88 lines
4.0 KiB
Diff
88 lines
4.0 KiB
Diff
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commit a3f6783b1cfe4b8067312fa65828fcd925757c38
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Author: Amos Jeffries <yadij@users.noreply.github.com>
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Date: Tue Jun 5 06:11:29 2018 +0000
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Bug 4831: filter chain certificates for validity when loading (#187)
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51e09c08a5e6c582e7d93af99a8f2cfcb14ea9e6 adding
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GnuTLS support required splitting the way
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certificate chains were loaded. This resulted in the
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leaf certificate being added twice at the prefix of a
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chain in the serverHello.
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It turns out that some recipients validate strictly that the
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chain delivered by a serverHello does not contain extra
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certificates and reject the handshake if they do.
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This patch implements the XXX about filtering certificates
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for chain sequence order and self-sign properties, added
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in the initial PR. Resolving the bug 4831 regression and also
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reporting failures at startup/reconfigure for admins.
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Also, add debug display of certificate names for simpler
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detection and administrative fix when loaded files fail
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these tests.
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diff --git a/src/security/KeyData.cc b/src/security/KeyData.cc
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index 23d123954..052c64ffd 100644
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--- a/src/security/KeyData.cc
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+++ b/src/security/KeyData.cc
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@@ -86,8 +86,6 @@ void
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Security::KeyData::loadX509ChainFromFile()
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{
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#if USE_OPENSSL
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- // XXX: This BIO loads the public cert as first chain cert,
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- // so the code appending chains sends it twice in handshakes.
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const char *certFilename = certFile.c_str();
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Ssl::BIO_Pointer bio(BIO_new(BIO_s_file()));
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if (!bio || !BIO_read_filename(bio.get(), certFilename)) {
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@@ -96,14 +94,41 @@ Security::KeyData::loadX509ChainFromFile()
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return;
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}
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- if (X509_check_issued(cert.get(), cert.get()) == X509_V_OK)
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- debugs(83, 5, "Certificate is self-signed, will not be chained");
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- else {
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+#if TLS_CHAIN_NO_SELFSIGNED // ignore self-signed certs in the chain
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+ if (X509_check_issued(cert.get(), cert.get()) == X509_V_OK) {
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+ char *nameStr = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert.get()), nullptr, 0);
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+ debugs(83, DBG_PARSE_NOTE(2), "Certificate is self-signed, will not be chained: " << nameStr);
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+ OPENSSL_free(nameStr);
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+ } else
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+#endif
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+ {
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+ debugs(83, DBG_PARSE_NOTE(3), "Using certificate chain in " << certFile);
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// and add to the chain any other certificate exist in the file
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- while (X509 *ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr)) {
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- // XXX: self-signed check should be applied to all certs loaded.
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- // XXX: missing checks that the chained certs are actually part of a chain for validating cert.
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- chain.emplace_front(Security::CertPointer(ca));
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+ CertPointer latestCert = cert;
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+
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+ while (auto ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr)) {
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+ // get Issuer name of the cert for debug display
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+ char *nameStr = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ca), nullptr, 0);
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+
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+#if TLS_CHAIN_NO_SELFSIGNED // ignore self-signed certs in the chain
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+ // self-signed certificates are not valid in a sent chain
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+ if (X509_check_issued(ca, ca) == X509_V_OK) {
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+ debugs(83, DBG_PARSE_NOTE(2), "CA " << nameStr << " is self-signed, will not be chained: " << nameStr);
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+ OPENSSL_free(nameStr);
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+ continue;
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+ }
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+#endif
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+ // checks that the chained certs are actually part of a chain for validating cert
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+ if (X509_check_issued(ca, latestCert.get()) == X509_V_OK) {
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+ debugs(83, DBG_PARSE_NOTE(3), "Adding issuer CA: " << nameStr);
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+ // OpenSSL API requires that we order certificates such that the
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+ // chain can be appended directly into the on-wire traffic.
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+ latestCert = CertPointer(ca);
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+ chain.emplace_front(latestCert);
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+ } else {
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+ debugs(83, DBG_PARSE_NOTE(2), "Ignoring non-issuer CA from " << certFile << ": " << nameStr);
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+ }
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+ OPENSSL_free(nameStr);
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}
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}
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