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- NetWare will not boot or install on Xen 4.2

Browse Source 
reverse-24757-use-grant-references.patch 

- fate#313222 - xenstore-chmod should support 256 permissions
  26189-xenstore-chmod.patch

- bnc#789945 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5510: xen: Grant table version
  switch list corruption vulnerability (XSA-26)
  CVE-2012-5510-xsa26.patch
- bnc#789944 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5511: xen: Several HVM operations do
  not validate the range of their inputs (XSA-27)
  CVE-2012-5511-xsa27.patch
- bnc#789951 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5513: xen: XENMEM_exchange may
  overwrite hypervisor memory (XSA-29)
  CVE-2012-5513-xsa29.patch
- bnc#789948 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5514: xen: Missing unlock in
  guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand() (XSA-30)
  CVE-2012-5514-xsa30.patch
- bnc#789950 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5515: xen: Several memory hypercall
  operations allow invalid extent order values (XSA-31)
  CVE-2012-5515-xsa31.patch
- bnc#789952 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5525: xen: Several hypercalls do not
  validate input GFNs (XSA-32)
  CVE-2012-5525-xsa32.patch
- Upstream patches from Jan
  26129-ACPI-BGRT-invalidate.patch
  26132-tmem-save-NULL-check.patch
  26134-x86-shadow-invlpg-check.patch
  26139-cpumap-masking.patch
  26148-vcpu-timer-overflow.patch (Replaces CVE-2012-4535-xsa20.patch)

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Virtualization/xen?expand=0&rev=219
This commit is contained in:
Charles Arnold 2012-12-07 18:04:08 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
parent 04a84ef35a
commit 5c0f7d38a6
22 changed files with 1710 additions and 31 deletions
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643
26129-ACPI-BGRT-invalidate.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,643 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1352368421 -3600
# Node ID 92163b114076029842d0f2d1dbfaa445976c71a3
# Parent aa2074529eb0183257b6f5f29821b0cd6dfd991a
x86/ACPI: invalidate BGRT if necessary
Since the image pointed to may live in boot services memory (which we
add to the global memory pool long before ACPI tables get looked at),
we should prevent Dom0 from trying to retrieve the image data in that
case.
The alternatives would be to
- not add boot services memory to the global pool at all, or
- defer adding boot services memory until Dom0 indicates it is safe to
do so, or
- find and parse the BGRT table in xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c, and avoid
adding that specific region to the E820 table.
None of these are really attractive, and as Xen commonly prints to the
video console anyway (without trying to avoid any regions on the
screen), the invalidation would need to be done conditionally anyway.
(xen/include/acpi/actbl3.h is a verbatim copy from Linux 3.7-rc4)
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/boot.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/boot.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <xen/init.h>
#include <xen/acpi.h>
#include <xen/irq.h>
+#include <xen/mm.h>
#include <xen/dmi.h>
#include <asm/fixmap.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
@@ -285,6 +286,27 @@ static int __init acpi_parse_hpet(struct
#define acpi_parse_hpet NULL
#endif
+static int __init acpi_invalidate_bgrt(struct acpi_table_header *table)
+{
+ struct acpi_table_bgrt *bgrt_tbl =
+ container_of(table, struct acpi_table_bgrt, header);
+
+ if (table->length < sizeof(*bgrt_tbl))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (bgrt_tbl->version == 1 && bgrt_tbl->image_address
+ && !page_is_ram_type(PFN_DOWN(bgrt_tbl->image_address),
+ RAM_TYPE_CONVENTIONAL))
+ return 0;
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO PREFIX "BGRT: invalidating v%d image at %#"PRIx64"\n",
+ bgrt_tbl->version, bgrt_tbl->image_address);
+ bgrt_tbl->image_address = 0;
+ bgrt_tbl->status &= ~1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_SLEEP
#define acpi_fadt_copy_address(dst, src, len) do { \
if (fadt->header.revision >= FADT2_REVISION_ID) \
@@ -833,5 +855,7 @@ int __init acpi_boot_init(void)
erst_init();
+ acpi_table_parse(ACPI_SIG_BGRT, acpi_invalidate_bgrt);
+
return 0;
}
--- a/xen/include/acpi/actbl.h
+++ b/xen/include/acpi/actbl.h
@@ -314,6 +314,7 @@ enum acpi_prefered_pm_profiles {
#include <acpi/actbl1.h>
#include <acpi/actbl2.h>
+#include <acpi/actbl3.h>
/*
* Sizes of the various flavors of FADT. We need to look closely
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xen/include/acpi/actbl3.h
@@ -0,0 +1,557 @@
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * Name: actbl3.h - ACPI Table Definitions
+ *
+ *****************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2000 - 2012, Intel Corp.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions, and the following disclaimer,
+ * without modification.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce at minimum a disclaimer
+ * substantially similar to the "NO WARRANTY" disclaimer below
+ * ("Disclaimer") and any redistribution must be conditioned upon
+ * including a substantially similar Disclaimer requirement for further
+ * binary redistribution.
+ * 3. Neither the names of the above-listed copyright holders nor the names
+ * of any contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
+ * from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * Alternatively, this software may be distributed under the terms of the
+ * GNU General Public License ("GPL") version 2 as published by the Free
+ * Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * NO WARRANTY
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+ * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ * HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
+ * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __ACTBL3_H__
+#define __ACTBL3_H__
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * Additional ACPI Tables (3)
+ *
+ * These tables are not consumed directly by the ACPICA subsystem, but are
+ * included here to support device drivers and the AML disassembler.
+ *
+ * The tables in this file are fully defined within the ACPI specification.
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Values for description table header signatures for tables defined in this
+ * file. Useful because they make it more difficult to inadvertently type in
+ * the wrong signature.
+ */
+#define ACPI_SIG_BGRT "BGRT" /* Boot Graphics Resource Table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_DRTM "DRTM" /* Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_FPDT "FPDT" /* Firmware Performance Data Table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_GTDT "GTDT" /* Generic Timer Description Table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_MPST "MPST" /* Memory Power State Table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_PCCT "PCCT" /* Platform Communications Channel Table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_PMTT "PMTT" /* Platform Memory Topology Table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_RASF "RASF" /* RAS Feature table */
+
+#define ACPI_SIG_S3PT "S3PT" /* S3 Performance (sub)Table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_PCCS "PCC" /* PCC Shared Memory Region */
+
+/* Reserved table signatures */
+
+#define ACPI_SIG_CSRT "CSRT" /* Core System Resources Table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_MATR "MATR" /* Memory Address Translation Table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_MSDM "MSDM" /* Microsoft Data Management Table */
+#define ACPI_SIG_WPBT "WPBT" /* Windows Platform Binary Table */
+
+/*
+ * All tables must be byte-packed to match the ACPI specification, since
+ * the tables are provided by the system BIOS.
+ */
+#pragma pack(1)
+
+/*
+ * Note: C bitfields are not used for this reason:
+ *
+ * "Bitfields are great and easy to read, but unfortunately the C language
+ * does not specify the layout of bitfields in memory, which means they are
+ * essentially useless for dealing with packed data in on-disk formats or
+ * binary wire protocols." (Or ACPI tables and buffers.) "If you ask me,
+ * this decision was a design error in C. Ritchie could have picked an order
+ * and stuck with it." Norman Ramsey.
+ * See http://stackoverflow.com/a/1053662/41661
+ */
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * BGRT - Boot Graphics Resource Table (ACPI 5.0)
+ * Version 1
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+struct acpi_table_bgrt {
+ struct acpi_table_header header; /* Common ACPI table header */
+ u16 version;
+ u8 status;
+ u8 image_type;
+ u64 image_address;
+ u32 image_offset_x;
+ u32 image_offset_y;
+};
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * DRTM - Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement table
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+struct acpi_table_drtm {
+ struct acpi_table_header header; /* Common ACPI table header */
+ u64 entry_base_address;
+ u64 entry_length;
+ u32 entry_address32;
+ u64 entry_address64;
+ u64 exit_address;
+ u64 log_area_address;
+ u32 log_area_length;
+ u64 arch_dependent_address;
+ u32 flags;
+};
+
+/* 1) Validated Tables List */
+
+struct acpi_drtm_vtl_list {
+ u32 validated_table_list_count;
+};
+
+/* 2) Resources List */
+
+struct acpi_drtm_resource_list {
+ u32 resource_list_count;
+};
+
+/* 3) Platform-specific Identifiers List */
+
+struct acpi_drtm_id_list {
+ u32 id_list_count;
+};
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * FPDT - Firmware Performance Data Table (ACPI 5.0)
+ * Version 1
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+struct acpi_table_fpdt {
+ struct acpi_table_header header; /* Common ACPI table header */
+};
+
+/* FPDT subtable header */
+
+struct acpi_fpdt_header {
+ u16 type;
+ u8 length;
+ u8 revision;
+};
+
+/* Values for Type field above */
+
+enum acpi_fpdt_type {
+ ACPI_FPDT_TYPE_BOOT = 0,
+ ACPI_FPDT_TYPE_S3PERF = 1,
+};
+
+/*
+ * FPDT subtables
+ */
+
+/* 0: Firmware Basic Boot Performance Record */
+
+struct acpi_fpdt_boot {
+ struct acpi_fpdt_header header;
+ u8 reserved[4];
+ u64 reset_end;
+ u64 load_start;
+ u64 startup_start;
+ u64 exit_services_entry;
+ u64 exit_services_exit;
+};
+
+/* 1: S3 Performance Table Pointer Record */
+
+struct acpi_fpdt_s3pt_ptr {
+ struct acpi_fpdt_header header;
+ u8 reserved[4];
+ u64 address;
+};
+
+/*
+ * S3PT - S3 Performance Table. This table is pointed to by the
+ * FPDT S3 Pointer Record above.
+ */
+struct acpi_table_s3pt {
+ u8 signature[4]; /* "S3PT" */
+ u32 length;
+};
+
+/*
+ * S3PT Subtables
+ */
+struct acpi_s3pt_header {
+ u16 type;
+ u8 length;
+ u8 revision;
+};
+
+/* Values for Type field above */
+
+enum acpi_s3pt_type {
+ ACPI_S3PT_TYPE_RESUME = 0,
+ ACPI_S3PT_TYPE_SUSPEND = 1,
+};
+
+struct acpi_s3pt_resume {
+ struct acpi_s3pt_header header;
+ u32 resume_count;
+ u64 full_resume;
+ u64 average_resume;
+};
+
+struct acpi_s3pt_suspend {
+ struct acpi_s3pt_header header;
+ u64 suspend_start;
+ u64 suspend_end;
+};
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * GTDT - Generic Timer Description Table (ACPI 5.0)
+ * Version 1
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+struct acpi_table_gtdt {
+ struct acpi_table_header header; /* Common ACPI table header */
+ u64 address;
+ u32 flags;
+ u32 secure_pl1_interrupt;
+ u32 secure_pl1_flags;
+ u32 non_secure_pl1_interrupt;
+ u32 non_secure_pl1_flags;
+ u32 virtual_timer_interrupt;
+ u32 virtual_timer_flags;
+ u32 non_secure_pl2_interrupt;
+ u32 non_secure_pl2_flags;
+};
+
+/* Values for Flags field above */
+
+#define ACPI_GTDT_MAPPED_BLOCK_PRESENT 1
+
+/* Values for all "TimerFlags" fields above */
+
+#define ACPI_GTDT_INTERRUPT_MODE 1
+#define ACPI_GTDT_INTERRUPT_POLARITY 2
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * MPST - Memory Power State Table (ACPI 5.0)
+ * Version 1
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+#define ACPI_MPST_CHANNEL_INFO \
+ u16 reserved1; \
+ u8 channel_id; \
+ u8 reserved2; \
+ u16 power_node_count;
+
+/* Main table */
+
+struct acpi_table_mpst {
+ struct acpi_table_header header; /* Common ACPI table header */
+ ACPI_MPST_CHANNEL_INFO /* Platform Communication Channel */
+};
+
+/* Memory Platform Communication Channel Info */
+
+struct acpi_mpst_channel {
+ ACPI_MPST_CHANNEL_INFO /* Platform Communication Channel */
+};
+
+/* Memory Power Node Structure */
+
+struct acpi_mpst_power_node {
+ u8 flags;
+ u8 reserved1;
+ u16 node_id;
+ u32 length;
+ u64 range_address;
+ u64 range_length;
+ u8 num_power_states;
+ u8 num_physical_components;
+ u16 reserved2;
+};
+
+/* Values for Flags field above */
+
+#define ACPI_MPST_ENABLED 1
+#define ACPI_MPST_POWER_MANAGED 2
+#define ACPI_MPST_HOT_PLUG_CAPABLE 4
+
+/* Memory Power State Structure (follows POWER_NODE above) */
+
+struct acpi_mpst_power_state {
+ u8 power_state;
+ u8 info_index;
+};
+
+/* Physical Component ID Structure (follows POWER_STATE above) */
+
+struct acpi_mpst_component {
+ u16 component_id;
+};
+
+/* Memory Power State Characteristics Structure (follows all POWER_NODEs) */
+
+struct acpi_mpst_data_hdr {
+ u16 characteristics_count;
+};
+
+struct acpi_mpst_power_data {
+ u8 revision;
+ u8 flags;
+ u16 reserved1;
+ u32 average_power;
+ u32 power_saving;
+ u64 exit_latency;
+ u64 reserved2;
+};
+
+/* Values for Flags field above */
+
+#define ACPI_MPST_PRESERVE 1
+#define ACPI_MPST_AUTOENTRY 2
+#define ACPI_MPST_AUTOEXIT 4
+
+/* Shared Memory Region (not part of an ACPI table) */
+
+struct acpi_mpst_shared {
+ u32 signature;
+ u16 pcc_command;
+ u16 pcc_status;
+ u16 command_register;
+ u16 status_register;
+ u16 power_state_id;
+ u16 power_node_id;
+ u64 energy_consumed;
+ u64 average_power;
+};
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * PCCT - Platform Communications Channel Table (ACPI 5.0)
+ * Version 1
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+struct acpi_table_pcct {
+ struct acpi_table_header header; /* Common ACPI table header */
+ u32 flags;
+ u32 latency;
+ u32 reserved;
+};
+
+/* Values for Flags field above */
+
+#define ACPI_PCCT_DOORBELL 1
+
+/*
+ * PCCT subtables
+ */
+
+/* 0: Generic Communications Subspace */
+
+struct acpi_pcct_subspace {
+ struct acpi_subtable_header header;
+ u8 reserved[6];
+ u64 base_address;
+ u64 length;
+ struct acpi_generic_address doorbell_register;
+ u64 preserve_mask;
+ u64 write_mask;
+};
+
+/*
+ * PCC memory structures (not part of the ACPI table)
+ */
+
+/* Shared Memory Region */
+
+struct acpi_pcct_shared_memory {
+ u32 signature;
+ u16 command;
+ u16 status;
+};
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * PMTT - Platform Memory Topology Table (ACPI 5.0)
+ * Version 1
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+struct acpi_table_pmtt {
+ struct acpi_table_header header; /* Common ACPI table header */
+ u32 reserved;
+};
+
+/* Common header for PMTT subtables that follow main table */
+
+struct acpi_pmtt_header {
+ u8 type;
+ u8 reserved1;
+ u16 length;
+ u16 flags;
+ u16 reserved2;
+};
+
+/* Values for Type field above */
+
+#define ACPI_PMTT_TYPE_SOCKET 0
+#define ACPI_PMTT_TYPE_CONTROLLER 1
+#define ACPI_PMTT_TYPE_DIMM 2
+#define ACPI_PMTT_TYPE_RESERVED 3 /* 0x03-0xFF are reserved */
+
+/* Values for Flags field above */
+
+#define ACPI_PMTT_TOP_LEVEL 0x0001
+#define ACPI_PMTT_PHYSICAL 0x0002
+#define ACPI_PMTT_MEMORY_TYPE 0x000C
+
+/*
+ * PMTT subtables, correspond to Type in struct acpi_pmtt_header
+ */
+
+/* 0: Socket Structure */
+
+struct acpi_pmtt_socket {
+ struct acpi_pmtt_header header;
+ u16 socket_id;
+ u16 reserved;
+};
+
+/* 1: Memory Controller subtable */
+
+struct acpi_pmtt_controller {
+ struct acpi_pmtt_header header;
+ u32 read_latency;
+ u32 write_latency;
+ u32 read_bandwidth;
+ u32 write_bandwidth;
+ u16 access_width;
+ u16 alignment;
+ u16 reserved;
+ u16 domain_count;
+};
+
+/* 1a: Proximity Domain substructure */
+
+struct acpi_pmtt_domain {
+ u32 proximity_domain;
+};
+
+/* 2: Physical Component Identifier (DIMM) */
+
+struct acpi_pmtt_physical_component {
+ struct acpi_pmtt_header header;
+ u16 component_id;
+ u16 reserved;
+ u32 memory_size;
+ u32 bios_handle;
+};
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * RASF - RAS Feature Table (ACPI 5.0)
+ * Version 1
+ *
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+struct acpi_table_rasf {
+ struct acpi_table_header header; /* Common ACPI table header */
+ u8 channel_id[12];
+};
+
+/* RASF Platform Communication Channel Shared Memory Region */
+
+struct acpi_rasf_shared_memory {
+ u32 signature;
+ u16 command;
+ u16 status;
+ u64 requested_address;
+ u64 requested_length;
+ u64 actual_address;
+ u64 actual_length;
+ u16 flags;
+ u8 speed;
+};
+
+/* Masks for Flags and Speed fields above */
+
+#define ACPI_RASF_SCRUBBER_RUNNING 1
+#define ACPI_RASF_SPEED (7<<1)
+
+/* Channel Commands */
+
+enum acpi_rasf_commands {
+ ACPI_RASF_GET_RAS_CAPABILITIES = 1,
+ ACPI_RASF_GET_PATROL_PARAMETERS = 2,
+ ACPI_RASF_START_PATROL_SCRUBBER = 3,
+ ACPI_RASF_STOP_PATROL_SCRUBBER = 4
+};
+
+/* Channel Command flags */
+
+#define ACPI_RASF_GENERATE_SCI (1<<15)
+
+/* Status values */
+
+enum acpi_rasf_status {
+ ACPI_RASF_SUCCESS = 0,
+ ACPI_RASF_NOT_VALID = 1,
+ ACPI_RASF_NOT_SUPPORTED = 2,
+ ACPI_RASF_BUSY = 3,
+ ACPI_RASF_FAILED = 4,
+ ACPI_RASF_ABORTED = 5,
+ ACPI_RASF_INVALID_DATA = 6
+};
+
+/* Status flags */
+
+#define ACPI_RASF_COMMAND_COMPLETE (1)
+#define ACPI_RASF_SCI_DOORBELL (1<<1)
+#define ACPI_RASF_ERROR (1<<2)
+#define ACPI_RASF_STATUS (0x1F<<3)
+
+/* Reset to default packing */
+
+#pragma pack()
+
+#endif /* __ACTBL3_H__ */

31
26132-tmem-save-NULL-check.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
# Date 1352709297 -3600
# Node ID 286ef4ced2164f4e9bf52fd0c52248182e69a6e6
# Parent 62885b3c34c84354ead017703a86f0465cb58cf7
tmem: Prevent NULL dereference on error case
If the client / pool IDs given to tmemc_save_get_next_page are invalid,
the calculation of pagesize will dereference NULL.
Fix this by moving the calculation below the appropriate NULL check.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/common/tmem.c
+++ b/xen/common/tmem.c
@@ -2446,10 +2446,12 @@ static NOINLINE int tmemc_save_get_next_
OID oid;
int ret = 0;
struct tmem_handle h;
- unsigned int pagesize = 1 << (pool->pageshift+12);
+ unsigned int pagesize;
if ( pool == NULL || is_ephemeral(pool) )
return -1;
+
+ pagesize = 1 << (pool->pageshift + 12);
if ( bufsize < pagesize + sizeof(struct tmem_handle) )
return -ENOMEM;

22
26134-x86-shadow-invlpg-check.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
# Date 1352715420 0
# Node ID 279bbf2a0b485fce18af26473eca5e60d794c17b
# Parent fdb69dd527cd01a46f87efb380050559dcf12d37
x86/mm x86 shadow: Fix typo in sh_invlpg sl3 page presence check
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Committed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
@@ -3665,7 +3665,7 @@ sh_invlpg(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long
perfc_incr(shadow_invlpg_fault);
return 0;
}
- if ( (!shadow_l3e_get_flags(sl3e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
+ if ( !(shadow_l3e_get_flags(sl3e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
return 0;
}
#else /* SHADOW_PAGING_LEVELS == 3 */

39
26139-cpumap-masking.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
# Date 1352802490 -3600
# Node ID 56400658f0962099988678487e525d12f869a96a
# Parent a3cde70320ada4a5424c37f65b8fe3753fc95205
fix xenctl_cpumap_to_cpumask() buffer size check
xenctl_cpumap_to_cpumask incorrectly uses sizeof when checking whether
bits should be masked off from the input cpumap bitmap or not.
Fix by using the correct cpumask buffer size in place of sizeof.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Compare against copy_bytes instead, and use equality rather than less-
or-equal.
Further, this issue (introduced with c/s 23991:a7ccbc79fc17) is not
security relevant (i.e. the bug could not cause memory corruption):
_xmalloc() never returns chunks of data smaller than the size of a
pointer, i.e. even if sizeof(void*) > guest_bytes > copy_bytes, the
piece of memory erroneously written to would still be inside the
allocation done at the top of the function.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ int xenctl_cpumap_to_cpumask(
{
if ( copy_from_guest(bytemap, xenctl_cpumap->bitmap, copy_bytes) )
err = -EFAULT;
- if ( (xenctl_cpumap->nr_cpus & 7) && (guest_bytes <= sizeof(bytemap)) )
+ if ( (xenctl_cpumap->nr_cpus & 7) && (guest_bytes == copy_bytes) )
bytemap[guest_bytes-1] &= ~(0xff << (xenctl_cpumap->nr_cpus & 7));
}

18
CVE-2012-4535-xsa20.patch → 26148-vcpu-timer-overflow.patch
View File

@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
References: CVE-2012-4535 XSA-20 bnc#786516 References: CVE-2012-4535 XSA-20 bnc#786516
# HG changeset patch
# User Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
# Date 1352892634 0
# Node ID bf58b94b3cef4db8d9ad9c8686bf10910ccc0644
# Parent 3186c04af5829a242059ffe4f6427853b7bfc408
VCPU/timers: Prevent overflow in calculations, leading to DoS vulnerability VCPU/timers: Prevent overflow in calculations, leading to DoS vulnerability
The timer action for a vcpu periodic timer is to calculate the next The timer action for a vcpu periodic timer is to calculate the next
@ -12,11 +17,10 @@ This is a security problem, XSA-20 / CVE-2012-4535.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/common/domain.c --- a/xen/common/domain.c
=================================================================== +++ b/xen/common/domain.c
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/xen/common/domain.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/common/domain.c
@@ -882,6 +882,9 @@ long do_vcpu_op(int cmd, int vcpuid, XEN @@ -882,6 +882,9 @@ long do_vcpu_op(int cmd, int vcpuid, XEN
if ( set.period_ns < MILLISECS(1) ) if ( set.period_ns < MILLISECS(1) )
return -EINVAL; return -EINVAL;
@ -27,10 +31,8 @@ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/common/domain.c
v->periodic_period = set.period_ns; v->periodic_period = set.period_ns;
vcpu_force_reschedule(v); vcpu_force_reschedule(v);
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/include/xen/time.h --- a/xen/include/xen/time.h
=================================================================== +++ b/xen/include/xen/time.h
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/time.h
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/include/xen/time.h
@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ struct tm gmtime(unsigned long t); @@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ struct tm gmtime(unsigned long t);
#define MILLISECS(_ms) ((s_time_t)((_ms) * 1000000ULL)) #define MILLISECS(_ms) ((s_time_t)((_ms) * 1000000ULL))
#define MICROSECS(_us) ((s_time_t)((_us) * 1000ULL)) #define MICROSECS(_us) ((s_time_t)((_us) * 1000ULL))

12
CVE-2012-4537-xsa22.patch → 26149-x86-p2m-physmap-error-path.patch
View File

@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
References: CVE-2012-4537 XSA-22 bnc#786517 References: CVE-2012-4537 XSA-22 bnc#786517
# HG changeset patch
# User Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
# Date 1352892962 0
# Node ID 6b6a4007a6091610a29b71cc32908c74113b852b
# Parent bf58b94b3cef4db8d9ad9c8686bf10910ccc0644
x86/physmap: Prevent incorrect updates of m2p mappings x86/physmap: Prevent incorrect updates of m2p mappings
In certain conditions, such as low memory, set_p2m_entry() can fail. In certain conditions, such as low memory, set_p2m_entry() can fail.
@ -17,11 +22,10 @@ This is a security problem, XSA-22 / CVE-2012-4537.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
=================================================================== +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -654,7 +654,10 @@ guest_physmap_add_entry(struct domain *d @@ -654,7 +654,10 @@ guest_physmap_add_entry(struct domain *d
if ( mfn_valid(_mfn(mfn)) ) if ( mfn_valid(_mfn(mfn)) )
{ {

12
CVE-2012-4538-xsa23.patch → 26150-x86-shadow-unhook-toplevel-check.patch
View File

@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
References: CVE-2012-4538 XSA-23 bnc#786519 References: CVE-2012-4538 XSA-23 bnc#786519
# HG changeset patch
# User Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
# Date 1352893341 0
# Node ID c7a01b6450e483ca839228bf1e1e44de692e3458
# Parent 6b6a4007a6091610a29b71cc32908c74113b852b
xen/mm/shadow: check toplevel pagetables are present before unhooking them. xen/mm/shadow: check toplevel pagetables are present before unhooking them.
If the guest has not fully populated its top-level PAE entries when it calls If the guest has not fully populated its top-level PAE entries when it calls
@ -13,11 +18,10 @@ This is a security problem, XSA-23 / CVE-2012-4538.
Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
=================================================================== +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
@@ -4734,8 +4734,12 @@ static void sh_pagetable_dying(struct vc @@ -4734,8 +4734,12 @@ static void sh_pagetable_dying(struct vc
unsigned long gfn; unsigned long gfn;
mfn_t smfn, gmfn; mfn_t smfn, gmfn;

12
CVE-2012-4539-xsa24.patch → 26151-gnttab-compat-get-status-frames.patch
View File

@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
References: CVE-2012-4539 XSA-24 bnc#786520 References: CVE-2012-4539 XSA-24 bnc#786520
# HG changeset patch
# User Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
# Date 1352893537 0
# Node ID b64a7d868f06c730a444e990da1a4d816ce3f5dc
# Parent c7a01b6450e483ca839228bf1e1e44de692e3458
compat/gnttab: Prevent infinite loop in compat code compat/gnttab: Prevent infinite loop in compat code
c/s 20281:95ea2052b41b, which introduces Grant Table version 2 c/s 20281:95ea2052b41b, which introduces Grant Table version 2
@ -13,11 +18,10 @@ This is a security problem, XSA-24 / CVE-2012-4539.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/common/compat/grant_table.c --- a/xen/common/compat/grant_table.c
=================================================================== +++ b/xen/common/compat/grant_table.c
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/xen/common/compat/grant_table.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/common/compat/grant_table.c
@@ -318,6 +318,8 @@ int compat_grant_table_op(unsigned int c @@ -318,6 +318,8 @@ int compat_grant_table_op(unsigned int c
#undef XLAT_gnttab_get_status_frames_HNDL_frame_list #undef XLAT_gnttab_get_status_frames_HNDL_frame_list
if ( unlikely(__copy_to_guest(cmp_uop, &cmp.get_status, 1)) ) if ( unlikely(__copy_to_guest(cmp_uop, &cmp.get_status, 1)) )

59
26179-PCI-find-next-cap.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1353398311 -3600
# Node ID ae6fb202b233af815466055d9f1a635802a50855
# Parent 02b9d9a25feecd76d56143afa9bbb853fd01f602
passthrough/PCI: replace improper uses of pci_find_next_cap()
Using pci_find_next_cap() without prior pci_find_cap_offset() is bogus
(and possibly wrong, given that the latter doesn't check the
PCI_STATUS_CAP_LIST flag, which so far was checked in an open-coded way
only for the non-bridge case).
Once at it, fold the two calls into one, as we need its result in any
case.
Question is whether, without any caller left, pci_find_next_cap()
should be purged as well.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Xiantao Zhang <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
@@ -565,16 +565,13 @@ void pci_release_devices(struct domain *
int pdev_type(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
{
- u16 class_device;
- u16 status, creg;
- int pos;
+ u16 class_device, creg;
u8 d = PCI_SLOT(devfn), f = PCI_FUNC(devfn);
+ int pos = pci_find_cap_offset(seg, bus, d, f, PCI_CAP_ID_EXP);
class_device = pci_conf_read16(seg, bus, d, f, PCI_CLASS_DEVICE);
if ( class_device == PCI_CLASS_BRIDGE_PCI )
{
- pos = pci_find_next_cap(seg, bus, devfn,
- PCI_CAPABILITY_LIST, PCI_CAP_ID_EXP);
if ( !pos )
return DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE;
creg = pci_conf_read16(seg, bus, d, f, pos + PCI_EXP_FLAGS);
@@ -582,15 +579,7 @@ int pdev_type(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE : DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE;
}
- status = pci_conf_read16(seg, bus, d, f, PCI_STATUS);
- if ( !(status & PCI_STATUS_CAP_LIST) )
- return DEV_TYPE_PCI;
-
- if ( pci_find_next_cap(seg, bus, devfn, PCI_CAPABILITY_LIST,
- PCI_CAP_ID_EXP) )
- return DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT;
-
- return DEV_TYPE_PCI;
+ return pos ? DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT : DEV_TYPE_PCI;
}
/*

88
26183-x86-HPET-masking.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1353575003 -3600
# Node ID c139ca92edca2fab8ec95deb7fd9e4246c3fe28d
# Parent af6b72a224e99a4a516fbc2eecc06ada569304e8
x86/HPET: fix FSB interrupt masking
HPET_TN_FSB is not really suitable for masking interrupts - it merely
switches between the two delivery methods. The right way of masking is
through the HPET_TN_ENABLE bit (which really is an interrupt enable,
not a counter enable or some such). This is even more so with certain
chip sets not even allowing HPET_TN_FSB to be cleared on some of the
channels.
Further, all the setup of the channel should happen before actually
enabling the interrupt, which requires splitting legacy and FSB logic.
Finally this also fixes an S3 resume problem (HPET_TN_FSB did not get
set in hpet_broadcast_resume(), and hpet_msi_unmask() doesn't get
called from the general resume code either afaict).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static void hpet_msi_unmask(struct irq_d
struct hpet_event_channel *ch = desc->action->dev_id;
cfg = hpet_read32(HPET_Tn_CFG(ch->idx));
- cfg |= HPET_TN_FSB;
+ cfg |= HPET_TN_ENABLE;
hpet_write32(cfg, HPET_Tn_CFG(ch->idx));
}
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ static void hpet_msi_mask(struct irq_des
struct hpet_event_channel *ch = desc->action->dev_id;
cfg = hpet_read32(HPET_Tn_CFG(ch->idx));
- cfg &= ~HPET_TN_FSB;
+ cfg &= ~HPET_TN_ENABLE;
hpet_write32(cfg, HPET_Tn_CFG(ch->idx));
}
@@ -319,8 +319,14 @@ static void __hpet_setup_msi_irq(struct
static int __init hpet_setup_msi_irq(unsigned int irq, struct hpet_event_channel *ch)
{
int ret;
+ u32 cfg = hpet_read32(HPET_Tn_CFG(ch->idx));
irq_desc_t *desc = irq_to_desc(irq);
+ /* set HPET Tn as oneshot */
+ cfg &= ~(HPET_TN_LEVEL | HPET_TN_PERIODIC);
+ cfg |= HPET_TN_FSB | HPET_TN_32BIT;
+ hpet_write32(cfg, HPET_Tn_CFG(ch->idx));
+
desc->handler = &hpet_msi_type;
ret = request_irq(irq, hpet_interrupt_handler, 0, "HPET", ch);
if ( ret < 0 )
@@ -541,11 +547,14 @@ void __init hpet_broadcast_init(void)
for ( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
{
- /* set HPET Tn as oneshot */
- cfg = hpet_read32(HPET_Tn_CFG(hpet_events[i].idx));
- cfg &= ~(HPET_TN_LEVEL | HPET_TN_PERIODIC);
- cfg |= HPET_TN_ENABLE | HPET_TN_32BIT;
- hpet_write32(cfg, HPET_Tn_CFG(hpet_events[i].idx));
+ if ( i == 0 && (cfg & HPET_CFG_LEGACY) )
+ {
+ /* set HPET T0 as oneshot */
+ cfg = hpet_read32(HPET_Tn_CFG(0));
+ cfg &= ~(HPET_TN_LEVEL | HPET_TN_PERIODIC);
+ cfg |= HPET_TN_ENABLE | HPET_TN_32BIT;
+ hpet_write32(cfg, HPET_Tn_CFG(0));
+ }
/*
* The period is a femto seconds value. We need to calculate the scaled
@@ -602,6 +611,8 @@ void hpet_broadcast_resume(void)
cfg = hpet_read32(HPET_Tn_CFG(hpet_events[i].idx));
cfg &= ~(HPET_TN_LEVEL | HPET_TN_PERIODIC);
cfg |= HPET_TN_ENABLE | HPET_TN_32BIT;
+ if ( !(hpet_events[i].flags & HPET_EVT_LEGACY) )
+ cfg |= HPET_TN_FSB;
hpet_write32(cfg, HPET_Tn_CFG(hpet_events[i].idx));
hpet_events[i].next_event = STIME_MAX;

34
26188-x86-time-scale-asm.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1353946839 -3600
# Node ID 16bf7f3069a77c8a15b785cfdb5f2f634661d7fc
# Parent 0049de3827bcfe3488dc6c7b7a60327a562aee5c
x86/time: fix scale_delta() inline assembly
The way it was coded, it clobbered %rdx without telling the compiler.
This generally didn't cause any problems except when there are two back
to back invocations (as in plt_overflow()), as in that case the
compiler may validly assume that it can re-use for the second instance
the value loaded into %rdx before the first one.
Once at it, also properly relax the second operand of "mul" (there's no
need for it to be in %rdx, or a register at all), and switch away from
using explicit register names in the instruction operands.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/time.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/time.c
@@ -142,8 +142,9 @@ static inline u64 scale_delta(u64 delta,
: "a" ((u32)delta), "1" ((u32)(delta >> 32)), "2" (scale->mul_frac) );
#else
asm (
- "mul %%rdx ; shrd $32,%%rdx,%%rax"
- : "=a" (product) : "0" (delta), "d" ((u64)scale->mul_frac) );
+ "mul %2 ; shrd $32,%1,%0"
+ : "=a" (product), "=d" (delta)
+ : "rm" (delta), "0" ((u64)scale->mul_frac) );
#endif
return product;

85
26189-xenstore-chmod.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 8b93ac0c93f3fb8a140b4688ba71841ac927d4e3
xenstore-chmod: handle arbitrary number of perms rather than MAX_PERMS constant
Constant MAX_PERMS 16 is too small to use in some occasions, e.g. if
there are more than 16 domU(s) on one hypervisor (it's easy to
achieve) and one wants to do xenstore-chmod PATH to all domU(s). So,
remove MAX_PERMS limitation and make it as arbitrary number of perms.
Signed-off-by: Chunyan Liu <cyliu@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r 8b93ac0c93f3 tools/xenstore/xenstore_client.c
--- a/tools/xenstore/xenstore_client.c Tue Nov 13 11:19:17 2012 +0000
+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstore_client.c Mon Nov 26 11:33:38 2012 +0800
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
#define PATH_SEP '/'
#define MAX_PATH_LEN 256
-#define MAX_PERMS 16
enum mode {
MODE_unknown,
@@ -407,44 +406,41 @@ perform(enum mode mode, int optind, int
output("%s\n", list[i]);
}
free(list);
- optind++;
- break;
- }
- case MODE_ls: {
- do_ls(xsh, argv[optind], 0, prefix);
- optind++;
- break;
+ optind++;
+ break;
+ }
+ case MODE_ls: {
+ do_ls(xsh, argv[optind], 0, prefix);
+ optind++;
+ break;
}
case MODE_chmod: {
- struct xs_permissions perms[MAX_PERMS];
- int nperms = 0;
/* save path pointer: */
char *path = argv[optind++];
- for (; argv[optind]; optind++, nperms++)
+ int nperms = argc - optind;
+ struct xs_permissions perms[nperms];
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; argv[optind]; optind++, i++)
{
- if (MAX_PERMS <= nperms)
- errx(1, "Too many permissions specified. "
- "Maximum per invocation is %d.", MAX_PERMS);
-
- perms[nperms].id = atoi(argv[optind]+1);
+ perms[i].id = atoi(argv[optind]+1);
switch (argv[optind][0])
{
case 'n':
- perms[nperms].perms = XS_PERM_NONE;
+ perms[i].perms = XS_PERM_NONE;
break;
case 'r':
- perms[nperms].perms = XS_PERM_READ;
+ perms[i].perms = XS_PERM_READ;
break;
case 'w':
- perms[nperms].perms = XS_PERM_WRITE;
+ perms[i].perms = XS_PERM_WRITE;
break;
case 'b':
- perms[nperms].perms = XS_PERM_READ | XS_PERM_WRITE;
+ perms[i].perms = XS_PERM_READ | XS_PERM_WRITE;
break;
default:
errx(1, "Invalid permission specification: '%c'",
- argv[optind][0]);
+ argv[optind][0]);
}
}

105
CVE-2012-5510-xsa26.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
References: CVE-2012-5510 XSA-26 bnc#789945
gnttab: fix releasing of memory upon switches between versions
gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames() incompletely freed the pages
previously used as status frame in that they did not get removed from
the domain's xenpage_list, thus causing subsequent list corruption
when those pages did get allocated again for the same or another purpose.
Similarly, grant_table_create() and gnttab_grow_table() both improperly
clean up in the event of an error - pages already shared with the guest
can't be freed by just passing them to free_xenheap_page(). Fix this by
sharing the pages only after all allocations succeeded.
This is CVE-2012-5510 / XSA-26.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
@@ -1170,12 +1170,13 @@ fault:
}
static int
-gnttab_populate_status_frames(struct domain *d, struct grant_table *gt)
+gnttab_populate_status_frames(struct domain *d, struct grant_table *gt,
+ unsigned int req_nr_frames)
{
unsigned i;
unsigned req_status_frames;
- req_status_frames = grant_to_status_frames(gt->nr_grant_frames);
+ req_status_frames = grant_to_status_frames(req_nr_frames);
for ( i = nr_status_frames(gt); i < req_status_frames; i++ )
{
if ( (gt->status[i] = alloc_xenheap_page()) == NULL )
@@ -1206,7 +1207,12 @@ gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames(struct d
for ( i = 0; i < nr_status_frames(gt); i++ )
{
- page_set_owner(virt_to_page(gt->status[i]), dom_xen);
+ struct page_info *pg = virt_to_page(gt->status[i]);
+
+ BUG_ON(page_get_owner(pg) != d);
+ if ( test_and_clear_bit(_PGC_allocated, &pg->count_info) )
+ put_page(pg);
+ BUG_ON(pg->count_info & ~PGC_xen_heap);
free_xenheap_page(gt->status[i]);
gt->status[i] = NULL;
}
@@ -1244,19 +1250,18 @@ gnttab_grow_table(struct domain *d, unsi
clear_page(gt->shared_raw[i]);
}
- /* Share the new shared frames with the recipient domain */
- for ( i = nr_grant_frames(gt); i < req_nr_frames; i++ )
- gnttab_create_shared_page(d, gt, i);
-
- gt->nr_grant_frames = req_nr_frames;
-
/* Status pages - version 2 */
if (gt->gt_version > 1)
{
- if ( gnttab_populate_status_frames(d, gt) )
+ if ( gnttab_populate_status_frames(d, gt, req_nr_frames) )
goto shared_alloc_failed;
}
+ /* Share the new shared frames with the recipient domain */
+ for ( i = nr_grant_frames(gt); i < req_nr_frames; i++ )
+ gnttab_create_shared_page(d, gt, i);
+ gt->nr_grant_frames = req_nr_frames;
+
return 1;
shared_alloc_failed:
@@ -2154,7 +2159,7 @@ gnttab_set_version(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(gntt
if ( op.version == 2 && gt->gt_version < 2 )
{
- res = gnttab_populate_status_frames(d, gt);
+ res = gnttab_populate_status_frames(d, gt, nr_grant_frames(gt));
if ( res < 0)
goto out_unlock;
}
@@ -2597,14 +2602,15 @@ grant_table_create(
clear_page(t->shared_raw[i]);
}
- for ( i = 0; i < INITIAL_NR_GRANT_FRAMES; i++ )
- gnttab_create_shared_page(d, t, i);
-
/* Status pages for grant table - for version 2 */
t->status = xzalloc_array(grant_status_t *,
grant_to_status_frames(max_nr_grant_frames));
if ( t->status == NULL )
goto no_mem_4;
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < INITIAL_NR_GRANT_FRAMES; i++ )
+ gnttab_create_shared_page(d, t, i);
+
t->nr_status_frames = 0;
/* Okay, install the structure. */

136
CVE-2012-5511-xsa27.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
References: CVE-2012-5511 XSA-27 bnc#789944
hvm: Limit the size of large HVM op batches
Doing large p2m updates for HVMOP_track_dirty_vram without preemption
ties up the physical processor. Integrating preemption into the p2m
updates is hard so simply limit to 1GB which is sufficient for a 15000
* 15000 * 32bpp framebuffer.
For HVMOP_modified_memory and HVMOP_set_mem_type preemptible add the
necessary machinery to handle preemption.
This is CVE-2012-5511 / XSA-27.
Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
v2: Provide definition of GB to fix x86-32 compile.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -4033,6 +4033,9 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUE
if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
goto param_fail2;
+ if ( a.nr > GB(1) >> PAGE_SHIFT )
+ goto param_fail2;
+
rc = xsm_hvm_param(d, op);
if ( rc )
goto param_fail2;
@@ -4059,7 +4062,6 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUE
{
struct xen_hvm_modified_memory a;
struct domain *d;
- unsigned long pfn;
if ( copy_from_guest(&a, arg, 1) )
return -EFAULT;
@@ -4086,9 +4088,11 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUE
if ( !paging_mode_log_dirty(d) )
goto param_fail3;
- for ( pfn = a.first_pfn; pfn < a.first_pfn + a.nr; pfn++ )
+ while ( a.nr > 0 )
{
+ unsigned long pfn = a.first_pfn;
struct page_info *page;
+
page = get_page_from_gfn(d, pfn, NULL, P2M_UNSHARE);
if ( page )
{
@@ -4098,6 +4102,19 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUE
sh_remove_shadows(d->vcpu[0], _mfn(page_to_mfn(page)), 1, 0);
put_page(page);
}
+
+ a.first_pfn++;
+ a.nr--;
+
+ /* Check for continuation if it's not the last interation */
+ if ( a.nr > 0 && hypercall_preempt_check() )
+ {
+ if ( copy_to_guest(arg, &a, 1) )
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ else
+ rc = -EAGAIN;
+ break;
+ }
}
param_fail3:
@@ -4153,7 +4170,6 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUE
{
struct xen_hvm_set_mem_type a;
struct domain *d;
- unsigned long pfn;
/* Interface types to internal p2m types */
p2m_type_t memtype[] = {
@@ -4186,8 +4202,9 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUE
if ( a.hvmmem_type >= ARRAY_SIZE(memtype) )
goto param_fail4;
- for ( pfn = a.first_pfn; pfn < a.first_pfn + a.nr; pfn++ )
+ while ( a.nr )
{
+ unsigned long pfn = a.first_pfn;
p2m_type_t t;
p2m_type_t nt;
mfn_t mfn;
@@ -4227,6 +4244,19 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUE
}
}
put_gfn(d, pfn);
+
+ a.first_pfn++;
+ a.nr--;
+
+ /* Check for continuation if it's not the last interation */
+ if ( a.nr > 0 && hypercall_preempt_check() )
+ {
+ if ( copy_to_guest(arg, &a, 1) )
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ else
+ rc = -EAGAIN;
+ goto param_fail4;
+ }
}
rc = 0;
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/config.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/config.h
@@ -119,6 +119,9 @@ extern char wakeup_start[];
extern unsigned int video_mode, video_flags;
extern unsigned short boot_edid_caps;
extern unsigned char boot_edid_info[128];
+
+#define GB(_gb) (_gb ## UL << 30)
+
#endif
#define asmlinkage
@@ -134,7 +137,6 @@ extern unsigned char boot_edid_info[128]
#define PML4_ADDR(_slot) \
((((_slot ## UL) >> 8) * 0xffff000000000000UL) | \
(_slot ## UL << PML4_ENTRY_BITS))
-#define GB(_gb) (_gb ## UL << 30)
#else
#define PML4_ENTRY_BYTES (1 << PML4_ENTRY_BITS)
#define PML4_ADDR(_slot) \

47
CVE-2012-5513-xsa29.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
References: CVE-2012-5513 XSA-29 bnc#789951
xen: add missing guest address range checks to XENMEM_exchange handlers
Ever since its existence (3.0.3 iirc) the handler for this has been
using non address range checking guest memory accessors (i.e.
the ones prefixed with two underscores) without first range
checking the accessed space (via guest_handle_okay()), allowing
a guest to access and overwrite hypervisor memory.
This is XSA-29 / CVE-2012-5513.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
--- a/xen/common/compat/memory.c
+++ b/xen/common/compat/memory.c
@@ -115,6 +115,12 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, X
(cmp.xchg.out.nr_extents << cmp.xchg.out.extent_order)) )
return -EINVAL;
+ if ( !compat_handle_okay(cmp.xchg.in.extent_start,
+ cmp.xchg.in.nr_extents) ||
+ !compat_handle_okay(cmp.xchg.out.extent_start,
+ cmp.xchg.out.nr_extents) )
+ return -EFAULT;
+
start_extent = cmp.xchg.nr_exchanged;
end_extent = (COMPAT_ARG_XLAT_SIZE - sizeof(*nat.xchg)) /
(((1U << ABS(order_delta)) + 1) *
--- a/xen/common/memory.c
+++ b/xen/common/memory.c
@@ -308,6 +308,13 @@ static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HA
goto fail_early;
}
+ if ( !guest_handle_okay(exch.in.extent_start, exch.in.nr_extents) ||
+ !guest_handle_okay(exch.out.extent_start, exch.out.nr_extents) )
+ {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto fail_early;
+ }
+
/* Only privileged guests can allocate multi-page contiguous extents. */
if ( !multipage_allocation_permitted(current->domain,
exch.in.extent_order) ||

57
CVE-2012-5514-xsa30.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
References: CVE-2012-5514 XSA-30 bnc#789948
fix error handling of guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand()
The only user of the "out" label bypasses a necessary unlock, thus
enabling the caller to lock up Xen.
Also, the function was never meant to be called by a guest for itself,
so rather than inspecting the code paths in depth for potential other
problems this might cause, and adjusting e.g. the non-guest printk()
in the above error path, just disallow the guest access to it.
Finally, the printk() (considering its potential of spamming the log,
the more that it's not using XENLOG_GUEST), is being converted to
P2M_DEBUG(), as debugging is what it apparently was added for in the
first place.
This is XSA-30 / CVE-2012-5514.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
@@ -1117,6 +1117,9 @@ guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(st
mfn_t omfn;
int rc = 0;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ return -EPERM;
+
if ( !paging_mode_translate(d) )
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1135,8 +1138,7 @@ guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(st
omfn = p2m->get_entry(p2m, gfn + i, &ot, &a, 0, NULL);
if ( p2m_is_ram(ot) )
{
- printk("%s: gfn_to_mfn returned type %d!\n",
- __func__, ot);
+ P2M_DEBUG("gfn_to_mfn returned type %d!\n", ot);
rc = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
@@ -1160,9 +1162,9 @@ guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(st
pod_unlock(p2m);
}
+out:
gfn_unlock(p2m, gfn, order);
-out:
return rc;
}

50
CVE-2012-5515-xsa31.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
References: CVE-2012-5515 XSA-31 bnc#789950
memop: limit guest specified extent order
Allowing unbounded order values here causes almost unbounded loops
and/or partially incomplete requests, particularly in PoD code.
The added range checks in populate_physmap(), decrease_reservation(),
and the "in" one in memory_exchange() architecturally all could use
PADDR_BITS - PAGE_SHIFT, and are being artificially constrained to
MAX_ORDER.
This is XSA-31 / CVE-2012-5515.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
--- a/xen/common/memory.c
+++ b/xen/common/memory.c
@@ -115,7 +115,8 @@ static void populate_physmap(struct memo
if ( a->memflags & MEMF_populate_on_demand )
{
- if ( guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(d, gpfn,
+ if ( a->extent_order > MAX_ORDER ||
+ guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(d, gpfn,
a->extent_order) < 0 )
goto out;
}
@@ -235,7 +236,8 @@ static void decrease_reservation(struct
xen_pfn_t gmfn;
if ( !guest_handle_subrange_okay(a->extent_list, a->nr_done,
- a->nr_extents-1) )
+ a->nr_extents-1) ||
+ a->extent_order > MAX_ORDER )
return;
for ( i = a->nr_done; i < a->nr_extents; i++ )
@@ -297,6 +299,9 @@ static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HA
if ( (exch.nr_exchanged > exch.in.nr_extents) ||
/* Input and output domain identifiers match? */
(exch.in.domid != exch.out.domid) ||
+ /* Extent orders are sensible? */
+ (exch.in.extent_order > MAX_ORDER) ||
+ (exch.out.extent_order > MAX_ORDER) ||
/* Sizes of input and output lists do not overflow a long? */
((~0UL >> exch.in.extent_order) < exch.in.nr_extents) ||
((~0UL >> exch.out.extent_order) < exch.out.nr_extents) ||

22
CVE-2012-5525-xsa32.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
References: CVE-2012-5525 XSA-32 bnc#789952
x86: get_page_from_gfn() must return NULL for invalid GFNs
... also in the non-translated case.
This is XSA-32 / CVE-2012-5525.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ static inline struct page_info *get_page
if (t)
*t = p2m_ram_rw;
page = __mfn_to_page(gfn);
- return get_page(page, d) ? page : NULL;
+ return mfn_valid(gfn) && get_page(page, d) ? page : NULL;
}

145
reverse-24757-use-grant-references.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
Reverse c/s 24757. Breaks booting NetWare.
# HG changeset patch
# User Alex Zeffertt <alex.zeffertt@eu.citrix.com>
# Date 1328812412 0
# Node ID aae516b78fce679f9c367231b7a3891814fcfdbb
# Parent 585caf50a9260d3fc6a4ece0450d10d34e73489f
xenstored: use grant references instead of map_foreign_range
make xenstored use grantref rather than map_foreign_range (which can
only be used by privileged domains)
This patch modifies the xenstore daemon to use xc_gnttab_map_grant_ref
instead of xc_map_foreign_range where available.
Previous versions of this patch have been sent to xen-devel. See
http://lists.xensource.com/archives/html/xen-devel/2008-07/msg00610.html
http://lists.xensource.com/archives/html/xen-devel/2009-03/msg01492.html
Signed-off-by: Diego Ongaro <diego.ongaro@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Zeffertt <alex.zeffertt@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
@@ -32,10 +32,8 @@
#include "xenstored_watch.h"
#include <xenctrl.h>
-#include <xen/grant_table.h>
static xc_interface **xc_handle;
-xc_gnttab **xcg_handle;
static evtchn_port_t virq_port;
xc_evtchn *xce_handle = NULL;
@@ -165,26 +163,6 @@ static int readchn(struct connection *co
return len;
}
-static void *map_interface(domid_t domid, unsigned long mfn)
-{
- if (*xcg_handle != NULL) {
- /* this is the preferred method */
- return xc_gnttab_map_grant_ref(*xcg_handle, domid,
- GNTTAB_RESERVED_XENSTORE, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE);
- } else {
- return xc_map_foreign_range(*xc_handle, domid,
- getpagesize(), PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, mfn);
- }
-}
-
-static void unmap_interface(void *interface)
-{
- if (*xcg_handle != NULL)
- xc_gnttab_munmap(*xcg_handle, interface, 1);
- else
- munmap(interface, getpagesize());
-}
-
static int destroy_domain(void *_domain)
{
struct domain *domain = _domain;
@@ -196,14 +174,8 @@ static int destroy_domain(void *_domain)
eprintf("> Unbinding port %i failed!\n", domain->port);
}
- if (domain->interface) {
- /* Domain 0 was mapped by dom0_init, so it must be unmapped
- using munmap() and not the grant unmap call. */
- if (domain->domid == 0)
- unmap_xenbus(domain->interface);
- else
- unmap_interface(domain->interface);
- }
+ if (domain->interface)
+ munmap(domain->interface, getpagesize());
fire_watches(NULL, "@releaseDomain", false);
@@ -372,7 +344,9 @@ void do_introduce(struct connection *con
domain = find_domain_by_domid(domid);
if (domain == NULL) {
- interface = map_interface(domid, mfn);
+ interface = xc_map_foreign_range(
+ *xc_handle, domid,
+ getpagesize(), PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, mfn);
if (!interface) {
send_error(conn, errno);
return;
@@ -380,7 +354,7 @@ void do_introduce(struct connection *con
/* Hang domain off "in" until we're finished. */
domain = new_domain(in, domid, port);
if (!domain) {
- unmap_interface(interface);
+ munmap(interface, getpagesize());
send_error(conn, errno);
return;
}
@@ -572,18 +546,6 @@ void do_reset_watches(struct connection
send_ack(conn, XS_RESET_WATCHES);
}
-static int close_xc_handle(void *_handle)
-{
- xc_interface_close(*(xc_interface**)_handle);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int close_xcg_handle(void *_handle)
-{
- xc_gnttab_close(*(xc_gnttab **)_handle);
- return 0;
-}
-
/* Returns the implicit path of a connection (only domains have this) */
const char *get_implicit_path(const struct connection *conn)
{
@@ -633,18 +595,6 @@ void domain_init(void)
if (!*xc_handle)
barf_perror("Failed to open connection to hypervisor");
- talloc_set_destructor(xc_handle, close_xc_handle);
-
- xcg_handle = talloc(talloc_autofree_context(), xc_gnttab*);
- if (!xcg_handle)
- barf_perror("Failed to allocate domain gnttab handle");
-
- *xcg_handle = xc_gnttab_open(NULL, 0);
- if (*xcg_handle < 0)
- xprintf("WARNING: Failed to open connection to gnttab\n");
- else
- talloc_set_destructor(xcg_handle, close_xcg_handle);
-
xce_handle = xc_evtchn_open(NULL, 0);
if (xce_handle == NULL)

17
xen-max-free-mem.diff
View File

@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/balloon.py
+def get_dom0_min_target(): +def get_dom0_min_target():
+ """Returns the minimum amount of memory (in KiB) that dom0 will accept.""" + """Returns the minimum amount of memory (in KiB) that dom0 will accept."""
+ +
+ kb = _get_proc_balloon(labels['min-target']) + kb = _get_proc_balloon('min-target')
+ if kb == None: + if kb == None:
+ raise VmError('Failed to query minimum target memory allocation of dom0.') + raise VmError('Failed to query minimum target memory allocation of dom0.')
+ return kb + return kb
@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/balloon.py
+ """Returns the maximum amount of memory (in KiB) that is potentially + """Returns the maximum amount of memory (in KiB) that is potentially
+ visible to dom0.""" + visible to dom0."""
+ +
+ kb = _get_proc_balloon(labels['max-target']) + kb = _get_proc_balloon('max-target')
+ if kb == None: + if kb == None:
+ raise VmError('Failed to query maximum target memory allocation of dom0.') + raise VmError('Failed to query maximum target memory allocation of dom0.')
+ return kb + return kb
@ -133,3 +133,16 @@ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/SrvDomain.py
[['target', 'int']], [['target', 'int']],
req) req)
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/osdep.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/osdep.py
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/osdep.py
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ def _linux_balloon_stat_proc(label):
xend2linux_labels = { 'current' : 'Current allocation',
'target' : 'Requested target',
+ 'min-target' : 'Minimum target',
+ 'max-target' : 'Maximum target',
'low-balloon' : 'Low-mem balloon',
'high-balloon' : 'High-mem balloon',
'limit' : 'Xen hard limit' }

59
xen.changes
View File

@ -1,3 +1,49 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Dec 6 10:56:26 MST 2012 - carnold@novell.com
- NetWare will not boot or install on Xen 4.2
reverse-24757-use-grant-references.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fri Nov 30 10:30:10 CST 2012 - cyliu@suse.com
- fate#313222 - xenstore-chmod should support 256 permissions
26189-xenstore-chmod.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tue Nov 27 09:17:17 MST 2012 - carnold@novell.com
- bnc#789945 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5510: xen: Grant table version
switch list corruption vulnerability (XSA-26)
CVE-2012-5510-xsa26.patch
- bnc#789944 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5511: xen: Several HVM operations do
not validate the range of their inputs (XSA-27)
CVE-2012-5511-xsa27.patch
- bnc#789951 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5513: xen: XENMEM_exchange may
overwrite hypervisor memory (XSA-29)
CVE-2012-5513-xsa29.patch
- bnc#789948 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5514: xen: Missing unlock in
guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand() (XSA-30)
CVE-2012-5514-xsa30.patch
- bnc#789950 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5515: xen: Several memory hypercall
operations allow invalid extent order values (XSA-31)
CVE-2012-5515-xsa31.patch
- bnc#789952 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5525: xen: Several hypercalls do not
validate input GFNs (XSA-32)
CVE-2012-5525-xsa32.patch
- Upstream patches from Jan
26129-ACPI-BGRT-invalidate.patch
26132-tmem-save-NULL-check.patch
26134-x86-shadow-invlpg-check.patch
26139-cpumap-masking.patch
26148-vcpu-timer-overflow.patch (Replaces CVE-2012-4535-xsa20.patch)
26149-x86-p2m-physmap-error-path.patch (Replaces CVE-2012-4537-xsa22.patch)
26150-x86-shadow-unhook-toplevel-check.patch (Replaces CVE-2012-4538-xsa23.patch)
26151-gnttab-compat-get-status-frames.patch (Replaces CVE-2012-4539-xsa24.patch)
26179-PCI-find-next-cap.patch
26183-x86-HPET-masking.patch
26188-x86-time-scale-asm.patch
------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------
Wed Nov 21 20:57:56 CET 2012 - ohering@suse.de Wed Nov 21 20:57:56 CET 2012 - ohering@suse.de
@ -15,6 +61,19 @@ Tue Nov 13 16:35:55 MST 2012 - jfehlig@suse.com
- bnc#777628 - guest "disappears" after live migration - bnc#777628 - guest "disappears" after live migration
Updated block-dmmd script Updated block-dmmd script
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fri Nov 9 10:29:51 MST 2012 - carnold@novell.com
- Fix exception in balloon.py and osdep.py
xen-max-free-mem.diff
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tue Nov 6 17:41:34 MDT 2012 - carnold@novell.com
- fate#311966: Fix XEN VNC implementation to correctly map keyboard
layouts
VNC-Support-for-ExtendedKeyEvent-client-message.patch
------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------
Tue Oct 30 15:28:27 CET 2012 - ohering@suse.de Tue Oct 30 15:28:27 CET 2012 - ohering@suse.de

48
xen.spec
View File

@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ BuildRequires: kernel-syms
BuildRequires: module-init-tools BuildRequires: module-init-tools
BuildRequires: xorg-x11 BuildRequires: xorg-x11
%endif %endif
Version: 4.2.0_03 Version: 4.2.0_04
Release: 0 Release: 0
PreReq: %insserv_prereq %fillup_prereq PreReq: %insserv_prereq %fillup_prereq
Summary: Xen Virtualization: Hypervisor (aka VMM aka Microkernel) Summary: Xen Virtualization: Hypervisor (aka VMM aka Microkernel)
@ -232,11 +232,25 @@ Patch26096: 26096-SVM-nested-vmexit-emul.patch
Patch26098: 26098-perfc-build.patch Patch26098: 26098-perfc-build.patch
Patch26102: 26102-x86-IOAPIC-legacy-not-first.patch Patch26102: 26102-x86-IOAPIC-legacy-not-first.patch
Patch26114: 26114-pygrub-list-entries.patch Patch26114: 26114-pygrub-list-entries.patch
Patch20: CVE-2012-4535-xsa20.patch Patch26129: 26129-ACPI-BGRT-invalidate.patch
Patch22: CVE-2012-4537-xsa22.patch Patch26132: 26132-tmem-save-NULL-check.patch
Patch23: CVE-2012-4538-xsa23.patch Patch26134: 26134-x86-shadow-invlpg-check.patch
Patch24: CVE-2012-4539-xsa24.patch Patch26139: 26139-cpumap-masking.patch
Patch26148: 26148-vcpu-timer-overflow.patch
Patch26149: 26149-x86-p2m-physmap-error-path.patch
Patch26150: 26150-x86-shadow-unhook-toplevel-check.patch
Patch26151: 26151-gnttab-compat-get-status-frames.patch
Patch26179: 26179-PCI-find-next-cap.patch
Patch26183: 26183-x86-HPET-masking.patch
Patch26188: 26188-x86-time-scale-asm.patch
Patch26189: 26189-xenstore-chmod.patch
Patch25: CVE-2012-4544-xsa25.patch Patch25: CVE-2012-4544-xsa25.patch
Patch26: CVE-2012-5510-xsa26.patch
Patch27: CVE-2012-5511-xsa27.patch
Patch29: CVE-2012-5513-xsa29.patch
Patch30: CVE-2012-5514-xsa30.patch
Patch31: CVE-2012-5515-xsa31.patch
Patch32: CVE-2012-5525-xsa32.patch
# Upstream qemu patches # Upstream qemu patches
Patch100: VNC-Support-for-ExtendedKeyEvent-client-message.patch Patch100: VNC-Support-for-ExtendedKeyEvent-client-message.patch
# Our patches # Our patches
@ -330,6 +344,7 @@ Patch458: ipxe-enable-nics.patch
Patch459: blktap-close-fifos.patch Patch459: blktap-close-fifos.patch
Patch460: blktap-disable-debug-printf.patch Patch460: blktap-disable-debug-printf.patch
Patch461: xen-glibc217.patch Patch461: xen-glibc217.patch
Patch462: reverse-24757-use-grant-references.patch
# Jim's domain lock patch # Jim's domain lock patch
Patch480: xend-domain-lock.patch Patch480: xend-domain-lock.patch
Patch481: xend-domain-lock-sfex.patch Patch481: xend-domain-lock-sfex.patch
@ -758,11 +773,25 @@ tar xfj %{SOURCE6} -C $RPM_BUILD_DIR/%{xen_build_dir}/tools
%patch26098 -p1 %patch26098 -p1
%patch26102 -p1 %patch26102 -p1
%patch26114 -p1 %patch26114 -p1
%patch20 -p1 %patch26129 -p1
%patch22 -p1 %patch26132 -p1
%patch23 -p1 %patch26134 -p1
%patch24 -p1 %patch26139 -p1
%patch26148 -p1
%patch26149 -p1
%patch26150 -p1
%patch26151 -p1
%patch26179 -p1
%patch26183 -p1
%patch26188 -p1
%patch26189 -p1
%patch25 -p1 %patch25 -p1
%patch26 -p1
%patch27 -p1
%patch29 -p1
%patch30 -p1
%patch31 -p1
%patch32 -p1
# Qemu # Qemu
%patch100 -p1 %patch100 -p1
# Our patches # Our patches
@ -853,6 +882,7 @@ tar xfj %{SOURCE6} -C $RPM_BUILD_DIR/%{xen_build_dir}/tools
%patch459 -p1 %patch459 -p1
%patch460 -p1 %patch460 -p1
%patch461 -p1 %patch461 -p1
%patch462 -p1
%patch480 -p1 %patch480 -p1
%patch481 -p1 %patch481 -p1
%patch500 -p1 %patch500 -p1