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- bnc#777628 - guest "disappears" after live migration

Browse Source 
Updated block-dmmd script

- fate#310510 - fix xenpaging
  restore changes to integrate paging into xm/xend
  xenpaging.autostart.patch
  xenpaging.doc.patch

- bnc#787163 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-4544: xen: Domain builder Out-of-
  memory due to malicious kernel/ramdisk (XSA 25)
  CVE-2012-4544-xsa25.patch
- bnc#779212 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-4411: XEN / qemu: guest
  administrator can access qemu monitor console (XSA-19)
  CVE-2012-4411-xsa19.patch

- bnc#786516 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-4535: xen: Timer overflow DoS
  vulnerability
  CVE-2012-4535-xsa20.patch
- bnc#786518 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-4536: xen: pirq range check DoS
  vulnerability
  CVE-2012-4536-xsa21.patch
- bnc#786517 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-4537: xen: Memory mapping failure
  DoS vulnerability
  CVE-2012-4537-xsa22.patch
- bnc#786519 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-4538: xen: Unhooking empty PAE
  entries DoS vulnerability
  CVE-2012-4538-xsa23.patch
- bnc#786520 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-4539: xen: Grant table hypercall
  infinite loop DoS vulnerability
  CVE-2012-4539-xsa24.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Virtualization/xen?expand=0&rev=212
This commit is contained in:
Charles Arnold 2012-11-19 13:58:33 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
parent 75bff12b8f
commit 646cd8897b
51 changed files with 3938 additions and 232 deletions
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130
25920-x86-APICV-enable.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
References: FATE#313605
# HG changeset patch
# User Jiongxi Li <jiongxi.li@intel.com>
# Date 1347912248 -3600
# Node ID ec60de627945f17ec2ce5c14e1224b59403875f7
# Parent 62de66cec48a1716bb700912da451a26296b8d1e
xen: enable APIC-Register Virtualization
Add APIC register virtualization support
- APIC read doesn't cause VM-Exit
- APIC write becomes trap-like
Signed-off-by: Gang Wei <gang.wei@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiongxi Li <jiongxi.li@intel.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
@@ -823,6 +823,14 @@ static int vlapic_write(struct vcpu *v,
return rc;
}
+int vlapic_apicv_write(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int offset)
+{
+ uint32_t val = vlapic_get_reg(vcpu_vlapic(v), offset);
+
+ vlapic_reg_write(v, offset, val);
+ return 0;
+}
+
int hvm_x2apic_msr_write(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int msr, uint64_t msr_content)
{
struct vlapic *vlapic = vcpu_vlapic(v);
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static void __init vmx_display_features(
P(cpu_has_vmx_vnmi, "Virtual NMI");
P(cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap, "MSR direct-access bitmap");
P(cpu_has_vmx_unrestricted_guest, "Unrestricted Guest");
+ P(cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt, "APIC Register Virtualization");
#undef P
if ( !printed )
@@ -186,6 +187,14 @@ static int vmx_init_vmcs_config(void)
if ( opt_unrestricted_guest_enabled )
opt |= SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
+ /*
+ * "APIC Register Virtualization"
+ * can be set only when "use TPR shadow" is set
+ */
+ if ( _vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW )
+ opt |= SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT;
+
+
_vmx_secondary_exec_control = adjust_vmx_controls(
"Secondary Exec Control", min, opt,
MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2, &mismatch);
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -2274,6 +2274,16 @@ static void vmx_idtv_reinject(unsigned l
}
}
+static int vmx_handle_apic_write(void)
+{
+ unsigned long exit_qualification = __vmread(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+ unsigned int offset = exit_qualification & 0xfff;
+
+ ASSERT(cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt);
+
+ return vlapic_apicv_write(current, offset);
+}
+
void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
{
unsigned int exit_reason, idtv_info, intr_info = 0, vector = 0;
@@ -2729,6 +2739,11 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_
break;
}
+ case EXIT_REASON_APIC_WRITE:
+ if ( vmx_handle_apic_write() )
+ hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_gp_fault, 0);
+ break;
+
case EXIT_REASON_ACCESS_GDTR_OR_IDTR:
case EXIT_REASON_ACCESS_LDTR_OR_TR:
case EXIT_REASON_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_EXPIRED:
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h
@@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ void vlapic_EOI_set(struct vlapic *vlapi
int vlapic_ipi(struct vlapic *vlapic, uint32_t icr_low, uint32_t icr_high);
+int vlapic_apicv_write(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int offset);
+
struct vlapic *vlapic_lowest_prio(
struct domain *d, struct vlapic *source,
int short_hand, uint8_t dest, uint8_t dest_mode);
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ extern u32 vmx_vmentry_control;
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID 0x00000020
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING 0x00000040
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST 0x00000080
+#define SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT 0x00000100
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING 0x00000400
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID 0x00001000
extern u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control;
@@ -230,6 +231,8 @@ extern bool_t cpu_has_vmx_ins_outs_instr
SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST)
#define cpu_has_vmx_ple \
(vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING)
+#define cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt \
+ (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT)
/* GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO flags. */
#define VMX_INTR_SHADOW_STI 0x00000001
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ void vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(struct
#define EXIT_REASON_INVVPID 53
#define EXIT_REASON_WBINVD 54
#define EXIT_REASON_XSETBV 55
+#define EXIT_REASON_APIC_WRITE 56
#define EXIT_REASON_INVPCID 58
/*

505
25921-x86-APICV-delivery.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,505 @@
References: FATE#313605
# HG changeset patch
# User Jiongxi Li <jiongxi.li@intel.com>
# Date 1347912311 -3600
# Node ID 713b8849b11afa05f1dde157a3f5086fa3aaad08
# Parent ec60de627945f17ec2ce5c14e1224b59403875f7
xen: enable Virtual-interrupt delivery
Virtual interrupt delivery avoids Xen to inject vAPIC interrupts
manually, which is fully taken care of by the hardware. This needs
some special awareness into existing interrupr injection path:
For pending interrupt from vLAPIC, instead of direct injection, we may
need update architecture specific indicators before resuming to guest.
Before returning to guest, RVI should be updated if any pending IRRs
EOI exit bitmap controls whether an EOI write should cause VM-Exit. If
set, a trap-like induced EOI VM-Exit is triggered. The approach here
is to manipulate EOI exit bitmap based on value of TMR. Level
triggered irq requires a hook in vLAPIC EOI write, so that vIOAPIC EOI
is triggered and emulated
Signed-off-by: Gang Wei <gang.wei@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiongxi Li <jiongxi.li@intel.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
@@ -145,6 +145,9 @@ int vlapic_set_irq(struct vlapic *vlapic
if ( trig )
vlapic_set_vector(vec, &vlapic->regs->data[APIC_TMR]);
+ if ( hvm_funcs.update_eoi_exit_bitmap )
+ hvm_funcs.update_eoi_exit_bitmap(vlapic_vcpu(vlapic), vec ,trig);
+
/* We may need to wake up target vcpu, besides set pending bit here */
return !vlapic_test_and_set_irr(vec, vlapic);
}
@@ -410,6 +413,14 @@ void vlapic_EOI_set(struct vlapic *vlapi
hvm_dpci_msi_eoi(current->domain, vector);
}
+void vlapic_handle_EOI_induced_exit(struct vlapic *vlapic, int vector)
+{
+ if ( vlapic_test_and_clear_vector(vector, &vlapic->regs->data[APIC_TMR]) )
+ vioapic_update_EOI(vlapic_domain(vlapic), vector);
+
+ hvm_dpci_msi_eoi(current->domain, vector);
+}
+
int vlapic_ipi(
struct vlapic *vlapic, uint32_t icr_low, uint32_t icr_high)
{
@@ -1000,6 +1011,14 @@ void vlapic_adjust_i8259_target(struct d
pt_adjust_global_vcpu_target(v);
}
+int vlapic_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled(void)
+{
+ if ( hvm_funcs.virtual_intr_delivery_enabled )
+ return hvm_funcs.virtual_intr_delivery_enabled();
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
int vlapic_has_pending_irq(struct vcpu *v)
{
struct vlapic *vlapic = vcpu_vlapic(v);
@@ -1012,6 +1031,9 @@ int vlapic_has_pending_irq(struct vcpu *
if ( irr == -1 )
return -1;
+ if ( vlapic_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled() )
+ return irr;
+
isr = vlapic_find_highest_isr(vlapic);
isr = (isr != -1) ? isr : 0;
if ( (isr & 0xf0) >= (irr & 0xf0) )
@@ -1024,6 +1046,9 @@ int vlapic_ack_pending_irq(struct vcpu *
{
struct vlapic *vlapic = vcpu_vlapic(v);
+ if ( vlapic_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled() )
+ return 1;
+
vlapic_set_vector(vector, &vlapic->regs->data[APIC_ISR]);
vlapic_clear_irr(vector, vlapic);
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c
@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ void vmx_intr_assist(void)
struct vcpu *v = current;
unsigned int tpr_threshold = 0;
enum hvm_intblk intblk;
+ int pt_vector = -1;
/* Block event injection when single step with MTF. */
if ( unlikely(v->arch.hvm_vcpu.single_step) )
@@ -216,7 +217,7 @@ void vmx_intr_assist(void)
}
/* Crank the handle on interrupt state. */
- pt_update_irq(v);
+ pt_vector = pt_update_irq(v);
do {
intack = hvm_vcpu_has_pending_irq(v);
@@ -227,16 +228,34 @@ void vmx_intr_assist(void)
goto out;
intblk = hvm_interrupt_blocked(v, intack);
- if ( intblk == hvm_intblk_tpr )
+ if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery )
+ {
+ /* Set "Interrupt-window exiting" for ExtINT */
+ if ( (intblk != hvm_intblk_none) &&
+ ( (intack.source == hvm_intsrc_pic) ||
+ ( intack.source == hvm_intsrc_vector) ) )
+ {
+ enable_intr_window(v, intack);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ( __vmread(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO) & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK )
+ {
+ if ( (intack.source == hvm_intsrc_pic) ||
+ (intack.source == hvm_intsrc_nmi) ||
+ (intack.source == hvm_intsrc_mce) )
+ enable_intr_window(v, intack);
+
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else if ( intblk == hvm_intblk_tpr )
{
ASSERT(vlapic_enabled(vcpu_vlapic(v)));
ASSERT(intack.source == hvm_intsrc_lapic);
tpr_threshold = intack.vector >> 4;
goto out;
- }
-
- if ( (intblk != hvm_intblk_none) ||
- (__vmread(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO) & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) )
+ } else if ( (intblk != hvm_intblk_none) ||
+ (__vmread(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO) & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) )
{
enable_intr_window(v, intack);
goto out;
@@ -253,6 +272,44 @@ void vmx_intr_assist(void)
{
hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_machine_check, HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE);
}
+ else if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery &&
+ intack.source != hvm_intsrc_pic &&
+ intack.source != hvm_intsrc_vector )
+ {
+ unsigned long status = __vmread(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
+
+ /*
+ * Set eoi_exit_bitmap for periodic timer interrup to cause EOI-induced VM
+ * exit, then pending periodic time interrups have the chance to be injected
+ * for compensation
+ */
+ if (pt_vector != -1)
+ vmx_set_eoi_exit_bitmap(v, pt_vector);
+
+ /* we need update the RVI field */
+ status &= ~(unsigned long)0x0FF;
+ status |= (unsigned long)0x0FF &
+ intack.vector;
+ __vmwrite(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
+ if (v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exitmap_changed) {
+#ifdef __i386__
+#define UPDATE_EOI_EXITMAP(v, e) { \
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(e, &v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exitmap_changed)) { \
+ __vmwrite(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP##e, v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[e]); \
+ __vmwrite(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP##e##_HIGH, v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[e] >> 32);}}
+#else
+#define UPDATE_EOI_EXITMAP(v, e) { \
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(e, &v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exitmap_changed)) { \
+ __vmwrite(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP##e, v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[e]);}}
+#endif
+ UPDATE_EOI_EXITMAP(v, 0);
+ UPDATE_EOI_EXITMAP(v, 1);
+ UPDATE_EOI_EXITMAP(v, 2);
+ UPDATE_EOI_EXITMAP(v, 3);
+ }
+
+ pt_intr_post(v, intack);
+ }
else
{
HVMTRACE_2D(INJ_VIRQ, intack.vector, /*fake=*/ 0);
@@ -262,11 +319,16 @@ void vmx_intr_assist(void)
/* Is there another IRQ to queue up behind this one? */
intack = hvm_vcpu_has_pending_irq(v);
- if ( unlikely(intack.source != hvm_intsrc_none) )
- enable_intr_window(v, intack);
+ if ( !cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery ||
+ intack.source == hvm_intsrc_pic ||
+ intack.source == hvm_intsrc_vector )
+ {
+ if ( unlikely(intack.source != hvm_intsrc_none) )
+ enable_intr_window(v, intack);
+ }
out:
- if ( cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow )
+ if ( !cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery && cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow )
__vmwrite(TPR_THRESHOLD, tpr_threshold);
}
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ static void __init vmx_display_features(
P(cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap, "MSR direct-access bitmap");
P(cpu_has_vmx_unrestricted_guest, "Unrestricted Guest");
P(cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt, "APIC Register Virtualization");
+ P(cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery, "Virtual Interrupt Delivery");
#undef P
if ( !printed )
@@ -188,11 +189,12 @@ static int vmx_init_vmcs_config(void)
opt |= SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
/*
- * "APIC Register Virtualization"
+ * "APIC Register Virtualization" and "Virtual Interrupt Delivery"
* can be set only when "use TPR shadow" is set
*/
if ( _vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW )
- opt |= SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT;
+ opt |= SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY;
_vmx_secondary_exec_control = adjust_vmx_controls(
@@ -787,6 +789,22 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v
__vmwrite(IO_BITMAP_A, virt_to_maddr((char *)hvm_io_bitmap + 0));
__vmwrite(IO_BITMAP_B, virt_to_maddr((char *)hvm_io_bitmap + PAGE_SIZE));
+ if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery )
+ {
+ /* EOI-exit bitmap */
+ v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[0] = (uint64_t)0;
+ __vmwrite(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0, v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[0]);
+ v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[1] = (uint64_t)0;
+ __vmwrite(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1, v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[1]);
+ v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[2] = (uint64_t)0;
+ __vmwrite(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2, v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[2]);
+ v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[3] = (uint64_t)0;
+ __vmwrite(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[3]);
+
+ /* Initialise Guest Interrupt Status (RVI and SVI) to 0 */
+ __vmwrite(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, 0);
+ }
+
/* Host data selectors. */
__vmwrite(HOST_SS_SELECTOR, __HYPERVISOR_DS);
__vmwrite(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, __HYPERVISOR_DS);
@@ -1028,6 +1046,30 @@ int vmx_add_host_load_msr(u32 msr)
return 0;
}
+void vmx_set_eoi_exit_bitmap(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector)
+{
+ int index, offset, changed;
+
+ index = vector >> 6;
+ offset = vector & 63;
+ changed = !test_and_set_bit(offset,
+ (uint64_t *)&v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[index]);
+ if (changed)
+ set_bit(index, &v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exitmap_changed);
+}
+
+void vmx_clear_eoi_exit_bitmap(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector)
+{
+ int index, offset, changed;
+
+ index = vector >> 6;
+ offset = vector & 63;
+ changed = test_and_clear_bit(offset,
+ (uint64_t *)&v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[index]);
+ if (changed)
+ set_bit(index, &v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exitmap_changed);
+}
+
int vmx_create_vmcs(struct vcpu *v)
{
struct arch_vmx_struct *arch_vmx = &v->arch.hvm_vmx;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1502,6 +1502,22 @@ static void vmx_set_info_guest(struct vc
vmx_vmcs_exit(v);
}
+static void vmx_update_eoi_exit_bitmap(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector, u8 trig)
+{
+ if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery )
+ {
+ if (trig)
+ vmx_set_eoi_exit_bitmap(v, vector);
+ else
+ vmx_clear_eoi_exit_bitmap(v, vector);
+ }
+}
+
+static int vmx_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled(void)
+{
+ return cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery;
+}
+
static struct hvm_function_table __read_mostly vmx_function_table = {
.name = "VMX",
.cpu_up_prepare = vmx_cpu_up_prepare,
@@ -1548,7 +1564,9 @@ static struct hvm_function_table __read_
.nhvm_vmcx_guest_intercepts_trap = nvmx_intercepts_exception,
.nhvm_vcpu_vmexit_trap = nvmx_vmexit_trap,
.nhvm_intr_blocked = nvmx_intr_blocked,
- .nhvm_domain_relinquish_resources = nvmx_domain_relinquish_resources
+ .nhvm_domain_relinquish_resources = nvmx_domain_relinquish_resources,
+ .update_eoi_exit_bitmap = vmx_update_eoi_exit_bitmap,
+ .virtual_intr_delivery_enabled = vmx_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled
};
struct hvm_function_table * __init start_vmx(void)
@@ -2284,6 +2302,17 @@ static int vmx_handle_apic_write(void)
return vlapic_apicv_write(current, offset);
}
+/*
+ * When "Virtual Interrupt Delivery" is enabled, this function is used
+ * to handle EOI-induced VM exit
+ */
+void vmx_handle_EOI_induced_exit(struct vlapic *vlapic, int vector)
+{
+ ASSERT(cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery);
+
+ vlapic_handle_EOI_induced_exit(vlapic, vector);
+}
+
void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
{
unsigned int exit_reason, idtv_info, intr_info = 0, vector = 0;
@@ -2677,6 +2706,16 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_
hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_gp_fault, 0);
break;
+ case EXIT_REASON_EOI_INDUCED:
+ {
+ int vector;
+ exit_qualification = __vmread(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+ vector = exit_qualification & 0xff;
+
+ vmx_handle_EOI_induced_exit(vcpu_vlapic(current), vector);
+ break;
+ }
+
case EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION:
exit_qualification = __vmread(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
if ( exit_qualification & 0x10 )
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpt.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpt.c
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static void pt_timer_fn(void *data)
pt_unlock(pt);
}
-void pt_update_irq(struct vcpu *v)
+int pt_update_irq(struct vcpu *v)
{
struct list_head *head = &v->arch.hvm_vcpu.tm_list;
struct periodic_time *pt, *temp, *earliest_pt = NULL;
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ void pt_update_irq(struct vcpu *v)
if ( earliest_pt == NULL )
{
spin_unlock(&v->arch.hvm_vcpu.tm_lock);
- return;
+ return -1;
}
earliest_pt->irq_issued = 1;
@@ -263,6 +263,17 @@ void pt_update_irq(struct vcpu *v)
hvm_isa_irq_deassert(v->domain, irq);
hvm_isa_irq_assert(v->domain, irq);
}
+
+ /*
+ * If periodic timer interrut is handled by lapic, its vector in
+ * IRR is returned and used to set eoi_exit_bitmap for virtual
+ * interrupt delivery case. Otherwise return -1 to do nothing.
+ */
+ if ( vlapic_accept_pic_intr(v) &&
+ (&v->domain->arch.hvm_domain)->vpic[0].int_output )
+ return -1;
+ else
+ return pt_irq_vector(earliest_pt, hvm_intsrc_lapic);
}
static struct periodic_time *is_pt_irq(
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
@@ -180,6 +180,10 @@ struct hvm_function_table {
enum hvm_intblk (*nhvm_intr_blocked)(struct vcpu *v);
void (*nhvm_domain_relinquish_resources)(struct domain *d);
+
+ /* Virtual interrupt delivery */
+ void (*update_eoi_exit_bitmap)(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector, u8 trig);
+ int (*virtual_intr_delivery_enabled)(void);
};
extern struct hvm_function_table hvm_funcs;
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ int vlapic_accept_pic_intr(struct vcpu *
void vlapic_adjust_i8259_target(struct domain *d);
void vlapic_EOI_set(struct vlapic *vlapic);
+void vlapic_handle_EOI_induced_exit(struct vlapic *vlapic, int vector);
int vlapic_ipi(struct vlapic *vlapic, uint32_t icr_low, uint32_t icr_high);
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
@@ -110,6 +110,9 @@ struct arch_vmx_struct {
unsigned int host_msr_count;
struct vmx_msr_entry *host_msr_area;
+ uint32_t eoi_exitmap_changed;
+ uint64_t eoi_exit_bitmap[4];
+
unsigned long host_cr0;
/* Is the guest in real mode? */
@@ -183,6 +186,7 @@ extern u32 vmx_vmentry_control;
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING 0x00000040
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST 0x00000080
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT 0x00000100
+#define SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY 0x00000200
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING 0x00000400
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID 0x00001000
extern u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control;
@@ -233,6 +237,8 @@ extern bool_t cpu_has_vmx_ins_outs_instr
(vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING)
#define cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt \
(vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT)
+#define cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery \
+ (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY)
/* GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO flags. */
#define VMX_INTR_SHADOW_STI 0x00000001
@@ -251,6 +257,7 @@ enum vmcs_field {
GUEST_GS_SELECTOR = 0x0000080a,
GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR = 0x0000080c,
GUEST_TR_SELECTOR = 0x0000080e,
+ GUEST_INTR_STATUS = 0x00000810,
HOST_ES_SELECTOR = 0x00000c00,
HOST_CS_SELECTOR = 0x00000c02,
HOST_SS_SELECTOR = 0x00000c04,
@@ -278,6 +285,14 @@ enum vmcs_field {
APIC_ACCESS_ADDR_HIGH = 0x00002015,
EPT_POINTER = 0x0000201a,
EPT_POINTER_HIGH = 0x0000201b,
+ EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0 = 0x0000201c,
+ EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0_HIGH = 0x0000201d,
+ EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1 = 0x0000201e,
+ EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1_HIGH = 0x0000201f,
+ EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2 = 0x00002020,
+ EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2_HIGH = 0x00002021,
+ EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3 = 0x00002022,
+ EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3_HIGH = 0x00002023,
GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS = 0x00002400,
GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_HIGH = 0x00002401,
VMCS_LINK_POINTER = 0x00002800,
@@ -398,6 +413,8 @@ int vmx_write_guest_msr(u32 msr, u64 val
int vmx_add_guest_msr(u32 msr);
int vmx_add_host_load_msr(u32 msr);
void vmx_vmcs_switch(struct vmcs_struct *from, struct vmcs_struct *to);
+void vmx_set_eoi_exit_bitmap(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector);
+void vmx_clear_eoi_exit_bitmap(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector);
#endif /* ASM_X86_HVM_VMX_VMCS_H__ */
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ void vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(struct
#define EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY 41
#define EXIT_REASON_TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD 43
#define EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS 44
+#define EXIT_REASON_EOI_INDUCED 45
#define EXIT_REASON_ACCESS_GDTR_OR_IDTR 46
#define EXIT_REASON_ACCESS_LDTR_OR_TR 47
#define EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION 48
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vpt.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vpt.h
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ struct pl_time { /* platform time */
void pt_save_timer(struct vcpu *v);
void pt_restore_timer(struct vcpu *v);
-void pt_update_irq(struct vcpu *v);
+int pt_update_irq(struct vcpu *v);
void pt_intr_post(struct vcpu *v, struct hvm_intack intack);
void pt_migrate(struct vcpu *v);

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@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
References: FATE#313605
# HG changeset patch
# User Jiongxi Li <jiongxi.li@intel.com>
# Date 1347912362 -3600
# Node ID c2578dd96b8318e108fff0f340411135dedaa47d
# Parent 713b8849b11afa05f1dde157a3f5086fa3aaad08
xen: add virtual x2apic support for apicv
basically to benefit from apicv, we need clear MSR bitmap for
corresponding x2apic MSRs:
0x800 - 0x8ff: no read intercept for apicv register virtualization
TPR,EOI,SELF-IPI: no write intercept for virtual interrupt
delivery
Signed-off-by: Jiongxi Li <jiongxi.li@intel.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
@@ -658,7 +658,7 @@ static void vmx_set_host_env(struct vcpu
(unsigned long)&get_cpu_info()->guest_cpu_user_regs.error_code);
}
-void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 msr)
+void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 msr, int type)
{
unsigned long *msr_bitmap = v->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_bitmap;
@@ -673,14 +673,18 @@ void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struc
*/
if ( msr <= 0x1fff )
{
- __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-low */
- __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-low */
+ if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+ __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-low */
+ if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+ __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-low */
}
else if ( (msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff) )
{
msr &= 0x1fff;
- __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-high */
- __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-high */
+ if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+ __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-high */
+ if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+ __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-high */
}
}
@@ -776,13 +780,25 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v
v->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_bitmap = msr_bitmap;
__vmwrite(MSR_BITMAP, virt_to_maddr(msr_bitmap));
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_FS_BASE);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_GS_BASE);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
if ( cpu_has_vmx_pat && paging_mode_hap(d) )
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
+ if ( cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt )
+ {
+ int msr;
+ for (msr = MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR; msr <= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR + 0xff; msr++)
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, msr, MSR_TYPE_R);
+ }
+ if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery )
+ {
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICTPR_MSR, MSR_TYPE_W);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICEOI_MSR, MSR_TYPE_W);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICSELF_MSR, MSR_TYPE_W);
+ }
}
/* I/O access bitmap. */
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -2036,7 +2036,7 @@ static int vmx_msr_write_intercept(unsig
for ( ; (rc == 0) && lbr->count; lbr++ )
for ( i = 0; (rc == 0) && (i < lbr->count); i++ )
if ( (rc = vmx_add_guest_msr(lbr->base + i)) == 0 )
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, lbr->base + i);
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, lbr->base + i, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
}
if ( (rc < 0) ||
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
@@ -407,7 +407,9 @@ enum vmcs_field {
#define VMCS_VPID_WIDTH 16
-void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 msr);
+#define MSR_TYPE_R 1
+#define MSR_TYPE_W 2
+void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 msr, int type);
int vmx_read_guest_msr(u32 msr, u64 *val);
int vmx_write_guest_msr(u32 msr, u64 val);
int vmx_add_guest_msr(u32 msr);
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
@@ -291,6 +291,9 @@
#define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE (1<<11)
#define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BASE (0xfffff<<12)
#define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR 0x800
+#define MSR_IA32_APICTPR_MSR 0x808
+#define MSR_IA32_APICEOI_MSR 0x80b
+#define MSR_IA32_APICSELF_MSR 0x83f
#define MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE 0x00000079
#define MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV 0x0000008b

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@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
References: FATE#313633
# HG changeset patch
# User Liu, Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
# Date 1348654362 -7200
# Node ID c47ef9592fb39325e33f8406b4bd736cc84482e5
# Parent 5d63c633a60b9a1d695594f9c17cf933240bec81
x86: Implement TSC adjust feature for HVM guest
IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR is maintained separately for each logical
processor. A logical processor maintains and uses the IA32_TSC_ADJUST
MSR as follows:
1). On RESET, the value of the IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR is 0;
2). If an execution of WRMSR to the IA32_TIME_STAMP_COUNTER MSR adds
(or subtracts) value X from the TSC, the logical processor also
adds (or subtracts) value X from the IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR;
3). If an execution of WRMSR to the IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR adds (or
subtracts) value X from that MSR, the logical processor also adds
(or subtracts) value X from the TSC.
This patch provides tsc adjust support for hvm guest, with it guest OS
would be happy when sync tsc.
Signed-off-by: Liu, Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ int hvm_set_guest_pat(struct vcpu *v, u6
void hvm_set_guest_tsc(struct vcpu *v, u64 guest_tsc)
{
uint64_t tsc;
+ uint64_t delta_tsc;
if ( v->domain->arch.vtsc )
{
@@ -255,10 +256,22 @@ void hvm_set_guest_tsc(struct vcpu *v, u
rdtscll(tsc);
}
- v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset = guest_tsc - tsc;
+ delta_tsc = guest_tsc - tsc;
+ v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_adjust += delta_tsc
+ - v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset;
+ v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset = delta_tsc;
+
hvm_funcs.set_tsc_offset(v, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset);
}
+void hvm_set_guest_tsc_adjust(struct vcpu *v, u64 tsc_adjust)
+{
+ v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset += tsc_adjust
+ - v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_adjust;
+ hvm_funcs.set_tsc_offset(v, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset);
+ v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_adjust = tsc_adjust;
+}
+
u64 hvm_get_guest_tsc(struct vcpu *v)
{
uint64_t tsc;
@@ -277,6 +290,11 @@ u64 hvm_get_guest_tsc(struct vcpu *v)
return tsc + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset;
}
+u64 hvm_get_guest_tsc_adjust(struct vcpu *v)
+{
+ return v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_adjust;
+}
+
void hvm_migrate_timers(struct vcpu *v)
{
rtc_migrate_timers(v);
@@ -2794,6 +2812,10 @@ int hvm_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int
*msr_content = hvm_get_guest_tsc(v);
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST:
+ *msr_content = hvm_get_guest_tsc_adjust(v);
+ break;
+
case MSR_TSC_AUX:
*msr_content = hvm_msr_tsc_aux(v);
break;
@@ -2907,6 +2929,10 @@ int hvm_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int
hvm_set_guest_tsc(v, msr_content);
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST:
+ hvm_set_guest_tsc_adjust(v, msr_content);
+ break;
+
case MSR_TSC_AUX:
v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_aux = (uint32_t)msr_content;
if ( cpu_has_rdtscp
@@ -3478,6 +3504,8 @@ void hvm_vcpu_reset_state(struct vcpu *v
v->domain->vcpu[0]->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset;
hvm_funcs.set_tsc_offset(v, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset);
+ v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_adjust = 0;
+
paging_update_paging_modes(v);
v->arch.flags |= TF_kernel_mode;
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h
@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ struct hvm_vcpu {
struct hvm_vcpu_asid n1asid;
u32 msr_tsc_aux;
+ u64 msr_tsc_adjust;
/* VPMU */
struct vpmu_struct vpmu;
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
#define MSR_IA32_PLATFORM_ID 0x00000017
#define MSR_IA32_EBL_CR_POWERON 0x0000002a
#define MSR_IA32_EBC_FREQUENCY_ID 0x0000002c
+#define MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST 0x0000003b
#define MSR_IA32_APICBASE 0x0000001b
#define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BSP (1<<8)

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@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
References: FATE#313633
# HG changeset patch
# User Liu, Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
# Date 1348654418 -7200
# Node ID 56fb977ce6eb4626a02d4a7a34e85009bb8ee3e0
# Parent c47ef9592fb39325e33f8406b4bd736cc84482e5
x86: Save/restore TSC adjust during HVM guest migration
Signed-off-by: Liu, Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/tools/misc/xen-hvmctx.c
+++ b/tools/misc/xen-hvmctx.c
@@ -390,6 +390,13 @@ static void dump_vmce_vcpu(void)
printf(" VMCE_VCPU: caps %" PRIx64 "\n", p.caps);
}
+static void dump_tsc_adjust(void)
+{
+ HVM_SAVE_TYPE(TSC_ADJUST) p;
+ READ(p);
+ printf(" TSC_ADJUST: tsc_adjust %" PRIx64 "\n", p.tsc_adjust);
+}
+
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int entry, domid;
@@ -457,6 +464,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
case HVM_SAVE_CODE(VIRIDIAN_DOMAIN): dump_viridian_domain(); break;
case HVM_SAVE_CODE(VIRIDIAN_VCPU): dump_viridian_vcpu(); break;
case HVM_SAVE_CODE(VMCE_VCPU): dump_vmce_vcpu(); break;
+ case HVM_SAVE_CODE(TSC_ADJUST): dump_tsc_adjust(); break;
case HVM_SAVE_CODE(END): break;
default:
printf(" ** Don't understand type %u: skipping\n",
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -610,6 +610,46 @@ void hvm_domain_destroy(struct domain *d
hvm_destroy_cacheattr_region_list(d);
}
+static int hvm_save_tsc_adjust(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
+{
+ struct vcpu *v;
+ struct hvm_tsc_adjust ctxt;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
+ {
+ ctxt.tsc_adjust = v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_adjust;
+ err = hvm_save_entry(TSC_ADJUST, v->vcpu_id, h, &ctxt);
+ if ( err )
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int hvm_load_tsc_adjust(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
+{
+ unsigned int vcpuid = hvm_load_instance(h);
+ struct vcpu *v;
+ struct hvm_tsc_adjust ctxt;
+
+ if ( vcpuid >= d->max_vcpus || (v = d->vcpu[vcpuid]) == NULL )
+ {
+ dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "HVM restore: dom%d has no vcpu%u\n",
+ d->domain_id, vcpuid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if ( hvm_load_entry(TSC_ADJUST, h, &ctxt) != 0 )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_adjust = ctxt.tsc_adjust;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+HVM_REGISTER_SAVE_RESTORE(TSC_ADJUST, hvm_save_tsc_adjust,
+ hvm_load_tsc_adjust, 1, HVMSR_PER_VCPU);
+
static int hvm_save_cpu_ctxt(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
{
struct vcpu *v;
--- a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/hvm/save.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/hvm/save.h
@@ -581,9 +581,15 @@ struct hvm_vmce_vcpu {
DECLARE_HVM_SAVE_TYPE(VMCE_VCPU, 18, struct hvm_vmce_vcpu);
+struct hvm_tsc_adjust {
+ uint64_t tsc_adjust;
+};
+
+DECLARE_HVM_SAVE_TYPE(TSC_ADJUST, 19, struct hvm_tsc_adjust);
+
/*
* Largest type-code in use
*/
-#define HVM_SAVE_CODE_MAX 18
+#define HVM_SAVE_CODE_MAX 19
#endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_HVM_SAVE_X86_H__ */

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@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
References: FATE#313633
# HG changeset patch
# User Liu, Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
# Date 1348654470 -7200
# Node ID 3aa66543a51ba77cb73e8c874e2416d065426a22
# Parent 56fb977ce6eb4626a02d4a7a34e85009bb8ee3e0
x86: Expose TSC adjust to HVM guest
Intel latest SDM (17.13.3) release a new MSR CPUID.7.0.EBX[1]=1
indicates TSC_ADJUST MSR 0x3b is supported.
This patch expose it to hvm guest.
Signed-off-by: Liu, Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_cpufeature.h
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_cpufeature.h
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ebx) */
#define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE 0 /* {RD,WR}{FS,GS}BASE instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST 1 /* Tsc thread offset */
#define X86_FEATURE_BMI1 3 /* 1st group bit manipulation extensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_HLE 4 /* Hardware Lock Elision */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX2 5 /* AVX2 instructions */
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c
@@ -362,7 +362,8 @@ static void xc_cpuid_hvm_policy(
case 0x00000007: /* Intel-defined CPU features */
if ( input[1] == 0 ) {
- regs[1] &= (bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_BMI1) |
+ regs[1] &= (bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST) |
+ bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_BMI1) |
bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_HLE) |
bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_AVX2) |
bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_SMEP) |

55
25975-x86-IvyBridge.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1349172840 -7200
# Node ID 87bf99fad7a9f018530d13213f57610621838085
# Parent 5fbdbf585f5f2ee9a3e3c75a8a9f9f2cc6eda65c
x86/Intel: add further support for Ivy Bridge CPU models
And some initial Haswell ones at once.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: "Nakajima, Jun" <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
@@ -105,11 +105,15 @@ static void do_get_hw_residencies(void *
switch ( c->x86_model )
{
- /* Ivy bridge */
- case 0x3A:
/* Sandy bridge */
case 0x2A:
case 0x2D:
+ /* Ivy bridge */
+ case 0x3A:
+ case 0x3E:
+ /* Haswell */
+ case 0x3C:
+ case 0x45:
GET_PC2_RES(hw_res->pc2);
GET_CC7_RES(hw_res->cc7);
/* fall through */
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1820,7 +1820,9 @@ static const struct lbr_info *last_branc
/* Sandy Bridge */
case 42: case 45:
/* Ivy Bridge */
- case 58:
+ case 58: case 62:
+ /* Haswell */
+ case 60: case 69:
return nh_lbr;
break;
/* Atom */
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vpmu_core2.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vpmu_core2.c
@@ -747,6 +747,7 @@ int vmx_vpmu_initialise(struct vcpu *v,
case 46:
case 47:
case 58:
+ case 62:
ret = core2_vpmu_initialise(v, vpmu_flags);
if ( !ret )
vpmu->arch_vpmu_ops = &core2_vpmu_ops;

41
25984-SVM-nested-paging-mode.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
# Date 1349356850 -3600
# Node ID a9c84069c2489e2c432a5068adc7cf8d51ae3366
# Parent 72d89cc43c72848be9bf49da9a87729ed8f48433
x86/nested-svm: Update the paging mode on VMRUN and VMEXIT emulation.
This allows Xen to walk the l1 hypervisor's shadow pagetable
correctly. Not needed for hap-on-hap guests because they are handled
at lookup time. Problem found with 64bit Win7 and 32bit XPMode where Win7
switches forth and back between long mode and PAE legacy pagetables.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Egger <Christoph.Egger@amd.com>
[Adjusted to update in all cases where the l1 vmm uses shadows]
Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Committed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/nestedsvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/nestedsvm.c
@@ -741,6 +741,10 @@ nsvm_vcpu_vmrun(struct vcpu *v, struct c
return 1;
}
+ /* If l1 guest uses shadow paging, update the paging mode. */
+ if (!nestedhvm_paging_mode_hap(v))
+ paging_update_paging_modes(v);
+
nv->nv_vmswitch_in_progress = 0;
return 0;
}
@@ -1408,6 +1412,10 @@ nestedsvm_vcpu_vmexit(struct vcpu *v, st
*/
rc = nhvm_vcpu_vmexit(v, regs, exitcode);
+ /* If l1 guest uses shadow paging, update the paging mode. */
+ if (!nestedhvm_paging_mode_hap(v))
+ paging_update_paging_modes(v);
+
nv->nv_vmswitch_in_progress = 0;
if (rc)

69
26054-x86-AMD-perf-ctr-init.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Wei Wang <wei.wang2@amd.com>
# Date 1350306216 -7200
# Node ID 983108e1b56bf809f3f5eaaebf18c4b613ff0865
# Parent 137dfbd3190e849b3a498d8b2ea282ebbf12e77d
x86/amd: Fix xen_apic_write warnings in Dom0
[ 0.020294] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 0.020311] WARNING: at arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c:730
xen_apic_write+0x15/0x17()
[ 0.020318] Hardware name: empty
[ 0.020323] Modules linked in:
[ 0.020334] Pid: 1, comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 3.3.8 #7
[ 0.020340] Call Trace:
[ 0.020354] [<ffffffff81050379>] warn_slowpath_common+0x80/0x98
[ 0.020369] [<ffffffff810503a6>] warn_slowpath_null+0x15/0x17
[ 0.020378] [<ffffffff810034df>] xen_apic_write+0x15/0x17
[ 0.020392] [<ffffffff8101cb2b>] perf_events_lapic_init+0x2e/0x30
[ 0.020410] [<ffffffff81ee4dd0>] init_hw_perf_events+0x250/0x407
[ 0.020419] [<ffffffff81ee4b80>] ? check_bugs+0x2d/0x2d
[ 0.020430] [<ffffffff81002181>] do_one_initcall+0x7a/0x131
[ 0.020444] [<ffffffff81edbbf9>] kernel_init+0x91/0x15d
[ 0.020456] [<ffffffff817caaa4>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10
[ 0.020471] [<ffffffff817c347c>] ? retint_restore_args+0x5/0x6
[ 0.020481] [<ffffffff817caaa0>] ? gs_change+0x13/0x13
[ 0.020500] ---[ end trace a7919e7f17c0a725 ]---
Kernel function check_hw_exists() writes 0xabcd to msr 0xc0010201 (Performance Event
Counter 0) and read it again to check if it is running as dom0. Early amd cpus does
not reset perf counters during warm reboot. If the kernel is booted with bare metal
and then as a dom0, the content of msr 0xc0010201 will stay and the checking will
pass and PMU will be enabled unexpectedly.
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.wang2@amd.com>
Don't reset the counters when used for the NMI watchdog.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <asm/hvm/support.h>
#include <asm/setup.h> /* amd_init_cpu */
#include <asm/acpi.h>
+#include <asm/apic.h>
#include "cpu.h"
@@ -532,6 +533,17 @@ static void __devinit init_amd(struct cp
if (c->x86 > 0x11)
set_bit(X86_FEATURE_ARAT, c->x86_capability);
+ /*
+ * Prior to Family 0x14, perf counters are not reset during warm reboot.
+ * We have to reset them manually.
+ */
+ if (nmi_watchdog != NMI_LOCAL_APIC && c->x86 < 0x14) {
+ wrmsrl(MSR_K7_PERFCTR0, 0);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_K7_PERFCTR1, 0);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_K7_PERFCTR2, 0);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_K7_PERFCTR3, 0);
+ }
+
if (cpuid_edx(0x80000007) & (1 << 10)) {
rdmsr(MSR_K7_HWCR, l, h);
l |= (1 << 27); /* Enable read-only APERF/MPERF bit */

65
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@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jacob Shin <jacob.shin@amd.com>
# Date 1350306291 -7200
# Node ID 14e32621dbaf5b485b134ace4558e67c4c36e1ce
# Parent 983108e1b56bf809f3f5eaaebf18c4b613ff0865
x86/xenoprof: fix kernel/user mode detection for HVM
While trying oprofile under Xen, I noticed that HVM passive domain's
kernel addresses were showing up as user application. It turns out
under HVM get_cpu_user_regs()->cs contains 0x0000beef.
Signed-off-by: Jacob Shin <jacob.shin@amd.com>
Don't cast away const-ness. Use SS instead of CS to determine ring.
Special-case real and protected mode.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/oprofile/xenoprof.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/oprofile/xenoprof.c
@@ -78,16 +78,26 @@ int compat_oprof_arch_counter(XEN_GUEST_
}
#endif
-int xenoprofile_get_mode(const struct vcpu *v,
- const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+int xenoprofile_get_mode(struct vcpu *curr, const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
{
if ( !guest_mode(regs) )
return 2;
- if ( is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
- return ((regs->cs & 3) != 3);
+ if ( !is_hvm_vcpu(curr) )
+ return guest_kernel_mode(curr, regs);
- return guest_kernel_mode(v, regs);
+ switch ( hvm_guest_x86_mode(curr) )
+ {
+ struct segment_register ss;
+
+ case 0: /* real mode */
+ return 1;
+ case 1: /* vm86 mode */
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ hvm_get_segment_register(curr, x86_seg_ss, &ss);
+ return (ss.sel & 3) != 3;
+ }
}
/*
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/xenoprof.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/xenoprof.h
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static inline void ibs_init(void) {}
#define ibs_caps 0
#endif
-int xenoprofile_get_mode(const struct vcpu *, const struct cpu_user_regs *);
+int xenoprofile_get_mode(struct vcpu *, const struct cpu_user_regs *);
static inline int xenoprof_backtrace_supported(void)
{

84
26056-page-alloc-flush-filter.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1350315491 -3600
# Node ID 177fdda0be568ccdb62697b64aa64ee20bc55bee
# Parent 14e32621dbaf5b485b134ace4558e67c4c36e1ce
More efficient TLB-flush filtering in alloc_heap_pages().
Rather than per-cpu filtering for every page in a super-page
allocation, simply remember the most recent TLB timestamp across all
allocated pages, and filter on that, just once, at the end of the
function.
For large-CPU systems, doing 2MB allocations during domain creation,
this cuts down the domain creation time *massively*.
TODO: It may make sense to move the filtering out into some callers,
such as memory.c:populate_physmap() and
memory.c:increase_reservation(), so that the filtering can be moved
outside their loops, too.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/common/page_alloc.c
+++ b/xen/common/page_alloc.c
@@ -414,9 +414,10 @@ static struct page_info *alloc_heap_page
unsigned int first_node, i, j, zone = 0, nodemask_retry = 0;
unsigned int node = (uint8_t)((memflags >> _MEMF_node) - 1);
unsigned long request = 1UL << order;
- cpumask_t mask;
struct page_info *pg;
nodemask_t nodemask = (d != NULL ) ? d->node_affinity : node_online_map;
+ bool_t need_tlbflush = 0;
+ uint32_t tlbflush_timestamp = 0;
if ( node == NUMA_NO_NODE )
{
@@ -530,22 +531,19 @@ static struct page_info *alloc_heap_page
if ( d != NULL )
d->last_alloc_node = node;
- cpumask_clear(&mask);
-
for ( i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++ )
{
/* Reference count must continuously be zero for free pages. */
BUG_ON(pg[i].count_info != PGC_state_free);
pg[i].count_info = PGC_state_inuse;
- if ( pg[i].u.free.need_tlbflush )
+ if ( pg[i].u.free.need_tlbflush &&
+ (pg[i].tlbflush_timestamp <= tlbflush_current_time()) &&
+ (!need_tlbflush ||
+ (pg[i].tlbflush_timestamp > tlbflush_timestamp)) )
{
- /* Add in extra CPUs that need flushing because of this page. */
- static cpumask_t extra_cpus_mask;
-
- cpumask_andnot(&extra_cpus_mask, &cpu_online_map, &mask);
- tlbflush_filter(extra_cpus_mask, pg[i].tlbflush_timestamp);
- cpumask_or(&mask, &mask, &extra_cpus_mask);
+ need_tlbflush = 1;
+ tlbflush_timestamp = pg[i].tlbflush_timestamp;
}
/* Initialise fields which have other uses for free pages. */
@@ -555,10 +553,15 @@ static struct page_info *alloc_heap_page
spin_unlock(&heap_lock);
- if ( unlikely(!cpumask_empty(&mask)) )
+ if ( need_tlbflush )
{
- perfc_incr(need_flush_tlb_flush);
- flush_tlb_mask(&mask);
+ cpumask_t mask = cpu_online_map;
+ tlbflush_filter(mask, tlbflush_timestamp);
+ if ( !cpumask_empty(&mask) )
+ {
+ perfc_incr(need_flush_tlb_flush);
+ flush_tlb_mask(&mask);
+ }
}
return pg;

30
26061-x86-oprof-counter-range.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1350465790 -7200
# Node ID 4b4c0c7a6031820ab521fdd6764cb0df157f44bf
# Parent 4fc87c2f31a02c770655518c9e4d389302564f00
x86/oprof: adjust off-by-one counter range checks
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/oprofile/xenoprof.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/oprofile/xenoprof.c
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ int xenoprof_arch_counter(XEN_GUEST_HAND
if ( copy_from_guest(&counter, arg, 1) )
return -EFAULT;
- if ( counter.ind > OP_MAX_COUNTER )
+ if ( counter.ind >= OP_MAX_COUNTER )
return -E2BIG;
counter_config[counter.ind].count = counter.count;
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ int compat_oprof_arch_counter(XEN_GUEST_
if ( copy_from_guest(&counter, arg, 1) )
return -EFAULT;
- if ( counter.ind > OP_MAX_COUNTER )
+ if ( counter.ind >= OP_MAX_COUNTER )
return -E2BIG;
counter_config[counter.ind].count = counter.count;

93
26062-ACPI-ERST-move-data.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
# Date 1350475926 -7200
# Node ID ec8a091efcce717584b00ce76e3cec40a6247ebc
# Parent 4b4c0c7a6031820ab521fdd6764cb0df157f44bf
ACPI/APEI: fix ERST MOVE_DATA instruction implementation
The src_base and dst_base fields in apei_exec_context are physical
address, so they should be ioremaped before being used in ERST
MOVE_DATA instruction.
Reported-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <martinez.javier@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Replace use of ioremap() by __acpi_map_table()/set_fixmap(). Fix error
handling.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/drivers/acpi/apei/erst.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/acpi/apei/erst.c
@@ -247,15 +247,64 @@ static int erst_exec_move_data(struct ap
{
int rc;
u64 offset;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+ enum fixed_addresses idx;
+#endif
+ void *src, *dst;
+
+ /* ioremap does not work in interrupt context */
+ if (in_irq()) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING
+ "MOVE_DATA cannot be used in interrupt context\n");
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
rc = __apei_exec_read_register(entry, &offset);
if (rc)
return rc;
- memmove((void *)(unsigned long)(ctx->dst_base + offset),
- (void *)(unsigned long)(ctx->src_base + offset),
- ctx->var2);
- return 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+ switch (ctx->var2) {
+ case 0:
+ return 0;
+ case 1 ... PAGE_SIZE:
+ break;
+ default:
+ printk(KERN_WARNING
+ "MOVE_DATA cannot be used for %#"PRIx64" bytes of data\n",
+ ctx->var2);
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ src = __acpi_map_table(ctx->src_base + offset, ctx->var2);
+#else
+ src = ioremap(ctx->src_base + offset, ctx->var2);
+#endif
+ if (!src)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(FIX_ACPI_PAGES < 4);
+ idx = virt_to_fix((unsigned long)src + 2 * PAGE_SIZE);
+ offset += ctx->dst_base;
+ dst = (void *)fix_to_virt(idx) + (offset & ~PAGE_MASK);
+ set_fixmap(idx, offset);
+ if (PFN_DOWN(offset) != PFN_DOWN(offset + ctx->var2 - 1)) {
+ idx = virt_to_fix((unsigned long)dst + PAGE_SIZE);
+ set_fixmap(idx, offset + PAGE_SIZE);
+ }
+#else
+ dst = ioremap(ctx->dst_base + offset, ctx->var2);
+#endif
+ if (dst) {
+ memmove(dst, src, ctx->var2);
+ iounmap(dst);
+ } else
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+
+ iounmap(src);
+
+ return rc;
}
static struct apei_exec_ins_type erst_ins_type[] = {

51
26063-x86-HPET-affinity-lock.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1350476000 -7200
# Node ID 1f4be6ee4619c88c273cb457d8e7f1eee49d00dd
# Parent ec8a091efcce717584b00ce76e3cec40a6247ebc
x86/HPET: obtain proper lock for changing IRQ affinity
The IRQ descriptor lock should be held while adjusting the affinity of
any IRQ; the HPET channel lock isn't sufficient to protect namely
against races with moving the IRQ to a different CPU.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c
@@ -433,6 +433,16 @@ static struct hpet_event_channel *hpet_g
return ch;
}
+static void set_channel_irq_affinity(const struct hpet_event_channel *ch)
+{
+ struct irq_desc *desc = irq_to_desc(ch->irq);
+
+ ASSERT(!local_irq_is_enabled());
+ spin_lock(&desc->lock);
+ hpet_msi_set_affinity(desc, cpumask_of(ch->cpu));
+ spin_unlock(&desc->lock);
+}
+
static void hpet_attach_channel(unsigned int cpu,
struct hpet_event_channel *ch)
{
@@ -447,7 +457,7 @@ static void hpet_attach_channel(unsigned
if ( ch->cpu != cpu )
return;
- hpet_msi_set_affinity(irq_to_desc(ch->irq), cpumask_of(ch->cpu));
+ set_channel_irq_affinity(ch);
}
static void hpet_detach_channel(unsigned int cpu,
@@ -469,7 +479,7 @@ static void hpet_detach_channel(unsigned
}
ch->cpu = cpumask_first(ch->cpumask);
- hpet_msi_set_affinity(irq_to_desc(ch->irq), cpumask_of(ch->cpu));
+ set_channel_irq_affinity(ch);
}
#include <asm/mc146818rtc.h>

76
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@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
changeset: 26077:33348baecf37
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Thu Oct 18 09:34:59 2012 +0100
files: stubdom/grub.patches/70compiler_warnings.diff
description:
stubdom: fix compile errors in grub
Building xen.rpm in SLES11 started to fail due to these compiler
warnings:
[ 1436s] ../grub-upstream/netboot/fsys_tftp.c:213: warning: operation on 'block' may be undefined
[ 1437s] ../grub-upstream/netboot/main.c:444: warning: operation on 'block' may be undefined
[ 1234s] E: xen sequence-point ../grub-upstream/netboot/fsys_tftp.c:213
[ 1234s] E: xen sequence-point ../grub-upstream/netboot/main.c:444
The reason for this is that the assignment is done twice:
tp.u.ack.block = ((uint16_t)( (((uint16_t)((block = prevblock)) & (uint16_t)0x00ffU) << 8) | (((uint16_t)((block = prevblock)) & (uint16_t)0xff00U) >> 8)));
Fix this package build error by adding another patch for grub, which
moves the assignment out of the macro usage.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r 8dcab28b8081 -r 33348baecf37 stubdom/grub.patches/70compiler_warnings.diff
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/stubdom/grub.patches/70compiler_warnings.diff Thu Oct 18 09:34:59 2012 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+[ 1436s] ../grub-upstream/netboot/fsys_tftp.c:213: warning: operation on 'block' may be undefined
+[ 1437s] ../grub-upstream/netboot/main.c:444: warning: operation on 'block' may be undefined
+
+[ 1234s] E: xen sequence-point ../grub-upstream/netboot/fsys_tftp.c:213
+[ 1234s] E: xen sequence-point ../grub-upstream/netboot/main.c:444
+
+---
+ netboot/fsys_tftp.c | 5 ++++-
+ netboot/main.c | 5 ++++-
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+Index: grub-0.97/netboot/fsys_tftp.c
+===================================================================
+--- grub-0.97.orig/netboot/fsys_tftp.c
++++ grub-0.97/netboot/fsys_tftp.c
+@@ -209,8 +209,11 @@ buf_fill (int abort)
+ break;
+
+ if ((block || bcounter) && (block != prevblock + (unsigned short) 1))
++ {
++ block = prevblock;
+ /* Block order should be continuous */
+- tp.u.ack.block = htons (block = prevblock);
++ tp.u.ack.block = htons (block);
++ }
+
+ /* Should be continuous. */
+ tp.opcode = abort ? htons (TFTP_ERROR) : htons (TFTP_ACK);
+Index: grub-0.97/netboot/main.c
+===================================================================
+--- grub-0.97.orig/netboot/main.c
++++ grub-0.97/netboot/main.c
+@@ -440,8 +440,11 @@ tftp (const char *name, int (*fnc) (unsi
+ break;
+
+ if ((block || bcounter) && (block != prevblock + 1))
++ {
++ block = prevblock;
+ /* Block order should be continuous */
+- tp.u.ack.block = htons (block = prevblock);
++ tp.u.ack.block = htons (block);
++ }
+
+ /* Should be continuous. */
+ tp.opcode = htons (TFTP_ACK);

187
26078-hotplug-Linux_remove_hotplug_support_rely_on_udev_instead.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
changeset: 26078:019ca95dfa34
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:00 2012 +0100
files: Makefile README install.sh tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile tools/hotplug/Linux/xen-backend.agent
description:
hotplug/Linux: remove hotplug support, rely on udev instead
Hotplug has been replaced by udev since several years. Remove the
hotplug related files and install udev unconditionally.
This makes it possible to remove udev from rpm BuildRequires which
reduces the buildtime dependency chain. For openSuSE:Factory it was
done just now:
http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-buildservice/2012-10/msg00085.html
The patch by itself will have no practical impact unless someone
attempts to build and run a Xen dom0 on a really old base system. e.g.
circa SLES9/2007 or earlier
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r 33348baecf37 -r 019ca95dfa34 Makefile
--- a/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:34:59 2012 +0100
+++ b/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:00 2012 +0100
@@ -223,7 +223,6 @@ uninstall:
$(MAKE) -C xen uninstall
rm -rf $(D)$(CONFIG_DIR)/init.d/xendomains $(D)$(CONFIG_DIR)/init.d/xend
rm -rf $(D)$(CONFIG_DIR)/init.d/xencommons $(D)$(CONFIG_DIR)/init.d/xen-watchdog
- rm -rf $(D)$(CONFIG_DIR)/hotplug/xen-backend.agent
rm -f $(D)$(CONFIG_DIR)/udev/rules.d/xen-backend.rules
rm -f $(D)$(CONFIG_DIR)/udev/rules.d/xend.rules
rm -f $(D)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)/xendomains
diff -r 33348baecf37 -r 019ca95dfa34 README
--- a/README Thu Oct 18 09:34:59 2012 +0100
+++ b/README Thu Oct 18 09:35:00 2012 +0100
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ provided by your OS distributor:
* pkg-config
* bridge-utils package (/sbin/brctl)
* iproute package (/sbin/ip)
- * hotplug or udev
+ * udev
* GNU bison and GNU flex
* GNU gettext
* 16-bit x86 assembler, loader and compiler (dev86 rpm or bin86 & bcc debs)
@@ -120,9 +120,9 @@ 4. To rebuild an existing tree without m
make install and make dist differ in that make install does the
right things for your local machine (installing the appropriate
- version of hotplug or udev scripts, for example), but make dist
- includes all versions of those scripts, so that you can copy the dist
- directory to another machine and install from that distribution.
+ version of udev scripts, for example), but make dist includes all
+ versions of those scripts, so that you can copy the dist directory
+ to another machine and install from that distribution.
Python Runtime Libraries
========================
diff -r 33348baecf37 -r 019ca95dfa34 install.sh
--- a/install.sh Thu Oct 18 09:34:59 2012 +0100
+++ b/install.sh Thu Oct 18 09:35:00 2012 +0100
@@ -27,20 +27,6 @@ echo "Installing Xen from '$src' to '$ds
echo "Installing Xen from '$src' to '$dst'..."
(cd $src; tar -cf - * ) | tar -C "$tmp" -xf -
-[ -x "$(which udevinfo)" ] && \
- UDEV_VERSION=$(udevinfo -V | sed -e 's/^[^0-9]* \([0-9]\{1,\}\)[^0-9]\{0,\}/\1/')
-
-[ -z "$UDEV_VERSION" -a -x /sbin/udevadm ] && \
- UDEV_VERSION=$(/sbin/udevadm info -V | awk '{print $NF}')
-
-if [ -n "$UDEV_VERSION" ] && [ $UDEV_VERSION -ge 059 ]; then
- echo " - installing for udev-based system"
- rm -rf "$tmp/etc/hotplug"
-else
- echo " - installing for hotplug-based system"
- rm -rf "$tmp/etc/udev"
-fi
-
echo " - modifying permissions"
chmod -R a+rX "$tmp"
diff -r 33348baecf37 -r 019ca95dfa34 tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile
--- a/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:34:59 2012 +0100
+++ b/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:00 2012 +0100
@@ -27,31 +27,8 @@ XEN_SCRIPT_DATA += block-common.sh vtpm-
XEN_SCRIPT_DATA += block-common.sh vtpm-common.sh vtpm-hotplug-common.sh
XEN_SCRIPT_DATA += vtpm-migration.sh vtpm-impl
-XEN_HOTPLUG_DIR = $(CONFIG_DIR)/hotplug
-XEN_HOTPLUG_SCRIPTS = xen-backend.agent
-
-UDEVVER = 0
-ifeq ($(shell [ -x /sbin/udevadm ] && echo 1),1)
-UDEVVER = $(shell /sbin/udevadm info -V | sed -e 's/^[^0-9]* \([0-9]\{1,\}\)[^0-9]\{0,\}/\1/' )
-endif
-ifeq ($(shell [ -x /usr/bin/udevinfo ] && echo 1),1)
-UDEVVER = $(shell /usr/bin/udevinfo -V | sed -e 's/^[^0-9]* \([0-9]\{1,\}\)[^0-9]\{0,\}/\1/' )
-endif
-
UDEV_RULES_DIR = $(CONFIG_DIR)/udev
UDEV_RULES = xen-backend.rules xend.rules
-
-DI = $(if $(DISTDIR),$(shell readlink -f $(DISTDIR)),)
-DE = $(if $(DESTDIR),$(shell readlink -f $(DESTDIR)),)
-ifeq ($(findstring $(DI),$(DE)),$(DI))
-HOTPLUGS=install-hotplug install-udev
-else
-ifeq ($(shell [ $(UDEVVER) -ge 059 ] && echo 1),1)
-HOTPLUGS=install-udev
-else
-HOTPLUGS=install-hotplug
-endif
-endif
.PHONY: all
all:
@@ -60,7 +37,7 @@ build:
build:
.PHONY: install
-install: all install-initd install-scripts $(HOTPLUGS)
+install: all install-initd install-scripts install-udev
# See docs/misc/distro_mapping.txt for INITD_DIR location
.PHONY: install-initd
@@ -87,15 +64,6 @@ install-scripts:
$(INSTALL_DATA) $$i $(DESTDIR)$(XEN_SCRIPT_DIR); \
done
-.PHONY: install-hotplug
-install-hotplug:
- [ -d $(DESTDIR)$(XEN_HOTPLUG_DIR) ] || \
- $(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(XEN_HOTPLUG_DIR)
- set -e; for i in $(XEN_HOTPLUG_SCRIPTS); \
- do \
- $(INSTALL_PROG) $$i $(DESTDIR)$(XEN_HOTPLUG_DIR); \
- done
-
.PHONY: install-udev
install-udev:
[ -d $(DESTDIR)$(UDEV_RULES_DIR) ] || \
diff -r 33348baecf37 -r 019ca95dfa34 tools/hotplug/Linux/xen-backend.agent
--- a/tools/hotplug/Linux/xen-backend.agent Thu Oct 18 09:34:59 2012 +0100
+++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-#! /bin/bash
-
-PATH=/etc/xen/scripts:$PATH
-
-. /etc/xen/scripts/locking.sh
-
-claim_lock xenbus_hotplug_global
-
-case "$XENBUS_TYPE" in
- tap)
- /etc/xen/scripts/blktap "$ACTION"
- ;;
- vbd)
- /etc/xen/scripts/block "$ACTION"
- ;;
- vtpm)
- /etc/xen/scripts/vtpm "$ACTION"
- ;;
- vif)
- [ -n "$script" ] && $script "$ACTION"
- ;;
- vscsi)
- /etc/xen/scripts/vscsi "$ACTION"
- ;;
-esac
-
-case "$ACTION" in
- add)
- ;;
- remove)
- /etc/xen/scripts/xen-hotplug-cleanup
- ;;
- online)
- ;;
- offline)
- ;;
-esac
-
-release_lock xenbus_hotplug_global

36
26079-hotplug-Linux_close_lockfd_after_lock_attempt.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
changeset: 26079:b3b03536789a
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:01 2012 +0100
files: tools/hotplug/Linux/locking.sh
description:
hotplug/Linux: close lockfd after lock attempt
When a HVM guest is shutdown some of the 'remove' events can not claim
the lock for some reason. Instead they try to grab the lock in a busy
loop, until udev reaps the xen-hotplug-cleanup helper.
After analyzing the resulting logfile its not obvious what the cause is.
The only explanation is that bash (?) gets confused if the same lockfd
is opened again and again. Closing it in each iteration seem to fix the
issue.
This was observed with sles11sp2 (bash 3.2) and 4.2 xend.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.campbell@citrix.com>
[ ijc -- added the comment ]
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r 019ca95dfa34 -r b3b03536789a tools/hotplug/Linux/locking.sh
--- a/tools/hotplug/Linux/locking.sh Thu Oct 18 09:35:00 2012 +0100
+++ b/tools/hotplug/Linux/locking.sh Thu Oct 18 09:35:01 2012 +0100
@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ claim_lock()
print "y\n" if $fd_inum eq $file_inum;
' "$_lockfile" )
if [ x$rightfile = xy ]; then break; fi
+ # Some versions of bash appear to be buggy if the same
+ # $_lockfile is opened repeatedly. Close the current fd here.
+ eval "exec $_lockfd<&-"
done
}

30
26081-stubdom_fix_rpmlint_warning_spurious-executable-perm.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
changeset: 26081:02064298ebcb
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:03 2012 +0100
files: stubdom/Makefile
description:
stubdom: fix rpmlint warning spurious-executable-perm
[ 1758s] xen-tools.x86_64: E: spurious-executable-perm (Badness: 50) /usr/lib/xen/boot/xenstore-stubdom.gz
[ 1758s] The file is installed with executable permissions, but was identified as one
[ 1758s] that probably should not be executable. Verify if the executable bits are
[ 1758s] desired, and remove if not. NOTE: example scripts should be packaged under
[ 1758s] %docdir/examples, which will avoid this warning.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r 25b2f53d2583 -r 02064298ebcb stubdom/Makefile
--- a/stubdom/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:02 2012 +0100
+++ b/stubdom/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:03 2012 +0100
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ install-grub: pv-grub
install-xenstore: xenstore-stubdom
$(INSTALL_DIR) "$(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/xen/boot"
- $(INSTALL_PROG) mini-os-$(XEN_TARGET_ARCH)-xenstore/mini-os.gz "$(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/xen/boot/xenstore-stubdom.gz"
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) mini-os-$(XEN_TARGET_ARCH)-xenstore/mini-os.gz "$(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/xen/boot/xenstore-stubdom.gz"
#######
# clean

30
26082-blktap2-libvhd_fix_rpmlint_warning_spurious-executable-perm.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
changeset: 26082:8cf26ace9ca0
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:03 2012 +0100
files: tools/blktap2/vhd/lib/Makefile
description:
blktap2/libvhd: fix rpmlint warning spurious-executable-perm
[ 1758s] xen-devel.x86_64: E: spurious-executable-perm (Badness: 50) /usr/lib64/libvhd.a
[ 1758s] The file is installed with executable permissions, but was identified as one
[ 1758s] that probably should not be executable. Verify if the executable bits are
[ 1758s] desired, and remove if not. NOTE: example scripts should be packaged under
[ 1758s] %docdir/examples, which will avoid this warning.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r 02064298ebcb -r 8cf26ace9ca0 tools/blktap2/vhd/lib/Makefile
--- a/tools/blktap2/vhd/lib/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:03 2012 +0100
+++ b/tools/blktap2/vhd/lib/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:03 2012 +0100
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR).$(LIBVHD-MINOR
install: all
$(INSTALL_DIR) -p $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)
- $(INSTALL_PROG) libvhd.a $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) libvhd.a $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)
$(INSTALL_PROG) libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR).$(LIBVHD-MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)
ln -sf libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR).$(LIBVHD-MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)/libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR)
ln -sf libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR) $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)/libvhd.so

51
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@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
changeset: 26083:3fbeb019d522
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:04 2012 +0100
files: tools/blktap/lib/Makefile
description:
blktap: fix rpmlint warning spurious-executable-perm
[ 1758s] xen-devel.x86_64: E: spurious-executable-perm (Badness: 50) /usr/lib64/libblktap.a
[ 1758s] The file is installed with executable permissions, but was identified as one
[ 1758s] that probably should not be executable. Verify if the executable bits are
[ 1758s] desired, and remove if not. NOTE: example scripts should be packaged under
[ 1758s] %docdir/examples, which will avoid this warning.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r 8cf26ace9ca0 -r 3fbeb019d522 tools/blktap/lib/Makefile
--- a/tools/blktap/lib/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:03 2012 +0100
+++ b/tools/blktap/lib/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:04 2012 +0100
@@ -23,23 +23,25 @@ OBJS_PIC = $(SRCS:.c=.opic)
OBJS_PIC = $(SRCS:.c=.opic)
IBINS :=
-LIB = libblktap.a libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR)
+LIB = libblktap.a
+LIB_SO = libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR)
.PHONY: all
-all: $(LIB)
+all: $(LIB) $(LIB_SO)
.PHONY: install
install: all
$(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)
$(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(INCLUDEDIR)
- $(INSTALL_PROG) $(LIB) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)
+ $(INSTALL_PROG) $(LIB_SO) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) $(LIB) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)
ln -sf libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)/libblktap.so.$(MAJOR)
ln -sf libblktap.so.$(MAJOR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)/libblktap.so
$(INSTALL_DATA) blktaplib.h $(DESTDIR)$(INCLUDEDIR)
.PHONY: clean
clean:
- rm -rf *.a *.so* *.o *.opic *.rpm $(LIB) *~ $(DEPS) xen TAGS
+ rm -rf *.a *.so* *.o *.opic *.rpm $(LIB) $(LIB_SO) *~ $(DEPS) xen TAGS
libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR): $(OBJS_PIC)
$(CC) $(LDFLAGS) -Wl,$(SONAME_LDFLAG) -Wl,$(SONAME) $(SHLIB_LDFLAGS) \

34
26084-hotplug_install_hotplugpath.sh_as_data_file.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
changeset: 26084:fe9a0eb9aaaa
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:05 2012 +0100
files: tools/hotplug/common/Makefile
description:
hotplug: install hotplugpath.sh as data file
rpmlint complains a script helper which is only sourced:
[ 1875s] xen-tools.i586: W: script-without-shebang /etc/xen/scripts/hotplugpath.sh
[ 1875s] This text file has executable bits set or is located in a path dedicated for
[ 1875s] executables, but lacks a shebang and cannot thus be executed. If the file is
[ 1875s] meant to be an executable script, add the shebang, otherwise remove the
[ 1875s] executable bits or move the file elsewhere.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r 3fbeb019d522 -r fe9a0eb9aaaa tools/hotplug/common/Makefile
--- a/tools/hotplug/common/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:04 2012 +0100
+++ b/tools/hotplug/common/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:05 2012 +0100
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ HOTPLUGPATH="hotplugpath.sh"
# OS-independent hotplug scripts go in this directory
# Xen scripts to go there.
-XEN_SCRIPTS = $(HOTPLUGPATH)
-XEN_SCRIPT_DATA =
+XEN_SCRIPTS =
+XEN_SCRIPT_DATA = $(HOTPLUGPATH)
genpath-target = $(call buildmakevars2file,$(HOTPLUGPATH))
$(eval $(genpath-target))

33
26085-stubdom_install_stubdompath.sh_as_data_file.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
changeset: 26085:e32f4301f384
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:06 2012 +0100
files: stubdom/Makefile
description:
stubdom: install stubdompath.sh as data file
rpmlint complains a script helper which is only sourced:
[ 1875s] xen-tools.i586: W: script-without-shebang /usr/lib/xen/bin/stubdompath.sh
[ 1875s] This text file has executable bits set or is located in a path dedicated for
[ 1875s] executables, but lacks a shebang and cannot thus be executed. If the file is
[ 1875s] meant to be an executable script, add the shebang, otherwise remove the
[ 1875s] executable bits or move the file elsewhere.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r fe9a0eb9aaaa -r e32f4301f384 stubdom/Makefile
--- a/stubdom/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:05 2012 +0100
+++ b/stubdom/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:06 2012 +0100
@@ -386,7 +386,8 @@ install-readme:
install-ioemu: ioemu-stubdom
$(INSTALL_DIR) "$(DESTDIR)$(LIBEXEC)"
- $(INSTALL_PROG) stubdompath.sh stubdom-dm "$(DESTDIR)$(LIBEXEC)"
+ $(INSTALL_PROG) stubdom-dm "$(DESTDIR)$(LIBEXEC)"
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) stubdompath.sh "$(DESTDIR)$(LIBEXEC)"
$(INSTALL_DIR) "$(DESTDIR)$(XENFIRMWAREDIR)"
$(INSTALL_DATA) mini-os-$(XEN_TARGET_ARCH)-ioemu/mini-os.gz "$(DESTDIR)$(XENFIRMWAREDIR)/ioemu-stubdom.gz"

21
26086-hotplug-Linux_correct_sysconfig_tag_in_xendomains.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
changeset: 26086:ba6b1db89ec8
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:07 2012 +0100
files: tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/sysconfig.xendomains
description:
hotplug/Linux: correct sysconfig tag in xendomains
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r e32f4301f384 -r ba6b1db89ec8 tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/sysconfig.xendomains
--- a/tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/sysconfig.xendomains Thu Oct 18 09:35:06 2012 +0100
+++ b/tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/sysconfig.xendomains Thu Oct 18 09:35:07 2012 +0100
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-## Path: System/xen
+## Path: System/Virtualization
## Description: xen domain start/stop on boot
## Type: string
## Default:

36
26087-hotplug-Linux_install_sysconfig_files_as_data_files.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
changeset: 26087:6239ace16749
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:07 2012 +0100
files: tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile
description:
hotplug/Linux: install sysconfig files as data files
rpmlint complains about wrong permissions of config files:
[ 455s] xen-tools.i586: W: script-without-shebang /var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.xendomains
[ 455s] xen-tools.i586: W: script-without-shebang /var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.xencommons
[ 455s] This text file has executable bits set or is located in a path dedicated for
[ 455s] executables, but lacks a shebang and cannot thus be executed. If the file is
[ 455s] meant to be an executable script, add the shebang, otherwise remove the
[ 455s] executable bits or move the file elsewhere.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r ba6b1db89ec8 -r 6239ace16749 tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile
--- a/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:07 2012 +0100
+++ b/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:07 2012 +0100
@@ -46,9 +46,9 @@ install-initd:
[ -d $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR) ] || $(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)
$(INSTALL_PROG) $(XEND_INITD) $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR)
$(INSTALL_PROG) $(XENDOMAINS_INITD) $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR)
- $(INSTALL_PROG) $(XENDOMAINS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)/xendomains
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) $(XENDOMAINS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)/xendomains
$(INSTALL_PROG) $(XENCOMMONS_INITD) $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR)
- $(INSTALL_PROG) $(XENCOMMONS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)/xencommons
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) $(XENCOMMONS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)/xencommons
$(INSTALL_PROG) init.d/xen-watchdog $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR)
.PHONY: install-scripts

29
26088-tools_xend_fix_wrong_condition_check_for_xml_file.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
changeset: 26088:dd64a1bdbe3a
user: Joe Jin <joe.jin@oracle.com>
date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:08 2012 +0100
files: tools/python/xen/xend/XendStateStore.py
description:
tools: xend: fix wrong condition check for xml file
In commit e8d40584, it intended to check xml file size and when empty will
return, the condition should be "if os.path.getsize(xml_path) == 0" rather
then "if not os.path.getsize(xml_path) == 0".
Signed-off-by: Chuang Cao <chuang.cao@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joe Jin <joe.jin@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r 6239ace16749 -r dd64a1bdbe3a tools/python/xen/xend/XendStateStore.py
--- a/tools/python/xen/xend/XendStateStore.py Thu Oct 18 09:35:07 2012 +0100
+++ b/tools/python/xen/xend/XendStateStore.py Thu Oct 18 09:35:08 2012 +0100
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ class XendStateStore:
if not os.path.exists(xml_path):
return {}
- if not os.path.getsize(xml_path) == 0:
+ if os.path.getsize(xml_path) == 0:
return {}
dom = minidom.parse(xml_path)

32
26093-HVM-PoD-grant-mem-type.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
# Date 1350655745 -7200
# Node ID 4ae08ca5500f68d19a689c06489024157300d7b0
# Parent 478ba3f146df23d2cfa95fc603d0b4b9d21ba15d
hvm: handle PoD and grant pages in HVMOP_get_mem_type
During kexec in a ballooned PVonHVM guest the new kernel needs to check
each pfn if its backed by a mfn to find ballooned pages. Currently all
PoD and grant pages will appear as HVMMEM_mmio_dm, so the new kernel has
to assume they are ballooned. This is wrong: PoD pages may turn into
real RAM at runtime, grant pages are also RAM.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Committed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -4135,6 +4135,10 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUE
a.mem_type = HVMMEM_ram_ro;
else if ( p2m_is_ram(t) )
a.mem_type = HVMMEM_ram_rw;
+ else if ( p2m_is_magic(t) )
+ a.mem_type = HVMMEM_ram_rw;
+ else if ( p2m_is_grant(t) )
+ a.mem_type = HVMMEM_ram_rw;
else
a.mem_type = HVMMEM_mmio_dm;
rc = copy_to_guest(arg, &a, 1) ? -EFAULT : 0;

31
26093-hvm_handle_PoD_and_grant_pages_in_HVMOP_get_mem_type.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
changeset: 26093:4ae08ca5500f
user: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
date: Fri Oct 19 16:09:05 2012 +0200
files: xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
description:
hvm: handle PoD and grant pages in HVMOP_get_mem_type
During kexec in a ballooned PVonHVM guest the new kernel needs to check
each pfn if its backed by a mfn to find ballooned pages. Currently all
PoD and grant pages will appear as HVMMEM_mmio_dm, so the new kernel has
to assume they are ballooned. This is wrong: PoD pages may turn into
real RAM at runtime, grant pages are also RAM.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Committed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -4135,6 +4135,10 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUE
a.mem_type = HVMMEM_ram_ro;
else if ( p2m_is_ram(t) )
a.mem_type = HVMMEM_ram_rw;
+ else if ( p2m_is_magic(t) )
+ a.mem_type = HVMMEM_ram_rw;
+ else if ( p2m_is_grant(t) )
+ a.mem_type = HVMMEM_ram_rw;
else
a.mem_type = HVMMEM_mmio_dm;
rc = copy_to_guest(arg, &a, 1) ? -EFAULT : 0;

32
26095-SVM-nested-leak.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Christoph Egger <Christoph.Egger@amd.com>
# Date 1350976407 -7200
# Node ID a7503ce27d462056421c6d74737cee08ab4ae31e
# Parent c69bcb24812896dc6d5cf033babb7e79b8a50aec
nestedsvm: fix memory leak on shutdown/crash
Fix memory leak of l1 vmcb page when destroying a vcpu while l2 guest
is running.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Egger <Christoph.Egger@amd.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/nestedsvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/nestedsvm.c
@@ -122,6 +122,15 @@ void nsvm_vcpu_destroy(struct vcpu *v)
struct nestedvcpu *nv = &vcpu_nestedhvm(v);
struct nestedsvm *svm = &vcpu_nestedsvm(v);
+ /*
+ * When destroying the vcpu, it may be running on behalf of l2 guest.
+ * Therefore we need to switch the VMCB pointer back to the l1 vmcb,
+ * in order to avoid double free of l2 vmcb and the possible memory leak
+ * of l1 vmcb page.
+ */
+ if (nv->nv_n1vmcx)
+ v->arch.hvm_svm.vmcb = nv->nv_n1vmcx;
+
if (svm->ns_cached_msrpm) {
free_xenheap_pages(svm->ns_cached_msrpm,
get_order_from_bytes(MSRPM_SIZE));

61
26096-SVM-nested-vmexit-emul.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Christoph Egger <Christoph.Egger@amd.com>
# Date 1350976467 -7200
# Node ID d642720e1ea996ce85203fc9718f64cf2cab0468
# Parent a7503ce27d462056421c6d74737cee08ab4ae31e
nestedsvm: fix VMEXIT emulation
Values in regs can be newer than those in the shadow vmcb (e.g. due to
an instruction emulation right before). So use the values from regs.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Egger <Christoph.Egger@amd.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/nestedsvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/nestedsvm.c
@@ -995,7 +995,7 @@ nsvm_vmcb_guest_intercepts_trap(struct v
}
static int
-nsvm_vmcb_prepare4vmexit(struct vcpu *v)
+nsvm_vmcb_prepare4vmexit(struct vcpu *v, struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
{
struct nestedvcpu *nv = &vcpu_nestedhvm(v);
struct nestedsvm *svm = &vcpu_nestedsvm(v);
@@ -1119,17 +1119,22 @@ nsvm_vmcb_prepare4vmexit(struct vcpu *v)
ns_vmcb->_dr7 = n2vmcb->_dr7;
ns_vmcb->_dr6 = n2vmcb->_dr6;
+ /* Restore registers from regs as those values
+ * can be newer than in n2vmcb (e.g. due to an
+ * instruction emulation right before).
+ */
+
/* RFLAGS */
- ns_vmcb->rflags = n2vmcb->rflags;
+ ns_vmcb->rflags = n2vmcb->rflags = regs->eflags;
/* RIP */
- ns_vmcb->rip = n2vmcb->rip;
+ ns_vmcb->rip = n2vmcb->rip = regs->eip;
/* RSP */
- ns_vmcb->rsp = n2vmcb->rsp;
+ ns_vmcb->rsp = n2vmcb->rsp = regs->esp;
/* RAX */
- ns_vmcb->rax = n2vmcb->rax;
+ ns_vmcb->rax = n2vmcb->rax = regs->eax;
/* Keep the l2 guest values of the fs, gs, ldtr, tr, kerngsbase,
* star, lstar, cstar, sfmask, sysenter_cs, sysenter_esp,
@@ -1363,7 +1368,7 @@ nestedsvm_vmexit_n2n1(struct vcpu *v, st
ASSERT(vcpu_nestedhvm(v).nv_vmswitch_in_progress);
ASSERT(nestedhvm_vcpu_in_guestmode(v));
- rc = nsvm_vmcb_prepare4vmexit(v);
+ rc = nsvm_vmcb_prepare4vmexit(v, regs);
if (rc)
ret = NESTEDHVM_VMEXIT_ERROR;

43
26098-perfc-build.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
# Date 1350990742 25200
# Node ID 6d54c3338c52ec3a8e671c13284a59a535a3273f
# Parent 67c27013e191598543ccc1b8f8f1d533c7a5164b
xen: fix build when 'perfc=y'
Which was failing with this:
viridian.c: In function ‘wrmsr_viridian_regs’:
viridian.c:254:1: error: ‘PERFC_mshv_wrmsr_apic_msr’ undeclared
(first use in this function)
viridian.c:254:1: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only
once for each function it appears in
viridian.c: In function ‘rdmsr_viridian_regs’:
viridian.c:305:1: error: ‘PERFC_mshv_rdmsr_apic_msr’ undeclared
(first use in this function)
as a consequence of 17b754cab7b0 using but not defining
the counters.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/perfc_defn.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/perfc_defn.h
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ PERFCOUNTER(mshv_rdmsr_vp_index,
PERFCOUNTER(mshv_rdmsr_icr, "MS Hv rdmsr icr")
PERFCOUNTER(mshv_rdmsr_tpr, "MS Hv rdmsr tpr")
PERFCOUNTER(mshv_rdmsr_apic_assist, "MS Hv rdmsr APIC assist")
+PERFCOUNTER(mshv_rdmsr_apic_msr, "MS Hv rdmsr APIC msr")
PERFCOUNTER(mshv_wrmsr_osid, "MS Hv wrmsr Guest OS ID")
PERFCOUNTER(mshv_wrmsr_hc_page, "MS Hv wrmsr hypercall page")
PERFCOUNTER(mshv_wrmsr_vp_index, "MS Hv wrmsr vp index")
@@ -128,6 +129,7 @@ PERFCOUNTER(mshv_wrmsr_icr,
PERFCOUNTER(mshv_wrmsr_tpr, "MS Hv wrmsr tpr")
PERFCOUNTER(mshv_wrmsr_eoi, "MS Hv wrmsr eoi")
PERFCOUNTER(mshv_wrmsr_apic_assist, "MS Hv wrmsr APIC assist")
+PERFCOUNTER(mshv_wrmsr_apic_msr, "MS Hv wrmsr APIC msr")
PERFCOUNTER(realmode_emulations, "realmode instructions emulated")
PERFCOUNTER(realmode_exits, "vmexits from realmode")

99
26102-x86-IOAPIC-legacy-not-first.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
References: bnc#784087
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1351093908 -7200
# Node ID 22e08c9ac770db07c3c3e7c844aa7153050939f3
# Parent 07cf00a917cd1d1849f3e40d5b8ecc2cd8964fe8
x86: don't special case first IO-APIC
It has always been puzzling me why the first IO-APIC gets special cased
in two places, and finally Xen got run on a system where this breaks:
(XEN) ACPI: IOAPIC (id[0x10] address[0xfecff000] gsi_base[0])
(XEN) IOAPIC[0]: apic_id 16, version 17, address 0xfecff000, GSI 0-2
(XEN) ACPI: IOAPIC (id[0x0f] address[0xfec00000] gsi_base[3])
(XEN) IOAPIC[1]: apic_id 15, version 17, address 0xfec00000, GSI 3-38
(XEN) ACPI: IOAPIC (id[0x0e] address[0xfec01000] gsi_base[39])
(XEN) IOAPIC[2]: apic_id 14, version 17, address 0xfec01000, GSI 39-74
(XEN) ACPI: INT_SRC_OVR (bus 0 bus_irq 1 global_irq 4 dfl dfl)
(XEN) ACPI: INT_SRC_OVR (bus 0 bus_irq 0 global_irq 5 dfl dfl)
(XEN) ACPI: INT_SRC_OVR (bus 0 bus_irq 3 global_irq 6 dfl dfl)
(XEN) ACPI: INT_SRC_OVR (bus 0 bus_irq 4 global_irq 7 dfl dfl)
(XEN) ACPI: INT_SRC_OVR (bus 0 bus_irq 6 global_irq 9 dfl dfl)
(XEN) ACPI: INT_SRC_OVR (bus 0 bus_irq 7 global_irq 10 dfl dfl)
(XEN) ACPI: INT_SRC_OVR (bus 0 bus_irq 8 global_irq 11 low edge)
(XEN) ACPI: INT_SRC_OVR (bus 0 bus_irq 9 global_irq 12 dfl dfl)
(XEN) ACPI: INT_SRC_OVR (bus 0 bus_irq 12 global_irq 15 dfl dfl)
(XEN) ACPI: INT_SRC_OVR (bus 0 bus_irq 13 global_irq 16 dfl dfl)
(XEN) ACPI: INT_SRC_OVR (bus 0 bus_irq 14 global_irq 17 low edge)
(XEN) ACPI: INT_SRC_OVR (bus 0 bus_irq 15 global_irq 18 dfl dfl)
i.e. all legacy IRQs (apart from the timer one, but the firmware passed
data doesn't look right for that case anyway, as both Xen and native
Linux are falling back to use the virtual wire setup for IRQ0,
apparently rather using pin 2 of the first IO-APIC) are being handled
by the second IO-APIC.
This at once eliminates the possibility of an unmasked RTE getting
written without having got a vector put in place (in
setup_IO_APIC_irqs()).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
@@ -999,18 +999,17 @@ static void __init setup_IO_APIC_irqs(vo
else
add_pin_to_irq(irq, apic, pin);
- if (!apic && !IO_APIC_IRQ(irq))
+ if (!IO_APIC_IRQ(irq))
continue;
- if (IO_APIC_IRQ(irq)) {
- vector = assign_irq_vector(irq, NULL);
- BUG_ON(vector < 0);
- entry.vector = vector;
- ioapic_register_intr(irq, IOAPIC_AUTO);
+ vector = assign_irq_vector(irq, NULL);
+ BUG_ON(vector < 0);
+ entry.vector = vector;
+ ioapic_register_intr(irq, IOAPIC_AUTO);
+
+ if (platform_legacy_irq(irq))
+ disable_8259A_irq(irq_to_desc(irq));
- if (!apic && platform_legacy_irq(irq))
- disable_8259A_irq(irq_to_desc(irq));
- }
desc = irq_to_desc(irq);
SET_DEST(entry.dest.dest32, entry.dest.logical.logical_dest,
cpu_mask_to_apicid(desc->arch.cpu_mask));
@@ -2257,18 +2256,15 @@ unsigned apic_gsi_base(int apic);
static int apic_pin_2_gsi_irq(int apic, int pin)
{
- int idx, irq;
+ int idx;
if (apic < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- irq = apic_gsi_base(apic) + pin;
- if (apic == 0) {
- idx = find_irq_entry(apic, pin, mp_INT);
- if (idx >= 0)
- irq = pin_2_irq(idx, apic, pin);
- }
- return irq;
+ idx = find_irq_entry(apic, pin, mp_INT);
+
+ return idx >= 0 ? pin_2_irq(idx, apic, pin)
+ : apic_gsi_base(apic) + pin;
}
int ioapic_guest_read(unsigned long physbase, unsigned int reg, u32 *pval)

90
26114-pygrub-list-entries.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Charles Arnold <carnold@suse.com>
# Date 1351249508 -3600
# Node ID 6f9e46917eb8771914041b98f714e8f485fca5ef
# Parent 03af0abd2b72dfab3f2e50dd502108de8603f741
pygrub: Add option to list grub entries
The argument to "--entry" allows 2 syntaxes, either directly the entry
number in menu.lst, or the whole string behind the "title" key word.
This poses the following issue:
From Dom0 there is no way to guess the number and, or the complete
title string because this string contains the kernel version, which
will change with a kernel update.
This patch adds [-l|--list-entries] as an argument to pygrub.
Signed-off-by: Charles Arnold <carnold@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
diff -r 03af0abd2b72 -r 6f9e46917eb8 tools/pygrub/src/pygrub
--- a/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub Fri Oct 26 12:03:12 2012 +0100
+++ b/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub Fri Oct 26 12:05:08 2012 +0100
@@ -595,7 +595,17 @@ def run_grub(file, entry, fs, cfg_args):
sel = g.run()
g = Grub(file, fs)
- if interactive:
+
+ if list_entries:
+ for i in range(len(g.cf.images)):
+ img = g.cf.images[i]
+ print "title: %s" % img.title
+ print " root: %s" % img.root
+ print " kernel: %s" % img.kernel[1]
+ print " args: %s" % img.args
+ print " initrd: %s" % img.initrd[1]
+
+ if interactive and not list_entries:
curses.wrapper(run_main)
else:
sel = g.cf.default
@@ -702,7 +712,7 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
sel = None
def usage():
- print >> sys.stderr, "Usage: %s [-q|--quiet] [-i|--interactive] [-n|--not-really] [--output=] [--kernel=] [--ramdisk=] [--args=] [--entry=] [--output-directory=] [--output-format=sxp|simple|simple0] <image>" %(sys.argv[0],)
+ print >> sys.stderr, "Usage: %s [-q|--quiet] [-i|--interactive] [-l|--list-entries] [-n|--not-really] [--output=] [--kernel=] [--ramdisk=] [--args=] [--entry=] [--output-directory=] [--output-format=sxp|simple|simple0] <image>" %(sys.argv[0],)
def copy_from_image(fs, file_to_read, file_type, output_directory,
not_really):
@@ -736,8 +746,8 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
dataoff += len(data)
try:
- opts, args = getopt.gnu_getopt(sys.argv[1:], 'qinh::',
- ["quiet", "interactive", "not-really", "help",
+ opts, args = getopt.gnu_getopt(sys.argv[1:], 'qilnh::',
+ ["quiet", "interactive", "list-entries", "not-really", "help",
"output=", "output-format=", "output-directory=",
"entry=", "kernel=",
"ramdisk=", "args=", "isconfig", "debug"])
@@ -753,6 +763,7 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
output = None
entry = None
interactive = True
+ list_entries = False
isconfig = False
debug = False
not_really = False
@@ -771,6 +782,8 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
interactive = False
elif o in ("-i", "--interactive"):
interactive = True
+ elif o in ("-l", "--list-entries"):
+ list_entries = True
elif o in ("-n", "--not-really"):
not_really = True
elif o in ("-h", "--help"):
@@ -855,6 +868,9 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
fs = None
continue
+ if list_entries:
+ sys.exit(0)
+
# Did looping through partitions find us a kernel?
if not fs:
raise RuntimeError, "Unable to find partition containing kernel"

42
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@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
References: CVE-2012-4535 XSA-20 bnc#786516
VCPU/timers: Prevent overflow in calculations, leading to DoS vulnerability
The timer action for a vcpu periodic timer is to calculate the next
expiry time, and to reinsert itself into the timer queue. If the
deadline ends up in the past, Xen never leaves __do_softirq(). The
affected PCPU will stay in an infinite loop until Xen is killed by the
watchdog (if enabled).
This is a security problem, XSA-20 / CVE-2012-4535.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/common/domain.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/xen/common/domain.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/common/domain.c
@@ -882,6 +882,9 @@ long do_vcpu_op(int cmd, int vcpuid, XEN
if ( set.period_ns < MILLISECS(1) )
return -EINVAL;
+ if ( set.period_ns > STIME_DELTA_MAX )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
v->periodic_period = set.period_ns;
vcpu_force_reschedule(v);
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/include/xen/time.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/time.h
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/include/xen/time.h
@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ struct tm gmtime(unsigned long t);
#define MILLISECS(_ms) ((s_time_t)((_ms) * 1000000ULL))
#define MICROSECS(_us) ((s_time_t)((_us) * 1000ULL))
#define STIME_MAX ((s_time_t)((uint64_t)~0ull>>1))
+/* Chosen so (NOW() + delta) wont overflow without an uptime of 200 years */
+#define STIME_DELTA_MAX ((s_time_t)((uint64_t)~0ull>>2))
extern void update_vcpu_system_time(struct vcpu *v);
extern void update_domain_wallclock_time(struct domain *d);

43
CVE-2012-4537-xsa22.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
References: CVE-2012-4537 XSA-22 bnc#786517
x86/physmap: Prevent incorrect updates of m2p mappings
In certain conditions, such as low memory, set_p2m_entry() can fail.
Currently, the p2m and m2p tables will get out of sync because we still
update the m2p table after the p2m update has failed.
If that happens, subsequent guest-invoked memory operations can cause
BUG()s and ASSERT()s to kill Xen.
This is fixed by only updating the m2p table iff the p2m was
successfully updated.
This is a security problem, XSA-22 / CVE-2012-4537.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -654,7 +654,10 @@ guest_physmap_add_entry(struct domain *d
if ( mfn_valid(_mfn(mfn)) )
{
if ( !set_p2m_entry(p2m, gfn, _mfn(mfn), page_order, t, p2m->default_access) )
+ {
rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out; /* Failed to update p2m, bail without updating m2p. */
+ }
if ( !p2m_is_grant(t) )
{
for ( i = 0; i < (1UL << page_order); i++ )
@@ -677,6 +680,7 @@ guest_physmap_add_entry(struct domain *d
}
}
+out:
p2m_unlock(p2m);
return rc;

35
CVE-2012-4538-xsa23.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
References: CVE-2012-4538 XSA-23 bnc#786519
xen/mm/shadow: check toplevel pagetables are present before unhooking them.
If the guest has not fully populated its top-level PAE entries when it calls
HVMOP_pagetable_dying, the shadow code could try to unhook entries from
MFN 0. Add a check to avoid that case.
This issue was introduced by c/s 21239:b9d2db109cf5.
This is a security problem, XSA-23 / CVE-2012-4538.
Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
@@ -4734,8 +4734,12 @@ static void sh_pagetable_dying(struct vc
unsigned long gfn;
mfn_t smfn, gmfn;
- if ( fast_path )
- smfn = _mfn(pagetable_get_pfn(v->arch.shadow_table[i]));
+ if ( fast_path ) {
+ if ( pagetable_is_null(v->arch.shadow_table[i]) )
+ smfn = _mfn(INVALID_MFN);
+ else
+ smfn = _mfn(pagetable_get_pfn(v->arch.shadow_table[i]));
+ }
else
{
/* retrieving the l2s */

29
CVE-2012-4539-xsa24.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
References: CVE-2012-4539 XSA-24 bnc#786520
compat/gnttab: Prevent infinite loop in compat code
c/s 20281:95ea2052b41b, which introduces Grant Table version 2
hypercalls introduces a vulnerability whereby the compat hypercall
handler can fall into an infinite loop.
If the watchdog is enabled, Xen will die after the timeout.
This is a security problem, XSA-24 / CVE-2012-4539.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/common/compat/grant_table.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/xen/common/compat/grant_table.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/common/compat/grant_table.c
@@ -318,6 +318,8 @@ int compat_grant_table_op(unsigned int c
#undef XLAT_gnttab_get_status_frames_HNDL_frame_list
if ( unlikely(__copy_to_guest(cmp_uop, &cmp.get_status, 1)) )
rc = -EFAULT;
+ else
+ i = 1;
}
break;
}

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View File

@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
libxc: builder: limit maximum size of kernel/ramdisk.
Allowing user supplied kernels of arbitrary sizes, especially during
decompression, can swallow up dom0 memory leading to either virtual
address space exhaustion in the builder process or allocation
failures/OOM killing of both toolstack and unrelated processes.
We disable these checks when building in a stub domain for pvgrub
since this uses the guest's own memory and is isolated.
Decompression of gzip compressed kernels and ramdisks has been safe
since 14954:58205257517d (Xen 3.1.0 onwards).
This is XSA-25 / CVE-2012-4544.
Also make explicit checks for buffer overflows in various
decompression routines. These were already ruled out due to other
properties of the code but check them as a belt-and-braces measure.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
[ Includes 25589:60f09d1ab1fe for CVE-2012-2625 ]
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/stubdom/grub/kexec.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/stubdom/grub/kexec.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/stubdom/grub/kexec.c
@@ -137,6 +137,10 @@ void kexec(void *kernel, long kernel_siz
dom = xc_dom_allocate(xc_handle, cmdline, features);
dom->allocate = kexec_allocate;
+ /* We are using guest owned memory, therefore no limits. */
+ xc_dom_kernel_max_size(dom, 0);
+ xc_dom_ramdisk_max_size(dom, 0);
+
dom->kernel_blob = kernel;
dom->kernel_size = kernel_size;
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/libxc/xc_dom.h
@@ -55,6 +55,9 @@ struct xc_dom_image {
void *ramdisk_blob;
size_t ramdisk_size;
+ size_t max_kernel_size;
+ size_t max_ramdisk_size;
+
/* arguments and parameters */
char *cmdline;
uint32_t f_requested[XENFEAT_NR_SUBMAPS];
@@ -180,6 +183,23 @@ void xc_dom_release_phys(struct xc_dom_i
void xc_dom_release(struct xc_dom_image *dom);
int xc_dom_mem_init(struct xc_dom_image *dom, unsigned int mem_mb);
+/* Set this larger if you have enormous ramdisks/kernels. Note that
+ * you should trust all kernels not to be maliciously large (e.g. to
+ * exhaust all dom0 memory) if you do this (see CVE-2012-4544 /
+ * XSA-25). You can also set the default independently for
+ * ramdisks/kernels in xc_dom_allocate() or call
+ * xc_dom_{kernel,ramdisk}_max_size.
+ */
+#ifndef XC_DOM_DECOMPRESS_MAX
+#define XC_DOM_DECOMPRESS_MAX (1024*1024*1024) /* 1GB */
+#endif
+
+int xc_dom_kernel_check_size(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t sz);
+int xc_dom_kernel_max_size(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t sz);
+
+int xc_dom_ramdisk_check_size(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t sz);
+int xc_dom_ramdisk_max_size(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t sz);
+
size_t xc_dom_check_gzip(xc_interface *xch,
void *blob, size_t ziplen);
int xc_dom_do_gunzip(xc_interface *xch,
@@ -240,7 +260,8 @@ void xc_dom_log_memory_footprint(struct
void *xc_dom_malloc(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t size);
void *xc_dom_malloc_page_aligned(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t size);
void *xc_dom_malloc_filemap(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
- const char *filename, size_t * size);
+ const char *filename, size_t * size,
+ const size_t max_size);
char *xc_dom_strdup(struct xc_dom_image *dom, const char *str);
/* --- alloc memory pool ------------------------------------------- */
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/libxc/xc_dom_bzimageloader.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_dom_bzimageloader.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/libxc/xc_dom_bzimageloader.c
@@ -47,13 +47,19 @@ static int xc_try_bzip2_decode(
char *out_buf;
char *tmp_buf;
int retval = -1;
- int outsize;
+ unsigned int outsize;
uint64_t total;
stream.bzalloc = NULL;
stream.bzfree = NULL;
stream.opaque = NULL;
+ if ( dom->kernel_size == 0)
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("BZIP2: Input is 0 size");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
ret = BZ2_bzDecompressInit(&stream, 0, 0);
if ( ret != BZ_OK )
{
@@ -66,6 +72,17 @@ static int xc_try_bzip2_decode(
* the input buffer to start, and we'll realloc as needed.
*/
outsize = dom->kernel_size;
+
+ /*
+ * stream.avail_in and outsize are unsigned int, while kernel_size
+ * is a size_t. Check we aren't overflowing.
+ */
+ if ( outsize != dom->kernel_size )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("BZIP2: Input too large");
+ goto bzip2_cleanup;
+ }
+
out_buf = malloc(outsize);
if ( out_buf == NULL )
{
@@ -98,13 +115,20 @@ static int xc_try_bzip2_decode(
if ( stream.avail_out == 0 )
{
/* Protect against output buffer overflow */
- if ( outsize > INT_MAX / 2 )
+ if ( outsize > UINT_MAX / 2 )
{
DOMPRINTF("BZIP2: output buffer overflow");
free(out_buf);
goto bzip2_cleanup;
}
+ if ( xc_dom_kernel_check_size(dom, outsize * 2) )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("BZIP2: output too large");
+ free(out_buf);
+ goto bzip2_cleanup;
+ }
+
tmp_buf = realloc(out_buf, outsize * 2);
if ( tmp_buf == NULL )
{
@@ -172,9 +196,15 @@ static int _xc_try_lzma_decode(
unsigned char *out_buf;
unsigned char *tmp_buf;
int retval = -1;
- int outsize;
+ size_t outsize;
const char *msg;
+ if ( dom->kernel_size == 0)
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("LZMA: Input is 0 size");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
/* sigh. We don't know up-front how much memory we are going to need
* for the output buffer. Allocate the output buffer to be equal
* the input buffer to start, and we'll realloc as needed.
@@ -244,13 +274,20 @@ static int _xc_try_lzma_decode(
if ( stream->avail_out == 0 )
{
/* Protect against output buffer overflow */
- if ( outsize > INT_MAX / 2 )
+ if ( outsize > SIZE_MAX / 2 )
{
DOMPRINTF("%s: output buffer overflow", what);
free(out_buf);
goto lzma_cleanup;
}
+ if ( xc_dom_kernel_check_size(dom, outsize * 2) )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("LZMA: output too large");
+ free(out_buf);
+ goto lzma_cleanup;
+ }
+
tmp_buf = realloc(out_buf, outsize * 2);
if ( tmp_buf == NULL )
{
@@ -359,6 +396,12 @@ static int xc_try_lzo1x_decode(
0x89, 0x4c, 0x5a, 0x4f, 0x00, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a
};
+ /*
+ * lzo_uint should match size_t. Check that this is the case to be
+ * sure we won't overflow various lzo_uint fields.
+ */
+ XC_BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(lzo_uint) != sizeof(size_t));
+
ret = lzo_init();
if ( ret != LZO_E_OK )
{
@@ -438,6 +481,14 @@ static int xc_try_lzo1x_decode(
if ( src_len <= 0 || src_len > dst_len || src_len > left )
break;
+ msg = "Output buffer overflow";
+ if ( *size > SIZE_MAX - dst_len )
+ break;
+
+ msg = "Decompressed image too large";
+ if ( xc_dom_kernel_check_size(dom, *size + dst_len) )
+ break;
+
msg = "Failed to (re)alloc memory";
tmp_buf = realloc(out_buf, *size + dst_len);
if ( tmp_buf == NULL )
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c
@@ -159,7 +159,8 @@ void *xc_dom_malloc_page_aligned(struct
}
void *xc_dom_malloc_filemap(struct xc_dom_image *dom,
- const char *filename, size_t * size)
+ const char *filename, size_t * size,
+ const size_t max_size)
{
struct xc_dom_mem *block = NULL;
int fd = -1;
@@ -171,6 +172,13 @@ void *xc_dom_malloc_filemap(struct xc_do
lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
*size = lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_END);
+ if ( max_size && *size > max_size )
+ {
+ xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+ "tried to map file which is too large");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
block = malloc(sizeof(*block));
if ( block == NULL )
goto err;
@@ -222,6 +230,40 @@ char *xc_dom_strdup(struct xc_dom_image
}
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* decompression buffer sizing */
+int xc_dom_kernel_check_size(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t sz)
+{
+ /* No limit */
+ if ( !dom->max_kernel_size )
+ return 0;
+
+ if ( sz > dom->max_kernel_size )
+ {
+ xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_INVALID_KERNEL,
+ "kernel image too large");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int xc_dom_ramdisk_check_size(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t sz)
+{
+ /* No limit */
+ if ( !dom->max_ramdisk_size )
+ return 0;
+
+ if ( sz > dom->max_ramdisk_size )
+ {
+ xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_INVALID_KERNEL,
+ "ramdisk image too large");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* read files, copy memory blocks, with transparent gunzip */
size_t xc_dom_check_gzip(xc_interface *xch, void *blob, size_t ziplen)
@@ -235,7 +277,7 @@ size_t xc_dom_check_gzip(xc_interface *x
gzlen = blob + ziplen - 4;
unziplen = gzlen[3] << 24 | gzlen[2] << 16 | gzlen[1] << 8 | gzlen[0];
- if ( (unziplen < 0) || (unziplen > (1024*1024*1024)) ) /* 1GB limit */
+ if ( (unziplen < 0) || (unziplen > XC_DOM_DECOMPRESS_MAX) )
{
xc_dom_printf
(xch,
@@ -288,6 +330,9 @@ int xc_dom_try_gunzip(struct xc_dom_imag
if ( unziplen == 0 )
return 0;
+ if ( xc_dom_kernel_check_size(dom, unziplen) )
+ return 0;
+
unzip = xc_dom_malloc(dom, unziplen);
if ( unzip == NULL )
return -1;
@@ -588,6 +633,9 @@ struct xc_dom_image *xc_dom_allocate(xc_
memset(dom, 0, sizeof(*dom));
dom->xch = xch;
+ dom->max_kernel_size = XC_DOM_DECOMPRESS_MAX;
+ dom->max_ramdisk_size = XC_DOM_DECOMPRESS_MAX;
+
if ( cmdline )
dom->cmdline = xc_dom_strdup(dom, cmdline);
if ( features )
@@ -608,10 +656,25 @@ struct xc_dom_image *xc_dom_allocate(xc_
return NULL;
}
+int xc_dom_kernel_max_size(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t sz)
+{
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: kernel_max_size=%zx", __FUNCTION__, sz);
+ dom->max_kernel_size = sz;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int xc_dom_ramdisk_max_size(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t sz)
+{
+ DOMPRINTF("%s: ramdisk_max_size=%zx", __FUNCTION__, sz);
+ dom->max_ramdisk_size = sz;
+ return 0;
+}
+
int xc_dom_kernel_file(struct xc_dom_image *dom, const char *filename)
{
DOMPRINTF("%s: filename=\"%s\"", __FUNCTION__, filename);
- dom->kernel_blob = xc_dom_malloc_filemap(dom, filename, &dom->kernel_size);
+ dom->kernel_blob = xc_dom_malloc_filemap(dom, filename, &dom->kernel_size,
+ dom->max_kernel_size);
if ( dom->kernel_blob == NULL )
return -1;
return xc_dom_try_gunzip(dom, &dom->kernel_blob, &dom->kernel_size);
@@ -621,7 +684,9 @@ int xc_dom_ramdisk_file(struct xc_dom_im
{
DOMPRINTF("%s: filename=\"%s\"", __FUNCTION__, filename);
dom->ramdisk_blob =
- xc_dom_malloc_filemap(dom, filename, &dom->ramdisk_size);
+ xc_dom_malloc_filemap(dom, filename, &dom->ramdisk_size,
+ dom->max_ramdisk_size);
+
if ( dom->ramdisk_blob == NULL )
return -1;
// return xc_dom_try_gunzip(dom, &dom->ramdisk_blob, &dom->ramdisk_size);
@@ -781,7 +846,11 @@ int xc_dom_build_image(struct xc_dom_ima
void *ramdiskmap;
unziplen = xc_dom_check_gzip(dom->xch, dom->ramdisk_blob, dom->ramdisk_size);
+ if ( xc_dom_ramdisk_check_size(dom, unziplen) != 0 )
+ unziplen = 0;
+
ramdisklen = unziplen ? unziplen : dom->ramdisk_size;
+
if ( xc_dom_alloc_segment(dom, &dom->ramdisk_seg, "ramdisk", 0,
ramdisklen) != 0 )
goto err;

157
VNC-Support-for-ExtendedKeyEvent-client-message.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
From 9ca313aa0824f2d350a7a6c9b1ef6c47e0408f1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: aliguori <aliguori@c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162>
Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2008 23:27:37 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] VNC: Support for ExtendedKeyEvent client message
This patch adds support for the ExtendedKeyEvent client message. This message
allows a client to send raw scan codes directly to the server. If the client
and server are using the same keymap, then it's unnecessary to use the '-k'
option with QEMU when this extension is supported.
This is extension is currently only implemented by gtk-vnc based clients
(gvncviewer, virt-manager, vinagre, etc.).
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@5076 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
---
vnc.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
@@ -1285,35 +1285,22 @@ static void press_key_altgr_down(VncStat
}
}
-static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, int down, uint32_t sym)
+static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, int down, int keycode, int sym, int shift)
{
- int keycode;
int shift_keys = 0;
- int shift = 0;
int keypad = 0;
int altgr = 0;
int altgr_keys = 0;
if (is_graphic_console()) {
- if (sym >= 'A' && sym <= 'Z') {
- sym = sym - 'A' + 'a';
- shift = 1;
- }
- else {
+ if (!shift)
shift = keysym_is_shift(vs->kbd_layout, sym & 0xFFFF);
- }
altgr = keysym_is_altgr(vs->kbd_layout, sym & 0xFFFF);
}
shift_keys = vs->modifiers_state[0x2a] | vs->modifiers_state[0x36];
altgr_keys = vs->modifiers_state[0xb8];
- keycode = keysym2scancode(vs->kbd_layout, sym & 0xFFFF);
- if (keycode == 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Key lost : keysym=0x%x(%d)\n", sym, sym);
- return;
- }
-
/* QEMU console switch */
switch(keycode) {
case 0x2a: /* Left Shift */
@@ -1445,7 +1432,25 @@ static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, i
static void key_event(VncState *vs, int down, uint32_t sym)
{
- do_key_event(vs, down, sym);
+ int keycode;
+ int shift = 0;
+
+ if (sym >= 'A' && sym <= 'Z' && is_graphic_console()) {
+ sym = sym - 'A' + 'a';
+ shift = 1;
+ }
+ keycode = keysym2scancode(vs->kbd_layout, sym & 0xFFFF);
+ do_key_event(vs, down, keycode, sym, shift);
+}
+
+static void ext_key_event(VncState *vs, int down,
+ uint32_t sym, uint16_t keycode)
+{
+ /* if the user specifies a keyboard layout, always use it */
+ if (keyboard_layout)
+ key_event(vs, down, sym);
+ else
+ do_key_event(vs, down, keycode, sym, 0);
}
static void framebuffer_set_updated(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
@@ -1534,6 +1539,15 @@ static void framebuffer_update_request(V
qemu_mod_timer(vs->timer, qemu_get_clock(rt_clock));
}
+static void send_ext_key_event_ack(VncState *vs)
+{
+ vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
+ vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
+ vnc_write_u16(vs, 1);
+ vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, 0, 0, ds_get_width(vs->ds), ds_get_height(vs->ds), -258);
+ vnc_flush(vs);
+}
+
static void set_encodings(VncState *vs, int32_t *encodings, size_t n_encodings)
{
int i;
@@ -1562,6 +1576,9 @@ static void set_encodings(VncState *vs,
case -257:
vs->has_pointer_type_change = 1;
break;
+ case -258:
+ send_ext_key_event_ack(vs);
+ break;
case 0x574D5669:
vs->has_WMVi = 1;
default:
@@ -1774,6 +1791,24 @@ static int protocol_client_msg(VncState
client_cut_text(vs, read_u32(data, 4), (char *)(data + 8));
break;
+ case 255:
+ if (len == 1)
+ return 2;
+
+ switch (read_u8(data, 1)) {
+ case 0:
+ if (len == 2)
+ return 12;
+
+ ext_key_event(vs, read_u16(data, 2),
+ read_u32(data, 4), read_u32(data, 8));
+ break;
+ default:
+ printf("Msg: %d\n", read_u16(data, 0));
+ vnc_client_error(vs);
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
default:
printf("Msg: %d\n", data[0]);
vnc_client_error(vs);
@@ -2445,10 +2480,11 @@ void vnc_display_init(DisplayState *ds)
vs->ds = ds;
- if (!keyboard_layout)
- keyboard_layout = "en-us";
+ if (keyboard_layout)
+ vs->kbd_layout = init_keyboard_layout(keyboard_layout);
+ else
+ vs->kbd_layout = init_keyboard_layout("en-us");
- vs->kbd_layout = init_keyboard_layout(keyboard_layout);
if (!vs->kbd_layout)
exit(1);
vs->modifiers_state[0x45] = 1; /* NumLock on - on boot */

14
altgr_2.patch
View File

@ -33,13 +33,13 @@ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
@@ -1308,6 +1308,9 @@ static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, i
shift_keys = vs->modifiers_state[0x2a] | vs->modifiers_state[0x36];
altgr_keys = vs->modifiers_state[0xb8];
@@ -1440,6 +1440,9 @@ static void key_event(VncState *vs, int
int keycode;
int shift = 0;
+ if ( !strcmp(keyboard_layout,"es") && sym == 0xffea )
+ if ( sym == 0xffea && keyboard_layout && !strcmp(keyboard_layout,"es") )
+ sym = 0xffe9;
+
keycode = keysym2scancode(vs->kbd_layout, sym & 0xFFFF);
if (keycode == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Key lost : keysym=0x%x(%d)\n", sym, sym);
if (sym >= 'A' && sym <= 'Z' && is_graphic_console()) {
sym = sym - 'A' + 'a';
shift = 1;

214
block-dmmd
View File

@ -26,10 +26,8 @@ dir=$(dirname "$0")
. "$dir/block-common.sh"
#exec >> /tmp/block-dmmd-`date +%F_%T.%N`.log 2>&1
echo ""
date
set -x
echo shell-flags: $-
#echo shell-flags: $-
command=$1
# We check for errors ourselves:
@ -37,85 +35,87 @@ set +e
function run_mdadm()
{
local mdadm_cmd=$1
local msg
local rc
local mdadm_cmd=$1
local msg
local rc
msg="`/sbin/mdadm $mdadm_cmd 2>&1`"
rc=$?
case "$msg" in
*"has been started"* | *"already active"* )
return 0
;;
*"is already in use"* )
: hmm, might be used by another device in this domU
: leave it to upper layers to detect a real error
return 2
;;
* )
return $rc
;;
esac
return 1
msg="`/sbin/mdadm $mdadm_cmd 2>&1`"
rc=$?
case "$msg" in
*"has been started"* | *"already active"* )
return 0
;;
*"is already in use"* )
# hmm, might be used by another device in this domU
# leave it to upper layers to detect a real error
return 2
;;
* )
return $rc
;;
esac
return 1
}
function activate_md()
{
local par=$1
local already_active=0 cfg dev rc t
local par=$1
local already_active=0 cfg dev rc t
if [ ${par} = ${par%%(*} ]; then
# No configuration file specified:
dev=$par
cfd=
else
dev=${par%%(*}
t=${par#*(}
cfg="-c ${t%%)*}"
fi
if /sbin/mdadm -Q -D $dev; then
already_active=1
fi
run_mdadm "-A $dev $cfg"
rc=$?
if [ $already_active -eq 1 ] && [ $rc -eq 2 ]; then
return 0
fi
return $rc
if [ ${par} = ${par%%(*} ]; then
# No configuration file specified:
dev=$par
cfg=
else
dev=${par%%(*}
t=${par#*(}
cfg="-c ${t%%)*}"
fi
if /sbin/mdadm -Q -D $dev; then
already_active=1
fi
run_mdadm "-A $dev $cfg"
rc=$?
if [ $already_active -eq 1 ] && [ $rc -eq 2 ]; then
return 0
fi
return $rc
}
function deactivate_md ()
function deactivate_md()
{
local par=$1 # Make it explicitly local
local par=$1 # Make it explicitly local
## We need the device name only while deactivating
/sbin/mdadm -S ${par%%(*}
return $?
## We need the device name only while deactivating
/sbin/mdadm -S ${par%%(*}
return $?
}
function activate_lvm ()
function activate_lvm()
{
# First scan for PVs and VGs; we may then have to activate the VG
# first, but can ignore errors:
# /sbin/pvscan || :
# /sbin/vgscan --mknodes || :
# /sbin/vgchange -ay ${1%/*} || :
/sbin/lvchange -ay $1
return $?
# First scan for PVs and VGs; we may then have to activate the VG
# first, but can ignore errors:
# /sbin/pvscan || :
# /sbin/vgscan --mknodes || :
# /sbin/vgchange -ay ${1%/*} || :
/sbin/lvchange -ay $1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
return 0
fi
return 1
}
function deactivate_lvm ()
function deactivate_lvm()
{
/sbin/lvchange -an $1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
# We may have to deactivate the VG now, but can ignore errors:
# /sbin/vgchange -an ${1%/*} || :
# Maybe we need to cleanup the LVM cache:
# /sbin/vgscan --mknodes || :
return 0
fi
return 1
/sbin/lvchange -an $1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
# We may have to deactivate the VG now, but can ignore errors:
# /sbin/vgchange -an ${1%/*} || :
# Maybe we need to cleanup the LVM cache:
# /sbin/vgscan --mknodes || :
return 0
fi
return 1
}
BP=100
@ -123,16 +123,16 @@ SP=$BP
VBD=
declare -a stack
function push ()
function push()
{
if [ -z "$1" ]; then
return
fi
let "SP -= 1"
stack[$SP]="${1}"
return
}
function pop ()
function pop()
{
VBD=
@ -142,11 +142,10 @@ function pop ()
VBD=${stack[$SP]}
let "SP += 1"
return
}
function activate_dmmd ()
function activate_dmmd()
{
# echo $1 $2
case $1 in
md)
activate_md $2
@ -158,6 +157,7 @@ function activate_dmmd ()
;;
esac
}
function deactivate_dmmd()
{
case "$1" in
@ -171,7 +171,8 @@ function deactivate_dmmd()
;;
esac
}
function cleanup_stack ()
function cleanup_stack()
{
while [ 1 ]; do
pop
@ -180,17 +181,15 @@ function cleanup_stack ()
fi
deactivate_dmmd $VBD
done
return
}
function parse_par ()
function parse_par()
{
local ac par rc s t # Make these explicitly local vars
ac=$1
par="$2"
echo "parse_paring $1, $2"
par="$par;"
while [ 1 ]; do
t=${par%%;*}
@ -205,7 +204,6 @@ function parse_par ()
fi
par=${par#*;}
echo "type is $t, dev is $s"
if [ "$ac" = "activate" ]; then
activate_dmmd $t $s
rc=$?
@ -213,45 +211,39 @@ function parse_par ()
return 1
fi
fi
echo "push $t $s"
push "$t $s"
done
}
echo $command
case "$command" in
add)
p=`xenstore-read $XENBUS_PATH/params` || true
claim_lock "dmmd"
dmmd=$p
echo "before parse_par $dmmd"
parse_par activate "$dmmd"
rc=$?
echo "reach here with rc: $rc"
if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then
cleanup_stack
release_lock "dmmd"
exit 1
fi
lastparam=${dmmd##*;}
usedevice=${lastparam%(*}
claim_lock "block"
xenstore-write $XENBUS_PATH/node "$usedevice"
write_dev "$usedevice"
release_lock "block"
release_lock "dmmd"
exit 0
;;
add)
p=`xenstore-read $XENBUS_PATH/params` || true
claim_lock "dmmd"
dmmd=$p
parse_par activate "$dmmd"
rc=$?
if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then
cleanup_stack
release_lock "dmmd"
exit 1
fi
lastparam=${dmmd##*;}
usedevice=${lastparam%(*}
xenstore-write $XENBUS_PATH/node "$usedevice"
write_dev "$usedevice"
release_lock "dmmd"
exit 0
;;
remove)
p=`xenstore-read $XENBUS_PATH/params` || true
claim_lock "dmmd"
dmmd=$p
parse_par noactivate "$dmmd"
cleanup_stack
release_lock "dmmd"
exit 0
;;
remove)
p=`xenstore-read $XENBUS_PATH/params` || true
claim_lock "dmmd"
dmmd=$p
parse_par noactivate "$dmmd"
cleanup_stack
release_lock "dmmd"
exit 0
;;
esac

2
capslock_enable.patch
View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
@@ -1342,6 +1342,11 @@ static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, i
@@ -1329,6 +1329,11 @@ static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, i
}
break;
case 0x3a: /* CapsLock */

2
change-vnc-passwd.patch
View File

@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
@@ -2591,6 +2591,7 @@ int vnc_display_password(DisplayState *d
@@ -2627,6 +2627,7 @@ int vnc_display_password(DisplayState *d
if (password && password[0]) {
if (!(vs->password = qemu_strdup(password)))
return -1;

2
ioemu-vnc-resize.patch
View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
@@ -1734,6 +1734,25 @@ static int protocol_client_msg(VncState
@@ -1751,6 +1751,25 @@ static int protocol_client_msg(VncState
}
set_encodings(vs, (int32_t *)(data + 4), limit);

13
log-guest-console.patch
View File

@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_console.c
if (buffer->max_capacity &&
buffer->size > buffer->max_capacity) {
/* Discard the middle of the data. */
@@ -176,6 +203,36 @@ static void xencons_send(struct XenConso
@@ -176,6 +203,37 @@ static void xencons_send(struct XenConso
}
}
@ -83,7 +83,8 @@ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_console.c
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ asprintf(&logfile, "%s/guest-%s.log", logdir, domname);
+ if (asprintf(&logfile, "%s/guest-%s.log", logdir, domname) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ qemu_free(domname);
+
+ fd = open(logfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_APPEND, 0644);
@ -97,7 +98,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_console.c
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static int con_init(struct XenDevice *xendev)
@@ -183,6 +240,7 @@ static int con_init(struct XenDevice *xe
@@ -183,6 +241,7 @@ static int con_init(struct XenDevice *xe
struct XenConsole *con = container_of(xendev, struct XenConsole, xendev);
char *type, *dom, label[32];
const char *output;
@ -105,7 +106,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_console.c
/* setup */
dom = xs_get_domain_path(xenstore, con->xendev.dom);
@@ -209,6 +267,10 @@ static int con_init(struct XenDevice *xe
@@ -209,6 +268,10 @@ static int con_init(struct XenDevice *xe
con->chr = qemu_chr_open(label, output, NULL);
xenstore_store_pv_console_info(con->xendev.dev, con->chr, output);
@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_console.c
return 0;
}
@@ -246,6 +308,9 @@ static int con_initialise(struct XenDevi
@@ -246,6 +309,9 @@ static int con_initialise(struct XenDevi
con->xendev.remote_port,
con->xendev.local_port,
con->buffer.max_capacity);
@ -126,7 +127,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_console.c
return 0;
}
@@ -266,6 +331,12 @@ static void con_disconnect(struct XenDev
@@ -266,6 +332,12 @@ static void con_disconnect(struct XenDev
xc_gnttab_munmap(xendev->gnttabdev, con->sring, 1);
con->sring = NULL;
}

8
x86-ioapic-ack-default.patch
View File

@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
Change default IO-APIC ack mode for single IO-APIC systems to old-style.
--- a/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
@@ -2013,7 +2013,10 @@ void __init setup_IO_APIC(void)
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
@@ -2012,7 +2012,10 @@ void __init setup_IO_APIC(void)
io_apic_irqs = ~PIC_IRQS;
printk("ENABLING IO-APIC IRQs\n");

97
xen-destdir.diff
View File

@ -60,33 +60,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile
@@ -41,18 +41,6 @@ endif
UDEV_RULES_DIR = $(CONFIG_DIR)/udev
UDEV_RULES = xen-backend.rules xend.rules
-DI = $(if $(DISTDIR),$(shell readlink -f $(DISTDIR)),)
-DE = $(if $(DESTDIR),$(shell readlink -f $(DESTDIR)),)
-ifeq ($(findstring $(DI),$(DE)),$(DI))
-HOTPLUGS=install-hotplug install-udev
-else
-ifeq ($(shell [ $(UDEVVER) -ge 059 ] && echo 1),1)
-HOTPLUGS=install-udev
-else
-HOTPLUGS=install-hotplug
-endif
-endif
-
.PHONY: all
all:
@@ -60,18 +48,18 @@ all:
build:
.PHONY: install
-install: all install-initd install-scripts $(HOTPLUGS)
+install: all install-initd install-scripts install-udev
# See docs/misc/distro_mapping.txt for INITD_DIR location
@@ -43,12 +43,12 @@ install: all install-initd install-scrip
.PHONY: install-initd
install-initd:
[ -d $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR) ] || $(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR)
@ -94,11 +68,11 @@ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile
+ [ -d $(DESTDIR)/var/adm/fillup-templates ] || $(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)/var/adm/fillup-templates/
$(INSTALL_PROG) $(XEND_INITD) $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR)
$(INSTALL_PROG) $(XENDOMAINS_INITD) $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR)
- $(INSTALL_PROG) $(XENDOMAINS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)/xendomains
+ $(INSTALL_PROG) $(XENDOMAINS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)/var/adm/fillup-templates/
- $(INSTALL_DATA) $(XENDOMAINS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)/xendomains
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) $(XENDOMAINS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)/var/adm/fillup-templates/
$(INSTALL_PROG) $(XENCOMMONS_INITD) $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR)
- $(INSTALL_PROG) $(XENCOMMONS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)/xencommons
+ $(INSTALL_PROG) $(XENCOMMONS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)/var/adm/fillup-templates/
- $(INSTALL_DATA) $(XENCOMMONS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)/xencommons
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) $(XENCOMMONS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)/var/adm/fillup-templates/
$(INSTALL_PROG) init.d/xen-watchdog $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR)
.PHONY: install-scripts
@ -125,64 +99,3 @@ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/firmware/etherboot/Makefile
mv _$T $T
$D/src/arch/i386/Makefile: $T Config
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/stubdom/Makefile
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/stubdom/Makefile
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/stubdom/Makefile
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ install-grub: pv-grub
install-xenstore: xenstore-stubdom
$(INSTALL_DIR) "$(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/xen/boot"
- $(INSTALL_PROG) mini-os-$(XEN_TARGET_ARCH)-xenstore/mini-os.gz "$(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/xen/boot/xenstore-stubdom.gz"
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) mini-os-$(XEN_TARGET_ARCH)-xenstore/mini-os.gz "$(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/xen/boot/xenstore-stubdom.gz"
#######
# clean
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap2/vhd/lib/Makefile
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/blktap2/vhd/lib/Makefile
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap2/vhd/lib/Makefile
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR).$(LIBVHD-MINOR
install: all
$(INSTALL_DIR) -p $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)
- $(INSTALL_PROG) libvhd.a $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) libvhd.a $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)
$(INSTALL_PROG) libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR).$(LIBVHD-MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)
ln -sf libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR).$(LIBVHD-MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)/libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR)
ln -sf libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR) $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)/libvhd.so
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap/lib/Makefile
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/blktap/lib/Makefile
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap/lib/Makefile
@@ -23,23 +23,26 @@ OBJS = $(SRCS:.c=.o)
OBJS_PIC = $(SRCS:.c=.opic)
IBINS :=
-LIB = libblktap.a libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR)
+LIB = libblktap.a
+LIB_SO = libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR)
+LIB_ALL = $(LIB) $(LIB_SO)
.PHONY: all
-all: $(LIB)
+all: $(LIB_ALL)
.PHONY: install
install: all
$(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)
$(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(INCLUDEDIR)
- $(INSTALL_PROG) $(LIB) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) $(LIB) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)
+ $(INSTALL_PROG) $(LIB_SO) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)
ln -sf libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)/libblktap.so.$(MAJOR)
ln -sf libblktap.so.$(MAJOR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)/libblktap.so
$(INSTALL_DATA) blktaplib.h $(DESTDIR)$(INCLUDEDIR)
.PHONY: clean
clean:
- rm -rf *.a *.so* *.o *.opic *.rpm $(LIB) *~ $(DEPS) xen TAGS
+ rm -rf *.a *.so* *.o *.opic *.rpm $(LIB_ALL) *~ $(DEPS) xen TAGS
libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR): $(OBJS_PIC)
$(CC) $(LDFLAGS) -Wl,$(SONAME_LDFLAG) -Wl,$(SONAME) $(SHLIB_LDFLAGS) \

117
xen.changes
View File

@ -4,6 +4,123 @@ Sat Nov 17 10:51:05 UTC 2012 - aj@suse.de
- Fix build with glibc 2.17: add patch xen-glibc217.patch, fix
configure for librt.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tue Nov 13 16:35:55 MST 2012 - jfehlig@suse.com
- bnc#777628 - guest "disappears" after live migration
Updated block-dmmd script
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tue Oct 30 15:28:27 CET 2012 - ohering@suse.de
- fate#310510 - fix xenpaging
restore changes to integrate paging into xm/xend
xenpaging.autostart.patch
xenpaging.doc.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Oct 29 10:46:50 MDT 2012 - carnold@novell.com
- bnc#787163 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-4544: xen: Domain builder Out-of-
memory due to malicious kernel/ramdisk (XSA 25)
CVE-2012-4544-xsa25.patch
- bnc#779212 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-4411: XEN / qemu: guest
administrator can access qemu monitor console (XSA-19)
CVE-2012-4411-xsa19.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Oct 25 07:02:45 MDT 2012 - carnold@novell.com
- bnc#786516 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-4535: xen: Timer overflow DoS
vulnerability
CVE-2012-4535-xsa20.patch
- bnc#786518 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-4536: xen: pirq range check DoS
vulnerability
CVE-2012-4536-xsa21.patch
- bnc#786517 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-4537: xen: Memory mapping failure
DoS vulnerability
CVE-2012-4537-xsa22.patch
- bnc#786519 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-4538: xen: Unhooking empty PAE
entries DoS vulnerability
CVE-2012-4538-xsa23.patch
- bnc#786520 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-4539: xen: Grant table hypercall
infinite loop DoS vulnerability
CVE-2012-4539-xsa24.patch
- bnc#784087 - L3: Xen BUG at io_apic.c:129
26102-x86-IOAPIC-legacy-not-first.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Wed Oct 24 06:15:58 MDT 2012 - carnold@novell.com
- Upstream patches from Jan
25920-x86-APICV-enable.patch
25921-x86-APICV-delivery.patch
25922-x86-APICV-x2APIC.patch
25957-x86-TSC-adjust-HVM.patch
25958-x86-TSC-adjust-sr.patch
25959-x86-TSC-adjust-expose.patch
25975-x86-IvyBridge.patch
25984-SVM-nested-paging-mode.patch
26054-x86-AMD-perf-ctr-init.patch
26055-x86-oprof-hvm-mode.patch
26056-page-alloc-flush-filter.patch
26061-x86-oprof-counter-range.patch
26062-ACPI-ERST-move-data.patch
26063-x86-HPET-affinity-lock.patch
26095-SVM-nested-leak.patch
26096-SVM-nested-vmexit-emul.patch
26098-perfc-build.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Oct 22 21:21:28 CEST 2012 - ohering@suse.de
- handle possible asprintf failures in log-guest-console.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Oct 22 20:19:09 CEST 2012 - ohering@suse.de
- bnc#694863 - kexec fails in xen
26093-hvm_handle_PoD_and_grant_pages_in_HVMOP_get_mem_type.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Oct 18 16:25:53 MDT 2012 - carnold@novell.com
- fate#312709: Pygrub needs to know which entry to select
26114-pygrub-list-entries.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Oct 18 11:13:32 CEST 2012 - ohering@suse.de
- merge changes fron xen-unstable, obsolete our changes
26077-stubdom_fix_compile_errors_in_grub.patch
26078-hotplug-Linux_remove_hotplug_support_rely_on_udev_instead.patch
26079-hotplug-Linux_close_lockfd_after_lock_attempt.patch
26081-stubdom_fix_rpmlint_warning_spurious-executable-perm.patch
26082-blktap2-libvhd_fix_rpmlint_warning_spurious-executable-perm.patch
26083-blktap_fix_rpmlint_warning_spurious-executable-perm.patch
26084-hotplug_install_hotplugpath.sh_as_data_file.patch
26085-stubdom_install_stubdompath.sh_as_data_file.patch
26086-hotplug-Linux_correct_sysconfig_tag_in_xendomains.patch
26087-hotplug-Linux_install_sysconfig_files_as_data_files.patch
26088-tools_xend_fix_wrong_condition_check_for_xml_file.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tue Oct 16 15:38:34 MDT 2012 - carnold@novell.com
- fate#311966: Fix XEN VNC implementation to correctly map keyboard
layouts
VNC-Support-for-ExtendedKeyEvent-client-message.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Oct 15 17:45:52 CEST 2012 - ohering@suse.de
- workaround bash bug in locking.sh:claim_lock, close fd
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Sat Oct 13 15:25:08 CEST 2012 - ohering@suse.de
- fix incorrect self-provides/obsoletes of xen-tools-ioemu
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tue Oct 9 06:19:55 MDT 2012 - carnold@novell.com

85
xen.spec
View File

@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
# Please submit bugfixes or comments via http://bugs.opensuse.org/
#
Name: xen
ExclusiveArch: %ix86 x86_64
%define xvers 4.2
@ -186,15 +185,23 @@ Patch25866: 25866-sercon-ns16550-pci-irq.patch
Patch25867: 25867-sercon-ns16550-parse.patch
Patch25874: 25874-x86-EFI-chain-cfg.patch
Patch25909: 25909-xenpm-consistent.patch
Patch25920: 25920-x86-APICV-enable.patch
Patch25921: 25921-x86-APICV-delivery.patch
Patch25922: 25922-x86-APICV-x2APIC.patch
Patch25927: 25927-x86-domctl-ioport-mapping-range.patch
Patch25929: 25929-tmem-restore-pool-version.patch
Patch25931: 25931-x86-domctl-iomem-mapping-checks.patch
Patch25940: 25940-x86-S3-flush-cache.patch
Patch25941: 25941-pygrub_always_append_--args.patch
Patch25952: 25952-x86-MMIO-remap-permissions.patch
Patch25957: 25957-x86-TSC-adjust-HVM.patch
Patch25958: 25958-x86-TSC-adjust-sr.patch
Patch25959: 25959-x86-TSC-adjust-expose.patch
Patch25961: 25961-x86-HPET-interrupts.patch
Patch25962: 25962-x86-assign-irq-vector-old.patch
Patch25965: 25965-x86-ucode-Intel-resume.patch
Patch25975: 25975-x86-IvyBridge.patch
Patch25984: 25984-SVM-nested-paging-mode.patch
Patch26006: 26006-hotplug-Linux_Remove_tracing_bash_-x_from_network-nat_script.patch
Patch26007: 26007-xenballoond.init_remove_4_from_default_runlevel.patch
Patch26008: 26008-xend-pvscsi_fix_passing_of_SCSI_control_LUNs.patch
@ -202,7 +209,36 @@ Patch26009: 26009-xend-pvscsi_fix_usage_of_persistant_device_names_for_SCSI_
Patch26010: 26010-xend-pvscsi_update_sysfs_parser_for_Linux_3.0.patch
Patch26011: 26011-stubdom_fix_parallel_build_by_expanding_CROSS_MAKE.patch
Patch26018: 26018-pygrub_correct_typo_in_--args_assignment.patch
Patch26054: 26054-x86-AMD-perf-ctr-init.patch
Patch26055: 26055-x86-oprof-hvm-mode.patch
Patch26056: 26056-page-alloc-flush-filter.patch
Patch26061: 26061-x86-oprof-counter-range.patch
Patch26062: 26062-ACPI-ERST-move-data.patch
Patch26063: 26063-x86-HPET-affinity-lock.patch
Patch26077: 26077-stubdom_fix_compile_errors_in_grub.patch
Patch26078: 26078-hotplug-Linux_remove_hotplug_support_rely_on_udev_instead.patch
Patch26079: 26079-hotplug-Linux_close_lockfd_after_lock_attempt.patch
Patch26081: 26081-stubdom_fix_rpmlint_warning_spurious-executable-perm.patch
Patch26082: 26082-blktap2-libvhd_fix_rpmlint_warning_spurious-executable-perm.patch
Patch26083: 26083-blktap_fix_rpmlint_warning_spurious-executable-perm.patch
Patch26084: 26084-hotplug_install_hotplugpath.sh_as_data_file.patch
Patch26085: 26085-stubdom_install_stubdompath.sh_as_data_file.patch
Patch26086: 26086-hotplug-Linux_correct_sysconfig_tag_in_xendomains.patch
Patch26087: 26087-hotplug-Linux_install_sysconfig_files_as_data_files.patch
Patch26088: 26088-tools_xend_fix_wrong_condition_check_for_xml_file.patch
Patch26093: 26093-HVM-PoD-grant-mem-type.patch
Patch26095: 26095-SVM-nested-leak.patch
Patch26096: 26096-SVM-nested-vmexit-emul.patch
Patch26098: 26098-perfc-build.patch
Patch26102: 26102-x86-IOAPIC-legacy-not-first.patch
Patch26114: 26114-pygrub-list-entries.patch
Patch20: CVE-2012-4535-xsa20.patch
Patch22: CVE-2012-4537-xsa22.patch
Patch23: CVE-2012-4538-xsa23.patch
Patch24: CVE-2012-4539-xsa24.patch
Patch25: CVE-2012-4544-xsa25.patch
# Upstream qemu patches
Patch100: VNC-Support-for-ExtendedKeyEvent-client-message.patch
# Our patches
Patch301: xend-config.diff
Patch302: xen-destdir.diff
@ -314,6 +350,8 @@ Patch650: disable_emulated_device.diff
Patch651: ioemu-disable-scsi.patch
Patch652: ioemu-disable-emulated-ide-if-pv.patch
Patch700: hv_extid_compatibility.patch
Patch800: xenpaging.autostart.patch
Patch801: xenpaging.doc.patch
# Build patch
Patch99998: tmp-initscript-modprobe.patch
Patch99999: tmp_build.patch
@ -441,8 +479,8 @@ Requires: python-pam
Requires: python-xml
Requires: xen-libs = %{version}
# subpackage existed in 10.3
Provides: xen-tools-ioemu = 3.2
Obsoletes: xen-tools-ioemu <= 3.2
Provides: xen-tools-ioemu = %{version}
Obsoletes: xen-tools-ioemu < %{version}
%description tools
Xen is a virtual machine monitor for x86 that supports execution of
@ -643,7 +681,7 @@ xpdf/kpdf/gpdf/gv/... to read the files in
Authors:
Authors
--------
Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@cl.cam.ac.uk>
%endif
@ -674,15 +712,23 @@ tar xfj %{SOURCE6} -C $RPM_BUILD_DIR/%{xen_build_dir}/tools
%patch25867 -p1
%patch25874 -p1
%patch25909 -p1
%patch25920 -p1
%patch25921 -p1
%patch25922 -p1
%patch25927 -p1
%patch25929 -p1
%patch25931 -p1
%patch25940 -p1
%patch25941 -p1
%patch25952 -p1
%patch25957 -p1
%patch25958 -p1
%patch25959 -p1
%patch25961 -p1
%patch25962 -p1
%patch25965 -p1
%patch25975 -p1
%patch25984 -p1
%patch26006 -p1
%patch26007 -p1
%patch26008 -p1
@ -690,7 +736,36 @@ tar xfj %{SOURCE6} -C $RPM_BUILD_DIR/%{xen_build_dir}/tools
%patch26010 -p1
%patch26011 -p1
%patch26018 -p1
%patch26054 -p1
%patch26055 -p1
%patch26056 -p1
%patch26061 -p1
%patch26062 -p1
%patch26063 -p1
%patch26077 -p1
%patch26078 -p1
%patch26079 -p1
%patch26081 -p1
%patch26082 -p1
%patch26083 -p1
%patch26084 -p1
%patch26085 -p1
%patch26086 -p1
%patch26087 -p1
%patch26088 -p1
%patch26093 -p1
%patch26095 -p1
%patch26096 -p1
%patch26098 -p1
%patch26102 -p1
%patch26114 -p1
%patch20 -p1
%patch22 -p1
%patch23 -p1
%patch24 -p1
%patch25 -p1
# Qemu
%patch100 -p1
# Our patches
%patch301 -p1
%patch302 -p1
@ -799,6 +874,8 @@ tar xfj %{SOURCE6} -C $RPM_BUILD_DIR/%{xen_build_dir}/tools
%patch651 -p1
%patch652 -p1
%patch700 -p1
%patch800 -p1
%patch801 -p1
%patch99998 -p1
%patch99999 -p1
# tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/configure ./tools/qemu-xen-dir-remote/configure use

6
xend-config.diff
View File

@ -2,12 +2,6 @@ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/sysconfig.xendomains
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/sysconfig.xendomains
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/sysconfig.xendomains
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-## Path: System/xen
+## Path: System/Virtualization
## Description: xen domain start/stop on boot
## Type: string
## Default:
@@ -98,7 +98,6 @@ XENDOMAINS_RESTORE=true
# Note that the script tries to be clever if both RESTORE and AUTO are
# set: It will first restore saved domains and then only start domains

413
xenpaging.autostart.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,413 @@
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 659ee31faec91ac543578db7c9b2849fb7367419
xenpaging: xend: start xenpaging via config option
Start xenpaging via config option.
TODO: add libxl support
TODO: parse config values like 42K, 42M, 42G, 42%
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
---
v5:
use actmem=, xenpaging_file=, xenpaging_extra=
add xm mem-swap-target
v4:
add config option for pagefile directory
add config option to enable debug
add config option to set policy mru_size
fail if chdir fails
force self.xenpaging* variables to be strings because a xm new may turn some
of them into type int and later os.execve fails with a TypeError
v3:
decouple create/destroycreateXenPaging from _create/_removeDevices
init xenpaging variable to 0 if xenpaging is not in config file to
avoid string None coming from sxp file
v2:
unlink logfile instead of truncating it.
allows hardlinking for further inspection
---
tools/examples/xmexample.hvm | 9 +++
tools/python/README.XendConfig | 3 +
tools/python/README.sxpcfg | 3 +
tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py | 9 +++
tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py | 15 +++++
tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py | 23 ++++++++
tools/python/xen/xend/image.py | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/python/xen/xm/create.py | 15 +++++
tools/python/xen/xm/main.py | 14 +++++
tools/python/xen/xm/xenapi_create.py | 3 +
10 files changed, 179 insertions(+)
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xmexample.hvm
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/examples/xmexample.hvm
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xmexample.hvm
@@ -142,6 +142,15 @@ disk = [ 'file:/var/lib/xen/images/disk.
# Device Model to be used
device_model = 'qemu-dm'
+# the amount of memory in MiB for the guest
+#actmem=42
+
+# Optional: guest page file
+#xenpaging_file="/var/lib/xen/xenpaging/<domain_name>.<domaind_id>.paging"
+
+# Optional: extra cmdline options for xenpaging
+#xenpaging_extra=[ 'string', 'string' ]
+
#-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# boot on floppy (a), hard disk (c), Network (n) or CD-ROM (d)
# default: hard disk, cd-rom, floppy
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/README.XendConfig
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/README.XendConfig
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/README.XendConfig
@@ -120,6 +120,9 @@ otherConfig
image.vncdisplay
image.vncunused
image.hvm.device_model
+ image.hvm.actmem
+ image.hvm.xenpaging_file
+ image.hvm.xenpaging_extra
image.hvm.display
image.hvm.xauthority
image.hvm.vncconsole
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/README.sxpcfg
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/README.sxpcfg
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/README.sxpcfg
@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ image
- vncunused
(HVM)
- device_model
+ - actmem
+ - xenpaging_file
+ - xenpaging_extra
- display
- xauthority
- vncconsole
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py
@@ -147,6 +147,9 @@ XENAPI_PLATFORM_CFG_TYPES = {
'apic': int,
'boot': str,
'device_model': str,
+ 'actmem': str,
+ 'xenpaging_file': str,
+ 'xenpaging_extra': str,
'loader': str,
'display' : str,
'fda': str,
@@ -516,6 +519,12 @@ class XendConfig(dict):
self['platform']['nomigrate'] = 0
if self.is_hvm():
+ if 'actmem' not in self['platform']:
+ self['platform']['actmem'] = "0"
+ if 'xenpaging_file' not in self['platform']:
+ self['platform']['xenpaging_file'] = ""
+ if 'xenpaging_extra' not in self['platform']:
+ self['platform']['xenpaging_extra'] = []
if 'timer_mode' not in self['platform']:
self['platform']['timer_mode'] = 1
if 'extid' in self['platform'] and int(self['platform']['extid']) == 1:
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py
@@ -1835,6 +1835,21 @@ class XendDomain:
log.exception(ex)
raise XendError(str(ex))
+ def domain_swaptarget_set(self, domid, mem):
+ """Set the memory limit for a domain.
+
+ @param domid: Domain ID or Name
+ @type domid: int or string.
+ @param mem: memory limit (in MiB)
+ @type mem: int
+ @raise XendError: fail to set memory
+ @rtype: 0
+ """
+ dominfo = self.domain_lookup_nr(domid)
+ if not dominfo:
+ raise XendInvalidDomain(str(domid))
+ dominfo.setSwapTarget(mem)
+
def domain_maxmem_set(self, domid, mem):
"""Set the memory limit for a domain.
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
@@ -1505,6 +1505,17 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
break
xen.xend.XendDomain.instance().managed_config_save(self)
+ def setSwapTarget(self, target):
+ """Set the swap target of this domain.
+ @param target: In MiB.
+ """
+ log.debug("Setting swap target of domain %s (%s) to %d MiB.",
+ self.info['name_label'], str(self.domid), target)
+
+ if self.domid > 0:
+ self.storeDom("memory/target-tot_pages", target * 1024)
+ self.info['platform']['actmem'] = str(target)
+
def setMemoryTarget(self, target):
"""Set the memory target of this domain.
@param target: In MiB.
@@ -2295,6 +2306,8 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
self.info['name_label'], self.domid, self.info['uuid'],
new_name, new_uuid)
self._unwatchVm()
+ if self.image:
+ self.image.destroyXenPaging()
self._releaseDevices()
# Remove existing vm node in xenstore
self._removeVm()
@@ -2974,6 +2987,9 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
self._createDevices()
+ if self.image:
+ self.image.createXenPaging()
+
self.image.cleanupTmpImages()
self.info['start_time'] = time.time()
@@ -2998,6 +3014,8 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
self.refresh_shutdown_lock.acquire()
try:
self.unwatchShutdown()
+ if self.image:
+ self.image.destroyXenPaging()
self._releaseDevices()
bootloader_tidy(self)
@@ -3082,6 +3100,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
self.image = image.create(self, self.info)
if self.image:
self.image.createDeviceModel(True)
+ self.image.createXenPaging()
self.console_port = console_port
self._storeDomDetails()
self._registerWatches()
@@ -3223,6 +3242,8 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
# could also fetch a parsed note from xenstore
fast = self.info.get_notes().get('SUSPEND_CANCEL') and 1 or 0
if not fast:
+ if self.image:
+ self.image.destroyXenPaging()
self._releaseDevices()
self.testDeviceComplete()
self.testvifsComplete()
@@ -3238,6 +3259,8 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
self._storeDomDetails()
self._createDevices()
+ if self.image:
+ self.image.createXenPaging()
log.debug("XendDomainInfo.resumeDomain: devices created")
xc.domain_resume(self.domid, fast)
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py
@@ -122,6 +122,10 @@ class ImageHandler:
self.vm.permissionsVm("image/cmdline", { 'dom': self.vm.getDomid(), 'read': True } )
self.device_model = vmConfig['platform'].get('device_model')
+ self.actmem = str(vmConfig['platform'].get('actmem'))
+ self.xenpaging_file = str(vmConfig['platform'].get('xenpaging_file'))
+ self.xenpaging_extra = vmConfig['platform'].get('xenpaging_extra')
+ self.xenpaging_pid = None
self.display = vmConfig['platform'].get('display')
self.xauthority = vmConfig['platform'].get('xauthority')
@@ -392,6 +396,87 @@ class ImageHandler:
sentinel_fifos_inuse[sentinel_path_fifo] = 1
self.sentinel_path_fifo = sentinel_path_fifo
+ def createXenPaging(self):
+ if not self.vm.info.is_hvm():
+ return
+ if self.actmem == "0":
+ return
+ if self.xenpaging_pid:
+ return
+ xenpaging_bin = auxbin.pathTo("xenpaging")
+ args = [xenpaging_bin]
+ args = args + ([ "-f", "/var/lib/xen/xenpaging/%s.%d.paging" % (str(self.vm.info['name_label']), self.vm.getDomid())])
+ if self.xenpaging_extra:
+ args = args + (self.xenpaging_extra)
+ args = args + ([ "-d", "%d" % self.vm.getDomid()])
+ self.xenpaging_logfile = "/var/log/xen/xenpaging-%s.log" % str(self.vm.info['name_label'])
+ logfile_mode = os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_APPEND|os.O_TRUNC
+ null = os.open("/dev/null", os.O_RDONLY)
+ try:
+ os.unlink(self.xenpaging_logfile)
+ except:
+ pass
+ logfd = os.open(self.xenpaging_logfile, logfile_mode, 0644)
+ sys.stderr.flush()
+ contract = osdep.prefork("%s:%d" % (self.vm.getName(), self.vm.getDomid()))
+ xenpaging_pid = os.fork()
+ if xenpaging_pid == 0: #child
+ try:
+ osdep.postfork(contract)
+ os.dup2(null, 0)
+ os.dup2(logfd, 1)
+ os.dup2(logfd, 2)
+ try:
+ env = dict(os.environ)
+ log.info("starting %s" % args)
+ os.execve(xenpaging_bin, args, env)
+ except Exception, e:
+ log.warn('failed to execute xenpaging: %s' % utils.exception_string(e))
+ os._exit(126)
+ except:
+ log.warn("starting xenpaging failed")
+ os._exit(127)
+ else:
+ osdep.postfork(contract, abandon=True)
+ self.xenpaging_pid = xenpaging_pid
+ os.close(null)
+ os.close(logfd)
+ self.vm.storeDom("xenpaging/xenpaging-pid", self.xenpaging_pid)
+ self.vm.storeDom("memory/target-tot_pages", int(self.actmem) * 1024)
+
+ def destroyXenPaging(self):
+ if self.actmem == "0":
+ return
+ if self.xenpaging_pid:
+ try:
+ os.kill(self.xenpaging_pid, signal.SIGHUP)
+ except OSError, exn:
+ log.exception(exn)
+ for i in xrange(100):
+ try:
+ (p, rv) = os.waitpid(self.xenpaging_pid, os.WNOHANG)
+ if p == self.xenpaging_pid:
+ break
+ except OSError:
+ # This is expected if Xend has been restarted within
+ # the life of this domain. In this case, we can kill
+ # the process, but we can't wait for it because it's
+ # not our child. We continue this loop, and after it is
+ # terminated make really sure the process is going away
+ # (SIGKILL).
+ pass
+ time.sleep(0.1)
+ else:
+ log.warning("xenpaging %d took more than 10s "
+ "to terminate: sending SIGKILL" % self.xenpaging_pid)
+ try:
+ os.kill(self.xenpaging_pid, signal.SIGKILL)
+ os.waitpid(self.xenpaging_pid, 0)
+ except OSError:
+ # This happens if the process doesn't exist.
+ pass
+ self.xenpaging_pid = None
+
def createDeviceModel(self, restore = False):
if self.device_model is None:
return
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py
@@ -495,6 +495,18 @@ gopts.var('nfs_root', val="PATH",
fn=set_value, default=None,
use="Set the path of the root NFS directory.")
+gopts.var('actmem', val='NUM',
+ fn=set_value, default='0',
+ use="Number of pages to swap.")
+
+gopts.var('xenpaging_file', val='PATH',
+ fn=set_value, default=None,
+ use="pagefile to use (optional)")
+
+gopts.var('xenpaging_extra', val='string1,string2',
+ fn=append_value, default=[],
+ use="additional args for xenpaging (optional)")
+
gopts.var('device_model', val='FILE',
fn=set_value, default=None,
use="Path to device model program.")
@@ -1100,6 +1112,9 @@ def configure_hvm(config_image, vals):
args = [ 'acpi', 'apic',
'boot',
'cpuid', 'cpuid_check',
+ 'actmem',
+ 'xenpaging_file',
+ 'xenpaging_extra',
'device_model', 'display',
'fda', 'fdb',
'gfx_passthru', 'guest_os_type',
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/main.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/main.py
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/main.py
@@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ SUBCOMMAND_HELP = {
'Set the maximum amount reservation for a domain.'),
'mem-set' : ('<Domain> <Mem>',
'Set the current memory usage for a domain.'),
+ 'mem-swap-target' : ('<Domain> <Mem>',
+ 'Set the memory usage for a domain.'),
'migrate' : ('<Domain> <Host>',
'Migrate a domain to another machine.'),
'pause' : ('<Domain>', 'Pause execution of a domain.'),
@@ -1592,6 +1594,17 @@ def xm_mem_set(args):
mem_target = int_unit(args[1], 'm')
server.xend.domain.setMemoryTarget(dom, mem_target)
+def xm_mem_swap_target(args):
+ arg_check(args, "mem-swap-target", 2)
+
+ dom = args[0]
+
+ if serverType == SERVER_XEN_API:
+ err("xenapi not supported")
+ else:
+ swap_target = int_unit(args[1], 'm')
+ server.xend.domain.swaptarget_set(dom, swap_target)
+
def xm_usb_add(args):
arg_check(args, "usb-add", 2)
server.xend.domain.usb_add(args[0],args[1])
@@ -3847,6 +3860,7 @@ commands = {
# memory commands
"mem-max": xm_mem_max,
"mem-set": xm_mem_set,
+ "mem-swap-target": xm_mem_swap_target,
# cpu commands
"vcpu-pin": xm_vcpu_pin,
"vcpu-list": xm_vcpu_list,
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/xenapi_create.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/xenapi_create.py
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/xenapi_create.py
@@ -1085,6 +1085,9 @@ class sxp2xml:
'acpi',
'apic',
'boot',
+ 'actmem',
+ 'xenpaging_file',
+ 'xenpaging_extra',
'device_model',
'loader',
'fda',

65
xenpaging.doc.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
---
docs/misc/xenpaging.txt | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/docs/misc/xenpaging.txt
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/docs/misc/xenpaging.txt
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/docs/misc/xenpaging.txt
@@ -22,22 +22,41 @@ functionality.
Usage:
-Up to now xenpaging is not integrated into libxl/xend, so it has to be
-started manually for each guest.
+Up to now xenpaging is only integrated into xm/xend.
-Once the guest is running, run xenpaging with the guest_id and the path
-to the pagefile:
-
- /usr/lib/xen/bin/xenpaging -f /path/to/page_file -d dom_id &
-
-Once xenpaging runs it needs a memory target, which is the memory
-footprint of the guest. This value (in KiB) must be written manually to
-xenstore. The following example sets the target to 512MB:
-
- xenstore-write /local/domain/<dom_id>/memory/target-tot_pages $((1024*512))
-
-Now xenpaging tries to page-out as many pages to keep the overall memory
-footprint of the guest at 512MB.
+To enable xenpaging for a guest add the option 'actmem=' to the guests
+config file and run 'xm new <vm_config_file>' to make the changes
+active. actmem= takes the amount of memory in MB which a guest is
+allowed to use at a given time. Everything above this limit will be
+paged out. This paging is transparent to the guest.
+
+Example:
+ memory=4096
+ actmem=1024
+In this example a guest gets the impression it has 4GB of memory and
+the guest OS has to configure itself for this amount of memory. But
+xenpaging will page-out 3072MB, leaving only 1024MB active at a time.
+
+At runtime the configured value of actmem= can be changed with the "xm
+mem-swap-target" command.
+ xm mem-swap-target <domain_name> 512
+
+Additional cmdline options for the xenpaging binary can be specified
+with the xenpaging_extra= config file option:
+
+ xenpaging_extra=[ '-f', '/dev/shm/pagefile-guest_name', '-v' ]
+
+To get a list of available options, run /usr/lib/xen/bin/xenpaging -h:
+
+ xenpaging [options] -f <pagefile> -d <domain_id>
+
+options:
+ -d <domid> --domain=<domid> numerical domain_id of guest. This option is required.
+ -f <file> --pagefile=<file> pagefile to use. This option is required.
+ -m <max_memkb> --max_memkb=<max_memkb> maximum amount of memory to handle.
+ -r <num> --mru_size=<num> number of paged-in pages to keep in memory.
+ -v --verbose enable debug output.
+ -h --help this output.
Todo:
- integrate xenpaging into libxl