xen/520b4b60-VT-d-protect-against-bogus-information-coming-from-BIOS.patch

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# Commit e8e8b030ecf916fea19639f0b6a446c1c9dbe174
# Date 2013-08-14 11:18:24 +0200
# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
VT-d: protect against bogus information coming from BIOS
Add checks similar to those done by Linux: The DRHD address must not
be all zeros or all ones (Linux only checks for zero), and capabilities
as well as extended capabilities must not be all ones.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Guthro <benjamin.guthro@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Ben Guthro <benjamin.guthro@citrix.com>
Acked by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Xiantao Zhang <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
@@ -447,6 +447,9 @@ acpi_parse_one_drhd(struct acpi_dmar_hea
if ( (ret = acpi_dmar_check_length(header, sizeof(*drhd))) != 0 )
return ret;
+ if ( !drhd->address || !(drhd->address + 1) )
+ return -ENODEV;
+
dmaru = xzalloc(struct acpi_drhd_unit);
if ( !dmaru )
return -ENOMEM;
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -1159,6 +1159,9 @@ int __init iommu_alloc(struct acpi_drhd_
dprintk(VTDPREFIX,
"cap = %"PRIx64" ecap = %"PRIx64"\n", iommu->cap, iommu->ecap);
}
+ if ( !(iommu->cap + 1) || !(iommu->ecap + 1) )
+ return -ENODEV;
+
if ( cap_fault_reg_offset(iommu->cap) +
cap_num_fault_regs(iommu->cap) * PRIMARY_FAULT_REG_LEN >= PAGE_SIZE ||
ecap_iotlb_offset(iommu->ecap) >= PAGE_SIZE )