From cfde0c0ea764934ebf962a385a0c2803b4055e64a2747693517f0237d49579d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marius Tomaschewski Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2015 13:41:42 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] - Applied upstream fix for a rogue servers vulnerability, that may enable rogue servers able to authenticate itself with certificate issued by any CA the client trusts, to gain user credentials from a client in certain IKEv2 setups (bsc#933591,CVE-2015-4171). [+ 0006-strongswan-5.1.0-5.3.1_enforce_remote_auth.patch] - Fix to apply unknown_payload patch if fips is disabled (<= 13.1) and renamed it to use number prefix corresponding with patch nr. [- strongswan-5.2.2-5.3.0_unknown_payload.patch, + 0005-strongswan-5.2.2-5.3.0_unknown_payload.patch] OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network:vpn/strongswan?expand=0&rev=93 --- ...rongswan-5.2.2-5.3.0_unknown_payload.patch | 0 ...swan-5.1.0-5.3.1_enforce_remote_auth.patch | 102 ++++++++++++++++++ strongswan.changes | 13 +++ strongswan.spec | 6 +- 4 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) rename strongswan-5.2.2-5.3.0_unknown_payload.patch => 0005-strongswan-5.2.2-5.3.0_unknown_payload.patch (100%) create mode 100644 0006-strongswan-5.1.0-5.3.1_enforce_remote_auth.patch diff --git a/strongswan-5.2.2-5.3.0_unknown_payload.patch b/0005-strongswan-5.2.2-5.3.0_unknown_payload.patch similarity index 100% rename from strongswan-5.2.2-5.3.0_unknown_payload.patch rename to 0005-strongswan-5.2.2-5.3.0_unknown_payload.patch diff --git a/0006-strongswan-5.1.0-5.3.1_enforce_remote_auth.patch b/0006-strongswan-5.1.0-5.3.1_enforce_remote_auth.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2d35f9c --- /dev/null +++ b/0006-strongswan-5.1.0-5.3.1_enforce_remote_auth.patch @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +From ca1a65cc6aef2e037b529574783b7c571d1d82a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Martin Willi +Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2015 10:52:34 +0200 +References: bsc#933591,CVE-2015-4171 +Subject: [PATCH] ikev2: Enforce remote authentication config before proceeding + with own authentication + +Previously the constraints in the authentication configuration of an +initiator were enforced only after all authentication rounds were +complete. This posed a problem if an initiator used EAP or PSK +authentication while the responder was authenticated with a certificate +and if a rogue server was able to authenticate itself with a valid +certificate issued by any CA the initiator trusted. + +Because any constraints for the responder's identity (rightid) or other +aspects of the authentication (e.g. rightca) the initiator had were not +enforced until the initiator itself finished its authentication such a rogue +responder was able to acquire usernames and password hashes from the client. +And if a client supported EAP-GTC it was even possible to trick it into +sending plaintext passwords. + +This patch enforces the configured constraints right after the responder's +authentication successfully finished for each round and before the initiator +starts with its own authentication. + +Fixes CVE-2015-4171. +--- + src/libcharon/sa/ikev2/tasks/ike_auth.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/libcharon/sa/ikev2/tasks/ike_auth.c b/src/libcharon/sa/ikev2/tasks/ike_auth.c +index bf747a49edde..2554496c1916 100644 +--- a/src/libcharon/sa/ikev2/tasks/ike_auth.c ++++ b/src/libcharon/sa/ikev2/tasks/ike_auth.c +@@ -112,6 +112,11 @@ struct private_ike_auth_t { + * received an INITIAL_CONTACT? + */ + bool initial_contact; ++ ++ /** ++ * Is EAP acceptable, did we strictly authenticate peer? ++ */ ++ bool eap_acceptable; + }; + + /** +@@ -879,6 +884,37 @@ static void send_auth_failed_informational(private_ike_auth_t *this, + message->destroy(message); + } + ++/** ++ * Check if strict constraint fullfillment required to continue current auth ++ */ ++static bool require_strict(private_ike_auth_t *this, bool mutual_eap) ++{ ++ auth_cfg_t *cfg; ++ ++ if (this->eap_acceptable) ++ { ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ cfg = this->ike_sa->get_auth_cfg(this->ike_sa, TRUE); ++ switch ((uintptr_t)cfg->get(cfg, AUTH_RULE_AUTH_CLASS)) ++ { ++ case AUTH_CLASS_EAP: ++ if (mutual_eap && this->my_auth) ++ { ++ this->eap_acceptable = TRUE; ++ return !this->my_auth->is_mutual(this->my_auth); ++ } ++ return TRUE; ++ case AUTH_CLASS_PSK: ++ return TRUE; ++ case AUTH_CLASS_PUBKEY: ++ case AUTH_CLASS_ANY: ++ default: ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++} ++ + METHOD(task_t, process_i, status_t, + private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *message) + { +@@ -1014,6 +1050,14 @@ METHOD(task_t, process_i, status_t, + } + } + ++ if (require_strict(this, mutual_eap)) ++ { ++ if (!update_cfg_candidates(this, TRUE)) ++ { ++ goto peer_auth_failed; ++ } ++ } ++ + if (this->my_auth) + { + switch (this->my_auth->process(this->my_auth, message)) +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/strongswan.changes b/strongswan.changes index c8f651a..c7d63f5 100644 --- a/strongswan.changes +++ b/strongswan.changes @@ -1,3 +1,16 @@ +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Thu Jun 4 10:54:29 UTC 2015 - mt@suse.de + +- Applied upstream fix for a rogue servers vulnerability, that may + enable rogue servers able to authenticate itself with certificate + issued by any CA the client trusts, to gain user credentials from + a client in certain IKEv2 setups (bsc#933591,CVE-2015-4171). + [+ 0006-strongswan-5.1.0-5.3.1_enforce_remote_auth.patch] +- Fix to apply unknown_payload patch if fips is disabled (<= 13.1) + and renamed it to use number prefix corresponding with patch nr. + [- strongswan-5.2.2-5.3.0_unknown_payload.patch, + + 0005-strongswan-5.2.2-5.3.0_unknown_payload.patch] + ------------------------------------------------------------------- Mon Jun 1 16:18:35 UTC 2015 - mt@suse.de diff --git a/strongswan.spec b/strongswan.spec index 93c5503..76df96b 100644 --- a/strongswan.spec +++ b/strongswan.spec @@ -82,7 +82,8 @@ Patch2: %{name}_ipsec_service.patch Patch3: %{name}_fipscheck.patch Patch4: %{name}_fipsfilter.patch %endif -Patch5: %{name}-5.2.2-5.3.0_unknown_payload.patch +Patch5: 0005-strongswan-5.2.2-5.3.0_unknown_payload.patch +Patch6: 0006-strongswan-5.1.0-5.3.1_enforce_remote_auth.patch BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build BuildRequires: bison BuildRequires: curl-devel @@ -292,8 +293,9 @@ and the load testing plugin for IKEv2 daemon. %if %{with fipscheck} %patch3 -p0 %patch4 -p1 -%patch5 -p1 %endif +%patch5 -p1 +%patch6 -p1 sed -e 's|@libexecdir@|%_libexecdir|g' \ < $RPM_SOURCE_DIR/strongswan.init.in \ > strongswan.init