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The tpm2-abrmd by upstream default allows every local users in the system to
access the TPM chip and modify its settings (bsc#1197532). Upstream suggests
to use the TPM's internal security features (e.g. password protection) to
prevent local users from manipulating the chip without authorization. Still
the default behaviour that every user in the system can access TPM features
without any authentication could come as a surprise to end users and system
integrators alike.

For this reason on SUSE only members of the 'tss' group are allowed to access
the tpm2-abrmd D-Bus interface, thereby mirroring the access permissions of
the /dev/tpm0 and /dev/tpmrm0 character devices.