squid/a3f6783.patch

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commit a3f6783b1cfe4b8067312fa65828fcd925757c38
Author: Amos Jeffries <yadij@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue Jun 5 06:11:29 2018 +0000
Bug 4831: filter chain certificates for validity when loading (#187)
51e09c08a5e6c582e7d93af99a8f2cfcb14ea9e6 adding
GnuTLS support required splitting the way
certificate chains were loaded. This resulted in the
leaf certificate being added twice at the prefix of a
chain in the serverHello.
It turns out that some recipients validate strictly that the
chain delivered by a serverHello does not contain extra
certificates and reject the handshake if they do.
This patch implements the XXX about filtering certificates
for chain sequence order and self-sign properties, added
in the initial PR. Resolving the bug 4831 regression and also
reporting failures at startup/reconfigure for admins.
Also, add debug display of certificate names for simpler
detection and administrative fix when loaded files fail
these tests.
diff --git a/src/security/KeyData.cc b/src/security/KeyData.cc
index 23d123954..052c64ffd 100644
--- a/src/security/KeyData.cc
+++ b/src/security/KeyData.cc
@@ -86,8 +86,6 @@ void
Security::KeyData::loadX509ChainFromFile()
{
#if USE_OPENSSL
- // XXX: This BIO loads the public cert as first chain cert,
- // so the code appending chains sends it twice in handshakes.
const char *certFilename = certFile.c_str();
Ssl::BIO_Pointer bio(BIO_new(BIO_s_file()));
if (!bio || !BIO_read_filename(bio.get(), certFilename)) {
@@ -96,14 +94,41 @@ Security::KeyData::loadX509ChainFromFile()
return;
}
- if (X509_check_issued(cert.get(), cert.get()) == X509_V_OK)
- debugs(83, 5, "Certificate is self-signed, will not be chained");
- else {
+#if TLS_CHAIN_NO_SELFSIGNED // ignore self-signed certs in the chain
+ if (X509_check_issued(cert.get(), cert.get()) == X509_V_OK) {
+ char *nameStr = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert.get()), nullptr, 0);
+ debugs(83, DBG_PARSE_NOTE(2), "Certificate is self-signed, will not be chained: " << nameStr);
+ OPENSSL_free(nameStr);
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ debugs(83, DBG_PARSE_NOTE(3), "Using certificate chain in " << certFile);
// and add to the chain any other certificate exist in the file
- while (X509 *ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr)) {
- // XXX: self-signed check should be applied to all certs loaded.
- // XXX: missing checks that the chained certs are actually part of a chain for validating cert.
- chain.emplace_front(Security::CertPointer(ca));
+ CertPointer latestCert = cert;
+
+ while (auto ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr)) {
+ // get Issuer name of the cert for debug display
+ char *nameStr = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ca), nullptr, 0);
+
+#if TLS_CHAIN_NO_SELFSIGNED // ignore self-signed certs in the chain
+ // self-signed certificates are not valid in a sent chain
+ if (X509_check_issued(ca, ca) == X509_V_OK) {
+ debugs(83, DBG_PARSE_NOTE(2), "CA " << nameStr << " is self-signed, will not be chained: " << nameStr);
+ OPENSSL_free(nameStr);
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif
+ // checks that the chained certs are actually part of a chain for validating cert
+ if (X509_check_issued(ca, latestCert.get()) == X509_V_OK) {
+ debugs(83, DBG_PARSE_NOTE(3), "Adding issuer CA: " << nameStr);
+ // OpenSSL API requires that we order certificates such that the
+ // chain can be appended directly into the on-wire traffic.
+ latestCert = CertPointer(ca);
+ chain.emplace_front(latestCert);
+ } else {
+ debugs(83, DBG_PARSE_NOTE(2), "Ignoring non-issuer CA from " << certFile << ": " << nameStr);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(nameStr);
}
}