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Accepting request 229558 from Virtualization

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Bug fixes for os13.2

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/229558
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/xen?expand=0&rev=185
This commit is contained in:
Stephan Kulow 2014-04-16 05:44:06 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
commit a0c3925640
19 changed files with 1488 additions and 178 deletions
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32
5310bac3-mm-ensure-useful-progress-in-decrease_reservation.patch
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@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
# Commit 79de2d31f1ff8910231b7ec15519405953e6571a
# Date 2014-02-28 17:35:15 +0100
# Author Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
mm: ensure useful progress in decrease_reservation
During my fun time playing with balloon driver I found that hypervisor's
preemption check kept decrease_reservation from doing any useful work
for 32 bit guests, resulting in hanging the guests.
As Andrew suggested, we can force the check to fail for the first
iteration to ensure progress. We did this in d3a55d7d9 "x86/mm: Ensure
useful progress in alloc_l2_table()" already.
After this change I cannot see the hang caused by continuation logic
anymore.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/common/memory.c
+++ b/xen/common/memory.c
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ static void decrease_reservation(struct
for ( i = a->nr_done; i < a->nr_extents; i++ )
{
- if ( hypercall_preempt_check() )
+ if ( hypercall_preempt_check() && i != a->nr_done )
{
a->preempted = 1;
goto out;

22
531d8e34-x86-HVM-consolidate-passthrough-handling-in-epte_get_entry_emt.patch
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@ -19,9 +19,21 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: "Xu, Dongxiao" <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Commit 1f8b57779785bf9f55c16312bb1ec679929c314b
# Date 2014-03-28 13:43:25 +0100
# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
x86/EPT: relax treatment of APIC MFN
There's no point in this being mapped UC by the guest due to using a
respective PAT index - set the ignore-PAT flag to true.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
@@ -698,14 +698,20 @@ uint8_t epte_get_entry_emt(struct domain
@@ -698,14 +698,24 @@ uint8_t epte_get_entry_emt(struct domain
if ( hvm_get_mem_pinned_cacheattr(d, gfn, &type) )
return type;
@ -39,8 +51,12 @@ Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
if ( direct_mmio )
- return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
+ return mfn_x(mfn) != d->arch.hvm_domain.vmx.apic_access_mfn
+ ? MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE : MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
+ {
+ if ( mfn_x(mfn) != d->arch.hvm_domain.vmx.apic_access_mfn )
+ return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
+ *ipat = 1;
+ return MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
+ }
if ( iommu_snoop )
{

165
53206661-pygrub-support-linux16-and-initrd16.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
Subject: xen/pygrub: grub2/grub.cfg from RHEL 7 has new commands in menuentry
From: Joby Poriyath joby.poriyath@citrix.com Tue Feb 4 18:10:35 2014 +0000
Date: Wed Mar 12 13:51:29 2014 +0000:
Git: dd03048708af072374963d6d0721cc6d4c5f52cf
menuentry in grub2/grub.cfg uses linux16 and initrd16 commands
instead of linux and initrd. Due to this RHEL 7 (beta) guest failed to
boot after the installation.
In addition to this, RHEL 7 menu entries have two different single-quote
delimited strings on the same line, and the greedy grouping for menuentry
parsing gets both strings, and the options inbetween.
Signed-off-by: Joby Poriyath <joby.poriyath@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: george.dunlap@citrix.com
diff --git a/tools/pygrub/examples/rhel-7-beta.grub2 b/tools/pygrub/examples/rhel-7-beta.grub2
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..88f0f99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/pygrub/examples/rhel-7-beta.grub2
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+#
+# DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE
+#
+# It is automatically generated by grub2-mkconfig using templates
+# from /etc/grub.d and settings from /etc/default/grub
+#
+
+### BEGIN /etc/grub.d/00_header ###
+set pager=1
+
+if [ -s $prefix/grubenv ]; then
+ load_env
+fi
+if [ "${next_entry}" ] ; then
+ set default="${next_entry}"
+ set next_entry=
+ save_env next_entry
+ set boot_once=true
+else
+ set default="${saved_entry}"
+fi
+
+if [ x"${feature_menuentry_id}" = xy ]; then
+ menuentry_id_option="--id"
+else
+ menuentry_id_option=""
+fi
+
+export menuentry_id_option
+
+if [ "${prev_saved_entry}" ]; then
+ set saved_entry="${prev_saved_entry}"
+ save_env saved_entry
+ set prev_saved_entry=
+ save_env prev_saved_entry
+ set boot_once=true
+fi
+
+function savedefault {
+ if [ -z "${boot_once}" ]; then
+ saved_entry="${chosen}"
+ save_env saved_entry
+ fi
+}
+
+function load_video {
+ if [ x$feature_all_video_module = xy ]; then
+ insmod all_video
+ else
+ insmod efi_gop
+ insmod efi_uga
+ insmod ieee1275_fb
+ insmod vbe
+ insmod vga
+ insmod video_bochs
+ insmod video_cirrus
+ fi
+}
+
+terminal_output console
+set timeout=5
+### END /etc/grub.d/00_header ###
+
+### BEGIN /etc/grub.d/10_linux ###
+menuentry 'Red Hat Enterprise Linux Everything, with Linux 3.10.0-54.0.1.el7.x86_64' --class red --class gnu-linux --class gnu --class os $menuentry_id_option 'gnulinux-3.10.0-54.0.1.el7.x86_64-advanced-d23b8b49-4cfe-4900-8ef1-ec80bc633163' {
+ load_video
+ set gfxpayload=keep
+ insmod gzio
+ insmod part_msdos
+ insmod xfs
+ set root='hd0,msdos1'
+ if [ x$feature_platform_search_hint = xy ]; then
+ search --no-floppy --fs-uuid --set=root --hint='hd0,msdos1' 89ffef78-82b3-457c-bc57-42cccc373851
+ else
+ search --no-floppy --fs-uuid --set=root 89ffef78-82b3-457c-bc57-42cccc373851
+ fi
+ linux16 /vmlinuz-3.10.0-54.0.1.el7.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel-root ro rd.lvm.lv=rhel/swap vconsole.keymap=uk crashkernel=auto rd.lvm.lv=rhel/root vconsole.font=latarcyrheb-sun16 LANG=en_GB.UTF-8
+ initrd16 /initramfs-3.10.0-54.0.1.el7.x86_64.img
+}
+menuentry 'Red Hat Enterprise Linux Everything, with Linux 0-rescue-af34f0b8cf364cdbbe6d093f8228a37f' --class red --class gnu-linux --class gnu --class os $menuentry_id_option 'gnulinux-0-rescue-af34f0b8cf364cdbbe6d093f8228a37f-advanced-d23b8b49-4cfe-4900-8ef1-ec80bc633163' {
+ load_video
+ insmod gzio
+ insmod part_msdos
+ insmod xfs
+ set root='hd0,msdos1'
+ if [ x$feature_platform_search_hint = xy ]; then
+ search --no-floppy --fs-uuid --set=root --hint='hd0,msdos1' 89ffef78-82b3-457c-bc57-42cccc373851
+ else
+ search --no-floppy --fs-uuid --set=root 89ffef78-82b3-457c-bc57-42cccc373851
+ fi
+ linux16 /vmlinuz-0-rescue-af34f0b8cf364cdbbe6d093f8228a37f root=/dev/mapper/rhel-root ro rd.lvm.lv=rhel/swap vconsole.keymap=uk crashkernel=auto rd.lvm.lv=rhel/root vconsole.font=latarcyrheb-sun16
+ initrd16 /initramfs-0-rescue-af34f0b8cf364cdbbe6d093f8228a37f.img
+}
+
+### END /etc/grub.d/10_linux ###
+
+### BEGIN /etc/grub.d/20_linux_xen ###
+### END /etc/grub.d/20_linux_xen ###
+
+### BEGIN /etc/grub.d/20_ppc_terminfo ###
+### END /etc/grub.d/20_ppc_terminfo ###
+
+### BEGIN /etc/grub.d/30_os-prober ###
+### END /etc/grub.d/30_os-prober ###
+
+### BEGIN /etc/grub.d/40_custom ###
+# This file provides an easy way to add custom menu entries. Simply type the
+# menu entries you want to add after this comment. Be careful not to change
+# the 'exec tail' line above.
+### END /etc/grub.d/40_custom ###
+
+### BEGIN /etc/grub.d/41_custom ###
+if [ -f ${config_directory}/custom.cfg ]; then
+ source ${config_directory}/custom.cfg
+elif [ -z "${config_directory}" -a -f $prefix/custom.cfg ]; then
+ source $prefix/custom.cfg;
+fi
+### END /etc/grub.d/41_custom ###
diff --git a/tools/pygrub/src/GrubConf.py b/tools/pygrub/src/GrubConf.py
index cb853c9..974cded 100644
--- a/tools/pygrub/src/GrubConf.py
+++ b/tools/pygrub/src/GrubConf.py
@@ -348,7 +348,9 @@ class Grub2Image(_GrubImage):
commands = {'set:root': 'root',
'linux': 'kernel',
+ 'linux16': 'kernel',
'initrd': 'initrd',
+ 'initrd16': 'initrd',
'echo': None,
'insmod': None,
'search': None}
@@ -394,7 +396,7 @@ class Grub2ConfigFile(_GrubConfigFile):
continue
# new image
- title_match = re.match('^menuentry ["\'](.*)["\'] (.*){', l)
+ title_match = re.match('^menuentry ["\'](.*?)["\'] (.*){', l)
if title_match:
if img is not None:
raise RuntimeError, "syntax error: cannot nest menuentry (%d %s)" % (len(img),img)

81
5321b20b-common-make-hypercall-preemption-checks-consistent.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
# Commit 8c0eed2cc8d8a2ccccdffe4c386b625b672dc12a
# Date 2014-03-13 14:26:35 +0100
# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
common: make hypercall preemption checks consistent
- never preempt on the first iteration (ensure forward progress)
- do cheap checks first
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/common/memory.c
+++ b/xen/common/memory.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static void increase_reservation(struct
for ( i = a->nr_done; i < a->nr_extents; i++ )
{
- if ( hypercall_preempt_check() )
+ if ( i != a->nr_done && hypercall_preempt_check() )
{
a->preempted = 1;
goto out;
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static void populate_physmap(struct memo
for ( i = a->nr_done; i < a->nr_extents; i++ )
{
- if ( hypercall_preempt_check() )
+ if ( i != a->nr_done && hypercall_preempt_check() )
{
a->preempted = 1;
goto out;
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ static void decrease_reservation(struct
for ( i = a->nr_done; i < a->nr_extents; i++ )
{
- if ( hypercall_preempt_check() )
+ if ( i != a->nr_done && hypercall_preempt_check() )
{
a->preempted = 1;
goto out;
@@ -398,7 +398,8 @@ static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HA
i < (exch.in.nr_extents >> in_chunk_order);
i++ )
{
- if ( hypercall_preempt_check() )
+ if ( i != (exch.nr_exchanged >> in_chunk_order) &&
+ hypercall_preempt_check() )
{
exch.nr_exchanged = i << in_chunk_order;
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
--- a/xen/common/multicall.c
+++ b/xen/common/multicall.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ do_multicall(
for ( i = 0; !rc && i < nr_calls; i++ )
{
- if ( hypercall_preempt_check() )
+ if ( i && hypercall_preempt_check() )
goto preempted;
if ( unlikely(__copy_from_guest(&mcs->call, call_list, 1)) )
--- a/xen/drivers/char/console.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/char/console.c
@@ -375,12 +375,12 @@ static DECLARE_SOFTIRQ_TASKLET(notify_do
static long guest_console_write(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(char) buffer, int count)
{
char kbuf[128];
- int kcount;
+ int kcount = 0;
struct domain *cd = current->domain;
while ( count > 0 )
{
- if ( hypercall_preempt_check() )
+ if ( kcount && hypercall_preempt_check() )
return hypercall_create_continuation(
__HYPERVISOR_console_io, "iih",
CONSOLEIO_write, count, buffer);

156
5321b257-x86-make-hypercall-preemption-checks-consistent.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
# Commit fd7bfce0395ace266159760e35dc49f7af3b90ce
# Date 2014-03-13 14:27:51 +0100
# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
x86: make hypercall preemption checks consistent
- never preempt on the first iteration (ensure forward progress)
- never preempt on the last iteration (pointless/wasteful)
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -2934,7 +2934,7 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
{
- if ( curr->arch.old_guest_table || hypercall_preempt_check() )
+ if ( curr->arch.old_guest_table || (i && hypercall_preempt_check()) )
{
rc = -EAGAIN;
break;
@@ -3481,7 +3481,7 @@ long do_mmu_update(
for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
{
- if ( curr->arch.old_guest_table || hypercall_preempt_check() )
+ if ( curr->arch.old_guest_table || (i && hypercall_preempt_check()) )
{
rc = -EAGAIN;
break;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ hap_set_allocation(struct domain *d, uns
else
pages -= d->arch.paging.hap.p2m_pages;
- while ( d->arch.paging.hap.total_pages != pages )
+ for ( ; ; )
{
if ( d->arch.paging.hap.total_pages < pages )
{
@@ -355,6 +355,8 @@ hap_set_allocation(struct domain *d, uns
d->arch.paging.hap.total_pages--;
free_domheap_page(pg);
}
+ else
+ break;
/* Check to see if we need to yield and try again */
if ( preempted && hypercall_preempt_check() )
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
@@ -242,7 +242,8 @@ p2m_pod_set_cache_target(struct p2m_doma
p2m_pod_cache_add(p2m, page, order);
- if ( hypercall_preempt_check() && preemptible )
+ if ( preemptible && pod_target != p2m->pod.count &&
+ hypercall_preempt_check() )
{
ret = -EAGAIN;
goto out;
@@ -286,7 +287,8 @@ p2m_pod_set_cache_target(struct p2m_doma
put_page(page+i);
- if ( hypercall_preempt_check() && preemptible )
+ if ( preemptible && pod_target != p2m->pod.count &&
+ hypercall_preempt_check() )
{
ret = -EAGAIN;
goto out;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
@@ -1674,7 +1674,7 @@ static unsigned int sh_set_allocation(st
SHADOW_PRINTK("current %i target %i\n",
d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages, pages);
- while ( d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages != pages )
+ for ( ; ; )
{
if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages < pages )
{
@@ -1709,6 +1709,8 @@ static unsigned int sh_set_allocation(st
d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages--;
free_domheap_page(sp);
}
+ else
+ break;
/* Check to see if we need to yield and try again */
if ( preempted && hypercall_preempt_check() )
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -3595,13 +3595,6 @@ long do_set_trap_table(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_
for ( ; ; )
{
- if ( hypercall_preempt_check() )
- {
- rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
- __HYPERVISOR_set_trap_table, "h", traps);
- break;
- }
-
if ( copy_from_guest(&cur, traps, 1) )
{
rc = -EFAULT;
@@ -3622,6 +3615,13 @@ long do_set_trap_table(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_
init_int80_direct_trap(curr);
guest_handle_add_offset(traps, 1);
+
+ if ( hypercall_preempt_check() )
+ {
+ rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
+ __HYPERVISOR_set_trap_table, "h", traps);
+ break;
+ }
}
return rc;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/traps.c
@@ -329,13 +329,6 @@ int compat_set_trap_table(XEN_GUEST_HAND
for ( ; ; )
{
- if ( hypercall_preempt_check() )
- {
- rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
- __HYPERVISOR_set_trap_table, "h", traps);
- break;
- }
-
if ( copy_from_guest(&cur, traps, 1) )
{
rc = -EFAULT;
@@ -353,6 +346,13 @@ int compat_set_trap_table(XEN_GUEST_HAND
init_int80_direct_trap(current);
guest_handle_add_offset(traps, 1);
+
+ if ( hypercall_preempt_check() )
+ {
+ rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
+ __HYPERVISOR_set_trap_table, "h", traps);
+ break;
+ }
}
return rc;

255
53271880-VT-d-fix-RMRR-handling.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
# Commit dd527061770789d8152b1dea68056987b202d87a
# Date 2014-03-17 16:45:04 +0100
# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
VT-d: fix RMRR handling
Removing mapped RMRR tracking structures in dma_pte_clear_one() is
wrong for two reasons: First, these regions may cover more than a
single page. And second, multiple devices (and hence multiple devices
assigned to any particular guest) may share a single RMRR (whether
assigning such devices to distinct guests is a safe thing to do is
another question).
Therefore move the removal of the tracking structures into the
counterpart function to the one doing the insertion -
intel_iommu_remove_device(), and add a reference count to the tracking
structure.
Further, for the handling of the mappings of the respective memory
regions to be correct, RMRRs must not overlap. Add a respective check
to acpi_parse_one_rmrr().
And finally, with all of this being VT-d specific, move the cleanup
of the list as well as the structure type definition where it belongs -
in VT-d specific rather than IOMMU generic code.
Note that this doesn't address yet another issue associated with RMRR
handling: The purpose of the RMRRs as well as the way the respective
IOMMU page table mappings get inserted both suggest that these regions
would need to be marked E820_RESERVED in all (HVM?) guests' memory
maps, yet nothing like this is being done in hvmloader. (For PV guests
this would also seem to be necessary, but may conflict with PV guests
possibly assuming there to be just a single E820 entry representing all
of its RAM.)
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Xiantao Zhang <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
@@ -412,9 +412,8 @@ static int iommu_populate_page_table(str
void iommu_domain_destroy(struct domain *d)
{
struct hvm_iommu *hd = domain_hvm_iommu(d);
- struct list_head *ioport_list, *rmrr_list, *tmp;
+ struct list_head *ioport_list, *tmp;
struct g2m_ioport *ioport;
- struct mapped_rmrr *mrmrr;
if ( !iommu_enabled || !hd->platform_ops )
return;
@@ -428,13 +427,6 @@ void iommu_domain_destroy(struct domain
list_del(&ioport->list);
xfree(ioport);
}
-
- list_for_each_safe ( rmrr_list, tmp, &hd->mapped_rmrrs )
- {
- mrmrr = list_entry(rmrr_list, struct mapped_rmrr, list);
- list_del(&mrmrr->list);
- xfree(mrmrr);
- }
}
int iommu_map_page(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, unsigned long mfn,
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
@@ -580,6 +580,16 @@ acpi_parse_one_rmrr(struct acpi_dmar_hea
if ( (ret = acpi_dmar_check_length(header, sizeof(*rmrr))) != 0 )
return ret;
+ list_for_each_entry(rmrru, &acpi_rmrr_units, list)
+ if ( base_addr <= rmrru->end_address && rmrru->base_address <= end_addr )
+ {
+ printk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX
+ "Overlapping RMRRs [%"PRIx64",%"PRIx64"] and [%"PRIx64",%"PRIx64"]\n",
+ rmrru->base_address, rmrru->end_address,
+ base_addr, end_addr);
+ return -EEXIST;
+ }
+
/* This check is here simply to detect when RMRR values are
* not properly represented in the system memory map and
* inform the user
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -42,6 +42,12 @@
#include "vtd.h"
#include "../ats.h"
+struct mapped_rmrr {
+ struct list_head list;
+ u64 base, end;
+ unsigned int count;
+};
+
/* Possible unfiltered LAPIC/MSI messages from untrusted sources? */
bool_t __read_mostly untrusted_msi;
@@ -619,7 +625,6 @@ static void dma_pte_clear_one(struct dom
struct hvm_iommu *hd = domain_hvm_iommu(domain);
struct dma_pte *page = NULL, *pte = NULL;
u64 pg_maddr;
- struct mapped_rmrr *mrmrr;
spin_lock(&hd->mapping_lock);
/* get last level pte */
@@ -648,21 +653,6 @@ static void dma_pte_clear_one(struct dom
__intel_iommu_iotlb_flush(domain, addr >> PAGE_SHIFT_4K, 1, 1);
unmap_vtd_domain_page(page);
-
- /* if the cleared address is between mapped RMRR region,
- * remove the mapped RMRR
- */
- spin_lock(&hd->mapping_lock);
- list_for_each_entry ( mrmrr, &hd->mapped_rmrrs, list )
- {
- if ( addr >= mrmrr->base && addr <= mrmrr->end )
- {
- list_del(&mrmrr->list);
- xfree(mrmrr);
- break;
- }
- }
- spin_unlock(&hd->mapping_lock);
}
static void iommu_free_pagetable(u64 pt_maddr, int level)
@@ -1700,10 +1690,17 @@ static int reassign_device_ownership(
void iommu_domain_teardown(struct domain *d)
{
struct hvm_iommu *hd = domain_hvm_iommu(d);
+ struct mapped_rmrr *mrmrr, *tmp;
if ( list_empty(&acpi_drhd_units) )
return;
+ list_for_each_entry_safe ( mrmrr, tmp, &hd->mapped_rmrrs, list )
+ {
+ list_del(&mrmrr->list);
+ xfree(mrmrr);
+ }
+
if ( iommu_use_hap_pt(d) )
return;
@@ -1848,14 +1845,17 @@ static int rmrr_identity_mapping(struct
ASSERT(rmrr->base_address < rmrr->end_address);
/*
- * No need to acquire hd->mapping_lock, as the only theoretical race is
- * with the insertion below (impossible due to holding pcidevs_lock).
+ * No need to acquire hd->mapping_lock: Both insertion and removal
+ * get done while holding pcidevs_lock.
*/
list_for_each_entry( mrmrr, &hd->mapped_rmrrs, list )
{
if ( mrmrr->base == rmrr->base_address &&
mrmrr->end == rmrr->end_address )
+ {
+ ++mrmrr->count;
return 0;
+ }
}
base = rmrr->base_address & PAGE_MASK_4K;
@@ -1876,9 +1876,8 @@ static int rmrr_identity_mapping(struct
return -ENOMEM;
mrmrr->base = rmrr->base_address;
mrmrr->end = rmrr->end_address;
- spin_lock(&hd->mapping_lock);
+ mrmrr->count = 1;
list_add_tail(&mrmrr->list, &hd->mapped_rmrrs);
- spin_unlock(&hd->mapping_lock);
return 0;
}
@@ -1940,17 +1939,52 @@ static int intel_iommu_remove_device(u8
if ( !pdev->domain )
return -EINVAL;
- /* If the device belongs to dom0, and it has RMRR, don't remove it
- * from dom0, because BIOS may use RMRR at booting time.
- */
- if ( pdev->domain->domain_id == 0 )
+ for_each_rmrr_device ( rmrr, bdf, i )
{
- for_each_rmrr_device ( rmrr, bdf, i )
+ struct hvm_iommu *hd;
+ struct mapped_rmrr *mrmrr, *tmp;
+
+ if ( rmrr->segment != pdev->seg ||
+ PCI_BUS(bdf) != pdev->bus ||
+ PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) != devfn )
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * If the device belongs to dom0, and it has RMRR, don't remove
+ * it from dom0, because BIOS may use RMRR at booting time.
+ */
+ if ( is_hardware_domain(pdev->domain) )
+ return 0;
+
+ hd = domain_hvm_iommu(pdev->domain);
+
+ /*
+ * No need to acquire hd->mapping_lock: Both insertion and removal
+ * get done while holding pcidevs_lock.
+ */
+ ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&pcidevs_lock));
+ list_for_each_entry_safe ( mrmrr, tmp, &hd->mapped_rmrrs, list )
{
- if ( rmrr->segment == pdev->seg &&
- PCI_BUS(bdf) == pdev->bus &&
- PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) == devfn )
- return 0;
+ unsigned long base_pfn, end_pfn;
+
+ if ( rmrr->base_address != mrmrr->base ||
+ rmrr->end_address != mrmrr->end )
+ continue;
+
+ if ( --mrmrr->count )
+ break;
+
+ base_pfn = (mrmrr->base & PAGE_MASK_4K) >> PAGE_SHIFT_4K;
+ end_pfn = PAGE_ALIGN_4K(mrmrr->end) >> PAGE_SHIFT_4K;
+ while ( base_pfn < end_pfn )
+ {
+ if ( intel_iommu_unmap_page(pdev->domain, base_pfn) )
+ return -ENXIO;
+ base_pfn++;
+ }
+
+ list_del(&mrmrr->list);
+ xfree(mrmrr);
}
}
--- a/xen/include/xen/hvm/iommu.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/hvm/iommu.h
@@ -29,12 +29,6 @@ struct g2m_ioport {
unsigned int np;
};
-struct mapped_rmrr {
- struct list_head list;
- u64 base;
- u64 end;
-};
-
struct hvm_iommu {
u64 pgd_maddr; /* io page directory machine address */
spinlock_t mapping_lock; /* io page table lock */

62
5327190a-x86-Intel-work-around-Xeon-7400-series-erratum-AAI65.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
# Commit 96d1b237ae9b2f2718bb1c59820701f17d3d86e0
# Date 2014-03-17 16:47:22 +0100
# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
x86/Intel: work around Xeon 7400 series erratum AAI65
Linux commit 40e2d7f9b5dae048789c64672bf3027fbb663ffa ("x86 idle:
Repair large-server 50-watt idle-power regression") tells us that this
applies not just to the named Xeon 7400 series, but also NHM-EX and
WSM-EX; sadly Intel's documentation is so badly searchable that I
wasn't able to locate the respective errata (and hence can't quote
their numbers here).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
@@ -296,6 +296,9 @@ void mwait_idle_with_hints(unsigned int
unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
s_time_t expires = per_cpu(timer_deadline, cpu);
+ if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH_MONITOR) )
+ clflush((void *)&mwait_wakeup(cpu));
+
__monitor((void *)&mwait_wakeup(cpu), 0, 0);
smp_mb();
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
@@ -147,6 +147,9 @@ void __devinit early_intel_workaround(st
/*
* P4 Xeon errata 037 workaround.
* Hardware prefetcher may cause stale data to be loaded into the cache.
+ *
+ * Xeon 7400 erratum AAI65 (and further newer Xeons)
+ * MONITOR/MWAIT may have excessive false wakeups
*/
static void __devinit Intel_errata_workarounds(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
@@ -161,6 +164,10 @@ static void __devinit Intel_errata_worka
wrmsr (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE, lo, hi);
}
}
+
+ if (c->x86 == 6 && cpu_has_clflush &&
+ (c->x86_model == 29 || c->x86_model == 46 || c->x86_model == 47))
+ set_bit(X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH_MONITOR, c->x86_capability);
}
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE (3*32+12) /* TSC is known to be reliable */
#define X86_FEATURE_XTOPOLOGY (3*32+13) /* cpu topology enum extensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULTING (3*32+14) /* cpuid faulting */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH_MONITOR (3*32+15) /* clflush reqd with monitor */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000001 (ecx), word 4 */
#define X86_FEATURE_XMM3 (4*32+ 0) /* Streaming SIMD Extensions-3 */

54
53299d8f-xenconsole-reset-tty-on-failure.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
Subject: tools/console: reset tty when xenconsole fails
From: Ian Jackson ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com Mon Feb 24 15:16:19 2014 +0000
Date: Wed Mar 19 13:37:19 2014 +0000:
Git: 111931f36885874103d65685ab15ea3d25d93da7
If xenconsole (the client program) fails, it calls err. This would
previously neglect to reset the user's terminal to sanity. Use atexit
to do so.
This routinely happens in Xen 4.4 RC5 with pygrub because libxl
writes the value "" to the tty xenstore key when using xenconsole.
After this patch this just results in a harmless error message.
Reported-by: M A Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: M A Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk>
CC: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
v2: Fix whitespace error (reintroduce hard tab)
Fix commit message not to claim ignorance about root cause
Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/console/client/main.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.4.0-testing.orig/tools/console/client/main.c
+++ xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/console/client/main.c
@@ -258,6 +258,13 @@ typedef enum {
CONSOLE_SERIAL,
} console_type;
+static struct termios stdin_old_attr;
+
+static void restore_term_stdin(void)
+{
+ restore_term(STDIN_FILENO, &stdin_old_attr);
+}
+
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
struct termios attr;
@@ -384,9 +391,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
}
init_term(spty, &attr);
- init_term(STDIN_FILENO, &attr);
+ init_term(STDIN_FILENO, &stdin_old_attr);
+ atexit(restore_term_stdin); /* if this fails, oh dear */
console_loop(spty, xs, path);
- restore_term(STDIN_FILENO, &attr);
free(path);
free(dom_path);

49
53299d8f-xenconsole-tolerate-tty-errors.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
Subject: tools/console: xenconsole tolerate tty errors
From: Ian Jackson ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com Thu Feb 27 17:46:49 2014 +0000
Date: Wed Mar 19 13:37:19 2014 +0000:
Git: 39ba2989b10b6a1852e253b204eb010f8e7026f1
Since 28d386fc4341 (XSA-57), libxl writes an empty value for the
console tty node, with read-only permission for the guest, when
setting up pv console "frontends". (The actual tty value is later set
by xenconsoled.) Writing an empty node is not strictly necessary to
stop the frontend from writing dangerous values here, but it is a good
belt-and-braces approach.
Unfortunately this confuses xenconsole. It reads the empty value, and
tries to open it as the tty. xenconsole then exits.
Fix this by having xenconsole treat an empty value the same way as no
value at all.
Also, make the error opening the tty be nonfatal: we just print a
warning, but do not exit. I think this is helpful in theoretical
situations where xenconsole is racing with libxl and/or xenconsoled.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
CC: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
---
v2: Combine two conditions and move the free
Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/console/client/main.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.4.0-testing.orig/tools/console/client/main.c
+++ xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/console/client/main.c
@@ -115,12 +115,12 @@ static int get_pty_fd(struct xs_handle *
/* We only watch for one thing, so no need to
* disambiguate: just read the pty path */
pty_path = xs_read(xs, XBT_NULL, path, &len);
- if (pty_path != NULL) {
+ if (pty_path != NULL && pty_path[0] != '\0') {
pty_fd = open(pty_path, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
if (pty_fd == -1)
- err(errno, "Could not open tty `%s'", pty_path);
- free(pty_path);
+ warn("Could not open tty `%s'", pty_path);
}
+ free(pty_path);
}
} while (pty_fd == -1 && (now = time(NULL)) < start + seconds);

57
532fff53-x86-fix-determination-of-bit-count-for-struct-domain-allocations.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
# Commit b3d2f8b2cba9fce5bc8995612d0d13fcefec7769
# Date 2014-03-24 10:48:03 +0100
# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
x86: fix determination of bit count for struct domain allocations
We can't just add in the hole shift value, as the hole may be at or
above the 44-bit boundary. Instead we need to determine the total bit
count until reaching 32 significant (not squashed out) bits in PFN
representations.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -180,6 +180,28 @@ void dump_pageframe_info(struct domain *
spin_unlock(&d->page_alloc_lock);
}
+/*
+ * The hole may be at or above the 44-bit boundary, so we need to determine
+ * the total bit count until reaching 32 significant (not squashed out) bits
+ * in PFN representations.
+ * Note that the way "bits" gets initialized/updated/bounds-checked guarantees
+ * that the function will never return zero, and hence will never be called
+ * more than once (which is important due to it being deliberately placed in
+ * .init.text).
+ */
+static unsigned int __init noinline _domain_struct_bits(void)
+{
+ unsigned int bits = 32 + PAGE_SHIFT;
+ unsigned int sig = hweight32(~pfn_hole_mask);
+ unsigned int mask = pfn_hole_mask >> 32;
+
+ for ( ; bits < BITS_PER_LONG && sig < 32; ++bits, mask >>= 1 )
+ if ( !(mask & 1) )
+ ++sig;
+
+ return bits;
+}
+
struct domain *alloc_domain_struct(void)
{
struct domain *d;
@@ -187,7 +209,10 @@ struct domain *alloc_domain_struct(void)
* We pack the PDX of the domain structure into a 32-bit field within
* the page_info structure. Hence the MEMF_bits() restriction.
*/
- unsigned int bits = 32 + PAGE_SHIFT + pfn_pdx_hole_shift;
+ static unsigned int __read_mostly bits;
+
+ if ( unlikely(!bits) )
+ bits = _domain_struct_bits();
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*d) > PAGE_SIZE);
d = alloc_xenheap_pages(0, MEMF_bits(bits));

102
5331917d-x86-enforce-preemption-in-HVM_set_mem_access-p2m_set_mem_access.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
References: bnc#867910 CVE-2014-2599 XSA-89
# Commit 0fe53c4f279e1a8ef913e71ed000236d21ce96de
# Date 2014-03-25 15:23:57 +0100
# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
x86: enforce preemption in HVM_set_mem_access / p2m_set_mem_access()
Processing up to 4G PFNs may take almost arbitrarily long, so
preemption is needed here.
This is CVE-2014-2599 / XSA-89.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -4465,6 +4465,15 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUE
goto param_fail5;
rc = p2m_set_mem_access(d, a.first_pfn, a.nr, a.hvmmem_access);
+ if ( rc > 0 )
+ {
+ a.first_pfn += a.nr - rc;
+ a.nr = rc;
+ if ( __copy_to_guest(arg, &a, 1) )
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ else
+ rc = -EAGAIN;
+ }
param_fail5:
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -1366,15 +1366,14 @@ void p2m_mem_access_resume(struct domain
/* Set access type for a region of pfns.
* If start_pfn == -1ul, sets the default access type */
-int p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, unsigned long start_pfn,
- uint32_t nr, hvmmem_access_t access)
+long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, unsigned long pfn, uint32_t nr,
+ hvmmem_access_t access)
{
struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
- unsigned long pfn;
p2m_access_t a, _a;
p2m_type_t t;
mfn_t mfn;
- int rc = 0;
+ long rc;
/* N.B. _not_ static: initializer depends on p2m->default_access */
p2m_access_t memaccess[] = {
@@ -1397,14 +1396,17 @@ int p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d,
a = memaccess[access];
/* If request to set default access */
- if ( start_pfn == ~0ull )
+ if ( pfn == ~0ul )
{
p2m->default_access = a;
return 0;
}
+ if ( !nr )
+ return 0;
+
p2m_lock(p2m);
- for ( pfn = start_pfn; pfn < start_pfn + nr; pfn++ )
+ for ( ; ; ++pfn )
{
mfn = p2m->get_entry(p2m, pfn, &t, &_a, 0, NULL);
if ( p2m->set_entry(p2m, pfn, mfn, PAGE_ORDER_4K, t, a) == 0 )
@@ -1412,6 +1414,13 @@ int p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d,
rc = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
+
+ /* Check for continuation if it's not the last interation. */
+ if ( !--nr || hypercall_preempt_check() )
+ {
+ rc = nr;
+ break;
+ }
}
p2m_unlock(p2m);
return rc;
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
@@ -576,8 +576,8 @@ void p2m_mem_access_resume(struct domain
/* Set access type for a region of pfns.
* If start_pfn == -1ul, sets the default access type */
-int p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, unsigned long start_pfn,
- uint32_t nr, hvmmem_access_t access);
+long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, unsigned long start_pfn,
+ uint32_t nr, hvmmem_access_t access);
/* Get access type for a pfn
* If pfn == -1ul, gets the default access type */

141
53356c1e-x86-HVM-correct-CPUID-leaf-80000008-handling.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
# Commit ef437690af8b75e6758dce77af75a22b63982883
# Date 2014-03-28 13:33:34 +0100
# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
x86/HVM: correct CPUID leaf 80000008 handling
CPUID[80000008].EAX[23:16] have been given the meaning of the guest
physical address restriction (in case it needs to be smaller than the
host's), hence we need to mirror that into vCPUID[80000008].EAX[7:0].
Enforce a lower limit at the same time, as well as a fixed value for
the virtual address bits, and zero for the guest physical address ones.
In order for the vMTRR code to see these overrides we need to make it
call hvm_cpuid() instead of domain_cpuid(), which in turn requires
special casing (and relaxing) the controlling domain.
This additionally should hide an ordering problem in the tools: Both
xend and xl appear to be restoring a guest from its image before
setting up the CPUID policy in the hypervisor, resulting in
domain_cpuid() returning all zeros and hence the check in
mtrr_var_range_msr_set() failing if the guest previously had more than
the minimum 36 physical address bits.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -2885,6 +2885,8 @@ void hvm_cpuid(unsigned int input, unsig
switch ( input )
{
+ unsigned int sub_leaf, _eax, _ebx, _ecx, _edx;
+
case 0x1:
/* Fix up VLAPIC details. */
*ebx &= 0x00FFFFFFu;
@@ -2918,8 +2920,6 @@ void hvm_cpuid(unsigned int input, unsig
*edx = v->vcpu_id * 2;
break;
case 0xd:
- {
- unsigned int sub_leaf, _eax, _ebx, _ecx, _edx;
/* EBX value of main leaf 0 depends on enabled xsave features */
if ( count == 0 && v->arch.xcr0 )
{
@@ -2936,7 +2936,7 @@ void hvm_cpuid(unsigned int input, unsig
}
}
break;
- }
+
case 0x80000001:
/* We expose RDTSCP feature to guest only when
tsc_mode == TSC_MODE_DEFAULT and host_tsc_is_safe() returns 1 */
@@ -2950,6 +2950,23 @@ void hvm_cpuid(unsigned int input, unsig
if ( !(hvm_pae_enabled(v) || hvm_long_mode_enabled(v)) )
*edx &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_PSE36);
break;
+
+ case 0x80000008:
+ count = cpuid_eax(0x80000008);
+ count = (count >> 16) & 0xff ?: count & 0xff;
+ if ( (*eax & 0xff) > count )
+ *eax = (*eax & ~0xff) | count;
+
+ hvm_cpuid(1, NULL, NULL, NULL, &_edx);
+ count = _edx & (cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_PAE) |
+ cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_PSE36)) ? 36 : 32;
+ if ( (*eax & 0xff) < count )
+ *eax = (*eax & ~0xff) | count;
+
+ hvm_cpuid(0x80000001, NULL, NULL, NULL, &_edx);
+ *eax = (*eax & ~0xffff00) | (_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_LM)
+ ? 0x3000 : 0x2000);
+ break;
}
}
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ bool_t is_var_mtrr_overlapped(struct mtr
static int hvm_mtrr_pat_init(void)
{
- unsigned int i, j, phys_addr;
+ unsigned int i, j;
memset(&mtrr_epat_tbl, INVALID_MEM_TYPE, sizeof(mtrr_epat_tbl));
for ( i = 0; i < MTRR_NUM_TYPES; i++ )
@@ -172,11 +172,7 @@ static int hvm_mtrr_pat_init(void)
}
}
- phys_addr = 36;
- if ( cpuid_eax(0x80000000) >= 0x80000008 )
- phys_addr = (uint8_t)cpuid_eax(0x80000008);
-
- size_or_mask = ~((1 << (phys_addr - PAGE_SHIFT)) - 1);
+ size_or_mask = ~((1 << (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) - 1);
return 0;
}
@@ -455,7 +451,7 @@ bool_t mtrr_fix_range_msr_set(struct mtr
bool_t mtrr_var_range_msr_set(
struct domain *d, struct mtrr_state *m, uint32_t msr, uint64_t msr_content)
{
- uint32_t index, type, phys_addr, eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+ uint32_t index, type, phys_addr, eax;
uint64_t msr_mask;
uint64_t *var_range_base = (uint64_t*)m->var_ranges;
@@ -468,16 +464,21 @@ bool_t mtrr_var_range_msr_set(
type == 4 || type == 5 || type == 6)) )
return 0;
- phys_addr = 36;
- domain_cpuid(d, 0x80000000, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
- if ( eax >= 0x80000008 )
+ if ( d == current->domain )
{
- domain_cpuid(d, 0x80000008, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
- phys_addr = (uint8_t)eax;
+ phys_addr = 36;
+ hvm_cpuid(0x80000000, &eax, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if ( eax >= 0x80000008 )
+ {
+ hvm_cpuid(0x80000008, &eax, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ phys_addr = (uint8_t)eax;
+ }
}
+ else
+ phys_addr = paddr_bits;
msr_mask = ~((((uint64_t)1) << phys_addr) - 1);
msr_mask |= (index & 1) ? 0x7ffUL : 0xf00UL;
- if ( unlikely(msr_content && (msr_content & msr_mask)) )
+ if ( unlikely(msr_content & msr_mask) )
{
HVM_DBG_LOG(DBG_LEVEL_MSR, "invalid msr content:%"PRIx64"\n",
msr_content);

34
533ad1ee-VMX-fix-PAT-value-seen-by-guest.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
# Commit fce79f8ce91dc45f3a4d699ee67c49e6cbeb1197
# Date 2014-04-01 16:49:18 +0200
# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
VMX: fix PAT value seen by guest
The XSA-60 fixes introduced a window during which the guest PAT gets
forced to all zeros. This shouldn't be visible to the guest. Therefore
we need to intercept PAT MSR accesses during that time period.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -984,6 +984,8 @@ static void vmx_handle_cd(struct vcpu *v
vmx_get_guest_pat(v, pat);
vmx_set_guest_pat(v, uc_pat);
+ vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT,
+ MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
wbinvd(); /* flush possibly polluted cache */
hvm_asid_flush_vcpu(v); /* invalidate memory type cached in TLB */
@@ -993,6 +995,9 @@ static void vmx_handle_cd(struct vcpu *v
{
v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_mode = NORMAL_CACHE_MODE;
vmx_set_guest_pat(v, *pat);
+ if ( !iommu_enabled || iommu_snoop )
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT,
+ MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
hvm_asid_flush_vcpu(v); /* no need to flush cache */
}
}

38
533d413b-x86-mm-fix-checks-against-max_mapped_pfn.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
# Commit 088ee1d47b65d6bb92de61b404805f4ca92e3240
# Date 2014-04-03 12:08:43 +0100
# Author Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
# Committer Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
x86/mm: fix checks against max_mapped_pfn
This value is an inclusive one, i.e. this fixes an off-by-one in memory
sharing and an off-by-two in shadow code.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c
@@ -1268,8 +1268,8 @@ int relinquish_shared_pages(struct domai
return 0;
p2m_lock(p2m);
- for (gfn = p2m->next_shared_gfn_to_relinquish;
- gfn < p2m->max_mapped_pfn; gfn++ )
+ for ( gfn = p2m->next_shared_gfn_to_relinquish;
+ gfn <= p2m->max_mapped_pfn; gfn++ )
{
p2m_access_t a;
p2m_type_t t;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
@@ -3489,9 +3489,7 @@ int shadow_track_dirty_vram(struct domai
struct sh_dirty_vram *dirty_vram = d->arch.hvm_domain.dirty_vram;
struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
- if (end_pfn < begin_pfn
- || begin_pfn > p2m->max_mapped_pfn
- || end_pfn >= p2m->max_mapped_pfn)
+ if ( end_pfn < begin_pfn || end_pfn > p2m->max_mapped_pfn + 1 )
return -EINVAL;
/* We perform p2m lookups, so lock the p2m upfront to avoid deadlock */

21
qemu-xen-upstream-megasas-buildtime.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
Causes rebuilds.
Says rpmlint.
---
tools/qemu-xen-dir-remote/hw/scsi/megasas.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-dir-remote/hw/scsi/megasas.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.4.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-dir-remote/hw/scsi/megasas.c
+++ xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-dir-remote/hw/scsi/megasas.c
@@ -712,8 +712,8 @@ static int megasas_ctrl_get_info(Megasas
snprintf(info.package_version, 0x60, "%s-QEMU", QEMU_VERSION);
memcpy(info.image_component[0].name, "APP", 3);
memcpy(info.image_component[0].version, MEGASAS_VERSION "-QEMU", 9);
- memcpy(info.image_component[0].build_date, __DATE__, 11);
- memcpy(info.image_component[0].build_time, __TIME__, 8);
+ memcpy(info.image_component[0].build_date, "Apr 1 2014", 11);
+ memcpy(info.image_component[0].build_time, "12:34:56", 8);
info.image_component_count = 1;
if (pci_dev->has_rom) {
uint8_t biosver[32];

73
xen.changes
View File

@ -1,6 +1,79 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Wed Apr 9 08:07:03 MDT 2014 - carnold@suse.com
- Upstream patches from Jan
53356c1e-x86-HVM-correct-CPUID-leaf-80000008-handling.patch
533ad1ee-VMX-fix-PAT-value-seen-by-guest.patch
533d413b-x86-mm-fix-checks-against-max_mapped_pfn.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Apr 3 16:21:03 UTC 2014 - carnold@suse.com
- bnc#862608 - SLES 11 SP3 vm-install should get RHEL 7 support
when released
53206661-pygrub-support-linux16-and-initrd16.patch
- Upstream bug fixes
53299d8f-xenconsole-reset-tty-on-failure.patch
53299d8f-xenconsole-tolerate-tty-errors.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Apr 3 16:21:03 UTC 2014 - dmueller@suse.com
- fix build for armv7l and aarch64
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Apr 3 15:40:31 CEST 2014 - ohering@suse.de
- Remove compiletime strings from qemu-upstream
qemu-xen-upstream-megasas-buildtime.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Wed Apr 2 08:47:27 MDT 2014 - carnold@suse.com
- bnc#871546 - KMPs are not signed in SUSE:SLE-12:GA?
xen.spec
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tue Apr 1 08:14:29 MDT 2014 - carnold@suse.com
- Upstream patches from Jan
532fff53-x86-fix-determination-of-bit-count-for-struct-domain-allocations.patch
5331917d-x86-enforce-preemption-in-HVM_set_mem_access-p2m_set_mem_access.patch
- Drop xsa89.patch for upstream version (see bnc#867910, 5331917d-x86-enforce...)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fri Mar 28 11:00:07 MDT 2014 - carnold@suse.com
- bnc#863821 - Xen unable to boot paravirtualized VMs installed
with btrfs. Add 'Requires: grub2-x86_64-xen' to xen-tools.
- Restore soft links for qemu-system-i386 and qemu-dm
- Cleanup inconsistency in which version of qemu-system-i386 is
being used (Xen vs qemu-x86). Use only Xen's version.
xen.spec
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Wed Mar 27 14:18:06 MDT 2014 - carnold@suse.com
- Add conditionals for SLE12 when defining xend and max_cpus
xen.spec
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Wed Mar 19 14:18:06 MDT 2014 - carnold@suse.com
- Upstream patches from Jan
5321b20b-common-make-hypercall-preemption-checks-consistent.patch
5321b257-x86-make-hypercall-preemption-checks-consistent.patch
53271880-VT-d-fix-RMRR-handling.patch
5327190a-x86-Intel-work-around-Xeon-7400-series-erratum-AAI65.patch
- Dropped the following as now part of 5321b257
5310bac3-mm-ensure-useful-progress-in-decrease_reservation.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Wed Mar 12 08:20:42 MDT 2014 - carnold@suse.com
- bnc#867910 - VUL-0: EMBARGOED: xen: XSA-89: HVMOP_set_mem_access
is not preemptible
xsa89.patch
- Upstream patches from Jan
530b27fd-x86-MCE-Fix-race-condition-in-mctelem_reserve.patch
530b2880-Nested-VMX-update-nested-paging-mode-on-vmexit.patch

78
xen.spec
View File

@ -41,10 +41,18 @@ ExclusiveArch: %ix86 x86_64 %arm aarch64
%define with_qemu_traditional 1
%define with_xend_tools_pkg 0
%if %suse_version > 1230
%if %suse_version == 1315
%define with_xend_tools_pkg 0
%else
%define with_xend_tools_pkg 1
%endif
%endif
%if %suse_version > 1230
%if %suse_version == 1315
%define with_xend 0
%else
%define with_xend 1
%endif
%else
%define with_xend 1
%endif
@ -56,8 +64,12 @@ ExclusiveArch: %ix86 x86_64 %arm aarch64
#
%define max_cpus 4
%ifarch x86_64
%if %suse_version == 1315
%define max_cpus 1024
%else
%define max_cpus 512
%endif
%endif
#
%define xen_install_suffix %{nil}
%ifarch x86_64
@ -84,19 +96,19 @@ BuildRequires: libfdt1-devel
%ifarch %ix86 x86_64
BuildRequires: dev86
%endif
BuildRequires: flex
BuildRequires: bison
BuildRequires: fdupes
BuildRequires: flex
BuildRequires: glib2-devel
BuildRequires: libaio-devel
BuildRequires: libbz2-devel
BuildRequires: libpixman-1-0-devel
BuildRequires: libuuid-devel
BuildRequires: libxml2-devel
BuildRequires: libyajl-devel
BuildRequires: libpixman-1-0-devel
%if %{?with_qemu_traditional}0
BuildRequires: pciutils-devel
BuildRequires: SDL-devel
BuildRequires: pciutils-devel
%endif
%if %{?with_stubdom}0
%if 0%{?suse_version} < 1230
@ -134,12 +146,13 @@ BuildRequires: kernel-syms
BuildRequires: module-init-tools
%if %suse_version >= 1230
BuildRequires: lndir
BuildRequires: pesign-obs-integration
%else
BuildRequires: xorg-x11-util-devel
%endif
%endif
Version: 4.4.0_08
Version: 4.4.0_14
Release: 0
PreReq: %insserv_prereq %fillup_prereq
Summary: Xen Virtualization: Hypervisor (aka VMM aka Microkernel)
@ -202,15 +215,26 @@ Patch1: 530b27fd-x86-MCE-Fix-race-condition-in-mctelem_reserve.patch
Patch2: 530b2880-Nested-VMX-update-nested-paging-mode-on-vmexit.patch
Patch3: 530b28c5-x86-MSI-don-t-risk-division-by-zero.patch
Patch4: 530c54c3-x86-mce-Reduce-boot-time-logspam.patch
Patch5: 5310bac3-mm-ensure-useful-progress-in-decrease_reservation.patch
Patch6: 5315a254-IOMMU-generalize-and-correct-softirq-processing.patch
Patch7: 5315a3bb-x86-don-t-propagate-acpi_skip_timer_override-do-Dom0.patch
Patch8: 5315a43a-x86-ACPI-also-print-address-space-for-PM1x-fields.patch
Patch9: 531d8db1-x86-hvm-refine-the-judgment-on-IDENT_PT-for-EMT.patch
Patch10: 531d8e09-x86-HVM-fix-memory-type-merging-in-epte_get_entry_emt.patch
Patch11: 531d8e34-x86-HVM-consolidate-passthrough-handling-in-epte_get_entry_emt.patch
Patch12: 531d8fd0-kexec-identify-which-cpu-the-kexec-image-is-being-executed-on.patch
Patch13: 531dc0e2-xmalloc-handle-correctly-page-allocation-when-align-size.patch
Patch5: 5315a254-IOMMU-generalize-and-correct-softirq-processing.patch
Patch6: 5315a3bb-x86-don-t-propagate-acpi_skip_timer_override-do-Dom0.patch
Patch7: 5315a43a-x86-ACPI-also-print-address-space-for-PM1x-fields.patch
Patch8: 531d8db1-x86-hvm-refine-the-judgment-on-IDENT_PT-for-EMT.patch
Patch9: 531d8e09-x86-HVM-fix-memory-type-merging-in-epte_get_entry_emt.patch
Patch10: 531d8e34-x86-HVM-consolidate-passthrough-handling-in-epte_get_entry_emt.patch
Patch11: 531d8fd0-kexec-identify-which-cpu-the-kexec-image-is-being-executed-on.patch
Patch12: 531dc0e2-xmalloc-handle-correctly-page-allocation-when-align-size.patch
Patch13: 53206661-pygrub-support-linux16-and-initrd16.patch
Patch14: 5321b20b-common-make-hypercall-preemption-checks-consistent.patch
Patch15: 5321b257-x86-make-hypercall-preemption-checks-consistent.patch
Patch16: 53271880-VT-d-fix-RMRR-handling.patch
Patch17: 5327190a-x86-Intel-work-around-Xeon-7400-series-erratum-AAI65.patch
Patch18: 53299d8f-xenconsole-reset-tty-on-failure.patch
Patch19: 53299d8f-xenconsole-tolerate-tty-errors.patch
Patch20: 532fff53-x86-fix-determination-of-bit-count-for-struct-domain-allocations.patch
Patch21: 5331917d-x86-enforce-preemption-in-HVM_set_mem_access-p2m_set_mem_access.patch
Patch22: 53356c1e-x86-HVM-correct-CPUID-leaf-80000008-handling.patch
Patch23: 533ad1ee-VMX-fix-PAT-value-seen-by-guest.patch
Patch24: 533d413b-x86-mm-fix-checks-against-max_mapped_pfn.patch
# Upstream qemu
Patch250: VNC-Support-for-ExtendedKeyEvent-client-message.patch
Patch251: 0001-net-move-the-tap-buffer-into-TAPState.patch
@ -277,6 +301,7 @@ Patch385: xen_pvonhvm.xen_emul_unplug.patch
Patch386: libxc-pass-errno-to-callers-of-xc_domain_save.patch
Patch387: libxl.set-migration-constraints-from-cmdline.patch
Patch388: libxl.honor-more-top-level-vfb-options.patch
Patch389: qemu-xen-upstream-megasas-buildtime.patch
# Xend
Patch400: xend-set-migration-constraints-from-cmdline.patch
Patch402: xen.migrate.tools-xend_move_assert_to_exception_block.patch
@ -425,6 +450,7 @@ Authors:
Summary: Xen Virtualization: Control tools for domain 0
Group: System/Kernel
Requires: bridge-utils
Requires: grub2-x86_64-xen
Requires: multipath-tools
Requires: python
Requires: python-curses
@ -529,6 +555,9 @@ Authors:
Summary: Xen para-virtual device drivers for fully virtualized guests
Group: System/Kernel
Conflicts: xen
%if %suse_version >= 1230
Requires: pesign-obs-integration
%endif
%description KMP
Xen is a virtual machine monitor for x86 that supports execution of
@ -577,6 +606,17 @@ Authors:
%patch11 -p1
%patch12 -p1
%patch13 -p1
%patch14 -p1
%patch15 -p1
%patch16 -p1
%patch17 -p1
%patch18 -p1
%patch19 -p1
%patch20 -p1
%patch21 -p1
%patch22 -p1
%patch23 -p1
%patch24 -p1
# Upstream qemu patches
%patch250 -p1
%patch251 -p1
@ -642,6 +682,7 @@ Authors:
%patch386 -p1
%patch387 -p1
%patch388 -p1
%patch389 -p1
# Xend
%patch400 -p1
%patch402 -p1
@ -786,6 +827,7 @@ export EXTRA_CFLAGS_QEMU_TRADITIONAL="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS"
export EXTRA_CFLAGS_QEMU_XEN="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS"
# EFI
%if %{?with_dom0_support}0
export BRP_PESIGN_FILES="*.ko *.efi /lib/firmware"
make -C xen install \
%if %{?with_gcc47}0
CC=gcc-4.7 \
@ -832,6 +874,8 @@ then
echo %{_libdir}/efi >> xen.files.txt
fi
%ifarch x86_64
ln -s /usr/lib/xen/bin/qemu-dm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/xen/bin/qemu-dm
ln -s /usr/lib/xen/bin/qemu-system-i386 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/xen/bin/qemu-system-i386
cp -avL xenalyze.hg/dump-raw $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/xenalyze.dump-raw
cp -avL xenalyze.hg/xenalyze $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}
%endif
@ -1340,14 +1384,6 @@ fi
%{fillup_and_insserv -y -n xendomains xendomains}
%{fillup_only -n pciback}
%endif
if [ -f /usr/bin/qemu-system-i386 ]; then
rm -f /usr/lib/xen/bin/qemu-system-i386
ln -s /usr/bin/qemu-system-i386 /usr/lib/xen/bin/qemu-system-i386
fi
if [ -f /usr/bin/qemu-system-x86_64 ]; then
rm -f /usr/lib/xen/bin/qemu-system-x86_64
ln -s /usr/bin/qemu-system-x86_64 /usr/lib/xen/bin/qemu-system-x86_64
fi
if [ -f /usr/bin/qemu-img ]; then
if [ -f /usr/bin/qemu-img-xen ]; then
rm /usr/bin/qemu-img-xen

226
xen2libvirt.py
View File

@ -1,113 +1,113 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python
#
# Copyright (C) 2014 SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
#
# This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
# modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
# License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
# version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
#
# This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
# Lesser General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
# License along with this library. If not, see
# <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
#
# Authors:
# Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
#
# Read native Xen configuration format, convert to libvirt domXML, and
# import (virsh define <xml>) into libvirt.
import sys
import os
import argparse
import re
try:
import libvirt
except ImportError:
print 'Unable to import the libvirt module. Is libvirt-python installed?'
sys.exit(1)
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Import Xen domain configuration into libvirt')
parser.add_argument('-c', '--convert-only', help='Convert Xen domain configuration into libvirt domXML, but do not import into libvirt', action='store_true', dest='convert_only')
parser.add_argument('-r', '--recursive', help='Operate recursivelly on all Xen domain configuration rooted at path', action='store_true')
parser.add_argument('-f', '--format', help='Format of Xen domain configuration. Supported formats are xm and sexpr', choices=['xm', 'sexpr'], default=None)
parser.add_argument('-v', '--verbose', help='Print information about the import process', action='store_true')
parser.add_argument('path', help='Path to Xen domain configuration')
def print_verbose(msg):
if args.verbose:
print msg
def check_config(path, config):
isbinary = os.system('file -b ' + path + ' | grep text > /dev/null')
if isbinary:
print 'File %s is not a text file containing Xen xm or sexpr configuration'
sys.exit(1)
if config.find('\(domain'):
return 'sexpr'
return 'xm'
def import_domain(conn, path, format=None, convert_only=False):
f = open(path, 'r')
config = f.read()
print_verbose('Xen domain configuration read from %s:\n %s' % (path, config))
if format is None:
format = check_config(path, config)
if format == 'sexpr':
print_verbose('scrubbing domin from configuration')
config = re.sub("\(domid [0-9]*\)", "", config)
print_verbose('scrubbed sexpr:\n %s' % config)
xml = conn.domainXMLFromNative('xen-sxpr', config, 0)
else:
# if format != sexpr, try xm
xml = conn.domainXMLFromNative('xen-xm', config, 0)
f.close()
print_verbose('Successfully converted Xen domain configuration to '
'libvirt domXML:\n %s' % xml)
if convert_only:
print xml
else:
print_verbose('Importing converted libvirt domXML into libvirt...')
dom = conn.defineXML(xml)
if dom is None:
print 'Failed to define domain from converted domXML'
sys.exit(1)
print_verbose('domXML successfully imported into libvirt')
args = parser.parse_args()
path = args.path
# Connect to libvirt
conn = libvirt.open(None)
if conn is None:
print('Failed to open connection to the hypervisor')
sys.exit(1)
if args.recursive:
try:
for root, dirs, files in os.walk(path):
for name in files:
abs_name = os.path.join(root, name)
print_verbose('Processing file %s' % abs_name)
import_domain(conn, abs_name, args.format, args.convert_only)
except IOError:
print('Failed to open/read path %s' % path)
sys.exit(1)
else:
import_domain(conn, args.path, args.format, args.convert_only)
#!/usr/bin/env python
#
# Copyright (C) 2014 SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
#
# This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
# modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
# License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
# version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
#
# This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
# Lesser General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
# License along with this library. If not, see
# <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
#
# Authors:
# Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
#
# Read native Xen configuration format, convert to libvirt domXML, and
# import (virsh define <xml>) into libvirt.
import sys
import os
import argparse
import re
try:
import libvirt
except ImportError:
print 'Unable to import the libvirt module. Is libvirt-python installed?'
sys.exit(1)
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Import Xen domain configuration into libvirt')
parser.add_argument('-c', '--convert-only', help='Convert Xen domain configuration into libvirt domXML, but do not import into libvirt', action='store_true', dest='convert_only')
parser.add_argument('-r', '--recursive', help='Operate recursivelly on all Xen domain configuration rooted at path', action='store_true')
parser.add_argument('-f', '--format', help='Format of Xen domain configuration. Supported formats are xm and sexpr', choices=['xm', 'sexpr'], default=None)
parser.add_argument('-v', '--verbose', help='Print information about the import process', action='store_true')
parser.add_argument('path', help='Path to Xen domain configuration')
def print_verbose(msg):
if args.verbose:
print msg
def check_config(path, config):
isbinary = os.system('file -b ' + path + ' | grep text > /dev/null')
if isbinary:
print 'File %s is not a text file containing Xen xm or sexpr configuration'
sys.exit(1)
if config.find('\(domain'):
return 'sexpr'
return 'xm'
def import_domain(conn, path, format=None, convert_only=False):
f = open(path, 'r')
config = f.read()
print_verbose('Xen domain configuration read from %s:\n %s' % (path, config))
if format is None:
format = check_config(path, config)
if format == 'sexpr':
print_verbose('scrubbing domin from configuration')
config = re.sub("\(domid [0-9]*\)", "", config)
print_verbose('scrubbed sexpr:\n %s' % config)
xml = conn.domainXMLFromNative('xen-sxpr', config, 0)
else:
# if format != sexpr, try xm
xml = conn.domainXMLFromNative('xen-xm', config, 0)
f.close()
print_verbose('Successfully converted Xen domain configuration to '
'libvirt domXML:\n %s' % xml)
if convert_only:
print xml
else:
print_verbose('Importing converted libvirt domXML into libvirt...')
dom = conn.defineXML(xml)
if dom is None:
print 'Failed to define domain from converted domXML'
sys.exit(1)
print_verbose('domXML successfully imported into libvirt')
args = parser.parse_args()
path = args.path
# Connect to libvirt
conn = libvirt.open(None)
if conn is None:
print('Failed to open connection to the hypervisor')
sys.exit(1)
if args.recursive:
try:
for root, dirs, files in os.walk(path):
for name in files:
abs_name = os.path.join(root, name)
print_verbose('Processing file %s' % abs_name)
import_domain(conn, abs_name, args.format, args.convert_only)
except IOError:
print('Failed to open/read path %s' % path)
sys.exit(1)
else:
import_domain(conn, args.path, args.format, args.convert_only)

20
xenconsole-no-multiple-connections.patch
View File

@ -10,16 +10,18 @@ Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/console/client/main.c
fd_set watch_fdset;
int xs_fd = xs_fileno(xs), pty_fd = -1;
int start, now;
@@ -119,6 +120,12 @@ static int get_pty_fd(struct xs_handle *
@@ -119,6 +120,14 @@ static int get_pty_fd(struct xs_handle *
pty_fd = open(pty_path, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
if (pty_fd == -1)
err(errno, "Could not open tty `%s'", pty_path);
+ memset(&lock, 0, sizeof(lock));
+ lock.l_type = F_WRLCK;
+ lock.l_whence = SEEK_SET;
+ if (fcntl(pty_fd, F_SETLK, &lock) != 0)
+ err(errno, "Could not lock tty '%s'",
+ pty_path);
free(pty_path);
warn("Could not open tty `%s'", pty_path);
+ else {
+ memset(&lock, 0, sizeof(lock));
+ lock.l_type = F_WRLCK;
+ lock.l_whence = SEEK_SET;
+ if (fcntl(pty_fd, F_SETLK, &lock) != 0)
+ err(errno, "Could not lock tty '%s'",
+ pty_path);
+ }
}
free(pty_path);
}