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- bnc#801663 - performance of mirror lvm unsuitable for production

Browse Source 
block-dmmd

- Update to Xen 4.3.0-rc2

- Consolidate all xend and traditional qemu patches into one patch
  file.  Rename '.diff' patches to '.patch' and reoder others.
  xend-traditional-qemu.patch

- Create a xend-tools package for the legacy xend toolstack files

- Update to Xen 4.3.0-rc1 c/s 27068

- bnc#818183 - VUL-0: xen: CVE-2013-2007: XSA-51: qga set umask
  0077 when daemonizing
  CVE-2013-2007-xsa51-1.patch
  CVE-2013-2007-xsa51-2.patch

- bnc#808269 - Fully Virtualized Windows VM install is failed on
  Ivy Bridge platforms with Xen kernel
  26754-hvm-Improve-APIC-INIT-SIPI-emulation.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Virtualization/xen?expand=0&rev=241
This commit is contained in:
Charles Arnold 2013-06-01 21:11:56 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
parent d766d613df
commit 0a0dc9a60d
190 changed files with 6745 additions and 22110 deletions
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234
25861-x86-early-fixmap.patch
View File

@ -1,234 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1347371120 -7200
# Node ID 51c2d7c83cbc2a0357ce112a463f91d354dcdba9
# Parent e4cb8411161043c726f699252cc761e77853e820
x86: allow early use of fixmaps
As a prerequisite for adding an EHCI debug port based console
implementation, set up the page tables needed for (a sub-portion of)
the fixmaps together with other boot time page table construction.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#include <public/xen.h>
#include <asm/asm_defns.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
+#include <asm/fixmap.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
@@ -136,6 +137,9 @@ __start:
add $8,%edx
add $(1<<L2_PAGETABLE_SHIFT),%eax
loop 1b
+ /* Initialise L2 fixmap page directory entry. */
+ mov $(sym_phys(l1_fixmap)+7),%eax
+ mov %eax,sym_phys(l2_fixmap) + l2_table_offset(FIXADDR_TOP-1)*8
/* Initialise L3 identity-map page directory entries. */
mov $sym_phys(l3_identmap),%edi
mov $(sym_phys(l2_identmap)+7),%eax
@@ -144,9 +148,11 @@ __start:
add $8,%edi
add $PAGE_SIZE,%eax
loop 1b
- /* Initialise L3 xen-map page directory entry. */
+ /* Initialise L3 xen-map and fixmap page directory entries. */
mov $(sym_phys(l2_xenmap)+7),%eax
mov %eax,sym_phys(l3_xenmap) + l3_table_offset(XEN_VIRT_START)*8
+ mov $(sym_phys(l2_fixmap)+7),%eax
+ mov %eax,sym_phys(l3_xenmap) + l3_table_offset(FIXADDR_TOP-1)*8
/* Initialise L3 boot-map page directory entry. */
mov $(sym_phys(l2_bootmap)+7),%eax
mov %eax,sym_phys(l3_bootmap) + 0*8
@@ -172,6 +178,9 @@ __start:
add $(1<<L2_PAGETABLE_SHIFT),%eax
cmp $(16<<20)+0xe3,%eax
jne 1b
+ /* Initialise L2 fixmap page directory entry. */
+ mov $(sym_phys(l1_fixmap)+7),%eax
+ mov %eax,sym_phys(idle_pg_table_l2) + l2_table_offset(FIXADDR_TOP-1)*8
#endif
/* Initialize 4kB mappings of first 2MB or 4MB of memory. */
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c
@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@
#include <xen/vga.h>
#include <asm/e820.h>
#include <asm/edd.h>
+#define __ASSEMBLY__ /* avoid pulling in ACPI stuff (conflicts with EFI) */
+#include <asm/fixmap.h>
+#undef __ASSEMBLY__
#include <asm/mm.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -1123,14 +1126,19 @@ efi_start(EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle, EFI_SY
slot &= L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1;
l2_bootmap[slot] = l2e_from_paddr(addr, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR|_PAGE_PSE);
}
+ /* Initialise L2 fixmap page directory entry. */
+ l2_fixmap[l2_table_offset(FIXADDR_TOP - 1)] =
+ l2e_from_paddr((UINTN)l1_fixmap, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR);
/* Initialise L3 identity-map page directory entries. */
for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(l2_identmap) / L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES; ++i )
l3_identmap[i] = l3e_from_paddr((UINTN)(l2_identmap +
i * L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES),
__PAGE_HYPERVISOR);
- /* Initialise L3 xen-map page directory entry. */
+ /* Initialise L3 xen-map and fixmap page directory entries. */
l3_xenmap[l3_table_offset(XEN_VIRT_START)] =
l3e_from_paddr((UINTN)l2_xenmap, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR);
+ l3_xenmap[l3_table_offset(FIXADDR_TOP - 1)] =
+ l3e_from_paddr((UINTN)l2_fixmap, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR);
/* Initialise L3 boot-map page directory entries. */
l3_bootmap[l3_table_offset(xen_phys_start)] =
l3e_from_paddr((UINTN)l2_bootmap, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR);
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -131,6 +131,10 @@
l1_pgentry_t __attribute__ ((__section__ (".bss.page_aligned")))
l1_identmap[L1_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES];
+/* Mapping of the fixmap space needed early. */
+l1_pgentry_t __attribute__ ((__section__ (".bss.page_aligned")))
+ l1_fixmap[L1_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES];
+
#define MEM_LOG(_f, _a...) gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING , _f "\n" , ## _a)
/*
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.c
@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@ l3_pgentry_t __attribute__ ((__section__
l2_pgentry_t __attribute__ ((__section__ (".bss.page_aligned")))
l2_xenmap[L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES];
+/* Enough page directories to map the early fixmap space. */
+l2_pgentry_t __attribute__ ((__section__ (".bss.page_aligned")))
+ l2_fixmap[L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES];
+
/* Enough page directories to map into the bottom 1GB. */
l3_pgentry_t __attribute__ ((__section__ (".bss.page_aligned")))
l3_bootmap[L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES];
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/config.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/config.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/config.h
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ extern unsigned char boot_edid_info[128]
#define MACHPHYS_MBYTES 16 /* 1 MB needed per 1 GB memory */
#define FRAMETABLE_MBYTES (MACHPHYS_MBYTES * 6)
-#define IOREMAP_VIRT_END 0UL
+#define IOREMAP_VIRT_END _AC(0,UL)
#define IOREMAP_VIRT_START (IOREMAP_VIRT_END - (IOREMAP_MBYTES<<20))
#define DIRECTMAP_VIRT_END IOREMAP_VIRT_START
#define DIRECTMAP_VIRT_START (DIRECTMAP_VIRT_END - (DIRECTMAP_MBYTES<<20))
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/fixmap.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/fixmap.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/fixmap.h
@@ -13,12 +13,17 @@
#define _ASM_FIXMAP_H
#include <xen/config.h>
+#include <asm/page.h>
+
+#define FIXADDR_TOP (IOREMAP_VIRT_END - PAGE_SIZE)
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
#include <xen/pfn.h>
#include <xen/kexec.h>
#include <xen/iommu.h>
#include <asm/apicdef.h>
#include <asm/acpi.h>
-#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/amd-iommu.h>
#include <asm/msi.h>
#include <acpi/apei.h>
@@ -68,7 +73,6 @@ enum fixed_addresses {
__end_of_fixed_addresses
};
-#define FIXADDR_TOP (IOREMAP_VIRT_END - PAGE_SIZE)
#define FIXADDR_SIZE (__end_of_fixed_addresses << PAGE_SHIFT)
#define FIXADDR_START (FIXADDR_TOP - FIXADDR_SIZE)
@@ -92,4 +96,6 @@ static inline unsigned long virt_to_fix(
return __virt_to_fix(vaddr);
}
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
#endif
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
#ifndef __X86_PAGE_H__
#define __X86_PAGE_H__
+#include <xen/const.h>
+
/*
* It is important that the masks are signed quantities. This ensures that
* the compiler sign-extends a 32-bit mask to 64 bits if that is required.
@@ -306,13 +308,15 @@ extern l2_pgentry_t idle_pg_table_l2[
extern l2_pgentry_t *compat_idle_pg_table_l2;
extern unsigned int m2p_compat_vstart;
extern l2_pgentry_t l2_xenmap[L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES],
+ l2_fixmap[L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES],
l2_bootmap[L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES];
extern l3_pgentry_t l3_xenmap[L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES],
l3_identmap[L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES],
l3_bootmap[L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES];
#endif
extern l2_pgentry_t l2_identmap[4*L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES];
-extern l1_pgentry_t l1_identmap[L1_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES];
+extern l1_pgentry_t l1_identmap[L1_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES],
+ l1_fixmap[L1_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES];
void paging_init(void);
void setup_idle_pagetable(void);
#endif /* !defined(__ASSEMBLY__) */
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/const.h
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/const.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* const.h: Macros for dealing with constants. */
+
+#ifndef __XEN_CONST_H__
+#define __XEN_CONST_H__
+
+/* Some constant macros are used in both assembler and
+ * C code. Therefore we cannot annotate them always with
+ * 'UL' and other type specifiers unilaterally. We
+ * use the following macros to deal with this.
+ *
+ * Similarly, _AT() will cast an expression with a type in C, but
+ * leave it unchanged in asm.
+ */
+
+#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
+#define _AC(X,Y) X
+#define _AT(T,X) X
+#else
+#define __AC(X,Y) (X##Y)
+#define _AC(X,Y) __AC(X,Y)
+#define _AT(T,X) ((T)(X))
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __XEN_CONST_H__ */

144
25862-sercon-non-com.patch
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@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1347371236 -7200
# Node ID 776a23fa0e938e4cf3307fc2e3b3f1a9488a5927
# Parent 51c2d7c83cbc2a0357ce112a463f91d354dcdba9
console: prepare for non-COMn port support
Widen SERHND_IDX (and use it where needed), introduce a flush low level
driver method, and remove unnecessary peeking of the common code at the
(driver specific) serial port identification string in the "console="
command line option value.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
@@ -1017,7 +1017,7 @@ void __init smp_intr_init(void)
* Also ensure serial interrupts are high priority. We do not
* want them to be blocked by unacknowledged guest-bound interrupts.
*/
- for ( seridx = 0; seridx < 2; seridx++ )
+ for ( seridx = 0; seridx <= SERHND_IDX; seridx++ )
{
if ( (irq = serial_irq(seridx)) < 0 )
continue;
--- a/xen/drivers/char/console.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/char/console.c
@@ -539,6 +539,7 @@ void printk(const char *fmt, ...)
void __init console_init_preirq(void)
{
char *p;
+ int sh;
serial_init_preirq();
@@ -551,8 +552,9 @@ void __init console_init_preirq(void)
vga_init();
else if ( !strncmp(p, "none", 4) )
continue;
- else if ( strncmp(p, "com", 3) ||
- (sercon_handle = serial_parse_handle(p)) == -1 )
+ else if ( (sh = serial_parse_handle(p)) >= 0 )
+ sercon_handle = sh;
+ else
{
char *q = strchr(p, ',');
if ( q != NULL )
--- a/xen/drivers/char/serial.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/char/serial.c
@@ -22,9 +22,11 @@ size_param("serial_tx_buffer", serial_tx
#define mask_serial_rxbuf_idx(_i) ((_i)&(serial_rxbufsz-1))
#define mask_serial_txbuf_idx(_i) ((_i)&(serial_txbufsz-1))
-static struct serial_port com[2] = {
- { .rx_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED, .tx_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED },
- { .rx_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED, .tx_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED }
+static struct serial_port com[SERHND_IDX + 1] = {
+ [0 ... SERHND_IDX] = {
+ .rx_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED,
+ .tx_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED
+ }
};
void serial_rx_interrupt(struct serial_port *port, struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
@@ -81,6 +83,8 @@ void serial_tx_interrupt(struct serial_p
port->driver->putc(
port, port->txbuf[mask_serial_txbuf_idx(port->txbufc++)]);
}
+ if ( i && port->driver->flush )
+ port->driver->flush(port);
}
spin_unlock(&port->tx_lock);
@@ -175,6 +179,9 @@ void serial_putc(int handle, char c)
__serial_putc(port, c);
+ if ( port->driver->flush )
+ port->driver->flush(port);
+
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&port->tx_lock, flags);
}
@@ -206,6 +213,9 @@ void serial_puts(int handle, const char
__serial_putc(port, c);
}
+ if ( port->driver->flush )
+ port->driver->flush(port);
+
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&port->tx_lock, flags);
}
@@ -261,10 +271,10 @@ int __init serial_parse_handle(char *con
switch ( conf[3] )
{
case '1':
- handle = 0;
+ handle = SERHND_COM1;
break;
case '2':
- handle = 1;
+ handle = SERHND_COM2;
break;
default:
goto fail;
@@ -365,6 +375,8 @@ void serial_start_sync(int handle)
port->driver->putc(
port, port->txbuf[mask_serial_txbuf_idx(port->txbufc++)]);
}
+ if ( port->driver->flush )
+ port->driver->flush(port);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&port->tx_lock, flags);
--- a/xen/include/xen/serial.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/serial.h
@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ struct uart_driver {
int (*tx_empty)(struct serial_port *);
/* Put a character onto the serial line. */
void (*putc)(struct serial_port *, char);
+ /* Flush accumulated characters. */
+ void (*flush)(struct serial_port *);
/* Get a character from the serial line: returns 0 if none available. */
int (*getc)(struct serial_port *, char *);
/* Get IRQ number for this port's serial line: returns -1 if none. */
@@ -67,10 +69,12 @@ struct uart_driver {
};
/* 'Serial handles' are composed from the following fields. */
-#define SERHND_IDX (1<<0) /* COM1 or COM2? */
-#define SERHND_HI (1<<1) /* Mux/demux each transferred char by MSB. */
-#define SERHND_LO (1<<2) /* Ditto, except that the MSB is cleared. */
-#define SERHND_COOKED (1<<3) /* Newline/carriage-return translation? */
+#define SERHND_IDX (3<<0) /* COM1 or COM2? */
+# define SERHND_COM1 (0<<0)
+# define SERHND_COM2 (1<<0)
+#define SERHND_HI (1<<2) /* Mux/demux each transferred char by MSB. */
+#define SERHND_LO (1<<3) /* Ditto, except that the MSB is cleared. */
+#define SERHND_COOKED (1<<4) /* Newline/carriage-return translation? */
/* Two-stage initialisation (before/after IRQ-subsystem initialisation). */
void serial_init_preirq(void);

1798
25863-sercon-ehci-dbgp.patch
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

142
25864-sercon-unused.patch
View File

@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1347371512 -7200
# Node ID e1380b5311ccee14eb47d7badb75339933d42249
# Parent 0d0c55a1975db9c6cac2e9259b5ebea7a7bdbaec
serial: avoid fully initializing unused consoles
Defer calling the drivers' post-IRQ initialization functions (generally
doing allocation of transmit buffers) until it is known that the
respective console is actually going to be used.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/drivers/char/ehci-dbgp.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/char/ehci-dbgp.c
@@ -1391,7 +1391,8 @@ static int ehci_dbgp_check_release(struc
printk(XENLOG_INFO "Releasing EHCI debug port at %02x:%02x.%u\n",
dbgp->bus, dbgp->slot, dbgp->func);
- kill_timer(&dbgp->timer);
+ if ( dbgp->timer.function )
+ kill_timer(&dbgp->timer);
dbgp->ehci_debug = NULL;
ctrl = readl(&ehci_debug->control);
--- a/xen/drivers/char/serial.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/char/serial.c
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ static struct serial_port com[SERHND_IDX
}
};
+static bool_t __read_mostly post_irq;
+
void serial_rx_interrupt(struct serial_port *port, struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
{
char c;
@@ -263,14 +265,12 @@ char serial_getc(int handle)
int __init serial_parse_handle(char *conf)
{
- int handle;
+ int handle, flags = 0;
if ( !strncmp(conf, "dbgp", 4) && (!conf[4] || conf[4] == ',') )
{
- if ( !com[SERHND_DBGP].driver )
- goto fail;
-
- return SERHND_DBGP | SERHND_COOKED;
+ handle = SERHND_DBGP;
+ goto common;
}
if ( strncmp(conf, "com", 3) )
@@ -288,17 +288,25 @@ int __init serial_parse_handle(char *con
goto fail;
}
- if ( !com[handle].driver )
- goto fail;
-
if ( conf[4] == 'H' )
- handle |= SERHND_HI;
+ flags |= SERHND_HI;
else if ( conf[4] == 'L' )
- handle |= SERHND_LO;
+ flags |= SERHND_LO;
- handle |= SERHND_COOKED;
+ common:
+ if ( !com[handle].driver )
+ goto fail;
+
+ if ( !post_irq )
+ com[handle].state = serial_parsed;
+ else if ( com[handle].state != serial_initialized )
+ {
+ if ( com[handle].driver->init_postirq )
+ com[handle].driver->init_postirq(&com[handle]);
+ com[handle].state = serial_initialized;
+ }
- return handle;
+ return handle | flags | SERHND_COOKED;
fail:
return -1;
@@ -450,8 +458,13 @@ void __init serial_init_postirq(void)
{
int i;
for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(com); i++ )
- if ( com[i].driver && com[i].driver->init_postirq )
- com[i].driver->init_postirq(&com[i]);
+ if ( com[i].state == serial_parsed )
+ {
+ if ( com[i].driver->init_postirq )
+ com[i].driver->init_postirq(&com[i]);
+ com[i].state = serial_initialized;
+ }
+ post_irq = 1;
}
void __init serial_endboot(void)
@@ -475,7 +488,7 @@ void serial_suspend(void)
{
int i;
for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(com); i++ )
- if ( com[i].driver && com[i].driver->suspend )
+ if ( com[i].state == serial_initialized && com[i].driver->suspend )
com[i].driver->suspend(&com[i]);
}
@@ -483,7 +496,7 @@ void serial_resume(void)
{
int i;
for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(com); i++ )
- if ( com[i].driver && com[i].driver->resume )
+ if ( com[i].state == serial_initialized && com[i].driver->resume )
com[i].driver->resume(&com[i]);
}
--- a/xen/include/xen/serial.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/serial.h
@@ -25,10 +25,17 @@ extern unsigned int serial_txbufsz;
struct uart_driver;
+enum serial_port_state {
+ serial_unused,
+ serial_parsed,
+ serial_initialized
+};
+
struct serial_port {
/* Uart-driver parameters. */
struct uart_driver *driver;
void *uart;
+ enum serial_port_state state;
/* Number of characters the port can hold for transmit. */
int tx_fifo_size;
/* Transmit data buffer (interrupt-driven uart). */

56
25866-sercon-ns16550-pci-irq.patch
View File

@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1347371733 -7200
# Node ID ee12dc357fbecbb0517798f395d14bf1764c6766
# Parent 5fb5b3b70e34ef278d06aff27878b4b8e6d9145f
ns16550: PCI initialization adjustments
Besides single-port serial cards, also accept multi-port ones and such
providing mixed functionality (e.g. also having a parallel port).
Reading PCI_INTERRUPT_PIN before ACPI gets enabled generally produces
an incorrect IRQ (below 16, whereas after enabling ACPI it frequently
would end up at a higher one), so this is useful (almost) only when a
system already boots in ACPI mode.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c
@@ -449,7 +449,6 @@ static int __init check_existence(struct
static int
pci_uart_config (struct ns16550 *uart, int skip_amt, int bar_idx)
{
- uint16_t class;
uint32_t bar, len;
int b, d, f;
@@ -460,9 +459,15 @@ pci_uart_config (struct ns16550 *uart, i
{
for ( f = 0; f < 0x8; f++ )
{
- class = pci_conf_read16(0, b, d, f, PCI_CLASS_DEVICE);
- if ( class != 0x700 )
+ switch ( pci_conf_read16(0, b, d, f, PCI_CLASS_DEVICE) )
+ {
+ case 0x0700: /* single port serial */
+ case 0x0702: /* multi port serial */
+ case 0x0780: /* other (e.g serial+parallel) */
+ break;
+ default:
continue;
+ }
bar = pci_conf_read32(0, b, d, f,
PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_0 + bar_idx*4);
@@ -485,7 +490,8 @@ pci_uart_config (struct ns16550 *uart, i
uart->bar = bar;
uart->bar_idx = bar_idx;
uart->io_base = bar & 0xfffe;
- uart->irq = 0;
+ uart->irq = pci_conf_read8(0, b, d, f, PCI_INTERRUPT_PIN) ?
+ pci_conf_read8(0, b, d, f, PCI_INTERRUPT_LINE) : 0;
return 0;
}

100
25867-sercon-ns16550-parse.patch
View File

@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1347371805 -7200
# Node ID b22f184e1a3cac03abeed92ec4b74235fd0881f4
# Parent ee12dc357fbecbb0517798f395d14bf1764c6766
ns16550: command line parsing adjustments
Allow intermediate parts of the command line options to be absent
(expressed by two immediately succeeding commas).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ If set, override Xen's calculation of th
If set, override Xen's default choice for the platform timer.
### com1,com2
-> `= <baud>[/<clock_hz>][,DPS[,<io-base>[,<irq>[,<port-bdf>[,<bridge-bdf>]]]] | pci | amt ] `
+> `= <baud>[/<clock_hz>][,[DPS][,[<io-base>|pci|amt][,[<irq>][,[<port-bdf>][,[<bridge-bdf>]]]]]]`
Both option `com1` and `com2` follow the same format.
--- a/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c
@@ -536,26 +536,23 @@ static void __init ns16550_parse_port_co
else if ( (baud = simple_strtoul(conf, &conf, 10)) != 0 )
uart->baud = baud;
- if ( *conf == '/')
+ if ( *conf == '/' )
{
conf++;
uart->clock_hz = simple_strtoul(conf, &conf, 0) << 4;
}
- if ( *conf != ',' )
- goto config_parsed;
- conf++;
-
- uart->data_bits = simple_strtoul(conf, &conf, 10);
+ if ( *conf == ',' && *++conf != ',' )
+ {
+ uart->data_bits = simple_strtoul(conf, &conf, 10);
- uart->parity = parse_parity_char(*conf);
- conf++;
+ uart->parity = parse_parity_char(*conf);
- uart->stop_bits = simple_strtoul(conf, &conf, 10);
+ uart->stop_bits = simple_strtoul(conf + 1, &conf, 10);
+ }
- if ( *conf == ',' )
+ if ( *conf == ',' && *++conf != ',' )
{
- conf++;
if ( strncmp(conf, "pci", 3) == 0 )
{
if ( pci_uart_config(uart, 1/* skip AMT */, uart - ns16550_com) )
@@ -572,24 +569,21 @@ static void __init ns16550_parse_port_co
{
uart->io_base = simple_strtoul(conf, &conf, 0);
}
+ }
- if ( *conf == ',' )
- {
- conf++;
- uart->irq = simple_strtoul(conf, &conf, 10);
- if ( *conf == ',' )
- {
- conf++;
- uart->ps_bdf_enable = 1;
- parse_pci_bdf(&conf, &uart->ps_bdf[0]);
- if ( *conf == ',' )
- {
- conf++;
- uart->pb_bdf_enable = 1;
- parse_pci_bdf(&conf, &uart->pb_bdf[0]);
- }
- }
- }
+ if ( *conf == ',' && *++conf != ',' )
+ uart->irq = simple_strtol(conf, &conf, 10);
+
+ if ( *conf == ',' && *++conf != ',' )
+ {
+ uart->ps_bdf_enable = 1;
+ parse_pci_bdf(&conf, &uart->ps_bdf[0]);
+ }
+
+ if ( *conf == ',' && *++conf != ',' )
+ {
+ uart->pb_bdf_enable = 1;
+ parse_pci_bdf(&conf, &uart->pb_bdf[0]);
}
config_parsed:

70
25874-x86-EFI-chain-cfg.patch
View File

@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1347437974 -7200
# Node ID 8c0aa97d529a55de2ab96be1a5a6e9ed6a9c6bf0
# Parent ac8f4afccd6c6786a3fd5691e8b0c9b38c47e994
x86-64/EFI: allow chaining of config files
Namely when making use the CONFIG_XEN_COMPAT_* options in the legacy
Linux kernels, newer kernels may not be compatible with older
hypervisors, so trying to boot such a combination makes little sense.
Booting older kernels on newer hypervisors, however, has to always
work.
With the way xen.efi looks for its configuration file, allowing
individual configuration files to refer only to compatible kernels,
and referring from an older- to a newer-hypervisor one (the kernels
of which will, as said, necessarily be compatible with the older
hypervisor) allows to greatly reduce redundancy at least in
development environments where one frequently wants multiple
hypervisors and kernles to be installed in parallel.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/docs/misc/efi.markdown
+++ b/docs/misc/efi.markdown
@@ -75,6 +75,13 @@ Specifies an XSM module to load.
Specifies a CPU microcode blob to load.
+###`chain=<filename>`
+
+Specifies an alternate configuration file to use in case the specified section
+(and in particular its `kernel=` setting) can't be found in the default (or
+specified) configuration file. This is only meaningful in the [global] section
+and really not meant to be used together with the `-cfg=` command line option.
+
Filenames must be specified relative to the location of the EFI binary.
Extra options to be passed to Xen can also be specified on the command line,
--- a/xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c
@@ -797,7 +797,26 @@ efi_start(EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle, EFI_SY
else
section.s = get_value(&cfg, "global", "default");
- name.s = get_value(&cfg, section.s, "kernel");
+ for ( ; ; )
+ {
+ name.s = get_value(&cfg, section.s, "kernel");
+ if ( name.s )
+ break;
+ name.s = get_value(&cfg, "global", "chain");
+ if ( !name.s )
+ break;
+ efi_bs->FreePages(cfg.addr, PFN_UP(cfg.size));
+ cfg.addr = 0;
+ if ( !read_file(dir_handle, s2w(&name), &cfg) )
+ {
+ PrintStr(L"Chained configuration file '");
+ PrintStr(name.w);
+ efi_bs->FreePool(name.w);
+ blexit(L"'not found\r\n");
+ }
+ pre_parse(&cfg);
+ efi_bs->FreePool(name.w);
+ }
if ( !name.s )
blexit(L"No Dom0 kernel image specified\r\n");
split_value(name.s);

630
25909-xenpm-consistent.patch
View File

@ -1,630 +0,0 @@
References: bnc#780401
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1347869399 -7200
# Node ID 51408c3528030309e8f064bf6a3c96b37de7dc96
# Parent 12fa949b90603f057d458e370284471412afb0ba
xenpm: make argument parsing and error handling more consistent
Specifically, what values are or aren't accepted as CPU identifier, and
how the values get interpreted should be consistent across sub-commands
(intended behavior now: non-negative values are okay, and along with
omitting the argument, specifying "all" will also be accepted).
For error handling, error messages should get consistently issued to
stderr, and the tool should now (hopefully) produce an exit code of
zero only in the (partial) success case (there may still be a small
number of questionable cases).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/tools/misc/xenpm.c
+++ b/tools/misc/xenpm.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
#define CPUFREQ_TURBO_ENABLED 1
static xc_interface *xc_handle;
-static int max_cpu_nr;
+static unsigned int max_cpu_nr;
/* help message */
void show_help(void)
@@ -77,6 +77,33 @@ void help_func(int argc, char *argv[])
show_help();
}
+static void parse_cpuid(const char *arg, int *cpuid)
+{
+ if ( sscanf(arg, "%d", cpuid) != 1 || *cpuid < 0 )
+ {
+ if ( strcasecmp(arg, "all") )
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid CPU identifier: '%s'\n", arg);
+ exit(EINVAL);
+ }
+ *cpuid = -1;
+ }
+}
+
+static void parse_cpuid_and_int(int argc, char *argv[],
+ int *cpuid, int *val, const char *what)
+{
+ if ( argc > 1 )
+ parse_cpuid(argv[0], cpuid);
+
+ if ( argc == 0 || sscanf(argv[argc > 1], "%d", val) != 1 )
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, argc ? "Invalid %s '%s'\n" : "Missing %s\n",
+ what, argv[argc > 1]);
+ exit(EINVAL);
+ }
+}
+
static void print_cxstat(int cpuid, struct xc_cx_stat *cxstat)
{
int i;
@@ -166,7 +193,8 @@ static int show_cxstat_by_cpuid(xc_inter
if ( ret )
{
if ( ret == -ENODEV )
- printf("Either xen cpuidle is disabled or no valid information is registered!\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Either Xen cpuidle is disabled or no valid information is registered!\n");
return ret;
}
@@ -181,11 +209,8 @@ void cxstat_func(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int cpuid = -1;
- if ( argc > 0 && sscanf(argv[0], "%d", &cpuid) != 1 )
- cpuid = -1;
-
- if ( cpuid >= max_cpu_nr )
- cpuid = -1;
+ if ( argc > 0 )
+ parse_cpuid(argv[0], &cpuid);
show_max_cstate(xc_handle);
@@ -294,11 +319,8 @@ void pxstat_func(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int cpuid = -1;
- if ( argc > 0 && sscanf(argv[0], "%d", &cpuid) != 1 )
- cpuid = -1;
-
- if ( cpuid >= max_cpu_nr )
- cpuid = -1;
+ if ( argc > 0 )
+ parse_cpuid(argv[0], &cpuid);
if ( cpuid < 0 )
{
@@ -338,10 +360,10 @@ static void signal_int_handler(int signo
goto out;
}
- if ( gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == -1 )
+ if ( gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) )
{
fprintf(stderr, "failed to get timeofday\n");
- goto out ;
+ goto out;
}
usec_end = tv.tv_sec * 1000000UL + tv.tv_usec;
@@ -541,7 +563,7 @@ void start_gather_func(int argc, char *a
printf("Timeout set to %d seconds\n", timeout);
}
- if ( gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == -1 )
+ if ( gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) )
{
fprintf(stderr, "failed to get timeofday\n");
return ;
@@ -766,11 +788,8 @@ void cpufreq_para_func(int argc, char *a
{
int cpuid = -1;
- if ( argc > 0 && sscanf(argv[0], "%d", &cpuid) != 1 )
- cpuid = -1;
-
- if ( cpuid >= max_cpu_nr )
- cpuid = -1;
+ if ( argc > 0 )
+ parse_cpuid(argv[0], &cpuid);
if ( cpuid < 0 )
{
@@ -788,26 +807,22 @@ void scaling_max_freq_func(int argc, cha
{
int cpuid = -1, freq = -1;
- if ( (argc >= 2 && (sscanf(argv[1], "%d", &freq) != 1 ||
- sscanf(argv[0], "%d", &cpuid) != 1)) ||
- (argc == 1 && sscanf(argv[0], "%d", &freq) != 1 ) ||
- argc == 0 )
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "failed to set scaling max freq\n");
- return ;
- }
+ parse_cpuid_and_int(argc, argv, &cpuid, &freq, "frequency");
if ( cpuid < 0 )
{
int i;
for ( i = 0; i < max_cpu_nr; i++ )
if ( xc_set_cpufreq_para(xc_handle, i, SCALING_MAX_FREQ, freq) )
- fprintf(stderr, "[CPU%d] failed to set scaling max freq\n", i);
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "[CPU%d] failed to set scaling max freq (%d - %s)\n",
+ i, errno, strerror(errno));
}
else
{
if ( xc_set_cpufreq_para(xc_handle, cpuid, SCALING_MAX_FREQ, freq) )
- fprintf(stderr, "failed to set scaling max freq\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "failed to set scaling max freq (%d - %s)\n",
+ errno, strerror(errno));
}
}
@@ -815,26 +830,22 @@ void scaling_min_freq_func(int argc, cha
{
int cpuid = -1, freq = -1;
- if ( (argc >= 2 && (sscanf(argv[1], "%d", &freq) != 1 ||
- sscanf(argv[0], "%d", &cpuid) != 1) ) ||
- (argc == 1 && sscanf(argv[0], "%d", &freq) != 1 ) ||
- argc == 0 )
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "failed to set scaling min freq\n");
- return ;
- }
+ parse_cpuid_and_int(argc, argv, &cpuid, &freq, "frequency");
if ( cpuid < 0 )
{
int i;
for ( i = 0; i < max_cpu_nr; i++ )
if ( xc_set_cpufreq_para(xc_handle, i, SCALING_MIN_FREQ, freq) )
- fprintf(stderr, "[CPU%d] failed to set scaling min freq\n", i);
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "[CPU%d] failed to set scaling min freq (%d - %s)\n",
+ i, errno, strerror(errno));
}
else
{
if ( xc_set_cpufreq_para(xc_handle, cpuid, SCALING_MIN_FREQ, freq) )
- fprintf(stderr, "failed to set scaling min freq\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "failed to set scaling min freq (%d - %s)\n",
+ errno, strerror(errno));
}
}
@@ -842,26 +853,22 @@ void scaling_speed_func(int argc, char *
{
int cpuid = -1, speed = -1;
- if ( (argc >= 2 && (sscanf(argv[1], "%d", &speed) != 1 ||
- sscanf(argv[0], "%d", &cpuid) != 1) ) ||
- (argc == 1 && sscanf(argv[0], "%d", &speed) != 1 ) ||
- argc == 0 )
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "failed to set scaling speed\n");
- return ;
- }
+ parse_cpuid_and_int(argc, argv, &cpuid, &speed, "speed");
if ( cpuid < 0 )
{
int i;
for ( i = 0; i < max_cpu_nr; i++ )
if ( xc_set_cpufreq_para(xc_handle, i, SCALING_SETSPEED, speed) )
- fprintf(stderr, "[CPU%d] failed to set scaling speed\n", i);
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "[CPU%d] failed to set scaling speed (%d - %s)\n",
+ i, errno, strerror(errno));
}
else
{
if ( xc_set_cpufreq_para(xc_handle, cpuid, SCALING_SETSPEED, speed) )
- fprintf(stderr, "failed to set scaling speed\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "failed to set scaling speed (%d - %s)\n",
+ errno, strerror(errno));
}
}
@@ -869,14 +876,7 @@ void scaling_sampling_rate_func(int argc
{
int cpuid = -1, rate = -1;
- if ( (argc >= 2 && (sscanf(argv[1], "%d", &rate) != 1 ||
- sscanf(argv[0], "%d", &cpuid) != 1) ) ||
- (argc == 1 && sscanf(argv[0], "%d", &rate) != 1 ) ||
- argc == 0 )
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "failed to set scaling sampling rate\n");
- return ;
- }
+ parse_cpuid_and_int(argc, argv, &cpuid, &rate, "rate");
if ( cpuid < 0 )
{
@@ -884,12 +884,14 @@ void scaling_sampling_rate_func(int argc
for ( i = 0; i < max_cpu_nr; i++ )
if ( xc_set_cpufreq_para(xc_handle, i, SAMPLING_RATE, rate) )
fprintf(stderr,
- "[CPU%d] failed to set scaling sampling rate\n", i);
+ "[CPU%d] failed to set scaling sampling rate (%d - %s)\n",
+ i, errno, strerror(errno));
}
else
{
if ( xc_set_cpufreq_para(xc_handle, cpuid, SAMPLING_RATE, rate) )
- fprintf(stderr, "failed to set scaling sampling rate\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "failed to set scaling sampling rate (%d - %s)\n",
+ errno, strerror(errno));
}
}
@@ -897,14 +899,7 @@ void scaling_up_threshold_func(int argc,
{
int cpuid = -1, threshold = -1;
- if ( (argc >= 2 && (sscanf(argv[1], "%d", &threshold) != 1 ||
- sscanf(argv[0], "%d", &cpuid) != 1) ) ||
- (argc == 1 && sscanf(argv[0], "%d", &threshold) != 1 ) ||
- argc == 0 )
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "failed to set up scaling threshold\n");
- return ;
- }
+ parse_cpuid_and_int(argc, argv, &cpuid, &threshold, "threshold");
if ( cpuid < 0 )
{
@@ -912,57 +907,49 @@ void scaling_up_threshold_func(int argc,
for ( i = 0; i < max_cpu_nr; i++ )
if ( xc_set_cpufreq_para(xc_handle, i, UP_THRESHOLD, threshold) )
fprintf(stderr,
- "[CPU%d] failed to set up scaling threshold\n", i);
+ "[CPU%d] failed to set up scaling threshold (%d - %s)\n",
+ i, errno, strerror(errno));
}
else
{
if ( xc_set_cpufreq_para(xc_handle, cpuid, UP_THRESHOLD, threshold) )
- fprintf(stderr, "failed to set up scaling threshold\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "failed to set up scaling threshold (%d - %s)\n",
+ errno, strerror(errno));
}
}
void scaling_governor_func(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int cpuid = -1;
- char *name = NULL;
+ char *name;
if ( argc >= 2 )
{
- name = strdup(argv[1]);
- if ( name == NULL )
- goto out;
- if ( sscanf(argv[0], "%d", &cpuid) != 1 )
- {
- free(name);
- goto out;
- }
+ parse_cpuid(argv[0], &cpuid);
+ name = argv[1];
}
else if ( argc > 0 )
+ name = argv[0];
+ else
{
- name = strdup(argv[0]);
- if ( name == NULL )
- goto out;
+ fprintf(stderr, "Missing argument(s)\n");
+ exit(EINVAL);
}
- else
- goto out;
if ( cpuid < 0 )
{
int i;
for ( i = 0; i < max_cpu_nr; i++ )
if ( xc_set_cpufreq_gov(xc_handle, i, name) )
- fprintf(stderr, "[CPU%d] failed to set governor name\n", i);
+ fprintf(stderr, "[CPU%d] failed to set governor name (%d - %s)\n",
+ i, errno, strerror(errno));
}
else
{
if ( xc_set_cpufreq_gov(xc_handle, cpuid, name) )
- fprintf(stderr, "failed to set governor name\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "failed to set governor name (%d - %s)\n",
+ errno, strerror(errno));
}
-
- free(name);
- return ;
-out:
- fprintf(stderr, "failed to set governor name\n");
}
void cpu_topology_func(int argc, char *argv[])
@@ -971,7 +958,7 @@ void cpu_topology_func(int argc, char *a
DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BUFFER(uint32_t, cpu_to_socket);
DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BUFFER(uint32_t, cpu_to_node);
xc_topologyinfo_t info = { 0 };
- int i;
+ int i, rc = ENOMEM;
cpu_to_core = xc_hypercall_buffer_alloc(xc_handle, cpu_to_core, sizeof(*cpu_to_core) * MAX_NR_CPU);
cpu_to_socket = xc_hypercall_buffer_alloc(xc_handle, cpu_to_socket, sizeof(*cpu_to_socket) * MAX_NR_CPU);
@@ -990,7 +977,9 @@ void cpu_topology_func(int argc, char *a
if ( xc_topologyinfo(xc_handle, &info) )
{
- printf("Can not get Xen CPU topology: %d\n", errno);
+ rc = errno;
+ fprintf(stderr, "Cannot get Xen CPU topology (%d - %s)\n",
+ errno, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
@@ -1005,116 +994,95 @@ void cpu_topology_func(int argc, char *a
printf("CPU%d\t %d\t %d\t %d\n",
i, cpu_to_core[i], cpu_to_socket[i], cpu_to_node[i]);
}
+ rc = 0;
out:
xc_hypercall_buffer_free(xc_handle, cpu_to_core);
xc_hypercall_buffer_free(xc_handle, cpu_to_socket);
xc_hypercall_buffer_free(xc_handle, cpu_to_node);
+ if ( rc )
+ exit(rc);
}
void set_sched_smt_func(int argc, char *argv[])
{
- int value, rc;
+ int value;
- if (argc != 1){
- show_help();
- exit(-1);
+ if ( argc != 1 ) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Missing or invalid argument(s)\n");
+ exit(EINVAL);
}
- if ( !strncmp(argv[0], "disable", sizeof("disable")) )
- {
+ if ( !strcasecmp(argv[0], "disable") )
value = 0;
- }
- else if ( !strncmp(argv[0], "enable", sizeof("enable")) )
- {
+ else if ( !strcasecmp(argv[0], "enable") )
value = 1;
- }
else
{
- show_help();
- exit(-1);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid argument: %s\n", argv[0]);
+ exit(EINVAL);
}
- rc = xc_set_sched_opt_smt(xc_handle, value);
- printf("%s sched_smt_power_savings %s\n", argv[0],
- rc? "failed":"succeeded" );
-
- return;
+ if ( !xc_set_sched_opt_smt(xc_handle, value) )
+ printf("%s sched_smt_power_savings succeeded\n", argv[0]);
+ else
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s sched_smt_power_savings failed (%d - %s)\n",
+ argv[0], errno, strerror(errno));
}
void set_vcpu_migration_delay_func(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int value;
- int rc;
-
- if (argc != 1){
- show_help();
- exit(-1);
- }
-
- value = atoi(argv[0]);
- if (value < 0)
- {
- printf("Please try non-negative vcpu migration delay\n");
- exit(-1);
+ if ( argc != 1 || (value = atoi(argv[0])) < 0 ) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Missing or invalid argument(s)\n");
+ exit(EINVAL);
}
- rc = xc_set_vcpu_migration_delay(xc_handle, value);
- printf("%s to set vcpu migration delay to %d us\n",
- rc? "Fail":"Succeed", value );
-
- return;
+ if ( !xc_set_vcpu_migration_delay(xc_handle, value) )
+ printf("set vcpu migration delay to %d us succeeded\n", value);
+ else
+ fprintf(stderr, "set vcpu migration delay failed (%d - %s)\n",
+ errno, strerror(errno));
}
void get_vcpu_migration_delay_func(int argc, char *argv[])
{
uint32_t value;
- int rc;
- if (argc != 0){
- show_help();
- exit(-1);
- }
+ if ( argc )
+ fprintf(stderr, "Ignoring argument(s)\n");
- rc = xc_get_vcpu_migration_delay(xc_handle, &value);
- if (!rc)
- {
- printf("Schduler vcpu migration delay is %d us\n", value);
- }
+ if ( !xc_get_vcpu_migration_delay(xc_handle, &value) )
+ printf("Scheduler vcpu migration delay is %d us\n", value);
else
- {
- printf("Failed to get scheduler vcpu migration delay, errno=%d\n", errno);
- }
-
- return;
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Failed to get scheduler vcpu migration delay (%d - %s)\n",
+ errno, strerror(errno));
}
void set_max_cstate_func(int argc, char *argv[])
{
- int value, rc;
+ int value;
if ( argc != 1 || sscanf(argv[0], "%d", &value) != 1 || value < 0 )
{
- show_help();
- exit(-1);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Missing or invalid argument(s)\n");
+ exit(EINVAL);
}
- rc = xc_set_cpuidle_max_cstate(xc_handle, (uint32_t)value);
- printf("set max_cstate to C%d %s\n", value,
- rc? "failed":"succeeded" );
-
- return;
+ if ( !xc_set_cpuidle_max_cstate(xc_handle, (uint32_t)value) )
+ printf("set max_cstate to C%d succeeded\n", value);
+ else
+ fprintf(stderr, "set max_cstate to C%d failed (%d - %s)\n",
+ value, errno, strerror(errno));
}
void enable_turbo_mode(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int cpuid = -1;
- if ( argc > 0 && sscanf(argv[0], "%d", &cpuid) != 1 )
- cpuid = -1;
-
- if ( cpuid >= max_cpu_nr )
- cpuid = -1;
+ if ( argc > 0 )
+ parse_cpuid(argv[0], &cpuid);
if ( cpuid < 0 )
{
@@ -1122,21 +1090,22 @@ void enable_turbo_mode(int argc, char *a
* only make effects on dbs governor */
int i;
for ( i = 0; i < max_cpu_nr; i++ )
- xc_enable_turbo(xc_handle, i);
+ if ( xc_enable_turbo(xc_handle, i) )
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "[CPU%d] failed to enable turbo mode (%d - %s)\n",
+ i, errno, strerror(errno));
}
- else
- xc_enable_turbo(xc_handle, cpuid);
+ else if ( xc_enable_turbo(xc_handle, cpuid) )
+ fprintf(stderr, "failed to enable turbo mode (%d - %s)\n",
+ errno, strerror(errno));
}
void disable_turbo_mode(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int cpuid = -1;
- if ( argc > 0 && sscanf(argv[0], "%d", &cpuid) != 1 )
- cpuid = -1;
-
- if ( cpuid >= max_cpu_nr )
- cpuid = -1;
+ if ( argc > 0 )
+ parse_cpuid(argv[0], &cpuid);
if ( cpuid < 0 )
{
@@ -1144,10 +1113,14 @@ void disable_turbo_mode(int argc, char *
* only make effects on dbs governor */
int i;
for ( i = 0; i < max_cpu_nr; i++ )
- xc_disable_turbo(xc_handle, i);
+ if ( xc_disable_turbo(xc_handle, i) )
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "[CPU%d] failed to disable turbo mode (%d - %s)\n",
+ i, errno, strerror(errno));
}
- else
- xc_disable_turbo(xc_handle, cpuid);
+ else if ( xc_disable_turbo(xc_handle, cpuid) )
+ fprintf(stderr, "failed to disable turbo mode (%d - %s)\n",
+ errno, strerror(errno));
}
struct {
@@ -1191,15 +1164,17 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
if ( !xc_handle )
{
fprintf(stderr, "failed to get the handler\n");
- return 0;
+ return EIO;
}
ret = xc_physinfo(xc_handle, &physinfo);
if ( ret )
{
- fprintf(stderr, "failed to get the processor information\n");
+ ret = errno;
+ fprintf(stderr, "failed to get processor information (%d - %s)\n",
+ ret, strerror(ret));
xc_interface_close(xc_handle);
- return 0;
+ return ret;
}
max_cpu_nr = physinfo.nr_cpus;
@@ -1214,14 +1189,18 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
for ( i = 0; i < nr_matches; i++ )
fprintf(stderr, " %s", main_options[matches_main_options[i]].name);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ ret = EINVAL;
}
else if ( nr_matches == 1 )
/* dispatch to the corresponding function handler */
main_options[matches_main_options[0]].function(argc - 2, argv + 2);
else
+ {
show_help();
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ }
xc_interface_close(xc_handle);
- return 0;
+ return ret;
}

128
25920-x86-APICV-enable.patch
View File

@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
References: FATE#313605
# HG changeset patch
# User Jiongxi Li <jiongxi.li@intel.com>
# Date 1347912248 -3600
# Node ID ec60de627945f17ec2ce5c14e1224b59403875f7
# Parent 62de66cec48a1716bb700912da451a26296b8d1e
xen: enable APIC-Register Virtualization
Add APIC register virtualization support
- APIC read doesn't cause VM-Exit
- APIC write becomes trap-like
Signed-off-by: Gang Wei <gang.wei@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiongxi Li <jiongxi.li@intel.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
@@ -822,6 +822,12 @@ static int vlapic_write(struct vcpu *v,
return rc;
}
+int vlapic_apicv_write(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int offset)
+{
+ uint32_t val = vlapic_get_reg(vcpu_vlapic(v), offset);
+ return vlapic_reg_write(v, offset, val);
+}
+
int hvm_x2apic_msr_write(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int msr, uint64_t msr_content)
{
struct vlapic *vlapic = vcpu_vlapic(v);
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static void __init vmx_display_features(
P(cpu_has_vmx_vnmi, "Virtual NMI");
P(cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap, "MSR direct-access bitmap");
P(cpu_has_vmx_unrestricted_guest, "Unrestricted Guest");
+ P(cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt, "APIC Register Virtualization");
#undef P
if ( !printed )
@@ -186,6 +187,14 @@ static int vmx_init_vmcs_config(void)
if ( opt_unrestricted_guest_enabled )
opt |= SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
+ /*
+ * "APIC Register Virtualization"
+ * can be set only when "use TPR shadow" is set
+ */
+ if ( _vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW )
+ opt |= SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT;
+
+
_vmx_secondary_exec_control = adjust_vmx_controls(
"Secondary Exec Control", min, opt,
MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2, &mismatch);
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -2279,6 +2279,16 @@ static void vmx_idtv_reinject(unsigned l
}
}
+static int vmx_handle_apic_write(void)
+{
+ unsigned long exit_qualification = __vmread(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+ unsigned int offset = exit_qualification & 0xfff;
+
+ ASSERT(cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt);
+
+ return vlapic_apicv_write(current, offset);
+}
+
void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
{
unsigned int exit_reason, idtv_info, intr_info = 0, vector = 0;
@@ -2741,6 +2751,11 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_
break;
}
+ case EXIT_REASON_APIC_WRITE:
+ if ( vmx_handle_apic_write() )
+ hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_gp_fault, 0);
+ break;
+
case EXIT_REASON_ACCESS_GDTR_OR_IDTR:
case EXIT_REASON_ACCESS_LDTR_OR_TR:
case EXIT_REASON_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_EXPIRED:
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h
@@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ void vlapic_EOI_set(struct vlapic *vlapi
int vlapic_ipi(struct vlapic *vlapic, uint32_t icr_low, uint32_t icr_high);
+int vlapic_apicv_write(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int offset);
+
struct vlapic *vlapic_lowest_prio(
struct domain *d, struct vlapic *source,
int short_hand, uint8_t dest, uint8_t dest_mode);
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ extern u32 vmx_vmentry_control;
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID 0x00000020
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING 0x00000040
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST 0x00000080
+#define SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT 0x00000100
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING 0x00000400
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID 0x00001000
extern u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control;
@@ -230,6 +231,8 @@ extern bool_t cpu_has_vmx_ins_outs_instr
SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST)
#define cpu_has_vmx_ple \
(vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING)
+#define cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt \
+ (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT)
/* GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO flags. */
#define VMX_INTR_SHADOW_STI 0x00000001
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ void vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(struct
#define EXIT_REASON_INVVPID 53
#define EXIT_REASON_WBINVD 54
#define EXIT_REASON_XSETBV 55
+#define EXIT_REASON_APIC_WRITE 56
#define EXIT_REASON_INVPCID 58
/*

505
25921-x86-APICV-delivery.patch
View File

@ -1,505 +0,0 @@
References: FATE#313605
# HG changeset patch
# User Jiongxi Li <jiongxi.li@intel.com>
# Date 1347912311 -3600
# Node ID 713b8849b11afa05f1dde157a3f5086fa3aaad08
# Parent ec60de627945f17ec2ce5c14e1224b59403875f7
xen: enable Virtual-interrupt delivery
Virtual interrupt delivery avoids Xen to inject vAPIC interrupts
manually, which is fully taken care of by the hardware. This needs
some special awareness into existing interrupr injection path:
For pending interrupt from vLAPIC, instead of direct injection, we may
need update architecture specific indicators before resuming to guest.
Before returning to guest, RVI should be updated if any pending IRRs
EOI exit bitmap controls whether an EOI write should cause VM-Exit. If
set, a trap-like induced EOI VM-Exit is triggered. The approach here
is to manipulate EOI exit bitmap based on value of TMR. Level
triggered irq requires a hook in vLAPIC EOI write, so that vIOAPIC EOI
is triggered and emulated
Signed-off-by: Gang Wei <gang.wei@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiongxi Li <jiongxi.li@intel.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
@@ -145,6 +145,9 @@ int vlapic_set_irq(struct vlapic *vlapic
if ( trig )
vlapic_set_vector(vec, &vlapic->regs->data[APIC_TMR]);
+ if ( hvm_funcs.update_eoi_exit_bitmap )
+ hvm_funcs.update_eoi_exit_bitmap(vlapic_vcpu(vlapic), vec ,trig);
+
/* We may need to wake up target vcpu, besides set pending bit here */
return !vlapic_test_and_set_irr(vec, vlapic);
}
@@ -410,6 +413,14 @@ void vlapic_EOI_set(struct vlapic *vlapi
hvm_dpci_msi_eoi(current->domain, vector);
}
+void vlapic_handle_EOI_induced_exit(struct vlapic *vlapic, int vector)
+{
+ if ( vlapic_test_and_clear_vector(vector, &vlapic->regs->data[APIC_TMR]) )
+ vioapic_update_EOI(vlapic_domain(vlapic), vector);
+
+ hvm_dpci_msi_eoi(current->domain, vector);
+}
+
int vlapic_ipi(
struct vlapic *vlapic, uint32_t icr_low, uint32_t icr_high)
{
@@ -996,6 +1007,14 @@ void vlapic_adjust_i8259_target(struct d
pt_adjust_global_vcpu_target(v);
}
+int vlapic_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled(void)
+{
+ if ( hvm_funcs.virtual_intr_delivery_enabled )
+ return hvm_funcs.virtual_intr_delivery_enabled();
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
int vlapic_has_pending_irq(struct vcpu *v)
{
struct vlapic *vlapic = vcpu_vlapic(v);
@@ -1008,6 +1027,9 @@ int vlapic_has_pending_irq(struct vcpu *
if ( irr == -1 )
return -1;
+ if ( vlapic_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled() )
+ return irr;
+
isr = vlapic_find_highest_isr(vlapic);
isr = (isr != -1) ? isr : 0;
if ( (isr & 0xf0) >= (irr & 0xf0) )
@@ -1020,6 +1042,9 @@ int vlapic_ack_pending_irq(struct vcpu *
{
struct vlapic *vlapic = vcpu_vlapic(v);
+ if ( vlapic_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled() )
+ return 1;
+
vlapic_set_vector(vector, &vlapic->regs->data[APIC_ISR]);
vlapic_clear_irr(vector, vlapic);
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c
@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ void vmx_intr_assist(void)
struct vcpu *v = current;
unsigned int tpr_threshold = 0;
enum hvm_intblk intblk;
+ int pt_vector = -1;
/* Block event injection when single step with MTF. */
if ( unlikely(v->arch.hvm_vcpu.single_step) )
@@ -219,7 +220,7 @@ void vmx_intr_assist(void)
}
/* Crank the handle on interrupt state. */
- pt_update_irq(v);
+ pt_vector = pt_update_irq(v);
do {
intack = hvm_vcpu_has_pending_irq(v);
@@ -230,16 +231,34 @@ void vmx_intr_assist(void)
goto out;
intblk = hvm_interrupt_blocked(v, intack);
- if ( intblk == hvm_intblk_tpr )
+ if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery )
+ {
+ /* Set "Interrupt-window exiting" for ExtINT */
+ if ( (intblk != hvm_intblk_none) &&
+ ( (intack.source == hvm_intsrc_pic) ||
+ ( intack.source == hvm_intsrc_vector) ) )
+ {
+ enable_intr_window(v, intack);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ( __vmread(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO) & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK )
+ {
+ if ( (intack.source == hvm_intsrc_pic) ||
+ (intack.source == hvm_intsrc_nmi) ||
+ (intack.source == hvm_intsrc_mce) )
+ enable_intr_window(v, intack);
+
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else if ( intblk == hvm_intblk_tpr )
{
ASSERT(vlapic_enabled(vcpu_vlapic(v)));
ASSERT(intack.source == hvm_intsrc_lapic);
tpr_threshold = intack.vector >> 4;
goto out;
- }
-
- if ( (intblk != hvm_intblk_none) ||
- (__vmread(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO) & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) )
+ } else if ( (intblk != hvm_intblk_none) ||
+ (__vmread(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO) & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) )
{
enable_intr_window(v, intack);
goto out;
@@ -256,6 +275,44 @@ void vmx_intr_assist(void)
{
hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_machine_check, HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE);
}
+ else if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery &&
+ intack.source != hvm_intsrc_pic &&
+ intack.source != hvm_intsrc_vector )
+ {
+ unsigned long status = __vmread(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
+
+ /*
+ * Set eoi_exit_bitmap for periodic timer interrup to cause EOI-induced VM
+ * exit, then pending periodic time interrups have the chance to be injected
+ * for compensation
+ */
+ if (pt_vector != -1)
+ vmx_set_eoi_exit_bitmap(v, pt_vector);
+
+ /* we need update the RVI field */
+ status &= ~(unsigned long)0x0FF;
+ status |= (unsigned long)0x0FF &
+ intack.vector;
+ __vmwrite(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
+ if (v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exitmap_changed) {
+#ifdef __i386__
+#define UPDATE_EOI_EXITMAP(v, e) { \
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(e, &v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exitmap_changed)) { \
+ __vmwrite(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP##e, v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[e]); \
+ __vmwrite(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP##e##_HIGH, v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[e] >> 32);}}
+#else
+#define UPDATE_EOI_EXITMAP(v, e) { \
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(e, &v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exitmap_changed)) { \
+ __vmwrite(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP##e, v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[e]);}}
+#endif
+ UPDATE_EOI_EXITMAP(v, 0);
+ UPDATE_EOI_EXITMAP(v, 1);
+ UPDATE_EOI_EXITMAP(v, 2);
+ UPDATE_EOI_EXITMAP(v, 3);
+ }
+
+ pt_intr_post(v, intack);
+ }
else
{
HVMTRACE_2D(INJ_VIRQ, intack.vector, /*fake=*/ 0);
@@ -265,11 +322,16 @@ void vmx_intr_assist(void)
/* Is there another IRQ to queue up behind this one? */
intack = hvm_vcpu_has_pending_irq(v);
- if ( unlikely(intack.source != hvm_intsrc_none) )
- enable_intr_window(v, intack);
+ if ( !cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery ||
+ intack.source == hvm_intsrc_pic ||
+ intack.source == hvm_intsrc_vector )
+ {
+ if ( unlikely(intack.source != hvm_intsrc_none) )
+ enable_intr_window(v, intack);
+ }
out:
- if ( cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow )
+ if ( !cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery && cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow )
__vmwrite(TPR_THRESHOLD, tpr_threshold);
}
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ static void __init vmx_display_features(
P(cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap, "MSR direct-access bitmap");
P(cpu_has_vmx_unrestricted_guest, "Unrestricted Guest");
P(cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt, "APIC Register Virtualization");
+ P(cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery, "Virtual Interrupt Delivery");
#undef P
if ( !printed )
@@ -188,11 +189,12 @@ static int vmx_init_vmcs_config(void)
opt |= SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
/*
- * "APIC Register Virtualization"
+ * "APIC Register Virtualization" and "Virtual Interrupt Delivery"
* can be set only when "use TPR shadow" is set
*/
if ( _vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW )
- opt |= SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT;
+ opt |= SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY;
_vmx_secondary_exec_control = adjust_vmx_controls(
@@ -787,6 +789,22 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v
__vmwrite(IO_BITMAP_A, virt_to_maddr((char *)hvm_io_bitmap + 0));
__vmwrite(IO_BITMAP_B, virt_to_maddr((char *)hvm_io_bitmap + PAGE_SIZE));
+ if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery )
+ {
+ /* EOI-exit bitmap */
+ v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[0] = (uint64_t)0;
+ __vmwrite(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0, v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[0]);
+ v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[1] = (uint64_t)0;
+ __vmwrite(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1, v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[1]);
+ v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[2] = (uint64_t)0;
+ __vmwrite(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2, v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[2]);
+ v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[3] = (uint64_t)0;
+ __vmwrite(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[3]);
+
+ /* Initialise Guest Interrupt Status (RVI and SVI) to 0 */
+ __vmwrite(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, 0);
+ }
+
/* Host data selectors. */
__vmwrite(HOST_SS_SELECTOR, __HYPERVISOR_DS);
__vmwrite(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, __HYPERVISOR_DS);
@@ -1028,6 +1046,30 @@ int vmx_add_host_load_msr(u32 msr)
return 0;
}
+void vmx_set_eoi_exit_bitmap(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector)
+{
+ int index, offset, changed;
+
+ index = vector >> 6;
+ offset = vector & 63;
+ changed = !test_and_set_bit(offset,
+ (uint64_t *)&v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[index]);
+ if (changed)
+ set_bit(index, &v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exitmap_changed);
+}
+
+void vmx_clear_eoi_exit_bitmap(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector)
+{
+ int index, offset, changed;
+
+ index = vector >> 6;
+ offset = vector & 63;
+ changed = test_and_clear_bit(offset,
+ (uint64_t *)&v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[index]);
+ if (changed)
+ set_bit(index, &v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exitmap_changed);
+}
+
int vmx_create_vmcs(struct vcpu *v)
{
struct arch_vmx_struct *arch_vmx = &v->arch.hvm_vmx;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1507,6 +1507,22 @@ static void vmx_set_info_guest(struct vc
vmx_vmcs_exit(v);
}
+static void vmx_update_eoi_exit_bitmap(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector, u8 trig)
+{
+ if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery )
+ {
+ if (trig)
+ vmx_set_eoi_exit_bitmap(v, vector);
+ else
+ vmx_clear_eoi_exit_bitmap(v, vector);
+ }
+}
+
+static int vmx_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled(void)
+{
+ return cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery;
+}
+
static struct hvm_function_table __read_mostly vmx_function_table = {
.name = "VMX",
.cpu_up_prepare = vmx_cpu_up_prepare,
@@ -1553,7 +1569,9 @@ static struct hvm_function_table __read_
.nhvm_vmcx_guest_intercepts_trap = nvmx_intercepts_exception,
.nhvm_vcpu_vmexit_trap = nvmx_vmexit_trap,
.nhvm_intr_blocked = nvmx_intr_blocked,
- .nhvm_domain_relinquish_resources = nvmx_domain_relinquish_resources
+ .nhvm_domain_relinquish_resources = nvmx_domain_relinquish_resources,
+ .update_eoi_exit_bitmap = vmx_update_eoi_exit_bitmap,
+ .virtual_intr_delivery_enabled = vmx_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled
};
struct hvm_function_table * __init start_vmx(void)
@@ -2289,6 +2307,17 @@ static int vmx_handle_apic_write(void)
return vlapic_apicv_write(current, offset);
}
+/*
+ * When "Virtual Interrupt Delivery" is enabled, this function is used
+ * to handle EOI-induced VM exit
+ */
+void vmx_handle_EOI_induced_exit(struct vlapic *vlapic, int vector)
+{
+ ASSERT(cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery);
+
+ vlapic_handle_EOI_induced_exit(vlapic, vector);
+}
+
void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
{
unsigned int exit_reason, idtv_info, intr_info = 0, vector = 0;
@@ -2689,6 +2718,16 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_
hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_gp_fault, 0);
break;
+ case EXIT_REASON_EOI_INDUCED:
+ {
+ int vector;
+ exit_qualification = __vmread(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+ vector = exit_qualification & 0xff;
+
+ vmx_handle_EOI_induced_exit(vcpu_vlapic(current), vector);
+ break;
+ }
+
case EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION:
exit_qualification = __vmread(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
if ( exit_qualification & 0x10 )
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpt.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpt.c
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static void pt_timer_fn(void *data)
pt_unlock(pt);
}
-void pt_update_irq(struct vcpu *v)
+int pt_update_irq(struct vcpu *v)
{
struct list_head *head = &v->arch.hvm_vcpu.tm_list;
struct periodic_time *pt, *temp, *earliest_pt = NULL;
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ void pt_update_irq(struct vcpu *v)
if ( earliest_pt == NULL )
{
spin_unlock(&v->arch.hvm_vcpu.tm_lock);
- return;
+ return -1;
}
earliest_pt->irq_issued = 1;
@@ -263,6 +263,17 @@ void pt_update_irq(struct vcpu *v)
hvm_isa_irq_deassert(v->domain, irq);
hvm_isa_irq_assert(v->domain, irq);
}
+
+ /*
+ * If periodic timer interrut is handled by lapic, its vector in
+ * IRR is returned and used to set eoi_exit_bitmap for virtual
+ * interrupt delivery case. Otherwise return -1 to do nothing.
+ */
+ if ( vlapic_accept_pic_intr(v) &&
+ (&v->domain->arch.hvm_domain)->vpic[0].int_output )
+ return -1;
+ else
+ return pt_irq_vector(earliest_pt, hvm_intsrc_lapic);
}
static struct periodic_time *is_pt_irq(
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
@@ -180,6 +180,10 @@ struct hvm_function_table {
enum hvm_intblk (*nhvm_intr_blocked)(struct vcpu *v);
void (*nhvm_domain_relinquish_resources)(struct domain *d);
+
+ /* Virtual interrupt delivery */
+ void (*update_eoi_exit_bitmap)(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector, u8 trig);
+ int (*virtual_intr_delivery_enabled)(void);
};
extern struct hvm_function_table hvm_funcs;
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ int vlapic_accept_pic_intr(struct vcpu *
void vlapic_adjust_i8259_target(struct domain *d);
void vlapic_EOI_set(struct vlapic *vlapic);
+void vlapic_handle_EOI_induced_exit(struct vlapic *vlapic, int vector);
int vlapic_ipi(struct vlapic *vlapic, uint32_t icr_low, uint32_t icr_high);
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
@@ -110,6 +110,9 @@ struct arch_vmx_struct {
unsigned int host_msr_count;
struct vmx_msr_entry *host_msr_area;
+ uint32_t eoi_exitmap_changed;
+ uint64_t eoi_exit_bitmap[4];
+
unsigned long host_cr0;
/* Is the guest in real mode? */
@@ -183,6 +186,7 @@ extern u32 vmx_vmentry_control;
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING 0x00000040
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST 0x00000080
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT 0x00000100
+#define SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY 0x00000200
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING 0x00000400
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID 0x00001000
extern u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control;
@@ -233,6 +237,8 @@ extern bool_t cpu_has_vmx_ins_outs_instr
(vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING)
#define cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt \
(vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT)
+#define cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery \
+ (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY)
/* GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO flags. */
#define VMX_INTR_SHADOW_STI 0x00000001
@@ -251,6 +257,7 @@ enum vmcs_field {
GUEST_GS_SELECTOR = 0x0000080a,
GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR = 0x0000080c,
GUEST_TR_SELECTOR = 0x0000080e,
+ GUEST_INTR_STATUS = 0x00000810,
HOST_ES_SELECTOR = 0x00000c00,
HOST_CS_SELECTOR = 0x00000c02,
HOST_SS_SELECTOR = 0x00000c04,
@@ -278,6 +285,14 @@ enum vmcs_field {
APIC_ACCESS_ADDR_HIGH = 0x00002015,
EPT_POINTER = 0x0000201a,
EPT_POINTER_HIGH = 0x0000201b,
+ EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0 = 0x0000201c,
+ EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0_HIGH = 0x0000201d,
+ EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1 = 0x0000201e,
+ EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1_HIGH = 0x0000201f,
+ EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2 = 0x00002020,
+ EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2_HIGH = 0x00002021,
+ EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3 = 0x00002022,
+ EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3_HIGH = 0x00002023,
GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS = 0x00002400,
GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_HIGH = 0x00002401,
VMCS_LINK_POINTER = 0x00002800,
@@ -398,6 +413,8 @@ int vmx_write_guest_msr(u32 msr, u64 val
int vmx_add_guest_msr(u32 msr);
int vmx_add_host_load_msr(u32 msr);
void vmx_vmcs_switch(struct vmcs_struct *from, struct vmcs_struct *to);
+void vmx_set_eoi_exit_bitmap(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector);
+void vmx_clear_eoi_exit_bitmap(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector);
#endif /* ASM_X86_HVM_VMX_VMCS_H__ */
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ void vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(struct
#define EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY 41
#define EXIT_REASON_TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD 43
#define EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS 44
+#define EXIT_REASON_EOI_INDUCED 45
#define EXIT_REASON_ACCESS_GDTR_OR_IDTR 46
#define EXIT_REASON_ACCESS_LDTR_OR_TR 47
#define EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION 48
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vpt.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vpt.h
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ struct pl_time { /* platform time */
void pt_save_timer(struct vcpu *v);
void pt_restore_timer(struct vcpu *v);
-void pt_update_irq(struct vcpu *v);
+int pt_update_irq(struct vcpu *v);
void pt_intr_post(struct vcpu *v, struct hvm_intack intack);
void pt_migrate(struct vcpu *v);

128
25922-x86-APICV-x2APIC.patch
View File

@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
References: FATE#313605
# HG changeset patch
# User Jiongxi Li <jiongxi.li@intel.com>
# Date 1347912362 -3600
# Node ID c2578dd96b8318e108fff0f340411135dedaa47d
# Parent 713b8849b11afa05f1dde157a3f5086fa3aaad08
xen: add virtual x2apic support for apicv
basically to benefit from apicv, we need clear MSR bitmap for
corresponding x2apic MSRs:
0x800 - 0x8ff: no read intercept for apicv register virtualization
TPR,EOI,SELF-IPI: no write intercept for virtual interrupt
delivery
Signed-off-by: Jiongxi Li <jiongxi.li@intel.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
@@ -658,7 +658,7 @@ static void vmx_set_host_env(struct vcpu
(unsigned long)&get_cpu_info()->guest_cpu_user_regs.error_code);
}
-void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 msr)
+void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 msr, int type)
{
unsigned long *msr_bitmap = v->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_bitmap;
@@ -673,14 +673,18 @@ void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struc
*/
if ( msr <= 0x1fff )
{
- __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-low */
- __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-low */
+ if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+ __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-low */
+ if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+ __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-low */
}
else if ( (msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff) )
{
msr &= 0x1fff;
- __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-high */
- __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-high */
+ if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+ __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-high */
+ if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+ __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-high */
}
}
@@ -776,13 +780,25 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v
v->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_bitmap = msr_bitmap;
__vmwrite(MSR_BITMAP, virt_to_maddr(msr_bitmap));
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_FS_BASE);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_GS_BASE);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
if ( cpu_has_vmx_pat && paging_mode_hap(d) )
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
+ if ( cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt )
+ {
+ int msr;
+ for (msr = MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR; msr <= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR + 0xff; msr++)
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, msr, MSR_TYPE_R);
+ }
+ if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery )
+ {
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICTPR_MSR, MSR_TYPE_W);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICEOI_MSR, MSR_TYPE_W);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICSELF_MSR, MSR_TYPE_W);
+ }
}
/* I/O access bitmap. */
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -2041,7 +2041,7 @@ static int vmx_msr_write_intercept(unsig
for ( ; (rc == 0) && lbr->count; lbr++ )
for ( i = 0; (rc == 0) && (i < lbr->count); i++ )
if ( (rc = vmx_add_guest_msr(lbr->base + i)) == 0 )
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, lbr->base + i);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, lbr->base + i, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
}
if ( (rc < 0) ||
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
@@ -407,7 +407,9 @@ enum vmcs_field {
#define VMCS_VPID_WIDTH 16
-void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 msr);
+#define MSR_TYPE_R 1
+#define MSR_TYPE_W 2
+void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 msr, int type);
int vmx_read_guest_msr(u32 msr, u64 *val);
int vmx_write_guest_msr(u32 msr, u64 val);
int vmx_add_guest_msr(u32 msr);
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
@@ -293,6 +293,9 @@
#define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE (1<<11)
#define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BASE (0xfffff<<12)
#define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR 0x800
+#define MSR_IA32_APICTPR_MSR 0x808
+#define MSR_IA32_APICEOI_MSR 0x80b
+#define MSR_IA32_APICSELF_MSR 0x83f
#define MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE 0x00000079
#define MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV 0x0000008b

43
25952-x86-MMIO-remap-permissions.patch
View File

@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
# Date 1348653367 -7200
# Node ID 8278d7d8fa485996f51134c5265fceaf239adf6a
# Parent b83f414ccf7a6e4e077a10bc422cf3f6c7d30566
x86: check remote MMIO remap permissions
When a domain is mapping pages from a different pg_owner domain, the
iomem_access checks are currently only applied to the pg_owner domain,
potentially allowing a domain with a more restrictive iomem_access
policy to have the pages mapped into its page tables. To catch this,
also check the owner of the page tables. The current domain does not
need to be checked because the ability to manipulate a domain's page
tables implies full access to the target domain, so checking that
domain's permission is sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -884,6 +884,19 @@ get_page_from_l1e(
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if ( pg_owner != l1e_owner &&
+ !iomem_access_permitted(l1e_owner, mfn, mfn) )
+ {
+ if ( mfn != (PADDR_MASK >> PAGE_SHIFT) ) /* INVALID_MFN? */
+ {
+ MEM_LOG("Dom%u attempted to map I/O space %08lx in dom%u to dom%u",
+ curr->domain->domain_id, mfn, pg_owner->domain_id,
+ l1e_owner->domain_id);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
if ( !(l1f & _PAGE_RW) ||
!rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn) )
return 0;

129
25957-x86-TSC-adjust-HVM.patch
View File

@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
References: FATE#313633
# HG changeset patch
# User Liu, Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
# Date 1348654362 -7200
# Node ID c47ef9592fb39325e33f8406b4bd736cc84482e5
# Parent 5d63c633a60b9a1d695594f9c17cf933240bec81
x86: Implement TSC adjust feature for HVM guest
IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR is maintained separately for each logical
processor. A logical processor maintains and uses the IA32_TSC_ADJUST
MSR as follows:
1). On RESET, the value of the IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR is 0;
2). If an execution of WRMSR to the IA32_TIME_STAMP_COUNTER MSR adds
(or subtracts) value X from the TSC, the logical processor also
adds (or subtracts) value X from the IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR;
3). If an execution of WRMSR to the IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR adds (or
subtracts) value X from that MSR, the logical processor also adds
(or subtracts) value X from the TSC.
This patch provides tsc adjust support for hvm guest, with it guest OS
would be happy when sync tsc.
Signed-off-by: Liu, Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ int hvm_set_guest_pat(struct vcpu *v, u6
void hvm_set_guest_tsc(struct vcpu *v, u64 guest_tsc)
{
uint64_t tsc;
+ uint64_t delta_tsc;
if ( v->domain->arch.vtsc )
{
@@ -255,10 +256,22 @@ void hvm_set_guest_tsc(struct vcpu *v, u
rdtscll(tsc);
}
- v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset = guest_tsc - tsc;
+ delta_tsc = guest_tsc - tsc;
+ v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_adjust += delta_tsc
+ - v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset;
+ v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset = delta_tsc;
+
hvm_funcs.set_tsc_offset(v, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset);
}
+void hvm_set_guest_tsc_adjust(struct vcpu *v, u64 tsc_adjust)
+{
+ v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset += tsc_adjust
+ - v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_adjust;
+ hvm_funcs.set_tsc_offset(v, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset);
+ v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_adjust = tsc_adjust;
+}
+
u64 hvm_get_guest_tsc(struct vcpu *v)
{
uint64_t tsc;
@@ -277,6 +290,11 @@ u64 hvm_get_guest_tsc(struct vcpu *v)
return tsc + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset;
}
+u64 hvm_get_guest_tsc_adjust(struct vcpu *v)
+{
+ return v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_adjust;
+}
+
void hvm_migrate_timers(struct vcpu *v)
{
rtc_migrate_timers(v);
@@ -2798,6 +2816,10 @@ int hvm_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int
*msr_content = hvm_get_guest_tsc(v);
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST:
+ *msr_content = hvm_get_guest_tsc_adjust(v);
+ break;
+
case MSR_TSC_AUX:
*msr_content = hvm_msr_tsc_aux(v);
break;
@@ -2911,6 +2933,10 @@ int hvm_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int
hvm_set_guest_tsc(v, msr_content);
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST:
+ hvm_set_guest_tsc_adjust(v, msr_content);
+ break;
+
case MSR_TSC_AUX:
v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_aux = (uint32_t)msr_content;
if ( cpu_has_rdtscp
@@ -3482,6 +3508,8 @@ void hvm_vcpu_reset_state(struct vcpu *v
v->domain->vcpu[0]->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset;
hvm_funcs.set_tsc_offset(v, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset);
+ v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_adjust = 0;
+
paging_update_paging_modes(v);
v->arch.flags |= TF_kernel_mode;
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h
@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ struct hvm_vcpu {
struct hvm_vcpu_asid n1asid;
u32 msr_tsc_aux;
+ u64 msr_tsc_adjust;
/* VPMU */
struct vpmu_struct vpmu;
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
@@ -286,6 +286,7 @@
#define MSR_IA32_PLATFORM_ID 0x00000017
#define MSR_IA32_EBL_CR_POWERON 0x0000002a
#define MSR_IA32_EBC_FREQUENCY_ID 0x0000002c
+#define MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST 0x0000003b
#define MSR_IA32_APICBASE 0x0000001b
#define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BSP (1<<8)

104
25958-x86-TSC-adjust-sr.patch
View File

@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
References: FATE#313633
# HG changeset patch
# User Liu, Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
# Date 1348654418 -7200
# Node ID 56fb977ce6eb4626a02d4a7a34e85009bb8ee3e0
# Parent c47ef9592fb39325e33f8406b4bd736cc84482e5
x86: Save/restore TSC adjust during HVM guest migration
Signed-off-by: Liu, Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/tools/misc/xen-hvmctx.c
+++ b/tools/misc/xen-hvmctx.c
@@ -390,6 +390,13 @@ static void dump_vmce_vcpu(void)
printf(" VMCE_VCPU: caps %" PRIx64 "\n", p.caps);
}
+static void dump_tsc_adjust(void)
+{
+ HVM_SAVE_TYPE(TSC_ADJUST) p;
+ READ(p);
+ printf(" TSC_ADJUST: tsc_adjust %" PRIx64 "\n", p.tsc_adjust);
+}
+
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int entry, domid;
@@ -457,6 +464,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
case HVM_SAVE_CODE(VIRIDIAN_DOMAIN): dump_viridian_domain(); break;
case HVM_SAVE_CODE(VIRIDIAN_VCPU): dump_viridian_vcpu(); break;
case HVM_SAVE_CODE(VMCE_VCPU): dump_vmce_vcpu(); break;
+ case HVM_SAVE_CODE(TSC_ADJUST): dump_tsc_adjust(); break;
case HVM_SAVE_CODE(END): break;
default:
printf(" ** Don't understand type %u: skipping\n",
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -610,6 +610,46 @@ void hvm_domain_destroy(struct domain *d
hvm_destroy_cacheattr_region_list(d);
}
+static int hvm_save_tsc_adjust(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
+{
+ struct vcpu *v;
+ struct hvm_tsc_adjust ctxt;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
+ {
+ ctxt.tsc_adjust = v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_adjust;
+ err = hvm_save_entry(TSC_ADJUST, v->vcpu_id, h, &ctxt);
+ if ( err )
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int hvm_load_tsc_adjust(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
+{
+ unsigned int vcpuid = hvm_load_instance(h);
+ struct vcpu *v;
+ struct hvm_tsc_adjust ctxt;
+
+ if ( vcpuid >= d->max_vcpus || (v = d->vcpu[vcpuid]) == NULL )
+ {
+ dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "HVM restore: dom%d has no vcpu%u\n",
+ d->domain_id, vcpuid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if ( hvm_load_entry(TSC_ADJUST, h, &ctxt) != 0 )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_adjust = ctxt.tsc_adjust;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+HVM_REGISTER_SAVE_RESTORE(TSC_ADJUST, hvm_save_tsc_adjust,
+ hvm_load_tsc_adjust, 1, HVMSR_PER_VCPU);
+
static int hvm_save_cpu_ctxt(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
{
struct vcpu *v;
--- a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/hvm/save.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/hvm/save.h
@@ -581,9 +581,15 @@ struct hvm_vmce_vcpu {
DECLARE_HVM_SAVE_TYPE(VMCE_VCPU, 18, struct hvm_vmce_vcpu);
+struct hvm_tsc_adjust {
+ uint64_t tsc_adjust;
+};
+
+DECLARE_HVM_SAVE_TYPE(TSC_ADJUST, 19, struct hvm_tsc_adjust);
+
/*
* Largest type-code in use
*/
-#define HVM_SAVE_CODE_MAX 18
+#define HVM_SAVE_CODE_MAX 19
#endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_HVM_SAVE_X86_H__ */

39
25959-x86-TSC-adjust-expose.patch
View File

@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
References: FATE#313633
# HG changeset patch
# User Liu, Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
# Date 1348654470 -7200
# Node ID 3aa66543a51ba77cb73e8c874e2416d065426a22
# Parent 56fb977ce6eb4626a02d4a7a34e85009bb8ee3e0
x86: Expose TSC adjust to HVM guest
Intel latest SDM (17.13.3) release a new MSR CPUID.7.0.EBX[1]=1
indicates TSC_ADJUST MSR 0x3b is supported.
This patch expose it to hvm guest.
Signed-off-by: Liu, Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_cpufeature.h
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_cpufeature.h
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ebx) */
#define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE 0 /* {RD,WR}{FS,GS}BASE instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST 1 /* Tsc thread offset */
#define X86_FEATURE_BMI1 3 /* 1st group bit manipulation extensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_HLE 4 /* Hardware Lock Elision */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX2 5 /* AVX2 instructions */
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c
@@ -362,7 +362,8 @@ static void xc_cpuid_hvm_policy(
case 0x00000007: /* Intel-defined CPU features */
if ( input[1] == 0 ) {
- regs[1] &= (bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_BMI1) |
+ regs[1] &= (bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST) |
+ bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_BMI1) |
bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_HLE) |
bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_AVX2) |
bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_SMEP) |

61
25975-x86-IvyBridge.patch
View File

@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1349172840 -7200
# Node ID 87bf99fad7a9f018530d13213f57610621838085
# Parent 5fbdbf585f5f2ee9a3e3c75a8a9f9f2cc6eda65c
x86/Intel: add further support for Ivy Bridge CPU models
And some initial Haswell ones at once.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: "Nakajima, Jun" <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
@@ -105,11 +105,15 @@ static void do_get_hw_residencies(void *
switch ( c->x86_model )
{
- /* Ivy bridge */
- case 0x3A:
/* Sandy bridge */
case 0x2A:
case 0x2D:
+ /* Ivy bridge */
+ case 0x3A:
+ case 0x3E:
+ /* Haswell */
+ case 0x3C:
+ case 0x45:
GET_PC2_RES(hw_res->pc2);
GET_CC7_RES(hw_res->cc7);
/* fall through */
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1825,7 +1825,9 @@ static const struct lbr_info *last_branc
/* Sandy Bridge */
case 42: case 45:
/* Ivy Bridge */
- case 58:
+ case 58: case 62:
+ /* Haswell */
+ case 60: case 69:
return nh_lbr;
break;
/* Atom */
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vpmu_core2.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vpmu_core2.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vpmu_core2.c
@@ -747,6 +747,7 @@ int vmx_vpmu_initialise(struct vcpu *v,
case 46:
case 47:
case 58:
+ case 62:
ret = core2_vpmu_initialise(v, vpmu_flags);
if ( !ret )
vpmu->arch_vpmu_ops = &core2_vpmu_ops;

76
26077-stubdom_fix_compile_errors_in_grub.patch
View File

@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
changeset: 26077:33348baecf37
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Thu Oct 18 09:34:59 2012 +0100
files: stubdom/grub.patches/70compiler_warnings.diff
description:
stubdom: fix compile errors in grub
Building xen.rpm in SLES11 started to fail due to these compiler
warnings:
[ 1436s] ../grub-upstream/netboot/fsys_tftp.c:213: warning: operation on 'block' may be undefined
[ 1437s] ../grub-upstream/netboot/main.c:444: warning: operation on 'block' may be undefined
[ 1234s] E: xen sequence-point ../grub-upstream/netboot/fsys_tftp.c:213
[ 1234s] E: xen sequence-point ../grub-upstream/netboot/main.c:444
The reason for this is that the assignment is done twice:
tp.u.ack.block = ((uint16_t)( (((uint16_t)((block = prevblock)) & (uint16_t)0x00ffU) << 8) | (((uint16_t)((block = prevblock)) & (uint16_t)0xff00U) >> 8)));
Fix this package build error by adding another patch for grub, which
moves the assignment out of the macro usage.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r 8dcab28b8081 -r 33348baecf37 stubdom/grub.patches/70compiler_warnings.diff
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/stubdom/grub.patches/70compiler_warnings.diff Thu Oct 18 09:34:59 2012 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+[ 1436s] ../grub-upstream/netboot/fsys_tftp.c:213: warning: operation on 'block' may be undefined
+[ 1437s] ../grub-upstream/netboot/main.c:444: warning: operation on 'block' may be undefined
+
+[ 1234s] E: xen sequence-point ../grub-upstream/netboot/fsys_tftp.c:213
+[ 1234s] E: xen sequence-point ../grub-upstream/netboot/main.c:444
+
+---
+ netboot/fsys_tftp.c | 5 ++++-
+ netboot/main.c | 5 ++++-
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+Index: grub-0.97/netboot/fsys_tftp.c
+===================================================================
+--- grub-0.97.orig/netboot/fsys_tftp.c
++++ grub-0.97/netboot/fsys_tftp.c
+@@ -209,8 +209,11 @@ buf_fill (int abort)
+ break;
+
+ if ((block || bcounter) && (block != prevblock + (unsigned short) 1))
++ {
++ block = prevblock;
+ /* Block order should be continuous */
+- tp.u.ack.block = htons (block = prevblock);
++ tp.u.ack.block = htons (block);
++ }
+
+ /* Should be continuous. */
+ tp.opcode = abort ? htons (TFTP_ERROR) : htons (TFTP_ACK);
+Index: grub-0.97/netboot/main.c
+===================================================================
+--- grub-0.97.orig/netboot/main.c
++++ grub-0.97/netboot/main.c
+@@ -440,8 +440,11 @@ tftp (const char *name, int (*fnc) (unsi
+ break;
+
+ if ((block || bcounter) && (block != prevblock + 1))
++ {
++ block = prevblock;
+ /* Block order should be continuous */
+- tp.u.ack.block = htons (block = prevblock);
++ tp.u.ack.block = htons (block);
++ }
+
+ /* Should be continuous. */
+ tp.opcode = htons (TFTP_ACK);

187
26078-hotplug-Linux_remove_hotplug_support_rely_on_udev_instead.patch
View File

@ -1,187 +0,0 @@
changeset: 26078:019ca95dfa34
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:00 2012 +0100
files: Makefile README install.sh tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile tools/hotplug/Linux/xen-backend.agent
description:
hotplug/Linux: remove hotplug support, rely on udev instead
Hotplug has been replaced by udev since several years. Remove the
hotplug related files and install udev unconditionally.
This makes it possible to remove udev from rpm BuildRequires which
reduces the buildtime dependency chain. For openSuSE:Factory it was
done just now:
http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-buildservice/2012-10/msg00085.html
The patch by itself will have no practical impact unless someone
attempts to build and run a Xen dom0 on a really old base system. e.g.
circa SLES9/2007 or earlier
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r 33348baecf37 -r 019ca95dfa34 Makefile
--- a/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:34:59 2012 +0100
+++ b/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:00 2012 +0100
@@ -223,7 +223,6 @@ uninstall:
$(MAKE) -C xen uninstall
rm -rf $(D)$(CONFIG_DIR)/init.d/xendomains $(D)$(CONFIG_DIR)/init.d/xend
rm -rf $(D)$(CONFIG_DIR)/init.d/xencommons $(D)$(CONFIG_DIR)/init.d/xen-watchdog
- rm -rf $(D)$(CONFIG_DIR)/hotplug/xen-backend.agent
rm -f $(D)$(CONFIG_DIR)/udev/rules.d/xen-backend.rules
rm -f $(D)$(CONFIG_DIR)/udev/rules.d/xend.rules
rm -f $(D)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)/xendomains
diff -r 33348baecf37 -r 019ca95dfa34 README
--- a/README Thu Oct 18 09:34:59 2012 +0100
+++ b/README Thu Oct 18 09:35:00 2012 +0100
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ provided by your OS distributor:
* pkg-config
* bridge-utils package (/sbin/brctl)
* iproute package (/sbin/ip)
- * hotplug or udev
+ * udev
* GNU bison and GNU flex
* GNU gettext
* 16-bit x86 assembler, loader and compiler (dev86 rpm or bin86 & bcc debs)
@@ -120,9 +120,9 @@ 4. To rebuild an existing tree without m
make install and make dist differ in that make install does the
right things for your local machine (installing the appropriate
- version of hotplug or udev scripts, for example), but make dist
- includes all versions of those scripts, so that you can copy the dist
- directory to another machine and install from that distribution.
+ version of udev scripts, for example), but make dist includes all
+ versions of those scripts, so that you can copy the dist directory
+ to another machine and install from that distribution.
Python Runtime Libraries
========================
diff -r 33348baecf37 -r 019ca95dfa34 install.sh
--- a/install.sh Thu Oct 18 09:34:59 2012 +0100
+++ b/install.sh Thu Oct 18 09:35:00 2012 +0100
@@ -27,20 +27,6 @@ echo "Installing Xen from '$src' to '$ds
echo "Installing Xen from '$src' to '$dst'..."
(cd $src; tar -cf - * ) | tar -C "$tmp" -xf -
-[ -x "$(which udevinfo)" ] && \
- UDEV_VERSION=$(udevinfo -V | sed -e 's/^[^0-9]* \([0-9]\{1,\}\)[^0-9]\{0,\}/\1/')
-
-[ -z "$UDEV_VERSION" -a -x /sbin/udevadm ] && \
- UDEV_VERSION=$(/sbin/udevadm info -V | awk '{print $NF}')
-
-if [ -n "$UDEV_VERSION" ] && [ $UDEV_VERSION -ge 059 ]; then
- echo " - installing for udev-based system"
- rm -rf "$tmp/etc/hotplug"
-else
- echo " - installing for hotplug-based system"
- rm -rf "$tmp/etc/udev"
-fi
-
echo " - modifying permissions"
chmod -R a+rX "$tmp"
diff -r 33348baecf37 -r 019ca95dfa34 tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile
--- a/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:34:59 2012 +0100
+++ b/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:00 2012 +0100
@@ -27,31 +27,8 @@ XEN_SCRIPT_DATA += block-common.sh vtpm-
XEN_SCRIPT_DATA += block-common.sh vtpm-common.sh vtpm-hotplug-common.sh
XEN_SCRIPT_DATA += vtpm-migration.sh vtpm-impl
-XEN_HOTPLUG_DIR = $(CONFIG_DIR)/hotplug
-XEN_HOTPLUG_SCRIPTS = xen-backend.agent
-
-UDEVVER = 0
-ifeq ($(shell [ -x /sbin/udevadm ] && echo 1),1)
-UDEVVER = $(shell /sbin/udevadm info -V | sed -e 's/^[^0-9]* \([0-9]\{1,\}\)[^0-9]\{0,\}/\1/' )
-endif
-ifeq ($(shell [ -x /usr/bin/udevinfo ] && echo 1),1)
-UDEVVER = $(shell /usr/bin/udevinfo -V | sed -e 's/^[^0-9]* \([0-9]\{1,\}\)[^0-9]\{0,\}/\1/' )
-endif
-
UDEV_RULES_DIR = $(CONFIG_DIR)/udev
UDEV_RULES = xen-backend.rules xend.rules
-
-DI = $(if $(DISTDIR),$(shell readlink -f $(DISTDIR)),)
-DE = $(if $(DESTDIR),$(shell readlink -f $(DESTDIR)),)
-ifeq ($(findstring $(DI),$(DE)),$(DI))
-HOTPLUGS=install-hotplug install-udev
-else
-ifeq ($(shell [ $(UDEVVER) -ge 059 ] && echo 1),1)
-HOTPLUGS=install-udev
-else
-HOTPLUGS=install-hotplug
-endif
-endif
.PHONY: all
all:
@@ -60,7 +37,7 @@ build:
build:
.PHONY: install
-install: all install-initd install-scripts $(HOTPLUGS)
+install: all install-initd install-scripts install-udev
# See docs/misc/distro_mapping.txt for INITD_DIR location
.PHONY: install-initd
@@ -87,15 +64,6 @@ install-scripts:
$(INSTALL_DATA) $$i $(DESTDIR)$(XEN_SCRIPT_DIR); \
done
-.PHONY: install-hotplug
-install-hotplug:
- [ -d $(DESTDIR)$(XEN_HOTPLUG_DIR) ] || \
- $(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(XEN_HOTPLUG_DIR)
- set -e; for i in $(XEN_HOTPLUG_SCRIPTS); \
- do \
- $(INSTALL_PROG) $$i $(DESTDIR)$(XEN_HOTPLUG_DIR); \
- done
-
.PHONY: install-udev
install-udev:
[ -d $(DESTDIR)$(UDEV_RULES_DIR) ] || \
diff -r 33348baecf37 -r 019ca95dfa34 tools/hotplug/Linux/xen-backend.agent
--- a/tools/hotplug/Linux/xen-backend.agent Thu Oct 18 09:34:59 2012 +0100
+++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-#! /bin/bash
-
-PATH=/etc/xen/scripts:$PATH
-
-. /etc/xen/scripts/locking.sh
-
-claim_lock xenbus_hotplug_global
-
-case "$XENBUS_TYPE" in
- tap)
- /etc/xen/scripts/blktap "$ACTION"
- ;;
- vbd)
- /etc/xen/scripts/block "$ACTION"
- ;;
- vtpm)
- /etc/xen/scripts/vtpm "$ACTION"
- ;;
- vif)
- [ -n "$script" ] && $script "$ACTION"
- ;;
- vscsi)
- /etc/xen/scripts/vscsi "$ACTION"
- ;;
-esac
-
-case "$ACTION" in
- add)
- ;;
- remove)
- /etc/xen/scripts/xen-hotplug-cleanup
- ;;
- online)
- ;;
- offline)
- ;;
-esac
-
-release_lock xenbus_hotplug_global

36
26079-hotplug-Linux_close_lockfd_after_lock_attempt.patch
View File

@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
changeset: 26079:b3b03536789a
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:01 2012 +0100
files: tools/hotplug/Linux/locking.sh
description:
hotplug/Linux: close lockfd after lock attempt
When a HVM guest is shutdown some of the 'remove' events can not claim
the lock for some reason. Instead they try to grab the lock in a busy
loop, until udev reaps the xen-hotplug-cleanup helper.
After analyzing the resulting logfile its not obvious what the cause is.
The only explanation is that bash (?) gets confused if the same lockfd
is opened again and again. Closing it in each iteration seem to fix the
issue.
This was observed with sles11sp2 (bash 3.2) and 4.2 xend.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.campbell@citrix.com>
[ ijc -- added the comment ]
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r 019ca95dfa34 -r b3b03536789a tools/hotplug/Linux/locking.sh
--- a/tools/hotplug/Linux/locking.sh Thu Oct 18 09:35:00 2012 +0100
+++ b/tools/hotplug/Linux/locking.sh Thu Oct 18 09:35:01 2012 +0100
@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ claim_lock()
print "y\n" if $fd_inum eq $file_inum;
' "$_lockfile" )
if [ x$rightfile = xy ]; then break; fi
+ # Some versions of bash appear to be buggy if the same
+ # $_lockfile is opened repeatedly. Close the current fd here.
+ eval "exec $_lockfd<&-"
done
}

30
26081-stubdom_fix_rpmlint_warning_spurious-executable-perm.patch
View File

@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
changeset: 26081:02064298ebcb
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:03 2012 +0100
files: stubdom/Makefile
description:
stubdom: fix rpmlint warning spurious-executable-perm
[ 1758s] xen-tools.x86_64: E: spurious-executable-perm (Badness: 50) /usr/lib/xen/boot/xenstore-stubdom.gz
[ 1758s] The file is installed with executable permissions, but was identified as one
[ 1758s] that probably should not be executable. Verify if the executable bits are
[ 1758s] desired, and remove if not. NOTE: example scripts should be packaged under
[ 1758s] %docdir/examples, which will avoid this warning.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r 25b2f53d2583 -r 02064298ebcb stubdom/Makefile
--- a/stubdom/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:02 2012 +0100
+++ b/stubdom/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:03 2012 +0100
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ install-grub: pv-grub
install-xenstore: xenstore-stubdom
$(INSTALL_DIR) "$(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/xen/boot"
- $(INSTALL_PROG) mini-os-$(XEN_TARGET_ARCH)-xenstore/mini-os.gz "$(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/xen/boot/xenstore-stubdom.gz"
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) mini-os-$(XEN_TARGET_ARCH)-xenstore/mini-os.gz "$(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/xen/boot/xenstore-stubdom.gz"
#######
# clean

30
26082-blktap2-libvhd_fix_rpmlint_warning_spurious-executable-perm.patch
View File

@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
changeset: 26082:8cf26ace9ca0
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:03 2012 +0100
files: tools/blktap2/vhd/lib/Makefile
description:
blktap2/libvhd: fix rpmlint warning spurious-executable-perm
[ 1758s] xen-devel.x86_64: E: spurious-executable-perm (Badness: 50) /usr/lib64/libvhd.a
[ 1758s] The file is installed with executable permissions, but was identified as one
[ 1758s] that probably should not be executable. Verify if the executable bits are
[ 1758s] desired, and remove if not. NOTE: example scripts should be packaged under
[ 1758s] %docdir/examples, which will avoid this warning.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r 02064298ebcb -r 8cf26ace9ca0 tools/blktap2/vhd/lib/Makefile
--- a/tools/blktap2/vhd/lib/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:03 2012 +0100
+++ b/tools/blktap2/vhd/lib/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:03 2012 +0100
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR).$(LIBVHD-MINOR
install: all
$(INSTALL_DIR) -p $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)
- $(INSTALL_PROG) libvhd.a $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) libvhd.a $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)
$(INSTALL_PROG) libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR).$(LIBVHD-MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)
ln -sf libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR).$(LIBVHD-MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)/libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR)
ln -sf libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR) $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)/libvhd.so

51
26083-blktap_fix_rpmlint_warning_spurious-executable-perm.patch
View File

@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
changeset: 26083:3fbeb019d522
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:04 2012 +0100
files: tools/blktap/lib/Makefile
description:
blktap: fix rpmlint warning spurious-executable-perm
[ 1758s] xen-devel.x86_64: E: spurious-executable-perm (Badness: 50) /usr/lib64/libblktap.a
[ 1758s] The file is installed with executable permissions, but was identified as one
[ 1758s] that probably should not be executable. Verify if the executable bits are
[ 1758s] desired, and remove if not. NOTE: example scripts should be packaged under
[ 1758s] %docdir/examples, which will avoid this warning.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r 8cf26ace9ca0 -r 3fbeb019d522 tools/blktap/lib/Makefile
--- a/tools/blktap/lib/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:03 2012 +0100
+++ b/tools/blktap/lib/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:04 2012 +0100
@@ -23,23 +23,25 @@ OBJS_PIC = $(SRCS:.c=.opic)
OBJS_PIC = $(SRCS:.c=.opic)
IBINS :=
-LIB = libblktap.a libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR)
+LIB = libblktap.a
+LIB_SO = libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR)
.PHONY: all
-all: $(LIB)
+all: $(LIB) $(LIB_SO)
.PHONY: install
install: all
$(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)
$(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(INCLUDEDIR)
- $(INSTALL_PROG) $(LIB) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)
+ $(INSTALL_PROG) $(LIB_SO) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) $(LIB) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)
ln -sf libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)/libblktap.so.$(MAJOR)
ln -sf libblktap.so.$(MAJOR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)/libblktap.so
$(INSTALL_DATA) blktaplib.h $(DESTDIR)$(INCLUDEDIR)
.PHONY: clean
clean:
- rm -rf *.a *.so* *.o *.opic *.rpm $(LIB) *~ $(DEPS) xen TAGS
+ rm -rf *.a *.so* *.o *.opic *.rpm $(LIB) $(LIB_SO) *~ $(DEPS) xen TAGS
libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR): $(OBJS_PIC)
$(CC) $(LDFLAGS) -Wl,$(SONAME_LDFLAG) -Wl,$(SONAME) $(SHLIB_LDFLAGS) \

34
26084-hotplug_install_hotplugpath.sh_as_data_file.patch
View File

@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
changeset: 26084:fe9a0eb9aaaa
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:05 2012 +0100
files: tools/hotplug/common/Makefile
description:
hotplug: install hotplugpath.sh as data file
rpmlint complains a script helper which is only sourced:
[ 1875s] xen-tools.i586: W: script-without-shebang /etc/xen/scripts/hotplugpath.sh
[ 1875s] This text file has executable bits set or is located in a path dedicated for
[ 1875s] executables, but lacks a shebang and cannot thus be executed. If the file is
[ 1875s] meant to be an executable script, add the shebang, otherwise remove the
[ 1875s] executable bits or move the file elsewhere.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r 3fbeb019d522 -r fe9a0eb9aaaa tools/hotplug/common/Makefile
--- a/tools/hotplug/common/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:04 2012 +0100
+++ b/tools/hotplug/common/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:05 2012 +0100
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ HOTPLUGPATH="hotplugpath.sh"
# OS-independent hotplug scripts go in this directory
# Xen scripts to go there.
-XEN_SCRIPTS = $(HOTPLUGPATH)
-XEN_SCRIPT_DATA =
+XEN_SCRIPTS =
+XEN_SCRIPT_DATA = $(HOTPLUGPATH)
genpath-target = $(call buildmakevars2file,$(HOTPLUGPATH))
$(eval $(genpath-target))

33
26085-stubdom_install_stubdompath.sh_as_data_file.patch
View File

@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
changeset: 26085:e32f4301f384
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:06 2012 +0100
files: stubdom/Makefile
description:
stubdom: install stubdompath.sh as data file
rpmlint complains a script helper which is only sourced:
[ 1875s] xen-tools.i586: W: script-without-shebang /usr/lib/xen/bin/stubdompath.sh
[ 1875s] This text file has executable bits set or is located in a path dedicated for
[ 1875s] executables, but lacks a shebang and cannot thus be executed. If the file is
[ 1875s] meant to be an executable script, add the shebang, otherwise remove the
[ 1875s] executable bits or move the file elsewhere.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r fe9a0eb9aaaa -r e32f4301f384 stubdom/Makefile
--- a/stubdom/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:05 2012 +0100
+++ b/stubdom/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:06 2012 +0100
@@ -386,7 +386,8 @@ install-readme:
install-ioemu: ioemu-stubdom
$(INSTALL_DIR) "$(DESTDIR)$(LIBEXEC)"
- $(INSTALL_PROG) stubdompath.sh stubdom-dm "$(DESTDIR)$(LIBEXEC)"
+ $(INSTALL_PROG) stubdom-dm "$(DESTDIR)$(LIBEXEC)"
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) stubdompath.sh "$(DESTDIR)$(LIBEXEC)"
$(INSTALL_DIR) "$(DESTDIR)$(XENFIRMWAREDIR)"
$(INSTALL_DATA) mini-os-$(XEN_TARGET_ARCH)-ioemu/mini-os.gz "$(DESTDIR)$(XENFIRMWAREDIR)/ioemu-stubdom.gz"

21
26086-hotplug-Linux_correct_sysconfig_tag_in_xendomains.patch
View File

@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
changeset: 26086:ba6b1db89ec8
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:07 2012 +0100
files: tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/sysconfig.xendomains
description:
hotplug/Linux: correct sysconfig tag in xendomains
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r e32f4301f384 -r ba6b1db89ec8 tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/sysconfig.xendomains
--- a/tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/sysconfig.xendomains Thu Oct 18 09:35:06 2012 +0100
+++ b/tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/sysconfig.xendomains Thu Oct 18 09:35:07 2012 +0100
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-## Path: System/xen
+## Path: System/Virtualization
## Description: xen domain start/stop on boot
## Type: string
## Default:

36
26087-hotplug-Linux_install_sysconfig_files_as_data_files.patch
View File

@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
changeset: 26087:6239ace16749
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:07 2012 +0100
files: tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile
description:
hotplug/Linux: install sysconfig files as data files
rpmlint complains about wrong permissions of config files:
[ 455s] xen-tools.i586: W: script-without-shebang /var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.xendomains
[ 455s] xen-tools.i586: W: script-without-shebang /var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.xencommons
[ 455s] This text file has executable bits set or is located in a path dedicated for
[ 455s] executables, but lacks a shebang and cannot thus be executed. If the file is
[ 455s] meant to be an executable script, add the shebang, otherwise remove the
[ 455s] executable bits or move the file elsewhere.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r ba6b1db89ec8 -r 6239ace16749 tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile
--- a/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:07 2012 +0100
+++ b/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:07 2012 +0100
@@ -46,9 +46,9 @@ install-initd:
[ -d $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR) ] || $(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)
$(INSTALL_PROG) $(XEND_INITD) $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR)
$(INSTALL_PROG) $(XENDOMAINS_INITD) $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR)
- $(INSTALL_PROG) $(XENDOMAINS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)/xendomains
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) $(XENDOMAINS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)/xendomains
$(INSTALL_PROG) $(XENCOMMONS_INITD) $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR)
- $(INSTALL_PROG) $(XENCOMMONS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)/xencommons
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) $(XENCOMMONS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)/xencommons
$(INSTALL_PROG) init.d/xen-watchdog $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR)
.PHONY: install-scripts

90
26114-pygrub-list-entries.patch
View File

@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Charles Arnold <carnold@suse.com>
# Date 1351249508 -3600
# Node ID 6f9e46917eb8771914041b98f714e8f485fca5ef
# Parent 03af0abd2b72dfab3f2e50dd502108de8603f741
pygrub: Add option to list grub entries
The argument to "--entry" allows 2 syntaxes, either directly the entry
number in menu.lst, or the whole string behind the "title" key word.
This poses the following issue:
From Dom0 there is no way to guess the number and, or the complete
title string because this string contains the kernel version, which
will change with a kernel update.
This patch adds [-l|--list-entries] as an argument to pygrub.
Signed-off-by: Charles Arnold <carnold@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
diff -r 03af0abd2b72 -r 6f9e46917eb8 tools/pygrub/src/pygrub
--- a/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub Fri Oct 26 12:03:12 2012 +0100
+++ b/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub Fri Oct 26 12:05:08 2012 +0100
@@ -595,7 +595,17 @@ def run_grub(file, entry, fs, cfg_args):
sel = g.run()
g = Grub(file, fs)
- if interactive:
+
+ if list_entries:
+ for i in range(len(g.cf.images)):
+ img = g.cf.images[i]
+ print "title: %s" % img.title
+ print " root: %s" % img.root
+ print " kernel: %s" % img.kernel[1]
+ print " args: %s" % img.args
+ print " initrd: %s" % img.initrd[1]
+
+ if interactive and not list_entries:
curses.wrapper(run_main)
else:
sel = g.cf.default
@@ -702,7 +712,7 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
sel = None
def usage():
- print >> sys.stderr, "Usage: %s [-q|--quiet] [-i|--interactive] [-n|--not-really] [--output=] [--kernel=] [--ramdisk=] [--args=] [--entry=] [--output-directory=] [--output-format=sxp|simple|simple0] <image>" %(sys.argv[0],)
+ print >> sys.stderr, "Usage: %s [-q|--quiet] [-i|--interactive] [-l|--list-entries] [-n|--not-really] [--output=] [--kernel=] [--ramdisk=] [--args=] [--entry=] [--output-directory=] [--output-format=sxp|simple|simple0] <image>" %(sys.argv[0],)
def copy_from_image(fs, file_to_read, file_type, output_directory,
not_really):
@@ -736,8 +746,8 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
dataoff += len(data)
try:
- opts, args = getopt.gnu_getopt(sys.argv[1:], 'qinh::',
- ["quiet", "interactive", "not-really", "help",
+ opts, args = getopt.gnu_getopt(sys.argv[1:], 'qilnh::',
+ ["quiet", "interactive", "list-entries", "not-really", "help",
"output=", "output-format=", "output-directory=",
"entry=", "kernel=",
"ramdisk=", "args=", "isconfig", "debug"])
@@ -753,6 +763,7 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
output = None
entry = None
interactive = True
+ list_entries = False
isconfig = False
debug = False
not_really = False
@@ -771,6 +782,8 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
interactive = False
elif o in ("-i", "--interactive"):
interactive = True
+ elif o in ("-l", "--list-entries"):
+ list_entries = True
elif o in ("-n", "--not-really"):
not_really = True
elif o in ("-h", "--help"):
@@ -855,6 +868,9 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
fs = None
continue
+ if list_entries:
+ sys.exit(0)
+
# Did looping through partitions find us a kernel?
if not fs:
raise RuntimeError, "Unable to find partition containing kernel"

643
26129-ACPI-BGRT-invalidate.patch
View File

@ -1,643 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1352368421 -3600
# Node ID 92163b114076029842d0f2d1dbfaa445976c71a3
# Parent aa2074529eb0183257b6f5f29821b0cd6dfd991a
x86/ACPI: invalidate BGRT if necessary
Since the image pointed to may live in boot services memory (which we
add to the global memory pool long before ACPI tables get looked at),
we should prevent Dom0 from trying to retrieve the image data in that
case.
The alternatives would be to
- not add boot services memory to the global pool at all, or
- defer adding boot services memory until Dom0 indicates it is safe to
do so, or
- find and parse the BGRT table in xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c, and avoid
adding that specific region to the E820 table.
None of these are really attractive, and as Xen commonly prints to the
video console anyway (without trying to avoid any regions on the
screen), the invalidation would need to be done conditionally anyway.
(xen/include/acpi/actbl3.h is a verbatim copy from Linux 3.7-rc4)
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/boot.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/boot.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <xen/init.h>
#include <xen/acpi.h>
#include <xen/irq.h>
+#include <xen/mm.h>
#include <xen/dmi.h>
#include <asm/fixmap.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
@@ -285,6 +286,27 @@ static int __init acpi_parse_hpet(struct
#define acpi_parse_hpet NULL
#endif
+static int __init acpi_invalidate_bgrt(struct acpi_table_header *table)
+{
+ struct acpi_table_bgrt *bgrt_tbl =
+ container_of(table, struct acpi_table_bgrt, header);
+
+ if (table->length < sizeof(*bgrt_tbl))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (bgrt_tbl->version == 1 && bgrt_tbl->image_address
+ && !page_is_ram_type(PFN_DOWN(bgrt_tbl->image_address),
+ RAM_TYPE_CONVENTIONAL))
+ return 0;
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO PREFIX "BGRT: invalidating v%d image at %#"PRIx64"\n",
+ bgrt_tbl->version, bgrt_tbl->image_address);
+ bgrt_tbl->image_address = 0;
+ bgrt_tbl->status &= ~1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_SLEEP
#define acpi_fadt_copy_address(dst, src, len) do { \
if (fadt->header.revision >= FADT2_REVISION_ID) \
@@ -833,5 +855,7 @@ int __init acpi_boot_init(void)
erst_init();
+ acpi_table_parse(ACPI_SIG_BGRT, acpi_invalidate_bgrt);
+
return 0;
}
--- a/xen/include/acpi/actbl.h
+++ b/xen/include/acpi/actbl.h
@@ -314,6 +314,7 @@ enum acpi_prefered_pm_profiles {
#include <acpi/actbl1.h>
#include <acpi/actbl2.h>
+#include <acpi/actbl3.h>
/*
* Sizes of the various flavors of FADT. We need to look closely
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xen/include/acpi/actbl3.h
@@ -0,0 +1,557 @@
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * Name: actbl3.h - ACPI Table Definitions
+ *
+ *****************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2000 - 2012, Intel Corp.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions, and the following disclaimer,
+ * without modification.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce at minimum a disclaimer
+ * substantially similar to the "NO WARRANTY" disclaimer below
+ * ("Disclaimer") and any redistribution must be conditioned upon
+ * including a substantially similar Disclaimer requirement for further
+ * binary redistribution.
+ * 3. Neither the names of the above-listed copyright holders nor the names
+ * of any contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
+ * from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * Alternatively, this software may be distributed under the terms of the
+ * GNU General Public License ("GPL") version 2 as published by the Free
+ * Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * NO WARRANTY
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+ * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ * HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
+ * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __ACTBL3_H__
+#define __ACTBL3_H__
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * Additional ACPI Tables (3)
+ *
+ * These tables are not consumed directly by the ACPICA subsystem, but are
+ * included here to support device drivers and the AML disassembler.
+ *
+ * The tables in this file are fully defined within the ACPI specification.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Values for description table header signatures for tables defined in this
+ * file. Useful because they make it more difficult to inadvertently type in
+ * the wrong signature.
+ */
+#define ACPI_SIG_BGRT "BGRT" /* Boot Graphics Resource Table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_DRTM "DRTM" /* Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_FPDT "FPDT" /* Firmware Performance Data Table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_GTDT "GTDT" /* Generic Timer Description Table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_MPST "MPST" /* Memory Power State Table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_PCCT "PCCT" /* Platform Communications Channel Table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_PMTT "PMTT" /* Platform Memory Topology Table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_RASF "RASF" /* RAS Feature table */
+
+#define ACPI_SIG_S3PT "S3PT" /* S3 Performance (sub)Table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_PCCS "PCC" /* PCC Shared Memory Region */
+
+/* Reserved table signatures */
+
+#define ACPI_SIG_CSRT "CSRT" /* Core System Resources Table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_MATR "MATR" /* Memory Address Translation Table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_MSDM "MSDM" /* Microsoft Data Management Table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_WPBT "WPBT" /* Windows Platform Binary Table */
+
+/*
+ * All tables must be byte-packed to match the ACPI specification, since
+ * the tables are provided by the system BIOS.
+ */
+#pragma pack(1)
+
+/*
+ * Note: C bitfields are not used for this reason:
+ *
+ * "Bitfields are great and easy to read, but unfortunately the C language
+ * does not specify the layout of bitfields in memory, which means they are
+ * essentially useless for dealing with packed data in on-disk formats or
+ * binary wire protocols." (Or ACPI tables and buffers.) "If you ask me,
+ * this decision was a design error in C. Ritchie could have picked an order
+ * and stuck with it." Norman Ramsey.
+ * See http://stackoverflow.com/a/1053662/41661
+ */
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * BGRT - Boot Graphics Resource Table (ACPI 5.0)
+ * Version 1
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+struct acpi_table_bgrt {
+ struct acpi_table_header header; /* Common ACPI table header */
+ u16 version;
+ u8 status;
+ u8 image_type;
+ u64 image_address;
+ u32 image_offset_x;
+ u32 image_offset_y;
+};
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * DRTM - Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement table
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+struct acpi_table_drtm {
+ struct acpi_table_header header; /* Common ACPI table header */
+ u64 entry_base_address;
+ u64 entry_length;
+ u32 entry_address32;
+ u64 entry_address64;
+ u64 exit_address;
+ u64 log_area_address;
+ u32 log_area_length;
+ u64 arch_dependent_address;
+ u32 flags;
+};
+
+/* 1) Validated Tables List */
+
+struct acpi_drtm_vtl_list {
+ u32 validated_table_list_count;
+};
+
+/* 2) Resources List */
+
+struct acpi_drtm_resource_list {
+ u32 resource_list_count;
+};
+
+/* 3) Platform-specific Identifiers List */
+
+struct acpi_drtm_id_list {
+ u32 id_list_count;
+};
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * FPDT - Firmware Performance Data Table (ACPI 5.0)
+ * Version 1
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+struct acpi_table_fpdt {
+ struct acpi_table_header header; /* Common ACPI table header */
+};
+
+/* FPDT subtable header */
+
+struct acpi_fpdt_header {
+ u16 type;
+ u8 length;
+ u8 revision;
+};
+
+/* Values for Type field above */
+
+enum acpi_fpdt_type {
+ ACPI_FPDT_TYPE_BOOT = 0,
+ ACPI_FPDT_TYPE_S3PERF = 1,
+};
+
+/*
+ * FPDT subtables
+ */
+
+/* 0: Firmware Basic Boot Performance Record */
+
+struct acpi_fpdt_boot {
+ struct acpi_fpdt_header header;
+ u8 reserved[4];
+ u64 reset_end;
+ u64 load_start;
+ u64 startup_start;
+ u64 exit_services_entry;
+ u64 exit_services_exit;
+};
+
+/* 1: S3 Performance Table Pointer Record */
+
+struct acpi_fpdt_s3pt_ptr {
+ struct acpi_fpdt_header header;
+ u8 reserved[4];
+ u64 address;
+};
+
+/*
+ * S3PT - S3 Performance Table. This table is pointed to by the
+ * FPDT S3 Pointer Record above.
+ */
+struct acpi_table_s3pt {
+ u8 signature[4]; /* "S3PT" */
+ u32 length;
+};
+
+/*
+ * S3PT Subtables
+ */
+struct acpi_s3pt_header {
+ u16 type;
+ u8 length;
+ u8 revision;
+};
+
+/* Values for Type field above */
+
+enum acpi_s3pt_type {
+ ACPI_S3PT_TYPE_RESUME = 0,
+ ACPI_S3PT_TYPE_SUSPEND = 1,
+};
+
+struct acpi_s3pt_resume {
+ struct acpi_s3pt_header header;
+ u32 resume_count;
+ u64 full_resume;
+ u64 average_resume;
+};
+
+struct acpi_s3pt_suspend {
+ struct acpi_s3pt_header header;
+ u64 suspend_start;
+ u64 suspend_end;
+};
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * GTDT - Generic Timer Description Table (ACPI 5.0)
+ * Version 1
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+struct acpi_table_gtdt {
+ struct acpi_table_header header; /* Common ACPI table header */
+ u64 address;
+ u32 flags;
+ u32 secure_pl1_interrupt;
+ u32 secure_pl1_flags;
+ u32 non_secure_pl1_interrupt;
+ u32 non_secure_pl1_flags;
+ u32 virtual_timer_interrupt;
+ u32 virtual_timer_flags;
+ u32 non_secure_pl2_interrupt;
+ u32 non_secure_pl2_flags;
+};
+
+/* Values for Flags field above */
+
+#define ACPI_GTDT_MAPPED_BLOCK_PRESENT 1
+
+/* Values for all "TimerFlags" fields above */
+
+#define ACPI_GTDT_INTERRUPT_MODE 1
+#define ACPI_GTDT_INTERRUPT_POLARITY 2
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * MPST - Memory Power State Table (ACPI 5.0)
+ * Version 1
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+#define ACPI_MPST_CHANNEL_INFO \
+ u16 reserved1; \
+ u8 channel_id; \
+ u8 reserved2; \
+ u16 power_node_count;
+
+/* Main table */
+
+struct acpi_table_mpst {
+ struct acpi_table_header header; /* Common ACPI table header */
+ ACPI_MPST_CHANNEL_INFO /* Platform Communication Channel */
+};
+
+/* Memory Platform Communication Channel Info */
+
+struct acpi_mpst_channel {
+ ACPI_MPST_CHANNEL_INFO /* Platform Communication Channel */
+};
+
+/* Memory Power Node Structure */
+
+struct acpi_mpst_power_node {
+ u8 flags;
+ u8 reserved1;
+ u16 node_id;
+ u32 length;
+ u64 range_address;
+ u64 range_length;
+ u8 num_power_states;
+ u8 num_physical_components;
+ u16 reserved2;
+};
+
+/* Values for Flags field above */
+
+#define ACPI_MPST_ENABLED 1
+#define ACPI_MPST_POWER_MANAGED 2
+#define ACPI_MPST_HOT_PLUG_CAPABLE 4
+
+/* Memory Power State Structure (follows POWER_NODE above) */
+
+struct acpi_mpst_power_state {
+ u8 power_state;
+ u8 info_index;
+};
+
+/* Physical Component ID Structure (follows POWER_STATE above) */
+
+struct acpi_mpst_component {
+ u16 component_id;
+};
+
+/* Memory Power State Characteristics Structure (follows all POWER_NODEs) */
+
+struct acpi_mpst_data_hdr {
+ u16 characteristics_count;
+};
+
+struct acpi_mpst_power_data {
+ u8 revision;
+ u8 flags;
+ u16 reserved1;
+ u32 average_power;
+ u32 power_saving;
+ u64 exit_latency;
+ u64 reserved2;
+};
+
+/* Values for Flags field above */
+
+#define ACPI_MPST_PRESERVE 1
+#define ACPI_MPST_AUTOENTRY 2
+#define ACPI_MPST_AUTOEXIT 4
+
+/* Shared Memory Region (not part of an ACPI table) */
+
+struct acpi_mpst_shared {
+ u32 signature;
+ u16 pcc_command;
+ u16 pcc_status;
+ u16 command_register;
+ u16 status_register;
+ u16 power_state_id;
+ u16 power_node_id;
+ u64 energy_consumed;
+ u64 average_power;
+};
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * PCCT - Platform Communications Channel Table (ACPI 5.0)
+ * Version 1
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+struct acpi_table_pcct {
+ struct acpi_table_header header; /* Common ACPI table header */
+ u32 flags;
+ u32 latency;
+ u32 reserved;
+};
+
+/* Values for Flags field above */
+
+#define ACPI_PCCT_DOORBELL 1
+
+/*
+ * PCCT subtables
+ */
+
+/* 0: Generic Communications Subspace */
+
+struct acpi_pcct_subspace {
+ struct acpi_subtable_header header;
+ u8 reserved[6];
+ u64 base_address;
+ u64 length;
+ struct acpi_generic_address doorbell_register;
+ u64 preserve_mask;
+ u64 write_mask;
+};
+
+/*
+ * PCC memory structures (not part of the ACPI table)
+ */
+
+/* Shared Memory Region */
+
+struct acpi_pcct_shared_memory {
+ u32 signature;
+ u16 command;
+ u16 status;
+};
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * PMTT - Platform Memory Topology Table (ACPI 5.0)
+ * Version 1
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+struct acpi_table_pmtt {
+ struct acpi_table_header header; /* Common ACPI table header */
+ u32 reserved;
+};
+
+/* Common header for PMTT subtables that follow main table */
+
+struct acpi_pmtt_header {
+ u8 type;
+ u8 reserved1;
+ u16 length;
+ u16 flags;
+ u16 reserved2;
+};
+
+/* Values for Type field above */
+
+#define ACPI_PMTT_TYPE_SOCKET 0
+#define ACPI_PMTT_TYPE_CONTROLLER 1
+#define ACPI_PMTT_TYPE_DIMM 2
+#define ACPI_PMTT_TYPE_RESERVED 3 /* 0x03-0xFF are reserved */
+
+/* Values for Flags field above */
+
+#define ACPI_PMTT_TOP_LEVEL 0x0001
+#define ACPI_PMTT_PHYSICAL 0x0002
+#define ACPI_PMTT_MEMORY_TYPE 0x000C
+
+/*
+ * PMTT subtables, correspond to Type in struct acpi_pmtt_header
+ */
+
+/* 0: Socket Structure */
+
+struct acpi_pmtt_socket {
+ struct acpi_pmtt_header header;
+ u16 socket_id;
+ u16 reserved;
+};
+
+/* 1: Memory Controller subtable */
+
+struct acpi_pmtt_controller {
+ struct acpi_pmtt_header header;
+ u32 read_latency;
+ u32 write_latency;
+ u32 read_bandwidth;
+ u32 write_bandwidth;
+ u16 access_width;
+ u16 alignment;
+ u16 reserved;
+ u16 domain_count;
+};
+
+/* 1a: Proximity Domain substructure */
+
+struct acpi_pmtt_domain {
+ u32 proximity_domain;
+};
+
+/* 2: Physical Component Identifier (DIMM) */
+
+struct acpi_pmtt_physical_component {
+ struct acpi_pmtt_header header;
+ u16 component_id;
+ u16 reserved;
+ u32 memory_size;
+ u32 bios_handle;
+};
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * RASF - RAS Feature Table (ACPI 5.0)
+ * Version 1
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+struct acpi_table_rasf {
+ struct acpi_table_header header; /* Common ACPI table header */
+ u8 channel_id[12];
+};
+
+/* RASF Platform Communication Channel Shared Memory Region */
+
+struct acpi_rasf_shared_memory {
+ u32 signature;
+ u16 command;
+ u16 status;
+ u64 requested_address;
+ u64 requested_length;
+ u64 actual_address;
+ u64 actual_length;
+ u16 flags;
+ u8 speed;
+};
+
+/* Masks for Flags and Speed fields above */
+
+#define ACPI_RASF_SCRUBBER_RUNNING 1
+#define ACPI_RASF_SPEED (7<<1)
+
+/* Channel Commands */
+
+enum acpi_rasf_commands {
+ ACPI_RASF_GET_RAS_CAPABILITIES = 1,
+ ACPI_RASF_GET_PATROL_PARAMETERS = 2,
+ ACPI_RASF_START_PATROL_SCRUBBER = 3,
+ ACPI_RASF_STOP_PATROL_SCRUBBER = 4
+};
+
+/* Channel Command flags */
+
+#define ACPI_RASF_GENERATE_SCI (1<<15)
+
+/* Status values */
+
+enum acpi_rasf_status {
+ ACPI_RASF_SUCCESS = 0,
+ ACPI_RASF_NOT_VALID = 1,
+ ACPI_RASF_NOT_SUPPORTED = 2,
+ ACPI_RASF_BUSY = 3,
+ ACPI_RASF_FAILED = 4,
+ ACPI_RASF_ABORTED = 5,
+ ACPI_RASF_INVALID_DATA = 6
+};
+
+/* Status flags */
+
+#define ACPI_RASF_COMMAND_COMPLETE (1)
+#define ACPI_RASF_SCI_DOORBELL (1<<1)
+#define ACPI_RASF_ERROR (1<<2)
+#define ACPI_RASF_STATUS (0x1F<<3)
+
+/* Reset to default packing */
+
+#pragma pack()
+
+#endif /* __ACTBL3_H__ */

178
26133-IOMMU-defer-BM-disable.patch
View File

@ -1,178 +0,0 @@
References: bnc#787169
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1352709367 -3600
# Node ID fdb69dd527cd01a46f87efb380050559dcf12d37
# Parent 286ef4ced2164f4e9bf52fd0c52248182e69a6e6
IOMMU: don't immediately disable bus mastering on faults
Instead, give the owning domain at least a small opportunity of fixing
things up, and allow for rare faults to not bring down the device at
all.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ static hw_irq_controller iommu_msi_type
static void parse_event_log_entry(struct amd_iommu *iommu, u32 entry[])
{
- u16 domain_id, device_id, bdf, cword;
+ u16 domain_id, device_id, bdf;
u32 code;
u64 *addr;
int count = 0;
@@ -615,18 +615,10 @@ static void parse_event_log_entry(struct
"fault address = 0x%"PRIx64"\n",
event_str[code-1], domain_id, device_id, *addr);
- /* Tell the device to stop DMAing; we can't rely on the guest to
- * control it for us. */
for ( bdf = 0; bdf < ivrs_bdf_entries; bdf++ )
if ( get_dma_requestor_id(iommu->seg, bdf) == device_id )
- {
- cword = pci_conf_read16(iommu->seg, PCI_BUS(bdf),
- PCI_SLOT(bdf), PCI_FUNC(bdf),
- PCI_COMMAND);
- pci_conf_write16(iommu->seg, PCI_BUS(bdf), PCI_SLOT(bdf),
- PCI_FUNC(bdf), PCI_COMMAND,
- cword & ~PCI_COMMAND_MASTER);
- }
+ pci_check_disable_device(iommu->seg, PCI_BUS(bdf),
+ PCI_DEVFN2(bdf));
}
else
{
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
@@ -218,6 +218,7 @@ static int device_assigned(u16 seg, u8 b
static int assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
{
struct hvm_iommu *hd = domain_hvm_iommu(d);
+ struct pci_dev *pdev;
int rc = 0;
if ( !iommu_enabled || !hd->platform_ops )
@@ -231,6 +232,10 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain *
return -EXDEV;
spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock);
+ pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn);
+ if ( pdev )
+ pdev->fault.count = 0;
+
if ( (rc = hd->platform_ops->assign_device(d, seg, bus, devfn)) )
goto done;
@@ -382,6 +387,8 @@ int deassign_device(struct domain *d, u1
return ret;
}
+ pdev->fault.count = 0;
+
if ( !has_arch_pdevs(d) && need_iommu(d) )
{
d->need_iommu = 0;
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
@@ -637,6 +637,36 @@ int __init pci_device_detect(u16 seg, u8
return 1;
}
+void pci_check_disable_device(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
+{
+ struct pci_dev *pdev;
+ s_time_t now = NOW();
+ u16 cword;
+
+ spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock);
+ pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn);
+ if ( pdev )
+ {
+ if ( now < pdev->fault.time ||
+ now - pdev->fault.time > MILLISECS(10) )
+ pdev->fault.count >>= 1;
+ pdev->fault.time = now;
+ if ( ++pdev->fault.count < PT_FAULT_THRESHOLD )
+ pdev = NULL;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&pcidevs_lock);
+
+ if ( !pdev )
+ return;
+
+ /* Tell the device to stop DMAing; we can't rely on the guest to
+ * control it for us. */
+ cword = pci_conf_read16(seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
+ PCI_COMMAND);
+ pci_conf_write16(seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
+ PCI_COMMAND, cword & ~PCI_COMMAND_MASTER);
+}
+
/*
* scan pci devices to add all existed PCI devices to alldevs_list,
* and setup pci hierarchy in array bus2bridge.
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -936,7 +936,7 @@ static void __do_iommu_page_fault(struct
while (1)
{
u8 fault_reason;
- u16 source_id, cword;
+ u16 source_id;
u32 data;
u64 guest_addr;
int type;
@@ -969,14 +969,8 @@ static void __do_iommu_page_fault(struct
iommu_page_fault_do_one(iommu, type, fault_reason,
source_id, guest_addr);
- /* Tell the device to stop DMAing; we can't rely on the guest to
- * control it for us. */
- cword = pci_conf_read16(iommu->intel->drhd->segment,
- PCI_BUS(source_id), PCI_SLOT(source_id),
- PCI_FUNC(source_id), PCI_COMMAND);
- pci_conf_write16(iommu->intel->drhd->segment, PCI_BUS(source_id),
- PCI_SLOT(source_id), PCI_FUNC(source_id),
- PCI_COMMAND, cword & ~PCI_COMMAND_MASTER);
+ pci_check_disable_device(iommu->intel->drhd->segment,
+ PCI_BUS(source_id), PCI_DEVFN2(source_id));
fault_index++;
if ( fault_index > cap_num_fault_regs(iommu->cap) )
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/pci.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/pci.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/pci.h
@@ -65,6 +65,11 @@ struct pci_dev {
const u8 devfn;
struct pci_dev_info info;
struct arch_pci_dev arch;
+ struct {
+ s_time_t time;
+ unsigned int count;
+#define PT_FAULT_THRESHOLD 10
+ } fault;
u64 vf_rlen[6];
};
@@ -107,6 +112,7 @@ void arch_pci_ro_device(int seg, int bdf
struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev(int seg, int bus, int devfn);
struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev_by_domain(
struct domain *, int seg, int bus, int devfn);
+void pci_check_disable_device(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn);
uint8_t pci_conf_read8(
unsigned int seg, unsigned int bus, unsigned int dev, unsigned int func,

85
26189-xenstore-chmod.patch
View File

@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 8b93ac0c93f3fb8a140b4688ba71841ac927d4e3
xenstore-chmod: handle arbitrary number of perms rather than MAX_PERMS constant
Constant MAX_PERMS 16 is too small to use in some occasions, e.g. if
there are more than 16 domU(s) on one hypervisor (it's easy to
achieve) and one wants to do xenstore-chmod PATH to all domU(s). So,
remove MAX_PERMS limitation and make it as arbitrary number of perms.
Signed-off-by: Chunyan Liu <cyliu@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r 8b93ac0c93f3 tools/xenstore/xenstore_client.c
--- a/tools/xenstore/xenstore_client.c Tue Nov 13 11:19:17 2012 +0000
+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstore_client.c Mon Nov 26 11:33:38 2012 +0800
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
#define PATH_SEP '/'
#define MAX_PATH_LEN 256
-#define MAX_PERMS 16
enum mode {
MODE_unknown,
@@ -407,44 +406,41 @@ perform(enum mode mode, int optind, int
output("%s\n", list[i]);
}
free(list);
- optind++;
- break;
- }
- case MODE_ls: {
- do_ls(xsh, argv[optind], 0, prefix);
- optind++;
- break;
+ optind++;
+ break;
+ }
+ case MODE_ls: {
+ do_ls(xsh, argv[optind], 0, prefix);
+ optind++;
+ break;
}
case MODE_chmod: {
- struct xs_permissions perms[MAX_PERMS];
- int nperms = 0;
/* save path pointer: */
char *path = argv[optind++];
- for (; argv[optind]; optind++, nperms++)
+ int nperms = argc - optind;
+ struct xs_permissions perms[nperms];
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; argv[optind]; optind++, i++)
{
- if (MAX_PERMS <= nperms)
- errx(1, "Too many permissions specified. "
- "Maximum per invocation is %d.", MAX_PERMS);
-
- perms[nperms].id = atoi(argv[optind]+1);
+ perms[i].id = atoi(argv[optind]+1);
switch (argv[optind][0])
{
case 'n':
- perms[nperms].perms = XS_PERM_NONE;
+ perms[i].perms = XS_PERM_NONE;
break;
case 'r':
- perms[nperms].perms = XS_PERM_READ;
+ perms[i].perms = XS_PERM_READ;
break;
case 'w':
- perms[nperms].perms = XS_PERM_WRITE;
+ perms[i].perms = XS_PERM_WRITE;
break;
case 'b':
- perms[nperms].perms = XS_PERM_READ | XS_PERM_WRITE;
+ perms[i].perms = XS_PERM_READ | XS_PERM_WRITE;
break;
default:
errx(1, "Invalid permission specification: '%c'",
- argv[optind][0]);
+ argv[optind][0]);
}
}

62
26262-x86-EFI-secure-shim.patch
View File

@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1354884272 -3600
# Node ID b62bd62b26836fafe19cf41fec194bcf33e2ead6
# Parent cb542e58da25211843eb79998ea8568ebe9c8056
x86/EFI: add code interfacing with the secure boot shim
... to validate the kernel image (which is required to be in PE
format, as is e.g. the case for the Linux bzImage when built with
CONFIG_EFI_STUB).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c
@@ -24,6 +24,18 @@
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
+#define SHIM_LOCK_PROTOCOL_GUID \
+ { 0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, {0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23} }
+
+typedef EFI_STATUS
+(/* _not_ EFIAPI */ *EFI_SHIM_LOCK_VERIFY) (
+ IN VOID *Buffer,
+ IN UINT32 Size);
+
+typedef struct {
+ EFI_SHIM_LOCK_VERIFY Verify;
+} EFI_SHIM_LOCK_PROTOCOL;
+
extern char start[];
extern u32 cpuid_ext_features;
@@ -628,12 +640,14 @@ efi_start(EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle, EFI_SY
static EFI_GUID __initdata gop_guid = EFI_GRAPHICS_OUTPUT_PROTOCOL_GUID;
static EFI_GUID __initdata bio_guid = BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL;
static EFI_GUID __initdata devp_guid = DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL;
+ static EFI_GUID __initdata shim_lock_guid = SHIM_LOCK_PROTOCOL_GUID;
EFI_LOADED_IMAGE *loaded_image;
EFI_STATUS status;
unsigned int i, argc;
CHAR16 **argv, *file_name, *cfg_file_name = NULL;
UINTN cols, rows, depth, size, map_key, info_size, gop_mode = ~0;
EFI_HANDLE *handles = NULL;
+ EFI_SHIM_LOCK_PROTOCOL *shim_lock;
EFI_GRAPHICS_OUTPUT_PROTOCOL *gop = NULL;
EFI_GRAPHICS_OUTPUT_MODE_INFORMATION *mode_info;
EFI_FILE_HANDLE dir_handle;
@@ -823,6 +837,11 @@ efi_start(EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle, EFI_SY
read_file(dir_handle, s2w(&name), &kernel);
efi_bs->FreePool(name.w);
+ if ( !EFI_ERROR(efi_bs->LocateProtocol(&shim_lock_guid, NULL,
+ (void **)&shim_lock)) &&
+ shim_lock->Verify(kernel.ptr, kernel.size) != EFI_SUCCESS )
+ blexit(L"Dom0 kernel image could not be verified\r\n");
+
name.s = get_value(&cfg, section.s, "ramdisk");
if ( name.s )
{

275
26324-IOMMU-assign-params.patch
View File

@ -1,275 +0,0 @@
References: bnc#787169
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1357559364 -3600
# Node ID 62dd78a4e3fc9d190840549f13b4d613f2d19c41
# Parent 64b36dde26bc3c4fc80312cc9eeb0e511f0cf94b
IOMMU: adjust (re)assign operation parameters
... to use a (struct pci_dev *, devfn) pair.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
@@ -333,34 +333,31 @@ void amd_iommu_disable_domain_device(str
disable_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, devfn);
}
-static int reassign_device( struct domain *source, struct domain *target,
- u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
+static int reassign_device(struct domain *source, struct domain *target,
+ u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
- struct pci_dev *pdev;
struct amd_iommu *iommu;
int bdf;
struct hvm_iommu *t = domain_hvm_iommu(target);
- ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&pcidevs_lock));
- pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(source, seg, bus, devfn);
- if ( !pdev )
- return -ENODEV;
-
- bdf = PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn);
- iommu = find_iommu_for_device(seg, bdf);
+ bdf = PCI_BDF2(pdev->bus, pdev->devfn);
+ iommu = find_iommu_for_device(pdev->seg, bdf);
if ( !iommu )
{
AMD_IOMMU_DEBUG("Fail to find iommu."
" %04x:%02x:%x02.%x cannot be assigned to dom%d\n",
- seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
+ pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
target->domain_id);
return -ENODEV;
}
amd_iommu_disable_domain_device(source, iommu, bdf);
- list_move(&pdev->domain_list, &target->arch.pdev_list);
- pdev->domain = target;
+ if ( devfn == pdev->devfn )
+ {
+ list_move(&pdev->domain_list, &target->arch.pdev_list);
+ pdev->domain = target;
+ }
/* IO page tables might be destroyed after pci-detach the last device
* In this case, we have to re-allocate root table for next pci-attach.*/
@@ -369,17 +366,18 @@ static int reassign_device( struct domai
amd_iommu_setup_domain_device(target, iommu, bdf);
AMD_IOMMU_DEBUG("Re-assign %04x:%02x:%02x.%u from dom%d to dom%d\n",
- seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
+ pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
source->domain_id, target->domain_id);
return 0;
}
-static int amd_iommu_assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
+static int amd_iommu_assign_device(struct domain *d, u8 devfn,
+ struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
- struct ivrs_mappings *ivrs_mappings = get_ivrs_mappings(seg);
- int bdf = (bus << 8) | devfn;
- int req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(seg, bdf);
+ struct ivrs_mappings *ivrs_mappings = get_ivrs_mappings(pdev->seg);
+ int bdf = PCI_BDF2(pdev->bus, devfn);
+ int req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(pdev->seg, bdf);
if ( ivrs_mappings[req_id].unity_map_enable )
{
@@ -391,7 +389,7 @@ static int amd_iommu_assign_device(struc
ivrs_mappings[req_id].read_permission);
}
- return reassign_device(dom0, d, seg, bus, devfn);
+ return reassign_device(dom0, d, devfn, pdev);
}
static void deallocate_next_page_table(struct page_info* pg, int level)
@@ -456,12 +454,6 @@ static void amd_iommu_domain_destroy(str
amd_iommu_flush_all_pages(d);
}
-static int amd_iommu_return_device(
- struct domain *s, struct domain *t, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
-{
- return reassign_device(s, t, seg, bus, devfn);
-}
-
static int amd_iommu_add_device(struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct amd_iommu *iommu;
@@ -601,7 +593,7 @@ const struct iommu_ops amd_iommu_ops = {
.teardown = amd_iommu_domain_destroy,
.map_page = amd_iommu_map_page,
.unmap_page = amd_iommu_unmap_page,
- .reassign_device = amd_iommu_return_device,
+ .reassign_device = reassign_device,
.get_device_group_id = amd_iommu_group_id,
.update_ire_from_apic = amd_iommu_ioapic_update_ire,
.update_ire_from_msi = amd_iommu_msi_msg_update_ire,
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
@@ -232,11 +232,16 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain *
return -EXDEV;
spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock);
- pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn);
- if ( pdev )
- pdev->fault.count = 0;
+ pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(dom0, seg, bus, devfn);
+ if ( !pdev )
+ {
+ rc = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn) ? -EBUSY : -ENODEV;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ pdev->fault.count = 0;
- if ( (rc = hd->platform_ops->assign_device(d, seg, bus, devfn)) )
+ if ( (rc = hd->platform_ops->assign_device(d, devfn, pdev)) )
goto done;
if ( has_arch_pdevs(d) && !need_iommu(d) )
@@ -367,18 +372,11 @@ int deassign_device(struct domain *d, u1
return -EINVAL;
ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&pcidevs_lock));
- pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn);
+ pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(d, seg, bus, devfn);
if ( !pdev )
return -ENODEV;
- if ( pdev->domain != d )
- {
- dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX,
- "d%d: deassign a device not owned\n", d->domain_id);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- ret = hd->platform_ops->reassign_device(d, dom0, seg, bus, devfn);
+ ret = hd->platform_ops->reassign_device(d, dom0, devfn, pdev);
if ( ret )
{
dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX,
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -1689,17 +1689,10 @@ out:
static int reassign_device_ownership(
struct domain *source,
struct domain *target,
- u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
+ u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
- struct pci_dev *pdev;
int ret;
- ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&pcidevs_lock));
- pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(source, seg, bus, devfn);
-
- if (!pdev)
- return -ENODEV;
-
/*
* Devices assigned to untrusted domains (here assumed to be any domU)
* can attempt to send arbitrary LAPIC/MSI messages. We are unprotected
@@ -1708,16 +1701,19 @@ static int reassign_device_ownership(
if ( (target != dom0) && !iommu_intremap )
untrusted_msi = 1;
- ret = domain_context_unmap(source, seg, bus, devfn);
+ ret = domain_context_unmap(source, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, devfn);
if ( ret )
return ret;
- ret = domain_context_mapping(target, seg, bus, devfn);
+ ret = domain_context_mapping(target, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, devfn);
if ( ret )
return ret;
- list_move(&pdev->domain_list, &target->arch.pdev_list);
- pdev->domain = target;
+ if ( devfn == pdev->devfn )
+ {
+ list_move(&pdev->domain_list, &target->arch.pdev_list);
+ pdev->domain = target;
+ }
return ret;
}
@@ -2222,36 +2218,26 @@ int __init intel_vtd_setup(void)
}
static int intel_iommu_assign_device(
- struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
+ struct domain *d, u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct acpi_rmrr_unit *rmrr;
int ret = 0, i;
- struct pci_dev *pdev;
- u16 bdf;
+ u16 bdf, seg;
+ u8 bus;
if ( list_empty(&acpi_drhd_units) )
return -ENODEV;
- ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&pcidevs_lock));
- pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn);
- if (!pdev)
- return -ENODEV;
-
- if (pdev->domain != dom0)
- {
- dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX,
- "IOMMU: assign a assigned device\n");
- return -EBUSY;
- }
-
- ret = reassign_device_ownership(dom0, d, seg, bus, devfn);
+ ret = reassign_device_ownership(dom0, d, devfn, pdev);
if ( ret )
goto done;
/* FIXME: Because USB RMRR conflicts with guest bios region,
* ignore USB RMRR temporarily.
*/
- if ( is_usb_device(seg, bus, devfn) )
+ seg = pdev->seg;
+ bus = pdev->bus;
+ if ( is_usb_device(seg, bus, pdev->devfn) )
{
ret = 0;
goto done;
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
@@ -123,13 +123,13 @@ struct iommu_ops {
int (*add_device)(struct pci_dev *pdev);
int (*enable_device)(struct pci_dev *pdev);
int (*remove_device)(struct pci_dev *pdev);
- int (*assign_device)(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn);
+ int (*assign_device)(struct domain *, u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *);
void (*teardown)(struct domain *d);
int (*map_page)(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, unsigned long mfn,
unsigned int flags);
int (*unmap_page)(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn);
int (*reassign_device)(struct domain *s, struct domain *t,
- u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn);
+ u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *);
int (*get_device_group_id)(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn);
void (*update_ire_from_apic)(unsigned int apic, unsigned int reg, unsigned int value);
void (*update_ire_from_msi)(struct msi_desc *msi_desc, struct msi_msg *msg);

366
26325-IOMMU-add-remove-params.patch
View File

@ -1,366 +0,0 @@
References: bnc#787169
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1357559482 -3600
# Node ID 75cc4943b1ff509c4074800a23ff51d773233b8a
# Parent 62dd78a4e3fc9d190840549f13b4d613f2d19c41
IOMMU: adjust add/remove operation parameters
... to use a (struct pci_dev *, devfn) pair.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
@@ -83,14 +83,14 @@ static void disable_translation(u32 *dte
}
static void amd_iommu_setup_domain_device(
- struct domain *domain, struct amd_iommu *iommu, int bdf)
+ struct domain *domain, struct amd_iommu *iommu,
+ u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
void *dte;
unsigned long flags;
int req_id, valid = 1;
int dte_i = 0;
- u8 bus = PCI_BUS(bdf);
- u8 devfn = PCI_DEVFN2(bdf);
+ u8 bus = pdev->bus;
struct hvm_iommu *hd = domain_hvm_iommu(domain);
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static void amd_iommu_setup_domain_devic
dte_i = 1;
/* get device-table entry */
- req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(iommu->seg, bdf);
+ req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(iommu->seg, PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn));
dte = iommu->dev_table.buffer + (req_id * IOMMU_DEV_TABLE_ENTRY_SIZE);
spin_lock_irqsave(&iommu->lock, flags);
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static void amd_iommu_setup_domain_devic
(u32 *)dte, page_to_maddr(hd->root_table), hd->domain_id,
hd->paging_mode, valid);
- if ( pci_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, devfn) &&
+ if ( pci_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, pdev->devfn) &&
iommu_has_cap(iommu, PCI_CAP_IOTLB_SHIFT) )
iommu_dte_set_iotlb((u32 *)dte, dte_i);
@@ -132,32 +132,31 @@ static void amd_iommu_setup_domain_devic
ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&pcidevs_lock));
- if ( pci_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, devfn) &&
- !pci_ats_enabled(iommu->seg, bus, devfn) )
+ if ( pci_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, pdev->devfn) &&
+ !pci_ats_enabled(iommu->seg, bus, pdev->devfn) )
{
- struct pci_dev *pdev;
+ if ( devfn == pdev->devfn )
+ enable_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, devfn);
- enable_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, devfn);
-
- ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&pcidevs_lock));
- pdev = pci_get_pdev(iommu->seg, bus, devfn);
-
- ASSERT( pdev != NULL );
amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(pdev, INV_IOMMU_ALL_PAGES_ADDRESS, 0);
}
}
-static void __init amd_iommu_setup_dom0_device(struct pci_dev *pdev)
+static int __init amd_iommu_setup_dom0_device(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
int bdf = PCI_BDF2(pdev->bus, pdev->devfn);
struct amd_iommu *iommu = find_iommu_for_device(pdev->seg, bdf);
- if ( likely(iommu != NULL) )
- amd_iommu_setup_domain_device(pdev->domain, iommu, bdf);
- else
+ if ( unlikely(!iommu) )
+ {
AMD_IOMMU_DEBUG("No iommu for device %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
pdev->seg, pdev->bus,
- PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn), PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn));
+ PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ amd_iommu_setup_domain_device(pdev->domain, iommu, devfn, pdev);
+ return 0;
}
int __init amd_iov_detect(void)
@@ -296,16 +295,16 @@ static void __init amd_iommu_dom0_init(s
}
void amd_iommu_disable_domain_device(struct domain *domain,
- struct amd_iommu *iommu, int bdf)
+ struct amd_iommu *iommu,
+ u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
void *dte;
unsigned long flags;
int req_id;
- u8 bus = PCI_BUS(bdf);
- u8 devfn = PCI_DEVFN2(bdf);
+ u8 bus = pdev->bus;
BUG_ON ( iommu->dev_table.buffer == NULL );
- req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(iommu->seg, bdf);
+ req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(iommu->seg, PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn));
dte = iommu->dev_table.buffer + (req_id * IOMMU_DEV_TABLE_ENTRY_SIZE);
spin_lock_irqsave(&iommu->lock, flags);
@@ -313,7 +312,7 @@ void amd_iommu_disable_domain_device(str
{
disable_translation((u32 *)dte);
- if ( pci_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, devfn) &&
+ if ( pci_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, pdev->devfn) &&
iommu_has_cap(iommu, PCI_CAP_IOTLB_SHIFT) )
iommu_dte_set_iotlb((u32 *)dte, 0);
@@ -328,7 +327,8 @@ void amd_iommu_disable_domain_device(str
ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&pcidevs_lock));
- if ( pci_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, devfn) &&
+ if ( devfn == pdev->devfn &&
+ pci_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, devfn) &&
pci_ats_enabled(iommu->seg, bus, devfn) )
disable_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, devfn);
}
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static int reassign_device(struct domain
return -ENODEV;
}
- amd_iommu_disable_domain_device(source, iommu, bdf);
+ amd_iommu_disable_domain_device(source, iommu, devfn, pdev);
if ( devfn == pdev->devfn )
{
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ static int reassign_device(struct domain
if ( t->root_table == NULL )
allocate_domain_resources(t);
- amd_iommu_setup_domain_device(target, iommu, bdf);
+ amd_iommu_setup_domain_device(target, iommu, devfn, pdev);
AMD_IOMMU_DEBUG("Re-assign %04x:%02x:%02x.%u from dom%d to dom%d\n",
pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
source->domain_id, target->domain_id);
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ static void amd_iommu_domain_destroy(str
amd_iommu_flush_all_pages(d);
}
-static int amd_iommu_add_device(struct pci_dev *pdev)
+static int amd_iommu_add_device(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct amd_iommu *iommu;
u16 bdf;
@@ -467,16 +467,16 @@ static int amd_iommu_add_device(struct p
{
AMD_IOMMU_DEBUG("Fail to find iommu."
" %04x:%02x:%02x.%u cannot be assigned to dom%d\n",
- pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn),
- PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn), pdev->domain->domain_id);
+ pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
+ pdev->domain->domain_id);
return -ENODEV;
}
- amd_iommu_setup_domain_device(pdev->domain, iommu, bdf);
+ amd_iommu_setup_domain_device(pdev->domain, iommu, devfn, pdev);
return 0;
}
-static int amd_iommu_remove_device(struct pci_dev *pdev)
+static int amd_iommu_remove_device(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct amd_iommu *iommu;
u16 bdf;
@@ -489,12 +489,12 @@ static int amd_iommu_remove_device(struc
{
AMD_IOMMU_DEBUG("Fail to find iommu."
" %04x:%02x:%02x.%u cannot be removed from dom%d\n",
- pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn),
- PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn), pdev->domain->domain_id);
+ pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
+ pdev->domain->domain_id);
return -ENODEV;
}
- amd_iommu_disable_domain_device(pdev->domain, iommu, bdf);
+ amd_iommu_disable_domain_device(pdev->domain, iommu, devfn, pdev);
return 0;
}
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ int iommu_add_device(struct pci_dev *pde
if ( !iommu_enabled || !hd->platform_ops )
return 0;
- return hd->platform_ops->add_device(pdev);
+ return hd->platform_ops->add_device(pdev->devfn, pdev);
}
int iommu_enable_device(struct pci_dev *pdev)
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ int iommu_remove_device(struct pci_dev *
if ( !iommu_enabled || !hd->platform_ops )
return 0;
- return hd->platform_ops->remove_device(pdev);
+ return hd->platform_ops->remove_device(pdev->devfn, pdev);
}
/*
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ int __init scan_pci_devices(void)
struct setup_dom0 {
struct domain *d;
- void (*handler)(struct pci_dev *);
+ int (*handler)(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *);
};
static int __init _setup_dom0_pci_devices(struct pci_seg *pseg, void *arg)
@@ -734,7 +734,7 @@ static int __init _setup_dom0_pci_device
pdev->domain = ctxt->d;
list_add(&pdev->domain_list, &ctxt->d->arch.pdev_list);
- ctxt->handler(pdev);
+ ctxt->handler(devfn, pdev);
}
}
@@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ static int __init _setup_dom0_pci_device
}
void __init setup_dom0_pci_devices(
- struct domain *d, void (*handler)(struct pci_dev *))
+ struct domain *d, int (*handler)(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *))
{
struct setup_dom0 ctxt = { .d = d, .handler = handler };
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ int nr_iommus;
static struct tasklet vtd_fault_tasklet;
-static void setup_dom0_device(struct pci_dev *);
+static int setup_dom0_device(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *);
static void setup_dom0_rmrr(struct domain *d);
static int domain_iommu_domid(struct domain *d,
@@ -1904,7 +1904,7 @@ static int rmrr_identity_mapping(struct
return 0;
}
-static int intel_iommu_add_device(struct pci_dev *pdev)
+static int intel_iommu_add_device(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct acpi_rmrr_unit *rmrr;
u16 bdf;
@@ -1915,8 +1915,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_add_device(struct
if ( !pdev->domain )
return -EINVAL;
- ret = domain_context_mapping(pdev->domain, pdev->seg, pdev->bus,
- pdev->devfn);
+ ret = domain_context_mapping(pdev->domain, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, devfn);
if ( ret )
{
dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX, "d%d: context mapping failed\n",
@@ -1928,7 +1927,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_add_device(struct
{
if ( rmrr->segment == pdev->seg &&
PCI_BUS(bdf) == pdev->bus &&
- PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) == pdev->devfn )
+ PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) == devfn )
{
ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(pdev->domain, rmrr);
if ( ret )
@@ -1953,7 +1952,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_enable_device(str
return ret >= 0 ? 0 : ret;
}
-static int intel_iommu_remove_device(struct pci_dev *pdev)
+static int intel_iommu_remove_device(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct acpi_rmrr_unit *rmrr;
u16 bdf;
@@ -1971,19 +1970,22 @@ static int intel_iommu_remove_device(str
{
if ( rmrr->segment == pdev->seg &&
PCI_BUS(bdf) == pdev->bus &&
- PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) == pdev->devfn )
+ PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) == devfn )
return 0;
}
}
- return domain_context_unmap(pdev->domain, pdev->seg, pdev->bus,
- pdev->devfn);
+ return domain_context_unmap(pdev->domain, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, devfn);
}
-static void __init setup_dom0_device(struct pci_dev *pdev)
+static int __init setup_dom0_device(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
- domain_context_mapping(pdev->domain, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, pdev->devfn);
- pci_vtd_quirk(pdev);
+ int err;
+
+ err = domain_context_mapping(pdev->domain, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, devfn);
+ if ( !err && devfn == pdev->devfn )
+ pci_vtd_quirk(pdev);
+ return err;
}
void clear_fault_bits(struct iommu *iommu)
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
@@ -120,9 +120,9 @@ bool_t pt_irq_need_timer(uint32_t flags)
struct iommu_ops {
int (*init)(struct domain *d);
void (*dom0_init)(struct domain *d);
- int (*add_device)(struct pci_dev *pdev);
+ int (*add_device)(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *);
int (*enable_device)(struct pci_dev *pdev);
- int (*remove_device)(struct pci_dev *pdev);
+ int (*remove_device)(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *);
int (*assign_device)(struct domain *, u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *);
void (*teardown)(struct domain *d);
int (*map_page)(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, unsigned long mfn,
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/pci.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/pci.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/pci.h
@@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ struct pci_dev *pci_lock_pdev(int seg, i
struct pci_dev *pci_lock_domain_pdev(
struct domain *, int seg, int bus, int devfn);
-void setup_dom0_pci_devices(struct domain *, void (*)(struct pci_dev *));
+void setup_dom0_pci_devices(struct domain *,
+ int (*)(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *));
void pci_release_devices(struct domain *d);
int pci_add_segment(u16 seg);
const unsigned long *pci_get_ro_map(u16 seg);

193
26326-VT-d-context-map-params.patch
View File

@ -1,193 +0,0 @@
References: bnc#787169
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1357559549 -3600
# Node ID afb598bd0f5436bea15b7ef842e8ad5c6adefa1a
# Parent 75cc4943b1ff509c4074800a23ff51d773233b8a
VT-d: adjust context map/unmap parameters
... to use a (struct pci_dev *, devfn) pair.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ void free_pgtable_maddr(u64 maddr);
void *map_vtd_domain_page(u64 maddr);
void unmap_vtd_domain_page(void *va);
int domain_context_mapping_one(struct domain *domain, struct iommu *iommu,
- u8 bus, u8 devfn);
+ u8 bus, u8 devfn, const struct pci_dev *);
int domain_context_unmap_one(struct domain *domain, struct iommu *iommu,
u8 bus, u8 devfn);
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -1308,7 +1308,7 @@ static void __init intel_iommu_dom0_init
int domain_context_mapping_one(
struct domain *domain,
struct iommu *iommu,
- u8 bus, u8 devfn)
+ u8 bus, u8 devfn, const struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct hvm_iommu *hd = domain_hvm_iommu(domain);
struct context_entry *context, *context_entries;
@@ -1325,11 +1325,9 @@ int domain_context_mapping_one(
if ( context_present(*context) )
{
int res = 0;
- struct pci_dev *pdev = NULL;
- /* First try to get domain ownership from device structure. If that's
+ /* Try to get domain ownership from device structure. If that's
* not available, try to read it from the context itself. */
- pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn);
if ( pdev )
{
if ( pdev->domain != domain )
@@ -1448,13 +1446,12 @@ int domain_context_mapping_one(
}
static int domain_context_mapping(
- struct domain *domain, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
+ struct domain *domain, u8 devfn, const struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd;
int ret = 0;
u32 type;
- u8 secbus;
- struct pci_dev *pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn);
+ u8 seg = pdev->seg, bus = pdev->bus, secbus;
drhd = acpi_find_matched_drhd_unit(pdev);
if ( !drhd )
@@ -1475,8 +1472,9 @@ static int domain_context_mapping(
dprintk(VTDPREFIX, "d%d:PCIe: map %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
domain->domain_id, seg, bus,
PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
- ret = domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, bus, devfn);
- if ( !ret && ats_device(pdev, drhd) > 0 )
+ ret = domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, bus, devfn,
+ pdev);
+ if ( !ret && devfn == pdev->devfn && ats_device(pdev, drhd) > 0 )
enable_ats_device(seg, bus, devfn);
break;
@@ -1487,14 +1485,16 @@ static int domain_context_mapping(
domain->domain_id, seg, bus,
PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
- ret = domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, bus, devfn);
+ ret = domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, bus, devfn,
+ pdev);
if ( ret )
break;
if ( find_upstream_bridge(seg, &bus, &devfn, &secbus) < 1 )
break;
- ret = domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, bus, devfn);
+ ret = domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, bus, devfn,
+ pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn));
/*
* Devices behind PCIe-to-PCI/PCIx bridge may generate different
@@ -1503,7 +1503,8 @@ static int domain_context_mapping(
*/
if ( !ret && pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn) == DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE &&
(secbus != pdev->bus || pdev->devfn != 0) )
- ret = domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, secbus, 0);
+ ret = domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, secbus, 0,
+ pci_get_pdev(seg, secbus, 0));
break;
@@ -1576,18 +1577,15 @@ int domain_context_unmap_one(
}
static int domain_context_unmap(
- struct domain *domain, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
+ struct domain *domain, u8 devfn, const struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd;
struct iommu *iommu;
int ret = 0;
u32 type;
- u8 tmp_bus, tmp_devfn, secbus;
- struct pci_dev *pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn);
+ u8 seg = pdev->seg, bus = pdev->bus, tmp_bus, tmp_devfn, secbus;
int found = 0;
- BUG_ON(!pdev);
-
drhd = acpi_find_matched_drhd_unit(pdev);
if ( !drhd )
return -ENODEV;
@@ -1607,7 +1605,7 @@ static int domain_context_unmap(
domain->domain_id, seg, bus,
PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
ret = domain_context_unmap_one(domain, iommu, bus, devfn);
- if ( !ret && ats_device(pdev, drhd) > 0 )
+ if ( !ret && devfn == pdev->devfn && ats_device(pdev, drhd) > 0 )
disable_ats_device(seg, bus, devfn);
break;
@@ -1701,11 +1699,11 @@ static int reassign_device_ownership(
if ( (target != dom0) && !iommu_intremap )
untrusted_msi = 1;
- ret = domain_context_unmap(source, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, devfn);
+ ret = domain_context_unmap(source, devfn, pdev);
if ( ret )
return ret;
- ret = domain_context_mapping(target, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, devfn);
+ ret = domain_context_mapping(target, devfn, pdev);
if ( ret )
return ret;
@@ -1915,7 +1913,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_add_device(u8 dev
if ( !pdev->domain )
return -EINVAL;
- ret = domain_context_mapping(pdev->domain, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, devfn);
+ ret = domain_context_mapping(pdev->domain, devfn, pdev);
if ( ret )
{
dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX, "d%d: context mapping failed\n",
@@ -1975,14 +1973,14 @@ static int intel_iommu_remove_device(u8
}
}
- return domain_context_unmap(pdev->domain, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, devfn);
+ return domain_context_unmap(pdev->domain, devfn, pdev);
}
static int __init setup_dom0_device(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
int err;
- err = domain_context_mapping(pdev->domain, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, devfn);
+ err = domain_context_mapping(pdev->domain, devfn, pdev);
if ( !err && devfn == pdev->devfn )
pci_vtd_quirk(pdev);
return err;
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ static void map_me_phantom_function(stru
/* map or unmap ME phantom function */
if ( map )
domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, 0,
- PCI_DEVFN(dev, 7));
+ PCI_DEVFN(dev, 7), NULL);
else
domain_context_unmap_one(domain, drhd->iommu, 0,
PCI_DEVFN(dev, 7));

84
26327-AMD-IOMMU-flush-params.patch
View File

@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
References: bnc#787169
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1357559599 -3600
# Node ID 2a2c63f641ee3bda4ad552eb0b3ea479d37590cc
# Parent afb598bd0f5436bea15b7ef842e8ad5c6adefa1a
AMD IOMMU: adjust flush function parameters
... to use a (struct pci_dev *, devfn) pair.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_cmd.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_cmd.c
@@ -287,12 +287,12 @@ void invalidate_iommu_all(struct amd_iom
send_iommu_command(iommu, cmd);
}
-void amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(struct pci_dev *pdev,
+void amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(u8 devfn, const struct pci_dev *pdev,
uint64_t gaddr, unsigned int order)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct amd_iommu *iommu;
- unsigned int bdf, req_id, queueid, maxpend;
+ unsigned int req_id, queueid, maxpend;
struct pci_ats_dev *ats_pdev;
if ( !ats_enabled )
@@ -305,8 +305,8 @@ void amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(struct pci_de
if ( !pci_ats_enabled(ats_pdev->seg, ats_pdev->bus, ats_pdev->devfn) )
return;
- bdf = PCI_BDF2(ats_pdev->bus, ats_pdev->devfn);
- iommu = find_iommu_for_device(ats_pdev->seg, bdf);
+ iommu = find_iommu_for_device(ats_pdev->seg,
+ PCI_BDF2(ats_pdev->bus, ats_pdev->devfn));
if ( !iommu )
{
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ void amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(struct pci_de
if ( !iommu_has_cap(iommu, PCI_CAP_IOTLB_SHIFT) )
return;
- req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(iommu->seg, bdf);
+ req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(iommu->seg, PCI_BDF2(ats_pdev->bus, devfn));
queueid = req_id;
maxpend = ats_pdev->ats_queue_depth & 0xff;
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static void amd_iommu_flush_all_iotlbs(s
return;
for_each_pdev( d, pdev )
- amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(pdev, gaddr, order);
+ amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(pdev->devfn, pdev, gaddr, order);
}
/* Flush iommu cache after p2m changes. */
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void amd_iommu_setup_domain_devic
if ( devfn == pdev->devfn )
enable_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, devfn);
- amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(pdev, INV_IOMMU_ALL_PAGES_ADDRESS, 0);
+ amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(devfn, pdev, INV_IOMMU_ALL_PAGES_ADDRESS, 0);
}
}
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/svm/amd-iommu-proto.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/svm/amd-iommu-proto.h
@@ -78,8 +78,8 @@ void iommu_dte_set_guest_cr3(u32 *dte, u
void amd_iommu_flush_all_pages(struct domain *d);
void amd_iommu_flush_pages(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn,
unsigned int order);
-void amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(struct pci_dev *pdev, uint64_t gaddr,
- unsigned int order);
+void amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(u8 devfn, const struct pci_dev *pdev,
+ uint64_t gaddr, unsigned int order);
void amd_iommu_flush_device(struct amd_iommu *iommu, uint16_t bdf);
void amd_iommu_flush_intremap(struct amd_iommu *iommu, uint16_t bdf);
void amd_iommu_flush_all_caches(struct amd_iommu *iommu);

232
26328-IOMMU-pdev-type.patch
View File

@ -1,232 +0,0 @@
References: bnc#787169
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1357559679 -3600
# Node ID 11fa145c880ee814aaf56a7f47f47ee3e5560c7c
# Parent 2a2c63f641ee3bda4ad552eb0b3ea479d37590cc
IOMMU/PCI: consolidate pdev_type() and cache its result for a given device
Add an "unknown" device types as well as one for PCI-to-PCIe bridges
(the latter of which other IOMMU code with or without this patch
doesn't appear to handle properly).
Make sure we don't mistake a device for which we can't access its
config space as a legacy PCI device (after all we in fact don't know
how to deal with such a device, and hence shouldn't try to).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ static struct pci_dev *alloc_pdev(struct
spin_lock_init(&pdev->msix_table_lock);
/* update bus2bridge */
- switch ( pdev_type(pseg->nr, bus, devfn) )
+ switch ( pdev->type = pdev_type(pseg->nr, bus, devfn) )
{
u8 sec_bus, sub_bus;
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ static struct pci_dev *alloc_pdev(struct
static void free_pdev(struct pci_seg *pseg, struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
/* update bus2bridge */
- switch ( pdev_type(pseg->nr, pdev->bus, pdev->devfn) )
+ switch ( pdev->type )
{
u8 dev, func, sec_bus, sub_bus;
@@ -202,6 +202,9 @@ static void free_pdev(struct pci_seg *ps
pseg->bus2bridge[sec_bus] = pseg->bus2bridge[pdev->bus];
spin_unlock(&pseg->bus2bridge_lock);
break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
}
list_del(&pdev->alldevs_list);
@@ -563,20 +566,30 @@ void pci_release_devices(struct domain *
#define PCI_CLASS_BRIDGE_PCI 0x0604
-int pdev_type(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
+enum pdev_type pdev_type(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
{
u16 class_device, creg;
u8 d = PCI_SLOT(devfn), f = PCI_FUNC(devfn);
int pos = pci_find_cap_offset(seg, bus, d, f, PCI_CAP_ID_EXP);
class_device = pci_conf_read16(seg, bus, d, f, PCI_CLASS_DEVICE);
- if ( class_device == PCI_CLASS_BRIDGE_PCI )
+ switch ( class_device )
{
+ case PCI_CLASS_BRIDGE_PCI:
if ( !pos )
return DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE;
creg = pci_conf_read16(seg, bus, d, f, pos + PCI_EXP_FLAGS);
- return ((creg & PCI_EXP_FLAGS_TYPE) >> 4) == PCI_EXP_TYPE_PCI_BRIDGE ?
- DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE : DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE;
+ switch ( (creg & PCI_EXP_FLAGS_TYPE) >> 4 )
+ {
+ case PCI_EXP_TYPE_PCI_BRIDGE:
+ return DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE;
+ case PCI_EXP_TYPE_PCIE_BRIDGE:
+ return DEV_TYPE_PCI2PCIe_BRIDGE;
+ }
+ return DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE;
+
+ case 0x0000: case 0xffff:
+ return DEV_TYPE_PCI_UNKNOWN;
}
return pos ? DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT : DEV_TYPE_PCI;
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
@@ -426,7 +426,6 @@ void io_apic_write_remap_rte(
static void set_msi_source_id(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct iremap_entry *ire)
{
- int type;
u16 seg;
u8 bus, devfn, secbus;
int ret;
@@ -437,8 +436,7 @@ static void set_msi_source_id(struct pci
seg = pdev->seg;
bus = pdev->bus;
devfn = pdev->devfn;
- type = pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn);
- switch ( type )
+ switch ( pdev->type )
{
case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE:
case DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE:
@@ -470,7 +468,7 @@ static void set_msi_source_id(struct pci
default:
dprintk(XENLOG_WARNING VTDPREFIX,
"d%d: unknown(%u): %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
- pdev->domain->domain_id, type,
+ pdev->domain->domain_id, pdev->type,
seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
break;
}
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -1450,7 +1450,6 @@ static int domain_context_mapping(
{
struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd;
int ret = 0;
- u32 type;
u8 seg = pdev->seg, bus = pdev->bus, secbus;
drhd = acpi_find_matched_drhd_unit(pdev);
@@ -1459,8 +1458,7 @@ static int domain_context_mapping(
ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&pcidevs_lock));
- type = pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn);
- switch ( type )
+ switch ( pdev->type )
{
case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE:
case DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE:
@@ -1510,7 +1508,7 @@ static int domain_context_mapping(
default:
dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX, "d%d:unknown(%u): %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
- domain->domain_id, type,
+ domain->domain_id, pdev->type,
seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
@@ -1582,7 +1580,6 @@ static int domain_context_unmap(
struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd;
struct iommu *iommu;
int ret = 0;
- u32 type;
u8 seg = pdev->seg, bus = pdev->bus, tmp_bus, tmp_devfn, secbus;
int found = 0;
@@ -1591,8 +1588,7 @@ static int domain_context_unmap(
return -ENODEV;
iommu = drhd->iommu;
- type = pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn);
- switch ( type )
+ switch ( pdev->type )
{
case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE:
case DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE:
@@ -1639,7 +1635,7 @@ static int domain_context_unmap(
default:
dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX, "d%d:unknown(%u): %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
- domain->domain_id, type,
+ domain->domain_id, pdev->type,
seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/pci.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/pci.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/pci.h
@@ -63,6 +63,17 @@ struct pci_dev {
const u16 seg;
const u8 bus;
const u8 devfn;
+
+ enum pdev_type {
+ DEV_TYPE_PCI_UNKNOWN,
+ DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT,
+ DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE, // PCIe root port, switch
+ DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE, // PCIe-to-PCI/PCIx bridge
+ DEV_TYPE_PCI2PCIe_BRIDGE, // PCI/PCIx-to-PCIe bridge
+ DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE, // Legacy PCI bridge
+ DEV_TYPE_PCI,
+ } type;
+
struct pci_dev_info info;
struct arch_pci_dev arch;
struct {
@@ -84,18 +95,10 @@ struct pci_dev {
extern spinlock_t pcidevs_lock;
-enum {
- DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT,
- DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE, // PCIe root port, switch
- DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE, // PCIe-to-PCI/PCIx bridge
- DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE, // Legacy PCI bridge
- DEV_TYPE_PCI,
-};
-
bool_t pci_known_segment(u16 seg);
int pci_device_detect(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 dev, u8 func);
int scan_pci_devices(void);
-int pdev_type(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn);
+enum pdev_type pdev_type(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn);
int find_upstream_bridge(u16 seg, u8 *bus, u8 *devfn, u8 *secbus);
struct pci_dev *pci_lock_pdev(int seg, int bus, int devfn);
struct pci_dev *pci_lock_domain_pdev(
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/pci_regs.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/pci_regs.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/pci_regs.h
@@ -371,6 +371,9 @@
#define PCI_EXP_TYPE_UPSTREAM 0x5 /* Upstream Port */
#define PCI_EXP_TYPE_DOWNSTREAM 0x6 /* Downstream Port */
#define PCI_EXP_TYPE_PCI_BRIDGE 0x7 /* PCI/PCI-X Bridge */
+#define PCI_EXP_TYPE_PCIE_BRIDGE 0x8 /* PCI/PCI-X to PCIE Bridge */
+#define PCI_EXP_TYPE_RC_END 0x9 /* Root Complex Integrated Endpoint */
+#define PCI_EXP_TYPE_RC_EC 0xa /* Root Complex Event Collector */
#define PCI_EXP_FLAGS_SLOT 0x0100 /* Slot implemented */
#define PCI_EXP_FLAGS_IRQ 0x3e00 /* Interrupt message number */
#define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP 4 /* Device capabilities */

377
26329-IOMMU-phantom-dev.patch
View File

@ -1,377 +0,0 @@
References: bnc#787169
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1357559742 -3600
# Node ID c9a01b396cb4eaedef30e9a6ed615115a9f8bfc5
# Parent 11fa145c880ee814aaf56a7f47f47ee3e5560c7c
IOMMU: add phantom function support
Apart from generating device context entries for the base function,
all phantom functions also need context entries to be generated for
them.
In order to distinguish different use cases, a variant of
pci_get_pdev() is being introduced that, even when passed a phantom
function number, would return the underlying actual device.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_cmd.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_cmd.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_cmd.c
@@ -339,7 +339,15 @@ static void amd_iommu_flush_all_iotlbs(s
return;
for_each_pdev( d, pdev )
- amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(pdev->devfn, pdev, gaddr, order);
+ {
+ u8 devfn = pdev->devfn;
+
+ do {
+ amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(devfn, pdev, gaddr, order);
+ devfn += pdev->phantom_stride;
+ } while ( devfn != pdev->devfn &&
+ PCI_SLOT(devfn) == PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) );
+ }
}
/* Flush iommu cache after p2m changes. */
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c
@@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ void parse_ppr_log_entry(struct amd_iomm
devfn = PCI_DEVFN2(device_id);
spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock);
- pdev = pci_get_pdev(iommu->seg, bus, devfn);
+ pdev = pci_get_real_pdev(iommu->seg, bus, devfn);
spin_unlock(&pcidevs_lock);
if ( pdev )
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_map.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_map.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_map.c
@@ -612,7 +612,6 @@ static int update_paging_mode(struct dom
for_each_pdev( d, pdev )
{
bdf = (pdev->bus << 8) | pdev->devfn;
- req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(pdev->seg, bdf);
iommu = find_iommu_for_device(pdev->seg, bdf);
if ( !iommu )
{
@@ -621,16 +620,21 @@ static int update_paging_mode(struct dom
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&iommu->lock, flags);
- device_entry = iommu->dev_table.buffer +
- (req_id * IOMMU_DEV_TABLE_ENTRY_SIZE);
+ do {
+ req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(pdev->seg, bdf);
+ device_entry = iommu->dev_table.buffer +
+ (req_id * IOMMU_DEV_TABLE_ENTRY_SIZE);
- /* valid = 0 only works for dom0 passthrough mode */
- amd_iommu_set_root_page_table((u32 *)device_entry,
- page_to_maddr(hd->root_table),
- hd->domain_id,
- hd->paging_mode, 1);
+ /* valid = 0 only works for dom0 passthrough mode */
+ amd_iommu_set_root_page_table((u32 *)device_entry,
+ page_to_maddr(hd->root_table),
+ hd->domain_id,
+ hd->paging_mode, 1);
- amd_iommu_flush_device(iommu, req_id);
+ amd_iommu_flush_device(iommu, req_id);
+ bdf += pdev->phantom_stride;
+ } while ( PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) != pdev->devfn &&
+ PCI_SLOT(bdf) == PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) );
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&iommu->lock, flags);
}
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ void __init iommu_dom0_init(struct domai
int iommu_add_device(struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct hvm_iommu *hd;
+ int rc;
+ u8 devfn;
if ( !pdev->domain )
return -EINVAL;
@@ -167,7 +169,20 @@ int iommu_add_device(struct pci_dev *pde
if ( !iommu_enabled || !hd->platform_ops )
return 0;
- return hd->platform_ops->add_device(pdev->devfn, pdev);
+ rc = hd->platform_ops->add_device(pdev->devfn, pdev);
+ if ( rc || !pdev->phantom_stride )
+ return rc;
+
+ for ( devfn = pdev->devfn ; ; )
+ {
+ devfn += pdev->phantom_stride;
+ if ( PCI_SLOT(devfn) != PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) )
+ return 0;
+ rc = hd->platform_ops->add_device(devfn, pdev);
+ if ( rc )
+ printk(XENLOG_WARNING "IOMMU: add %04x:%02x:%02x.%u failed (%d)\n",
+ pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), rc);
+ }
}
int iommu_enable_device(struct pci_dev *pdev)
@@ -190,6 +205,8 @@ int iommu_enable_device(struct pci_dev *
int iommu_remove_device(struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct hvm_iommu *hd;
+ u8 devfn;
+
if ( !pdev->domain )
return -EINVAL;
@@ -197,6 +214,22 @@ int iommu_remove_device(struct pci_dev *
if ( !iommu_enabled || !hd->platform_ops )
return 0;
+ for ( devfn = pdev->devfn ; pdev->phantom_stride; )
+ {
+ int rc;
+
+ devfn += pdev->phantom_stride;
+ if ( PCI_SLOT(devfn) != PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) )
+ break;
+ rc = hd->platform_ops->remove_device(devfn, pdev);
+ if ( !rc )
+ continue;
+
+ printk(XENLOG_ERR "IOMMU: remove %04x:%02x:%02x.%u failed (%d)\n",
+ pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
return hd->platform_ops->remove_device(pdev->devfn, pdev);
}
@@ -244,6 +277,18 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain *
if ( (rc = hd->platform_ops->assign_device(d, devfn, pdev)) )
goto done;
+ for ( ; pdev->phantom_stride; rc = 0 )
+ {
+ devfn += pdev->phantom_stride;
+ if ( PCI_SLOT(devfn) != PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) )
+ break;
+ rc = hd->platform_ops->assign_device(d, devfn, pdev);
+ if ( rc )
+ printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING "d%d: assign %04x:%02x:%02x.%u failed (%d)\n",
+ d->domain_id, seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
+ rc);
+ }
+
if ( has_arch_pdevs(d) && !need_iommu(d) )
{
d->need_iommu = 1;
@@ -376,6 +421,21 @@ int deassign_device(struct domain *d, u1
if ( !pdev )
return -ENODEV;
+ while ( pdev->phantom_stride )
+ {
+ devfn += pdev->phantom_stride;
+ if ( PCI_SLOT(devfn) != PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) )
+ break;
+ ret = hd->platform_ops->reassign_device(d, dom0, devfn, pdev);
+ if ( !ret )
+ continue;
+
+ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "d%d: deassign %04x:%02x:%02x.%u failed (%d)\n",
+ d->domain_id, seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ devfn = pdev->devfn;
ret = hd->platform_ops->reassign_device(d, dom0, devfn, pdev);
if ( ret )
{
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
@@ -146,6 +146,8 @@ static struct pci_dev *alloc_pdev(struct
/* update bus2bridge */
switch ( pdev->type = pdev_type(pseg->nr, bus, devfn) )
{
+ int pos;
+ u16 cap;
u8 sec_bus, sub_bus;
case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE:
@@ -169,6 +171,20 @@ static struct pci_dev *alloc_pdev(struct
break;
case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT:
+ pos = pci_find_cap_offset(pseg->nr, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn),
+ PCI_FUNC(devfn), PCI_CAP_ID_EXP);
+ BUG_ON(!pos);
+ cap = pci_conf_read16(pseg->nr, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn),
+ PCI_FUNC(devfn), pos + PCI_EXP_DEVCAP);
+ if ( cap & PCI_EXP_DEVCAP_PHANTOM )
+ {
+ pdev->phantom_stride = 8 >> MASK_EXTR(cap,
+ PCI_EXP_DEVCAP_PHANTOM);
+ if ( PCI_FUNC(devfn) >= pdev->phantom_stride )
+ pdev->phantom_stride = 0;
+ }
+ break;
+
case DEV_TYPE_PCI:
break;
@@ -266,6 +282,27 @@ struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev(int seg, in
return NULL;
}
+struct pci_dev *pci_get_real_pdev(int seg, int bus, int devfn)
+{
+ struct pci_dev *pdev;
+ int stride;
+
+ if ( seg < 0 || bus < 0 || devfn < 0 )
+ return NULL;
+
+ for ( pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn), stride = 4;
+ !pdev && stride; stride >>= 1 )
+ {
+ if ( !(devfn & (8 - stride)) )
+ continue;
+ pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn & ~(8 - stride));
+ if ( pdev && stride != pdev->phantom_stride )
+ pdev = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return pdev;
+}
+
struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev_by_domain(
struct domain *d, int seg, int bus, int devfn)
{
@@ -464,8 +501,19 @@ int pci_add_device(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 d
out:
spin_unlock(&pcidevs_lock);
- printk(XENLOG_DEBUG "PCI add %s %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n", pdev_type,
- seg, bus, slot, func);
+ if ( !ret )
+ {
+ printk(XENLOG_DEBUG "PCI add %s %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n", pdev_type,
+ seg, bus, slot, func);
+ while ( pdev->phantom_stride )
+ {
+ func += pdev->phantom_stride;
+ if ( PCI_SLOT(func) )
+ break;
+ printk(XENLOG_DEBUG "PCI phantom %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
+ seg, bus, slot, func);
+ }
+ }
return ret;
}
@@ -657,7 +705,7 @@ void pci_check_disable_device(u16 seg, u
u16 cword;
spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock);
- pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn);
+ pdev = pci_get_real_pdev(seg, bus, devfn);
if ( pdev )
{
if ( now < pdev->fault.time ||
@@ -674,6 +722,7 @@ void pci_check_disable_device(u16 seg, u
/* Tell the device to stop DMAing; we can't rely on the guest to
* control it for us. */
+ devfn = pdev->devfn;
cword = pci_conf_read16(seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
PCI_COMMAND);
pci_conf_write16(seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
@@ -731,6 +780,27 @@ struct setup_dom0 {
int (*handler)(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *);
};
+static void setup_one_dom0_device(const struct setup_dom0 *ctxt,
+ struct pci_dev *pdev)
+{
+ u8 devfn = pdev->devfn;
+
+ do {
+ int err = ctxt->handler(devfn, pdev);
+
+ if ( err )
+ {
+ printk(XENLOG_ERR "setup %04x:%02x:%02x.%u for d%d failed (%d)\n",
+ pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
+ ctxt->d->domain_id, err);
+ if ( devfn == pdev->devfn )
+ return;
+ }
+ devfn += pdev->phantom_stride;
+ } while ( devfn != pdev->devfn &&
+ PCI_SLOT(devfn) == PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) );
+}
+
static int __init _setup_dom0_pci_devices(struct pci_seg *pseg, void *arg)
{
struct setup_dom0 *ctxt = arg;
@@ -747,7 +817,7 @@ static int __init _setup_dom0_pci_device
pdev->domain = ctxt->d;
list_add(&pdev->domain_list, &ctxt->d->arch.pdev_list);
- ctxt->handler(devfn, pdev);
+ setup_one_dom0_device(ctxt, pdev);
}
}
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/lib.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/lib.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/lib.h
@@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ do {
#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof((x)[0]) + __must_be_array(x))
+#define MASK_EXTR(v, m) (((v) & (m)) / ((m) & -(m)))
+#define MASK_INSR(v, m) (((v) * ((m) & -(m))) & (m))
+
#define reserve_bootmem(_p,_l) ((void)0)
struct domain;
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/pci.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/pci.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/pci.h
@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ struct pci_dev {
const u8 bus;
const u8 devfn;
+ u8 phantom_stride;
+
enum pdev_type {
DEV_TYPE_PCI_UNKNOWN,
DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT,
@@ -114,6 +116,7 @@ int pci_remove_device(u16 seg, u8 bus, u
int pci_ro_device(int seg, int bus, int devfn);
void arch_pci_ro_device(int seg, int bdf);
struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev(int seg, int bus, int devfn);
+struct pci_dev *pci_get_real_pdev(int seg, int bus, int devfn);
struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev_by_domain(
struct domain *, int seg, int bus, int devfn);
void pci_check_disable_device(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn);

42
26330-VT-d-phantom-MSI.patch
View File

@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
References: bnc#787169
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1357559812 -3600
# Node ID b514b7118958327605e33dd387944832bc8d734a
# Parent c9a01b396cb4eaedef30e9a6ed615115a9f8bfc5
VT-d: relax source qualifier for MSI of phantom functions
With ordinary requests allowed to come from phantom functions, the
remapping tables ought to be set up to allow for MSI triggers to come
from other than the "real" device too.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
@@ -438,13 +438,22 @@ static void set_msi_source_id(struct pci
devfn = pdev->devfn;
switch ( pdev->type )
{
+ unsigned int sq;
+
case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE:
case DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE:
case DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE:
break;
case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT:
- set_ire_sid(ire, SVT_VERIFY_SID_SQ, SQ_ALL_16, PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn));
+ switch ( pdev->phantom_stride )
+ {
+ case 1: sq = SQ_13_IGNORE_3; break;
+ case 2: sq = SQ_13_IGNORE_2; break;
+ case 4: sq = SQ_13_IGNORE_1; break;
+ default: sq = SQ_ALL_16; break;
+ }
+ set_ire_sid(ire, SVT_VERIFY_SID_SQ, sq, PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn));
break;
case DEV_TYPE_PCI:

112
26331-IOMMU-phantom-dev-quirk.patch
View File

@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
References: bnc#787169
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1357559889 -3600
# Node ID 23c4bbc0111dd807561b2c62cbc5798220943a0d
# Parent b514b7118958327605e33dd387944832bc8d734a
IOMMU: add option to specify devices behaving like ones using phantom functions
At least certain Marvell SATA controllers are known to issue bus master
requests with a non-zero function as origin, despite themselves being
single function devices.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
@@ -679,6 +679,16 @@ Defaults to booting secondary processors
Default: `on`
+### pci-phantom
+> `=[<seg>:]<bus>:<device>,<stride>`
+
+Mark a group of PCI devices as using phantom functions without actually
+advertising so, so the IOMMU can create translation contexts for them.
+
+All numbers specified must be hexadecimal ones.
+
+This option can be specified more than once (up to 8 times at present).
+
### ple\_gap
> `= <integer>`
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
@@ -123,6 +123,49 @@ const unsigned long *pci_get_ro_map(u16
return pseg ? pseg->ro_map : NULL;
}
+static struct phantom_dev {
+ u16 seg;
+ u8 bus, slot, stride;
+} phantom_devs[8];
+static unsigned int nr_phantom_devs;
+
+static void __init parse_phantom_dev(char *str) {
+ const char *s = str;
+ struct phantom_dev phantom;
+
+ if ( !s || !*s || nr_phantom_devs >= ARRAY_SIZE(phantom_devs) )
+ return;
+
+ phantom.seg = simple_strtol(s, &s, 16);
+ if ( *s != ':' )
+ return;
+
+ phantom.bus = simple_strtol(s + 1, &s, 16);
+ if ( *s == ',' )
+ {
+ phantom.slot = phantom.bus;
+ phantom.bus = phantom.seg;
+ phantom.seg = 0;
+ }
+ else if ( *s == ':' )
+ phantom.slot = simple_strtol(s + 1, &s, 16);
+ else
+ return;
+
+ if ( *s != ',' )
+ return;
+ switch ( phantom.stride = simple_strtol(s + 1, &s, 0) )
+ {
+ case 1: case 2: case 4:
+ if ( *s )
+ default:
+ return;
+ }
+
+ phantom_devs[nr_phantom_devs++] = phantom;
+}
+custom_param("pci-phantom", parse_phantom_dev);
+
static struct pci_dev *alloc_pdev(struct pci_seg *pseg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
{
struct pci_dev *pdev;
@@ -183,6 +226,20 @@ static struct pci_dev *alloc_pdev(struct
if ( PCI_FUNC(devfn) >= pdev->phantom_stride )
pdev->phantom_stride = 0;
}
+ else
+ {
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < nr_phantom_devs; ++i )
+ if ( phantom_devs[i].seg == pseg->nr &&
+ phantom_devs[i].bus == bus &&
+ phantom_devs[i].slot == PCI_SLOT(devfn) &&
+ phantom_devs[i].stride > PCI_FUNC(devfn) )
+ {
+ pdev->phantom_stride = phantom_devs[i].stride;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
break;
case DEV_TYPE_PCI:

99
26341-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch
View File

@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
fate#313584: pass bios information to XEN HVM guest
# HG changeset patch
# User Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
# Date 1357838188 0
# Node ID 07bf59a7ce837bd795e2df2f28166cfe41990d3d
# Parent 19fd1237ff0dfa3d97a896d6ed6fbbd33f816a9f
HVM xenstore strings and firmware passthrough header
Add public HVM definitions header for xenstore strings used in
HVMLOADER. In addition this header describes the use of the firmware
passthrough values set using xenstore.
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
diff -r 19fd1237ff0d -r 07bf59a7ce83 xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_xs_strings.h
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_xs_strings.h Thu Jan 10 17:16:28 2013 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/******************************************************************************
+ * hvm/hvm_xs_strings.h
+ *
+ * HVM xenstore strings used in HVMLOADER.
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+ * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
+ * deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the
+ * rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or
+ * sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
+ * all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+ * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
+ * FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
+ * DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __XEN_PUBLIC_HVM_HVM_XS_STRINGS_H__
+#define __XEN_PUBLIC_HVM_HVM_XS_STRINGS_H__
+
+#define HVM_XS_HVMLOADER "hvmloader"
+#define HVM_XS_BIOS "hvmloader/bios"
+#define HVM_XS_GENERATION_ID_ADDRESS "hvmloader/generation-id-address"
+
+/* The following values allow additional ACPI tables to be added to the
+ * virtual ACPI BIOS that hvmloader constructs. The values specify the guest
+ * physical address and length of a block of ACPI tables to add. The format of
+ * the block is simply concatenated raw tables (which specify their own length
+ * in the ACPI header).
+ */
+#define HVM_XS_ACPI_PT_ADDRESS "hvmloader/acpi/address"
+#define HVM_XS_ACPI_PT_LENGTH "hvmloader/acpi/length"
+
+/* Any number of SMBIOS types can be passed through to an HVM guest using
+ * the following xenstore values. The values specify the guest physical
+ * address and length of a block of SMBIOS structures for hvmloader to use.
+ * The block is formatted in the following way:
+ *
+ * <length><struct><length><struct>...
+ *
+ * Each length separator is a 32b integer indicating the length of the next
+ * SMBIOS structure. For DMTF defined types (0 - 121), the passed in struct
+ * will replace the default structure in hvmloader. In addition, any
+ * OEM/vendortypes (128 - 255) will all be added.
+ */
+#define HVM_XS_SMBIOS_PT_ADDRESS "hvmloader/smbios/address"
+#define HVM_XS_SMBIOS_PT_LENGTH "hvmloader/smbios/length"
+
+/* Set to 1 to enable SMBIOS default portable battery (type 22) values. */
+#define HVM_XS_SMBIOS_DEFAULT_BATTERY "hvmloader/smbios/default_battery"
+
+/* The following xenstore values are used to override some of the default
+ * string values in the SMBIOS table constructed in hvmloader.
+ */
+#define HVM_XS_BIOS_STRINGS "bios-strings"
+#define HVM_XS_BIOS_VENDOR "bios-strings/bios-vendor"
+#define HVM_XS_BIOS_VERSION "bios-strings/bios-version"
+#define HVM_XS_SYSTEM_MANUFACTURER "bios-strings/system-manufacturer"
+#define HVM_XS_SYSTEM_PRODUCT_NAME "bios-strings/system-product-name"
+#define HVM_XS_SYSTEM_VERSION "bios-strings/system-version"
+#define HVM_XS_SYSTEM_SERIAL_NUMBER "bios-strings/system-serial-number"
+#define HVM_XS_ENCLOSURE_MANUFACTURER "bios-strings/enclosure-manufacturer"
+#define HVM_XS_ENCLOSURE_SERIAL_NUMBER "bios-strings/enclosure-serial-number"
+#define HVM_XS_BATTERY_MANUFACTURER "bios-strings/battery-manufacturer"
+#define HVM_XS_BATTERY_DEVICE_NAME "bios-strings/battery-device-name"
+
+/* 1 to 99 OEM strings can be set in xenstore using values of the form
+ * below. These strings will be loaded into the SMBIOS type 11 structure.
+ */
+#define HVM_XS_OEM_STRINGS "bios-strings/oem-%02d"
+
+#endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_HVM_HVM_XS_STRINGS_H__ */

282
26342-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch
View File

@ -1,282 +0,0 @@
fate#313584: pass bios information to XEN HVM guest
# HG changeset patch
# User Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
# Date 1357838241 0
# Node ID cabf395a6c849cc65e56f1640b18db0c3e0faf5d
# Parent 07bf59a7ce837bd795e2df2f28166cfe41990d3d
HVM firmware passthrough control tools support
Xen control tools support for loading the firmware passthrough blocks
during domain construction. SMBIOS and ACPI blocks are passed in using
the new xc_hvm_build_args structure. Each block is read and loaded
into the new domain address space behind the HVMLOADER image. The base
address for the two blocks is returned as an out parameter to the
caller via the args structure.
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
diff -r 07bf59a7ce83 -r cabf395a6c84 tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_arm.c
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_arm.c Thu Jan 10 17:16:28 2013 +0000
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_arm.c Thu Jan 10 17:17:21 2013 +0000
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
#include <xenguest.h>
int xc_hvm_build(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid,
- const struct xc_hvm_build_args *hvm_args)
+ struct xc_hvm_build_args *hvm_args)
{
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
diff -r 07bf59a7ce83 -r cabf395a6c84 tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_x86.c
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_x86.c Thu Jan 10 17:16:28 2013 +0000
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_x86.c Thu Jan 10 17:17:21 2013 +0000
@@ -49,6 +49,40 @@
#define NR_SPECIAL_PAGES 8
#define special_pfn(x) (0xff000u - NR_SPECIAL_PAGES + (x))
+static int modules_init(struct xc_hvm_build_args *args,
+ uint64_t vend, struct elf_binary *elf,
+ uint64_t *mstart_out, uint64_t *mend_out)
+{
+#define MODULE_ALIGN 1UL << 7
+#define MB_ALIGN 1UL << 20
+#define MKALIGN(x, a) (((uint64_t)(x) + (a) - 1) & ~(uint64_t)((a) - 1))
+ uint64_t total_len = 0, offset1 = 0;
+
+ if ( (args->acpi_module.length == 0)&&(args->smbios_module.length == 0) )
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Find the total length for the firmware modules with a reasonable large
+ * alignment size to align each the modules.
+ */
+ total_len = MKALIGN(args->acpi_module.length, MODULE_ALIGN);
+ offset1 = total_len;
+ total_len += MKALIGN(args->smbios_module.length, MODULE_ALIGN);
+
+ /* Want to place the modules 1Mb+change behind the loader image. */
+ *mstart_out = MKALIGN(elf->pend, MB_ALIGN) + (MB_ALIGN);
+ *mend_out = *mstart_out + total_len;
+
+ if ( *mend_out > vend )
+ return -1;
+
+ if ( args->acpi_module.length != 0 )
+ args->acpi_module.guest_addr_out = *mstart_out;
+ if ( args->smbios_module.length != 0 )
+ args->smbios_module.guest_addr_out = *mstart_out + offset1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static void build_hvm_info(void *hvm_info_page, uint64_t mem_size,
uint64_t mmio_start, uint64_t mmio_size)
{
@@ -86,9 +120,8 @@ static void build_hvm_info(void *hvm_inf
hvm_info->checksum = -sum;
}
-static int loadelfimage(
- xc_interface *xch,
- struct elf_binary *elf, uint32_t dom, unsigned long *parray)
+static int loadelfimage(xc_interface *xch, struct elf_binary *elf,
+ uint32_t dom, unsigned long *parray)
{
privcmd_mmap_entry_t *entries = NULL;
unsigned long pfn_start = elf->pstart >> PAGE_SHIFT;
@@ -126,6 +159,66 @@ static int loadelfimage(
return rc;
}
+static int loadmodules(xc_interface *xch,
+ struct xc_hvm_build_args *args,
+ uint64_t mstart, uint64_t mend,
+ uint32_t dom, unsigned long *parray)
+{
+ privcmd_mmap_entry_t *entries = NULL;
+ unsigned long pfn_start;
+ unsigned long pfn_end;
+ size_t pages;
+ uint32_t i;
+ uint8_t *dest;
+ int rc = -1;
+
+ if ( (mstart == 0)||(mend == 0) )
+ return 0;
+
+ pfn_start = (unsigned long)(mstart >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ pfn_end = (unsigned long)((mend + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ pages = pfn_end - pfn_start;
+
+ /* Map address space for module list. */
+ entries = calloc(pages, sizeof(privcmd_mmap_entry_t));
+ if ( entries == NULL )
+ goto error_out;
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < pages; i++ )
+ entries[i].mfn = parray[(mstart >> PAGE_SHIFT) + i];
+
+ dest = xc_map_foreign_ranges(
+ xch, dom, pages << PAGE_SHIFT, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, 1 << PAGE_SHIFT,
+ entries, pages);
+ if ( dest == NULL )
+ goto error_out;
+
+ /* Zero the range so padding is clear between modules */
+ memset(dest, 0, pages << PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+ /* Load modules into range */
+ if ( args->acpi_module.length != 0 )
+ {
+ memcpy(dest,
+ args->acpi_module.data,
+ args->acpi_module.length);
+ }
+ if ( args->smbios_module.length != 0 )
+ {
+ memcpy(dest + (args->smbios_module.guest_addr_out - mstart),
+ args->smbios_module.data,
+ args->smbios_module.length);
+ }
+
+ munmap(dest, pages << PAGE_SHIFT);
+ rc = 0;
+
+ error_out:
+ free(entries);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
/*
* Check whether there exists mmio hole in the specified memory range.
* Returns 1 if exists, else returns 0.
@@ -140,7 +233,7 @@ static int check_mmio_hole(uint64_t star
}
static int setup_guest(xc_interface *xch,
- uint32_t dom, const struct xc_hvm_build_args *args,
+ uint32_t dom, struct xc_hvm_build_args *args,
char *image, unsigned long image_size)
{
xen_pfn_t *page_array = NULL;
@@ -153,6 +246,7 @@ static int setup_guest(xc_interface *xch
uint32_t *ident_pt;
struct elf_binary elf;
uint64_t v_start, v_end;
+ uint64_t m_start = 0, m_end = 0;
int rc;
xen_capabilities_info_t caps;
unsigned long stat_normal_pages = 0, stat_2mb_pages = 0,
@@ -178,11 +272,19 @@ static int setup_guest(xc_interface *xch
goto error_out;
}
+ if ( modules_init(args, v_end, &elf, &m_start, &m_end) != 0 )
+ {
+ ERROR("Insufficient space to load modules.");
+ goto error_out;
+ }
+
IPRINTF("VIRTUAL MEMORY ARRANGEMENT:\n"
" Loader: %016"PRIx64"->%016"PRIx64"\n"
+ " Modules: %016"PRIx64"->%016"PRIx64"\n"
" TOTAL: %016"PRIx64"->%016"PRIx64"\n"
" ENTRY ADDRESS: %016"PRIx64"\n",
elf.pstart, elf.pend,
+ m_start, m_end,
v_start, v_end,
elf_uval(&elf, elf.ehdr, e_entry));
@@ -337,6 +439,9 @@ static int setup_guest(xc_interface *xch
if ( loadelfimage(xch, &elf, dom, page_array) != 0 )
goto error_out;
+ if ( loadmodules(xch, args, m_start, m_end, dom, page_array) != 0 )
+ goto error_out;
+
if ( (hvm_info_page = xc_map_foreign_range(
xch, dom, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
HVM_INFO_PFN)) == NULL )
@@ -413,7 +518,7 @@ static int setup_guest(xc_interface *xch
* Create a domain for a virtualized Linux, using files/filenames.
*/
int xc_hvm_build(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid,
- const struct xc_hvm_build_args *hvm_args)
+ struct xc_hvm_build_args *hvm_args)
{
struct xc_hvm_build_args args = *hvm_args;
void *image;
@@ -441,6 +546,15 @@ int xc_hvm_build(xc_interface *xch, uint
sts = setup_guest(xch, domid, &args, image, image_size);
+ if (!sts)
+ {
+ /* Return module load addresses to caller */
+ hvm_args->acpi_module.guest_addr_out =
+ args.acpi_module.guest_addr_out;
+ hvm_args->smbios_module.guest_addr_out =
+ args.smbios_module.guest_addr_out;
+ }
+
free(image);
return sts;
@@ -461,6 +575,7 @@ int xc_hvm_build_target_mem(xc_interface
{
struct xc_hvm_build_args args = {};
+ memset(&args, 0, sizeof(struct xc_hvm_build_args));
args.mem_size = (uint64_t)memsize << 20;
args.mem_target = (uint64_t)target << 20;
args.image_file_name = image_name;
diff -r 07bf59a7ce83 -r cabf395a6c84 tools/libxc/xenguest.h
--- a/tools/libxc/xenguest.h Thu Jan 10 17:16:28 2013 +0000
+++ b/tools/libxc/xenguest.h Thu Jan 10 17:17:21 2013 +0000
@@ -211,11 +211,23 @@ int xc_linux_build_mem(xc_interface *xch
unsigned int console_evtchn,
unsigned long *console_mfn);
+struct xc_hvm_firmware_module {
+ uint8_t *data;
+ uint32_t length;
+ uint64_t guest_addr_out;
+};
+
struct xc_hvm_build_args {
uint64_t mem_size; /* Memory size in bytes. */
uint64_t mem_target; /* Memory target in bytes. */
uint64_t mmio_size; /* Size of the MMIO hole in bytes. */
const char *image_file_name; /* File name of the image to load. */
+
+ /* Extra ACPI tables passed to HVMLOADER */
+ struct xc_hvm_firmware_module acpi_module;
+
+ /* Extra SMBIOS structures passed to HVMLOADER */
+ struct xc_hvm_firmware_module smbios_module;
};
/**
@@ -228,7 +240,7 @@ struct xc_hvm_build_args {
* are optional.
*/
int xc_hvm_build(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid,
- const struct xc_hvm_build_args *hvm_args);
+ struct xc_hvm_build_args *hvm_args);
int xc_hvm_build_target_mem(xc_interface *xch,
uint32_t domid,
diff -r 07bf59a7ce83 -r cabf395a6c84 tools/libxc/xg_private.c
--- a/tools/libxc/xg_private.c Thu Jan 10 17:16:28 2013 +0000
+++ b/tools/libxc/xg_private.c Thu Jan 10 17:17:21 2013 +0000
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ unsigned long csum_page(void *page)
__attribute__((weak))
int xc_hvm_build(xc_interface *xch,
uint32_t domid,
- const struct xc_hvm_build_args *hvm_args)
+ struct xc_hvm_build_args *hvm_args)
{
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;

645
26343-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch
View File

@ -1,645 +0,0 @@
fate#313584: pass bios information to XEN HVM guest
# HG changeset patch
# User Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
# Date 1357838290 0
# Node ID a7ce196f40444fafbe8f13b2d80e4885d4321806
# Parent cabf395a6c849cc65e56f1640b18db0c3e0faf5d
HVM firmware passthrough SMBIOS processing
Passthrough support for the SMBIOS structures including three new DMTF
defined types and support for OEM defined tables. Passed in SMBIOS
types override the default internal values. Default values can be
enabled for the new type 22 portable battery using a xenstore
flag. All other new DMTF defined and OEM structures will only be added
to the SMBIOS table if passthrough values are present.
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
diff -r cabf395a6c84 -r a7ce196f4044 tools/firmware/hvmloader/smbios.c
--- a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/smbios.c Thu Jan 10 17:17:21 2013 +0000
+++ b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/smbios.c Thu Jan 10 17:18:10 2013 +0000
@@ -26,16 +26,38 @@
#include "smbios_types.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "hypercall.h"
+#include <xen/hvm/hvm_xs_strings.h>
+/* SBMIOS handle base values */
+#define SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE0 0x0000
+#define SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE1 0x0100
+#define SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE2 0x0200
+#define SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE3 0x0300
+#define SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE4 0x0400
+#define SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE11 0x0B00
+#define SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE16 0x1000
+#define SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE17 0x1100
+#define SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE19 0x1300
+#define SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE20 0x1400
+#define SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE22 0x1600
+#define SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE32 0x2000
+#define SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE39 0x2700
+#define SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE127 0x7f00
+
+static void
+smbios_pt_init(void);
+static void*
+get_smbios_pt_struct(uint8_t type, uint32_t *length_out);
+static void
+get_cpu_manufacturer(char *buf, int len);
static int
write_smbios_tables(void *ep, void *start,
uint32_t vcpus, uint64_t memsize,
uint8_t uuid[16], char *xen_version,
uint32_t xen_major_version, uint32_t xen_minor_version,
unsigned *nr_structs, unsigned *max_struct_size);
-
-static void
-get_cpu_manufacturer(char *buf, int len);
+static uint64_t
+get_memsize(void);
static void
smbios_entry_point_init(void *start,
uint16_t max_structure_size,
@@ -49,6 +71,8 @@ static void *
smbios_type_1_init(void *start, const char *xen_version,
uint8_t uuid[16]);
static void *
+smbios_type_2_init(void *start);
+static void *
smbios_type_3_init(void *start);
static void *
smbios_type_4_init(void *start, unsigned int cpu_number,
@@ -64,10 +88,73 @@ smbios_type_19_init(void *start, uint32_
static void *
smbios_type_20_init(void *start, uint32_t memory_size_mb, int instance);
static void *
+smbios_type_22_init(void *start);
+static void *
smbios_type_32_init(void *start);
static void *
+smbios_type_39_init(void *start);
+static void *
+smbios_type_vendor_oem_init(void *start);
+static void *
smbios_type_127_init(void *start);
+static uint32_t *smbios_pt_addr = NULL;
+static uint32_t smbios_pt_length = 0;
+
+static void
+smbios_pt_init(void)
+{
+ const char *s;
+
+ s = xenstore_read(HVM_XS_SMBIOS_PT_ADDRESS, NULL);
+ if ( s == NULL )
+ goto reset;
+
+ smbios_pt_addr = (uint32_t*)(uint32_t)strtoll(s, NULL, 0);
+ if ( smbios_pt_addr == NULL )
+ goto reset;
+
+ s = xenstore_read(HVM_XS_SMBIOS_PT_LENGTH, NULL);
+ if ( s == NULL )
+ goto reset;
+
+ smbios_pt_length = (uint32_t)strtoll(s, NULL, 0);
+ if ( smbios_pt_length == 0 )
+ goto reset;
+
+ return;
+
+reset:
+ smbios_pt_addr = NULL;
+ smbios_pt_length = 0;
+}
+
+static void*
+get_smbios_pt_struct(uint8_t type, uint32_t *length_out)
+{
+ uint32_t *sep = smbios_pt_addr;
+ uint32_t total = 0;
+ uint8_t *ptr;
+
+ if ( sep == NULL )
+ return NULL;
+
+ while ( total < smbios_pt_length )
+ {
+ ptr = (uint8_t*)(sep + 1);
+ if ( ptr[0] == type )
+ {
+ *length_out = *sep;
+ return ptr;
+ }
+
+ total += (*sep + sizeof(uint32_t));
+ sep = (uint32_t*)(ptr + *sep);
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
static void
get_cpu_manufacturer(char *buf, int len)
{
@@ -97,6 +184,8 @@ write_smbios_tables(void *ep, void *star
char cpu_manufacturer[15];
int i, nr_mem_devs;
+ smbios_pt_init();
+
get_cpu_manufacturer(cpu_manufacturer, 15);
p = (char *)start;
@@ -112,6 +201,7 @@ write_smbios_tables(void *ep, void *star
do_struct(smbios_type_0_init(p, xen_version, xen_major_version,
xen_minor_version));
do_struct(smbios_type_1_init(p, xen_version, uuid));
+ do_struct(smbios_type_2_init(p));
do_struct(smbios_type_3_init(p));
for ( cpu_num = 1; cpu_num <= vcpus; cpu_num++ )
do_struct(smbios_type_4_init(p, cpu_num, cpu_manufacturer));
@@ -130,7 +220,10 @@ write_smbios_tables(void *ep, void *star
do_struct(smbios_type_20_init(p, dev_memsize, i));
}
+ do_struct(smbios_type_22_init(p));
do_struct(smbios_type_32_init(p));
+ do_struct(smbios_type_39_init(p));
+ do_struct(smbios_type_vendor_oem_init(p));
do_struct(smbios_type_127_init(p));
#undef do_struct
@@ -289,12 +382,22 @@ smbios_type_0_init(void *start, const ch
struct smbios_type_0 *p = (struct smbios_type_0 *)start;
static const char *smbios_release_date = __SMBIOS_DATE__;
const char *s;
+ void *pts;
+ uint32_t length;
+
+ pts = get_smbios_pt_struct(0, &length);
+ if ( (pts != NULL)&&(length > 0) )
+ {
+ memcpy(start, pts, length);
+ p->header.handle = SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE0;
+ return (start + length);
+ }
memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
p->header.type = 0;
p->header.length = sizeof(struct smbios_type_0);
- p->header.handle = 0;
+ p->header.handle = SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE0;
p->vendor_str = 1;
p->version_str = 2;
@@ -315,11 +418,11 @@ smbios_type_0_init(void *start, const ch
p->embedded_controller_minor = 0xff;
start += sizeof(struct smbios_type_0);
- s = xenstore_read("bios-strings/bios-vendor", "Xen");
+ s = xenstore_read(HVM_XS_BIOS_VENDOR, "Xen");
strcpy((char *)start, s);
start += strlen(s) + 1;
- s = xenstore_read("bios-strings/bios-version", xen_version);
+ s = xenstore_read(HVM_XS_BIOS_VERSION, xen_version);
strcpy((char *)start, s);
start += strlen(s) + 1;
@@ -338,12 +441,22 @@ smbios_type_1_init(void *start, const ch
char uuid_str[37];
struct smbios_type_1 *p = (struct smbios_type_1 *)start;
const char *s;
+ void *pts;
+ uint32_t length;
+
+ pts = get_smbios_pt_struct(1, &length);
+ if ( (pts != NULL)&&(length > 0) )
+ {
+ memcpy(start, pts, length);
+ p->header.handle = SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE1;
+ return (start + length);
+ }
memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
p->header.type = 1;
p->header.length = sizeof(struct smbios_type_1);
- p->header.handle = 0x100;
+ p->header.handle = SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE1;
p->manufacturer_str = 1;
p->product_name_str = 2;
@@ -358,20 +471,20 @@ smbios_type_1_init(void *start, const ch
start += sizeof(struct smbios_type_1);
- s = xenstore_read("bios-strings/system-manufacturer", "Xen");
+ s = xenstore_read(HVM_XS_SYSTEM_MANUFACTURER, "Xen");
strcpy((char *)start, s);
start += strlen(s) + 1;
- s = xenstore_read("bios-strings/system-product-name", "HVM domU");
+ s = xenstore_read(HVM_XS_SYSTEM_PRODUCT_NAME, "HVM domU");
strcpy((char *)start, s);
start += strlen(s) + 1;
- s = xenstore_read("bios-strings/system-version", xen_version);
+ s = xenstore_read(HVM_XS_SYSTEM_VERSION, xen_version);
strcpy((char *)start, s);
start += strlen(s) + 1;
uuid_to_string(uuid_str, uuid);
- s = xenstore_read("bios-strings/system-serial-number", uuid_str);
+ s = xenstore_read(HVM_XS_SYSTEM_SERIAL_NUMBER, uuid_str);
strcpy((char *)start, s);
start += strlen(s) + 1;
@@ -380,17 +493,58 @@ smbios_type_1_init(void *start, const ch
return start+1;
}
+/* Type 2 -- System Board */
+static void *
+smbios_type_2_init(void *start)
+{
+ struct smbios_type_2 *p = (struct smbios_type_2 *)start;
+ uint8_t *ptr;
+ void *pts;
+ uint32_t length;
+
+ pts = get_smbios_pt_struct(2, &length);
+ if ( (pts != NULL)&&(length > 0) )
+ {
+ memcpy(start, pts, length);
+ p->header.handle = SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE2;
+
+ /* Set current chassis handle if present */
+ if ( p->header.length > 13 )
+ {
+ ptr = ((uint8_t*)start) + 11;
+ if ( *((uint16_t*)ptr) != 0 )
+ *((uint16_t*)ptr) = SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE3;
+ }
+
+ return (start + length);
+ }
+
+ /* Only present when passed in */
+ return start;
+}
+
/* Type 3 -- System Enclosure */
static void *
smbios_type_3_init(void *start)
{
struct smbios_type_3 *p = (struct smbios_type_3 *)start;
+ const char *s;
+ void *pts;
+ uint32_t length;
+
+ pts = get_smbios_pt_struct(3, &length);
+ if ( (pts != NULL)&&(length > 0) )
+ {
+ memcpy(start, pts, length);
+ p->header.handle = SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE3;
+ return (start + length);
+ }
memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
p->header.type = 3;
p->header.length = sizeof(struct smbios_type_3);
- p->header.handle = 0x300;
+ p->header.handle = SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE3;
p->manufacturer_str = 1;
p->type = 0x01; /* other */
@@ -404,8 +558,19 @@ smbios_type_3_init(void *start)
start += sizeof(struct smbios_type_3);
- strcpy((char *)start, "Xen");
- start += strlen("Xen") + 1;
+ s = xenstore_read(HVM_XS_ENCLOSURE_MANUFACTURER, "Xen");
+ strcpy((char *)start, s);
+ start += strlen(s) + 1;
+
+ /* No internal defaults for this if the value is not set */
+ s = xenstore_read(HVM_XS_ENCLOSURE_SERIAL_NUMBER, NULL);
+ if ( (s != NULL)&&(*s != '\0') )
+ {
+ strcpy((char *)start, s);
+ start += strlen(s) + 1;
+ p->serial_number_str = 2;
+ }
+
*((uint8_t *)start) = 0;
return start+1;
}
@@ -423,7 +588,7 @@ smbios_type_4_init(
p->header.type = 4;
p->header.length = sizeof(struct smbios_type_4);
- p->header.handle = 0x400 + cpu_number;
+ p->header.handle = SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE4 + cpu_number;
p->socket_designation_str = 1;
p->processor_type = 0x03; /* CPU */
@@ -465,13 +630,23 @@ static void *
smbios_type_11_init(void *start)
{
struct smbios_type_11 *p = (struct smbios_type_11 *)start;
- char path[20] = "bios-strings/oem-XX";
+ char path[20];
const char *s;
int i;
+ void *pts;
+ uint32_t length;
+
+ pts = get_smbios_pt_struct(11, &length);
+ if ( (pts != NULL)&&(length > 0) )
+ {
+ memcpy(start, pts, length);
+ p->header.handle = SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE11;
+ return (start + length);
+ }
p->header.type = 11;
p->header.length = sizeof(struct smbios_type_11);
- p->header.handle = 0xB00;
+ p->header.handle = SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE11;
p->count = 0;
@@ -480,8 +655,7 @@ smbios_type_11_init(void *start)
/* Pull out as many oem-* strings we find in xenstore */
for ( i = 1; i < 100; i++ )
{
- path[(sizeof path) - 3] = '0' + ((i < 10) ? i : i / 10);
- path[(sizeof path) - 2] = (i < 10) ? '\0' : '0' + (i % 10);
+ snprintf(path, sizeof(path), HVM_XS_OEM_STRINGS, i);
if ( ((s = xenstore_read(path, NULL)) == NULL) || (*s == '\0') )
break;
strcpy((char *)start, s);
@@ -510,7 +684,7 @@ smbios_type_16_init(void *start, uint32_
memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
p->header.type = 16;
- p->header.handle = 0x1000;
+ p->header.handle = SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE16;
p->header.length = sizeof(struct smbios_type_16);
p->location = 0x01; /* other */
@@ -536,7 +710,7 @@ smbios_type_17_init(void *start, uint32_
p->header.type = 17;
p->header.length = sizeof(struct smbios_type_17);
- p->header.handle = 0x1100 + instance;
+ p->header.handle = SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE17 + instance;
p->physical_memory_array_handle = 0x1000;
p->total_width = 64;
@@ -571,7 +745,7 @@ smbios_type_19_init(void *start, uint32_
p->header.type = 19;
p->header.length = sizeof(struct smbios_type_19);
- p->header.handle = 0x1300 + instance;
+ p->header.handle = SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE19 + instance;
p->starting_address = instance << 24;
p->ending_address = p->starting_address + (memory_size_mb << 10) - 1;
@@ -593,7 +767,7 @@ smbios_type_20_init(void *start, uint32_
p->header.type = 20;
p->header.length = sizeof(struct smbios_type_20);
- p->header.handle = 0x1400 + instance;
+ p->header.handle = SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE20 + instance;
p->starting_address = instance << 24;
p->ending_address = p->starting_address + (memory_size_mb << 10) - 1;
@@ -609,6 +783,71 @@ smbios_type_20_init(void *start, uint32_
return start+2;
}
+/* Type 22 -- Portable Battery */
+static void *
+smbios_type_22_init(void *start)
+{
+ struct smbios_type_22 *p = (struct smbios_type_22 *)start;
+ static const char *smbios_release_date = __SMBIOS_DATE__;
+ const char *s;
+ void *pts;
+ uint32_t length;
+
+ pts = get_smbios_pt_struct(22, &length);
+ if ( (pts != NULL)&&(length > 0) )
+ {
+ memcpy(start, pts, length);
+ p->header.handle = SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE22;
+ return (start + length);
+ }
+
+ s = xenstore_read(HVM_XS_SMBIOS_DEFAULT_BATTERY, "0");
+ if ( strncmp(s, "1", 1) != 0 )
+ return start;
+
+ memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
+
+ p->header.type = 22;
+ p->header.length = sizeof(struct smbios_type_22);
+ p->header.handle = SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE22;
+
+ p->location_str = 1;
+ p->manufacturer_str = 2;
+ p->manufacturer_date_str = 3;
+ p->serial_number_str = 0;
+ p->device_name_str = 4;
+ p->device_chemistry = 0x2; /* unknown */
+ p->device_capacity = 0; /* unknown */
+ p->device_voltage = 0; /* unknown */
+ p->sbds_version_number = 0;
+ p->max_error = 0xff; /* unknown */
+ p->sbds_serial_number = 0;
+ p->sbds_manufacturer_date = 0;
+ p->sbds_device_chemistry = 0;
+ p->design_capacity_multiplier = 0;
+ p->oem_specific = 0;
+
+ start += sizeof(struct smbios_type_22);
+
+ strcpy((char *)start, "Primary");
+ start += strlen("Primary") + 1;
+
+ s = xenstore_read(HVM_XS_BATTERY_MANUFACTURER, "Xen");
+ strcpy((char *)start, s);
+ start += strlen(s) + 1;
+
+ strcpy((char *)start, smbios_release_date);
+ start += strlen(smbios_release_date) + 1;
+
+ s = xenstore_read(HVM_XS_BATTERY_DEVICE_NAME, "XEN-VBAT");
+ strcpy((char *)start, s);
+ start += strlen(s) + 1;
+
+ *((uint8_t *)start) = 0;
+
+ return start+1;
+}
+
/* Type 32 -- System Boot Information */
static void *
smbios_type_32_init(void *start)
@@ -619,7 +858,7 @@ smbios_type_32_init(void *start)
p->header.type = 32;
p->header.length = sizeof(struct smbios_type_32);
- p->header.handle = 0x2000;
+ p->header.handle = SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE32;
memset(p->reserved, 0, 6);
p->boot_status = 0; /* no errors detected */
@@ -628,6 +867,58 @@ smbios_type_32_init(void *start)
return start+2;
}
+/* Type 39 -- Power Supply */
+static void *
+smbios_type_39_init(void *start)
+{
+ struct smbios_type_39 *p = (struct smbios_type_39 *)start;
+ void *pts;
+ uint32_t length;
+
+ pts = get_smbios_pt_struct(39, &length);
+ if ( (pts != NULL)&&(length > 0) )
+ {
+ memcpy(start, pts, length);
+ p->header.handle = SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE39;
+ return (start + length);
+ }
+
+ /* Only present when passed in */
+ return start;
+}
+
+static void *
+smbios_type_vendor_oem_init(void *start)
+{
+ uint32_t *sep = smbios_pt_addr;
+ uint32_t total = 0;
+ uint8_t *ptr;
+
+ if ( sep == NULL )
+ return start;
+
+ while ( total < smbios_pt_length )
+ {
+ ptr = (uint8_t*)(sep + 1);
+ if ( ptr[0] >= 128 )
+ {
+ /* Vendor/OEM table, copy it in. Note the handle values cannot
+ * be changed since it is unknown what is in each of these tables
+ * but they could contain handle references to other tables. This
+ * means a slight risk of collision with the tables above but that
+ * would have to be dealt with on a case by case basis.
+ */
+ memcpy(start, ptr, *sep);
+ start += *sep;
+ }
+
+ total += (*sep + sizeof(uint32_t));
+ sep = (uint32_t*)(ptr + *sep);
+ }
+
+ return start;
+}
+
/* Type 127 -- End of Table */
static void *
smbios_type_127_init(void *start)
@@ -638,7 +929,7 @@ smbios_type_127_init(void *start)
p->header.type = 127;
p->header.length = sizeof(struct smbios_type_127);
- p->header.handle = 0x7f00;
+ p->header.handle = SMBIOS_HANDLE_TYPE127;
start += sizeof(struct smbios_type_127);
*((uint16_t *)start) = 0;
diff -r cabf395a6c84 -r a7ce196f4044 tools/firmware/hvmloader/smbios_types.h
--- a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/smbios_types.h Thu Jan 10 17:17:21 2013 +0000
+++ b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/smbios_types.h Thu Jan 10 17:18:10 2013 +0000
@@ -84,6 +84,15 @@ struct smbios_type_1 {
uint8_t family_str;
} __attribute__ ((packed));
+/* SMBIOS type 2 - Base Board Information */
+struct smbios_type_2 {
+ struct smbios_structure_header header;
+ uint8_t manufacturer_str;
+ uint8_t product_name_str;
+ uint8_t version_str;
+ uint8_t serial_number_str;
+} __attribute__ ((packed));
+
/* SMBIOS type 3 - System Enclosure */
struct smbios_type_3 {
struct smbios_structure_header header;
@@ -173,6 +182,26 @@ struct smbios_type_20 {
uint8_t interleaved_data_depth;
} __attribute__ ((packed));
+/* SMBIOS type 22 - Portable battery */
+struct smbios_type_22 {
+ struct smbios_structure_header header;
+ uint8_t location_str;
+ uint8_t manufacturer_str;
+ uint8_t manufacturer_date_str;
+ uint8_t serial_number_str;
+ uint8_t device_name_str;
+ uint8_t device_chemistry;
+ uint16_t device_capacity;
+ uint16_t device_voltage;
+ uint8_t sbds_version_number;
+ uint8_t max_error;
+ uint16_t sbds_serial_number;
+ uint16_t sbds_manufacturer_date;
+ uint8_t sbds_device_chemistry;
+ uint8_t design_capacity_multiplier;
+ uint32_t oem_specific;
+} __attribute__ ((packed));
+
/* SMBIOS type 32 - System Boot Information */
struct smbios_type_32 {
struct smbios_structure_header header;
@@ -180,6 +209,24 @@ struct smbios_type_32 {
uint8_t boot_status;
} __attribute__ ((packed));
+/* SMBIOS type 39 - Power Supply */
+struct smbios_type_39 {
+ struct smbios_structure_header header;
+ uint8_t power_unit_group;
+ uint8_t location_str;
+ uint8_t device_name_str;
+ uint8_t manufacturer_str;
+ uint8_t serial_number_str;
+ uint8_t asset_tag_number_str;
+ uint8_t model_part_number_str;
+ uint8_t revision_level_str;
+ uint16_t max_capacity;
+ uint16_t characteristics;
+ uint16_t input_voltage_probe_handle;
+ uint16_t cooling_device_handle;
+ uint16_t input_current_probe_handle;
+} __attribute__ ((packed));
+
/* SMBIOS type 127 -- End-of-table */
struct smbios_type_127 {
struct smbios_structure_header header;

101
26344-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch
View File

@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
fate#313584: pass bios information to XEN HVM guest
# HG changeset patch
# User Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
# Date 1357838323 0
# Node ID b9c38bea15b117552ecb51809779c7cfef82dd44
# Parent a7ce196f40444fafbe8f13b2d80e4885d4321806
HVM firmware passthrough ACPI processing
ACPI table passthrough support allowing additional static tables and
SSDTs (AML code) to be loaded. These additional tables are added at
the end of the secondary table list in the RSDT/XSDT tables.
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
diff -r a7ce196f4044 -r b9c38bea15b1 tools/firmware/hvmloader/acpi/build.c
--- a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/acpi/build.c Thu Jan 10 17:18:10 2013 +0000
+++ b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/acpi/build.c Thu Jan 10 17:18:43 2013 +0000
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
#include "ssdt_pm.h"
#include "../config.h"
#include "../util.h"
+#include <xen/hvm/hvm_xs_strings.h>
+
+#define ACPI_MAX_SECONDARY_TABLES 16
#define align16(sz) (((sz) + 15) & ~15)
#define fixed_strcpy(d, s) strncpy((d), (s), sizeof(d))
@@ -198,6 +201,52 @@ static struct acpi_20_waet *construct_wa
return waet;
}
+static int construct_passthrough_tables(unsigned long *table_ptrs,
+ int nr_tables)
+{
+ const char *s;
+ uint8_t *acpi_pt_addr;
+ uint32_t acpi_pt_length;
+ struct acpi_header *header;
+ int nr_added;
+ int nr_max = (ACPI_MAX_SECONDARY_TABLES - nr_tables - 1);
+ uint32_t total = 0;
+ uint8_t *buffer;
+
+ s = xenstore_read(HVM_XS_ACPI_PT_ADDRESS, NULL);
+ if ( s == NULL )
+ return 0;
+
+ acpi_pt_addr = (uint8_t*)(uint32_t)strtoll(s, NULL, 0);
+ if ( acpi_pt_addr == NULL )
+ return 0;
+
+ s = xenstore_read(HVM_XS_ACPI_PT_LENGTH, NULL);
+ if ( s == NULL )
+ return 0;
+
+ acpi_pt_length = (uint32_t)strtoll(s, NULL, 0);
+
+ for ( nr_added = 0; nr_added < nr_max; nr_added++ )
+ {
+ if ( (acpi_pt_length - total) < sizeof(struct acpi_header) )
+ break;
+
+ header = (struct acpi_header*)acpi_pt_addr;
+
+ buffer = mem_alloc(header->length, 16);
+ if ( buffer == NULL )
+ break;
+ memcpy(buffer, header, header->length);
+
+ table_ptrs[nr_tables++] = (unsigned long)buffer;
+ total += header->length;
+ acpi_pt_addr += header->length;
+ }
+
+ return nr_added;
+}
+
static int construct_secondary_tables(unsigned long *table_ptrs,
struct acpi_info *info)
{
@@ -293,6 +342,9 @@ static int construct_secondary_tables(un
}
}
+ /* Load any additional tables passed through. */
+ nr_tables += construct_passthrough_tables(table_ptrs, nr_tables);
+
table_ptrs[nr_tables] = 0;
return nr_tables;
}
@@ -327,7 +379,7 @@ void acpi_build_tables(struct acpi_confi
struct acpi_10_fadt *fadt_10;
struct acpi_20_facs *facs;
unsigned char *dsdt;
- unsigned long secondary_tables[16];
+ unsigned long secondary_tables[ACPI_MAX_SECONDARY_TABLES];
int nr_secondaries, i;
unsigned long vm_gid_addr;

103
26369-libxl-devid.patch
View File

@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
commit 5420f26507fc5c9853eb1076401a8658d72669da
Author: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Date: Fri Jan 11 12:22:26 2013 +0000
libxl: Set vfb and vkb devid if not done so by the caller
Other devices set a sensible devid if the caller has not done so.
Do the same for vfb and vkb. While at it, factor out the common code
used to determine a sensible devid, so it can be used by other
libxl__device_*_add functions.
Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
@@ -1710,6 +1710,26 @@ out:
return;
}
+/* common function to get next device id */
+static int libxl__device_nextid(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid, char *device)
+{
+ char *dompath, **l;
+ unsigned int nb;
+ int nextid = -1;
+
+ if (!(dompath = libxl__xs_get_dompath(gc, domid)))
+ return nextid;
+
+ l = libxl__xs_directory(gc, XBT_NULL,
+ GCSPRINTF("%s/device/%s", dompath, device), &nb);
+ if (l == NULL || nb == 0)
+ nextid = 0;
+ else
+ nextid = strtoul(l[nb - 1], NULL, 10) + 1;
+
+ return nextid;
+}
+
/******************************************************************************/
int libxl__device_disk_setdefault(libxl__gc *gc, libxl_device_disk *disk)
@@ -2549,8 +2569,7 @@ void libxl__device_nic_add(libxl__egc *e
flexarray_t *front;
flexarray_t *back;
libxl__device *device;
- char *dompath, **l;
- unsigned int nb, rc;
+ unsigned int rc;
rc = libxl__device_nic_setdefault(gc, nic, domid);
if (rc) goto out;
@@ -2567,17 +2586,10 @@ void libxl__device_nic_add(libxl__egc *e
}
if (nic->devid == -1) {
- if (!(dompath = libxl__xs_get_dompath(gc, domid))) {
+ if ((nic->devid = libxl__device_nextid(gc, domid, "vif") < 0)) {
rc = ERROR_FAIL;
goto out_free;
}
- if (!(l = libxl__xs_directory(gc, XBT_NULL,
- libxl__sprintf(gc, "%s/device/vif", dompath), &nb)) ||
- nb == 0) {
- nic->devid = 0;
- } else {
- nic->devid = strtoul(l[nb - 1], NULL, 10) + 1;
- }
}
GCNEW(device);
@@ -2964,6 +2976,13 @@ int libxl__device_vkb_add(libxl__gc *gc,
goto out_free;
}
+ if (vkb->devid == -1) {
+ if ((vkb->devid = libxl__device_nextid(gc, domid, "vkb") < 0)) {
+ rc = ERROR_FAIL;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ }
+
rc = libxl__device_from_vkb(gc, domid, vkb, &device);
if (rc != 0) goto out_free;
@@ -3065,6 +3084,13 @@ int libxl__device_vfb_add(libxl__gc *gc,
goto out_free;
}
+ if (vfb->devid == -1) {
+ if ((vfb->devid = libxl__device_nextid(gc, domid, "vfb") < 0)) {
+ rc = ERROR_FAIL;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ }
+
rc = libxl__device_from_vfb(gc, domid, vfb, &device);
if (rc != 0) goto out_free;

59
26370-libxc-x86-initial-mapping-fit.patch
View File

@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
# Date 1357906947 0
# Node ID ba2d73234d73fc0faa027cd9bdfd3ac90642733c
# Parent 84d87ca765be81c215ef3b67d2ed71acfba73553
libxc: x86: ensure that the initial mapping fits into the guest's memory
In particular we need to check that adding 512KB of slack and
rounding up to a 4MB boundary do not overflow the guest's memory
allocation. Otherwise we run off the end of the p2m when building the
guest's initial page tables and populate them with garbage.
Wei noticed this when build tiny (2MB) mini-os domains.
Reported-by: Wei Liu <Wei.Liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
@@ -871,7 +871,8 @@ int xc_dom_build_image(struct xc_dom_ima
goto err;
if ( dom->arch_hooks->count_pgtables )
{
- dom->arch_hooks->count_pgtables(dom);
+ if ( dom->arch_hooks->count_pgtables(dom) != 0 )
+ goto err;
if ( (dom->pgtables > 0) &&
(xc_dom_alloc_segment(dom, &dom->pgtables_seg, "page tables", 0,
dom->pgtables * page_size) != 0) )
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ static int count_pgtables(struct xc_dom_
{
int pages, extra_pages;
xen_vaddr_t try_virt_end;
+ xen_pfn_t try_pfn_end;
extra_pages = dom->alloc_bootstack ? 1 : 0;
extra_pages += dom->extra_pages;
@@ -91,6 +92,17 @@ static int count_pgtables(struct xc_dom_
{
try_virt_end = round_up(dom->virt_alloc_end + pages * PAGE_SIZE_X86,
bits_to_mask(22)); /* 4MB alignment */
+
+ try_pfn_end = (try_virt_end - dom->parms.virt_base) >> PAGE_SHIFT_X86;
+
+ if ( try_pfn_end > dom->total_pages )
+ {
+ xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+ "%s: not enough memory for initial mapping (%#"PRIpfn" > %#"PRIpfn")",
+ __FUNCTION__, try_pfn_end, dom->total_pages);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
dom->pg_l4 =
nr_page_tables(dom, dom->parms.virt_base, try_virt_end, l4_bits);
dom->pg_l3 =

56
26372-tools-paths.patch
View File

@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Bamvor Jian Zhang <bjzhang@suse.com>
# Date 1357906948 0
# Node ID 2ad5792b4274d76ced39515cbd3f84898b181768
# Parent ba2d73234d73fc0faa027cd9bdfd3ac90642733c
fix wrong path while calling pygrub and libxl-save-helper
in current xen x86_64, the default libexec directory is /usr/lib/xen/bin,
while the private binder is /usr/lib64/xen/bin. but some commands(pygrub,
libxl-save-helper) located in private binder directory is called from
libexec directory which lead to the following error:
1, for pygrub bootloader:
libxl: debug: libxl_bootloader.c:429:bootloader_disk_attached_cb: /usr/lib/xen/bin/pygrub doesn't exist, falling back to config path
2, for libxl-save-helper:
libxl: cannot execute /usr/lib/xen/bin/libxl-save-helper: No such file or directory
libxl: error: libxl_utils.c:363:libxl_read_exactly: file/stream truncated reading ipc msg header from domain 3 save/restore helper stdout pipe
libxl: error: libxl_exec.c:118:libxl_report_child_exitstatus: domain 3 save/restore helper [10222] exited with error status 255
there are two ways to fix above error. the first one is make such command
store in the /usr/lib/xen/bin and /usr/lib64/xen/bin(symbol link to
previous), e.g. qemu-dm. The second way is using private binder dir
instead of libexec dir. e.g. xenconsole.
For these cases, the latter one is suitable.
Signed-off-by: Bamvor Jian Zhang <bjzhang@suse.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_bootloader.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl_bootloader.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_bootloader.c
@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ static void bootloader_disk_attached_cb(
const char *bltmp;
struct stat st;
- bltmp = libxl__abs_path(gc, bootloader, libxl__libexec_path());
+ bltmp = libxl__abs_path(gc, bootloader, libxl__private_bindir_path());
/* Check to see if the file exists in this location; if not,
* fall back to checking the path */
LOG(DEBUG, "Checking for bootloader in libexec path: %s", bltmp);
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_save_callout.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl_save_callout.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_save_callout.c
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static void run_helper(libxl__egc *egc,
shs->stdout_what = GCSPRINTF("domain %"PRIu32" save/restore helper"
" stdout pipe", domid);
- *arg++ = getenv("LIBXL_SAVE_HELPER") ?: LIBEXEC "/" "libxl-save-helper";
+ *arg++ = getenv("LIBXL_SAVE_HELPER") ?: PRIVATE_BINDIR "/" "libxl-save-helper";
*arg++ = mode_arg;
const char **stream_fd_arg = arg++;
for (i=0; i<num_argnums; i++)

34
26404-x86-forward-both-NMI-kinds.patch
View File

@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1358427591 -3600
# Node ID 76598d4bf61ef0c575deba539ff99078c80e651e
# Parent 0dee85c061addb7124d77c5f6cfe2ea7bc03b760
x86: handle both NMI kinds if they occur simultaneously
We shouldn't assume PCI SERR excludes IOCHK.
Once at it, also remove the doubly redundant range restriction on
"reason" - the variable already is "unsigned char".
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -3369,10 +3369,10 @@ void do_nmi(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
reason = inb(0x61);
if ( reason & 0x80 )
pci_serr_error(regs);
- else if ( reason & 0x40 )
+ if ( reason & 0x40 )
io_check_error(regs);
- else if ( !nmi_watchdog )
- unknown_nmi_error(regs, (unsigned char)(reason&0xff));
+ if ( !(reason & 0xc0) && !nmi_watchdog )
+ unknown_nmi_error(regs, reason);
}
}

94
26418-x86-trampoline-consider-multiboot.patch
View File

@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
# Date 1358505311 -3600
# Node ID 3b59a6c3e9b0fb5009bdfff97c8493bb9f0bec54
# Parent 025f202f3022c30d1ec3b6ffcb72861c43a32cf7
x86: find a better location for the real-mode trampoline
On some machines, the location at 0x40e does not point to the beginning
of the EBDA. Rather, it points to the beginning of the BIOS-reserved
area of the EBDA, while the option ROMs place their data below that
segment.
For this reason, 0x413 is actually a better source than 0x40e to get
the location of the real-mode trampoline. Xen was already using it
as a second source, and this patch keeps that working. However, just
in case, let's also fetch the information from the multiboot structure,
where the boot loader should have placed it. This way we don't
necessarily trust one of the BIOS or the multiboot loader more than
the other.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Retain the previous code, thus using the multiboot value only if it's
sane but lower than the BDA computed one. Also use the full 32-bit
mem_lower value and prefer MBI_MEMLIMITS over open coding it (requiring
a slight adjustment to multiboot.h to make its constants actually
usable in assembly code, which previously they were only meant to be).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S
@@ -88,6 +88,20 @@ __start:
movzwl 0x413,%eax /* use base memory size on failure */
shl $10-4,%eax
1:
+ /*
+ * Compare the value in the BDA with the information from the
+ * multiboot structure (if available) and use the smallest.
+ */
+ testb $MBI_MEMLIMITS,(%ebx)
+ jz 2f /* not available? BDA value will be fine */
+ mov 4(%ebx),%edx
+ cmp $0x100,%edx /* is the multiboot value too small? */
+ jb 2f /* if so, do not use it */
+ shl $10-4,%edx
+ cmp %eax,%edx /* compare with BDA value */
+ cmovb %edx,%eax /* and use the smaller */
+
+2: /* Reserve 64kb for the trampoline */
sub $0x1000,%eax
/* From arch/x86/smpboot.c: start_eip had better be page-aligned! */
--- a/xen/include/xen/multiboot.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/multiboot.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#ifndef __MULTIBOOT_H__
#define __MULTIBOOT_H__
+#include "const.h"
/*
* Multiboot header structure.
@@ -31,17 +32,17 @@
/* The magic number passed by a Multiboot-compliant boot loader. */
#define MULTIBOOT_BOOTLOADER_MAGIC 0x2BADB002
-#define MBI_MEMLIMITS (1u<< 0)
-#define MBI_BOOTDEV (1u<< 1)
-#define MBI_CMDLINE (1u<< 2)
-#define MBI_MODULES (1u<< 3)
-#define MBI_AOUT_SYMS (1u<< 4)
-#define MBI_ELF_SYMS (1u<< 5)
-#define MBI_MEMMAP (1u<< 6)
-#define MBI_DRIVES (1u<< 7)
-#define MBI_BIOSCONFIG (1u<< 8)
-#define MBI_LOADERNAME (1u<< 9)
-#define MBI_APM (1u<<10)
+#define MBI_MEMLIMITS (_AC(1,u) << 0)
+#define MBI_BOOTDEV (_AC(1,u) << 1)
+#define MBI_CMDLINE (_AC(1,u) << 2)
+#define MBI_MODULES (_AC(1,u) << 3)
+#define MBI_AOUT_SYMS (_AC(1,u) << 4)
+#define MBI_ELF_SYMS (_AC(1,u) << 5)
+#define MBI_MEMMAP (_AC(1,u) << 6)
+#define MBI_DRIVES (_AC(1,u) << 7)
+#define MBI_BIOSCONFIG (_AC(1,u) << 8)
+#define MBI_LOADERNAME (_AC(1,u) << 9)
+#define MBI_APM (_AC(1,u) << 10)
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__

137
26532-AMD-IOMMU-phantom-MSI.patch
View File

@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
References: bnc#787169
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1360831377 -3600
# Node ID 788f4551580d476e13ea907e373e58806a32179e
# Parent e68f14b9e73925e9d404e517ba510f73fe472e4e
AMD IOMMU: handle MSI for phantom functions
With ordinary requests allowed to come from phantom functions, the
remapping tables ought to be set up to also allow for MSI triggers to
come from other than the "real" device too.
It is not clear to me whether the alias-ID handling also needs
adjustment for this to work properly, or whether firmware can be
expected to properly express this through a device alias range
descriptor (or multiple device alias ones).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_intr.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_intr.c
@@ -284,33 +284,32 @@ void amd_iommu_ioapic_update_ire(
}
static void update_intremap_entry_from_msi_msg(
- struct amd_iommu *iommu, struct pci_dev *pdev,
- struct msi_desc *msi_desc, struct msi_msg *msg)
+ struct amd_iommu *iommu, u16 bdf,
+ int *remap_index, const struct msi_msg *msg)
{
unsigned long flags;
u32* entry;
- u16 bdf, req_id, alias_id;
+ u16 req_id, alias_id;
u8 delivery_mode, dest, vector, dest_mode;
spinlock_t *lock;
int offset;
- bdf = (pdev->bus << 8) | pdev->devfn;
- req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(pdev->seg, bdf);
- alias_id = get_intremap_requestor_id(pdev->seg, bdf);
+ req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(iommu->seg, bdf);
+ alias_id = get_intremap_requestor_id(iommu->seg, bdf);
if ( msg == NULL )
{
lock = get_intremap_lock(iommu->seg, req_id);
spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flags);
- free_intremap_entry(iommu->seg, req_id, msi_desc->remap_index);
+ free_intremap_entry(iommu->seg, req_id, *remap_index);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
if ( ( req_id != alias_id ) &&
- get_ivrs_mappings(pdev->seg)[alias_id].intremap_table != NULL )
+ get_ivrs_mappings(iommu->seg)[alias_id].intremap_table != NULL )
{
lock = get_intremap_lock(iommu->seg, alias_id);
spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flags);
- free_intremap_entry(iommu->seg, alias_id, msi_desc->remap_index);
+ free_intremap_entry(iommu->seg, alias_id, *remap_index);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
}
goto done;
@@ -324,7 +323,10 @@ static void update_intremap_entry_from_m
vector = (msg->data >> MSI_DATA_VECTOR_SHIFT) & MSI_DATA_VECTOR_MASK;
dest = (msg->address_lo >> MSI_ADDR_DEST_ID_SHIFT) & 0xff;
offset = get_intremap_offset(vector, delivery_mode);
- msi_desc->remap_index = offset;
+ if ( *remap_index < 0)
+ *remap_index = offset;
+ else
+ BUG_ON(*remap_index != offset);
entry = (u32*)get_intremap_entry(iommu->seg, req_id, offset);
update_intremap_entry(entry, vector, delivery_mode, dest_mode, dest);
@@ -339,7 +341,7 @@ static void update_intremap_entry_from_m
lock = get_intremap_lock(iommu->seg, alias_id);
if ( ( req_id != alias_id ) &&
- get_ivrs_mappings(pdev->seg)[alias_id].intremap_table != NULL )
+ get_ivrs_mappings(iommu->seg)[alias_id].intremap_table != NULL )
{
spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flags);
entry = (u32*)get_intremap_entry(iommu->seg, alias_id, offset);
@@ -362,27 +364,44 @@ void amd_iommu_msi_msg_update_ire(
struct msi_desc *msi_desc, struct msi_msg *msg)
{
struct pci_dev *pdev = msi_desc->dev;
+ int bdf = PCI_BDF2(pdev->bus, pdev->devfn);
struct amd_iommu *iommu = NULL;
if ( !iommu_intremap )
return;
- iommu = find_iommu_for_device(pdev->seg, (pdev->bus << 8) | pdev->devfn);
-
+ iommu = find_iommu_for_device(pdev->seg, bdf);
if ( !iommu )
{
- AMD_IOMMU_DEBUG("Fail to find iommu for MSI device id = 0x%x\n",
- (pdev->bus << 8) | pdev->devfn);
+ AMD_IOMMU_DEBUG("Fail to find iommu for MSI device id = 0x%x\n", bdf);
return;
}
if ( msi_desc->remap_index >= 0 )
- update_intremap_entry_from_msi_msg(iommu, pdev, msi_desc, NULL);
+ {
+ do {
+ update_intremap_entry_from_msi_msg(iommu, bdf,
+ &msi_desc->remap_index, NULL);
+ if ( !pdev || !pdev->phantom_stride )
+ break;
+ bdf += pdev->phantom_stride;
+ } while ( PCI_SLOT(bdf) == PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) );
+
+ msi_desc->remap_index = -1;
+ if ( pdev )
+ bdf = PCI_BDF2(pdev->bus, pdev->devfn);
+ }
if ( !msg )
return;
- update_intremap_entry_from_msi_msg(iommu, pdev, msi_desc, msg);
+ do {
+ update_intremap_entry_from_msi_msg(iommu, bdf, &msi_desc->remap_index,
+ msg);
+ if ( !pdev || !pdev->phantom_stride )
+ break;
+ bdf += pdev->phantom_stride;
+ } while ( PCI_SLOT(bdf) == PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) );
}
void amd_iommu_read_msi_from_ire(

26
26547-tools-xc_fix_logic_error_in_stdiostream_progress.patch
View File

@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
changeset: 26547:8285d20a6f5b
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Fri Feb 15 13:32:11 2013 +0000
files: tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c
description:
tools/xc: fix logic error in stdiostream_progress
Setting XTL_STDIOSTREAM_HIDE_PROGRESS should disable progress reporting.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r 0141aeb86b79 -r 8285d20a6f5b tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c
--- a/tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c Fri Feb 15 13:32:10 2013 +0000
+++ b/tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c Fri Feb 15 13:32:11 2013 +0000
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static void stdiostream_progress(struct
int newpel, extra_erase;
xentoollog_level this_level;
- if (!(lg->flags & XTL_STDIOSTREAM_HIDE_PROGRESS))
+ if (lg->flags & XTL_STDIOSTREAM_HIDE_PROGRESS)
return;
if (percent < lg->progress_last_percent) {

62
26548-tools-xc_handle_tty_output_differently_in_stdiostream_progress.patch
View File

@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
changeset: 26548:e7d9bac5c11d
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Fri Feb 15 13:32:11 2013 +0000
files: tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c
description:
tools/xc: handle tty output differently in stdiostream_progress
If the output goes to a tty, rewind the cursor and print everything in a
single line as it was done up to now. If the output goes to a file or
pipe print a newline after each progress output. This will fix logging
of progress messages from xc_save to xend.log.
To support XTL_STDIOSTREAM_SHOW_PID or XTL_STDIOSTREAM_SHOW_DATE print
the output via vmessage if the output is not a tty.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r 8285d20a6f5b -r e7d9bac5c11d tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c
--- a/tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c Fri Feb 15 13:32:11 2013 +0000
+++ b/tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c Fri Feb 15 13:32:11 2013 +0000
@@ -81,6 +81,17 @@ static void stdiostream_vmessage(xentool
fflush(lg->f);
}
+static void stdiostream_message(struct xentoollog_logger *logger_in,
+ xentoollog_level level,
+ const char *context,
+ const char *format, ...)
+{
+ va_list al;
+ va_start(al,format);
+ stdiostream_vmessage(logger_in, level, -1, context, format, al);
+ va_end(al);
+}
+
static void stdiostream_progress(struct xentoollog_logger *logger_in,
const char *context,
const char *doing_what, int percent,
@@ -105,11 +116,18 @@ static void stdiostream_progress(struct
if (this_level < lg->min_level)
return;
+ lg->progress_last_percent = percent;
+
+ if (isatty(fileno(lg->f)) <= 0) {
+ stdiostream_message(logger_in, this_level, context,
+ "%s: %lu/%lu %3d%%",
+ doing_what, done, total, percent);
+ return;
+ }
+
if (lg->progress_erase_len)
putc('\r', lg->f);
- lg->progress_last_percent = percent;
-
newpel = fprintf(lg->f, "%s%s" "%s: %lu/%lu %3d%%%s",
context?context:"", context?": ":"",
doing_what, done, total, percent,

36
26549-tools-xc_turn_XCFLAGS__into_shifts.patch
View File

@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
changeset: 26549:d2991367ecd2
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Fri Feb 15 13:32:12 2013 +0000
files: tools/libxc/xenguest.h
description:
tools/xc: turn XCFLAGS_* into shifts
to make it clear that these are bits and to make it easier to use in
xend code.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r e7d9bac5c11d -r d2991367ecd2 tools/libxc/xenguest.h
--- a/tools/libxc/xenguest.h Fri Feb 15 13:32:11 2013 +0000
+++ b/tools/libxc/xenguest.h Fri Feb 15 13:32:12 2013 +0000
@@ -23,11 +23,12 @@
#ifndef XENGUEST_H
#define XENGUEST_H
-#define XCFLAGS_LIVE 1
-#define XCFLAGS_DEBUG 2
-#define XCFLAGS_HVM 4
-#define XCFLAGS_STDVGA 8
-#define XCFLAGS_CHECKPOINT_COMPRESS 16
+#define XCFLAGS_LIVE (1 << 0)
+#define XCFLAGS_DEBUG (1 << 1)
+#define XCFLAGS_HVM (1 << 2)
+#define XCFLAGS_STDVGA (1 << 3)
+#define XCFLAGS_CHECKPOINT_COMPRESS (1 << 4)
+
#define X86_64_B_SIZE 64
#define X86_32_B_SIZE 32

58
26550-tools-xc_restore_logging_in_xc_save.patch
View File

@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
changeset: 26550:e6c373fcb73e
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Fri Feb 15 13:32:13 2013 +0000
files: tools/xcutils/xc_save.c
description:
tools/xc: restore logging in xc_save
Prior to xen-4.1 the helper xc_save would print some progress during
migration. With the new xc_interface_open API no more messages were
printed because no logger was configured.
Restore previous behaviour by providing a logger. The progress in
xc_domain_save will be disabled because it generates alot of output and
fills up xend.log quickly.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r d2991367ecd2 -r e6c373fcb73e tools/xcutils/xc_save.c
--- a/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c Fri Feb 15 13:32:12 2013 +0000
+++ b/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c Fri Feb 15 13:32:13 2013 +0000
@@ -166,17 +166,15 @@ static int switch_qemu_logdirty(int domi
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
- unsigned int maxit, max_f;
+ unsigned int maxit, max_f, lflags;
int io_fd, ret, port;
struct save_callbacks callbacks;
+ xentoollog_level lvl;
+ xentoollog_logger *l;
if (argc != 6)
errx(1, "usage: %s iofd domid maxit maxf flags", argv[0]);
- si.xch = xc_interface_open(0,0,0);
- if (!si.xch)
- errx(1, "failed to open control interface");
-
io_fd = atoi(argv[1]);
si.domid = atoi(argv[2]);
maxit = atoi(argv[3]);
@@ -185,6 +183,13 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
si.suspend_evtchn = -1;
+ lvl = si.flags & XCFLAGS_DEBUG ? XTL_DEBUG: XTL_DETAIL;
+ lflags = XTL_STDIOSTREAM_HIDE_PROGRESS;
+ l = (xentoollog_logger *)xtl_createlogger_stdiostream(stderr, lvl, lflags);
+ si.xch = xc_interface_open(l, 0, 0);
+ if (!si.xch)
+ errx(1, "failed to open control interface");
+
si.xce = xc_evtchn_open(NULL, 0);
if (si.xce == NULL)
warnx("failed to open event channel handle");

111
26551-tools-xc_log_pid_in_xc_save-xc_restore_output.patch
View File

@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
changeset: 26551:48f9436959dd
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Fri Feb 15 13:32:13 2013 +0000
files: tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c tools/xcutils/xc_restore.c tools/xcutils/xc_save.c
description:
tools/xc: log pid in xc_save/xc_restore output
If several migrations log their output to xend.log its not clear which
line belongs to a which guest. Print entry/exit of xc_save and
xc_restore and also request to print pid with each log call.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c
@@ -1382,6 +1382,8 @@ int xc_domain_restore(xc_interface *xch,
struct restore_ctx *ctx = &_ctx;
struct domain_info_context *dinfo = &ctx->dinfo;
+ DPRINTF("%s: starting restore of new domid %u", __func__, dom);
+
pagebuf_init(&pagebuf);
memset(&tailbuf, 0, sizeof(tailbuf));
tailbuf.ishvm = hvm;
@@ -1408,7 +1410,7 @@ int xc_domain_restore(xc_interface *xch,
PERROR("read: p2m_size");
goto out;
}
- DPRINTF("xc_domain_restore start: p2m_size = %lx\n", dinfo->p2m_size);
+ DPRINTF("%s: p2m_size = %lx\n", __func__, dinfo->p2m_size);
if ( !get_platform_info(xch, dom,
&ctx->max_mfn, &ctx->hvirt_start, &ctx->pt_levels, &dinfo->guest_width) )
@@ -2215,7 +2217,7 @@ int xc_domain_restore(xc_interface *xch,
fcntl(io_fd, F_SETFL, orig_io_fd_flags);
- DPRINTF("Restore exit with rc=%d\n", rc);
+ DPRINTF("Restore exit of domid %u with rc=%d\n", dom, rc);
return rc;
}
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
@@ -897,6 +897,8 @@ int xc_domain_save(xc_interface *xch, in
int completed = 0;
+ DPRINTF("%s: starting save of domid %u", __func__, dom);
+
if ( hvm && !callbacks->switch_qemu_logdirty )
{
ERROR("No switch_qemu_logdirty callback provided.");
@@ -2112,7 +2114,7 @@ int xc_domain_save(xc_interface *xch, in
free(pfn_err);
free(to_fix);
- DPRINTF("Save exit rc=%d\n",rc);
+ DPRINTF("Save exit of domid %u with rc=%d\n", dom, rc);
return !!rc;
}
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/xcutils/xc_restore.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/xcutils/xc_restore.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/xcutils/xc_restore.c
@@ -19,17 +19,22 @@ int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
unsigned int domid, store_evtchn, console_evtchn;
- unsigned int hvm, pae, apic;
+ unsigned int hvm, pae, apic, lflags;
xc_interface *xch;
int io_fd, ret;
int superpages;
unsigned long store_mfn, console_mfn;
+ xentoollog_level lvl;
+ xentoollog_logger *l;
if ( (argc != 8) && (argc != 9) )
errx(1, "usage: %s iofd domid store_evtchn "
"console_evtchn hvm pae apic [superpages]", argv[0]);
- xch = xc_interface_open(0,0,0);
+ lvl = XTL_DETAIL;
+ lflags = XTL_STDIOSTREAM_SHOW_PID | XTL_STDIOSTREAM_HIDE_PROGRESS;
+ l = (xentoollog_logger *)xtl_createlogger_stdiostream(stderr, lvl, lflags);
+ xch = xc_interface_open(l, 0, 0);
if ( !xch )
errx(1, "failed to open control interface");
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
si.suspend_evtchn = -1;
lvl = si.flags & XCFLAGS_DEBUG ? XTL_DEBUG: XTL_DETAIL;
- lflags = XTL_STDIOSTREAM_HIDE_PROGRESS;
+ lflags = XTL_STDIOSTREAM_SHOW_PID | XTL_STDIOSTREAM_HIDE_PROGRESS;
l = (xentoollog_logger *)xtl_createlogger_stdiostream(stderr, lvl, lflags);
si.xch = xc_interface_open(l, 0, 0);
if (!si.xch)

46
26554-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch
View File

@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
# Date 1360935136 0
# Node ID 3124ab7855fd7d4e0f3ea125cb21b60d693e8800
# Parent 71c15ae0998378b5c117bbd27a48015757685706
libxl: switch to using the new xc_hvm_build() libxc API.
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
@@ -546,17 +546,24 @@ int libxl__build_hvm(libxl__gc *gc, uint
libxl__domain_build_state *state)
{
libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc);
+ struct xc_hvm_build_args args = {};
int ret, rc = ERROR_FAIL;
const char *firmware = libxl__domain_firmware(gc, info);
if (!firmware)
goto out;
- ret = xc_hvm_build_target_mem(
- ctx->xch,
- domid,
- (info->max_memkb - info->video_memkb) / 1024,
- (info->target_memkb - info->video_memkb) / 1024,
- firmware);
+
+ memset(&args, 0, sizeof(struct xc_hvm_build_args));
+ /* The params from the configuration file are in Mb, which are then
+ * multiplied by 1 Kb. This was then divided off when calling
+ * the old xc_hvm_build_target_mem() which then turned them to bytes.
+ * Do all this in one step here...
+ */
+ args.mem_size = (uint64_t)(info->max_memkb - info->video_memkb) << 10;
+ args.mem_target = (uint64_t)(info->target_memkb - info->video_memkb) << 10;
+ args.image_file_name = firmware;
+
+ ret = xc_hvm_build(ctx->xch, domid, &args);
if (ret) {
LIBXL__LOG_ERRNOVAL(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, ret, "hvm building failed");
goto out;

314
26555-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch
View File

@ -1,314 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
# Date 1360935136 0
# Node ID 17a228e37ec0913ff86b8b5f2d88f1b8e92146f1
# Parent 3124ab7855fd7d4e0f3ea125cb21b60d693e8800
libxl: HVM firmware passthrough support
This patch introduces support for two new parameters in libxl:
smbios_firmware=<path_to_smbios_structures_file>
acpi_firmware=<path_to_acpi_tables_file>
The changes are primarily in the domain building code where the firmware files
are read and passed to libxc for loading into the new guest. After the domain
building call to libxc, the addresses for the loaded blobs are returned and
written to xenstore.
LIBXL_HAVE_FIRMWARE_PASSTHROUGH is defined in libxl.h to allow users to
determine if the feature is present.
This patch also updates the xl.cfg man page with descriptions of the two new
parameters for firmware passthrough.
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5
@@ -637,6 +637,25 @@ of Xen) within a Xen guest or to support
which uses hardware virtualisation extensions (e.g. Windows XP
compatibility mode on more modern Windows OS).
+=item B<acpi_firmware="STRING">
+
+Specify a path to a file that contains extra ACPI firmware tables to pass in to
+a guest. The file can contain several tables in their binary AML form
+concatenated together. Each table self describes its length so no additional
+information is needed. These tables will be added to the ACPI table set in the
+guest. Note that existing tables cannot be overridden by this feature. For
+example this cannot be used to override tables like DSDT, FADT, etc.
+
+=item B<smbios_firmware="STRING">
+
+Specify a path to a file that contains extra SMBIOS firmware structures to pass
+in to a guest. The file can contain a set DMTF predefined structures which will
+override the internal defaults. Not all predefined structures can be overridden,
+only the following types: 0, 1, 2, 3, 11, 22, 39. The file can also contain any
+number of vendor defined SMBIOS structures (type 128 - 255). Since SMBIOS
+structures do not present their overall size, each entry in the file must be
+preceded by a 32b integer indicating the size of the next structure.
+
=back
=head3 Guest Virtual Time Controls
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.h
@@ -68,6 +68,13 @@
*/
/*
+ * LIBXL_HAVE_FIRMWARE_PASSTHROUGH indicates the feature for
+ * passing in SMBIOS and ACPI firmware to HVM guests is present
+ * in the library.
+ */
+#define LIBXL_HAVE_FIRMWARE_PASSTHROUGH 1
+
+/*
* libxl ABI compatibility
*
* The only guarantee which libxl makes regarding ABI compatibility
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <xc_dom.h>
#include <xen/hvm/hvm_info_table.h>
+#include <xen/hvm/hvm_xs_strings.h>
libxl_domain_type libxl__domain_type(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid)
{
@@ -514,11 +515,61 @@ static int hvm_build_set_params(xc_inter
return 0;
}
-static const char *libxl__domain_firmware(libxl__gc *gc,
- libxl_domain_build_info *info)
+static int hvm_build_set_xs_values(libxl__gc *gc,
+ uint32_t domid,
+ struct xc_hvm_build_args *args)
+{
+ char *path = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (args->smbios_module.guest_addr_out) {
+ path = GCSPRINTF("/local/domain/%d/"HVM_XS_SMBIOS_PT_ADDRESS, domid);
+
+ ret = libxl__xs_write(gc, XBT_NULL, path, "0x%"PRIx64,
+ args->smbios_module.guest_addr_out);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+
+ path = GCSPRINTF("/local/domain/%d/"HVM_XS_SMBIOS_PT_LENGTH, domid);
+
+ ret = libxl__xs_write(gc, XBT_NULL, path, "0x%x",
+ args->smbios_module.length);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (args->acpi_module.guest_addr_out) {
+ path = GCSPRINTF("/local/domain/%d/"HVM_XS_ACPI_PT_ADDRESS, domid);
+
+ ret = libxl__xs_write(gc, XBT_NULL, path, "0x%"PRIx64,
+ args->acpi_module.guest_addr_out);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+
+ path = GCSPRINTF("/local/domain/%d/"HVM_XS_ACPI_PT_LENGTH, domid);
+
+ ret = libxl__xs_write(gc, XBT_NULL, path, "0x%x",
+ args->acpi_module.length);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ LOG(ERROR, "failed to write firmware xenstore value, err: %d", ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int libxl__domain_firmware(libxl__gc *gc,
+ libxl_domain_build_info *info,
+ struct xc_hvm_build_args *args)
{
libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc);
const char *firmware;
+ int e, rc = ERROR_FAIL;
+ int datalen = 0;
+ void *data;
if (info->u.hvm.firmware)
firmware = info->u.hvm.firmware;
@@ -532,13 +583,52 @@ static const char *libxl__domain_firmwar
firmware = "hvmloader";
break;
default:
- LIBXL__LOG(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "invalid device model version %d",
- info->device_model_version);
- return NULL;
+ LOG(ERROR, "invalid device model version %d",
+ info->device_model_version);
+ return ERROR_FAIL;
break;
}
}
- return libxl__abs_path(gc, firmware, libxl__xenfirmwaredir_path());
+ args->image_file_name = libxl__abs_path(gc, firmware,
+ libxl__xenfirmwaredir_path());
+
+ if (info->u.hvm.smbios_firmware) {
+ data = NULL;
+ e = libxl_read_file_contents(ctx, info->u.hvm.smbios_firmware,
+ &data, &datalen);
+ if (e) {
+ LOGEV(ERROR, e, "failed to read SMBIOS firmware file %s",
+ info->u.hvm.smbios_firmware);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ libxl__ptr_add(gc, data);
+ if (datalen) {
+ /* Only accept non-empty files */
+ args->smbios_module.data = data;
+ args->smbios_module.length = (uint32_t)datalen;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (info->u.hvm.acpi_firmware) {
+ data = NULL;
+ e = libxl_read_file_contents(ctx, info->u.hvm.acpi_firmware,
+ &data, &datalen);
+ if (e) {
+ LOGEV(ERROR, e, "failed to read ACPI firmware file %s",
+ info->u.hvm.acpi_firmware);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ libxl__ptr_add(gc, data);
+ if (datalen) {
+ /* Only accept non-empty files */
+ args->acpi_module.data = data;
+ args->acpi_module.length = (uint32_t)datalen;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
}
int libxl__build_hvm(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
@@ -548,10 +638,6 @@ int libxl__build_hvm(libxl__gc *gc, uint
libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc);
struct xc_hvm_build_args args = {};
int ret, rc = ERROR_FAIL;
- const char *firmware = libxl__domain_firmware(gc, info);
-
- if (!firmware)
- goto out;
memset(&args, 0, sizeof(struct xc_hvm_build_args));
/* The params from the configuration file are in Mb, which are then
@@ -561,22 +647,34 @@ int libxl__build_hvm(libxl__gc *gc, uint
*/
args.mem_size = (uint64_t)(info->max_memkb - info->video_memkb) << 10;
args.mem_target = (uint64_t)(info->target_memkb - info->video_memkb) << 10;
- args.image_file_name = firmware;
+
+ if (libxl__domain_firmware(gc, info, &args)) {
+ LOG(ERROR, "initializing domain firmware failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
ret = xc_hvm_build(ctx->xch, domid, &args);
if (ret) {
- LIBXL__LOG_ERRNOVAL(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, ret, "hvm building failed");
+ LOGEV(ERROR, ret, "hvm building failed");
goto out;
}
+
ret = hvm_build_set_params(ctx->xch, domid, info, state->store_port,
&state->store_mfn, state->console_port,
&state->console_mfn, state->store_domid,
state->console_domid);
if (ret) {
- LIBXL__LOG_ERRNOVAL(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, ret, "hvm build set params failed");
+ LOGEV(ERROR, ret, "hvm build set params failed");
goto out;
}
- rc = 0;
+
+ ret = hvm_build_set_xs_values(gc, domid, &args);
+ if (ret) {
+ LOG(ERROR, "hvm build set xenstore values failed (ret=%d)", ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
out:
return rc;
}
@@ -638,7 +736,7 @@ int libxl__toolstack_restore(uint32_t do
memcpy(&count, ptr, sizeof(count));
ptr += sizeof(count);
-
+
if (size < sizeof(version) + sizeof(count) +
count * (sizeof(struct libxl__physmap_info))) {
LIBXL__LOG(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "wrong size");
@@ -852,7 +950,7 @@ static void switch_logdirty_xswatch(libx
rc = libxl__xs_rm_checked(gc, t, lds->ret_path);
if (rc) goto out;
- rc = libxl__xs_transaction_commit(gc, &t);
+ rc = libxl__xs_transaction_commit(gc, &t);
if (!rc) break;
if (rc<0) goto out;
}
@@ -1324,7 +1422,7 @@ void libxl__xc_domain_save_done(libxl__e
if (type == LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_HVM) {
rc = libxl__domain_suspend_device_model(gc, dss);
if (rc) goto out;
-
+
libxl__domain_save_device_model(egc, dss, domain_suspend_done);
return;
}
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl
@@ -301,6 +301,8 @@ libxl_domain_build_info = Struct("domain
("vpt_align", libxl_defbool),
("timer_mode", libxl_timer_mode),
("nested_hvm", libxl_defbool),
+ ("smbios_firmware", string),
+ ("acpi_firmware", string),
("nographic", libxl_defbool),
("vga", libxl_vga_interface_info),
("vnc", libxl_vnc_info),
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c
@@ -863,6 +863,11 @@ static void parse_config_data(const char
}
xlu_cfg_get_defbool(config, "nestedhvm", &b_info->u.hvm.nested_hvm, 0);
+
+ xlu_cfg_replace_string(config, "smbios_firmware",
+ &b_info->u.hvm.smbios_firmware, 0);
+ xlu_cfg_replace_string(config, "acpi_firmware",
+ &b_info->u.hvm.acpi_firmware, 0);
break;
case LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_PV:
{

320
26556-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch
View File

@ -1,320 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
# Date 1360935137 0
# Node ID 6a9549a15108669408123e5e39f52ad09dea1c10
# Parent 17a228e37ec0913ff86b8b5f2d88f1b8e92146f1
libxl: Cleanup, use LOG* and GCSPRINTF macro in libxl_dom.c
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
@@ -32,8 +32,7 @@ libxl_domain_type libxl__domain_type(lib
ret = xc_domain_getinfolist(ctx->xch, domid, 1, &info);
if (ret != 1 || info.domain != domid) {
- LIBXL__LOG(CTX, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR,
- "unable to get domain type for domid=%"PRIu32, domid);
+ LOG(ERROR, "unable to get domain type for domid=%"PRIu32, domid);
return LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_INVALID;
}
if (info.flags & XEN_DOMINF_hvm_guest)
@@ -317,20 +316,19 @@ int libxl__build_post(libxl__gc *gc, uin
ents = libxl__calloc(gc, 12 + (info->max_vcpus * 2) + 2, sizeof(char *));
ents[0] = "memory/static-max";
- ents[1] = libxl__sprintf(gc, "%"PRId64, info->max_memkb);
+ ents[1] = GCSPRINTF("%"PRId64, info->max_memkb);
ents[2] = "memory/target";
- ents[3] = libxl__sprintf(gc, "%"PRId64,
- info->target_memkb - info->video_memkb);
+ ents[3] = GCSPRINTF("%"PRId64, info->target_memkb - info->video_memkb);
ents[4] = "memory/videoram";
- ents[5] = libxl__sprintf(gc, "%"PRId64, info->video_memkb);
+ ents[5] = GCSPRINTF("%"PRId64, info->video_memkb);
ents[6] = "domid";
- ents[7] = libxl__sprintf(gc, "%d", domid);
+ ents[7] = GCSPRINTF("%d", domid);
ents[8] = "store/port";
- ents[9] = libxl__sprintf(gc, "%"PRIu32, state->store_port);
+ ents[9] = GCSPRINTF("%"PRIu32, state->store_port);
ents[10] = "store/ring-ref";
- ents[11] = libxl__sprintf(gc, "%lu", state->store_mfn);
+ ents[11] = GCSPRINTF("%lu", state->store_mfn);
for (i = 0; i < info->max_vcpus; i++) {
- ents[12+(i*2)] = libxl__sprintf(gc, "cpu/%d/availability", i);
+ ents[12+(i*2)] = GCSPRINTF("cpu/%d/availability", i);
ents[12+(i*2)+1] = libxl_bitmap_test(&info->avail_vcpus, i)
? "online" : "offline";
}
@@ -339,7 +337,7 @@ int libxl__build_post(libxl__gc *gc, uin
if (info->type == LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_HVM) {
hvm_ents = libxl__calloc(gc, 3, sizeof(char *));
hvm_ents[0] = "hvmloader/generation-id-address";
- hvm_ents[1] = libxl__sprintf(gc, "0x%lx", state->vm_generationid_addr);
+ hvm_ents[1] = GCSPRINTF("0x%lx", state->vm_generationid_addr);
}
dom_path = libxl__xs_get_dompath(gc, domid);
@@ -347,7 +345,7 @@ int libxl__build_post(libxl__gc *gc, uin
return ERROR_FAIL;
}
- vm_path = xs_read(ctx->xsh, XBT_NULL, libxl__sprintf(gc, "%s/vm", dom_path), NULL);
+ vm_path = xs_read(ctx->xsh, XBT_NULL, GCSPRINTF("%s/vm", dom_path), NULL);
retry_transaction:
t = xs_transaction_start(ctx->xsh);
@@ -378,7 +376,7 @@ int libxl__build_pv(libxl__gc *gc, uint3
dom = xc_dom_allocate(ctx->xch, state->pv_cmdline, info->u.pv.features);
if (!dom) {
- LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_allocate failed");
+ LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_allocate failed");
return ERROR_FAIL;
}
@@ -388,13 +386,13 @@ int libxl__build_pv(libxl__gc *gc, uint3
state->pv_kernel.data,
state->pv_kernel.size);
if ( ret != 0) {
- LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_kernel_mem failed");
+ LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_kernel_mem failed");
goto out;
}
} else {
ret = xc_dom_kernel_file(dom, state->pv_kernel.path);
if ( ret != 0) {
- LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_kernel_file failed");
+ LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_kernel_file failed");
goto out;
}
}
@@ -402,12 +400,12 @@ int libxl__build_pv(libxl__gc *gc, uint3
if ( state->pv_ramdisk.path && strlen(state->pv_ramdisk.path) ) {
if (state->pv_ramdisk.mapped) {
if ( (ret = xc_dom_ramdisk_mem(dom, state->pv_ramdisk.data, state->pv_ramdisk.size)) != 0 ) {
- LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_ramdisk_mem failed");
+ LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_ramdisk_mem failed");
goto out;
}
} else {
if ( (ret = xc_dom_ramdisk_file(dom, state->pv_ramdisk.path)) != 0 ) {
- LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_ramdisk_file failed");
+ LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_ramdisk_file failed");
goto out;
}
}
@@ -420,31 +418,31 @@ int libxl__build_pv(libxl__gc *gc, uint3
dom->xenstore_domid = state->store_domid;
if ( (ret = xc_dom_boot_xen_init(dom, ctx->xch, domid)) != 0 ) {
- LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_boot_xen_init failed");
+ LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_boot_xen_init failed");
goto out;
}
if ( (ret = xc_dom_parse_image(dom)) != 0 ) {
- LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_parse_image failed");
+ LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_parse_image failed");
goto out;
}
if ( (ret = xc_dom_mem_init(dom, info->target_memkb / 1024)) != 0 ) {
- LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_mem_init failed");
+ LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_mem_init failed");
goto out;
}
if ( (ret = xc_dom_boot_mem_init(dom)) != 0 ) {
- LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_boot_mem_init failed");
+ LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_boot_mem_init failed");
goto out;
}
if ( (ret = xc_dom_build_image(dom)) != 0 ) {
- LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_build_image failed");
+ LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_build_image failed");
goto out;
}
if ( (ret = xc_dom_boot_image(dom)) != 0 ) {
- LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_boot_image failed");
+ LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_boot_image failed");
goto out;
}
if ( (ret = xc_dom_gnttab_init(dom)) != 0 ) {
- LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_gnttab_init failed");
+ LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_gnttab_init failed");
goto out;
}
@@ -683,8 +681,7 @@ int libxl__qemu_traditional_cmd(libxl__g
const char *cmd)
{
char *path = NULL;
- path = libxl__sprintf(gc, "/local/domain/0/device-model/%d/command",
- domid);
+ path = GCSPRINTF("/local/domain/0/device-model/%d/command", domid);
return libxl__xs_write(gc, XBT_NULL, path, "%s", cmd);
}
@@ -701,8 +698,7 @@ struct libxl__physmap_info {
static inline char *restore_helper(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
uint64_t phys_offset, char *node)
{
- return libxl__sprintf(gc,
- "/local/domain/0/device-model/%d/physmap/%"PRIx64"/%s",
+ return GCSPRINTF("/local/domain/0/device-model/%d/physmap/%"PRIx64"/%s",
domid, phys_offset, node);
}
@@ -712,7 +708,6 @@ int libxl__toolstack_restore(uint32_t do
libxl__save_helper_state *shs = user;
libxl__domain_create_state *dcs = CONTAINER_OF(shs, *dcs, shs);
STATE_AO_GC(dcs->ao);
- libxl_ctx *ctx = CTX;
int i, ret;
const uint8_t *ptr = buf;
uint32_t count = 0, version = 0;
@@ -722,7 +717,7 @@ int libxl__toolstack_restore(uint32_t do
LOG(DEBUG,"domain=%"PRIu32" toolstack data size=%"PRIu32, domid, size);
if (size < sizeof(version) + sizeof(count)) {
- LIBXL__LOG(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "wrong size");
+ LOG(ERROR, "wrong size");
return -1;
}
@@ -730,7 +725,7 @@ int libxl__toolstack_restore(uint32_t do
ptr += sizeof(version);
if (version != TOOLSTACK_SAVE_VERSION) {
- LIBXL__LOG(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "wrong version");
+ LOG(ERROR, "wrong version");
return -1;
}
@@ -739,7 +734,7 @@ int libxl__toolstack_restore(uint32_t do
if (size < sizeof(version) + sizeof(count) +
count * (sizeof(struct libxl__physmap_info))) {
- LIBXL__LOG(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "wrong size");
+ LOG(ERROR, "wrong size");
return -1;
}
@@ -988,15 +983,13 @@ static void switch_logdirty_done(libxl__
int libxl__domain_suspend_device_model(libxl__gc *gc,
libxl__domain_suspend_state *dss)
{
- libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc);
int ret = 0;
uint32_t const domid = dss->domid;
const char *const filename = dss->dm_savefile;
switch (libxl__device_model_version_running(gc, domid)) {
case LIBXL_DEVICE_MODEL_VERSION_QEMU_XEN_TRADITIONAL: {
- LIBXL__LOG(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_DEBUG,
- "Saving device model state to %s", filename);
+ LOG(DEBUG, "Saving device model state to %s", filename);
libxl__qemu_traditional_cmd(gc, domid, "save");
libxl__wait_for_device_model(gc, domid, "paused", NULL, NULL, NULL);
break;
@@ -1172,8 +1165,7 @@ int libxl__domain_suspend_common_callbac
static inline char *physmap_path(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
char *phys_offset, char *node)
{
- return libxl__sprintf(gc,
- "/local/domain/0/device-model/%d/physmap/%s/%s",
+ return GCSPRINTF("/local/domain/0/device-model/%d/physmap/%s/%s",
domid, phys_offset, node);
}
@@ -1190,7 +1182,7 @@ int libxl__toolstack_save(uint32_t domid
char **entries = NULL;
struct libxl__physmap_info *pi;
- entries = libxl__xs_directory(gc, 0, libxl__sprintf(gc,
+ entries = libxl__xs_directory(gc, 0, GCSPRINTF(
"/local/domain/0/device-model/%d/physmap", domid), &num);
count = num;
@@ -1331,7 +1323,7 @@ void libxl__domain_suspend(libxl__egc *e
char *path;
char *addr;
- path = libxl__sprintf(gc, "%s/hvmloader/generation-id-address",
+ path = GCSPRINTF("%s/hvmloader/generation-id-address",
libxl__xs_get_dompath(gc, domid));
addr = libxl__xs_read(gc, XBT_NULL, path);
@@ -1545,10 +1537,7 @@ static void domain_suspend_done(libxl__e
char *libxl__uuid2string(libxl__gc *gc, const libxl_uuid uuid)
{
- char *s = libxl__sprintf(gc, LIBXL_UUID_FMT, LIBXL_UUID_BYTES(uuid));
- if (!s)
- LIBXL__LOG(libxl__gc_owner(gc), LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "cannot allocate for uuid");
- return s;
+ return GCSPRINTF(LIBXL_UUID_FMT, LIBXL_UUID_BYTES(uuid));
}
static const char *userdata_path(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
@@ -1556,34 +1545,27 @@ static const char *userdata_path(libxl__
const char *wh)
{
libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc);
- char *path, *uuid_string;
+ char *uuid_string;
libxl_dominfo info;
int rc;
rc = libxl_domain_info(ctx, &info, domid);
if (rc) {
- LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "unable to find domain info"
- " for domain %"PRIu32, domid);
+ LOGE(ERROR, "unable to find domain info for domain %"PRIu32, domid);
return NULL;
}
- uuid_string = libxl__sprintf(gc, LIBXL_UUID_FMT, LIBXL_UUID_BYTES(info.uuid));
+ uuid_string = GCSPRINTF(LIBXL_UUID_FMT, LIBXL_UUID_BYTES(info.uuid));
- path = libxl__sprintf(gc, "/var/lib/xen/"
- "userdata-%s.%u.%s.%s",
- wh, domid, uuid_string, userdata_userid);
- if (!path)
- LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "unable to allocate for"
- " userdata path");
- return path;
+ return GCSPRINTF("/var/lib/xen/userdata-%s.%u.%s.%s",
+ wh, domid, uuid_string, userdata_userid);
}
static int userdata_delete(libxl__gc *gc, const char *path)
{
- libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc);
int r;
r = unlink(path);
if (r) {
- LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "remove failed for %s", path);
+ LOGE(ERROR, "remove failed for %s", path);
return errno;
}
return 0;
@@ -1591,7 +1573,6 @@ static int userdata_delete(libxl__gc *gc
void libxl__userdata_destroyall(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid)
{
- libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc);
const char *pattern;
glob_t gl;
int r, i;
@@ -1607,7 +1588,7 @@ void libxl__userdata_destroyall(libxl__g
if (r == GLOB_NOMATCH)
goto out;
if (r)
- LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "glob failed for %s", pattern);
+ LOGE(ERROR, "glob failed for %s", pattern);
for (i=0; i<gl.gl_pathc; i++) {
userdata_delete(gc, gl.gl_pathv[i]);

108
26576-x86-APICV-migration.patch
View File

@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
References: FATE#313605
# HG changeset patch
# User Jiongxi Li <jiongxi.li@intel.com>
# Date 1361176078 -3600
# Node ID 4c3355d776e115f979fd2abc135bb77ba710f0d4
# Parent 217a4fc4cd46e8de06f2f43eed727838891e9398
x86/VMX: fix live migration while enabling APICV
SVI should be restored in case guest is processing virtual interrupt
while saveing a domain state. Otherwise SVI would be missed when
virtual interrupt delivery is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Jiongxi Li <jiongxi.li@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
@@ -1194,6 +1194,9 @@ static int lapic_load_regs(struct domain
if ( hvm_load_entry(LAPIC_REGS, h, s->regs) != 0 )
return -EINVAL;
+ if ( hvm_funcs.process_isr )
+ hvm_funcs.process_isr(vlapic_find_highest_isr(s), v);
+
vlapic_adjust_i8259_target(d);
lapic_rearm(s);
return 0;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c
@@ -290,8 +290,8 @@ void vmx_intr_assist(void)
vmx_set_eoi_exit_bitmap(v, pt_vector);
/* we need update the RVI field */
- status &= ~(unsigned long)0x0FF;
- status |= (unsigned long)0x0FF &
+ status &= ~VMX_GUEST_INTR_STATUS_SUBFIELD_BITMASK;
+ status |= VMX_GUEST_INTR_STATUS_SUBFIELD_BITMASK &
intack.vector;
__vmwrite(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
if (v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exitmap_changed) {
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1523,6 +1523,29 @@ static int vmx_virtual_intr_delivery_ena
return cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery;
}
+static void vmx_process_isr(int isr, struct vcpu *v)
+{
+ unsigned long status;
+ u8 old;
+
+ if ( !cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery )
+ return;
+
+ if ( isr < 0 )
+ isr = 0;
+
+ vmx_vmcs_enter(v);
+ status = __vmread(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
+ old = status >> VMX_GUEST_INTR_STATUS_SVI_OFFSET;
+ if ( isr != old )
+ {
+ status &= VMX_GUEST_INTR_STATUS_SUBFIELD_BITMASK;
+ status |= isr << VMX_GUEST_INTR_STATUS_SVI_OFFSET;
+ __vmwrite(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
+ }
+ vmx_vmcs_exit(v);
+}
+
static struct hvm_function_table __read_mostly vmx_function_table = {
.name = "VMX",
.cpu_up_prepare = vmx_cpu_up_prepare,
@@ -1571,7 +1594,8 @@ static struct hvm_function_table __read_
.nhvm_intr_blocked = nvmx_intr_blocked,
.nhvm_domain_relinquish_resources = nvmx_domain_relinquish_resources,
.update_eoi_exit_bitmap = vmx_update_eoi_exit_bitmap,
- .virtual_intr_delivery_enabled = vmx_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled
+ .virtual_intr_delivery_enabled = vmx_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled,
+ .process_isr = vmx_process_isr,
};
struct hvm_function_table * __init start_vmx(void)
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ struct hvm_function_table {
/* Virtual interrupt delivery */
void (*update_eoi_exit_bitmap)(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector, u8 trig);
int (*virtual_intr_delivery_enabled)(void);
+ void (*process_isr)(int isr, struct vcpu *v);
};
extern struct hvm_function_table hvm_funcs;
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
@@ -246,6 +246,10 @@ extern bool_t cpu_has_vmx_ins_outs_instr
#define VMX_INTR_SHADOW_SMI 0x00000004
#define VMX_INTR_SHADOW_NMI 0x00000008
+/* Guest interrupt status */
+#define VMX_GUEST_INTR_STATUS_SUBFIELD_BITMASK 0x0FF
+#define VMX_GUEST_INTR_STATUS_SVI_OFFSET 8
+
/* VMCS field encodings. */
enum vmcs_field {
VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID = 0x00000000,

248
26577-x86-APICV-x2APIC.patch
View File

@ -1,248 +0,0 @@
References: FATE#313605
# HG changeset patch
# User Jiongxi Li <jiongxi.li@intel.com>
# Date 1361176458 -3600
# Node ID 45d59b822ed187c535b127679e32853b148ed411
# Parent 4c3355d776e115f979fd2abc135bb77ba710f0d4
x86/VMX: fix VMCS setting for x2APIC mode guest while enabling APICV
The "APIC-register virtualization" and "virtual-interrupt deliver"
VM-execution control has no effect on the behavior of RDMSR/WRMSR if
the "virtualize x2APIC mode" VM-execution control is 0.
When guest uses x2APIC mode, we should enable "virtualize x2APIC mode"
for APICV first.
Signed-off-by: Jiongxi Li <jiongxi.li@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
@@ -194,7 +194,8 @@ static int vmx_init_vmcs_config(void)
*/
if ( _vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW )
opt |= SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY;
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY |
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE;
_vmx_secondary_exec_control = adjust_vmx_controls(
@@ -673,19 +674,59 @@ void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struc
*/
if ( msr <= 0x1fff )
{
- if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
- __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-low */
- if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
- __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-low */
+ if ( type & MSR_TYPE_R )
+ clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-low */
+ if ( type & MSR_TYPE_W )
+ clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-low */
}
else if ( (msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff) )
{
msr &= 0x1fff;
- if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
- __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-high */
- if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
- __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-high */
+ if ( type & MSR_TYPE_R )
+ clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-high */
+ if ( type & MSR_TYPE_W )
+ clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-high */
}
+ else
+ HVM_DBG_LOG(DBG_LEVEL_0,
+ "msr %x is out of the control range"
+ "0x00000000-0x00001fff and 0xc0000000-0xc0001fff"
+ "RDMSR or WRMSR will cause a VM exit", msr);
+}
+
+void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 msr, int type)
+{
+ unsigned long *msr_bitmap = v->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_bitmap;
+
+ /* VMX MSR bitmap supported? */
+ if ( msr_bitmap == NULL )
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * See Intel PRM Vol. 3, 20.6.9 (MSR-Bitmap Address). Early manuals
+ * have the write-low and read-high bitmap offsets the wrong way round.
+ * We can control MSRs 0x00000000-0x00001fff and 0xc0000000-0xc0001fff.
+ */
+ if ( msr <= 0x1fff )
+ {
+ if ( type & MSR_TYPE_R )
+ set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-low */
+ if ( type & MSR_TYPE_W )
+ set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-low */
+ }
+ else if ( (msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff) )
+ {
+ msr &= 0x1fff;
+ if ( type & MSR_TYPE_R )
+ set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-high */
+ if ( type & MSR_TYPE_W )
+ set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-high */
+ }
+ else
+ HVM_DBG_LOG(DBG_LEVEL_0,
+ "msr %x is out of the control range"
+ "0x00000000-0x00001fff and 0xc0000000-0xc0001fff"
+ "RDMSR or WRMSR will cause a VM exit", msr);
}
/*
@@ -751,6 +792,10 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v
vmentry_ctl &= ~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_PAT;
}
+ /* Disable Virtualize x2APIC mode by default. */
+ v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control &=
+ ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE;
+
/* Do not enable Monitor Trap Flag unless start single step debug */
v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG;
@@ -787,18 +832,6 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v
vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
if ( cpu_has_vmx_pat && paging_mode_hap(d) )
vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
- if ( cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt )
- {
- int msr;
- for (msr = MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR; msr <= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR + 0xff; msr++)
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, msr, MSR_TYPE_R);
- }
- if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery )
- {
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICTPR_MSR, MSR_TYPE_W);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICEOI_MSR, MSR_TYPE_W);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICSELF_MSR, MSR_TYPE_W);
- }
}
/* I/O access bitmap. */
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -2012,18 +2012,63 @@ static void vmx_install_vlapic_mapping(s
void vmx_vlapic_msr_changed(struct vcpu *v)
{
+ int virtualize_x2apic_mode;
struct vlapic *vlapic = vcpu_vlapic(v);
- if ( !cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses )
+ virtualize_x2apic_mode = ( (cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt ||
+ cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery) &&
+ cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode );
+
+ if ( !cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses &&
+ !virtualize_x2apic_mode )
return;
vmx_vmcs_enter(v);
v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control &=
- ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
+ ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE);
if ( !vlapic_hw_disabled(vlapic) &&
(vlapic_base_address(vlapic) == APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE) )
- v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control |=
- SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
+ {
+ unsigned int msr;
+
+ if ( virtualize_x2apic_mode && vlapic_x2apic_mode(vlapic) )
+ {
+ v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control |=
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE;
+ if ( cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt )
+ {
+ for ( msr = MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR;
+ msr <= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR + 0xff; msr++ )
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, msr, MSR_TYPE_R);
+
+ vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICPPR_MSR,
+ MSR_TYPE_R);
+ vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICTMICT_MSR,
+ MSR_TYPE_R);
+ vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICTMCCT_MSR,
+ MSR_TYPE_R);
+ }
+ if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery )
+ {
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICTPR_MSR,
+ MSR_TYPE_W);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICEOI_MSR,
+ MSR_TYPE_W);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICSELF_MSR,
+ MSR_TYPE_W);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control |=
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
+ for ( msr = MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR;
+ msr <= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR + 0xff; msr++ )
+ vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(v, msr,
+ MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
+ }
+ }
vmx_update_secondary_exec_control(v);
vmx_vmcs_exit(v);
}
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ extern u32 vmx_vmentry_control;
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES 0x00000001
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT 0x00000002
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP 0x00000008
+#define SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE 0x00000010
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID 0x00000020
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING 0x00000040
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST 0x00000080
@@ -239,6 +240,8 @@ extern bool_t cpu_has_vmx_ins_outs_instr
(vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT)
#define cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery \
(vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY)
+#define cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode \
+ (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE)
/* GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO flags. */
#define VMX_INTR_SHADOW_STI 0x00000001
@@ -414,6 +417,7 @@ enum vmcs_field {
#define MSR_TYPE_R 1
#define MSR_TYPE_W 2
void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 msr, int type);
+void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 msr, int type);
int vmx_read_guest_msr(u32 msr, u64 *val);
int vmx_write_guest_msr(u32 msr, u64 val);
int vmx_add_guest_msr(u32 msr);
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
@@ -295,7 +295,10 @@
#define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BASE (0xfffff<<12)
#define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR 0x800
#define MSR_IA32_APICTPR_MSR 0x808
+#define MSR_IA32_APICPPR_MSR 0x80a
#define MSR_IA32_APICEOI_MSR 0x80b
+#define MSR_IA32_APICTMICT_MSR 0x838
+#define MSR_IA32_APICTMCCT_MSR 0x839
#define MSR_IA32_APICSELF_MSR 0x83f
#define MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE 0x00000079

43
26675-tools-xentoollog_update_tty_detection_in_stdiostream_progress.patch
View File

@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
changeset: 26675:3eb62c576a1a
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Wed Feb 27 14:16:36 2013 +0000
files: tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c
description:
tools/xentoollog: update tty detection in stdiostream_progress
As suggested by IanJ:
Check isatty only once to preserve the errno of ->progress users, and to
reduce the noice in strace output.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
diff -r 4b25c1e6cfbb -r 3eb62c576a1a tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c
--- a/tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c Wed Feb 27 11:16:47 2013 +0000
+++ b/tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c Wed Feb 27 14:16:36 2013 +0000
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct xentoollog_logger_stdiostream {
xentoollog_level min_level;
unsigned flags;
int progress_erase_len, progress_last_percent;
+ int tty;
};
static void progress_erase(xentoollog_logger_stdiostream *lg) {
@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ static void stdiostream_progress(struct
lg->progress_last_percent = percent;
- if (isatty(fileno(lg->f)) <= 0) {
+ if (!lg->tty) {
stdiostream_message(logger_in, this_level, context,
"%s: %lu/%lu %3d%%",
doing_what, done, total, percent);
@@ -166,6 +167,7 @@ xentoollog_logger_stdiostream *xtl_creat
newlogger.f = f;
newlogger.min_level = min_level;
newlogger.flags = flags;
+ newlogger.tty = isatty(fileno(newlogger.f)) > 0;
if (newlogger.flags & XTL_STDIOSTREAM_SHOW_DATE) tzset();

144
26891-x86-S3-Fix-cpu-pool-scheduling-after-suspend-resume.patch
View File

@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
# Commit 9aa356bc9f7533c3cb7f02c823f532532876d444
# Date 2013-04-19 12:29:01 +0200
# Author Ben Guthro <benjamin.guthro@citrix.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
x86/S3: Fix cpu pool scheduling after suspend/resume
This review is another S3 scheduler problem with the system_state
variable introduced with the following changeset:
http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commit;h=269f543ea750ed567d18f2e819e5d5ce58eda5c5
Specifically, the cpu_callback function that takes the CPU down during
suspend, and back up during resume. We were seeing situations where,
after S3, only CPU0 was in cpupool0. Guest performance suffered
greatly, since all vcpus were only on a single pcpu. Guests under high
CPU load showed the problem much more quickly than an idle guest.
Removing this if condition forces the CPUs to go through the expected
online/offline state, and be properly scheduled after S3.
This also includes a necessary partial change proposed earlier by
Tomasz Wroblewski here:
http://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2013-01/msg02206.html
It should also resolve the issues discussed in this thread:
http://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2012-11/msg01801.html
Signed-off-by: Ben Guthro <benjamin.guthro@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Juergen Gross <juergen.gross@ts.fujitsu.com>
--- a/xen/common/cpupool.c
+++ b/xen/common/cpupool.c
@@ -41,16 +41,28 @@ static struct cpupool *alloc_cpupool_str
{
struct cpupool *c = xzalloc(struct cpupool);
- if ( c && zalloc_cpumask_var(&c->cpu_valid) )
- return c;
- xfree(c);
- return NULL;
+ if ( !c || !zalloc_cpumask_var(&c->cpu_valid) )
+ {
+ xfree(c);
+ c = NULL;
+ }
+ else if ( !zalloc_cpumask_var(&c->cpu_suspended) )
+ {
+ free_cpumask_var(c->cpu_valid);
+ xfree(c);
+ c = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return c;
}
static void free_cpupool_struct(struct cpupool *c)
{
if ( c )
+ {
+ free_cpumask_var(c->cpu_suspended);
free_cpumask_var(c->cpu_valid);
+ }
xfree(c);
}
@@ -417,14 +429,32 @@ void cpupool_rm_domain(struct domain *d)
/*
* called to add a new cpu to pool admin
- * we add a hotplugged cpu to the cpupool0 to be able to add it to dom0
+ * we add a hotplugged cpu to the cpupool0 to be able to add it to dom0,
+ * unless we are resuming from S3, in which case we put the cpu back
+ * in the cpupool it was in prior to suspend.
*/
static void cpupool_cpu_add(unsigned int cpu)
{
spin_lock(&cpupool_lock);
cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, &cpupool_locked_cpus);
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, &cpupool_free_cpus);
- cpupool_assign_cpu_locked(cpupool0, cpu);
+
+ if ( system_state == SYS_STATE_resume )
+ {
+ struct cpupool **c;
+
+ for_each_cpupool(c)
+ {
+ if ( cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, (*c)->cpu_suspended ) )
+ {
+ cpupool_assign_cpu_locked(*c, cpu);
+ cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, (*c)->cpu_suspended);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ( cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, &cpupool_free_cpus) )
+ cpupool_assign_cpu_locked(cpupool0, cpu);
spin_unlock(&cpupool_lock);
}
@@ -436,7 +466,7 @@ static void cpupool_cpu_add(unsigned int
static int cpupool_cpu_remove(unsigned int cpu)
{
int ret = 0;
-
+
spin_lock(&cpupool_lock);
if ( !cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, cpupool0->cpu_valid))
ret = -EBUSY;
@@ -633,9 +663,14 @@ static int cpu_callback(
unsigned int cpu = (unsigned long)hcpu;
int rc = 0;
- if ( (system_state == SYS_STATE_suspend) ||
- (system_state == SYS_STATE_resume) )
- goto out;
+ if ( system_state == SYS_STATE_suspend )
+ {
+ struct cpupool **c;
+
+ for_each_cpupool(c)
+ if ( cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, (*c)->cpu_valid ) )
+ cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, (*c)->cpu_suspended);
+ }
switch ( action )
{
@@ -650,7 +685,6 @@ static int cpu_callback(
break;
}
-out:
return !rc ? NOTIFY_DONE : notifier_from_errno(rc);
}
--- a/xen/include/xen/sched-if.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched-if.h
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ struct cpupool
{
int cpupool_id;
cpumask_var_t cpu_valid; /* all cpus assigned to pool */
+ cpumask_var_t cpu_suspended; /* cpus in S3 that should be in this pool */
struct cpupool *next;
unsigned int n_dom;
struct scheduler *sched;

142
26902-x86-EFI-pass-boot-services-variable-info-to-runtime-code.patch
View File

@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
References: FATE#314499, FATE#314509
# Commit 9be8a4447103d92843fcfeaad8be42408c90e9a9
# Date 2013-04-22 13:58:01 +0200
# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
x86/EFI: pass boot services variable info to runtime code
EFI variables can be flagged as being accessible only within boot services.
This makes it awkward for us to figure out how much space they use at
runtime. In theory we could figure this out by simply comparing the results
from QueryVariableInfo() to the space used by all of our variables, but
that fails if the platform doesn't garbage collect on every boot. Thankfully,
calling QueryVariableInfo() while still inside boot services gives a more
reliable answer. This patch passes that information from the EFI boot stub
up to the efi platform code.
Based on a similarly named Linux patch by Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c
@@ -1128,6 +1128,23 @@ efi_start(EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle, EFI_SY
if (efi.smbios != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR)
dmi_efi_get_table((void *)(long)efi.smbios);
+ /* Get snapshot of variable store parameters. */
+ status = efi_rs->QueryVariableInfo(EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE |
+ EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
+ &efi_boot_max_var_store_size,
+ &efi_boot_remain_var_store_size,
+ &efi_boot_max_var_size);
+ if ( EFI_ERROR(status) )
+ {
+ efi_boot_max_var_store_size = 0;
+ efi_boot_remain_var_store_size = 0;
+ efi_boot_max_var_size = status;
+ PrintStr(L"Warning: Could not query variable store: ");
+ DisplayUint(status, 0);
+ PrintStr(newline);
+ }
+
/* Allocate space for trampoline (in first Mb). */
cfg.addr = 0x100000;
cfg.size = trampoline_end - trampoline_start;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/efi/efi.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/efi/efi.h
@@ -22,5 +22,8 @@ extern void *efi_memmap;
extern l4_pgentry_t *efi_l4_pgtable;
+extern UINT64 efi_boot_max_var_store_size, efi_boot_remain_var_store_size,
+ efi_boot_max_var_size;
+
unsigned long efi_rs_enter(void);
void efi_rs_leave(unsigned long);
--- a/xen/arch/x86/efi/runtime.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/efi/runtime.c
@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@ UINTN __read_mostly efi_memmap_size;
UINTN __read_mostly efi_mdesc_size;
void *__read_mostly efi_memmap;
+UINT64 __read_mostly efi_boot_max_var_store_size;
+UINT64 __read_mostly efi_boot_remain_var_store_size;
+UINT64 __read_mostly efi_boot_max_var_size;
+
struct efi __read_mostly efi = {
.acpi = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
.acpi20 = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
@@ -446,6 +450,35 @@ int efi_runtime_call(struct xenpf_efi_ru
break;
case XEN_EFI_query_variable_info:
+ if ( op->misc & ~XEN_EFI_VARINFO_BOOT_SNAPSHOT )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ( op->misc & XEN_EFI_VARINFO_BOOT_SNAPSHOT )
+ {
+ if ( (op->u.query_variable_info.attr
+ & ~EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) !=
+ (EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE |
+ EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ op->u.query_variable_info.max_store_size =
+ efi_boot_max_var_store_size;
+ op->u.query_variable_info.remain_store_size =
+ efi_boot_remain_var_store_size;
+ if ( efi_boot_max_var_store_size )
+ {
+ op->u.query_variable_info.max_size = efi_boot_max_var_size;
+ status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ op->u.query_variable_info.max_size = 0;
+ status = efi_boot_max_var_size;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
cr3 = efi_rs_enter();
if ( (efi_rs->Hdr.Revision >> 16) < 2 )
{
@@ -462,6 +495,9 @@ int efi_runtime_call(struct xenpf_efi_ru
case XEN_EFI_query_capsule_capabilities:
case XEN_EFI_update_capsule:
+ if ( op->misc )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
cr3 = efi_rs_enter();
if ( (efi_rs->Hdr.Revision >> 16) < 2 )
{
--- a/xen/include/efi/efiapi.h
+++ b/xen/include/efi/efiapi.h
@@ -213,6 +213,10 @@ VOID
#define EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE 0x00000001
#define EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS 0x00000002
#define EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS 0x00000004
+#define EFI_VARIABLE_HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD 0x00000008
+#define EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS 0x00000010
+#define EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS 0x00000020
+#define EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE 0x00000040
// Variable size limitation
#define EFI_MAXIMUM_VARIABLE_SIZE 1024
--- a/xen/include/public/platform.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/platform.h
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ struct xenpf_efi_runtime_call {
struct xenpf_efi_guid vendor_guid;
} get_next_variable_name;
+#define XEN_EFI_VARINFO_BOOT_SNAPSHOT 0x00000001
struct {
uint32_t attr;
uint64_t max_store_size;

23
26930-x86-EFI-fix-runtime-call-status-for-compat-mode-Dom0.patch
View File

@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
# Commit a7ac9597a7fc6ca934957eb78b41e26638281953
# Date 2013-04-29 11:27:54 +0200
# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
x86/EFI: fix runtime call status for compat mode Dom0
The top two bits (indicating error/warning classification) need to
remain the top two bits.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/efi/runtime.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/efi/runtime.c
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ int efi_runtime_call(struct xenpf_efi_ru
#ifndef COMPAT
op->status = status;
#else
- op->status = (status & 0x3fffffff) | (status >> 62);
+ op->status = (status & 0x3fffffff) | ((status >> 32) & 0xc0000000);
#endif
return rc;

13
32on64-extra-mem.patch
View File

@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
@@ -2985,7 +2985,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
self.guest_bitsize = self.image.getBitSize()
# Make sure there's enough RAM available for the domain
- balloon.free(memory + shadow + vtd_mem, self)
+ balloon.free(memory + shadow + vtd_mem + 512, self)
# Set up the shadow memory
shadow_cur = xc.shadow_mem_control(self.domid, shadow / 1024)

262
CVE-2013-1918-xsa45-1-vcpu-destroy-pagetables-preemptible.patch
View File

@ -1,262 +0,0 @@
x86: make vcpu_destroy_pagetables() preemptible
... as it may take significant amounts of time.
The function, being moved to mm.c as the better home for it anyway, and
to avoid having to make a new helper function there non-static, is
given a "preemptible" parameter temporarily (until, in a subsequent
patch, its other caller is also being made capable of dealing with
preemption).
This is part of CVE-2013-1918 / XSA-45.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -73,8 +73,6 @@ void (*dead_idle) (void) __read_mostly =
static void paravirt_ctxt_switch_from(struct vcpu *v);
static void paravirt_ctxt_switch_to(struct vcpu *v);
-static void vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu *v);
-
static void default_idle(void)
{
local_irq_disable();
@@ -1058,7 +1056,7 @@ void arch_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *v)
if ( !is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
{
destroy_gdt(v);
- vcpu_destroy_pagetables(v);
+ vcpu_destroy_pagetables(v, 0);
}
else
{
@@ -2069,63 +2067,6 @@ static int relinquish_memory(
return ret;
}
-static void vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu *v)
-{
- struct domain *d = v->domain;
- unsigned long pfn;
-
-#ifdef __x86_64__
- if ( is_pv_32on64_vcpu(v) )
- {
- pfn = l4e_get_pfn(*(l4_pgentry_t *)
- __va(pagetable_get_paddr(v->arch.guest_table)));
-
- if ( pfn != 0 )
- {
- if ( paging_mode_refcounts(d) )
- put_page(mfn_to_page(pfn));
- else
- put_page_and_type(mfn_to_page(pfn));
- }
-
- l4e_write(
- (l4_pgentry_t *)__va(pagetable_get_paddr(v->arch.guest_table)),
- l4e_empty());
-
- v->arch.cr3 = 0;
- return;
- }
-#endif
-
- pfn = pagetable_get_pfn(v->arch.guest_table);
- if ( pfn != 0 )
- {
- if ( paging_mode_refcounts(d) )
- put_page(mfn_to_page(pfn));
- else
- put_page_and_type(mfn_to_page(pfn));
- v->arch.guest_table = pagetable_null();
- }
-
-#ifdef __x86_64__
- /* Drop ref to guest_table_user (from MMUEXT_NEW_USER_BASEPTR) */
- pfn = pagetable_get_pfn(v->arch.guest_table_user);
- if ( pfn != 0 )
- {
- if ( !is_pv_32bit_vcpu(v) )
- {
- if ( paging_mode_refcounts(d) )
- put_page(mfn_to_page(pfn));
- else
- put_page_and_type(mfn_to_page(pfn));
- }
- v->arch.guest_table_user = pagetable_null();
- }
-#endif
-
- v->arch.cr3 = 0;
-}
-
int domain_relinquish_resources(struct domain *d)
{
int ret;
@@ -2143,7 +2084,11 @@ int domain_relinquish_resources(struct d
/* Drop the in-use references to page-table bases. */
for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
- vcpu_destroy_pagetables(v);
+ {
+ ret = vcpu_destroy_pagetables(v, 1);
+ if ( ret )
+ return ret;
+ }
if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
{
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -2825,6 +2825,82 @@ static void put_superpage(unsigned long
#endif
+static int put_old_guest_table(struct vcpu *v)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if ( !v->arch.old_guest_table )
+ return 0;
+
+ switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(v->arch.old_guest_table, 1) )
+ {
+ case -EINTR:
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+
+ v->arch.old_guest_table = NULL;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu *v, bool_t preemptible)
+{
+ unsigned long mfn = pagetable_get_pfn(v->arch.guest_table);
+ struct page_info *page;
+ int rc = put_old_guest_table(v);
+
+ if ( rc )
+ return rc;
+
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+ if ( is_pv_32on64_vcpu(v) )
+ mfn = l4e_get_pfn(*(l4_pgentry_t *)mfn_to_virt(mfn));
+#endif
+
+ if ( mfn )
+ {
+ page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
+ if ( paging_mode_refcounts(v->domain) )
+ put_page(page);
+ else
+ rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, preemptible);
+ }
+
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+ if ( is_pv_32on64_vcpu(v) )
+ {
+ if ( !rc )
+ l4e_write(
+ (l4_pgentry_t *)__va(pagetable_get_paddr(v->arch.guest_table)),
+ l4e_empty());
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ if ( !rc )
+ {
+ v->arch.guest_table = pagetable_null();
+
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+ /* Drop ref to guest_table_user (from MMUEXT_NEW_USER_BASEPTR) */
+ mfn = pagetable_get_pfn(v->arch.guest_table_user);
+ if ( mfn )
+ {
+ page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
+ if ( paging_mode_refcounts(v->domain) )
+ put_page(page);
+ else
+ rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, preemptible);
+ }
+ if ( !rc )
+ v->arch.guest_table_user = pagetable_null();
+#endif
+ }
+
+ v->arch.cr3 = 0;
+
+ return rc;
+}
int new_guest_cr3(unsigned long mfn)
{
@@ -3011,12 +3087,21 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
unsigned int foreigndom)
{
struct mmuext_op op;
- int rc = 0, i = 0, okay;
unsigned long type;
- unsigned int done = 0;
+ unsigned int i = 0, done = 0;
struct vcpu *curr = current;
struct domain *d = curr->domain;
struct domain *pg_owner;
+ int okay, rc = put_old_guest_table(curr);
+
+ if ( unlikely(rc) )
+ {
+ if ( likely(rc == -EAGAIN) )
+ rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
+ __HYPERVISOR_mmuext_op, "hihi", uops, count, pdone,
+ foreigndom);
+ return rc;
+ }
if ( unlikely(count & MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED) )
{
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/mm.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/mm.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/mm.c
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ int compat_mmuext_op(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(mm
: mcs->call.args[1];
unsigned int left = arg1 & ~MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED;
- BUG_ON(left == arg1);
+ BUG_ON(left == arg1 && left != i);
BUG_ON(left > count);
guest_handle_add_offset(nat_ops, i - left);
guest_handle_subtract_offset(cmp_uops, left);
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
@@ -464,6 +464,7 @@ struct arch_vcpu
pagetable_t guest_table_user; /* (MFN) x86/64 user-space pagetable */
#endif
pagetable_t guest_table; /* (MFN) guest notion of cr3 */
+ struct page_info *old_guest_table; /* partially destructed pagetable */
/* guest_table holds a ref to the page, and also a type-count unless
* shadow refcounts are in use */
pagetable_t shadow_table[4]; /* (MFN) shadow(s) of guest */
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ void audit_domains(void);
int new_guest_cr3(unsigned long pfn);
void make_cr3(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long mfn);
void update_cr3(struct vcpu *v);
+int vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu *, bool_t preemptible);
void propagate_page_fault(unsigned long addr, u16 error_code);
void *do_page_walk(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr);

173
CVE-2013-1918-xsa45-2-new-guest-cr3-preemptible.patch
View File

@ -1,173 +0,0 @@
x86: make new_guest_cr3() preemptible
... as it may take significant amounts of time.
This is part of CVE-2013-1918 / XSA-45.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -2906,44 +2906,69 @@ int new_guest_cr3(unsigned long mfn)
{
struct vcpu *curr = current;
struct domain *d = curr->domain;
- int okay;
+ int rc;
unsigned long old_base_mfn;
#ifdef __x86_64__
if ( is_pv_32on64_domain(d) )
{
- okay = paging_mode_refcounts(d)
- ? 0 /* Old code was broken, but what should it be? */
- : mod_l4_entry(
+ rc = paging_mode_refcounts(d)
+ ? -EINVAL /* Old code was broken, but what should it be? */
+ : mod_l4_entry(
__va(pagetable_get_paddr(curr->arch.guest_table)),
l4e_from_pfn(
mfn,
(_PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_RW|_PAGE_USER|_PAGE_ACCESSED)),
- pagetable_get_pfn(curr->arch.guest_table), 0, 0, curr) == 0;
- if ( unlikely(!okay) )
+ pagetable_get_pfn(curr->arch.guest_table), 0, 1, curr);
+ switch ( rc )
{
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case -EINTR:
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ default:
MEM_LOG("Error while installing new compat baseptr %lx", mfn);
- return 0;
+ return rc;
}
invalidate_shadow_ldt(curr, 0);
write_ptbase(curr);
- return 1;
+ return 0;
}
#endif
- okay = paging_mode_refcounts(d)
- ? get_page_from_pagenr(mfn, d)
- : !get_page_and_type_from_pagenr(mfn, PGT_root_page_table, d, 0, 0);
- if ( unlikely(!okay) )
+ rc = put_old_guest_table(curr);
+ if ( unlikely(rc) )
+ return rc;
+
+ old_base_mfn = pagetable_get_pfn(curr->arch.guest_table);
+ /*
+ * This is particularly important when getting restarted after the
+ * previous attempt got preempted in the put-old-MFN phase.
+ */
+ if ( old_base_mfn == mfn )
{
- MEM_LOG("Error while installing new baseptr %lx", mfn);
+ write_ptbase(curr);
return 0;
}
- invalidate_shadow_ldt(curr, 0);
+ rc = paging_mode_refcounts(d)
+ ? (get_page_from_pagenr(mfn, d) ? 0 : -EINVAL)
+ : get_page_and_type_from_pagenr(mfn, PGT_root_page_table, d, 0, 1);
+ switch ( rc )
+ {
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case -EINTR:
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ default:
+ MEM_LOG("Error while installing new baseptr %lx", mfn);
+ return rc;
+ }
- old_base_mfn = pagetable_get_pfn(curr->arch.guest_table);
+ invalidate_shadow_ldt(curr, 0);
curr->arch.guest_table = pagetable_from_pfn(mfn);
update_cr3(curr);
@@ -2952,13 +2977,25 @@ int new_guest_cr3(unsigned long mfn)
if ( likely(old_base_mfn != 0) )
{
+ struct page_info *page = mfn_to_page(old_base_mfn);
+
if ( paging_mode_refcounts(d) )
- put_page(mfn_to_page(old_base_mfn));
+ put_page(page);
else
- put_page_and_type(mfn_to_page(old_base_mfn));
+ switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, 1) )
+ {
+ case -EINTR:
+ rc = -EAGAIN;
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG_ON(rc);
+ break;
+ }
}
- return 1;
+ return rc;
}
static struct domain *get_pg_owner(domid_t domid)
@@ -3256,8 +3293,13 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
}
case MMUEXT_NEW_BASEPTR:
- okay = (!paging_mode_translate(d)
- && new_guest_cr3(op.arg1.mfn));
+ if ( paging_mode_translate(d) )
+ okay = 0;
+ else
+ {
+ rc = new_guest_cr3(op.arg1.mfn);
+ okay = !rc;
+ }
break;
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -2407,12 +2407,23 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct
#endif
}
page = get_page_from_gfn(v->domain, gfn, NULL, P2M_ALLOC);
- rc = page ? new_guest_cr3(page_to_mfn(page)) : 0;
if ( page )
+ {
+ rc = new_guest_cr3(page_to_mfn(page));
put_page(page);
+ }
+ else
+ rc = -EINVAL;
domain_unlock(v->domain);
- if ( rc == 0 ) /* not okay */
+ switch ( rc )
+ {
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case -EAGAIN: /* retry after preemption */
+ goto skip;
+ default: /* not okay */
goto fail;
+ }
break;
}

76
CVE-2013-1918-xsa45-3-new-user-base-preemptible.patch
View File

@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
x86: make MMUEXT_NEW_USER_BASEPTR preemptible
... as it may take significant amounts of time.
This is part of CVE-2013-1918 / XSA-45.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -3313,29 +3313,56 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
break;
}
+ old_mfn = pagetable_get_pfn(curr->arch.guest_table_user);
+ /*
+ * This is particularly important when getting restarted after the
+ * previous attempt got preempted in the put-old-MFN phase.
+ */
+ if ( old_mfn == op.arg1.mfn )
+ break;
+
if ( op.arg1.mfn != 0 )
{
if ( paging_mode_refcounts(d) )
okay = get_page_from_pagenr(op.arg1.mfn, d);
else
- okay = !get_page_and_type_from_pagenr(
- op.arg1.mfn, PGT_root_page_table, d, 0, 0);
+ {
+ rc = get_page_and_type_from_pagenr(
+ op.arg1.mfn, PGT_root_page_table, d, 0, 1);
+ okay = !rc;
+ }
if ( unlikely(!okay) )
{
- MEM_LOG("Error while installing new mfn %lx", op.arg1.mfn);
+ if ( rc == -EINTR )
+ rc = -EAGAIN;
+ else if ( rc != -EAGAIN )
+ MEM_LOG("Error while installing new mfn %lx",
+ op.arg1.mfn);
break;
}
}
- old_mfn = pagetable_get_pfn(curr->arch.guest_table_user);
curr->arch.guest_table_user = pagetable_from_pfn(op.arg1.mfn);
if ( old_mfn != 0 )
{
+ struct page_info *page = mfn_to_page(old_mfn);
+
if ( paging_mode_refcounts(d) )
- put_page(mfn_to_page(old_mfn));
+ put_page(page);
else
- put_page_and_type(mfn_to_page(old_mfn));
+ switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, 1) )
+ {
+ case -EINTR:
+ rc = -EAGAIN;
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
+ okay = 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG_ON(rc);
+ break;
+ }
}
break;

218
CVE-2013-1918-xsa45-4-vcpu-reset-preemptible.patch
View File

@ -1,218 +0,0 @@
x86: make vcpu_reset() preemptible
... as dropping the old page tables may take significant amounts of
time.
This is part of CVE-2013-1918 / XSA-45.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -1051,17 +1051,16 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
#undef c
}
-void arch_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *v)
+int arch_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *v)
{
if ( !is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
{
destroy_gdt(v);
- vcpu_destroy_pagetables(v, 0);
- }
- else
- {
- vcpu_end_shutdown_deferral(v);
+ return vcpu_destroy_pagetables(v);
}
+
+ vcpu_end_shutdown_deferral(v);
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -2085,7 +2084,7 @@ int domain_relinquish_resources(struct d
/* Drop the in-use references to page-table bases. */
for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
{
- ret = vcpu_destroy_pagetables(v, 1);
+ ret = vcpu_destroy_pagetables(v);
if ( ret )
return ret;
}
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -3577,8 +3577,11 @@ static void hvm_s3_suspend(struct domain
for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
{
+ int rc;
+
vlapic_reset(vcpu_vlapic(v));
- vcpu_reset(v);
+ rc = vcpu_reset(v);
+ ASSERT(!rc);
}
vpic_reset(d);
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
@@ -255,10 +255,13 @@ static void vlapic_init_sipi_action(unsi
{
case APIC_DM_INIT: {
bool_t fpu_initialised;
+ int rc;
+
domain_lock(target->domain);
/* Reset necessary VCPU state. This does not include FPU state. */
fpu_initialised = target->fpu_initialised;
- vcpu_reset(target);
+ rc = vcpu_reset(target);
+ ASSERT(!rc);
target->fpu_initialised = fpu_initialised;
vlapic_reset(vcpu_vlapic(target));
domain_unlock(target->domain);
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -2844,7 +2844,7 @@ static int put_old_guest_table(struct vc
return rc;
}
-int vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu *v, bool_t preemptible)
+int vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu *v)
{
unsigned long mfn = pagetable_get_pfn(v->arch.guest_table);
struct page_info *page;
@@ -2864,7 +2864,7 @@ int vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu
if ( paging_mode_refcounts(v->domain) )
put_page(page);
else
- rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, preemptible);
+ rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, 1);
}
#ifdef __x86_64__
@@ -2890,7 +2890,7 @@ int vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu
if ( paging_mode_refcounts(v->domain) )
put_page(page);
else
- rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, preemptible);
+ rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, 1);
}
if ( !rc )
v->arch.guest_table_user = pagetable_null();
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/common/domain.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/common/domain.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/common/domain.c
@@ -779,14 +779,18 @@ void domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(
domain_unpause(d);
}
-void vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *v)
+int vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *v)
{
struct domain *d = v->domain;
+ int rc;
vcpu_pause(v);
domain_lock(d);
- arch_vcpu_reset(v);
+ set_bit(_VPF_in_reset, &v->pause_flags);
+ rc = arch_vcpu_reset(v);
+ if ( rc )
+ goto out_unlock;
set_bit(_VPF_down, &v->pause_flags);
@@ -802,9 +806,13 @@ void vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *v)
#endif
cpumask_clear(v->cpu_affinity_tmp);
clear_bit(_VPF_blocked, &v->pause_flags);
+ clear_bit(_VPF_in_reset, &v->pause_flags);
+ out_unlock:
domain_unlock(v->domain);
vcpu_unpause(v);
+
+ return rc;
}
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/common/domctl.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/common/domctl.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/common/domctl.c
@@ -307,8 +307,10 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_domc
if ( guest_handle_is_null(op->u.vcpucontext.ctxt) )
{
- vcpu_reset(v);
- ret = 0;
+ ret = vcpu_reset(v);
+ if ( ret == -EAGAIN )
+ ret = hypercall_create_continuation(
+ __HYPERVISOR_domctl, "h", u_domctl);
goto svc_out;
}
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ void audit_domains(void);
int new_guest_cr3(unsigned long pfn);
void make_cr3(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long mfn);
void update_cr3(struct vcpu *v);
-int vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu *, bool_t preemptible);
+int vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu *);
void propagate_page_fault(unsigned long addr, u16 error_code);
void *do_page_walk(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr);
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/domain.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/domain.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/domain.h
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ typedef union {
struct vcpu *alloc_vcpu(
struct domain *d, unsigned int vcpu_id, unsigned int cpu_id);
struct vcpu *alloc_dom0_vcpu0(void);
-void vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *v);
+int vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *);
struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo;
void getdomaininfo(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info);
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ void arch_dump_vcpu_info(struct vcpu *v)
void arch_dump_domain_info(struct domain *d);
-void arch_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *v);
+int arch_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *);
extern spinlock_t vcpu_alloc_lock;
bool_t domctl_lock_acquire(void);
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/sched.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/sched.h
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/include/xen/sched.h
@@ -644,6 +644,9 @@ static inline struct domain *next_domain
/* VCPU is blocked due to missing mem_sharing ring. */
#define _VPF_mem_sharing 6
#define VPF_mem_sharing (1UL<<_VPF_mem_sharing)
+ /* VCPU is being reset. */
+#define _VPF_in_reset 7
+#define VPF_in_reset (1UL<<_VPF_in_reset)
static inline int vcpu_runnable(struct vcpu *v)
{

212
CVE-2013-1918-xsa45-5-set-info-guest-preemptible.patch
View File

@ -1,212 +0,0 @@
x86: make arch_set_info_guest() preemptible
.. as the root page table validation (and the dropping of an eventual
old one) can require meaningful amounts of time.
This is part of CVE-2013-1918 / XSA-45.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -858,6 +858,9 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
if ( !v->is_initialised )
{
+ if ( !compat && !(flags & VGCF_in_kernel) && !c.nat->ctrlreg[1] )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
v->arch.pv_vcpu.ldt_base = c(ldt_base);
v->arch.pv_vcpu.ldt_ents = c(ldt_ents);
}
@@ -955,24 +958,44 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
if ( rc != 0 )
return rc;
+ set_bit(_VPF_in_reset, &v->pause_flags);
+
if ( !compat )
- {
cr3_gfn = xen_cr3_to_pfn(c.nat->ctrlreg[3]);
- cr3_page = get_page_from_gfn(d, cr3_gfn, NULL, P2M_ALLOC);
-
- if ( !cr3_page )
- {
- destroy_gdt(v);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- if ( !paging_mode_refcounts(d)
- && !get_page_type(cr3_page, PGT_base_page_table) )
- {
- put_page(cr3_page);
- destroy_gdt(v);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ else
+ cr3_gfn = compat_cr3_to_pfn(c.cmp->ctrlreg[3]);
+#endif
+ cr3_page = get_page_from_gfn(d, cr3_gfn, NULL, P2M_ALLOC);
+ if ( !cr3_page )
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ else if ( paging_mode_refcounts(d) )
+ /* nothing */;
+ else if ( cr3_page == v->arch.old_guest_table )
+ {
+ v->arch.old_guest_table = NULL;
+ put_page(cr3_page);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * Since v->arch.guest_table{,_user} are both NULL, this effectively
+ * is just a call to put_old_guest_table().
+ */
+ if ( !compat )
+ rc = vcpu_destroy_pagetables(v);
+ if ( !rc )
+ rc = get_page_type_preemptible(cr3_page,
+ !compat ? PGT_root_page_table
+ : PGT_l3_page_table);
+ if ( rc == -EINTR )
+ rc = -EAGAIN;
+ }
+ if ( rc )
+ /* handled below */;
+ else if ( !compat )
+ {
v->arch.guest_table = pagetable_from_page(cr3_page);
#ifdef __x86_64__
if ( c.nat->ctrlreg[1] )
@@ -980,56 +1003,44 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
cr3_gfn = xen_cr3_to_pfn(c.nat->ctrlreg[1]);
cr3_page = get_page_from_gfn(d, cr3_gfn, NULL, P2M_ALLOC);
- if ( !cr3_page ||
- (!paging_mode_refcounts(d)
- && !get_page_type(cr3_page, PGT_base_page_table)) )
+ if ( !cr3_page )
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ else if ( !paging_mode_refcounts(d) )
{
- if (cr3_page)
- put_page(cr3_page);
- cr3_page = pagetable_get_page(v->arch.guest_table);
- v->arch.guest_table = pagetable_null();
- if ( paging_mode_refcounts(d) )
- put_page(cr3_page);
- else
- put_page_and_type(cr3_page);
- destroy_gdt(v);
- return -EINVAL;
+ rc = get_page_type_preemptible(cr3_page, PGT_root_page_table);
+ switch ( rc )
+ {
+ case -EINTR:
+ rc = -EAGAIN;
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ v->arch.old_guest_table =
+ pagetable_get_page(v->arch.guest_table);
+ v->arch.guest_table = pagetable_null();
+ break;
+ }
}
-
- v->arch.guest_table_user = pagetable_from_page(cr3_page);
- }
- else if ( !(flags & VGCF_in_kernel) )
- {
- destroy_gdt(v);
- return -EINVAL;
+ if ( !rc )
+ v->arch.guest_table_user = pagetable_from_page(cr3_page);
}
}
else
{
l4_pgentry_t *l4tab;
- cr3_gfn = compat_cr3_to_pfn(c.cmp->ctrlreg[3]);
- cr3_page = get_page_from_gfn(d, cr3_gfn, NULL, P2M_ALLOC);
-
- if ( !cr3_page)
- {
- destroy_gdt(v);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- if (!paging_mode_refcounts(d)
- && !get_page_type(cr3_page, PGT_l3_page_table) )
- {
- put_page(cr3_page);
- destroy_gdt(v);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
l4tab = __va(pagetable_get_paddr(v->arch.guest_table));
*l4tab = l4e_from_pfn(page_to_mfn(cr3_page),
_PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_RW|_PAGE_USER|_PAGE_ACCESSED);
#endif
}
+ if ( rc )
+ {
+ if ( cr3_page )
+ put_page(cr3_page);
+ destroy_gdt(v);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ clear_bit(_VPF_in_reset, &v->pause_flags);
if ( v->vcpu_id == 0 )
update_domain_wallclock_time(d);
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/common/compat/domain.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/common/compat/domain.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/common/compat/domain.c
@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ int compat_vcpu_op(int cmd, int vcpuid,
rc = v->is_initialised ? -EEXIST : arch_set_info_guest(v, cmp_ctxt);
domain_unlock(d);
+ if ( rc == -EAGAIN )
+ rc = hypercall_create_continuation(__HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op, "iih",
+ cmd, vcpuid, arg);
+
xfree(cmp_ctxt);
break;
}
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/common/domain.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/common/domain.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/common/domain.c
@@ -849,6 +849,11 @@ long do_vcpu_op(int cmd, int vcpuid, XEN
domain_unlock(d);
free_vcpu_guest_context(ctxt);
+
+ if ( rc == -EAGAIN )
+ rc = hypercall_create_continuation(__HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op, "iih",
+ cmd, vcpuid, arg);
+
break;
case VCPUOP_up: {
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/common/domctl.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/common/domctl.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/common/domctl.c
@@ -339,6 +339,10 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_domc
domain_pause(d);
ret = arch_set_info_guest(v, c);
domain_unpause(d);
+
+ if ( ret == -EAGAIN )
+ ret = hypercall_create_continuation(
+ __HYPERVISOR_domctl, "h", u_domctl);
}
svc_out:

131
CVE-2013-1918-xsa45-6-unpin-preemptible.patch
View File

@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
x86: make page table unpinning preemptible
... as it may take significant amounts of time.
Since we can't re-invoke the operation in a second attempt, the
continuation logic must be slightly tweaked so that we make sure
do_mmuext_op() gets run one more time even when the preempted unpin
operation was the last one in a batch.
This is part of CVE-2013-1918 / XSA-45.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -3140,6 +3140,14 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
return rc;
}
+ if ( unlikely(count == MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED) &&
+ likely(guest_handle_is_null(uops)) )
+ {
+ /* See the curr->arch.old_guest_table related
+ * hypercall_create_continuation() below. */
+ return (int)foreigndom;
+ }
+
if ( unlikely(count & MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED) )
{
count &= ~MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED;
@@ -3163,7 +3171,7 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
{
- if ( hypercall_preempt_check() )
+ if ( curr->arch.old_guest_table || hypercall_preempt_check() )
{
rc = -EAGAIN;
break;
@@ -3283,7 +3291,17 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
break;
}
- put_page_and_type(page);
+ switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, 1) )
+ {
+ case -EINTR:
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
+ rc = 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG_ON(rc);
+ break;
+ }
put_page(page);
/* A page is dirtied when its pin status is cleared. */
@@ -3604,9 +3622,27 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
}
if ( rc == -EAGAIN )
+ {
+ ASSERT(i < count);
rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
__HYPERVISOR_mmuext_op, "hihi",
uops, (count - i) | MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED, pdone, foreigndom);
+ }
+ else if ( curr->arch.old_guest_table )
+ {
+ XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(void) null;
+
+ ASSERT(rc || i == count);
+ set_xen_guest_handle(null, NULL);
+ /*
+ * In order to have a way to communicate the final return value to
+ * our continuation, we pass this in place of "foreigndom", building
+ * on the fact that this argument isn't needed anymore.
+ */
+ rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
+ __HYPERVISOR_mmuext_op, "hihi", null,
+ MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED, null, rc);
+ }
put_pg_owner(pg_owner);
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/mm.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/mm.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/mm.c
@@ -268,6 +268,13 @@ int compat_mmuext_op(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(mm
int rc = 0;
XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(mmuext_op_t) nat_ops;
+ if ( unlikely(count == MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED) &&
+ likely(guest_handle_is_null(cmp_uops)) )
+ {
+ set_xen_guest_handle(nat_ops, NULL);
+ return do_mmuext_op(nat_ops, count, pdone, foreigndom);
+ }
+
preempt_mask = count & MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED;
count ^= preempt_mask;
@@ -370,12 +377,18 @@ int compat_mmuext_op(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(mm
guest_handle_add_offset(nat_ops, i - left);
guest_handle_subtract_offset(cmp_uops, left);
left = 1;
- BUG_ON(!hypercall_xlat_continuation(&left, 0x01, nat_ops, cmp_uops));
- BUG_ON(left != arg1);
- if (!test_bit(_MCSF_in_multicall, &mcs->flags))
- regs->_ecx += count - i;
+ if ( arg1 != MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED )
+ {
+ BUG_ON(!hypercall_xlat_continuation(&left, 0x01, nat_ops,
+ cmp_uops));
+ if ( !test_bit(_MCSF_in_multicall, &mcs->flags) )
+ regs->_ecx += count - i;
+ else
+ mcs->compat_call.args[1] += count - i;
+ }
else
- mcs->compat_call.args[1] += count - i;
+ BUG_ON(hypercall_xlat_continuation(&left, 0));
+ BUG_ON(left != arg1);
}
else
BUG_ON(err > 0);

257
CVE-2013-1918-xsa45-7-mm-error-paths-preemptible.patch
View File

@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
x86: make page table handling error paths preemptible
... as they may take significant amounts of time.
This requires cloning the tweaked continuation logic from
do_mmuext_op() to do_mmu_update().
Note that in mod_l[34]_entry() a negative "preemptible" value gets
passed to put_page_from_l[34]e() now, telling the callee to store the
respective page in current->arch.old_guest_table (for a hypercall
continuation to pick up), rather than carrying out the put right away.
This is going to be made a little more explicit by a subsequent cleanup
patch.
This is part of CVE-2013-1918 / XSA-45.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -1258,7 +1258,16 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_
#endif
if ( unlikely(partial > 0) )
+ {
+ ASSERT(preemptible >= 0);
return __put_page_type(l3e_get_page(l3e), preemptible);
+ }
+
+ if ( preemptible < 0 )
+ {
+ current->arch.old_guest_table = l3e_get_page(l3e);
+ return 0;
+ }
return put_page_and_type_preemptible(l3e_get_page(l3e), preemptible);
}
@@ -1271,7 +1280,17 @@ static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_
(l4e_get_pfn(l4e) != pfn) )
{
if ( unlikely(partial > 0) )
+ {
+ ASSERT(preemptible >= 0);
return __put_page_type(l4e_get_page(l4e), preemptible);
+ }
+
+ if ( preemptible < 0 )
+ {
+ current->arch.old_guest_table = l4e_get_page(l4e);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
return put_page_and_type_preemptible(l4e_get_page(l4e), preemptible);
}
return 1;
@@ -1566,12 +1585,17 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_in
if ( rc < 0 && rc != -EAGAIN && rc != -EINTR )
{
MEM_LOG("Failure in alloc_l3_table: entry %d", i);
+ if ( i )
+ {
+ page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
+ page->partial_pte = 0;
+ current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
+ }
while ( i-- > 0 )
{
if ( !is_guest_l3_slot(i) )
continue;
unadjust_guest_l3e(pl3e[i], d);
- put_page_from_l3e(pl3e[i], pfn, 0, 0);
}
}
@@ -1601,22 +1625,24 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_in
page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
page->partial_pte = partial ?: 1;
}
- else if ( rc == -EINTR )
+ else if ( rc < 0 )
{
+ if ( rc != -EINTR )
+ MEM_LOG("Failure in alloc_l4_table: entry %d", i);
if ( i )
{
page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
page->partial_pte = 0;
- rc = -EAGAIN;
+ if ( rc == -EINTR )
+ rc = -EAGAIN;
+ else
+ {
+ if ( current->arch.old_guest_table )
+ page->nr_validated_ptes++;
+ current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
+ }
}
}
- else if ( rc < 0 )
- {
- MEM_LOG("Failure in alloc_l4_table: entry %d", i);
- while ( i-- > 0 )
- if ( is_guest_l4_slot(d, i) )
- put_page_from_l4e(pl4e[i], pfn, 0, 0);
- }
if ( rc < 0 )
return rc;
@@ -2064,7 +2090,7 @@ static int mod_l3_entry(l3_pgentry_t *pl
pae_flush_pgd(pfn, pgentry_ptr_to_slot(pl3e), nl3e);
}
- put_page_from_l3e(ol3e, pfn, 0, 0);
+ put_page_from_l3e(ol3e, pfn, 0, -preemptible);
return rc;
}
@@ -2127,7 +2153,7 @@ static int mod_l4_entry(l4_pgentry_t *pl
return -EFAULT;
}
- put_page_from_l4e(ol4e, pfn, 0, 0);
+ put_page_from_l4e(ol4e, pfn, 0, -preemptible);
return rc;
}
@@ -2285,7 +2311,15 @@ static int alloc_page_type(struct page_i
PRtype_info ": caf=%08lx taf=%" PRtype_info,
page_to_mfn(page), get_gpfn_from_mfn(page_to_mfn(page)),
type, page->count_info, page->u.inuse.type_info);
- page->u.inuse.type_info = 0;
+ if ( page != current->arch.old_guest_table )
+ page->u.inuse.type_info = 0;
+ else
+ {
+ ASSERT((page->u.inuse.type_info &
+ (PGT_count_mask | PGT_validated)) == 1);
+ get_page_light(page);
+ page->u.inuse.type_info |= PGT_partial;
+ }
}
else
{
@@ -3235,21 +3269,17 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
}
if ( (rc = xsm_memory_pin_page(d, pg_owner, page)) != 0 )
- {
- put_page_and_type(page);
okay = 0;
- break;
- }
-
- if ( unlikely(test_and_set_bit(_PGT_pinned,
- &page->u.inuse.type_info)) )
+ else if ( unlikely(test_and_set_bit(_PGT_pinned,
+ &page->u.inuse.type_info)) )
{
MEM_LOG("Mfn %lx already pinned", page_to_mfn(page));
- put_page_and_type(page);
okay = 0;
- break;
}
+ if ( unlikely(!okay) )
+ goto pin_drop;
+
/* A page is dirtied when its pin status is set. */
paging_mark_dirty(pg_owner, page_to_mfn(page));
@@ -3263,7 +3293,13 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
&page->u.inuse.type_info));
spin_unlock(&pg_owner->page_alloc_lock);
if ( drop_ref )
- put_page_and_type(page);
+ {
+ pin_drop:
+ if ( type == PGT_l1_page_table )
+ put_page_and_type(page);
+ else
+ curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
+ }
}
break;
@@ -3669,11 +3705,28 @@ long do_mmu_update(
void *va;
unsigned long gpfn, gmfn, mfn;
struct page_info *page;
- int rc = 0, i = 0;
- unsigned int cmd, done = 0, pt_dom;
- struct vcpu *v = current;
+ unsigned int cmd, i = 0, done = 0, pt_dom;
+ struct vcpu *curr = current, *v = curr;
struct domain *d = v->domain, *pt_owner = d, *pg_owner;
struct domain_mmap_cache mapcache;
+ int rc = put_old_guest_table(curr);
+
+ if ( unlikely(rc) )
+ {
+ if ( likely(rc == -EAGAIN) )
+ rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
+ __HYPERVISOR_mmu_update, "hihi", ureqs, count, pdone,
+ foreigndom);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if ( unlikely(count == MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED) &&
+ likely(guest_handle_is_null(ureqs)) )
+ {
+ /* See the curr->arch.old_guest_table related
+ * hypercall_create_continuation() below. */
+ return (int)foreigndom;
+ }
if ( unlikely(count & MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED) )
{
@@ -3722,7 +3775,7 @@ long do_mmu_update(
for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
{
- if ( hypercall_preempt_check() )
+ if ( curr->arch.old_guest_table || hypercall_preempt_check() )
{
rc = -EAGAIN;
break;
@@ -3903,9 +3956,27 @@ long do_mmu_update(
}
if ( rc == -EAGAIN )
+ {
+ ASSERT(i < count);
rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
__HYPERVISOR_mmu_update, "hihi",
ureqs, (count - i) | MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED, pdone, foreigndom);
+ }
+ else if ( curr->arch.old_guest_table )
+ {
+ XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(void) null;
+
+ ASSERT(rc || i == count);
+ set_xen_guest_handle(null, NULL);
+ /*
+ * In order to have a way to communicate the final return value to
+ * our continuation, we pass this in place of "foreigndom", building
+ * on the fact that this argument isn't needed anymore.
+ */
+ rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
+ __HYPERVISOR_mmu_update, "hihi", null,
+ MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED, null, rc);
+ }
put_pg_owner(pg_owner);

406
CVE-2013-1918-xsa45-followup.patch
View File

@ -1,406 +0,0 @@
x86: cleanup after making various page table manipulation operations preemptible
This drops the "preemptible" parameters from various functions where
now they can't (or shouldn't, validated by assertions) be run in non-
preemptible mode anymore, to prove that manipulations of at least L3
and L4 page tables and page table entries are now always preemptible,
i.e. the earlier patches actually fulfill their purpose of fixing the
resulting security issue.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -1986,7 +1986,7 @@ static int relinquish_memory(
}
if ( test_and_clear_bit(_PGT_pinned, &page->u.inuse.type_info) )
- ret = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, 1);
+ ret = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page);
switch ( ret )
{
case 0:
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -1044,7 +1044,7 @@ get_page_from_l2e(
define_get_linear_pagetable(l3);
static int
get_page_from_l3e(
- l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn, struct domain *d, int partial, int preemptible)
+ l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn, struct domain *d, int partial)
{
int rc;
@@ -1058,7 +1058,7 @@ get_page_from_l3e(
}
rc = get_page_and_type_from_pagenr(
- l3e_get_pfn(l3e), PGT_l2_page_table, d, partial, preemptible);
+ l3e_get_pfn(l3e), PGT_l2_page_table, d, partial, 1);
if ( unlikely(rc == -EINVAL) && get_l3_linear_pagetable(l3e, pfn, d) )
rc = 0;
@@ -1069,7 +1069,7 @@ get_page_from_l3e(
define_get_linear_pagetable(l4);
static int
get_page_from_l4e(
- l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn, struct domain *d, int partial, int preemptible)
+ l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn, struct domain *d, int partial)
{
int rc;
@@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@ get_page_from_l4e(
}
rc = get_page_and_type_from_pagenr(
- l4e_get_pfn(l4e), PGT_l3_page_table, d, partial, preemptible);
+ l4e_get_pfn(l4e), PGT_l3_page_table, d, partial, 1);
if ( unlikely(rc == -EINVAL) && get_l4_linear_pagetable(l4e, pfn, d) )
rc = 0;
@@ -1237,8 +1237,10 @@ static int put_page_from_l2e(l2_pgentry_
static int __put_page_type(struct page_info *, int preemptible);
static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
- int partial, int preemptible)
+ int partial, bool_t defer)
{
+ struct page_info *pg;
+
if ( !(l3e_get_flags(l3e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) || (l3e_get_pfn(l3e) == pfn) )
return 1;
@@ -1257,41 +1259,45 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_
}
#endif
+ pg = l3e_get_page(l3e);
+
if ( unlikely(partial > 0) )
{
- ASSERT(preemptible >= 0);
- return __put_page_type(l3e_get_page(l3e), preemptible);
+ ASSERT(!defer);
+ return __put_page_type(pg, 1);
}
- if ( preemptible < 0 )
+ if ( defer )
{
- current->arch.old_guest_table = l3e_get_page(l3e);
+ current->arch.old_guest_table = pg;
return 0;
}
- return put_page_and_type_preemptible(l3e_get_page(l3e), preemptible);
+ return put_page_and_type_preemptible(pg);
}
#if CONFIG_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn,
- int partial, int preemptible)
+ int partial, bool_t defer)
{
if ( (l4e_get_flags(l4e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) &&
(l4e_get_pfn(l4e) != pfn) )
{
+ struct page_info *pg = l4e_get_page(l4e);
+
if ( unlikely(partial > 0) )
{
- ASSERT(preemptible >= 0);
- return __put_page_type(l4e_get_page(l4e), preemptible);
+ ASSERT(!defer);
+ return __put_page_type(pg, 1);
}
- if ( preemptible < 0 )
+ if ( defer )
{
- current->arch.old_guest_table = l4e_get_page(l4e);
+ current->arch.old_guest_table = pg;
return 0;
}
- return put_page_and_type_preemptible(l4e_get_page(l4e), preemptible);
+ return put_page_and_type_preemptible(pg);
}
return 1;
}
@@ -1509,7 +1515,7 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_in
return rc > 0 ? 0 : rc;
}
-static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page, int preemptible)
+static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
{
struct domain *d = page_get_owner(page);
unsigned long pfn = page_to_mfn(page);
@@ -1556,11 +1562,10 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_in
rc = get_page_and_type_from_pagenr(l3e_get_pfn(pl3e[i]),
PGT_l2_page_table |
PGT_pae_xen_l2,
- d, partial, preemptible);
+ d, partial, 1);
}
else if ( !is_guest_l3_slot(i) ||
- (rc = get_page_from_l3e(pl3e[i], pfn, d,
- partial, preemptible)) > 0 )
+ (rc = get_page_from_l3e(pl3e[i], pfn, d, partial)) > 0 )
continue;
if ( rc == -EAGAIN )
@@ -1604,7 +1609,7 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_in
}
#if CONFIG_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
-static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_info *page, int preemptible)
+static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
{
struct domain *d = page_get_owner(page);
unsigned long pfn = page_to_mfn(page);
@@ -1616,8 +1621,7 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_in
i++, partial = 0 )
{
if ( !is_guest_l4_slot(d, i) ||
- (rc = get_page_from_l4e(pl4e[i], pfn, d,
- partial, preemptible)) > 0 )
+ (rc = get_page_from_l4e(pl4e[i], pfn, d, partial)) > 0 )
continue;
if ( rc == -EAGAIN )
@@ -1662,7 +1666,7 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_in
return rc > 0 ? 0 : rc;
}
#else
-#define alloc_l4_table(page, preemptible) (-EINVAL)
+#define alloc_l4_table(page) (-EINVAL)
#endif
@@ -1714,7 +1718,7 @@ static int free_l2_table(struct page_inf
return err;
}
-static int free_l3_table(struct page_info *page, int preemptible)
+static int free_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
{
struct domain *d = page_get_owner(page);
unsigned long pfn = page_to_mfn(page);
@@ -1727,7 +1731,7 @@ static int free_l3_table(struct page_inf
do {
if ( is_guest_l3_slot(i) )
{
- rc = put_page_from_l3e(pl3e[i], pfn, partial, preemptible);
+ rc = put_page_from_l3e(pl3e[i], pfn, partial, 0);
if ( rc < 0 )
break;
partial = 0;
@@ -1754,7 +1758,7 @@ static int free_l3_table(struct page_inf
}
#if CONFIG_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
-static int free_l4_table(struct page_info *page, int preemptible)
+static int free_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
{
struct domain *d = page_get_owner(page);
unsigned long pfn = page_to_mfn(page);
@@ -1764,7 +1768,7 @@ static int free_l4_table(struct page_inf
do {
if ( is_guest_l4_slot(d, i) )
- rc = put_page_from_l4e(pl4e[i], pfn, partial, preemptible);
+ rc = put_page_from_l4e(pl4e[i], pfn, partial, 0);
if ( rc < 0 )
break;
partial = 0;
@@ -1784,7 +1788,7 @@ static int free_l4_table(struct page_inf
return rc > 0 ? 0 : rc;
}
#else
-#define free_l4_table(page, preemptible) (-EINVAL)
+#define free_l4_table(page) (-EINVAL)
#endif
int page_lock(struct page_info *page)
@@ -2023,7 +2027,6 @@ static int mod_l3_entry(l3_pgentry_t *pl
l3_pgentry_t nl3e,
unsigned long pfn,
int preserve_ad,
- int preemptible,
struct vcpu *vcpu)
{
l3_pgentry_t ol3e;
@@ -2063,7 +2066,7 @@ static int mod_l3_entry(l3_pgentry_t *pl
return rc ? 0 : -EFAULT;
}
- rc = get_page_from_l3e(nl3e, pfn, d, 0, preemptible);
+ rc = get_page_from_l3e(nl3e, pfn, d, 0);
if ( unlikely(rc < 0) )
return rc;
rc = 0;
@@ -2090,7 +2093,7 @@ static int mod_l3_entry(l3_pgentry_t *pl
pae_flush_pgd(pfn, pgentry_ptr_to_slot(pl3e), nl3e);
}
- put_page_from_l3e(ol3e, pfn, 0, -preemptible);
+ put_page_from_l3e(ol3e, pfn, 0, 1);
return rc;
}
@@ -2101,7 +2104,6 @@ static int mod_l4_entry(l4_pgentry_t *pl
l4_pgentry_t nl4e,
unsigned long pfn,
int preserve_ad,
- int preemptible,
struct vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct domain *d = vcpu->domain;
@@ -2134,7 +2136,7 @@ static int mod_l4_entry(l4_pgentry_t *pl
return rc ? 0 : -EFAULT;
}
- rc = get_page_from_l4e(nl4e, pfn, d, 0, preemptible);
+ rc = get_page_from_l4e(nl4e, pfn, d, 0);
if ( unlikely(rc < 0) )
return rc;
rc = 0;
@@ -2153,7 +2155,7 @@ static int mod_l4_entry(l4_pgentry_t *pl
return -EFAULT;
}
- put_page_from_l4e(ol4e, pfn, 0, -preemptible);
+ put_page_from_l4e(ol4e, pfn, 0, 1);
return rc;
}
@@ -2275,10 +2277,12 @@ static int alloc_page_type(struct page_i
rc = alloc_l2_table(page, type, preemptible);
break;
case PGT_l3_page_table:
- rc = alloc_l3_table(page, preemptible);
+ ASSERT(preemptible);
+ rc = alloc_l3_table(page);
break;
case PGT_l4_page_table:
- rc = alloc_l4_table(page, preemptible);
+ ASSERT(preemptible);
+ rc = alloc_l4_table(page);
break;
case PGT_seg_desc_page:
rc = alloc_segdesc_page(page);
@@ -2372,10 +2376,12 @@ int free_page_type(struct page_info *pag
if ( !(type & PGT_partial) )
page->nr_validated_ptes = L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES;
#endif
- rc = free_l3_table(page, preemptible);
+ ASSERT(preemptible);
+ rc = free_l3_table(page);
break;
case PGT_l4_page_table:
- rc = free_l4_table(page, preemptible);
+ ASSERT(preemptible);
+ rc = free_l4_table(page);
break;
default:
MEM_LOG("type %lx pfn %lx\n", type, page_to_mfn(page));
@@ -2866,7 +2872,7 @@ static int put_old_guest_table(struct vc
if ( !v->arch.old_guest_table )
return 0;
- switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(v->arch.old_guest_table, 1) )
+ switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(v->arch.old_guest_table) )
{
case -EINTR:
case -EAGAIN:
@@ -2898,7 +2904,7 @@ int vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu
if ( paging_mode_refcounts(v->domain) )
put_page(page);
else
- rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, 1);
+ rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page);
}
#ifdef __x86_64__
@@ -2924,7 +2930,7 @@ int vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu
if ( paging_mode_refcounts(v->domain) )
put_page(page);
else
- rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, 1);
+ rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page);
}
if ( !rc )
v->arch.guest_table_user = pagetable_null();
@@ -2953,7 +2959,7 @@ int new_guest_cr3(unsigned long mfn)
l4e_from_pfn(
mfn,
(_PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_RW|_PAGE_USER|_PAGE_ACCESSED)),
- pagetable_get_pfn(curr->arch.guest_table), 0, 1, curr);
+ pagetable_get_pfn(curr->arch.guest_table), 0, curr);
switch ( rc )
{
case 0:
@@ -3016,7 +3022,7 @@ int new_guest_cr3(unsigned long mfn)
if ( paging_mode_refcounts(d) )
put_page(page);
else
- switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, 1) )
+ switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page) )
{
case -EINTR:
rc = -EAGAIN;
@@ -3327,7 +3333,7 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
break;
}
- switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, 1) )
+ switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page) )
{
case -EINTR:
case -EAGAIN:
@@ -3405,7 +3411,7 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
if ( paging_mode_refcounts(d) )
put_page(page);
else
- switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page, 1) )
+ switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page) )
{
case -EINTR:
rc = -EAGAIN;
@@ -3882,12 +3888,12 @@ long do_mmu_update(
break;
case PGT_l3_page_table:
rc = mod_l3_entry(va, l3e_from_intpte(req.val), mfn,
- cmd == MMU_PT_UPDATE_PRESERVE_AD, 1, v);
+ cmd == MMU_PT_UPDATE_PRESERVE_AD, v);
break;
#if CONFIG_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
case PGT_l4_page_table:
rc = mod_l4_entry(va, l4e_from_intpte(req.val), mfn,
- cmd == MMU_PT_UPDATE_PRESERVE_AD, 1, v);
+ cmd == MMU_PT_UPDATE_PRESERVE_AD, v);
break;
#endif
case PGT_writable_page:
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
@@ -384,15 +384,10 @@ static inline void put_page_and_type(str
put_page(page);
}
-static inline int put_page_and_type_preemptible(struct page_info *page,
- int preemptible)
+static inline int put_page_and_type_preemptible(struct page_info *page)
{
- int rc = 0;
+ int rc = put_page_type_preemptible(page);
- if ( preemptible )
- rc = put_page_type_preemptible(page);
- else
- put_page_type(page);
if ( likely(rc == 0) )
put_page(page);
return rc;

112
CVE-2013-1922-xsa48.patch
View File

@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
References: bnc#81???? CVE-2013-1922 XSA-48
Add -f FMT / --format FMT arg to qemu-nbd
From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
Currently the qemu-nbd program will auto-detect the format of
any disk it is given. This behaviour is known to be insecure.
For example, if qemu-nbd initially exposes a 'raw' file to an
unprivileged app, and that app runs
'qemu-img create -f qcow2 -o backing_file=/etc/shadow /dev/nbd0'
then the next time the app is started, the qemu-nbd will now
detect it as a 'qcow2' file and expose /etc/shadow to the
unprivileged app.
The only way to avoid this is to explicitly tell qemu-nbd what
disk format to use on the command line, completely disabling
auto-detection. This patch adds a '-f' / '--format' arg for
this purpose, mirroring what is already available via qemu-img
and qemu commands.
qemu-nbd --format raw -p 9000 evil.img
will now always use raw, regardless of what format 'evil.img'
looks like it contains
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
[Use errx, not err. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
[ This is a security issue, CVE-2013-1922 / XSA-48. ]
--- a/tools/qemu-xen-dir-remote/qemu-nbd.c
+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-dir-remote/qemu-nbd.c
@@ -247,6 +247,7 @@ out:
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
BlockDriverState *bs;
+ BlockDriver *drv;
off_t dev_offset = 0;
off_t offset = 0;
uint32_t nbdflags = 0;
@@ -256,7 +257,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
struct sockaddr_in addr;
socklen_t addr_len = sizeof(addr);
off_t fd_size;
- const char *sopt = "hVb:o:p:rsnP:c:dvk:e:t";
+ const char *sopt = "hVb:o:p:rsnP:c:dvk:e:f:t";
struct option lopt[] = {
{ "help", 0, NULL, 'h' },
{ "version", 0, NULL, 'V' },
@@ -271,6 +272,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
{ "snapshot", 0, NULL, 's' },
{ "nocache", 0, NULL, 'n' },
{ "shared", 1, NULL, 'e' },
+ { "format", 1, NULL, 'f' },
{ "persistent", 0, NULL, 't' },
{ "verbose", 0, NULL, 'v' },
{ NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
@@ -292,6 +294,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
int max_fd;
int persistent = 0;
pthread_t client_thread;
+ const char *fmt = NULL;
/* The client thread uses SIGTERM to interrupt the server. A signal
* handler ensures that "qemu-nbd -v -c" exits with a nice status code.
@@ -368,6 +371,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "Shared device number must be greater than 0\n");
}
break;
+ case 'f':
+ fmt = optarg;
+ break;
case 't':
persistent = 1;
break;
@@ -478,9 +484,19 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
bdrv_init();
atexit(bdrv_close_all);
+ if (fmt) {
+ drv = bdrv_find_format(fmt);
+ if (!drv) {
+ errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "Unknown file format '%s'", fmt);
+ }
+ } else {
+ drv = NULL;
+ }
+
bs = bdrv_new("hda");
srcpath = argv[optind];
- if ((ret = bdrv_open(bs, srcpath, flags, NULL)) < 0) {
+ ret = bdrv_open(bs, srcpath, flags, drv);
+ if (ret < 0) {
errno = -ret;
err(EXIT_FAILURE, "Failed to bdrv_open '%s'", argv[optind]);
}
--- a/tools/qemu-xen-dir-remote/qemu-nbd.texi
+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-dir-remote/qemu-nbd.texi
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ Export Qemu disk image using NBD protoco
disconnect the specified device
@item -e, --shared=@var{num}
device can be shared by @var{num} clients (default @samp{1})
+@item -f, --format=@var{fmt}
+ force block driver for format @var{fmt} instead of auto-detecting
@item -t, --persistent
don't exit on the last connection
@item -v, --verbose

57
CVE-2013-1952-xsa49.patch
View File

@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
References: bnc#8161663 CVE-2013-1952 XSA-49
VT-d: don't permit SVT_NO_VERIFY entries for known device types
Only in cases where we don't know what to do we should leave the IRTE
blank (suppressing all validation), but we should always log a warning
in those cases (as being insecure).
This is CVE-2013-1952 / XSA-49.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
@@ -440,12 +440,9 @@ static void set_msi_source_id(struct pci
{
unsigned int sq;
+ case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT:
case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE:
case DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE:
- case DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE:
- break;
-
- case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT:
switch ( pdev->phantom_stride )
{
case 1: sq = SQ_13_IGNORE_3; break;
@@ -457,6 +454,8 @@ static void set_msi_source_id(struct pci
break;
case DEV_TYPE_PCI:
+ case DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE:
+ case DEV_TYPE_PCI2PCIe_BRIDGE:
ret = find_upstream_bridge(seg, &bus, &devfn, &secbus);
if ( ret == 0 ) /* integrated PCI device */
{
@@ -468,10 +467,15 @@ static void set_msi_source_id(struct pci
if ( pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn) == DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE )
set_ire_sid(ire, SVT_VERIFY_BUS, SQ_ALL_16,
(bus << 8) | pdev->bus);
- else if ( pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn) == DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE )
+ else
set_ire_sid(ire, SVT_VERIFY_SID_SQ, SQ_ALL_16,
PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn));
}
+ else
+ dprintk(XENLOG_WARNING VTDPREFIX,
+ "d%d: no upstream bridge for %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
+ pdev->domain->domain_id,
+ seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
break;
default:

157
VNC-Support-for-ExtendedKeyEvent-client-message.patch
View File

@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
From 9ca313aa0824f2d350a7a6c9b1ef6c47e0408f1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: aliguori <aliguori@c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162>
Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2008 23:27:37 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] VNC: Support for ExtendedKeyEvent client message
This patch adds support for the ExtendedKeyEvent client message. This message
allows a client to send raw scan codes directly to the server. If the client
and server are using the same keymap, then it's unnecessary to use the '-k'
option with QEMU when this extension is supported.
This is extension is currently only implemented by gtk-vnc based clients
(gvncviewer, virt-manager, vinagre, etc.).
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@5076 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
---
vnc.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
@@ -1285,35 +1285,22 @@ static void press_key_altgr_down(VncStat
}
}
-static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, int down, uint32_t sym)
+static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, int down, int keycode, int sym, int shift)
{
- int keycode;
int shift_keys = 0;
- int shift = 0;
int keypad = 0;
int altgr = 0;
int altgr_keys = 0;
if (is_graphic_console()) {
- if (sym >= 'A' && sym <= 'Z') {
- sym = sym - 'A' + 'a';
- shift = 1;
- }
- else {
+ if (!shift)
shift = keysym_is_shift(vs->kbd_layout, sym & 0xFFFF);
- }
altgr = keysym_is_altgr(vs->kbd_layout, sym & 0xFFFF);
}
shift_keys = vs->modifiers_state[0x2a] | vs->modifiers_state[0x36];
altgr_keys = vs->modifiers_state[0xb8];
- keycode = keysym2scancode(vs->kbd_layout, sym & 0xFFFF);
- if (keycode == 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Key lost : keysym=0x%x(%d)\n", sym, sym);
- return;
- }
-
/* QEMU console switch */
switch(keycode) {
case 0x2a: /* Left Shift */
@@ -1445,7 +1432,25 @@ static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, i
static void key_event(VncState *vs, int down, uint32_t sym)
{
- do_key_event(vs, down, sym);
+ int keycode;
+ int shift = 0;
+
+ if (sym >= 'A' && sym <= 'Z' && is_graphic_console()) {
+ sym = sym - 'A' + 'a';
+ shift = 1;
+ }
+ keycode = keysym2scancode(vs->kbd_layout, sym & 0xFFFF);
+ do_key_event(vs, down, keycode, sym, shift);
+}
+
+static void ext_key_event(VncState *vs, int down,
+ uint32_t sym, uint16_t keycode)
+{
+ /* if the user specifies a keyboard layout, always use it */
+ if (keyboard_layout)
+ key_event(vs, down, sym);
+ else
+ do_key_event(vs, down, keycode, sym, 0);
}
static void framebuffer_set_updated(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
@@ -1534,6 +1539,15 @@ static void framebuffer_update_request(V
qemu_mod_timer(vs->timer, qemu_get_clock(rt_clock));
}
+static void send_ext_key_event_ack(VncState *vs)
+{
+ vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
+ vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
+ vnc_write_u16(vs, 1);
+ vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, 0, 0, ds_get_width(vs->ds), ds_get_height(vs->ds), -258);
+ vnc_flush(vs);
+}
+
static void set_encodings(VncState *vs, int32_t *encodings, size_t n_encodings)
{
int i;
@@ -1562,6 +1576,9 @@ static void set_encodings(VncState *vs,
case -257:
vs->has_pointer_type_change = 1;
break;
+ case -258:
+ send_ext_key_event_ack(vs);
+ break;
case 0x574D5669:
vs->has_WMVi = 1;
default:
@@ -1774,6 +1791,24 @@ static int protocol_client_msg(VncState
client_cut_text(vs, read_u32(data, 4), (char *)(data + 8));
break;
+ case 255:
+ if (len == 1)
+ return 2;
+
+ switch (read_u8(data, 1)) {
+ case 0:
+ if (len == 2)
+ return 12;
+
+ ext_key_event(vs, read_u16(data, 2),
+ read_u32(data, 4), read_u32(data, 8));
+ break;
+ default:
+ printf("Msg: %d\n", read_u16(data, 0));
+ vnc_client_error(vs);
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
default:
printf("Msg: %d\n", data[0]);
vnc_client_error(vs);
@@ -2445,10 +2480,11 @@ void vnc_display_init(DisplayState *ds)
vs->ds = ds;
- if (!keyboard_layout)
- keyboard_layout = "en-us";
+ if (keyboard_layout)
+ vs->kbd_layout = init_keyboard_layout(keyboard_layout);
+ else
+ vs->kbd_layout = init_keyboard_layout("en-us");
- vs->kbd_layout = init_keyboard_layout(keyboard_layout);
if (!vs->kbd_layout)
exit(1);
vs->modifiers_state[0x45] = 1; /* NumLock on - on boot */

45
altgr_2.patch
View File

@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
When access domU from Windows VNC client, spanish keyboard altgr key
doesn't work. According to log info, we found that the keycodes passed
from vncclient to qemu vncserver have something wrong. When altgr and "2"
pressed, keycodes vncserver receives are:
ALT_R down,
CTRL_L down,
CTRL_L up,
ATL_R up,
"2" down,
"2" up,
...
Since when send "2" down, there is no altgr modifier, the char displayed
on screen will be "2" but not "@".
To solve this problem, there is another patch applied by upstream which
sends an additional altgr modifier before "2" down in the above case.
It works well when domU is windows, but on sles10 sp3 domU, sometimes it
display "@" and sometimes it still displays "2", especially when press
altgr+2 continuously.
For the sles10 sp3 domU problem, maybe because there are two many alt_r (same
keycode as altgr on "es") up and down events and the domU OS couldn't handle
it well.
To furtherly solve this problem, I write this patch, when vncserver
is "es" and receives a alt_r keysym (this is already abnormal since "es" has
no alt_r), then treat the alt_r as alt_l. This can avoid too many altgr
keycodes up and down events and make sure the intentionally added altgr keycode can take effect.
Signed-off by Chunyan Liu (cyliu@novell.com)
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
@@ -1440,6 +1440,9 @@ static void key_event(VncState *vs, int
int keycode;
int shift = 0;
+ if ( sym == 0xffea && keyboard_layout && !strcmp(keyboard_layout,"es") )
+ sym = 0xffe9;
+
if (sym >= 'A' && sym <= 'Z' && is_graphic_console()) {
sym = sym - 'A' + 'a';
shift = 1;

32
bdrv_default_rwflag.patch
View File

@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
Subject: modify default read/write flag in bdrv_init.
Signed-off by Chunyan Liu <cyliu@novell.com>
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vl.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vl.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vl.c
@@ -2627,6 +2627,8 @@ int drive_init(struct drive_opt *arg, in
strncpy(drives_table[nb_drives].serial, serial, sizeof(serial));
nb_drives++;
+ bdrv_flags = BDRV_O_RDWR;
+
switch(type) {
case IF_IDE:
case IF_XEN:
@@ -2640,6 +2642,7 @@ int drive_init(struct drive_opt *arg, in
break;
case MEDIA_CDROM:
bdrv_set_type_hint(bdrv, BDRV_TYPE_CDROM);
+ bdrv_flags &= ~BDRV_O_RDWR;
break;
}
break;
@@ -2660,7 +2663,6 @@ int drive_init(struct drive_opt *arg, in
}
if (!file[0])
return -2;
- bdrv_flags = 0;
if (snapshot) {
bdrv_flags |= BDRV_O_SNAPSHOT;
cache = 2; /* always use write-back with snapshot */

129
bdrv_open2_fix_flags.patch
View File

@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/block.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/block.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/block.c
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ int bdrv_file_open(BlockDriverState **pb
int bdrv_open(BlockDriverState *bs, const char *filename, int flags)
{
- return bdrv_open2(bs, filename, flags, NULL);
+ return bdrv_open2(bs, filename, flags|BDRV_O_RDWR, NULL);
}
int bdrv_open2(BlockDriverState *bs, const char *filename, int flags,
@@ -419,12 +419,13 @@ int bdrv_open2(BlockDriverState *bs, con
}
bs->drv = drv;
bs->opaque = qemu_mallocz(drv->instance_size);
- /* Note: for compatibility, we open disk image files as RDWR, and
- RDONLY as fallback */
if (!(flags & BDRV_O_FILE))
- open_flags = (flags & BDRV_O_ACCESS) | (flags & BDRV_O_CACHE_MASK);
+ open_flags = flags;
else
open_flags = flags & ~(BDRV_O_FILE | BDRV_O_SNAPSHOT);
+ if (!(open_flags & BDRV_O_RDWR))
+ bs->read_only = 1;
+
ret = drv->bdrv_open(bs, filename, open_flags);
if ((ret == -EACCES || ret == -EPERM) && !(flags & BDRV_O_FILE)) {
ret = drv->bdrv_open(bs, filename, open_flags & ~BDRV_O_RDWR);
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/usb-msd.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/usb-msd.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/usb-msd.c
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ USBDevice *usb_msd_init(const char *file
s = qemu_mallocz(sizeof(MSDState));
bdrv = bdrv_new("usb");
- if (bdrv_open2(bdrv, filename, 0, drv) < 0)
+ if (bdrv_open2(bdrv, filename, BDRV_O_RDWR, drv) < 0)
goto fail;
s->bs = bdrv;
*pbs = bdrv;
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/qemu-img.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/qemu-img.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/qemu-img.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
#endif
/* Default to cache=writeback as data integrity is not important for qemu-tcg. */
-#define BRDV_O_FLAGS BDRV_O_CACHE_WB
+#define BDRV_O_FLAGS BDRV_O_CACHE_WB
static void QEMU_NORETURN error(const char *fmt, ...)
{
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static int read_password(char *buf, int
#endif
static BlockDriverState *bdrv_new_open(const char *filename,
- const char *fmt)
+ const char *fmt, int flags)
{
BlockDriverState *bs;
BlockDriver *drv;
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ static BlockDriverState *bdrv_new_open(c
} else {
drv = &bdrv_raw;
}
- if (bdrv_open2(bs, filename, BRDV_O_FLAGS, drv) < 0) {
+ if (bdrv_open2(bs, filename, flags, drv) < 0) {
error("Could not open '%s'", filename);
}
if (bdrv_is_encrypted(bs)) {
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ static int img_create(int argc, char **a
size = 0;
if (base_filename) {
BlockDriverState *bs;
- bs = bdrv_new_open(base_filename, NULL);
+ bs = bdrv_new_open(base_filename, NULL, BDRV_O_RDWR);
bdrv_get_geometry(bs, &size);
size *= 512;
bdrv_delete(bs);
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ static int img_commit(int argc, char **a
} else {
drv = NULL;
}
- if (bdrv_open2(bs, filename, BRDV_O_FLAGS, drv) < 0) {
+ if (bdrv_open2(bs, filename, BDRV_O_RDWR, drv) < 0) {
error("Could not open '%s'", filename);
}
ret = bdrv_commit(bs);
@@ -455,7 +455,8 @@ static int img_convert(int argc, char **
total_sectors = 0;
for (bs_i = 0; bs_i < bs_n; bs_i++) {
- bs[bs_i] = bdrv_new_open(argv[optind + bs_i], fmt);
+ bs[bs_i] = bdrv_new_open(argv[optind + bs_i], fmt,
+ BDRV_O_CACHE_WB|BDRV_O_RDONLY);
if (!bs[bs_i])
error("Could not open '%s'", argv[optind + bs_i]);
bdrv_get_geometry(bs[bs_i], &bs_sectors);
@@ -483,7 +484,7 @@ static int img_convert(int argc, char **
}
}
- out_bs = bdrv_new_open(out_filename, out_fmt);
+ out_bs = bdrv_new_open(out_filename, out_fmt, BDRV_O_CACHE_WB|BDRV_O_RDWR);
bs_i = 0;
bs_offset = 0;
@@ -706,7 +707,7 @@ static int img_info(int argc, char **arg
} else {
drv = NULL;
}
- if (bdrv_open2(bs, filename, BRDV_O_FLAGS, drv) < 0) {
+ if (bdrv_open2(bs, filename, BDRV_O_FLAGS|BDRV_O_RDWR, drv) < 0) {
error("Could not open '%s'", filename);
}
bdrv_get_format(bs, fmt_name, sizeof(fmt_name));
@@ -810,7 +811,7 @@ static void img_snapshot(int argc, char
if (!bs)
error("Not enough memory");
- if (bdrv_open2(bs, filename, 0, NULL) < 0) {
+ if (bdrv_open2(bs, filename, BDRV_O_RDWR, NULL) < 0) {
error("Could not open '%s'", filename);
}

72
bdrv_open2_flags_2.patch
View File

@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c
@@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ static int open_disk(struct td_state *s,
BlockDriver* drv;
char* devname;
static int devnumber = 0;
+ int flags = readonly ? BDRV_O_RDONLY : BDRV_O_RDWR;
int i;
DPRINTF("Opening %s as blktap%d\n", path, devnumber);
@@ -247,7 +248,7 @@ static int open_disk(struct td_state *s,
DPRINTF("%s driver specified\n", drv ? drv->format_name : "No");
/* Open the image */
- if (bdrv_open2(bs, path, 0, drv) != 0) {
+ if (bdrv_open2(bs, path, flags, drv) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not open image file %s\n", path);
return -ENOMEM;
}
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c
@@ -133,7 +133,8 @@ static void insert_media(void *opaque)
else
format = &bdrv_raw;
- bdrv_open2(bs, media_filename[i], 0, format);
+ /* Temporary BDRV_O_RDWR */
+ bdrv_open2(bs, media_filename[i], BDRV_O_RDWR, format);
#ifdef CONFIG_STUBDOM
{
char *buf, *backend, *params_path, *params;
@@ -508,7 +509,8 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv
}
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
- format = NULL; /* don't know what the format is yet */
+ flags = 0;
+ format = NULL; /* don't know what the format is yet */
/* read the backend path */
xenstore_get_backend_path(&bpath, "vbd", danger_path, hvm_domid, e_danger[i]);
if (bpath == NULL)
@@ -594,6 +596,17 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv
format = &bdrv_raw;
}
+ /* read the mode of the device */
+ if (pasprintf(&buf, "%s/mode", bpath) == -1)
+ continue;
+ free(mode);
+ mode = xs_read(xsh, XBT_NULL, buf, &len);
+
+ if (!strcmp(mode, "r") || !strcmp(mode, "ro"))
+ flags |= BDRV_O_RDONLY;
+ if (!strcmp(mode, "w") || !strcmp(mode, "rw"))
+ flags |= BDRV_O_RDWR;
+
#if 0
/* Phantom VBDs are disabled because the use of paths
* from guest-controlled areas in xenstore is unsafe.
@@ -661,7 +674,7 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv
#ifdef CONFIG_STUBDOM
if (pasprintf(&danger_buf, "%s/device/vbd/%s", danger_path, e_danger[i]) == -1)
continue;
- if (bdrv_open2(bs, danger_buf, BDRV_O_CACHE_WB /* snapshot and write-back */, &bdrv_raw) == 0) {
+ if (bdrv_open2(bs, danger_buf, flags|BDRV_O_CACHE_WB /* snapshot and write-back */, &bdrv_raw) == 0) {
if (pasprintf(&buf, "%s/params", bpath) == -1)
continue;
free(params);

27
blktap-disable-debug-printf.patch
View File

@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/blktapctrl.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/blktap/drivers/blktapctrl.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/blktapctrl.c
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@
#include "list.h"
#include "xs_api.h" /* for xs_fire_next_watch() */
+#undef DPRINTF
+#define DPRINTF(_f, _a...) ((void)0)
+
#define PIDFILE "/var/run/blktapctrl.pid"
#define NUM_POLL_FDS 2
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
#define BLKTAP_CTRL_DIR "/var/run/tap"
/* If enabled, print debug messages to stderr */
-#if 1
+#if 0
#define DPRINTF(_f, _a...) fprintf(stderr, __FILE__ ":%d: " _f, __LINE__, ##_a)
#else
#define DPRINTF(_f, _a...) ((void)0)

55
blktap-pv-cdrom.patch
View File

@ -4,15 +4,14 @@
tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.c | 16
tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h | 16
tools/blktap/lib/blktaplib.h | 1
tools/python/xen/xend/server/BlktapController.py | 1
xen/include/public/io/blkif.h | 2
xen/include/public/io/cdromif.h | 122 ++++
8 files changed, 726 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
7 files changed, 726 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/Makefile
Index: xen-4.3.0-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/Makefile
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/blktap/drivers/Makefile
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/Makefile
--- xen-4.3.0-testing.orig/tools/blktap/drivers/Makefile
+++ xen-4.3.0-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/Makefile
@@ -38,8 +38,9 @@ endif
CFLAGS += $(PTHREAD_CFLAGS)
LDFLAGS += $(PTHREAD_LDFLAGS)
@ -33,10 +32,10 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/Makefile
BLK-OBJS-y += aes.o
BLK-OBJS-y += tapaio.o
BLK-OBJS-$(CONFIG_Linux) += blk_linux.o
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/block-cdrom.c
Index: xen-4.3.0-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/block-cdrom.c
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/block-cdrom.c
+++ xen-4.3.0-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/block-cdrom.c
@@ -0,0 +1,568 @@
+/* block-cdrom.c
+ *
@ -606,10 +605,10 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/block-cdrom.c
+ .td_get_parent_id = tdcdrom_get_parent_id,
+ .td_validate_parent = tdcdrom_validate_parent
+};
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.c
Index: xen-4.3.0-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.c
--- xen-4.3.0-testing.orig/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.c
+++ xen-4.3.0-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.c
@@ -735,6 +735,22 @@ static void get_io_request(struct td_sta
goto out;
}
@ -633,10 +632,10 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.c
default:
DPRINTF("Unknown block operation\n");
break;
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h
Index: xen-4.3.0-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h
--- xen-4.3.0-testing.orig/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h
+++ xen-4.3.0-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h
@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ struct tap_disk {
int (*td_get_parent_id) (struct disk_driver *dd, struct disk_id *id);
int (*td_validate_parent)(struct disk_driver *dd,
@ -681,10 +680,10 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h
};
typedef struct driver_list_entry {
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/blktap/lib/blktaplib.h
Index: xen-4.3.0-testing/tools/blktap/lib/blktaplib.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/blktap/lib/blktaplib.h
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/blktap/lib/blktaplib.h
--- xen-4.3.0-testing.orig/tools/blktap/lib/blktaplib.h
+++ xen-4.3.0-testing/tools/blktap/lib/blktaplib.h
@@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ typedef struct msg_pid {
#define DISK_TYPE_RAM 3
#define DISK_TYPE_QCOW 4
@ -693,23 +692,11 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/blktap/lib/blktaplib.h
/* xenstore/xenbus: */
#define DOMNAME "Domain-0"
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/BlktapController.py
Index: xen-4.3.0-testing/xen/include/public/io/blkif.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/server/BlktapController.py
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/BlktapController.py
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ blktap1_disk_types = [
'ram',
'qcow',
'qcow2',
+ 'cdrom',
'ioemu',
]
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/include/public/io/blkif.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/xen/include/public/io/blkif.h
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/include/public/io/blkif.h
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@
--- xen-4.3.0-testing.orig/xen/include/public/io/blkif.h
+++ xen-4.3.0-testing/xen/include/public/io/blkif.h
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@
* Used in SLES sources for device specific command packet
* contained within the request. Reserved for that purpose.
*/
@ -718,10 +705,10 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/include/public/io/blkif.h
/*
* Indicate to the backend device that a region of storage is no longer in
* use, and may be discarded at any time without impact to the client. If
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/include/public/io/cdromif.h
Index: xen-4.3.0-testing/xen/include/public/io/cdromif.h
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/include/public/io/cdromif.h
+++ xen-4.3.0-testing/xen/include/public/io/cdromif.h
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/******************************************************************************
+ * cdromif.h

55
blktap.patch
View File

@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
bug #239173
bug #242953
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
@@ -3317,7 +3317,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
(fn, BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICE))
vbd = {
- 'mode': 'RO',
+ 'mode': 'RW',
'device': BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICE,
}
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c
@@ -447,9 +447,9 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv
{
char **e_danger = NULL;
char *buf = NULL;
- char *fpath = NULL, *bpath = NULL,
+ char *fpath = NULL, *bpath = NULL, *btype = NULL,
*dev = NULL, *params = NULL, *drv = NULL;
- int i, ret;
+ int i, ret, is_tap;
unsigned int len, num, hd_index, pci_devid = 0;
BlockDriverState *bs;
BlockDriver *format;
@@ -486,6 +486,14 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv
e_danger[i]);
if (bpath == NULL)
continue;
+ /* check to see if type is tap or not */
+ if (pasprintf(&buf, "%s/type", bpath) == -1)
+ continue;
+ free(btype);
+ btype = xs_read(xsh, XBT_NULL, buf, &len);
+ if (btype == NULL)
+ continue;
+ is_tap = !strncmp(btype, "tap", 3);
/* read the name of the device */
if (pasprintf(&buf, "%s/dev", bpath) == -1)
continue;
@@ -777,6 +785,7 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv
free(mode);
free(params);
free(dev);
+ free(btype);
free(bpath);
free(buf);
free(danger_buf);

0
blktap-close-fifos.patch → blktapctrl-close-fifos.patch
View File

14
blktapctrl-disable-debug-printf.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/blktapctrl.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/blktap/drivers/blktapctrl.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/blktapctrl.c
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@
#include "list.h"
#include "xs_api.h" /* for xs_fire_next_watch() */
+#undef DPRINTF
+#define DPRINTF(_f, _a...) ((void)0)
+
#define PIDFILE "/var/run/blktapctrl.pid"
#define NUM_POLL_FDS 2

33
block-dmmd
View File

@ -93,21 +93,36 @@ function deactivate_md()
function activate_lvm()
{
# First scan for PVs and VGs; we may then have to activate the VG
# first, but can ignore errors:
# /sbin/pvscan || :
# /sbin/vgscan --mknodes || :
# /sbin/vgchange -ay ${1%/*} || :
/sbin/lvchange -ay $1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
return 0
local run_timeout=90
local parsed_timeout
local end_time
# Parse device-create-timeout from /etc/xen/xend-config.sxp
# If not set, use default timeout of 90s
parsed_timeout=$(grep -v "^[ \t]*#.*" /etc/xen/xend-config.sxp|sed -n 's/(device-create-timeout \+\([0-9]\+\))/\1/p')
if [ ! -z $parsed_timeout ]; then
run_timeout=$((${parsed_timeout}*9/10))
fi
end_time=$(($(date +%s)+${run_timeout}))
while true; do
/sbin/lvchange -aey $1
if [ $? -eq 0 -a -e $1 ]; then
return 0
fi
sleep 0.1
if [ $(date +%s) -ge ${end_time} ]; then
log err "Failed to activate $1 within ${run_timeout} seconds"
return 1
fi
done
return 1
}
function deactivate_lvm()
{
/sbin/lvchange -an $1
/sbin/lvchange -aen $1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
# We may have to deactivate the VG now, but can ignore errors:
# /sbin/vgchange -an ${1%/*} || :

0
bridge-bonding.diff → bridge-bonding.patch
View File

0
bridge-vlan.diff → bridge-vlan.patch
View File

140
build-tapdisk-ioemu.patch
View File

@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
From f1ebeae7802a5775422004f62630c42e46dcf664 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@suse.de>
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2009 16:32:40 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 3/6] ioemu: Build tapdisk-ioemu binary
When changing away from the old ioemu, changes in the Makefiles
resulted in tapdisk-ioemu appearing there, but actually not
being built. This patch re-enables the build of tapdisk-ioemu.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@suse.de>
---
Makefile | 22 +++++++++++++++-------
configure | 2 +-
qemu-tool.c | 2 +-
tapdisk-ioemu.c | 17 -----------------
4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/Makefile
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/Makefile
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/Makefile
@@ -46,14 +46,6 @@ $(filter %-user,$(SUBDIR_RULES)): libqem
recurse-all: $(SUBDIR_RULES)
-CPPFLAGS += -I$(XEN_ROOT)/tools/libxc
-CPPFLAGS += -I$(XEN_ROOT)/tools/blktap/lib
-CPPFLAGS += -I$(XEN_ROOT)/tools/xenstore
-CPPFLAGS += -I$(XEN_ROOT)/tools/include
-
-tapdisk-ioemu: tapdisk-ioemu.c cutils.c block.c block-raw.c block-cow.c block-qcow.c aes.c block-vmdk.c block-cloop.c block-dmg.c block-bochs.c block-vpc.c block-vvfat.c block-qcow2.c hw/xen_blktap.c osdep.c
- $(CC) -DQEMU_TOOL $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(BASE_CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) $(BASE_LDFLAGS) -o $@ $^ -lz $(LIBS)
-
#######################################################################
# BLOCK_OBJS is code used by both qemu system emulation and qemu-img
@@ -72,6 +64,21 @@ endif
BLOCK_OBJS += block-raw-posix.o
endif
+#######################################################################
+# tapdisk-ioemu
+
+hw/tapdisk-xen_blktap.o: hw/xen_blktap.c
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -DQEMU_IMG -DQEMU_TOOL -c -o $@ $<
+tapdisk-ioemu.o: tapdisk-ioemu.c
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -DQEMU_IMG -DQEMU_TOOL -c -o $@ $<
+
+tapdisk-ioemu: CPPFLAGS += -I$(XEN_ROOT)/tools/libxc
+tapdisk-ioemu: CPPFLAGS += -I$(XEN_ROOT)/tools/blktap/lib
+tapdisk-ioemu: CPPFLAGS += -I$(XEN_ROOT)/tools/xenstore
+tapdisk-ioemu: CPPFLAGS += -I$(XEN_ROOT)/tools/include
+tapdisk-ioemu: tapdisk-ioemu.o $(BLOCK_OBJS) qemu-tool.o hw/tapdisk-xen_blktap.o
+ $(CC) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $^ -lz $(LIBS)
+
######################################################################
# libqemu_common.a: Target independent part of system emulation. The
# long term path is to suppress *all* target specific code in case of
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/configure
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/configure
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/configure
@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ bsd)
;;
esac
-tools=
+tools="tapdisk-ioemu"
if test `expr "$target_list" : ".*softmmu.*"` != 0 ; then
tools="qemu-img\$(EXESUF) $tools"
if [ "$linux" = "yes" ] ; then
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/qemu-tool.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/qemu-tool.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/qemu-tool.c
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ void qemu_bh_delete(QEMUBH *bh)
qemu_free(bh);
}
-int qemu_set_fd_handler2(int fd,
+int __attribute__((weak)) qemu_set_fd_handler2(int fd,
IOCanRWHandler *fd_read_poll,
IOHandler *fd_read,
IOHandler *fd_write,
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/tapdisk-ioemu.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/tapdisk-ioemu.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/tapdisk-ioemu.c
@@ -12,34 +12,12 @@
extern void qemu_aio_init(void);
extern void qemu_aio_poll(void);
-extern void bdrv_init(void);
-
-extern void *qemu_mallocz(size_t size);
-extern void qemu_free(void *ptr);
extern void *fd_start;
int domid = 0;
FILE* logfile;
-void term_printf(const char *fmt, ...)
-{
- va_list ap;
- va_start(ap, fmt);
- vprintf(fmt, ap);
- va_end(ap);
-}
-
-void term_print_filename(const char *filename)
-{
- term_printf(filename);
-}
-
-
-typedef void IOReadHandler(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size);
-typedef int IOCanRWHandler(void *opaque);
-typedef void IOHandler(void *opaque);
-
typedef struct IOHandlerRecord {
int fd;
IOCanRWHandler *fd_read_poll;
@@ -103,7 +81,6 @@ int main(void)
logfile = stderr;
bdrv_init();
- qemu_aio_init();
init_blktap();
/* Daemonize */
@@ -115,8 +92,6 @@ int main(void)
* completed aio operations.
*/
while (1) {
- qemu_aio_poll();
-
max_fd = -1;
FD_ZERO(&rfds);
for(ioh = first_io_handler; ioh != NULL; ioh = ioh->next)

16
capslock_enable.patch
View File

@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
@@ -1329,6 +1329,11 @@ static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, i
}
break;
case 0x3a: /* CapsLock */
+ if(!down){
+ vs->modifiers_state[keycode] ^= 1;
+ kbd_put_keycode(keycode | 0x80);
+ }
+ return;
case 0x45: /* NumLock */
if (down) {
kbd_put_keycode(keycode & 0x7f);

496
cdrom-removable.patch
View File

@ -1,496 +0,0 @@
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/HalDaemon.py
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/HalDaemon.py
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python
+# -*- mode: python; -*-
+#============================================================================
+# This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+# modify it under the terms of version 2.1 of the GNU Lesser General Public
+# License as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+#
+# This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+# Lesser General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+# License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
+# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
+#============================================================================
+# Copyright (C) 2007 Pat Campbell <plc@novell.com>
+# Copyright (C) 2007 Novell Inc.
+#============================================================================
+
+"""hald (Hardware Abstraction Layer Daemon) watcher for Xen management
+ of removable block device media.
+
+"""
+
+import gobject
+import dbus
+import dbus.glib
+import os
+import types
+import sys
+import signal
+import traceback
+from xen.xend.xenstore.xstransact import xstransact, complete
+from xen.xend.xenstore.xsutil import xshandle
+from xen.xend import PrettyPrint
+from xen.xend import XendLogging
+from xen.xend.XendLogging import log
+
+DEVICE_TYPES = ['vbd', 'tap']
+
+class HalDaemon:
+ """The Hald block device watcher for XEN
+ """
+
+ """Default path to the log file. """
+ logfile_default = "/var/log/xen/hald.log"
+
+ """Default level of information to be logged."""
+ loglevel_default = 'INFO'
+
+
+ def __init__(self):
+
+ XendLogging.init(self.logfile_default, self.loglevel_default)
+ log.debug( "%s", "__init__")
+
+ self.udi_dict = {}
+ self.debug = 0
+ self.dbpath = "/local/domain/0/backend"
+ self.bus = dbus.SystemBus()
+ self.hal_manager_obj = self.bus.get_object('org.freedesktop.Hal', '/org/freedesktop/Hal/Manager')
+ self.hal_manager = dbus.Interface( self.hal_manager_obj, 'org.freedesktop.Hal.Manager')
+ self.gatherBlockDevices()
+ self.registerDeviceCallbacks()
+
+ def run(self):
+ log.debug( "%s", "In new run" );
+ try:
+ self.mainloop = gobject.MainLoop()
+ self.mainloop.run()
+ except KeyboardInterrupt, ex:
+ log.debug('Keyboard exception handler: %s', ex )
+ self.mainloop.quit()
+ except Exception, ex:
+ log.debug('Generic exception handler: %s', ex )
+ self.mainloop.quit()
+
+ def __del__(self):
+ log.debug( "%s", "In del " );
+ self.unRegisterDeviceCallbacks()
+ self.mainloop.quit()
+
+ def shutdown(self):
+ log.debug( "%s", "In shutdown now " );
+ self.unRegisterDeviceCallbacks()
+ self.mainloop.quit()
+
+ def stop(self):
+ log.debug( "%s", "In stop now " );
+ self.unRegisterDeviceCallbacks()
+ self.mainloop.quit()
+
+ def gatherBlockDevices(self):
+
+ # Get all the current devices from hal and save in a dictionary
+ try:
+ device_names = self.hal_manager.GetAllDevices()
+ i = 0;
+ for name in device_names:
+ #log.debug("device name, device=%s",name)
+ dev_obj = self.bus.get_object ('org.freedesktop.Hal', name)
+ dev = dbus.Interface (dev_obj, 'org.freedesktop.Hal.Device')
+ dev_properties = dev_obj.GetAllProperties(dbus_interface="org.freedesktop.Hal.Device")
+ if dev_properties.has_key('block.device'):
+ dev_str = dev_properties['block.device']
+ dev_major = dev_properties['block.major']
+ dev_minor = dev_properties['block.minor']
+ udi_info = {}
+ udi_info['device'] = dev_str
+ udi_info['major'] = dev_major
+ udi_info['minor'] = dev_minor
+ udi_info['udi'] = name
+ self.udi_dict[i] = udi_info
+ i = i + 1
+ except Exception, ex:
+ print >>sys.stderr, 'Exception gathering block devices:', ex
+ log.warn("Exception gathering block devices (%s)",ex)
+
+ #
+ def registerDeviceCallbacks(self):
+ # setup the callbacks for when the gdl changes
+ self.hal_manager.connect_to_signal('DeviceAdded', self.device_added_callback)
+ self.hal_manager.connect_to_signal('DeviceRemoved', self.device_removed_callback)
+
+ #
+ def unRegisterDeviceCallbacks(self):
+ # setup the callbacks for when the gdl changes
+ self.hal_manager.remove_signal_receiver(self.device_added_callback,'DeviceAdded')
+ self.hal_manager.remove_signal_receiver(self.device_removed_callback,'DeviceRemoved')
+
+ #
+ def device_removed_callback(self,udi):
+ log.debug('UDI %s was removed',udi)
+ self.show_dict(self.udi_dict)
+ for key in self.udi_dict:
+ udi_info = self.udi_dict[key]
+ if udi_info['udi'] == udi:
+ device = udi_info['device']
+ major = udi_info['major']
+ minor = udi_info['minor']
+ self.change_xenstore( "remove", device, major, minor)
+
+ # Adds device to dictionary if not already there
+ def device_added_callback(self,udi):
+ log.debug('UDI %s was added', udi)
+ self.show_dict(self.udi_dict)
+ dev_obj = self.bus.get_object ('org.freedesktop.Hal', udi)
+ dev = dbus.Interface (dev_obj, 'org.freedesktop.Hal.Device')
+ device = dev.GetProperty ('block.device')
+ major = dev.GetProperty ('block.major')
+ minor = dev.GetProperty ('block.minor')
+ udi_info = {}
+ udi_info['device'] = device
+ udi_info['major'] = major
+ udi_info['minor'] = minor
+ udi_info['udi'] = udi
+ already = 0
+ cnt = 0;
+ for key in self.udi_dict:
+ info = self.udi_dict[key]
+ if info['udi'] == udi:
+ already = 1
+ break
+ cnt = cnt + 1
+ if already == 0:
+ self.udi_dict[cnt] = udi_info;
+ log.debug('UDI %s was added, device:%s major:%s minor:%s index:%d\n', udi, device, major, minor, cnt)
+ self.change_xenstore( "add", device, major, minor)
+
+ # Debug helper, shows dictionary contents
+ def show_dict(self,dict=None):
+ if self.debug == 0 :
+ return
+ if dict == None :
+ dict = self.udi_dict
+ for key in dict:
+ log.debug('udi_info %s udi_info:%s',key,dict[key])
+
+ # Set or clear xenstore media-present depending on the action argument
+ # for every vbd that has this block device
+ def change_xenstore(self,action, device, major, minor):
+ for type in DEVICE_TYPES:
+ path = self.dbpath + '/' + type
+ domains = xstransact.List(path)
+ log.debug('domains: %s', domains)
+ for domain in domains: # for each domain
+ devices = xstransact.List( path + '/' + domain)
+ log.debug('devices: %s',devices)
+ for device in devices: # for each vbd device
+ str = device.split('/')
+ vbd_type = None;
+ vbd_physical_device = None
+ vbd_media = None
+ vbd_device_path = path + '/' + domain + '/' + device
+ listing = xstransact.List(vbd_device_path)
+ for entry in listing: # for each entry
+ item = path + '/' + entry
+ value = xstransact.Read( vbd_device_path + '/' + entry)
+ log.debug('%s=%s',item,value)
+ if item.find('media-present') != -1:
+ vbd_media = item;
+ vbd_media_path = item
+ if item.find('physical-device') != -1:
+ vbd_physical_device = value;
+ if item.find('type') != -1:
+ vbd_type = value;
+ if vbd_type is not None and vbd_physical_device is not None and vbd_media is not None :
+ inode = vbd_physical_device.split(':')
+ imajor = parse_hex(inode[0])
+ iminor = parse_hex(inode[1])
+ log.debug("action:%s major:%s- minor:%s- imajor:%s- iminor:%s- inode: %s",
+ action,major,minor, imajor, iminor, inode)
+ if int(imajor) == int(major) and int(iminor) == int(minor):
+ if action == "add":
+ xs_dict = {'media': "1"}
+ xstransact.Write(vbd_device_path, 'media-present', "1" )
+ log.debug("wrote xenstore media-present 1 path:%s",vbd_media_path)
+ else:
+ xstransact.Write(vbd_device_path, 'media-present', "0" )
+ log.debug("wrote xenstore media 0 path:%s",vbd_media_path)
+
+def mylog( fmt, *args):
+ f = open('/tmp/haldaemon.log', 'a')
+ print >>f, "HalDaemon ", fmt % args
+ f.close()
+
+
+def parse_hex(val):
+ try:
+ if isinstance(val, types.StringTypes):
+ return int(val, 16)
+ else:
+ return val
+ except ValueError:
+ return None
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ watcher = HalDaemon()
+ watcher.run()
+ print 'Falling off end'
+
+
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/Hald.py
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/Hald.py
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+#============================================================================
+# This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+# modify it under the terms of version 2.1 of the GNU Lesser General Public
+# License as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+#
+# This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+# Lesser General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+# License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
+# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
+#============================================================================
+# Copyright (C) 2007 Pat Campbell <plc@novell.com>
+# Copyright (C) 2007 Novell Inc.
+#============================================================================
+
+import errno
+import types
+import os
+import sys
+import time
+import signal
+from traceback import print_exc
+
+from xen.xend.XendLogging import log
+
+class Hald:
+ def __init__(self):
+ self.ready = False
+ self.running = True
+
+ def run(self):
+ """Starts the HalDaemon process
+ """
+ self.ready = True
+ try:
+ myfile = self.find("xen/xend/server/HalDaemon.py")
+ args = (["python", myfile ])
+ self.pid = self.daemonize("python", args )
+ #log.debug( "%s %s pid:%d", "Hald.py starting ", args, self.pid )
+ except:
+ self.pid = -1
+ log.debug("Unable to start HalDaemon process")
+
+ def shutdown(self):
+ """Shutdown the HalDaemon process
+ """
+ log.debug("%s pid:%d", "Hald.shutdown()", self.pid)
+ self.running = False
+ self.ready = False
+ if self.pid != -1:
+ try:
+ os.kill(self.pid, signal.SIGINT)
+ except:
+ print_exc()
+
+ def daemonize(self,prog, args):
+ """Runs a program as a daemon with the list of arguments. Returns the PID
+ of the daemonized program, or returns 0 on error.
+ Copied from xm/create.py instead of importing to reduce coupling
+ """
+ r, w = os.pipe()
+ pid = os.fork()
+
+ if pid == 0:
+ os.close(r)
+ w = os.fdopen(w, 'w')
+ os.setsid()
+ try:
+ pid2 = os.fork()
+ except:
+ pid2 = None
+ if pid2 == 0:
+ os.chdir("/")
+ env = os.environ.copy()
+ env['PYTHONPATH'] = self.getpythonpath()
+ for fd in range(0, 256):
+ try:
+ os.close(fd)
+ except:
+ pass
+ os.open("/dev/null", os.O_RDWR)
+ os.dup2(0, 1)
+ os.dup2(0, 2)
+ os.execvpe(prog, args, env)
+ os._exit(1)
+ else:
+ w.write(str(pid2 or 0))
+ w.close()
+ os._exit(0)
+ os.close(w)
+ r = os.fdopen(r)
+ daemon_pid = int(r.read())
+ r.close()
+ os.waitpid(pid, 0)
+ #log.debug( "daemon_pid: %d", daemon_pid )
+ return daemon_pid
+
+ def getpythonpath(self):
+ str = " "
+ for p in sys.path:
+ if str != " ":
+ str = str + ":" + p
+ else:
+ if str != "":
+ str = p
+ return str
+
+ def find(self,path, matchFunc=os.path.isfile):
+ """Find a module in the sys.path
+ From web page: http://aspn.activestate.com/ASPN/Cookbook/Python/Recipe/52224
+ """
+ for dirname in sys.path:
+ candidate = os.path.join(dirname, path)
+ if matchFunc(candidate):
+ return candidate
+ raise Error("Can't find file %s" % path)
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ watcher = Hald()
+ watcher.run()
+ time.sleep(10)
+ watcher.shutdown()
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/SrvServer.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/server/SrvServer.py
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/SrvServer.py
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ from xen.web.SrvDir import SrvDir
from SrvRoot import SrvRoot
from XMLRPCServer import XMLRPCServer
+from xen.xend.server.Hald import Hald
xoptions = XendOptions.instance()
@@ -252,6 +253,8 @@ def _loadConfig(servers, root, reload):
if xoptions.get_xend_unix_xmlrpc_server():
servers.add(XMLRPCServer(XendAPI.AUTH_PAM, False))
+ servers.add(Hald())
+
def create():
root = SrvDir()
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include "exec-all.h"
#include "sysemu.h"
+#include "console.h"
#include "hw.h"
#include "pci.h"
#include "qemu-timer.h"
@@ -595,6 +596,21 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv
#endif
bs = bdrv_new(dev);
+
+ /* if cdrom physical put a watch on media-present */
+ if (bdrv_get_type_hint(bs) == BDRV_TYPE_CDROM) {
+ if (drv && !strcmp(drv, "phy")) {
+ if (pasprintf(&buf, "%s/media-present", bpath) != -1) {
+ if (bdrv_is_inserted(bs))
+ xs_write(xsh, XBT_NULL, buf, "1", strlen("1"));
+ else {
+ xs_write(xsh, XBT_NULL, buf, "0", strlen("0"));
+ }
+ xs_watch(xsh, buf, "media-present");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
/* check if it is a cdrom */
if (danger_type && !strcmp(danger_type, "cdrom")) {
bdrv_set_type_hint(bs, BDRV_TYPE_CDROM);
@@ -1030,6 +1046,50 @@ static void xenstore_process_vcpu_set_ev
return;
}
+static void xenstore_process_media_change_event(char **vec)
+{
+ char *media_present = NULL;
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ media_present = xs_read(xsh, XBT_NULL, vec[XS_WATCH_PATH], &len);
+
+ if (media_present) {
+ BlockDriverState *bs;
+ char *buf = NULL, *cp = NULL, *path = NULL, *dev = NULL;
+
+ path = strdup(vec[XS_WATCH_PATH]);
+ cp = strstr(path, "media-present");
+ if (cp){
+ *(cp-1) = '\0';
+ pasprintf(&buf, "%s/dev", path);
+ dev = xs_read(xsh, XBT_NULL, buf, &len);
+ if (dev) {
+ if ( !strncmp(dev, "xvd", 3)) {
+ memmove(dev, dev+1, strlen(dev));
+ dev[0] = 'h';
+ dev[1] = 'd';
+ }
+ bs = bdrv_find(dev);
+ if (!bs) {
+ term_printf("device not found\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(media_present, "0") == 0 && bs) {
+ bdrv_close(bs);
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(media_present, "1") == 0 &&
+ bs != NULL && bs->drv == NULL) {
+ if (bdrv_open(bs, bs->filename, 0 /* snapshot */) < 0) {
+ fprintf(logfile, "%s() qemu: could not open cdrom disk '%s'\n",
+ __func__, bs->filename);
+ }
+ bs->media_changed = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
void xenstore_process_event(void *opaque)
{
char **vec, *offset, *bpath = NULL, *buf = NULL, *drv = NULL, *image = NULL;
@@ -1065,6 +1125,11 @@ void xenstore_process_event(void *opaque
xenstore_watch_callbacks[i].cb(vec[XS_WATCH_TOKEN],
xenstore_watch_callbacks[i].opaque);
+ if (!strcmp(vec[XS_WATCH_TOKEN], "media-present")) {
+ xenstore_process_media_change_event(vec);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
hd_index = drive_name_to_index(vec[XS_WATCH_TOKEN]);
if (hd_index == -1) {
fprintf(stderr,"medium change watch on `%s' -"

157
change-vnc-passwd.patch
View File

@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
Add support of change-vnc-password while vm is running.
Signed-off-by: Chunyan Liu <cyliu@novell.com>
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vl.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vl.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vl.c
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ DriveInfo drives_table[MAX_DRIVES+1];
int nb_drives;
enum vga_retrace_method vga_retrace_method = VGA_RETRACE_DUMB;
int vga_ram_size;
-static DisplayState *display_state;
+DisplayState *display_state;
int nographic;
static int curses;
static int sdl;
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
@@ -2627,6 +2627,7 @@ int vnc_display_password(DisplayState *d
if (password && password[0]) {
if (!(vs->password = qemu_strdup(password)))
return -1;
+ vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_VNC;
}
return 0;
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include "qemu-timer.h"
#include "qemu-xen.h"
+extern DisplayState *display_state;
struct xs_handle *xsh = NULL;
static char *media_filename[MAX_DRIVES+1];
static QEMUTimer *insert_timer = NULL;
@@ -939,6 +940,19 @@ static void xenstore_process_dm_command_
} else if (!strncmp(command, "continue", len)) {
fprintf(logfile, "dm-command: continue after state save\n");
xen_pause_requested = 0;
+ } else if (!strncmp(command, "chgvncpasswd", len)) {
+ fprintf(logfile, "dm-command: change vnc passwd\n");
+ if (pasprintf(&path,
+ "/local/domain/0/backend/vfb/%u/0/vncpasswd", domid) == -1) {
+ fprintf(logfile, "out of memory reading dm command parameter\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ par = xs_read(xsh, XBT_NULL, path, &len);
+ if (!par)
+ goto out;
+ if (vnc_display_password(display_state, par) == 0)
+ xenstore_record_dm_state("vncpasswdchged");
+ free(par);
} else if (!strncmp(command, "usb-add", len)) {
fprintf(logfile, "dm-command: usb-add a usb device\n");
if (pasprintf(&path,
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
@@ -1506,6 +1506,20 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
target = max_target
self.setMemoryTarget(target)
+ def chgvncpasswd(self, passwd):
+ if self._stateGet() != DOM_STATE_HALTED:
+ path = '/local/domain/0/backend/vfb/%u/0/' % self.getDomid()
+ xstransact.Write(path, 'vncpasswd', passwd)
+ self.image.signalDeviceModel("chgvncpasswd", "vncpasswdchged")
+
+ for dev_uuid, (dev_type, dev_info) in self.info['devices'].items():
+ if dev_type == 'vfb':
+ dev_info['vncpasswd'] = passwd
+ dev_info['other_config']['vncpasswd'] = passwd
+ self.info.device_update(dev_uuid, cfg_xenapi = dev_info)
+ break
+ xen.xend.XendDomain.instance().managed_config_save(self)
+
def setMemoryTarget(self, target):
"""Set the memory target of this domain.
@param target: In MiB.
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/XMLRPCServer.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/server/XMLRPCServer.py
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/XMLRPCServer.py
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ methods = ['device_create', 'device_conf
'destroyDevice','getDeviceSxprs',
'setMemoryTarget', 'setName', 'setVCpuCount', 'shutdown',
'send_sysrq', 'getVCPUInfo', 'waitForDevices',
- 'getRestartCount', 'getBlockDeviceClass']
+ 'getRestartCount', 'getBlockDeviceClass', 'chgvncpasswd']
exclude = ['domain_create', 'domain_restore']
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/main.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/main.py
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/main.py
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
"""Grand unified management application for Xen.
"""
+import getpass
import atexit
import cmd
import os
@@ -281,6 +282,9 @@ SUBCOMMAND_HELP = {
'getenforce' : ('', 'Returns the current enforcing mode for the Flask XSM module (Enforcing,Permissive)'),
'setenforce' : ('[ (Enforcing|1) | (Permissive|0) ]',
'Modifies the current enforcing mode for the Flask XSM module'),
+ #change vnc password
+ 'change-vnc-passwd' : ('<Domain>',\
+ 'Change vnc password'),
}
SUBCOMMAND_OPTIONS = {
@@ -406,6 +410,7 @@ common_commands = [
"usb-del",
"domstate",
"vcpu-set",
+ "change-vnc-passwd",
]
domain_commands = [
@@ -443,6 +448,7 @@ domain_commands = [
"vcpu-list",
"vcpu-pin",
"vcpu-set",
+ "change-vnc-passwd",
]
host_commands = [
@@ -3806,6 +3812,10 @@ def xm_cpupool_migrate(args):
else:
server.xend.cpu_pool.migrate(domname, poolname)
+def xm_chgvncpasswd(args):
+ arg_check(args, "change-vnc-passwd", 1)
+ pwd = getpass.getpass("Enter new password: ")
+ server.xend.domain.chgvncpasswd(args[0], pwd)
commands = {
"shell": xm_shell,
@@ -3914,6 +3924,8 @@ commands = {
"usb-del": xm_usb_del,
#domstate
"domstate": xm_domstate,
+ #change vnc password:
+ "change-vnc-passwd": xm_chgvncpasswd,
}
## The commands supported by a separate argument parser in xend.xm.

16
change_home_server.patch
View File

@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
@@ -3155,6 +3155,11 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
self._cleanup_phantom_devs(paths)
self._cleanupVm()
+ if "change_home_server" in self.info:
+ chs = self.info["change_home_server"]
+ if (type(chs) is str and chs == "False") or \
+ (type(chs) is bool and chs is False):
+ self.setChangeHomeServer(None)
if ("transient" in self.info["other_config"] and \
bool(self.info["other_config"]["transient"])) or \
("change_home_server" in self.info and \

56
check_device_status.patch
View File

@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
Improve check_device_status to handle HA cases
In HA environment, sometimes xenstore status has changed but ev.wait() cannot
get the signal, it will wait until timeout, thus incorrect device status is
returned. To fix this problem, we do not depend on ev.wait() result, but read
xenstore directly to get correct device status.
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/DevController.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/server/DevController.py
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/DevController.py
@@ -149,7 +149,10 @@ class DevController:
(status, err) = self.waitForBackend(devid)
if status == Timeout:
- self.destroyDevice(devid, False)
+ #Clean timeout backend resource
+ dev = self.convertToDeviceNumber(devid)
+ self.writeBackend(dev, HOTPLUG_STATUS_NODE, HOTPLUG_STATUS_ERROR)
+ self.destroyDevice(devid, True)
raise VmError("Device %s (%s) could not be connected. "
"Hotplug scripts not working." %
(devid, self.deviceClass))
@@ -554,7 +557,17 @@ class DevController:
xswatch(statusPath, hotplugStatusCallback, ev, result)
- ev.wait(DEVICE_CREATE_TIMEOUT)
+ for i in range(1, 50):
+ ev.wait(DEVICE_CREATE_TIMEOUT/50)
+ status = xstransact.Read(statusPath)
+ if status is not None:
+ if status == HOTPLUG_STATUS_ERROR:
+ result['status'] = Error
+ elif status == HOTPLUG_STATUS_BUSY:
+ result['status'] = Busy
+ else:
+ result['status'] = Connected
+ break
err = xstransact.Read(backpath, HOTPLUG_ERROR_NODE)
@@ -571,7 +584,12 @@ class DevController:
xswatch(statusPath, deviceDestroyCallback, ev, result)
- ev.wait(DEVICE_DESTROY_TIMEOUT)
+ for i in range(1, 50):
+ ev.wait(DEVICE_DESTROY_TIMEOUT/50)
+ status = xstransact.Read(statusPath)
+ if status is None:
+ result['status'] = Disconnected
+ break
return result['status']

13
checkpoint-rename.patch
View File

@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ def save(fd, dominfo, network, live, dst
dominfo.destroy()
dominfo.testDeviceComplete()
try:
- dominfo.setName(domain_name, False)
+ dominfo.setName(domain_name)
except VmError:
# Ignore this. The name conflict (hopefully) arises because we
# are doing localhost migration; if we are doing a suspend of a

22
del_usb_xend_entry.patch
View File

@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
@@ -1298,8 +1298,15 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
frontpath = self.getDeviceController(deviceClass).frontendPath(dev)
backpath = xstransact.Read(frontpath, "backend")
thread.start_new_thread(self.getDeviceController(deviceClass).finishDeviceCleanup, (backpath, path))
-
- rc = self.getDeviceController(deviceClass).destroyDevice(devid, force)
+ if deviceClass =='vusb':
+ dev = self.getDeviceController(deviceClass).convertToDeviceNumber(devid)
+ state = self.getDeviceController(deviceClass).readBackend(dev, 'state')
+ if state == '1':
+ rc = self.getDeviceController(deviceClass).destroyDevice(devid, True)
+ else:
+ rc = self.getDeviceController(deviceClass).destroyDevice(devid, force)
+ else:
+ rc = self.getDeviceController(deviceClass).destroyDevice(devid, force)
if not force and rm_cfg:
# The backend path, other than the device itself,
# has to be passed because its accompanied frontend

340
disable-wget-check.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
Index: xen-4.3.0-testing/tools/configure
===================================================================
--- xen-4.3.0-testing.orig/tools/configure
+++ xen-4.3.0-testing/tools/configure
@@ -605,9 +605,6 @@ libgcrypt
EXTFS_LIBS
system_aio
zlib
-FETCHER
-FTP
-WGET
glib_LIBS
glib_CFLAGS
PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR
@@ -7068,104 +7065,104 @@ $as_echo "yes" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "wget", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy wget; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if test "${ac_cv_path_WGET+set}" = set; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $WGET in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_WGET="$WGET" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_WGET="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- test -z "$ac_cv_path_WGET" && ac_cv_path_WGET="no"
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-WGET=$ac_cv_path_WGET
-if test -n "$WGET"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $WGET" >&5
-$as_echo "$WGET" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-if test x"$WGET" != x"no"; then :
-
- FETCHER="$WGET -c -O"
-
-else
-
- # Extract the first word of "ftp", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy ftp; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if test "${ac_cv_path_FTP+set}" = set; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $FTP in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_FTP="$FTP" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_FTP="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- test -z "$ac_cv_path_FTP" && ac_cv_path_FTP="no"
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-FTP=$ac_cv_path_FTP
-if test -n "$FTP"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $FTP" >&5
-$as_echo "$FTP" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
- if test x"$FTP" != x"no"; then :
-
- FETCHER="$FTP -o"
-
-else
-
- as_fn_error $? "cannot find wget or ftp" "$LINENO" 5
-
-fi
-
-fi
+#set dummy wget; ac_word=$2
+#{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+#$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+#if test "${ac_cv_path_WGET+set}" = set; then :
+# $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+#else
+# case $WGET in
+# [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+# ac_cv_path_WGET="$WGET" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+# ;;
+# *)
+# as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+#for as_dir in $PATH
+#do
+# IFS=$as_save_IFS
+# test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+# for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+# if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+# ac_cv_path_WGET="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+# $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+# break 2
+# fi
+#done
+# done
+#IFS=$as_save_IFS
+#
+# test -z "$ac_cv_path_WGET" && ac_cv_path_WGET="no"
+# ;;
+#esac
+#fi
+#WGET=$ac_cv_path_WGET
+#if test -n "$WGET"; then
+# { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $WGET" >&5
+#$as_echo "$WGET" >&6; }
+#else
+# { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+#$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+#fi
+#
+#
+#if test x"$WGET" != x"no"; then :
+#
+# FETCHER="$WGET -c -O"
+#
+#else
+#
+# # Extract the first word of "ftp", so it can be a program name with args.
+#set dummy ftp; ac_word=$2
+#{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+#$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+#if test "${ac_cv_path_FTP+set}" = set; then :
+# $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+#else
+# case $FTP in
+# [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+# ac_cv_path_FTP="$FTP" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+# ;;
+# *)
+# as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+#for as_dir in $PATH
+#do
+# IFS=$as_save_IFS
+# test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+# for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+# if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+# ac_cv_path_FTP="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+# $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+# break 2
+# fi
+#done
+# done
+#IFS=$as_save_IFS
+#
+# test -z "$ac_cv_path_FTP" && ac_cv_path_FTP="no"
+# ;;
+#esac
+#fi
+#FTP=$ac_cv_path_FTP
+#if test -n "$FTP"; then
+# { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $FTP" >&5
+#$as_echo "$FTP" >&6; }
+#else
+# { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+#$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+#fi
+#
+#
+# if test x"$FTP" != x"no"; then :
+#
+# FETCHER="$FTP -o"
+#
+#else
+#
+# as_fn_error $? "cannot find wget or ftp" "$LINENO" 5
+#
+#fi
+#
+#fi
Index: xen-4.3.0-testing/stubdom/configure
===================================================================
--- xen-4.3.0-testing.orig/stubdom/configure
+++ xen-4.3.0-testing/stubdom/configure
@@ -593,7 +593,6 @@ CPPFLAGS
LDFLAGS
CFLAGS
CC
-WGET
CMAKE
extfiles
debug
@@ -657,7 +656,6 @@ enable_extfiles
host_alias
target_alias
CMAKE
-WGET
CC
CFLAGS
LDFLAGS
@@ -1299,7 +1297,6 @@ Optional Features:
Some influential environment variables:
CMAKE Path to the cmake program
- WGET Path to wget program
CC C compiler command
CFLAGS C compiler flags
LDFLAGS linker flags, e.g. -L<lib dir> if you have libraries in a
@@ -3079,50 +3076,50 @@ test -z "$INSTALL_SCRIPT" && INSTALL_SCR
test -z "$INSTALL_DATA" && INSTALL_DATA='${INSTALL} -m 644'
# Extract the first word of "wget", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy wget; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if test "${ac_cv_path_WGET+set}" = set; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $WGET in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_WGET="$WGET" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
- ac_cv_path_WGET="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- test -z "$ac_cv_path_WGET" && ac_cv_path_WGET="no"
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-WGET=$ac_cv_path_WGET
-if test -n "$WGET"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $WGET" >&5
-$as_echo "$WGET" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-if test x"${WGET}" = x"no"
-then
- as_fn_error $? "Unable to find wget, please install wget" "$LINENO" 5
-fi
+#set dummy wget; ac_word=$2
+#{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+#$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+#if test "${ac_cv_path_WGET+set}" = set; then :
+# $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+#else
+# case $WGET in
+# [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+# ac_cv_path_WGET="$WGET" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+# ;;
+# *)
+# as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+#for as_dir in $PATH
+#do
+# IFS=$as_save_IFS
+# test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+# for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+# if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then
+# ac_cv_path_WGET="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+# $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+# break 2
+# fi
+#done
+# done
+#IFS=$as_save_IFS
+#
+# test -z "$ac_cv_path_WGET" && ac_cv_path_WGET="no"
+# ;;
+#esac
+#fi
+#WGET=$ac_cv_path_WGET
+#if test -n "$WGET"; then
+# { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $WGET" >&5
+#$as_echo "$WGET" >&6; }
+#else
+# { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+#$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+#fi
+#
+#
+#if test x"${WGET}" = x"no"
+#then
+# as_fn_error $? "Unable to find wget, please install wget" "$LINENO" 5
+#fi
# Checks for programs that depend on a feature

0
disable_emulated_device.diff → disable_emulated_device.patch
View File

20
domu-usb-controller.patch
View File

@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py
@@ -1875,7 +1875,14 @@ class XendConfig(dict):
ports = sxp.child(dev_sxp, 'port')
for port in ports[1:]:
try:
- num, bus = port
+ # When ['port' ['1','']] is saved into sxp file, it will become (port (1 ))
+ # If using this sxp file, here variable "port" will be port=1,
+ # we should process it, otherwise, it will report error.
+ if len(port) == 1:
+ num = port[0]
+ bus = ""
+ else:
+ num, bus = port
dev_config['port-%i' % int(num)] = str(bus)
except TypeError:
pass

68
hv_extid_compatibility.patch
View File

@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py
@@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ XENAPI_PLATFORM_CFG_TYPES = {
'nographic': int,
'nomigrate': int,
'pae' : int,
+ 'extid': int,
'rtc_timeoffset': int,
'parallel': str,
'serial': str,
@@ -523,6 +524,8 @@ class XendConfig(dict):
self['platform']['acpi_firmware'] = ""
if 'timer_mode' not in self['platform']:
self['platform']['timer_mode'] = 1
+ if 'extid' in self['platform'] and int(self['platform']['extid']) == 1:
+ self['platform']['viridian'] = 1
if 'viridian' not in self['platform']:
self['platform']['viridian'] = 0
if 'rtc_timeoffset' not in self['platform']:
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py
@@ -830,6 +830,7 @@ class HVMImageHandler(ImageHandler):
self.apic = int(vmConfig['platform'].get('apic', 0))
self.acpi = int(vmConfig['platform'].get('acpi', 0))
+ self.extid = int(vmConfig['platform'].get('extid', 0))
self.guest_os_type = vmConfig['platform'].get('guest_os_type')
self.memory_sharing = int(vmConfig['memory_sharing'])
try:
Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py
@@ -242,6 +242,10 @@ gopts.var('viridian', val='VIRIDIAN',
use="""Expose Viridian interface to x86 HVM guest?
(Default is 0).""")
+gopts.var('extid', val='EXTID',
+ fn=set_int, default=0,
+ use="Specify extention ID for a HVM domain.")
+
gopts.var('acpi', val='ACPI',
fn=set_int, default=1,
use="Disable or enable ACPI of HVM domain.")
@@ -1120,7 +1124,7 @@ def configure_hvm(config_image, vals):
'timer_mode',
'usb', 'usbdevice',
'vcpus', 'vnc', 'vncconsole', 'vncdisplay', 'vnclisten',
- 'vncunused', 'viridian', 'vpt_align',
+ 'vncunused', 'vpt_align',
'watchdog', 'watchdog_action',
'xauthority', 'xen_extended_power_mgmt', 'xen_platform_pci',
'memory_sharing' ]
@@ -1130,6 +1134,10 @@ def configure_hvm(config_image, vals):
config_image.append([a, vals.__dict__[a]])
if vals.vncpasswd is not None:
config_image.append(['vncpasswd', vals.vncpasswd])
+ if vals.extid and vals.extid == 1:
+ config_image.append(['viridian', vals.extid])
+ elif vals.viridian:
+ config_image.append(['viridian', vals.viridian])
def make_config(vals):

32
ioemu-7615-qcow2-fix-alloc_cluster_link_l2.patch
View File

@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
qcow2 corruption: Fix alloc_cluster_link_l2 (Kevin Wolf)
This patch fixes a qcow2 corruption bug introduced in SVN Rev 5861. L2 tables
are big endian, so entries must be converted before being passed to functions.
This bug is easy to trigger. The following script will create and destroy a
qcow2 image (the header is gone after three loop iterations):
#!/bin/bash
qemu-img create -f qcow2 test.qcow 1M
for i in $(seq 1 10); do
qemu-system-x86_64 -hda test.qcow -monitor stdio > /dev/null 2>&1 <<EOF
savevm test-$i
quit
EOF
done
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/block-qcow2.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/block-qcow2.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/block-qcow2.c
@@ -916,7 +916,7 @@ static int alloc_cluster_link_l2(BlockDr
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < j; i++)
- free_any_clusters(bs, old_cluster[i], 1);
+ free_any_clusters(bs, be64_to_cpu(old_cluster[i]) & ~QCOW_OFLAG_COPIED, 1);
ret = 0;
err:

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More