUID;
EFI_GUID EFI_TPM_GUID = { 0xf541796d, 0xa62e, 0x4954, {0xa7, 0x75, 0x95, 0x84, 0xf6, 0x1b, 0x9c, 0xdd } };
EFI_GUID EFI_TPM2_GUID = { 0x607f766c, 0x7455, 0x42be, {0x93, 0x0b, 0xe4, 0xd7, 0x6d, 0xb2, 0x72, 0x0f } };
+EFI_GUID EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL_GUID = { 0x96751a3d, 0x72f4, 0x41a6, {0xa7, 0x94, 0xed, 0x5d, 0x0e, 0x67, 0xae, 0x6b } };
EFI_GUID EFI_SECURE_BOOT_DB_GUID = { 0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, { 0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f } };
EFI_GUID EFI_SIMPLE_FILE_SYSTEM_GUID = SIMPLE_FILE_SYSTEM_PROTOCOL;
EFI_GUID SECURITY_PROTOCOL_GUID = { 0xA46423E3, 0x4617, 0x49f1, {0xB9, 0xFF, 0xD1, 0xBF, 0xA9, 0x11, 0x58, 0x39 } };
diff --git a/shim.h b/shim.h
index 7e9d10e..14824c6 100644
--- a/shim.h
+++ b/shim.h
@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@
#include "include/simple_file.h"
#include "include/str.h"
#include "include/tpm.h"
+#include "include/cc.h"
#include "include/ucs2.h"
#include "include/variables.h"
#include "include/hexdump.h"
diff --git a/tpm.c b/tpm.c
index 41f3665..388f8d1 100644
--- a/tpm.c
+++ b/tpm.c
@@ -108,6 +108,45 @@ static EFI_STATUS tpm_locate_protocol(efi_tpm_protocol_t **tpm,
return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
}
+static EFI_STATUS cc_log_event_raw(EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS buf, UINTN size,
+ UINT8 pcr, const CHAR8 *log, UINTN logsize,
+ UINT32 type, BOOLEAN is_pe_image)
+{
+ EFI_STATUS efi_status;
+ EFI_CC_EVENT *event;
+ efi_cc_protocol_t *cc;
+ EFI_CC_MR_INDEX mr;
+ uint64_t flags = is_pe_image ? EFI_CC_FLAG_PE_COFF_IMAGE : 0;
+
+ efi_status = LibLocateProtocol(&EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL_GUID,
+ (VOID **)&cc);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status) || !cc)
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+
+ efi_status = cc->map_pcr_to_mr_index(cc, pcr, &mr);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status))
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+
+ UINTN event_size = sizeof(*event) - sizeof(event->Event) + logsize;
+
+ event = AllocatePool(event_size);
+ if (!event) {
+ perror(L"Unable to allocate event structure\n");
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ event->Header.HeaderSize = sizeof(EFI_CC_EVENT_HEADER);
+ event->Header.HeaderVersion = EFI_CC_EVENT_HEADER_VERSION;
+ event->Header.MrIndex = mr;
+ event->Header.EventType = type;
+ event->Size = event_size;
+ CopyMem(event->Event, (VOID *)log, logsize);
+ efi_status = cc->hash_log_extend_event(cc, flags, buf, (UINT64)size,
+ event);
+ FreePool(event);
+ return efi_status;
+}
+
static EFI_STATUS tpm_log_event_raw(EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS buf, UINTN size,
UINT8 pcr, const CHAR8 *log, UINTN logsize,
UINT32 type, CHAR8 *hash)
@@ -118,6 +157,15 @@ static EFI_STATUS tpm_log_event_raw(EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS buf, UINTN size,
BOOLEAN old_caps;
EFI_TCG2_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY caps;
+ /* CC guest like TDX or SEV will measure the buffer and log the event,
+ extend the result into a specific CC MR like TCG's PCR. It could
+ coexists with TCG's TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.
+ */
+ efi_status = cc_log_event_raw(buf, size, pcr, log, logsize, type,
+ (hash != NULL));
+ if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status))
+ return efi_status;
+
efi_status = tpm_locate_protocol(&tpm, &tpm2, &old_caps, &caps);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
#ifdef REQUIRE_TPM
--
2.35.3

36
shim-bsc1198101-opensuse-cert-prompt.patch
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@ -22,10 +22,10 @@ The state will store in use_openSUSE_cert, a volatile RT variable.
shim.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Index: shim-15.6~rc1+77144e5a/mok.c
Index: shim-15.6/mok.c
===================================================================
--- shim-15.6~rc1+77144e5a.orig/mok.c
+++ shim-15.6~rc1+77144e5a/mok.c
--- shim-15.6.orig/mok.c
+++ shim-15.6/mok.c
@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ static EFI_STATUS check_mok_request(EFI_
check_var(L"MokPW") || check_var(L"MokAuth") ||
check_var(L"MokDel") || check_var(L"MokDB") ||
@ -46,10 +46,10 @@ Index: shim-15.6~rc1+77144e5a/mok.c
return VENDOR_ADDEND_NONE;
}
Index: shim-15.6~rc1+77144e5a/shim.c
Index: shim-15.6/shim.c
===================================================================
--- shim-15.6~rc1+77144e5a.orig/shim.c
+++ shim-15.6~rc1+77144e5a/shim.c
--- shim-15.6.orig/shim.c
+++ shim-15.6/shim.c
@@ -496,6 +496,8 @@ verify_one_signature(WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI
}
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ Index: shim-15.6~rc1+77144e5a/shim.c
#if defined(ENABLE_SHIM_CERT)
/*
* Check against the shim build key
@@ -1572,6 +1574,69 @@ shim_fini(void)
@@ -1568,6 +1570,69 @@ shim_fini(void)
console_fini();
}
@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ Index: shim-15.6~rc1+77144e5a/shim.c
extern EFI_STATUS
efi_main(EFI_HANDLE passed_image_handle, EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *passed_systab);
@@ -1712,6 +1777,9 @@ efi_main (EFI_HANDLE passed_image_handle
@@ -1708,6 +1773,9 @@ efi_main (EFI_HANDLE passed_image_handle
*/
debug_hook();
@ -139,10 +139,10 @@ Index: shim-15.6~rc1+77144e5a/shim.c
efi_status = set_sbat_uefi_variable();
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status) && secure_mode()) {
perror(L"%s variable initialization failed\n", SBAT_VAR_NAME);
Index: shim-15.6~rc1+77144e5a/MokManager.c
Index: shim-15.6/MokManager.c
===================================================================
--- shim-15.6~rc1+77144e5a.orig/MokManager.c
+++ shim-15.6~rc1+77144e5a/MokManager.c
--- shim-15.6.orig/MokManager.c
+++ shim-15.6/MokManager.c
@@ -1864,6 +1864,36 @@ mokpw_done:
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
@ -280,10 +280,10 @@ Index: shim-15.6~rc1+77144e5a/MokManager.c
LibDeleteVariable(L"MokAuth", &SHIM_LOCK_GUID);
LibDeleteVariable(L"MokDelAuth", &SHIM_LOCK_GUID);
LibDeleteVariable(L"MokXAuth", &SHIM_LOCK_GUID);
Index: shim-15.6~rc1+77144e5a/globals.c
Index: shim-15.6/globals.c
===================================================================
--- shim-15.6~rc1+77144e5a.orig/globals.c
+++ shim-15.6~rc1+77144e5a/globals.c
--- shim-15.6.orig/globals.c
+++ shim-15.6/globals.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ UINT8 *build_cert;
*/
verification_method_t verification_method;
@ -292,11 +292,11 @@ Index: shim-15.6~rc1+77144e5a/globals.c
UINT8 user_insecure_mode;
UINT8 ignore_db;
Index: shim-15.6~rc1+77144e5a/shim.h
Index: shim-15.6/shim.h
===================================================================
--- shim-15.6~rc1+77144e5a.orig/shim.h
+++ shim-15.6~rc1+77144e5a/shim.h
@@ -268,6 +268,7 @@ extern UINT8 mok_policy;
--- shim-15.6.orig/shim.h
+++ shim-15.6/shim.h
@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ extern UINT8 mok_policy;
extern UINT8 in_protocol;
extern void *load_options;
extern UINT32 load_options_size;

672
shim-jscPED-127-upgrade-shim-in-SLE15-SP5.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,672 @@
From 0eb07e11b20680200d3ce9c5bc59299121a75388 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 31 May 2022 22:21:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 01/12] Make SBAT variable payload introspectable
Given a set of EFI variables and boot assets, it should be possible
to compute what the value of PCR 7 will be on the next boot.
As shim manages the contents of the SbatLevel variable and this is
measured to PCR 7, export the payloads that shim contains in a new
COFF section (.sbatlevel) so that it can be introspected by code
outside of shim.
The new section works a bit like .vendor_cert - it contains a header
and then the payload. In this case, the header contains no size fields
because the strings are NULL terminated. Shim uses this new section
internally in set_sbat_uefi_variable.
The .sbatlevel section starts with a 4 byte version field which is
not used by shim but may be useful for external auditors if the
format of the section contents change in the future.
Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
---
Makefile | 7 ++++---
elf_aarch64_efi.lds | 4 ++++
elf_ia32_efi.lds | 4 ++++
elf_ia64_efi.lds | 4 ++++
elf_x86_64_efi.lds | 4 ++++
include/sbat.h | 32 --------------------------------
include/sbat_var_defs.h | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/test.mk | 2 +-
sbat.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
sbat_var.S | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
shim.h | 1 +
11 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/sbat_var_defs.h
create mode 100644 sbat_var.S
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 24ac314..866611c 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -38,9 +38,9 @@ CFLAGS += -DENABLE_SHIM_CERT
else
TARGETS += $(MMNAME) $(FBNAME)
endif
-OBJS = shim.o globals.o mok.o netboot.o cert.o replacements.o tpm.o version.o errlog.o sbat.o sbat_data.o pe.o httpboot.o csv.o load-options.o
+OBJS = shim.o globals.o mok.o netboot.o cert.o replacements.o tpm.o version.o errlog.o sbat.o sbat_data.o sbat_var.o pe.o httpboot.o csv.o load-options.o
KEYS = shim_cert.h ocsp.* ca.* shim.crt shim.csr shim.p12 shim.pem shim.key shim.cer
-ORIG_SOURCES = shim.c globals.c mok.c netboot.c replacements.c tpm.c errlog.c sbat.c pe.c httpboot.c shim.h version.h $(wildcard include/*.h) cert.S
+ORIG_SOURCES = shim.c globals.c mok.c netboot.c replacements.c tpm.c errlog.c sbat.c pe.c httpboot.c shim.h version.h $(wildcard include/*.h) cert.S sbat_var.S
MOK_OBJS = MokManager.o PasswordCrypt.o crypt_blowfish.o errlog.o sbat_data.o globals.o
ORIG_MOK_SOURCES = MokManager.c PasswordCrypt.c crypt_blowfish.c shim.h $(wildcard include/*.h)
FALLBACK_OBJS = fallback.o tpm.o errlog.o sbat_data.o globals.o
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ endif
$(OBJCOPY) -D -j .text -j .sdata -j .data -j .data.ident \
-j .dynamic -j .rodata -j .rel* \
-j .rela* -j .dyn -j .reloc -j .eh_frame \
- -j .vendor_cert -j .sbat \
+ -j .vendor_cert -j .sbat -j .sbatlevel \
$(FORMAT) $< $@
./post-process-pe -vv $@
@@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ endif
$(OBJCOPY) -D -j .text -j .sdata -j .data \
-j .dynamic -j .rodata -j .rel* \
-j .rela* -j .dyn -j .reloc -j .eh_frame -j .sbat \
+ -j .sbatlevel \
-j .debug_info -j .debug_abbrev -j .debug_aranges \
-j .debug_line -j .debug_str -j .debug_ranges \
-j .note.gnu.build-id \
diff --git a/elf_aarch64_efi.lds b/elf_aarch64_efi.lds
index 60c55ba..0861f5e 100644
--- a/elf_aarch64_efi.lds
+++ b/elf_aarch64_efi.lds
@@ -34,6 +34,10 @@ SECTIONS
.data.ident : {
*(.data.ident)
}
+ . = ALIGN(4096);
+ .sbatlevel : {
+ *(.sbatlevel)
+ }
. = ALIGN(4096);
.data :
diff --git a/elf_ia32_efi.lds b/elf_ia32_efi.lds
index 497a3a1..e8da91b 100644
--- a/elf_ia32_efi.lds
+++ b/elf_ia32_efi.lds
@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@ SECTIONS
.data.ident : {
*(.data.ident)
}
+ . = ALIGN(4096);
+ .sbatlevel : {
+ *(.sbatlevel)
+ }
. = ALIGN(4096);
.data :
diff --git a/elf_ia64_efi.lds b/elf_ia64_efi.lds
index 2669b85..a219560 100644
--- a/elf_ia64_efi.lds
+++ b/elf_ia64_efi.lds
@@ -34,6 +34,10 @@ SECTIONS
.data.ident : {
*(.data.ident)
}
+ . = ALIGN(4096);
+ .sbatlevel : {
+ *(.sbatlevel)
+ }
. = ALIGN(4096);
.data :
diff --git a/elf_x86_64_efi.lds b/elf_x86_64_efi.lds
index bcc6527..39aff6b 100644
--- a/elf_x86_64_efi.lds
+++ b/elf_x86_64_efi.lds
@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ SECTIONS
.data.ident : {
*(.data.ident)
}
+ . = ALIGN(4096);
+ .sbatlevel : {
+ *(.sbatlevel)
+ }
. = ALIGN(4096);
.data :
diff --git a/include/sbat.h b/include/sbat.h
index aca4359..c94c4fb 100644
--- a/include/sbat.h
+++ b/include/sbat.h
@@ -6,38 +6,6 @@
#ifndef SBAT_H_
#define SBAT_H_
-#define SBAT_VAR_SIG "sbat,"
-#define SBAT_VAR_VERSION "1,"
-#define SBAT_VAR_ORIGINAL_DATE "2021030218"
-#define SBAT_VAR_ORIGINAL \
- SBAT_VAR_SIG SBAT_VAR_VERSION SBAT_VAR_ORIGINAL_DATE "\n"
-
-#if defined(ENABLE_SHIM_DEVEL)
-#define SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS_DATE "2022020101"
-#define SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS_REVOCATIONS "component,2\n"
-#define SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS \
- SBAT_VAR_SIG SBAT_VAR_VERSION SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS_DATE "\n" \
- SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS_REVOCATIONS
-
-#define SBAT_VAR_LATEST_DATE "2022050100"
-#define SBAT_VAR_LATEST_REVOCATIONS "component,2\nothercomponent,2\n"
-#define SBAT_VAR_LATEST \
- SBAT_VAR_SIG SBAT_VAR_VERSION SBAT_VAR_LATEST_DATE "\n" \
- SBAT_VAR_LATEST_REVOCATIONS
-#else /* !ENABLE_SHIM_DEVEL */
-#define SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS_DATE SBAT_VAR_ORIGINAL_DATE
-#define SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS_REVOCATIONS
-#define SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS \
- SBAT_VAR_SIG SBAT_VAR_VERSION SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS_DATE "\n" \
- SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS_REVOCATIONS
-
-#define SBAT_VAR_LATEST_DATE "2022052400"
-#define SBAT_VAR_LATEST_REVOCATIONS "shim,2\ngrub,2\n"
-#define SBAT_VAR_LATEST \
- SBAT_VAR_SIG SBAT_VAR_VERSION SBAT_VAR_LATEST_DATE "\n" \
- SBAT_VAR_LATEST_REVOCATIONS
-#endif /* ENABLE_SHIM_DEVEL */
-
#define UEFI_VAR_NV_BS \
(EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS)
#define UEFI_VAR_NV_BS_RT \
diff --git a/include/sbat_var_defs.h b/include/sbat_var_defs.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c656b56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/sbat_var_defs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+
+#ifndef SBAT_VAR_DEFS_H_
+#define SBAT_VAR_DEFS_H_
+
+#define SBAT_VAR_SIG "sbat,"
+#define SBAT_VAR_VERSION "1,"
+#define SBAT_VAR_ORIGINAL_DATE "2021030218"
+#define SBAT_VAR_ORIGINAL \
+ SBAT_VAR_SIG SBAT_VAR_VERSION SBAT_VAR_ORIGINAL_DATE "\n"
+
+#if defined(ENABLE_SHIM_DEVEL)
+#define SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS_DATE "2022020101"
+#define SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS_REVOCATIONS "component,2\n"
+#define SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS \
+ SBAT_VAR_SIG SBAT_VAR_VERSION SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS_DATE "\n" \
+ SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS_REVOCATIONS
+
+#define SBAT_VAR_LATEST_DATE "2022050100"
+#define SBAT_VAR_LATEST_REVOCATIONS "component,2\nothercomponent,2\n"
+#define SBAT_VAR_LATEST \
+ SBAT_VAR_SIG SBAT_VAR_VERSION SBAT_VAR_LATEST_DATE "\n" \
+ SBAT_VAR_LATEST_REVOCATIONS
+#else /* !ENABLE_SHIM_DEVEL */
+#define SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS_DATE SBAT_VAR_ORIGINAL_DATE
+#define SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS_REVOCATIONS
+#define SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS \
+ SBAT_VAR_SIG SBAT_VAR_VERSION SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS_DATE "\n" \
+ SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS_REVOCATIONS
+
+#define SBAT_VAR_LATEST_DATE "2022052400"
+#define SBAT_VAR_LATEST_REVOCATIONS "shim,2\ngrub,2\n"
+#define SBAT_VAR_LATEST \
+ SBAT_VAR_SIG SBAT_VAR_VERSION SBAT_VAR_LATEST_DATE "\n" \
+ SBAT_VAR_LATEST_REVOCATIONS
+#endif /* ENABLE_SHIM_DEVEL */
+
+#endif /* !SBAT_VAR_DEFS_H_ */
diff --git a/include/test.mk b/include/test.mk
index e965c60..c0e2409 100644
--- a/include/test.mk
+++ b/include/test.mk
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ test-mock-variables: CFLAGS+=-DHAVE_SHIM_LOCK_GUID
test-mok-mirror_FILES = mok.c globals.c tpm.c lib/guid.c lib/variables.c mock-variables.c
test-mok-mirror: CFLAGS+=-DHAVE_START_IMAGE -DHAVE_SHIM_LOCK_GUID
-test-sbat_FILES = csv.c lib/variables.c lib/guid.c
+test-sbat_FILES = csv.c lib/variables.c lib/guid.c sbat_var.S
test-sbat :: CFLAGS+=-DHAVE_GET_VARIABLE -DHAVE_GET_VARIABLE_ATTR -DHAVE_SHIM_LOCK_GUID
test-str_FILES = lib/string.c
diff --git a/sbat.c b/sbat.c
index f1d6e98..a08c5b2 100644
--- a/sbat.c
+++ b/sbat.c
@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@
#include "shim.h"
+extern struct {
+ UINT32 previous_offset;
+ UINT32 latest_offset;
+} sbat_var_payload_header;
+
EFI_STATUS
parse_sbat_section(char *section_base, size_t section_size,
size_t *n_entries,
@@ -399,6 +404,9 @@ set_sbat_uefi_variable(void)
EFI_STATUS efi_status = EFI_SUCCESS;
UINT32 attributes = 0;
+ char *sbat_var_previous;
+ char *sbat_var_latest;
+
UINT8 *sbat = NULL;
UINT8 *sbat_policy = NULL;
UINTN sbatsize = 0;
@@ -407,27 +415,30 @@ set_sbat_uefi_variable(void)
char *sbat_var = NULL;
bool reset_sbat = false;
+ sbat_var_previous = (char *)&sbat_var_payload_header + sbat_var_payload_header.previous_offset;
+ sbat_var_latest = (char *)&sbat_var_payload_header + sbat_var_payload_header.latest_offset;
+
efi_status = get_variable_attr(SBAT_POLICY, &sbat_policy,
&sbat_policysize, SHIM_LOCK_GUID,
&attributes);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
dprint("Default sbat policy: previous\n");
- sbat_var = SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS;
+ sbat_var = sbat_var_previous;
} else {
switch (*sbat_policy) {
case SBAT_POLICY_LATEST:
dprint("Custom sbat policy: latest\n");
- sbat_var = SBAT_VAR_LATEST;
+ sbat_var = sbat_var_latest;
clear_sbat_policy();
break;
case SBAT_POLICY_PREVIOUS:
dprint("Custom sbat policy: previous\n");
- sbat_var = SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS;
+ sbat_var = sbat_var_previous;
break;
case SBAT_POLICY_RESET:
if (secure_mode()) {
console_print(L"Cannot reset SBAT policy: Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
- sbat_var = SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS;
+ sbat_var = sbat_var_previous;
} else {
dprint(L"Custom SBAT policy: reset OK\n");
reset_sbat = true;
@@ -438,7 +449,7 @@ set_sbat_uefi_variable(void)
default:
console_error(L"SBAT policy state %llu is invalid",
EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER);
- sbat_var = SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS;
+ sbat_var = sbat_var_previous;
clear_sbat_policy();
break;
}
diff --git a/sbat_var.S b/sbat_var.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a115077
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sbat_var.S
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+
+#include "include/sbat_var_defs.h"
+
+ .section .sbatlevel, "a", %progbits
+ .balignl 4, 0
+ .4byte 0 /* format version for external parsers */
+ .globl sbat_var_payload_header
+ .type sbat_var_payload_header, %object
+ .size sbat_var_payload_header, .Lsbat_var_payload_header_end - sbat_var_payload_header
+sbat_var_payload_header:
+ .4byte .Lsbat_var_previous - sbat_var_payload_header
+ .4byte .Lsbat_var_latest - sbat_var_payload_header
+.Lsbat_var_payload_header_end:
+ .balign 1, 0
+.Lsbat_var_previous:
+ .asciz SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS
+ .balign 1, 0
+.Lsbat_var_latest:
+ .asciz SBAT_VAR_LATEST
diff --git a/shim.h b/shim.h
index b5272b9..7e9d10e 100644
--- a/shim.h
+++ b/shim.h
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@
#include "include/pe.h"
#include "include/replacements.h"
#include "include/sbat.h"
+#include "include/sbat_var_defs.h"
#if defined(OVERRIDE_SECURITY_POLICY)
#include "include/security_policy.h"
#endif
--
2.35.3
From 092c2b2bbed950727e41cf450b61c794881c33e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 12:37:28 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 02/12] Reference MokListRT instead of MokList
When calling back into shim from grub, the MokListRT may contain additional
entries not available in the original MokList, an example being the certs
included via user_cert. Use the MokListRT instead when calling check_db_cert
and check_db_hash.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
---
shim.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/shim.c b/shim.c
index fdd205e..27b74ce 100644
--- a/shim.c
+++ b/shim.c
@@ -397,22 +397,22 @@ static EFI_STATUS check_allowlist (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *cert,
}
#endif
- if (check_db_hash(L"MokList", SHIM_LOCK_GUID, sha256hash,
+ if (check_db_hash(L"MokListRT", SHIM_LOCK_GUID, sha256hash,
SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID)
== DATA_FOUND) {
verification_method = VERIFIED_BY_HASH;
update_verification_method(VERIFIED_BY_HASH);
return EFI_SUCCESS;
} else {
- LogError(L"check_db_hash(MokList, sha256hash) != DATA_FOUND\n");
+ LogError(L"check_db_hash(MokListRT, sha256hash) != DATA_FOUND\n");
}
- if (cert && check_db_cert(L"MokList", SHIM_LOCK_GUID, cert, sha256hash)
+ if (cert && check_db_cert(L"MokListRT", SHIM_LOCK_GUID, cert, sha256hash)
== DATA_FOUND) {
verification_method = VERIFIED_BY_CERT;
update_verification_method(VERIFIED_BY_CERT);
return EFI_SUCCESS;
} else if (cert) {
- LogError(L"check_db_cert(MokList, sha256hash) != DATA_FOUND\n");
+ LogError(L"check_db_cert(MokListRT, sha256hash) != DATA_FOUND\n");
}
update_verification_method(VERIFIED_BY_NOTHING);
--
2.35.3
From 14d63398298c8de23036a4cf61594108b7345863 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2022 12:07:16 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 05/12] Discard load-options that start with a NUL
In 6c8d08c0af4768c715b79c8ec25141d56e34f8b4 ("shim: Ignore UEFI
LoadOptions that are just NUL characters."), a check was added to
discard load options that are entirely NUL. We now see some firmwares
that start LoadOptions with a NUL, and then follow it with garbage (path
to directory containing loaders). Widen the check to just discard
anything that starts with a NUL.
Resolves: #490
Related: #95
See-also: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2113005
Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
---
include/ucs2.h | 18 ------------------
load-options.c | 7 ++++++-
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/ucs2.h b/include/ucs2.h
index ee038ce..87eab32 100644
--- a/include/ucs2.h
+++ b/include/ucs2.h
@@ -63,22 +63,4 @@ StrCSpn(const CHAR16 *s, const CHAR16 *reject)
return ret;
}
-/*
- * Test if an entire buffer is nothing but NUL characters. This
- * implementation "gracefully" ignores the difference between the
- * UTF-8/ASCII 1-byte NUL and the UCS-2 2-byte NUL.
- */
-static inline bool
-__attribute__((__unused__))
-is_all_nuls(UINT8 *data, UINTN data_size)
-{
- UINTN i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < data_size; i++) {
- if (data[i] != 0)
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
#endif /* SHIM_UCS2_H */
diff --git a/load-options.c b/load-options.c
index c6bb742..a8c6e1a 100644
--- a/load-options.c
+++ b/load-options.c
@@ -404,8 +404,13 @@ parse_load_options(EFI_LOADED_IMAGE *li)
/*
* Apparently sometimes we get L"\0\0"? Which isn't useful at all.
+ *
+ * Possibly related, but some boards have additional data before the
+ * size which is garbage (it's a weird path to the directory
+ * containing the loaders). Known boards that do this: Kontron VX3040
+ * (AMI), ASUS B85M-E, and at least one "older Dell laptop".
*/
- if (is_all_nuls(li->LoadOptions, li->LoadOptionsSize))
+ if (((CHAR16 *)li->LoadOptions)[0] == 0)
return EFI_SUCCESS;
/*
--
2.35.3
From 5c537b3d0cf8c393dad2e61d49aade68f3af1401 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: dann frazier <dann.frazier@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2022 09:28:22 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 06/12] shim: Flush the memory region from i-cache before
execution
We've seen crashes in early GRUB code on an ARM Cortex-A72-based
platform that point at seemingly harmless instructions. Flushing
the i-cache of those instructions prior to executing has been
shown to avoid the problem, which has parallels with this story:
https://www.mail-archive.com/osv-dev@googlegroups.com/msg06203.html
Add a cache flushing utility function and provide an implementation
using a GCC intrinsic. This will need to be extended to support other
compilers. Note that this intrinsic is a no-op for x86 platforms.
This fixes issue #498.
Signed-off-by: dann frazier <dann.frazier@canonical.com>
---
include/compiler.h | 6 ++++++
pe.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/compiler.h b/include/compiler.h
index b4bf103..b0d595f 100644
--- a/include/compiler.h
+++ b/include/compiler.h
@@ -192,5 +192,11 @@
*/
#define unreachable() __builtin_unreachable()
+#if defined(__GNUC__)
+#define cache_invalidate(begin, end) __builtin___clear_cache(begin, end)
+#else /* __GNUC__ */
+#error shim has no cache_invalidate() implementation for this compiler
+#endif /* __GNUC__ */
+
#endif /* !COMPILER_H_ */
// vim:fenc=utf-8:tw=75:et
diff --git a/pe.c b/pe.c
index ba3e2bb..f94530a 100644
--- a/pe.c
+++ b/pe.c
@@ -1196,6 +1196,9 @@ handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
CopyMem(buffer, data, context.SizeOfHeaders);
+ /* Flush the instruction cache for the region holding the image */
+ cache_invalidate(buffer, buffer + context.ImageSize);
+
*entry_point = ImageAddress(buffer, context.ImageSize, context.EntryPoint);
if (!*entry_point) {
perror(L"Entry point is invalid\n");
--
2.35.3
From 2d4ebb5a798aafd3b06d2c3cb9c9840c1caa41ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2022 10:39:43 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 07/12] load_cert_file: Fix stack issue
0214cd9cef5a fixes a NULL pointer dereference problem, it introduces two
new problems. First it incorrectly assumes li.FilePath is a string.
Second, it puts EFI_LOADED_IMAGE li on the stack. It has been found
that not all archectures can handle this being on the stack.
The shim_li variable will be setup properly from the read_image
call. Use the global shim_li variable instead when calling
verify_image.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
---
shim.c | 6 +-----
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/shim.c b/shim.c
index 27b74ce..0d919ce 100644
--- a/shim.c
+++ b/shim.c
@@ -1395,7 +1395,6 @@ EFI_STATUS
load_cert_file(EFI_HANDLE image_handle, CHAR16 *filename, CHAR16 *PathName)
{
EFI_STATUS efi_status;
- EFI_LOADED_IMAGE li;
PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT context;
EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;
EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *certlist;
@@ -1410,10 +1409,7 @@ load_cert_file(EFI_HANDLE image_handle, CHAR16 *filename, CHAR16 *PathName)
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status))
return efi_status;
- memset(&li, 0, sizeof(li));
- memcpy(&li.FilePath[0], filename, MIN(StrSize(filename), sizeof(li.FilePath)));
-
- efi_status = verify_image(data, datasize, &li, &context);
+ efi_status = verify_image(data, datasize, shim_li, &context);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status))
return efi_status;
--
2.35.3
From ea4911c2f3ce8f8f703a1476febac86bb16b00fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2022 10:45:23 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 08/12] load_cert_file: Use EFI RT memory function
Use the EFI RT memory function CopyMem instead of memcpy in load_cert_file.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
---
shim.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/shim.c b/shim.c
index 0d919ce..4437898 100644
--- a/shim.c
+++ b/shim.c
@@ -1429,8 +1429,8 @@ load_cert_file(EFI_HANDLE image_handle, CHAR16 *filename, CHAR16 *PathName)
user_cert_size += certlist->SignatureListSize;;
user_cert = ReallocatePool(user_cert, original,
user_cert_size);
- memcpy(user_cert + original, pointer,
- certlist->SignatureListSize);
+ CopyMem(user_cert + original, pointer,
+ certlist->SignatureListSize);
}
}
FreePool(data);
--
2.35.3
From 0cf43ac6d78c6f47f8b91210639ac1aa63665f0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nicholas Bishop <nicholasbishop@google.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 2022 16:08:56 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 09/12] Add -malign-double to IA32 compiler flags
This changes the alignment of UINT64 data to 8 bytes on IA32, which
matches EDK2's understanding of alignment. In particular this change
affects the offset where shim writes `EFI_LOADED_IMAGE.ImageSize`.
Fixes https://github.com/rhboot/shim/issues/515
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bishop <nicholasbishop@google.com>
---
Make.defaults | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Make.defaults b/Make.defaults
index dfed9c4..c46164a 100644
--- a/Make.defaults
+++ b/Make.defaults
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ ifeq ($(ARCH),x86_64)
endif
ifeq ($(ARCH),ia32)
ARCH_CFLAGS ?= -mno-mmx -mno-sse -mno-red-zone -nostdinc \
- $(CLANG_BUGS) -m32 \
+ $(CLANG_BUGS) -m32 -malign-double \
-DMDE_CPU_IA32 -DPAGE_SIZE=4096
ARCH_GNUEFI ?= ia32
ARCH_SUFFIX ?= ia32
--
2.35.3
From aa1b289a1a16774afc3143b8948d97261f0872d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Arthur Gautier <arthur.gautier@arista.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Oct 2022 13:20:45 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 12/12] mok: remove MokListTrusted from PCR 7
MokListTrusted was added by mistake to PCR 7 in 4e513405. The value of
MokListTrusted does not alter the behavior of secure boot so, as per
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf#page=36
(section 3.3.4 PCR usage) so it should not be factored in the value of
PCR 7.
See:
https://github.com/rhboot/shim/pull/423
https://github.com/rhboot/shim/commit/4e513405b4f1641710115780d19dcec130c5208f
Fixes https://github.com/rhboot/shim/issues/484
Fixes https://github.com/rhboot/shim/issues/492
Signed-off-by: Arthur Gautier <arthur.gautier@arista.com>
---
mok.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mok.c b/mok.c
index 63ddfca..9811b35 100644
--- a/mok.c
+++ b/mok.c
@@ -178,7 +178,6 @@ struct mok_state_variable mok_state_variable_data[] = {
EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE,
.no_attr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
.flags = MOK_MIRROR_DELETE_FIRST |
- MOK_VARIABLE_MEASURE |
MOK_VARIABLE_INVERSE |
MOK_VARIABLE_LOG,
.pcr = 14,
--
2.35.3

89
shim.changes
View File

@ -1,3 +1,37 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tue Nov 15 08:06:24 UTC 2022 - Joey Lee <jlee@suse.com>
- Add shim-jscPED-127-upgrade-shim-in-SLE15-SP5.patch for backporting the following
patches between 15.6 with aa1b289a1a (jsc#PED-127):
aa1b289a1a16774afc3143b8948d97261f0872d0 mok: remove MokListTrusted from PCR 7
0cf43ac6d78c6f47f8b91210639ac1aa63665f0b Add -malign-double to IA32 compiler flags
ea4911c2f3ce8f8f703a1476febac86bb16b00fd load_cert_file: Use EFI RT memory function
2d4ebb5a798aafd3b06d2c3cb9c9840c1caa41ef load_cert_file: Fix stack issue
5c537b3d0cf8c393dad2e61d49aade68f3af1401 shim: Flush the memory region from i-cache before execution
14d63398298c8de23036a4cf61594108b7345863 Discard load-options that start with a NUL
092c2b2bbed950727e41cf450b61c794881c33e7 Reference MokListRT instead of MokList
0eb07e11b20680200d3ce9c5bc59299121a75388 Make SBAT variable payload introspectable
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tue Nov 15 08:06:05 UTC 2022 - Joey Lee <jlee@suse.com>
- Add shim-Enable-TDX-measurement-to-RTMR-register.patch to support
enhance shim measurement to TD RTMR. (jsc#PED-1273)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tue Nov 15 07:53:59 UTC 2022 - Joey Lee <jlee@suse.com>
- For pushing openSUSE:Factory/shim to SLE15-SP5, sync the shim.spec
and shim.changes: (jsc#PED-127)
- Add some change log from SLE shim.changes to Factory shim.changes
Those messages are added "(sync shim.changes from SLE)" tag.
- Add the following changes to shim.spec
- only apply Patch100, the shim-bsc1198101-opensuse-cert-prompt.patch
on openSUSE.
- Enable the AArch64 signature check for SLE:
# AArch64 signature
signature=%{SOURCE13}
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Sep 29 02:42:35 UTC 2022 - Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
@ -192,6 +226,11 @@ Tue Apr 12 06:35:16 UTC 2022 - Ludwig Nussel <lnussel@suse.de>
- use common SBAT values (boo#1193282)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Jul 15 08:13:26 UTC 2021 - Johannes Segitz <jsegitz@suse.com>
- Update the SLE signatures (sync shim.changes from SLE)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Jul 1 04:07:03 UTC 2021 - Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
@ -201,6 +240,40 @@ Thu Jul 1 04:07:03 UTC 2021 - Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Jun 21 08:51:37 UTC 2021 - Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
(sync shim.changes from SLE)
- Split the keys in vendor-dbx.bin to vendor-dbx-sles and
vendor-dbx-opensuse for shim-sles and shim-opensuse to reduce
the size of MokListXRT (bsc#1185261)
+ Also update generate-vendor-dbx.sh in dbx-cert.tar.xz
- Add shim-bsc1185441-fix-handling-of-ignore_db-and-user_insecure_mode.patch
to handle ignore_db and user_insecure_mode correctly
(bsc#1185441, bsc#1187071)
- Add shim-bsc1185621-relax-max-var-sz-check.patch to relax the
maximum variable size check for u-boot (bsc#1185621)
+ Also drop AArch64 suse-signed shim since we merged this patch
- Add shim-bsc1185261-relax-import_mok_state-check.patch to relax
the check for import_mok_state() when Secure Boot is off.
(bsc#1185261)
- Add shim-bsc1185232-relax-loadoptions-length-check.patch to
ignore the odd LoadOptions length (bsc#1185232)
- shim-install: reset def_shim_efi to "shim.efi" if the given
file doesn't exist
- Add shim-fix-aa64-relsz.patch to fix the size of rela sections
for AArch64
Fix: https://github.com/rhboot/shim/issues/371
- Add shim-disable-export-vendor-dbx.patch to disable exporting
vendor-dbx to MokListXRT since writing a large RT variable
could crash some machines (bsc#1185261)
- Add shim-bsc1187260-fix-efi-1.10-machines.patch to avoid the
potential crash when calling QueryVariableInfo in EFI 1.10
machines (bsc#1187260)
- Add shim-bsc1185232-fix-config-table-copying.patch to avoid
buffer overflow when copying data to the MOK config table
(bsc#1185232)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Jun 21 08:51:37 UTC 2021 - Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
- Add shim-bsc1185232-fix-config-table-copying.patch to avoid
buffer overflow when copying data to the MOK config table
(bsc#1185232)
@ -255,6 +328,12 @@ Fri May 7 08:33:49 UTC 2021 - Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
- shim-install: always assume "removable" for Azure to avoid the
endless reset loop (bsc#1185464)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu May 6 06:45:39 UTC 2021 - Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
- Include suse-signed shim for AArch64 (bsc#1185621)
(sync shim.changes from SLE)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu May 6 03:18:32 UTC 2021 - Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
@ -276,6 +355,16 @@ Wed Apr 28 09:28:30 UTC 2021 - Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
the size of MokListXRT (bsc#1185261)
+ Also update generate-vendor-dbx.sh in dbx-cert.tar.xz
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Apr 22 03:26:48 UTC 2021 - Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
- Enable the AArch64 signature check for SLE (sync shim.changes from SLE)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Wed Apr 21 05:44:35 UTC 2021 - Johannes Segitz <jsegitz@suse.com>
- Update the SLE signatures (sync shim.changes from SLE)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Apr 8 08:44:27 UTC 2021 - Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>

12
shim.spec
View File

@ -77,6 +77,10 @@ Patch4: shim-bsc1177789-fix-null-pointer-deref-AuthenticodeVerify.patch
Patch5: remove_build_id.patch
# PATCH-FIX-SUSE shim-disable-export-vendor-dbx.patch bsc#1185261 glin@suse.com -- Disable exporting vendor-dbx to MokListXRT
Patch6: shim-disable-export-vendor-dbx.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM shim-Enable-TDX-measurement-to-RTMR-register.patch jsc#PED-1273 jlee@suse.com -- Impl: [TDX Guest] TDX: Enhance shim measurement to TD RTMR
Patch7: shim-Enable-TDX-measurement-to-RTMR-register.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM shim-jscPED-127-upgrade-shim-in-SLE15-SP5.patch jsc#PED-127 jlee@suse.com -- Impl: Upgrade shim in SLE 15-SP5 and openSUSE TW for some issues
Patch8: shim-jscPED-127-upgrade-shim-in-SLE15-SP5.patch
# PATCH-FIX-OPENSUSE shim-bsc1198101-opensuse-cert-prompt.patch glin@suse.com -- Show the prompt to ask whether the user trusts openSUSE certificate or not
Patch100: shim-bsc1198101-opensuse-cert-prompt.patch
BuildRequires: dos2unix
@ -124,7 +128,11 @@ The source code of UEFI shim loader
%patch4 -p1
%patch5 -p1
%patch6 -p1
%patch7 -p1
%patch8 -p1
%if 0%{?is_opensuse} == 1 || 0%{?sle_version} == 0
%patch100 -p1
%endif
%build
# generate the vendor SBAT metadata
@ -189,9 +197,7 @@ for suffix in "${suffixes[@]}"; do
signature=%{SOURCE11}
%else
# AArch64 signature
# Disable AArch64 signature attachment temporarily
# until we get a real one.
#signature=%{SOURCE13}
signature=%{SOURCE13}
%endif
elif test "$suffix" = "devel"; then
cert=%{_sourcedir}/_projectcert.crt