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Accepting request 60109 from Virtualization

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Accepted submit request 60109 from user charlesa

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/60109
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/xen?expand=0&rev=116
This commit is contained in:
Ruediger Oertel 2011-02-07 11:21:08 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
commit a94943149a
232 changed files with 2626 additions and 4338 deletions
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14
20158-revert.patch
View File

@ -15,10 +15,10 @@ Note: Patch submitted upstream but not (yet) accepted since xend is on
http://lists.xensource.com/archives/html/xen-devel/2010-12/msg01160.html
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/util/blkif.py
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/util/blkif.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/util/blkif.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/util/blkif.py
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/util/blkif.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/util/blkif.py
@@ -79,13 +79,6 @@ def parse_uname(uname):
if typ == "phy" and not fn.startswith("/"):
fn = "/dev/%s" %(fn,)
@ -33,10 +33,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/util/blkif.py
if typ in ("tap", "tap2"):
(taptype, fn) = fn.split(":", 1)
if taptype in ("tapdisk", "ioemu"):
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
@@ -3283,15 +3283,6 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
(fn, types) = parse_uname(disk)
@ -50,6 +50,6 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
- if state == 'Secondary':
- os.system('/sbin/drbdadm primary ' + diskname)
-
mounted_vbd_uuid = 0
def _shouldMount(types):
if types[0] in ('file', 'phy'):
return False

22
21089-x86-startup-irq-from-setup-gsi.patch
View File

@ -54,11 +54,11 @@ up in order for it to be usable.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
@@ -2231,6 +2231,7 @@ int __init io_apic_get_redir_entries (in
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
@@ -2232,6 +2232,7 @@ int __init io_apic_get_redir_entries (in
int io_apic_set_pci_routing (int ioapic, int pin, int irq, int edge_level, int active_high_low)
{
@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
struct IO_APIC_route_entry entry;
unsigned long flags;
int vector;
@@ -2282,7 +2283,12 @@ int io_apic_set_pci_routing (int ioapic,
@@ -2283,7 +2284,12 @@ int io_apic_set_pci_routing (int ioapic,
io_apic_write(ioapic, 0x11+2*pin, *(((int *)&entry)+1));
io_apic_write(ioapic, 0x10+2*pin, *(((int *)&entry)+0));
set_native_irq_info(irq, TARGET_CPUS);
@ -80,10 +80,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
return 0;
}
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
@@ -1102,6 +1102,8 @@ int mp_register_gsi (u32 gsi, int trigge
int ioapic = -1;
int ioapic_pin = 0;
@ -93,9 +93,9 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
/*
* Mapping between Global System Interrups, which
@@ -1126,8 +1128,13 @@ int mp_register_gsi (u32 gsi, int trigge
if (ioapic_renumber_irq)
gsi = ioapic_renumber_irq(ioapic, gsi);
@@ -1123,8 +1125,13 @@ int mp_register_gsi (u32 gsi, int trigge
ioapic_pin = gsi - mp_ioapic_routing[ioapic].gsi_base;
- if (!(irq_to_desc(gsi)->status & IRQ_DISABLED))
+ desc = irq_to_desc(gsi);

18
21235-crashkernel-advanced.patch
View File

@ -33,10 +33,10 @@ This still needs to be hooked up for ia64.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
@@ -664,6 +664,11 @@ void __init __start_xen(unsigned long mb
memcpy(&boot_e820, &e820, sizeof(e820));
@ -49,10 +49,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
kexec_reserve_area(&boot_e820);
/*
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/common/kexec.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/common/kexec.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/common/kexec.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/common/kexec.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/common/kexec.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/common/kexec.c
@@ -49,15 +49,109 @@ static unsigned char vmcoreinfo_data[VMC
static size_t vmcoreinfo_size = 0;
@ -166,10 +166,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/common/kexec.c
static void one_cpu_only(void)
{
/* Only allow the first cpu to continue - force other cpus to spin */
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/include/xen/kexec.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/xen/kexec.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/kexec.h
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/include/xen/kexec.h
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/kexec.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/xen/kexec.h
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ typedef struct xen_kexec_reserve {
extern xen_kexec_reserve_t kexec_crash_area;

12
21271-x86-cache-flush-global.patch
View File

@ -12,10 +12,10 @@ the hypervisor. Add a new MMUEXT operation for this.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -2889,6 +2889,27 @@ int do_mmuext_op(
}
break;
@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
case MMUEXT_SET_LDT:
{
unsigned long ptr = op.arg1.linear_addr;
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/include/public/xen.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/public/xen.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/include/public/xen.h
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/include/public/xen.h
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/public/xen.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/public/xen.h
@@ -239,6 +239,10 @@ DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_pfn_t);
*
* cmd: MMUEXT_FLUSH_CACHE

18
21301-svm-lmsl.patch
View File

@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ makes sense to also allow HVM guests to make use of it.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -603,11 +603,12 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_ctxt(struct doma
return -EINVAL;
}
@ -42,10 +42,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
(!cpu_has_ffxsr && (value & EFER_FFXSE)) )
{
gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Trying to set reserved bit in "
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@
u32 svm_feature_flags;
@ -86,10 +86,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
return 1;
}
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ struct hvm_function_table {
extern struct hvm_function_table hvm_funcs;

8
21304-keyhandler-alternative.patch
View File

@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ a tasklet-based alternative mechanism to handle Dom0 state dumps.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/common/keyhandler.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/common/keyhandler.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/common/keyhandler.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/common/keyhandler.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/common/keyhandler.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/common/keyhandler.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
static struct keyhandler *key_table[256];
@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/common/keyhandler.c
}
static struct keyhandler dump_dom0_registers_keyhandler = {
@@ -434,8 +465,28 @@ static struct keyhandler do_debug_key_ke
@@ -439,8 +470,28 @@ static struct keyhandler do_debug_key_ke
.desc = "trap to xendbg"
};

25
21344-4.0-testing-xenstore-fd-leak.patch
View File

@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
# Date 1284535198 -3600
# Node ID 86b99b9ad6ef9492b66c98e2377105f3ea584cbf
# Parent 89605b79f56529d34d963d0d91c67c46294a7b7c
Fix fd leak in xenstore
Missing from commit 'libxl: Backported stuff from unstable'
Without this change, xs_daemon_open/xs_daemon_close will leak
file descriptors.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
diff -r 89605b79f565 -r 86b99b9ad6ef tools/xenstore/xs.c
--- a/tools/xenstore/xs.c Mon Sep 13 17:51:50 2010 +0100
+++ b/tools/xenstore/xs.c Wed Sep 15 08:19:58 2010 +0100
@@ -285,6 +285,8 @@
mutex_unlock(&h->request_mutex);
mutex_unlock(&h->reply_mutex);
mutex_unlock(&h->watch_mutex);
+
+ close_fds_free(h);
}
static bool read_all(int fd, void *data, unsigned int len)

6
21406-x86-microcode-quiet.patch
View File

@ -7,8 +7,10 @@ x86: Quieten microcode.c during CPU hotplug
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/microcode.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/microcode.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/microcode.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/microcode.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/microcode.c
@@ -66,12 +66,10 @@ static void microcode_fini_cpu(int cpu)
int microcode_resume_cpu(int cpu)

24
21421-vts-ats-enabling.patch → 21421-vtd-ats-enabling.patch
View File

@ -18,10 +18,10 @@ device is deassigned from a domain.
Signed-off-by: Weidong Han <weidong.han@intel.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/ia64/ats.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/ia64/ats.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/ia64/ats.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/ia64/ats.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/ia64/ats.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/ia64/ats.c
@@ -47,6 +47,11 @@ int enable_ats_device(int seg, int bus,
return 0;
}
@ -34,11 +34,11 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/ia64/ats.c
int dev_invalidate_iotlb(struct iommu *iommu, u16 did,
u64 addr, unsigned int size_order, u64 type)
{
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -1331,6 +1331,9 @@ static int domain_context_mapping(struct
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -1354,6 +1354,9 @@ static int domain_context_mapping(struct
dprintk(VTDPREFIX, "d%d:PCIe: map bdf = %x:%x.%x\n",
domain->domain_id, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
ret = domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, bus, devfn);
@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
break;
case DEV_TYPE_PCI:
@@ -1460,6 +1463,9 @@ static int domain_context_unmap(struct d
@@ -1476,6 +1479,9 @@ static int domain_context_unmap(struct d
dprintk(VTDPREFIX, "d%d:PCIe: unmap bdf = %x:%x.%x\n",
domain->domain_id, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
ret = domain_context_unmap_one(domain, iommu, bus, devfn);
@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
break;
case DEV_TYPE_PCI:
@@ -1788,8 +1794,6 @@ static void setup_dom0_devices(struct do
@@ -1805,8 +1811,6 @@ static void setup_dom0_devices(struct do
list_add(&pdev->domain_list, &d->arch.pdev_list);
domain_context_mapping(d, pdev->bus, pdev->devfn);
pci_enable_acs(pdev);
@ -67,10 +67,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
}
}
spin_unlock(&pcidevs_lock);
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/ats.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/ats.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/ats.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/ats.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/ats.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/ats.c
@@ -92,6 +92,9 @@ int ats_device(int seg, int bus, int dev
pdev = pci_get_pdev(bus, devfn);

35
21432-4.0-cpu-boot-failure.patch
View File

@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1294742461 0
# Node ID 7a203c60d588a7a15a28a6fb16c69feafd157e0d
# Parent 64bb7d9904a64cc4561c6d541d857acf46e42180
x86: don't crash when a CPU cannot be brought online during boot
References: bnc#656369, bnc#658704
x86_cpu_to_apicid[] gets set to BAD_APICID when bringup of a secondary
CPU fails, yet srat_detect_node() wants to use this as array index.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
@@ -1103,10 +1103,13 @@ void __init __start_xen(unsigned long mb
__cpu_up(i);
}
- /* Set up cpu_to_node[]. */
- srat_detect_node(i);
- /* Set up node_to_cpumask based on cpu_to_node[]. */
- numa_add_cpu(i);
+ if ( cpu_online(i) )
+ {
+ /* Set up cpu_to_node[]. */
+ srat_detect_node(i);
+ /* Set up node_to_cpumask based on cpu_to_node[]. */
+ numa_add_cpu(i);
+ }
}
printk("Brought up %ld CPUs\n", (long)num_online_cpus());

36
21526-x86-nehalem-cpuid-mask.patch
View File

@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ consume these masks.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
@@ -33,14 +33,6 @@ void start_svm(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
static char opt_famrev[14];
string_param("cpuid_mask_cpu", opt_famrev);
@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
static inline void wrmsr_amd(unsigned int index, unsigned int lo,
unsigned int hi)
{
@@ -61,7 +53,7 @@ static inline void wrmsr_amd(unsigned in
@@ -102,7 +94,7 @@ static inline int wrmsr_amd_safe(unsigne
*
* The processor revision string parameter has precedene.
*/
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
{
static unsigned int feat_ecx, feat_edx;
static unsigned int extfeat_ecx, extfeat_edx;
@@ -76,12 +68,12 @@ static void __devinit set_cpuidmask(stru
@@ -117,12 +109,12 @@ static void __devinit set_cpuidmask(stru
ASSERT((status == not_parsed) && (smp_processor_id() == 0));
status = no_mask;
@ -78,10 +78,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
} else if (*opt_famrev == '\0') {
return;
} else if (!strcmp(opt_famrev, "fam_0f_rev_c")) {
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
@@ -22,6 +22,15 @@ static int cachesize_override __cpuinitd
static int disable_x86_fxsr __cpuinitdata;
static int disable_x86_serial_nr __cpuinitdata;
@ -98,10 +98,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
struct cpu_dev * cpu_devs[X86_VENDOR_NUM] = {};
/*
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ struct cpu_dev {
extern struct cpu_dev * cpu_devs [X86_VENDOR_NUM];
@ -112,10 +112,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h
extern int get_model_name(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern void display_cacheinfo(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
@@ -20,16 +20,6 @@
extern int trap_init_f00f_bug(void);
@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
-integer_param("cpuid_mask_ecx", opt_cpuid_mask_ecx);
-integer_param("cpuid_mask_edx", opt_cpuid_mask_edx);
-
static int use_xsave = 1;
static int use_xsave;
boolean_param("xsave", use_xsave);
@@ -40,24 +30,57 @@ boolean_param("xsave", use_xsave);
@ -211,10 +211,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
/* Work around errata */
Intel_errata_workarounds(c);
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
@@ -156,8 +156,10 @@
#define MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0 0x00000186
#define MSR_P6_EVNTSEL1 0x00000187

14
21542-amd-erratum-411.patch
View File

@ -9,10 +9,10 @@ Clear APIC TMICT when we mask APIC LVTT.
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.wang2@amd.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
@@ -198,6 +198,9 @@ void clear_local_APIC(void)
maxlvt = get_maxlvt();
@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
/*
* Masking an LVT entry on a P6 can trigger a local APIC error
* if the vector is zero. Mask LVTERR first to prevent this.
@@ -1335,7 +1338,10 @@ void disable_APIC_timer(void)
@@ -1327,7 +1330,10 @@ void disable_APIC_timer(void)
{
if (using_apic_timer) {
unsigned long v;
@ -35,10 +35,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
v = apic_read(APIC_LVTT);
apic_write_around(APIC_LVTT, v | APIC_LVT_MASKED);
}
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c
@@ -659,8 +659,7 @@ void hpet_broadcast_enter(void)
if ( hpet_attach_channel )
hpet_attach_channel(cpu, ch);

12
21615-dont-save-xen-heap-pages.patch
View File

@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ guests, meaning that the input to these must be treated as GMFNs.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
@@ -1282,58 +1282,64 @@ int xc_domain_save(int xc_handle, int io
goto out;
}
@ -124,10 +124,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
if ( write_exact(io_fd, &batch, sizeof(unsigned int)) )
{
PERROR("Error when writing to state file (2)");
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
@@ -206,11 +206,12 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
for ( j = 0; j < k; j++ )

6
21627-cpuidle-wrap.patch
View File

@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ cpuidle: fix wrapped ticks calculation for pm timer.
Signed-off-by: Wei Gang <gang.wei@intel.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
@@ -127,9 +127,9 @@ static inline u32 ticks_elapsed(u32 t1,
if ( t2 >= t1 )
return (t2 - t1);

6
21653-xend-mac-addr.patch
View File

@ -16,10 +16,10 @@ validity before doing device_add, there will be no problem.
Signed-off-by Chunyan Liu <CYLiu@novell.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
@@ -847,11 +847,6 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
@type dev_config: SXP object (parsed config)
"""

6
21678-xend-mac-fix.patch
View File

@ -16,10 +16,10 @@ change manually as it had been mangled.)
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by Chunyan Liu <CYLiu@novell.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
@@ -847,6 +847,8 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
@type dev_config: SXP object (parsed config)
"""

20
21683-vtd-kill-timer-conditional.patch
View File

@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ vtd: Only kill_timer() an init_timer()'ed timer.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/io.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/io.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/io.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/io.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/io.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/io.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
static void hvm_dirq_assist(unsigned long _d);
@ -20,10 +20,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/io.c
{
return !(flags & (HVM_IRQ_DPCI_GUEST_MSI | HVM_IRQ_DPCI_TRANSLATE));
}
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
@@ -257,7 +257,9 @@ static void pci_clean_dpci_irqs(struct d
i = find_next_bit(hvm_irq_dpci->mapping, d->nr_pirqs, i + 1) )
{
@ -35,11 +35,11 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
list_for_each_safe ( digl_list, tmp,
&hvm_irq_dpci->mirq[i].digl_list )
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ void hvm_dpci_isairq_eoi(struct domain *
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ void hvm_dpci_isairq_eoi(struct domain *
struct hvm_irq_dpci *domain_get_irq_dpci(struct domain *domain);
int domain_set_irq_dpci(struct domain *domain, struct hvm_irq_dpci *dpci);
void free_hvm_irq_dpci(struct hvm_irq_dpci *dpci);

24
21723-get-domu-state.patch
View File

@ -16,10 +16,10 @@ VM" or " API"
Signed-off-by James (Song Wei) <jsong@novell.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py
@@ -250,6 +250,18 @@ class XendDomain:
@return: path to config file.
"""
@ -39,10 +39,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py
def _managed_check_point_path(self, domuuid):
"""Returns absolute path to check point file for managed domain.
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
@@ -327,6 +327,8 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
@type info: dictionary
@ivar domid: Domain ID (if VM has started)
@ -60,10 +60,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
maxmem = self.info.get('memory_static_max', 0)
memory = self.info.get('memory_dynamic_max', 0)
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/SrvDomain.py
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/SrvDomain.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/server/SrvDomain.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/SrvDomain.py
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/server/SrvDomain.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/SrvDomain.py
@@ -225,6 +225,20 @@ class SrvDomain(SrvDir):
self.acceptCommand(req)
return self.xd.domain_reset(self.dom.getName())
@ -85,10 +85,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/SrvDomain.py
def op_usb_add(self, op, req):
self.acceptCommand(req)
return req.threadRequest(self.do_usb_add, op, req)
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/main.py
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/main.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/main.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/main.py
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/main.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/main.py
@@ -165,6 +165,8 @@ SUBCOMMAND_HELP = {
#usb
'usb-add' : ('<domain> <[host:bus.addr] [host:vendor_id:product_id]>','Add the usb device to FV VM.'),

62
21810-x2apic-acpi.patch
View File

@ -26,8 +26,10 @@ needs to be fixed in future.
Signed-off-by: Weidong Han <weidong.han@intel.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/boot.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/boot.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/acpi/boot.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/acpi/boot.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/acpi/boot.c
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ u8 acpi_enable_value, acpi_disable_value
#warning ACPI uses CMPXCHG, i486 and later hardware
#endif
@ -136,8 +138,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Weidong Han <weidong.han@intel.com>
printk(KERN_ERR PREFIX "Error parsing LAPIC NMI entry\n");
/* TBD: Cleanup to allow fallback to MPS */
return count;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
@@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ void __init mp_register_lapic_address (
@ -147,8 +151,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Weidong Han <weidong.han@intel.com>
u8 enabled)
{
struct mpc_config_processor processor;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/srat.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/srat.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/srat.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/srat.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/srat.c
@@ -164,6 +164,36 @@ void __init acpi_numa_slit_init(struct a
}
#endif
@ -186,8 +192,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Weidong Han <weidong.han@intel.com>
/* Callback for Proximity Domain -> LAPIC mapping */
void __init
acpi_numa_processor_affinity_init(struct acpi_srat_cpu_affinity *pa)
--- a/xen/drivers/acpi/numa.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/acpi/numa.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/acpi/numa.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/acpi/numa.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/acpi/numa.c
@@ -90,6 +90,21 @@ void __init acpi_table_print_srat_entry(
#endif /* ACPI_DEBUG_OUTPUT */
break;
@ -253,8 +261,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Weidong Han <weidong.han@intel.com>
acpi_table_parse_srat(ACPI_SRAT_PROCESSOR_AFFINITY,
acpi_parse_processor_affinity,
NR_CPUS);
--- a/xen/drivers/acpi/tables.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/acpi/tables.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/acpi/tables.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/acpi/tables.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/acpi/tables.c
@@ -63,6 +63,18 @@ void __init acpi_table_print_madt_entry(
}
break;
@ -274,10 +284,11 @@ Signed-off-by: Weidong Han <weidong.han@intel.com>
case ACPI_MADT_TYPE_IO_APIC:
{
struct acpi_madt_io_apic *p =
@@ -117,6 +129,24 @@ void __init acpi_table_print_madt_entry(
@@ -116,6 +128,24 @@ void __init acpi_table_print_madt_entry(
p->lint);
}
break;
+
+ case ACPI_MADT_TYPE_LOCAL_X2APIC_NMI:
+ {
+ u16 polarity, trigger;
@ -295,12 +306,13 @@ Signed-off-by: Weidong Han <weidong.han@intel.com>
+ p->lint);
+ }
+ break;
+
case ACPI_MADT_TYPE_LOCAL_APIC_OVERRIDE:
{
struct acpi_madt_local_apic_override *p =
--- a/xen/include/acpi/actbl1.h
+++ b/xen/include/acpi/actbl1.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/acpi/actbl1.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/acpi/actbl1.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/acpi/actbl1.h
@@ -404,7 +404,9 @@ enum acpi_madt_type {
ACPI_MADT_TYPE_IO_SAPIC = 6,
ACPI_MADT_TYPE_LOCAL_SAPIC = 7,
@ -389,8 +401,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Weidong Han <weidong.han@intel.com>
/*******************************************************************************
*
* TCPA - Trusted Computing Platform Alliance table
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/acpi.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/acpi.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/acpi.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/acpi.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/acpi.h
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ struct acpi_sleep_info {
#endif /* CONFIG_ACPI_SLEEP */
@ -400,8 +414,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Weidong Han <weidong.han@intel.com>
#define MAX_LOCAL_APIC 256
extern u32 pmtmr_ioport;
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mpspec.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mpspec.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/mpspec.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/mpspec.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/mpspec.h
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ extern int pic_mode;
extern int using_apic_timer;
@ -411,8 +427,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Weidong Han <weidong.han@intel.com>
extern void mp_unregister_lapic(uint32_t apic_id, uint32_t cpu);
extern void mp_register_lapic_address (u64 address);
extern void mp_register_ioapic (u8 id, u32 address, u32 gsi_base);
--- a/xen/include/xen/acpi.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/acpi.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/xen/acpi.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/acpi.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/xen/acpi.h
@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ enum acpi_madt_entry_id {
ACPI_MADT_IOSAPIC,
ACPI_MADT_LSAPIC,

24
21847-pscsi.patch
View File

@ -37,10 +37,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Lutz Dube Lutz.Dube@ts.fujitsu.com
Comment from Masaki Kanno <kanno.masaki@jp.fujitsu.com>: "Well done"
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp
@@ -277,3 +277,11 @@
# we have to realize this may incur security issue and we can't make sure the
# device assignment could really work properly even after we do this.
@ -53,10 +53,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp
+# command lsscsi, e.g. ('16:0:0:0' '15:0')
+# (pscsi-device-mask ('*'))
+
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/util/vscsi_util.py
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/util/vscsi_util.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/util/vscsi_util.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/util/vscsi_util.py
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/util/vscsi_util.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/util/vscsi_util.py
@@ -148,11 +148,12 @@ def _vscsi_get_scsidevices_by_sysfs():
return devices
@ -85,10 +85,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/util/vscsi_util.py
scsi_record = _make_scsi_record(scsi_info)
scsi_records.append(scsi_record)
return scsi_records
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendNode.py
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendNode.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendNode.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendNode.py
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendNode.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendNode.py
@@ -323,7 +323,12 @@ class XendNode:
pscsi_table = {}
pscsi_HBA_table = {}
@ -103,10 +103,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendNode.py
scsi_id = pscsi_record['scsi_id']
if scsi_id:
saved_HBA_uuid = None
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendOptions.py
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendOptions.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendOptions.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendOptions.py
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendOptions.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendOptions.py
@@ -164,6 +164,9 @@ class XendOptions:
"""
print >>sys.stderr, "xend [ERROR]", fmt % args

18
21866-xenapi.patch
View File

@ -18,10 +18,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Lutz Dube Lutz.Dube@ts.fujitsu.com
Acked-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@novell.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendAPI.py
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendAPI.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendAPI.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendAPI.py
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendAPI.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendAPI.py
@@ -1667,7 +1667,8 @@ class XendAPI(object):
def VM_set_actions_after_crash(self, session, vm_ref, action):
if action not in XEN_API_ON_CRASH_BEHAVIOUR:
@ -32,10 +32,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendAPI.py
def VM_set_HVM_boot_policy(self, session, vm_ref, value):
if value != "" and value != "BIOS order":
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendAPIConstants.py
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendAPIConstants.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendAPIConstants.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendAPIConstants.py
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendAPIConstants.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendAPIConstants.py
@@ -63,6 +63,18 @@ XEN_API_ON_CRASH_BEHAVIOUR_FILTER = {
'rename_restart' : 'rename_restart',
}
@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendAPIConstants.py
XEN_API_VBD_MODE = ['RO', 'RW']
XEN_API_VDI_TYPE = ['system', 'user', 'ephemeral']
XEN_API_VBD_TYPE = ['CD', 'Disk']
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ from xen.util.pci import pci_opts_list_f
from xen.xend.XendSXPDev import dev_dict_to_sxp
from xen.util import xsconstants

12
21894-intel-unmask-cpuid.patch
View File

@ -13,8 +13,10 @@ etc.
Signed-off-by: Wei Gang <gang.wei@intel.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
@@ -90,6 +90,20 @@ void __devinit early_intel_workaround(st
/* Netburst reports 64 bytes clflush size, but does IO in 128 bytes */
if (c->x86 == 15 && c->x86_cache_alignment == 64)
@ -36,8 +38,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Wei Gang <gang.wei@intel.com>
}
/*
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_BTS_UNAVAIL (1<<11)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_PEBS_UNAVAIL (1<<12)

168
21989-x2apic-resume.patch
View File

@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
# Date 1281707886 -3600
# Node ID 3cee41690fa26853acb0be65065c52f6029ca599
# Parent 01d185dab39e9be399b203bec91870e04f576c23
x2APIC: Improve x2APIC suspend/resume
References: bnc#656369, bnc#658704
x2apic depends on interrupt remapping, so it should disable interrupt
remapping behind x2apic disabling. And also this patch wraps
__enable_x2apic to get rid of duplicated code.
Signed-off-by: Weidong Han <weidong.han@intel.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
@@ -496,9 +496,20 @@ static void apic_pm_activate(void)
apic_pm_state.active = 1;
}
+static void __enable_x2apic(void)
+{
+ u32 lo, hi;
+
+ rdmsr(MSR_IA32_APICBASE, lo, hi);
+ if ( !(lo & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_EXTD) )
+ {
+ lo |= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE | MSR_IA32_APICBASE_EXTD;
+ wrmsr(MSR_IA32_APICBASE, lo, 0);
+ }
+}
+
static void resume_x2apic(void)
{
- uint64_t msr_content;
struct IO_APIC_route_entry **ioapic_entries = NULL;
ASSERT(x2apic_enabled);
@@ -520,14 +531,7 @@ static void resume_x2apic(void)
mask_IO_APIC_setup(ioapic_entries);
iommu_enable_IR();
-
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_APICBASE, msr_content);
- if ( !(msr_content & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_EXTD) )
- {
- msr_content |= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE | MSR_IA32_APICBASE_EXTD;
- msr_content = (uint32_t)msr_content;
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_APICBASE, msr_content);
- }
+ __enable_x2apic();
restore_IO_APIC_setup(ioapic_entries);
unmask_8259A();
@@ -743,9 +747,10 @@ int lapic_suspend(void)
apic_pm_state.apic_tmict = apic_read(APIC_TMICT);
apic_pm_state.apic_tdcr = apic_read(APIC_TDCR);
apic_pm_state.apic_thmr = apic_read(APIC_LVTTHMR);
-
+
local_irq_save(flags);
disable_local_APIC();
+ iommu_disable_IR();
local_irq_restore(flags);
return 0;
}
@@ -1042,15 +1047,8 @@ static void enable_bsp_x2apic(void)
if ( !x2apic_preenabled )
{
- u32 lo, hi;
-
- rdmsr(MSR_IA32_APICBASE, lo, hi);
- if ( !(lo & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_EXTD) )
- {
- lo |= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE | MSR_IA32_APICBASE_EXTD;
- wrmsr(MSR_IA32_APICBASE, lo, 0);
- printk("x2APIC mode enabled.\n");
- }
+ __enable_x2apic();
+ printk("x2APIC mode enabled.\n");
}
restore_out:
@@ -1064,19 +1062,12 @@ out:
static void enable_ap_x2apic(void)
{
- u32 lo, hi;
-
ASSERT(smp_processor_id() != 0);
/* APs only enable x2apic when BSP did so. */
BUG_ON(!x2apic_enabled);
- rdmsr(MSR_IA32_APICBASE, lo, hi);
- if ( !(lo & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_EXTD) )
- {
- lo |= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE | MSR_IA32_APICBASE_EXTD;
- wrmsr(MSR_IA32_APICBASE, lo, 0);
- }
+ __enable_x2apic();
}
void enable_x2apic(void)
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
@@ -873,6 +873,24 @@ int iommu_enable_IR(void)
}
/*
+ * This function is used to disable Interrutp remapping when
+ * suspend local apic
+ */
+void iommu_disable_IR(void)
+{
+ struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd;
+
+ if ( !iommu_supports_eim() )
+ return;
+
+ for_each_drhd_unit ( drhd )
+ disable_intremap(drhd->iommu);
+
+ for_each_drhd_unit ( drhd )
+ disable_qinval(drhd->iommu);
+}
+
+/*
* Check if interrupt remapping is enabled or not
* return 1: enabled
* return 0: not enabled
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -2126,10 +2126,11 @@ static void vtd_suspend(void)
iommu_disable_translation(iommu);
- if ( iommu_intremap )
- disable_intremap(iommu);
-
- if ( iommu_qinval )
+ /* If interrupt remapping is enabled, queued invalidation
+ * will be disabled following interupt remapping disabling
+ * in local apic suspend
+ */
+ if ( !iommu_intremap && iommu_qinval )
disable_qinval(iommu);
}
}
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct iommu {
int iommu_setup(void);
int iommu_supports_eim(void);
int iommu_enable_IR(void);
+void iommu_disable_IR(void);
int intremap_enabled(void);
int iommu_add_device(struct pci_dev *pdev);

6
22019-x86-cpuidle-online-check.patch
View File

@ -13,8 +13,10 @@ patch fixed the issue.
Signed-off-by: Uwe Dannowski <uwe.dannowski@amd.com>
Acked-by: Wei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpuidle_menu.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpuidle_menu.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpuidle_menu.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpuidle_menu.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpuidle_menu.c
@@ -270,9 +270,10 @@ static void menu_reflect(struct acpi_pro
static int menu_enable_device(struct acpi_processor_power *power)

55
22045-python27-compat.patch
View File

@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk>
# Date 1282234170 -3600
# Node ID 2940165380de2348e0ea3f628dea35750a2b4c8f
# Parent 60746a2c14a6cc123892f973fbdd6acb73251d39
tools/python: fix xm list for Python 2.7
This patch fixes
Unexpected error: <type 'exceptions.AttributeError'>
This is due to xmlrpc changes in Python 2.7. This patch should
fixe it for both old and new versions.
Signed-off-by: Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/util/xmlrpcclient.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/util/xmlrpcclient.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/util/xmlrpcclient.py
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import socket
import string
import xmlrpclib
from types import StringTypes
+from sys import hexversion
try:
@@ -54,7 +55,12 @@ class UnixTransport(xmlrpclib.Transport)
return xmlrpclib.Transport.request(self, host, '/RPC2',
request_body, verbose)
def make_connection(self, host):
- return HTTPUnix(self.__handler)
+ if hexversion < 0x02070000:
+ # python 2.6 or earlier
+ return HTTPUnix(self.__handler)
+ else:
+ # xmlrpclib.Transport changed in python 2.7
+ return HTTPUnixConnection(self.__handler)
# We need our own transport for HTTPS, because xmlrpclib.SafeTransport is
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/util/xmlrpclib2.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/util/xmlrpclib2.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/util/xmlrpclib2.py
@@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ def stringify(value):
# some bugs in Keep-Alive handling and also enabled it by default
class XMLRPCRequestHandler(SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler):
protocol_version = "HTTP/1.1"
+ # xend crashes in python 2.7 unless disable_nagle_algorithm = False
+ # it isn't used in earlier versions so it is harmless to set it generally
+ disable_nagle_algorithm = False
def __init__(self, hosts_allowed, request, client_address, server):
self.hosts_allowed = hosts_allowed

203
22051-x86-forced-EOI.patch
View File

@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
# Date 1282466228 -3600
# Node ID 59ff5820534f4c5ec006d1ddca0f4356634c3b22
# Parent f77261710856aad506dda92cfa3b92b923be4e15
x86: Automatically EOI guest-bound interrupts if guest takes too long.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
Includes the x86 IRQ specific parts of c/s 21508:
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
# Date 1275480791 -3600
# Node ID 5aabc6f94df5f275647d55caa24780eff0c81355
# Parent a3bdee5a20daf590ae7a440dad4e3b104b99c620
timers: Track inactive timers and migrate them on cpu offline.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
@@ -46,8 +46,6 @@ static DECLARE_BITMAP(used_vectors, NR_V
struct irq_cfg __read_mostly *irq_cfg = NULL;
-static struct timer *__read_mostly irq_guest_eoi_timer;
-
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(vector_lock);
DEFINE_PER_CPU(vector_irq_t, vector_irq) = {
@@ -274,18 +272,15 @@ int init_irq_data(void)
irq_desc = xmalloc_array(struct irq_desc, nr_irqs);
irq_cfg = xmalloc_array(struct irq_cfg, nr_irqs);
irq_status = xmalloc_array(int, nr_irqs);
- irq_guest_eoi_timer = xmalloc_array(struct timer, nr_irqs);
irq_vector = xmalloc_array(u8, nr_irqs_gsi);
- if (!irq_desc || !irq_cfg || !irq_status ||! irq_vector ||
- !irq_guest_eoi_timer)
+ if ( !irq_desc || !irq_cfg || !irq_status ||! irq_vector )
return -ENOMEM;
memset(irq_desc, 0, nr_irqs * sizeof(*irq_desc));
memset(irq_cfg, 0, nr_irqs * sizeof(*irq_cfg));
memset(irq_status, 0, nr_irqs * sizeof(*irq_status));
memset(irq_vector, 0, nr_irqs_gsi * sizeof(*irq_vector));
- memset(irq_guest_eoi_timer, 0, nr_irqs * sizeof(*irq_guest_eoi_timer));
for (irq = 0; irq < nr_irqs; irq++) {
desc = irq_to_desc(irq);
@@ -740,6 +735,7 @@ typedef struct {
#define ACKTYPE_UNMASK 1 /* Unmask PIC hardware (from any CPU) */
#define ACKTYPE_EOI 2 /* EOI on the CPU that was interrupted */
cpumask_t cpu_eoi_map; /* CPUs that need to EOI this interrupt */
+ struct timer eoi_timer;
struct domain *guest[IRQ_MAX_GUESTS];
} irq_guest_action_t;
@@ -784,13 +780,55 @@ static void _irq_guest_eoi(struct irq_de
desc->handler->enable(irq);
}
+static void set_eoi_ready(void *data);
+
static void irq_guest_eoi_timer_fn(void *data)
{
struct irq_desc *desc = data;
+ unsigned int irq = desc - irq_desc;
+ irq_guest_action_t *action;
+ cpumask_t cpu_eoi_map;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&desc->lock, flags);
- _irq_guest_eoi(desc);
+
+ if ( !(desc->status & IRQ_GUEST) )
+ goto out;
+
+ action = (irq_guest_action_t *)desc->action;
+
+ if ( action->ack_type != ACKTYPE_NONE )
+ {
+ unsigned int i;
+ for ( i = 0; i < action->nr_guests; i++ )
+ {
+ struct domain *d = action->guest[i];
+ unsigned int pirq = domain_irq_to_pirq(d, irq);
+ if ( test_and_clear_bit(pirq, d->pirq_mask) )
+ action->in_flight--;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ( action->in_flight != 0 )
+ goto out;
+
+ switch ( action->ack_type )
+ {
+ case ACKTYPE_UNMASK:
+ desc->handler->end(irq);
+ break;
+ case ACKTYPE_EOI:
+ cpu_eoi_map = action->cpu_eoi_map;
+ spin_unlock_irq(&desc->lock);
+ on_selected_cpus(&cpu_eoi_map, set_eoi_ready, desc, 0);
+ spin_lock_irq(&desc->lock);
+ break;
+ case ACKTYPE_NONE:
+ _irq_guest_eoi(desc);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&desc->lock, flags);
}
@@ -847,9 +885,11 @@ static void __do_IRQ_guest(int irq)
}
}
- if ( already_pending == action->nr_guests )
+ stop_timer(&action->eoi_timer);
+
+ if ( (action->ack_type == ACKTYPE_NONE) &&
+ (already_pending == action->nr_guests) )
{
- stop_timer(&irq_guest_eoi_timer[irq]);
desc->handler->disable(irq);
desc->status |= IRQ_GUEST_EOI_PENDING;
for ( i = 0; i < already_pending; ++i )
@@ -865,10 +905,10 @@ static void __do_IRQ_guest(int irq)
* - skip the timer setup below.
*/
}
- init_timer(&irq_guest_eoi_timer[irq],
- irq_guest_eoi_timer_fn, desc, smp_processor_id());
- set_timer(&irq_guest_eoi_timer[irq], NOW() + MILLISECS(1));
}
+
+ migrate_timer(&action->eoi_timer, smp_processor_id());
+ set_timer(&action->eoi_timer, NOW() + MILLISECS(1));
}
/*
@@ -978,7 +1018,7 @@ static void __pirq_guest_eoi(struct doma
if ( action->ack_type == ACKTYPE_NONE )
{
ASSERT(!test_bit(pirq, d->pirq_mask));
- stop_timer(&irq_guest_eoi_timer[irq]);
+ stop_timer(&action->eoi_timer);
_irq_guest_eoi(desc);
}
@@ -1162,6 +1202,7 @@ int pirq_guest_bind(struct vcpu *v, int
action->shareable = will_share;
action->ack_type = pirq_acktype(v->domain, pirq);
cpus_clear(action->cpu_eoi_map);
+ init_timer(&action->eoi_timer, irq_guest_eoi_timer_fn, desc, 0);
desc->depth = 0;
desc->status |= IRQ_GUEST;
@@ -1266,7 +1307,7 @@ static irq_guest_action_t *__pirq_guest_
}
break;
case ACKTYPE_NONE:
- stop_timer(&irq_guest_eoi_timer[irq]);
+ stop_timer(&action->eoi_timer);
_irq_guest_eoi(desc);
break;
}
@@ -1306,9 +1347,7 @@ static irq_guest_action_t *__pirq_guest_
BUG_ON(!cpus_empty(action->cpu_eoi_map));
desc->action = NULL;
- desc->status &= ~IRQ_GUEST;
- desc->status &= ~IRQ_INPROGRESS;
- kill_timer(&irq_guest_eoi_timer[irq]);
+ desc->status &= ~(IRQ_GUEST|IRQ_GUEST_EOI_PENDING|IRQ_INPROGRESS);
desc->handler->shutdown(irq);
/* Caller frees the old guest descriptor block. */
@@ -1342,7 +1381,10 @@ void pirq_guest_unbind(struct domain *d,
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->lock);
if ( oldaction != NULL )
+ {
+ kill_timer(&oldaction->eoi_timer);
xfree(oldaction);
+ }
}
static int pirq_guest_force_unbind(struct domain *d, int irq)
@@ -1380,7 +1422,10 @@ static int pirq_guest_force_unbind(struc
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->lock);
if ( oldaction != NULL )
+ {
+ kill_timer(&oldaction->eoi_timer);
xfree(oldaction);
+ }
return bound;
}

31
22067-x86-irq-domain.patch
View File

@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
# Date 1282817774 -3600
# Node ID 3eb5127e46365242401e37df292fbe290fa0a974
# Parent eccfdeb41b803d07bcb4f7fa912a8341fdb19162
Fix bind_irq_vector() destination
The "mask" covered all online cpus in the "domain". It should be used
as destination later, instead of using "domain" directly.
Signed-off-by: Sheng Yang <sheng@linux.intel.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
@@ -88,14 +88,14 @@ static int __bind_irq_vector(int irq, in
cpus_and(mask, domain, cpu_online_map);
if (cpus_empty(mask))
return -EINVAL;
- if ((cfg->vector == vector) && cpus_equal(cfg->domain, domain))
+ if ((cfg->vector == vector) && cpus_equal(cfg->domain, mask))
return 0;
if (cfg->vector != IRQ_VECTOR_UNASSIGNED)
return -EBUSY;
for_each_cpu_mask(cpu, mask)
per_cpu(vector_irq, cpu)[vector] = irq;
cfg->vector = vector;
- cfg->domain = domain;
+ cfg->domain = mask;
irq_status[irq] = IRQ_USED;
if (IO_APIC_IRQ(irq))
irq_vector[irq] = vector;

35
22068-vtd-irte-RH-bit.patch
View File

@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
# Date 1282817816 -3600
# Node ID 3c4c3d48a8350994f4450314c6b759771c7ad4ef
# Parent 3eb5127e46365242401e37df292fbe290fa0a974
VT-d: Hardware require RH bit to be set in IRTE when delivery mode is LPR
Signed-off-by: Sheng Yang <sheng@linux.intel.com>
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
@@ -318,9 +318,10 @@ static int ioapic_rte_to_remap_entry(str
*(((u32 *)&new_rte) + 0) = value;
new_ire.lo.fpd = 0;
new_ire.lo.dm = new_rte.dest_mode;
- new_ire.lo.rh = 0;
new_ire.lo.tm = new_rte.trigger;
new_ire.lo.dlm = new_rte.delivery_mode;
+ /* Hardware require RH = 1 for LPR delivery mode */
+ new_ire.lo.rh = (new_ire.lo.dlm == dest_LowestPrio);
new_ire.lo.avail = 0;
new_ire.lo.res_1 = 0;
new_ire.lo.vector = new_rte.vector;
@@ -630,9 +631,10 @@ static int msi_msg_to_remap_entry(
/* Set interrupt remapping table entry */
new_ire.lo.fpd = 0;
new_ire.lo.dm = (msg->address_lo >> MSI_ADDR_DESTMODE_SHIFT) & 0x1;
- new_ire.lo.rh = 0;
new_ire.lo.tm = (msg->data >> MSI_DATA_TRIGGER_SHIFT) & 0x1;
new_ire.lo.dlm = (msg->data >> MSI_DATA_DELIVERY_MODE_SHIFT) & 0x1;
+ /* Hardware require RH = 1 for LPR delivery mode */
+ new_ire.lo.rh = (new_ire.lo.dlm == dest_LowestPrio);
new_ire.lo.avail = 0;
new_ire.lo.res_1 = 0;
new_ire.lo.vector = (msg->data >> MSI_DATA_VECTOR_SHIFT) &

45
22071-ept-get-entry-lock.patch
View File

@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
# Date 1283153992 -3600
# Node ID c5aed2e049bce2724b035dd6aa09c4c4e609c27c
# Parent 20920c12bc4815b1f755786c0924393809664807
ept: Put locks around ept_get_entry
There's a subtle race in ept_get_entry, such that if tries to read an
entry that ept_set_entry is modifying, it gets neither the old entry
nor the new entry, but empty. In the case of multi-cpu
populate-on-demand guests, this manifests as a guest crash when one
vcpu tries to read a page which another page is trying to populate,
and ept_get_entry returns p2m_mmio_dm.
This bug can also be fixed by making both ept_set_entry and
ept_next_level access-once (i.e., ept_next_level reads full ept_entry
and then works with local value; ept_set_entry construct the entry
locally and then sets it in one write). But there doesn't seem to be
any major performance implications of just making ept_get_entry use
locks; so the simpler, the better.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/p2m-ept.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/p2m-ept.c
@@ -387,6 +387,10 @@ static mfn_t ept_get_entry(struct domain
int i;
int ret = 0;
mfn_t mfn = _mfn(INVALID_MFN);
+ int do_locking = !p2m_locked_by_me(d->arch.p2m);
+
+ if ( do_locking )
+ p2m_lock(d->arch.p2m);
*t = p2m_mmio_dm;
@@ -464,6 +468,8 @@ static mfn_t ept_get_entry(struct domain
}
out:
+ if ( do_locking )
+ p2m_unlock(d->arch.p2m);
unmap_domain_page(table);
return mfn;
}

22
22084-x86-xsave-off.patch
View File

@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
# Date 1283332754 -3600
# Node ID ae0cd4e5cc0149ceb5d3dd61a003aadc008f036e
# Parent 972d90ff31349816cc8c785a8b2defb2f70ed441
x86 intel: Disable XSAVE support.
It breaks HVM save/restore.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
extern int trap_init_f00f_bug(void);
-static int use_xsave = 1;
+static int use_xsave;
boolean_param("xsave", use_xsave);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY

51
22135-heap-lock.patch
View File

@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
References: bnc#638465
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
# Date 1284394111 -3600
# Node ID 69e8bb164683c76e0cd787df21b98c73905a61e6
# Parent e300bfa3c0323ac08e7b8cd9fb40f9f1ab548543
page_alloc: Hold heap_lock while adjusting page states to/from PGC_state_free.
This avoids races with buddy-merging logic in free_heap_pages().
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
--- a/xen/common/page_alloc.c
+++ b/xen/common/page_alloc.c
@@ -378,8 +378,6 @@ static struct page_info *alloc_heap_page
total_avail_pages -= request;
ASSERT(total_avail_pages >= 0);
- spin_unlock(&heap_lock);
-
cpus_clear(mask);
for ( i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++ )
@@ -401,6 +399,8 @@ static struct page_info *alloc_heap_page
page_set_owner(&pg[i], NULL);
}
+ spin_unlock(&heap_lock);
+
if ( unlikely(!cpus_empty(mask)) )
{
perfc_incr(need_flush_tlb_flush);
@@ -496,6 +496,8 @@ static void free_heap_pages(
ASSERT(order <= MAX_ORDER);
ASSERT(node >= 0);
+ spin_lock(&heap_lock);
+
for ( i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++ )
{
/*
@@ -523,8 +525,6 @@ static void free_heap_pages(
pg[i].tlbflush_timestamp = tlbflush_current_time();
}
- spin_lock(&heap_lock);
-
avail[node][zone] += 1 << order;
total_avail_pages += 1 << order;

24
22148-serial-irq-dest.patch
View File

@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
# Date 1284395845 -3600
# Node ID a254d1236c1a52264beb0253352ef64d65a98eb3
# Parent f0a1229cb0a6505f3240ac59a3bb6ade2acfa1a2
Fix serial interrupt's destination
Lowest Priority can't use with invalid cpu_mask, and the default value
of CPU_MASK_ALL may cover CPU which wasn't online.
From: "Yang, Sheng" <sheng.yang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
@@ -1602,7 +1602,7 @@ void __init smp_intr_init(void)
irq_vector[irq] = FIRST_HIPRIORITY_VECTOR + seridx + 1;
per_cpu(vector_irq, cpu)[FIRST_HIPRIORITY_VECTOR + seridx + 1] = irq;
irq_cfg[irq].vector = FIRST_HIPRIORITY_VECTOR + seridx + 1;
- irq_cfg[irq].domain = (cpumask_t)CPU_MASK_ALL;
+ irq_cfg[irq].domain = cpu_online_map;
}
/* IPI for cleanuping vectors after irq move */

21
22157-x86-debug-key-i.patch
View File

@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
# Date 1284533274 -3600
# Node ID d4976434b8bba469fd1d337dc16249a5abfc4e5a
# Parent 14ce571d157e060fdb390e70fa8d0c95b2fd9b76
x86: fix debug key 'i' handling with no IO-APICs
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
@@ -2463,6 +2463,9 @@ void dump_ioapic_irq_info(void)
unsigned int irq, pin, printed = 0;
unsigned long flags;
+ if ( !irq_2_pin )
+ return;
+
for ( irq = 0; irq < nr_irqs_gsi; irq++ )
{
entry = &irq_2_pin[irq];

27
22159-notify-evtchn-dying.patch
View File

@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
# Date 1284535133 -3600
# Node ID 62edd2611cbbe4c50574b6f6f73dda2ae1136dde
# Parent 869a0fdf8686c3dada14122df6d22a38705c2401
notify_via_xen_event_channel() should check for dying domain.
Else we can fail on either ASSERTion in that function.
From: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
--- a/xen/common/event_channel.c
+++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c
@@ -994,6 +994,12 @@ void notify_via_xen_event_channel(struct
spin_lock(&ld->event_lock);
+ if ( unlikely(ld->is_dying) )
+ {
+ spin_unlock(&ld->event_lock);
+ return;
+ }
+
ASSERT(port_is_valid(ld, lport));
lchn = evtchn_from_port(ld, lport);
ASSERT(lchn->consumer_is_xen);

91
22160-Intel-C6-EOI.patch
View File

@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
# Date 1284537635 -3600
# Node ID 1087f9a03ab61d3a8bb0a1c65e5b09f82f3a4277
# Parent 62edd2611cbbe4c50574b6f6f73dda2ae1136dde
C6 state with EOI issue fix for some Intel processors
There is an errata in some of Intel processors.
AAJ72. EOI Transaction May Not be Sent if Software Enters Core C6
During an Interrupt Service Routine
If core C6 is entered after the start of an interrupt service routine
but before a write to the APIC EOI register, the core may not send an
EOI transaction (if needed) and further interrupts from the same
priority level or lower may be blocked.
This patch fix this issue, by checking if ISR is pending before enter
deep Cx state. If so, it would use power->safe_state instead of deep
Cx state to prevent the above issue happen.
Signed-off-by: Sheng Yang <sheng@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
@@ -226,6 +226,31 @@ static int sched_has_urgent_vcpu(void)
return atomic_read(&this_cpu(schedule_data).urgent_count);
}
+/*
+ * "AAJ72. EOI Transaction May Not be Sent if Software Enters Core C6 During
+ * an Interrupt Service Routine"
+ *
+ * There was an errata with some Core i7 processors that an EOI transaction
+ * may not be sent if software enters core C6 during an interrupt service
+ * routine. So we don't enter deep Cx state if there is an EOI pending.
+ */
+bool_t errata_c6_eoi_workaround(void)
+{
+ static bool_t fix_needed = -1;
+
+ if ( unlikely(fix_needed == -1) )
+ {
+ int model = boot_cpu_data.x86_model;
+ fix_needed = (cpu_has_apic && !directed_eoi_enabled &&
+ (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) &&
+ (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) &&
+ ((model == 0x1a) || (model == 0x1e) || (model == 0x1f) ||
+ (model == 0x25) || (model == 0x2c) || (model == 0x2f)));
+ }
+
+ return (fix_needed && cpu_has_pending_apic_eoi());
+}
+
static void acpi_processor_idle(void)
{
struct acpi_processor_power *power = processor_powers[smp_processor_id()];
@@ -277,6 +302,9 @@ static void acpi_processor_idle(void)
return;
}
+ if ( (cx->type == ACPI_STATE_C3) && errata_c6_eoi_workaround() )
+ cx = power->safe_state;
+
power->last_state = cx;
/*
--- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
@@ -752,6 +752,11 @@ struct pending_eoi {
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct pending_eoi, pending_eoi[NR_DYNAMIC_VECTORS]);
#define pending_eoi_sp(p) ((p)[NR_DYNAMIC_VECTORS-1].vector)
+bool_t cpu_has_pending_apic_eoi(void)
+{
+ return (pending_eoi_sp(this_cpu(pending_eoi)) != 0);
+}
+
static inline void set_pirq_eoi(struct domain *d, unsigned int irq)
{
if ( d->arch.pirq_eoi_map )
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/irq.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/irq.h
@@ -150,4 +150,6 @@ void irq_set_affinity(int irq, cpumask_t
#define domain_pirq_to_irq(d, pirq) ((d)->arch.pirq_irq[pirq])
#define domain_irq_to_pirq(d, irq) ((d)->arch.irq_pirq[irq])
+bool_t cpu_has_pending_apic_eoi(void);
+
#endif /* _ASM_HW_IRQ_H */

68
22174-x86-pmtimer-accuracy.patch
View File

@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
# Date 1284739161 -3600
# Node ID 632c02167f97bb2bd25571b2780425b9b75949b4
# Parent 1b05090854ba83576aa8399fa70e481f5b602417
hvm pmtimer: correct pmtimer accuracy
Several seconds of backward time drift per minute can be seen on a
RHEL6 HVM guest by switching the clocksource to 'acpi_pm' and then
running gettimeofday() in a loop. This is due to the accumulation
of small inaccuracies that are caused by shifting out the lower 32
bits when pmt_update_time() computes 'tmr_val'.
The patch makes sure that the lower 32 bits of the computed value
are not lost. They are saved in a new field 'not_accounted' in the
PMTState structure and are accounted the next time pmt_update_time()
is called.
From: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/pmtimer.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/pmtimer.c
@@ -83,14 +83,16 @@ void hvm_acpi_sleep_button(struct domain
* since the last time we did that. */
static void pmt_update_time(PMTState *s)
{
- uint64_t curr_gtime;
+ uint64_t curr_gtime, tmp;
uint32_t msb = s->pm.tmr_val & TMR_VAL_MSB;
ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&s->lock));
/* Update the timer */
curr_gtime = hvm_get_guest_time(s->vcpu);
- s->pm.tmr_val += ((curr_gtime - s->last_gtime) * s->scale) >> 32;
+ tmp = ((curr_gtime - s->last_gtime) * s->scale) + s->not_accounted;
+ s->not_accounted = (uint32_t)tmp;
+ s->pm.tmr_val += tmp >> 32;
s->pm.tmr_val &= TMR_VAL_MASK;
s->last_gtime = curr_gtime;
@@ -257,6 +259,7 @@ static int pmtimer_load(struct domain *d
/* Calculate future counter values from now. */
s->last_gtime = hvm_get_guest_time(s->vcpu);
+ s->not_accounted = 0;
/* Set the SCI state from the registers */
pmt_update_sci(s);
@@ -276,6 +279,7 @@ void pmtimer_init(struct vcpu *v)
spin_lock_init(&s->lock);
s->scale = ((uint64_t)FREQUENCE_PMTIMER << 32) / SYSTEM_TIME_HZ;
+ s->not_accounted = 0;
s->vcpu = v;
/* Intercept port I/O (need two handlers because PM1a_CNT is between
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vpt.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vpt.h
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ typedef struct PMTState {
struct hvm_hw_pmtimer pm; /* 32bit timer value */
struct vcpu *vcpu; /* Keeps sync with this vcpu's guest-time */
uint64_t last_gtime; /* Last (guest) time we updated the timer */
+ uint32_t not_accounted; /* time not accounted at last update */
uint64_t scale; /* Multiplier to get from tsc to timer ticks */
struct timer timer; /* To make sure we send SCIs */
spinlock_t lock;

59
22175-x86-irq-enter-exit.patch
View File

@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
# Date 1284795115 -3600
# Node ID ee3c640732311ef6bc5e2de56c3b4b753cb020fa
# Parent 632c02167f97bb2bd25571b2780425b9b75949b4
x86: irq_enter()/irq_exit() covers all of do_IRQ().
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
@@ -535,6 +535,8 @@ asmlinkage void do_IRQ(struct cpu_user_r
return;
}
+ irq_enter();
+
desc = irq_to_desc(irq);
spin_lock(&desc->lock);
@@ -568,14 +570,10 @@ asmlinkage void do_IRQ(struct cpu_user_r
desc->rl_quantum_start = now;
}
- irq_enter();
tsc_in = tb_init_done ? get_cycles() : 0;
__do_IRQ_guest(irq);
TRACE_3D(TRC_TRACE_IRQ, irq, tsc_in, get_cycles());
- irq_exit();
- spin_unlock(&desc->lock);
- set_irq_regs(old_regs);
- return;
+ goto out_no_end;
}
desc->status &= ~IRQ_REPLAY;
@@ -594,20 +592,20 @@ asmlinkage void do_IRQ(struct cpu_user_r
while ( desc->status & IRQ_PENDING )
{
desc->status &= ~IRQ_PENDING;
- irq_enter();
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->lock);
tsc_in = tb_init_done ? get_cycles() : 0;
action->handler(irq, action->dev_id, regs);
TRACE_3D(TRC_TRACE_IRQ, irq, tsc_in, get_cycles());
spin_lock_irq(&desc->lock);
- irq_exit();
}
desc->status &= ~IRQ_INPROGRESS;
out:
desc->handler->end(irq);
+ out_no_end:
spin_unlock(&desc->lock);
+ irq_exit();
set_irq_regs(old_regs);
}

92
22177-i386-irq-safe-map_domain_page.patch
View File

@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
# Date 1284796635 -3600
# Node ID 7405e0ddb912a993982e4e4122856965b7c706dd
# Parent 0da4bfd2bc23937d2e1a8bfa6d259be0d9e482ad
x86_32: [un]map_domain_page() is now IRQ safe.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_32/domain_page.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_32/domain_page.c
@@ -42,15 +42,13 @@ static inline struct vcpu *mapcache_curr
void *map_domain_page(unsigned long mfn)
{
- unsigned long va;
- unsigned int idx, i, flags;
+ unsigned long va, flags;
+ unsigned int idx, i;
struct vcpu *v;
struct mapcache_domain *dcache;
struct mapcache_vcpu *vcache;
struct vcpu_maphash_entry *hashent;
- ASSERT(!in_irq());
-
perfc_incr(map_domain_page_count);
v = mapcache_current_vcpu();
@@ -58,6 +56,8 @@ void *map_domain_page(unsigned long mfn)
dcache = &v->domain->arch.mapcache;
vcache = &v->arch.mapcache;
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+
hashent = &vcache->hash[MAPHASH_HASHFN(mfn)];
if ( hashent->mfn == mfn )
{
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ void *map_domain_page(unsigned long mfn)
goto out;
}
- spin_lock_irqsave(&dcache->lock, flags);
+ spin_lock(&dcache->lock);
/* Has some other CPU caused a wrap? We must flush if so. */
if ( unlikely(dcache->epoch != vcache->shadow_epoch) )
@@ -105,11 +105,12 @@ void *map_domain_page(unsigned long mfn)
set_bit(idx, dcache->inuse);
dcache->cursor = idx + 1;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dcache->lock, flags);
+ spin_unlock(&dcache->lock);
l1e_write(&dcache->l1tab[idx], l1e_from_pfn(mfn, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR));
out:
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
va = MAPCACHE_VIRT_START + (idx << PAGE_SHIFT);
return (void *)va;
}
@@ -119,11 +120,9 @@ void unmap_domain_page(const void *va)
unsigned int idx;
struct vcpu *v;
struct mapcache_domain *dcache;
- unsigned long mfn;
+ unsigned long mfn, flags;
struct vcpu_maphash_entry *hashent;
- ASSERT(!in_irq());
-
ASSERT((void *)MAPCACHE_VIRT_START <= va);
ASSERT(va < (void *)MAPCACHE_VIRT_END);
@@ -135,6 +134,8 @@ void unmap_domain_page(const void *va)
mfn = l1e_get_pfn(dcache->l1tab[idx]);
hashent = &v->arch.mapcache.hash[MAPHASH_HASHFN(mfn)];
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+
if ( hashent->idx == idx )
{
ASSERT(hashent->mfn == mfn);
@@ -163,6 +164,8 @@ void unmap_domain_page(const void *va)
/* /Second/, mark as garbage. */
set_bit(idx, dcache->garbage);
}
+
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
}
void mapcache_domain_init(struct domain *d)

240
22194-tmem-check-pv-mfn.patch
View File

@ -1,240 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@citrix.com>
# Date 1285142048 -3600
# Node ID e8e3aeed3ebacac6faa5795f67b195a434562323
# Parent 35a1a14c408e60eca608a67a79f38ae5fdf3ea19
tmem: disallow bad gmfns from PV domains
Mfns for PV domains were not properly checked, potentially
allowing a buggy or malicious PV guest to crash Xen. Also,
use get_page/put_page to claim a reference to the pages
so they can't disappear out from under tmem's feet.
Signed-off-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
--- a/xen/common/tmem_xen.c
+++ b/xen/common/tmem_xen.c
@@ -87,49 +87,88 @@ void tmh_copy_page(char *to, char*from)
}
#ifdef __ia64__
-static inline void *cli_mfn_to_va(tmem_cli_mfn_t cmfn, unsigned long *pcli_mfn)
+static inline void *cli_get_page(tmem_cli_mfn_t cmfn, unsigned long *pcli_mfn,
+ pfp_t **pcli_pfp, bool_t cli_write)
{
ASSERT(0);
return NULL;
}
-#define paging_mark_dirty(_x,_y) do {} while(0)
+
+static inline void cli_put_page(void *cli_va, struct page_info *cli_pfp,
+ bool_t mark_dirty)
+{
+ ASSERT(0);
+}
#else
-static inline void *cli_mfn_to_va(tmem_cli_mfn_t cmfn, unsigned long *pcli_mfn)
+static inline void *cli_get_page(tmem_cli_mfn_t cmfn, unsigned long *pcli_mfn,
+ pfp_t **pcli_pfp, bool_t cli_write)
{
unsigned long cli_mfn;
p2m_type_t t;
+ struct page_info *page;
+ int ret;
cli_mfn = mfn_x(gfn_to_mfn(current->domain, cmfn, &t));
- if (t != p2m_ram_rw || cli_mfn == INVALID_MFN)
+ if ( t != p2m_ram_rw || !mfn_valid(cli_mfn) )
+ return NULL;
+ page = mfn_to_page(cli_mfn);
+ if ( cli_write )
+ ret = get_page_and_type(page, current->domain, PGT_writable_page);
+ else
+ ret = get_page(page, current->domain);
+ if ( !ret )
return NULL;
- if (pcli_mfn != NULL)
- *pcli_mfn = cli_mfn;
+ *pcli_mfn = cli_mfn;
+ *pcli_pfp = (pfp_t *)page;
return map_domain_page(cli_mfn);
}
+
+static inline void cli_put_page(void *cli_va, pfp_t *cli_pfp,
+ unsigned long cli_mfn, bool_t mark_dirty)
+{
+ if ( mark_dirty )
+ {
+ put_page_and_type((struct page_info *)cli_pfp);
+ paging_mark_dirty(current->domain,cli_mfn);
+ }
+ else
+ put_page((struct page_info *)cli_pfp);
+ unmap_domain_page(cli_va);
+}
#endif
EXPORT int tmh_copy_from_client(pfp_t *pfp,
tmem_cli_mfn_t cmfn, pagesize_t tmem_offset,
pagesize_t pfn_offset, pagesize_t len, void *cli_va)
{
- unsigned long tmem_mfn;
+ unsigned long tmem_mfn, cli_mfn = 0;
void *tmem_va;
+ pfp_t *cli_pfp = NULL;
+ bool_t tmemc = cli_va != NULL; /* if true, cli_va is control-op buffer */
ASSERT(pfp != NULL);
- if ( tmem_offset || pfn_offset || len )
- if ( (cli_va == NULL) && ((cli_va = cli_mfn_to_va(cmfn,NULL)) == NULL) )
- return -EFAULT;
tmem_mfn = page_to_mfn(pfp);
tmem_va = map_domain_page(tmem_mfn);
- mb();
- if (!len && !tmem_offset && !pfn_offset)
+ if ( tmem_offset == 0 && pfn_offset == 0 && len == 0 )
+ {
memset(tmem_va, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
- else if (len == PAGE_SIZE && !tmem_offset && !pfn_offset)
+ unmap_domain_page(tmem_va);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if ( !tmemc )
+ {
+ cli_va = cli_get_page(cmfn, &cli_mfn, &cli_pfp, 0);
+ if ( cli_va == NULL )
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ mb();
+ if (len == PAGE_SIZE && !tmem_offset && !pfn_offset)
tmh_copy_page(tmem_va, cli_va);
else if ( (tmem_offset+len <= PAGE_SIZE) &&
- (pfn_offset+len <= PAGE_SIZE) )
+ (pfn_offset+len <= PAGE_SIZE) )
memcpy((char *)tmem_va+tmem_offset,(char *)cli_va+pfn_offset,len);
- unmap_domain_page(cli_va);
+ if ( !tmemc )
+ cli_put_page(cli_va, cli_pfp, cli_mfn, 0);
unmap_domain_page(tmem_va);
return 1;
}
@@ -140,15 +179,24 @@ EXPORT int tmh_compress_from_client(tmem
int ret = 0;
unsigned char *dmem = this_cpu(dstmem);
unsigned char *wmem = this_cpu(workmem);
+ pfp_t *cli_pfp = NULL;
+ unsigned long cli_mfn = 0;
+ bool_t tmemc = cli_va != NULL; /* if true, cli_va is control-op buffer */
- if ( (cli_va == NULL) && (cli_va = cli_mfn_to_va(cmfn,NULL)) == NULL)
- return -EFAULT;
if ( dmem == NULL || wmem == NULL )
return 0; /* no buffer, so can't compress */
+ if ( !tmemc )
+ {
+ cli_va = cli_get_page(cmfn, &cli_mfn, &cli_pfp, 0);
+ if ( cli_va == NULL )
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
mb();
ret = lzo1x_1_compress(cli_va, PAGE_SIZE, dmem, out_len, wmem);
ASSERT(ret == LZO_E_OK);
*out_va = dmem;
+ if ( !tmemc )
+ cli_put_page(cli_va, cli_pfp, cli_mfn, 0);
unmap_domain_page(cli_va);
return 1;
}
@@ -157,14 +205,17 @@ EXPORT int tmh_copy_to_client(tmem_cli_m
pagesize_t tmem_offset, pagesize_t pfn_offset, pagesize_t len, void *cli_va)
{
unsigned long tmem_mfn, cli_mfn = 0;
- int mark_dirty = 1;
void *tmem_va;
+ pfp_t *cli_pfp = NULL;
+ bool_t tmemc = cli_va != NULL; /* if true, cli_va is control-op buffer */
ASSERT(pfp != NULL);
- if ( cli_va != NULL )
- mark_dirty = 0;
- else if ( (cli_va = cli_mfn_to_va(cmfn,&cli_mfn)) == NULL)
- return -EFAULT;
+ if ( !tmemc )
+ {
+ cli_va = cli_get_page(cmfn, &cli_mfn, &cli_pfp, 1);
+ if ( cli_va == NULL )
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
tmem_mfn = page_to_mfn(pfp);
tmem_va = map_domain_page(tmem_mfn);
if (len == PAGE_SIZE && !tmem_offset && !pfn_offset)
@@ -172,11 +223,8 @@ EXPORT int tmh_copy_to_client(tmem_cli_m
else if ( (tmem_offset+len <= PAGE_SIZE) && (pfn_offset+len <= PAGE_SIZE) )
memcpy((char *)cli_va+pfn_offset,(char *)tmem_va+tmem_offset,len);
unmap_domain_page(tmem_va);
- if ( mark_dirty )
- {
- unmap_domain_page(cli_va);
- paging_mark_dirty(current->domain,cli_mfn);
- }
+ if ( !tmemc )
+ cli_put_page(cli_va, cli_pfp, cli_mfn, 1);
mb();
return 1;
}
@@ -185,22 +233,22 @@ EXPORT int tmh_decompress_to_client(tmem
size_t size, void *cli_va)
{
unsigned long cli_mfn = 0;
- int mark_dirty = 1;
+ pfp_t *cli_pfp = NULL;
size_t out_len = PAGE_SIZE;
+ bool_t tmemc = cli_va != NULL; /* if true, cli_va is control-op buffer */
int ret;
- if ( cli_va != NULL )
- mark_dirty = 0;
- else if ( (cli_va = cli_mfn_to_va(cmfn,&cli_mfn)) == NULL)
- return -EFAULT;
+ if ( !tmemc )
+ {
+ cli_va = cli_get_page(cmfn, &cli_mfn, &cli_pfp, 1);
+ if ( cli_va == NULL )
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
ret = lzo1x_decompress_safe(tmem_va, size, cli_va, &out_len);
ASSERT(ret == LZO_E_OK);
ASSERT(out_len == PAGE_SIZE);
- if ( mark_dirty )
- {
- unmap_domain_page(cli_va);
- paging_mark_dirty(current->domain,cli_mfn);
- }
+ if ( !tmemc )
+ cli_put_page(cli_va, cli_pfp, cli_mfn, 1);
mb();
return 1;
}
@@ -210,18 +258,19 @@ EXPORT int tmh_copy_tze_to_client(tmem_c
{
void *cli_va;
unsigned long cli_mfn;
+ pfp_t *cli_pfp = NULL;
ASSERT(!(len & (sizeof(uint64_t)-1)));
ASSERT(len <= PAGE_SIZE);
ASSERT(len > 0 || tmem_va == NULL);
- if ( (cli_va = cli_mfn_to_va(cmfn,&cli_mfn)) == NULL)
+ cli_va = cli_get_page(cmfn, &cli_mfn, &cli_pfp, 1);
+ if ( cli_va == NULL )
return -EFAULT;
if ( len > 0 )
memcpy((char *)cli_va,(char *)tmem_va,len);
if ( len < PAGE_SIZE )
memset((char *)cli_va+len,0,PAGE_SIZE-len);
- unmap_domain_page(cli_va);
- paging_mark_dirty(current->domain,cli_mfn);
+ cli_put_page(cli_va, cli_pfp, cli_mfn, 1);
mb();
return 1;
}

50
22213-x86-xsave-cpuid-check.patch
View File

@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1285340011 -3600
# Node ID eb247ea9db8c8b541a7f8c9cdc51c064c4c9e41c
# Parent 105c938eacbbc250447a676bb2088f804033b82b
x86: check CPUID level before enabling xsave
References: bnc#640773
While not as relevant after c/s 21894, is still seems safer to check
the CPUID level here, just like Linux does. The is particularly
relevant for the 4.0 tree (which doesn't have said c/s), but also
possibly for nested environments where writing MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE
may not actually take effect (Xen itself ignores such writes).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/i387.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/i387.c
@@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ void restore_fpu(struct vcpu *v)
}
}
+#define XSTATE_CPUID 0xd
+
/*
* Maximum size (in byte) of the XSAVE/XRSTOR save area required by all
* the supported and enabled features on the processor, including the
@@ -148,7 +150,12 @@ void xsave_init(void)
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
u32 min_size;
- cpuid_count(0xd, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.cpuid_level < XSTATE_CPUID ) {
+ printk(XENLOG_ERR "XSTATE_CPUID missing\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ cpuid_count(XSTATE_CPUID, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
printk("%s: cpu%d: cntxt_max_size: 0x%x and states: %08x:%08x\n",
__func__, cpu, ecx, edx, eax);
@@ -169,7 +176,7 @@ void xsave_init(void)
*/
set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_OSXSAVE);
set_xcr0(eax & XCNTXT_MASK);
- cpuid_count(0xd, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ cpuid_count(XSTATE_CPUID, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
clear_in_cr4(X86_CR4_OSXSAVE);
if ( cpu == 0 )

18
22214-x86-msr-misc-enable.patch
View File

@ -23,9 +23,11 @@ Further, the default case value-changed check can be simplified.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -1661,6 +1661,16 @@ unsigned long guest_to_host_gpr_switch(u
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -1679,6 +1679,16 @@ unsigned long guest_to_host_gpr_switch(u
void (*pv_post_outb_hook)(unsigned int port, u8 value);
@ -42,7 +44,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
/* Instruction fetch with error handling. */
#define insn_fetch(type, base, eip, limit) \
({ unsigned long _rc, _ptr = (base) + (eip); \
@@ -2258,6 +2268,13 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct
@@ -2276,6 +2286,13 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct
if ( wrmsr_safe(MSR_FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE, eax, edx) != 0 )
goto fail;
break;
@ -56,7 +58,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
case MSR_IA32_MPERF:
case MSR_IA32_APERF:
if (( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ) &&
@@ -2364,11 +2381,7 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct
@@ -2382,11 +2399,7 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct
case MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE:
if ( rdmsr_safe(regs->ecx, regs->eax, regs->edx) )
goto fail;
@ -69,8 +71,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
break;
case MSR_EFER:
case MSR_AMD_PATCHLEVEL:
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h
@@ -39,7 +39,8 @@ static inline void wrmsrl(unsigned int m
__asm__ __volatile__( \
"1: rdmsr\n2:\n" \

70
22222-x86-timer-extint.patch
View File

@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1286028195 -3600
# Node ID aed9fd361340158daf2d7160d1b367478b6312d6
# Parent 3518149c4d5d0d8ce7402a24f95d3badbecc1c17
x86: fix boot failure (regression from pre-4.0 IRQ handling changes)
References: bnc#583568, bnc#615206
With the change to index irq_desc[] by IRQ rather than by vector, the
prior implicit change of the used flow handler when altering the IRQ
routing path to go through the 8259A didn't work anymore, and hence
on boards needing the ExtINT delivery workaround failed to boot.
Make make_8259A_irq() a real function again, thus allowing the flow
handler to be changed there.
Also eliminate the generally superfluous and (at least theoretically)
dangerous hard coded setting of the flow handler for IRQ0: Earlier
code should have set this already based on information coming from
ACPI/MPS, and non-standard systems may e.g. have this IRQ level
triggered.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Tested-by: Markus Schuster <ml@markus.schuster.name>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/i8259.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/i8259.c
@@ -367,6 +367,12 @@ void __devinit init_8259A(int auto_eoi)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&i8259A_lock, flags);
}
+void __init make_8259A_irq(unsigned int irq)
+{
+ io_apic_irqs &= ~(1 << irq);
+ irq_to_desc(irq)->handler = &i8259A_irq_type;
+}
+
static struct irqaction __read_mostly cascade = { no_action, "cascade", NULL};
void __init init_IRQ(void)
--- a/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
@@ -38,9 +38,6 @@
#include <io_ports.h>
#include <public/physdev.h>
-/* Different to Linux: our implementation can be simpler. */
-#define make_8259A_irq(irq) (io_apic_irqs &= ~(1<<(irq)))
-
int (*ioapic_renumber_irq)(int ioapic, int irq);
atomic_t irq_mis_count;
@@ -1929,7 +1926,6 @@ static inline void check_timer(void)
irq_desc[0].depth = 0;
irq_desc[0].status &= ~IRQ_DISABLED;
- irq_desc[0].handler = &ioapic_edge_type;
/*
* Subtle, code in do_timer_interrupt() expects an AEOI
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/irq.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/irq.h
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ int i8259A_irq_pending(unsigned int irq)
void mask_8259A(void);
void unmask_8259A(void);
void init_8259A(int aeoi);
+void make_8259A_irq(unsigned int irq);
int i8259A_suspend(void);
int i8259A_resume(void);

12
22231-x86-pv-ucode-msr-intel.patch
View File

@ -13,9 +13,11 @@ change.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -2268,6 +2268,14 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -2286,6 +2286,14 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct
if ( wrmsr_safe(MSR_FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE, eax, edx) != 0 )
goto fail;
break;
@ -30,7 +32,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
case MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE:
if ( rdmsr_safe(regs->ecx, l, h) )
goto invalid;
@@ -2375,16 +2383,21 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct
@@ -2393,16 +2401,21 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct
regs->eax = regs->edx = 0;
break;
}
@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
default:
if ( rdmsr_hypervisor_regs(regs->ecx, &val) )
{
@@ -2400,6 +2413,8 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct
@@ -2418,6 +2431,8 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct
if ( rc )
goto rdmsr_writeback;

89
22232-x86-64-lahf-lm-bios-workaround.patch
View File

@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1286784156 -3600
# Node ID eb964c4b4f31c6b7bdfe8504839c4acac776f506
# Parent a1405385db77c7c81aac27bd88d6c4b2d90b1389
x86-64: workaround for BIOSes wrongly enabling LAHF_LM feature indicator
This workaround is taken from Linux, and the main motivation (besides
such workarounds indeed belonging in the hypervisor rather than each
kernel) is to suppress the warnings in the Xen log each Linux guest
would cause due to the disallowed wrmsr.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
@@ -44,6 +44,47 @@ static inline void wrmsr_amd(unsigned in
);
}
+static inline int rdmsr_amd_safe(unsigned int msr, unsigned int *lo,
+ unsigned int *hi)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ asm volatile("1: rdmsr\n2:\n"
+ ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
+ "3: movl %6,%2\n"
+ " jmp 2b\n"
+ ".previous\n"
+ ".section __ex_table,\"a\"\n"
+ __FIXUP_ALIGN "\n"
+ __FIXUP_WORD " 1b,3b\n"
+ ".previous\n"
+ : "=a" (*lo), "=d" (*hi), "=r" (err)
+ : "c" (msr), "D" (0x9c5a203a), "2" (0), "i" (-EFAULT));
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static inline int wrmsr_amd_safe(unsigned int msr, unsigned int lo,
+ unsigned int hi)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ asm volatile("1: wrmsr\n2:\n"
+ ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
+ "3: movl %6,%0\n"
+ " jmp 2b\n"
+ ".previous\n"
+ ".section __ex_table,\"a\"\n"
+ __FIXUP_ALIGN "\n"
+ __FIXUP_WORD " 1b,3b\n"
+ ".previous\n"
+ : "=r" (err)
+ : "c" (msr), "a" (lo), "d" (hi), "D" (0x9c5a203a),
+ "0" (0), "i" (-EFAULT));
+
+ return err;
+}
+
/*
* Mask the features and extended features returned by CPUID. Parameters are
* set from the boot line via two methods:
@@ -330,6 +371,24 @@ static void __devinit init_amd(struct cp
3DNow is IDd by bit 31 in extended CPUID (1*32+31) anyway */
clear_bit(0*32+31, c->x86_capability);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ if (c->x86 == 0xf && c->x86_model < 0x14
+ && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_LAHF_LM)) {
+ /*
+ * Some BIOSes incorrectly force this feature, but only K8
+ * revision D (model = 0x14) and later actually support it.
+ * (AMD Erratum #110, docId: 25759).
+ */
+ unsigned int lo, hi;
+
+ clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_LAHF_LM, c->x86_capability);
+ if (!rdmsr_amd_safe(0xc001100d, &lo, &hi)) {
+ hi &= ~1;
+ wrmsr_amd_safe(0xc001100d, lo, hi);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
r = get_model_name(c);
switch(c->x86)

12
22235-lxml-validator.patch
View File

@ -16,10 +16,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Stephan Peijnik <spe@anexia.at>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
committer: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/README
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/README
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/README
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/README
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/README
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/README
@@ -137,12 +137,15 @@ Python Runtime Libraries
Xend (the Xen daemon) has the following runtime dependencies:
@ -50,10 +50,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/README
Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology Support
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/xenapi_create.py
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/xenapi_create.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/xenapi_create.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/xenapi_create.py
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/xenapi_create.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/xenapi_create.py
@@ -14,13 +14,15 @@
# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
#============================================================================

71
22280-kexec.patch
View File

@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1287922506 -3600
# Node ID d6e3cd10a9a6ab16d0cc772ee70b2ae99e8fac31
# Parent 2208a036f8d9d932de8ab0aa0206f5c57dba8728
x86/kexec: fix very old regression and make compatible with modern Linux
References: bnc#619122
c/s 13829 lost the (32-bit only) cpu_has_pae argument passed to the
primary kernel's stub (in the 32-bit Xen case only), and Linux
2.6.27/.30 (32-/64-bit) introduced a new argument (for KEXEC_JUMP)
which for now simply gets passed a hardcoded value.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/machine_kexec.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/machine_kexec.c
@@ -23,7 +23,11 @@
typedef void (*relocate_new_kernel_t)(
unsigned long indirection_page,
unsigned long *page_list,
- unsigned long start_address);
+ unsigned long start_address,
+#ifdef __i386__
+ unsigned int cpu_has_pae,
+#endif
+ unsigned int preserve_context);
extern int machine_kexec_get_xen(xen_kexec_range_t *range);
@@ -121,7 +125,11 @@ void machine_kexec(xen_kexec_image_t *im
rnk = (relocate_new_kernel_t) image->page_list[1];
(*rnk)(image->indirection_page, image->page_list,
- image->start_address);
+ image->start_address,
+#ifdef __i386__
+ 1 /* cpu_has_pae */,
+#endif
+ 0 /* preserve_context */);
}
}
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat_kexec.S
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat_kexec.S
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ compatibility_mode:
movl %eax, %ss
/* Push arguments onto stack. */
+ pushl $0 /* 20(%esp) - preserve context */
pushl $1 /* 16(%esp) - cpu has pae */
pushl %ecx /* 12(%esp) - start address */
pushl %edx /* 8(%esp) - page list */
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
@@ -138,7 +138,6 @@
#define cpu_has_de boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DE)
#define cpu_has_pse boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PSE)
#define cpu_has_tsc boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC)
-#define cpu_has_pae boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PAE)
#define cpu_has_pge boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PGE)
#define cpu_has_pat boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PAT)
#define cpu_has_apic boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_APIC)
@@ -164,7 +163,6 @@
#define cpu_has_de 1
#define cpu_has_pse 1
#define cpu_has_tsc 1
-#define cpu_has_pae 1
#define cpu_has_pge 1
#define cpu_has_pat 1
#define cpu_has_apic boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_APIC)

12
22326-cpu-pools-numa-placement.patch
View File

@ -12,10 +12,10 @@ numa placement should be handled by cpupool configuration instead.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <juergen.gross@ts.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCPUPool.py
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCPUPool.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCPUPool.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCPUPool.py
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCPUPool.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCPUPool.py
@@ -881,6 +881,11 @@ class XendCPUPool(XendBase):
lookup_pool = classmethod(lookup_pool)
@ -28,10 +28,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCPUPool.py
def _cpu_number_to_ref(cls, number):
node = XendNode.instance()
for cpu_ref in node.get_host_cpu_refs():
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
@@ -2790,7 +2790,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
return map(lambda x: x[0], sorted(enumerate(nodeload), key=lambda x:x[1]))

269
22223-vtd-workarounds.patch → 22332-vtd-workarounds.patch
View File

@ -1,19 +1,3 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1286028261 -3600
# Node ID 4beee577912215c734b79cb84bfe3fb20c1afbfc
# Parent aed9fd361340158daf2d7160d1b367478b6312d6
Vt-d: fix dom0 graphics problem on Levnovo T410.
References: bnc#643477
The patch is derived from a similar quirk in Linux kernel by David
Woodhouse and Adam Jackson. It checks for VT enabling bit in IGD GGC
register. If VT is not enabled correctly in the IGD, Xen does not
enable VT-d translation for IGD VT-d engine. In case where iommu boot
parameter is set to force, Xen calls panic().
Signed-off-by: Allen Kay <allen.m.kay@intel.com>
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1288344554 -3600
@ -41,43 +25,52 @@ enhancement.
Signed-off-by: Allen Kay <allen.m.kay@intel.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/Makefile
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/Makefile
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/Makefile
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1294221021 0
# Node ID e635e6641c07ee2da66b16f46f45442c9a46821d
# Parent 76d897a06b316bf2278220b006d578faf31ce3fb
[VTD] added WLAN device ID on Fujitsu's platform in quirks.c
Added WLAN device ID 0x422C that was found on Fujitsu's Calpella
system to WLAN quirk.
Signed-off-by: Allen Kay <allen.m.kay@intel.com>
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/Makefile
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/Makefile
@@ -6,3 +6,4 @@ obj-y += dmar.o
obj-y += utils.o
obj-y += qinval.o
obj-y += intremap.o
+obj-y += quirks.o
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ LIST_HEAD(acpi_rmrr_units);
LIST_HEAD(acpi_atsr_units);
LIST_HEAD(acpi_rhsa_units);
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ struct acpi_rhsa_unit * drhd_to_rhsa(str
+static u64 igd_drhd_address;
u8 dmar_host_address_width;
void dmar_scope_add_buses(struct dmar_scope *scope, u16 sec_bus, u16 sub_bus)
@@ -239,6 +240,11 @@ struct acpi_rhsa_unit * drhd_to_rhsa(str
return NULL;
int is_igd_drhd(struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd)
{
- return ( drhd->address == igd_drhd_address ? 1 : 0);
+ return drhd && (drhd->address == igd_drhd_address);
}
+int is_igd_drhd(struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd)
+{
+ return drhd && (drhd->address == igd_drhd_address);
+}
+
/*
* Count number of devices in device scope. Do not include PCI sub
* hierarchies.
@@ -333,6 +339,15 @@ static int __init acpi_parse_dev_scope(v
@@ -278,8 +278,7 @@ static int scope_device_count(void *star
static int __init acpi_parse_dev_scope(void *start, void *end,
- void *acpi_entry, int type,
- int *igd)
+ void *acpi_entry, int type)
{
struct dmar_scope *scope = acpi_entry;
struct acpi_ioapic_unit *acpi_ioapic_unit;
@@ -340,8 +339,15 @@ static int __init acpi_parse_dev_scope(v
if ( iommu_verbose )
dprintk(VTDPREFIX, " endpoint: %x:%x.%x\n",
bus, path->dev, path->fn);
- if ( (bus == 0) && (path->dev == 2) && (path->fn == 0) )
- *igd = 1;
+
+ if ( type == DMAR_TYPE )
+ {
@ -90,21 +83,65 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
break;
case ACPI_DEV_IOAPIC:
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.h
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.h
@@ -114,5 +114,6 @@ void *map_to_nocache_virt(int nr_iommus,
int vtd_hw_check(void);
void disable_pmr(struct iommu *iommu);
int is_usb_device(u8 bus, u8 devfn);
+int is_igd_drhd(struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd);
@@ -388,7 +394,7 @@ acpi_parse_one_drhd(struct acpi_dmar_ent
struct acpi_table_drhd * drhd = (struct acpi_table_drhd *)header;
void *dev_scope_start, *dev_scope_end;
struct acpi_drhd_unit *dmaru;
- int ret, igd = 0;
+ int ret;
static int include_all = 0;
#endif /* _DMAR_H_ */
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
if ( (ret = acpi_dmar_check_length(header, sizeof(*drhd))) != 0 )
@@ -413,10 +419,7 @@ acpi_parse_one_drhd(struct acpi_dmar_ent
dev_scope_start = (void *)(drhd + 1);
dev_scope_end = ((void *)drhd) + header->length;
ret = acpi_parse_dev_scope(dev_scope_start, dev_scope_end,
- dmaru, DMAR_TYPE, &igd);
-
- if ( igd )
- igd_drhd_address = dmaru->address;
+ dmaru, DMAR_TYPE);
if ( dmaru->include_all )
{
@@ -504,7 +507,7 @@ acpi_parse_one_rmrr(struct acpi_dmar_ent
struct acpi_rmrr_unit *rmrru;
void *dev_scope_start, *dev_scope_end;
u64 base_addr = rmrr->base_address, end_addr = rmrr->end_address;
- int ret, igd = 0;
+ int ret;
if ( (ret = acpi_dmar_check_length(header, sizeof(*rmrr))) != 0 )
return ret;
@@ -536,7 +539,7 @@ acpi_parse_one_rmrr(struct acpi_dmar_ent
dev_scope_start = (void *)(rmrr + 1);
dev_scope_end = ((void *)rmrr) + header->length;
ret = acpi_parse_dev_scope(dev_scope_start, dev_scope_end,
- rmrru, RMRR_TYPE, &igd);
+ rmrru, RMRR_TYPE);
if ( ret || (rmrru->scope.devices_cnt == 0) )
xfree(rmrru);
@@ -601,7 +604,7 @@ acpi_parse_one_atsr(struct acpi_dmar_ent
{
struct acpi_table_atsr *atsr = (struct acpi_table_atsr *)header;
struct acpi_atsr_unit *atsru;
- int ret, igd = 0;
+ int ret;
static int all_ports;
void *dev_scope_start, *dev_scope_end;
@@ -622,7 +625,7 @@ acpi_parse_one_atsr(struct acpi_dmar_ent
dev_scope_start = (void *)(atsr + 1);
dev_scope_end = ((void *)atsr) + header->length;
ret = acpi_parse_dev_scope(dev_scope_start, dev_scope_end,
- atsru, ATSR_TYPE, &igd);
+ atsru, ATSR_TYPE);
}
else
{
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
extern int qinval_enabled;
@ -170,10 +207,8 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
+void me_wifi_quirk(struct domain *domain, u8 bus, u8 devfn, int map);
#endif // _VTD_EXTERN_H_
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@
#endif
@ -247,35 +282,43 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
}
static void iommu_flush_all(void)
@@ -688,10 +716,26 @@ static int iommu_set_root_entry(struct i
@@ -688,24 +716,13 @@ static int iommu_set_root_entry(struct i
return 0;
}
-static void iommu_enable_translation(struct iommu *iommu)
+static void iommu_enable_translation(struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd)
-#define GGC 0x52
-#define GGC_MEMORY_VT_ENABLED (0x8 << 8)
-static int is_igd_vt_enabled(void)
-{
- unsigned short ggc;
-
- /* integrated graphics on Intel platforms is located at 0:2.0 */
- ggc = pci_conf_read16(0, 2, 0, GGC);
- return ( ggc & GGC_MEMORY_VT_ENABLED ? 1 : 0 );
-}
-
static void iommu_enable_translation(struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd)
{
u32 sts;
unsigned long flags;
+ struct iommu *iommu = drhd->iommu;
+
struct iommu *iommu = drhd->iommu;
- if ( !is_igd_vt_enabled() && is_igd_drhd(drhd) )
+ if ( is_igd_drhd(drhd) && !is_igd_vt_enabled_quirk() )
+ {
+ if ( force_iommu )
+ panic("BIOS did not enable IGD for VT properly, crash Xen for security purpose!\n");
+ else
+ {
+ dprintk(XENLOG_WARNING VTDPREFIX,
+ "BIOS did not enable IGD for VT properly. Disabling IGD VT-d engine.\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
{
if ( force_iommu )
panic("BIOS did not enable IGD for VT properly, crash Xen for security purpose!\n");
@@ -717,6 +734,9 @@ static void iommu_enable_translation(str
}
}
+ /* apply platform specific errata workarounds */
+ vtd_ops_preamble_quirk(iommu);
+
if ( iommu_verbose )
dprintk(VTDPREFIX,
@@ -705,6 +749,9 @@ static void iommu_enable_translation(str
"iommu_enable_translation: iommu->reg = %p\n", iommu->reg);
@@ -729,6 +749,9 @@ static void iommu_enable_translation(str
(sts & DMA_GSTS_TES), sts);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&iommu->register_lock, flags);
@ -285,7 +328,7 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
/* Disable PMRs when VT-d engine takes effect per spec definition */
disable_pmr(iommu);
}
@@ -714,6 +761,9 @@ static void iommu_disable_translation(st
@@ -738,6 +761,9 @@ static void iommu_disable_translation(st
u32 sts;
unsigned long flags;
@ -295,7 +338,7 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
spin_lock_irqsave(&iommu->register_lock, flags);
sts = dmar_readl(iommu->reg, DMAR_GSTS_REG);
dmar_writel(iommu->reg, DMAR_GCMD_REG, sts & (~DMA_GCMD_TE));
@@ -722,6 +772,9 @@ static void iommu_disable_translation(st
@@ -746,6 +772,9 @@ static void iommu_disable_translation(st
IOMMU_WAIT_OP(iommu, DMAR_GSTS_REG, dmar_readl,
!(sts & DMA_GSTS_TES), sts);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&iommu->register_lock, flags);
@ -305,7 +348,7 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
}
enum faulttype {
@@ -1065,6 +1118,7 @@ int __init iommu_alloc(struct acpi_drhd_
@@ -1089,6 +1118,7 @@ int __init iommu_alloc(struct acpi_drhd_
xfree(iommu);
return -ENOMEM;
}
@ -313,21 +356,7 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
iommu->reg = map_to_nocache_virt(nr_iommus, drhd->address);
iommu->index = nr_iommus++;
@@ -1178,7 +1232,6 @@ static int intel_iommu_domain_init(struc
static void intel_iommu_dom0_init(struct domain *d)
{
- struct iommu *iommu;
struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd;
if ( !iommu_passthrough && !need_iommu(d) )
@@ -1194,12 +1247,11 @@ static void intel_iommu_dom0_init(struct
for_each_drhd_unit ( drhd )
{
- iommu = drhd->iommu;
- iommu_enable_translation(iommu);
+ iommu_enable_translation(drhd);
@@ -1221,7 +1251,7 @@ static void intel_iommu_dom0_init(struct
}
}
@ -336,7 +365,7 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
struct domain *domain,
struct iommu *iommu,
u8 bus, u8 devfn)
@@ -1301,6 +1353,8 @@ static int domain_context_mapping_one(
@@ -1324,6 +1354,8 @@ static int domain_context_mapping_one(
unmap_vtd_domain_page(context_entries);
@ -345,7 +374,7 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
return 0;
}
@@ -1382,7 +1436,7 @@ static int domain_context_mapping(struct
@@ -1398,7 +1430,7 @@ static int domain_context_mapping(struct
return ret;
}
@ -354,7 +383,7 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
struct domain *domain,
struct iommu *iommu,
u8 bus, u8 devfn)
@@ -1430,6 +1484,8 @@ static int domain_context_unmap_one(
@@ -1446,6 +1478,8 @@ static int domain_context_unmap_one(
spin_unlock(&iommu->lock);
unmap_vtd_domain_page(context_entries);
@ -363,7 +392,7 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
return 0;
}
@@ -1928,19 +1984,6 @@ static void setup_dom0_rmrr(struct domai
@@ -1945,19 +1979,6 @@ static void setup_dom0_rmrr(struct domai
spin_unlock(&pcidevs_lock);
}
@ -383,7 +412,7 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
int intel_vtd_setup(void)
{
struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd;
@@ -1949,7 +1992,7 @@ int intel_vtd_setup(void)
@@ -1966,7 +1987,7 @@ int intel_vtd_setup(void)
if ( list_empty(&acpi_drhd_units) )
return -ENODEV;
@ -392,19 +421,8 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
irq_to_iommu = xmalloc_array(struct iommu*, nr_irqs);
BUG_ON(!irq_to_iommu);
@@ -2164,7 +2207,7 @@ static void vtd_resume(void)
(u32) iommu_state[i][DMAR_FEUADDR_REG]);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&iommu->register_lock, flags);
- iommu_enable_translation(iommu);
+ iommu_enable_translation(drhd);
}
}
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.h
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.h
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.h
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.h
@@ -501,6 +501,7 @@ struct intel_iommu {
struct qi_ctrl qi_ctrl;
struct ir_ctrl ir_ctrl;
@ -413,11 +431,9 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.h
};
#endif
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2010, Intel Corporation.
+ *
@ -672,6 +688,7 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
+ case 0x00858086:
+ case 0x42388086:
+ case 0x422b8086:
+ case 0x422c8086:
+ map_me_phantom_function(domain, 22, map);
+ break;
+ default:
@ -680,10 +697,8 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
+
+ }
+}
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/vtd.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/vtd.h
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/vtd.h
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/vtd.h
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/vtd.h
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
#include <xen/iommu.h>
@ -713,10 +728,8 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/vtd.h
-void iommu_free(struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd);
-
#endif // _VTD_H_
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/vtd.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/vtd.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/vtd.c
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/vtd.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/vtd.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include "../iommu.h"
#include "../dmar.h"
@ -725,10 +738,8 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/vtd.c
/*
* iommu_inclusive_mapping: when set, all memory below 4GB is included in dom0
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/fixmap.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/fixmap.h
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/fixmap.h
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/fixmap.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/fixmap.h
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ enum fixed_addresses {
FIX_MSIX_IO_RESERV_BASE,
FIX_MSIX_IO_RESERV_END = FIX_MSIX_IO_RESERV_BASE + FIX_MSIX_MAX_PAGES -1,

22
22337-vtd-scan-single-func.patch
View File

@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1288371977 -3600
# Node ID 7afd8dd1d6cb97484d263311f3f0e6ab74d27ed3
# Parent 49803ac994f4094719ec2c3b67d82561a24ba293
VT-d: only scan secondary functions on multi-function devices
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
@@ -442,6 +442,10 @@ int __init scan_pci_devices(void)
spin_unlock(&pcidevs_lock);
return -EINVAL;
}
+
+ if ( !func && !(pci_conf_read8(bus, dev, func,
+ PCI_HEADER_TYPE) & 0x80) )
+ break;
}
}
}

52
22348-vtd-check-secbus-devfn.patch
View File

@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1288772331 0
# Node ID 2dfba250c50bafac4e333d84450324daedf5ae2c
# Parent 16093532f384eee02518520662a38ad16915b063
VT-d: fix device assignment failure (regression from Xen c/s 19805:2f1fa2215e60)
References: bnc#647681
If the device at <secbus>:00.0 is the device the mapping operation was
initiated for, trying to map it a second time will fail, and hence
this second mapping attempt must be prevented (as was done prior to
said c/s).
While at it, simplify the code a little, too.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Acked-by: Weidong Han <weidong.han@intel.com>
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -1402,23 +1402,16 @@ static int domain_context_mapping(struct
if ( find_upstream_bridge(&bus, &devfn, &secbus) < 1 )
break;
- /* PCIe to PCI/PCIx bridge */
- if ( pdev_type(bus, devfn) == DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE )
- {
- ret = domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, bus, devfn);
- if ( ret )
- return ret;
+ ret = domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, bus, devfn);
- /*
- * Devices behind PCIe-to-PCI/PCIx bridge may generate
- * different requester-id. It may originate from devfn=0
- * on the secondary bus behind the bridge. Map that id
- * as well.
- */
+ /*
+ * Devices behind PCIe-to-PCI/PCIx bridge may generate different
+ * requester-id. It may originate from devfn=0 on the secondary bus
+ * behind the bridge. Map that id as well if we didn't already.
+ */
+ if ( !ret && pdev_type(bus, devfn) == DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE &&
+ (secbus != pdev->bus || pdev->devfn != 0) )
ret = domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, secbus, 0);
- }
- else /* Legacy PCI bridge */
- ret = domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, bus, devfn);
break;

9
22369-xend-pci-passthru-fix.patch
View File

@ -38,10 +38,11 @@ I've done the same here.
Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@novell.com>
diff -r 28a160746815 -r 461b9d3a643a tools/python/xen/util/pci.py
--- a/tools/python/xen/util/pci.py Wed Oct 27 12:24:28 2010 +0100
+++ b/tools/python/xen/util/pci.py Thu Oct 28 15:27:09 2010 -0600
@@ -240,10 +240,16 @@
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/util/pci.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/util/pci.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/util/pci.py
@@ -240,10 +240,16 @@ def pci_convert_sxp_to_dict(dev_sxp):
pci_dev_info = dict(pci_dev[1:])
if 'opts' in pci_dev_info:
pci_dev_info['opts'] = pci_opts_list_from_sxp(pci_dev)

8
22388-x2apic-panic.patch
View File

@ -16,9 +16,11 @@ depends on VT-d Interrupt remapping).
Signed-off-by: Weidong Han <weidong.han@intel.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
@@ -1000,22 +1000,11 @@ static void enable_bsp_x2apic(void)
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
@@ -1001,22 +1001,11 @@ static void enable_bsp_x2apic(void)
}
else
{

33
22389-amd-iommu-decls.patch
View File

@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1289906913 0
# Node ID 9b2ca938cfe6c0639471e24634bc4a48d889b412
# Parent 87f248de52304bc96a80dc093250fed0197f37e0
amd iommu: Fix HV crash with 32bit pv_ops kernel
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.wang2@amd.com>
Tested-by: Conny Seidel <conny.seidel@amd.com>
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/svm/amd-iommu-proto.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/svm/amd-iommu-proto.h
@@ -32,9 +32,6 @@
#define DMA_32BIT_MASK 0x00000000ffffffffULL
#define PAGE_ALIGN(addr) (((addr) + PAGE_SIZE - 1) & PAGE_MASK)
-extern int amd_iommu_debug;
-extern int amd_iommu_perdev_intremap;
-
#define AMD_IOMMU_DEBUG(fmt, args...) \
do \
{ \
--- a/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ extern bool_t iommu_enabled;
extern bool_t force_iommu, iommu_verbose;
extern bool_t iommu_workaround_bios_bug, iommu_passthrough;
extern bool_t iommu_snoop, iommu_qinval, iommu_intremap;
+extern bool_t amd_iommu_debug;
+extern bool_t amd_iommu_perdev_intremap;
#define domain_hvm_iommu(d) (&d->arch.hvm_domain.hvm_iommu)

21
22408-vpmu-nehalem.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
References: bnc#655438
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1290173202 0
# Node ID b7ed352fa6100104374000cdbd845bbfc6478f08
# Parent 437576a0f2026ded6dcc4b11558714dad1d1d042
VPMU: Add the Intel CPU X7542 to the list of supported prcocessors
Signed-off-by: Dietmar Hahn <dietmar.hahn@ts.fujitsu.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vpmu.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vpmu.c
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ void vpmu_initialise(struct vcpu *v)
case 23:
case 26:
case 29:
+ case 46:
vpmu->arch_vpmu_ops = &core2_vpmu_ops;
break;
}

21
22416-acpi-check-mwait.patch
View File

@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1290453180 0
# Node ID 0cc4ed1ce1f34ce442ed4da106e555931c895395
# Parent 899131a8f9d2b99acc4bbe18593952d30446e71b
x86: Check for MWAIT in CPUID before using it in ACPI idle code.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
@@ -717,7 +717,8 @@ static void set_cx(
{
case ACPI_ADR_SPACE_FIXED_HARDWARE:
if ( xen_cx->reg.bit_width == VENDOR_INTEL &&
- xen_cx->reg.bit_offset == NATIVE_CSTATE_BEYOND_HALT )
+ xen_cx->reg.bit_offset == NATIVE_CSTATE_BEYOND_HALT &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MWAIT) )
cx->entry_method = ACPI_CSTATE_EM_FFH;
else
cx->entry_method = ACPI_CSTATE_EM_HALT;

123
22417-vpmu-nehalem.patch
View File

@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
References: bnc#655438
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1290453394 0
# Node ID c0c1f5f0745e25af6f8b4a1006637d98a8d63581
# Parent 0cc4ed1ce1f34ce442ed4da106e555931c895395
x86 hvm: Fix VPMU issue on Nehalem cpus
Fix an issue on Nehalem cpus where performance counter overflows may
lead to endless interrupt loops on this cpu.
Signed-off-by: Dietmar Hahn <dietmar.hahn@ts.fujitsu.com>
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1290173202 0
# Node ID b7ed352fa6100104374000cdbd845bbfc6478f08
# Parent 437576a0f2026ded6dcc4b11558714dad1d1d042
VPMU: Add the Intel CPU X7542 to the list of supported prcocessors
Signed-off-by: Dietmar Hahn <dietmar.hahn@ts.fujitsu.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vpmu.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vpmu.c
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ void vpmu_initialise(struct vcpu *v)
case 23:
case 26:
case 29:
+ case 46:
vpmu->arch_vpmu_ops = &core2_vpmu_ops;
break;
}
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vpmu_core2.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vpmu_core2.c
@@ -35,6 +35,68 @@
#include <asm/hvm/vmx/vpmu.h>
#include <asm/hvm/vmx/vpmu_core2.h>
+/*
+ * QUIRK to workaround an issue on Nehalem processors currently seen
+ * on family 6 cpus E5520 (model 26) and X7542 (model 46).
+ * The issue leads to endless PMC interrupt loops on the processor.
+ * If the interrupt handler is running and a pmc reaches the value 0, this
+ * value remains forever and it triggers immediately a new interrupt after
+ * finishing the handler.
+ * A workaround is to read all flagged counters and if the value is 0 write
+ * 1 (or another value != 0) into it.
+ * There exist no errata and the real cause of this behaviour is unknown.
+ */
+bool_t __read_mostly is_pmc_quirk;
+
+static void check_pmc_quirk(void)
+{
+ u8 family = current_cpu_data.x86;
+ u8 cpu_model = current_cpu_data.x86_model;
+ is_pmc_quirk = 0;
+ if ( family == 6 )
+ {
+ if ( cpu_model == 46 || cpu_model == 26 )
+ is_pmc_quirk = 1;
+ }
+}
+
+static int core2_get_pmc_count(void);
+static void handle_pmc_quirk(u64 msr_content)
+{
+ int num_gen_pmc = core2_get_pmc_count();
+ int num_fix_pmc = 3;
+ int i;
+ u64 val;
+
+ if ( !is_pmc_quirk )
+ return;
+
+ val = msr_content;
+ for ( i = 0; i < num_gen_pmc; i++ )
+ {
+ if ( val & 0x1 )
+ {
+ u64 cnt;
+ rdmsrl(MSR_P6_PERFCTR0 + i, cnt);
+ if ( cnt == 0 )
+ wrmsrl(MSR_P6_PERFCTR0 + i, 1);
+ }
+ val >>= 1;
+ }
+ val = msr_content >> 32;
+ for ( i = 0; i < num_fix_pmc; i++ )
+ {
+ if ( val & 0x1 )
+ {
+ u64 cnt;
+ rdmsrl(MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR0 + i, cnt);
+ if ( cnt == 0 )
+ wrmsrl(MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR0 + i, 1);
+ }
+ val >>= 1;
+ }
+}
+
u32 core2_counters_msr[] = {
MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR0,
MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR1,
@@ -497,6 +559,10 @@ static int core2_vpmu_do_interrupt(struc
rdmsrl(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_STATUS, msr_content);
if ( !msr_content )
return 0;
+
+ if ( is_pmc_quirk )
+ handle_pmc_quirk(msr_content);
+
core2_vpmu_cxt->global_ovf_status |= msr_content;
msr_content = 0xC000000700000000 | ((1 << core2_get_pmc_count()) - 1);
wrmsrl(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL, msr_content);
@@ -518,6 +584,7 @@ static int core2_vpmu_do_interrupt(struc
static void core2_vpmu_initialise(struct vcpu *v)
{
+ check_pmc_quirk();
}
static void core2_vpmu_destroy(struct vcpu *v)

6
22431-p2m-remove-bug-check.patch
View File

@ -9,8 +9,10 @@ and is explicitly _not_ seeing the MFN that's known to be owned.
Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <Tim.Deegan@citrix.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -2186,9 +2186,6 @@ guest_physmap_add_entry(struct domain *d
P2M_DEBUG("aliased! mfn=%#lx, old gfn=%#lx, new gfn=%#lx\n",
mfn + i, ogfn, gfn + i);

57
22448-x86_64-gdt-ldt-fault-filter.patch
View File

@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1291041272 0
# Node ID 5cd9612db2bba51f63ff7897aca4c72cc4b8e8c2
# Parent aba70e59a90dcb0cacc2c6834a6ce19d03d88601
x86-64: don't crash Xen upon direct pv guest access to GDT/LDT mapping area
handle_gdt_ldt_mapping_fault() is intended to deal with indirect
accesses (i.e. those caused by descriptor loads) to the GDT/LDT
mapping area only. While for 32-bit segment limits indeed prevent the
function being entered for direct accesses (i.e. a #GP fault will be
raised even before the address translation gets done, on 64-bit even
user mode accesses would lead to control reaching the BUG_ON() at the
beginning of that function.
Fortunately the fix is simple: Since the guest kernel runs in ring 3,
any guest direct access will have the "user mode" bit set, whereas
descriptor loads always do the translations to access the actual
descriptors as kernel mode ones.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Further, relax the BUG_ON() in handle_gdt_ldt_mapping_fault() to a
check-and-bail. This avoids any problems in future, if we don't
execute x86_64 guest kernels in ring 3 (e.g., because we use a
lightweight HVM container).
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -1051,8 +1051,14 @@ static int handle_gdt_ldt_mapping_fault(
unsigned int is_ldt_area = (offset >> (GDT_LDT_VCPU_VA_SHIFT-1)) & 1;
unsigned int vcpu_area = (offset >> GDT_LDT_VCPU_VA_SHIFT);
- /* Should never fault in another vcpu's area. */
- BUG_ON(vcpu_area != curr->vcpu_id);
+ /*
+ * If the fault is in another vcpu's area, it cannot be due to
+ * a GDT/LDT descriptor load. Thus we can reasonably exit immediately, and
+ * indeed we have to since map_ldt_shadow_page() works correctly only on
+ * accesses to a vcpu's own area.
+ */
+ if ( vcpu_area != curr->vcpu_id )
+ return 0;
/* Byte offset within the gdt/ldt sub-area. */
offset &= (1UL << (GDT_LDT_VCPU_VA_SHIFT-1)) - 1UL;
@@ -1223,7 +1229,7 @@ static int fixup_page_fault(unsigned lon
if ( unlikely(IN_HYPERVISOR_RANGE(addr)) )
{
- if ( !(regs->error_code & PFEC_reserved_bit) &&
+ if ( !(regs->error_code & (PFEC_user_mode | PFEC_reserved_bit)) &&
(addr >= GDT_LDT_VIRT_START) && (addr < GDT_LDT_VIRT_END) )
return handle_gdt_ldt_mapping_fault(
addr - GDT_LDT_VIRT_START, regs);

43
22451-hvm-cap-clobber.patch
View File

@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1291116848 0
# Node ID 8420b82c22c2cad54860ffdbe8bcec21c65c86be
# Parent d281061e6ec06bbbf8e2b0fadbeb9d1a04bc32e2
x86 hvm: Do not overwrite boot-cpu capability data on VMX/SVM startup.
Apparently required back in the earliest days of Xen, we now properly
initialise CPU capabilities early during bootstrap. Re-writing
capability data later now causes problems if specific features have
been deliberately masked out.
Thanks to Weidong Han at Intel for finding such a bug where XSAVE
feature is masked out by default, but then erroneously written back
during VMX initialisation. This would cause memory corruption problems
during boot for XSAVE-capable systems.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -915,9 +915,6 @@ void start_svm(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
return;
}
- /* Xen does not fill x86_capability words except 0. */
- boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[5] = cpuid_ecx(0x80000001);
-
if ( !test_bit(X86_FEATURE_SVME, &boot_cpu_data.x86_capability) )
return;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1433,9 +1433,6 @@ void start_vmx(void)
return;
}
- /* Xen does not fill x86_capability words except 0. */
- boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[4] = cpuid_ecx(1);
-
if ( !test_bit(X86_FEATURE_VMXE, &boot_cpu_data.x86_capability) )
return;

62
22452-x86-irq-migrate-directed-eoi.patch
View File

@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1291234227 0
# Node ID 62bf12040b0f4d802dc7e1cd61294776c8a41a89
# Parent 8420b82c22c2cad54860ffdbe8bcec21c65c86be
x86: fix IRQ migration when using directed EOI (broken with c/s 20465)
In directed-EOI mode, there is no chance to do the migration in
mask_and_ack_level_ioapic_irq(), as the remote IRR bit can't possibly
be clear after issuing the EOI to the LAPIC. Consequently, there's no
point to even try. Instead, migration must be done in
end_level_ioapic_irq(), and it requires masking the interrupt source
prior to issuing the EOI to the IO-APIC.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
@@ -1642,11 +1642,14 @@ static void mask_and_ack_level_ioapic_ir
ack_APIC_irq();
+ if ( directed_eoi_enabled )
+ return;
+
if ((irq_desc[irq].status & IRQ_MOVE_PENDING) &&
!io_apic_level_ack_pending(irq))
- move_native_irq(irq);
+ move_masked_irq(irq);
- if (!directed_eoi_enabled && !(v & (1 << (i & 0x1f)))) {
+ if ( !(v & (1 << (i & 0x1f))) ) {
atomic_inc(&irq_mis_count);
spin_lock(&ioapic_lock);
__edge_IO_APIC_irq(irq);
@@ -1662,12 +1665,22 @@ static void end_level_ioapic_irq (unsign
if ( !ioapic_ack_new )
{
- if ( irq_desc[irq].status & IRQ_DISABLED )
- return;
-
if ( directed_eoi_enabled )
+ {
+ if ( !(irq_desc[irq].status & (IRQ_DISABLED|IRQ_MOVE_PENDING)) )
+ {
+ eoi_IO_APIC_irq(irq);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mask_IO_APIC_irq(irq);
eoi_IO_APIC_irq(irq);
- else
+ if ( (irq_desc[irq].status & IRQ_MOVE_PENDING) &&
+ !io_apic_level_ack_pending(irq) )
+ move_masked_irq(irq);
+ }
+
+ if ( !(irq_desc[irq].status & IRQ_DISABLED) )
unmask_IO_APIC_irq(irq);
return;

36
22466-x86-sis-apic-bug.patch
View File

@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1291746724 0
# Node ID bfd13358b8bf3a6ca49702d773435a67f1ea5551
# Parent d4b35162b3a11f7d9c28501192b7e231609e561d
x86: remove BUG_ON() from QUIRK_IOAPIC_*_REGSEL handler
References: bnc#657692
Since (non-pvops, 32-bit only up to 2.6.27) Linux would report "BAD"
unconditionally on all SiS chipset versions (it only looks for a PCI
device at 0000:00:00.0 with SiS as the vendor), we must not crash if
the report on a 64-bit hypervisor doesn't match the #define (which is
zero).
While we could honor the quirk indication even on 64-bit, it doesn't
seem worthwhile, as there's no evidence that newer SiS chipsets
(supporting 64-bit CPUs) are actually affected.
This should also address bug 1687 (mis-reported, however, afaict).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/platform_hypercall.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/platform_hypercall.c
@@ -192,7 +192,10 @@ ret_t do_platform_op(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xe
dprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "Domain 0 says that IO-APIC REGSEL is %s\n",
sis_apic_bug ? "bad" : "good");
#else
- BUG_ON(sis_apic_bug != (quirk_id == QUIRK_IOAPIC_BAD_REGSEL));
+ if ( sis_apic_bug != (quirk_id == QUIRK_IOAPIC_BAD_REGSEL) )
+ dprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
+ "Domain 0 thinks that IO-APIC REGSEL is %s\n",
+ sis_apic_bug ? "good" : "bad");
#endif
break;
default:

28
22470-vlapic-tick-loss.patch
View File

@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1291883699 0
# Node ID 0c97247c64d61511acff37d1903cb304b387f397
# Parent 84a72f957fe9e1a5af3dfb8f53334faa555e22f8
x86:vlapic: Fix possible guest tick losing after save/restore
Guest vcpu may totally lose all ticks if the vlapic->pt.irq was not
restored during save/restore process. Fix it.
Signed-off-by: Wei Gang <gang.wei@intel.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
@@ -863,12 +863,12 @@ static void lapic_rearm(struct vlapic *s
unsigned long tmict = vlapic_get_reg(s, APIC_TMICT);
uint64_t period;
+ s->pt.irq = vlapic_get_reg(s, APIC_LVTT) & APIC_VECTOR_MASK;
if ( (tmict = vlapic_get_reg(s, APIC_TMICT)) == 0 )
return;
period = ((uint64_t)APIC_BUS_CYCLE_NS *
(uint32_t)tmict * s->hw.timer_divisor);
- s->pt.irq = vlapic_get_reg(s, APIC_LVTT) & APIC_VECTOR_MASK;
create_periodic_time(vlapic_vcpu(s), &s->pt, period,
vlapic_lvtt_period(s) ? period : 0,
s->pt.irq, vlapic_pt_cb,

62
22475-x2apic-cleanup.patch
View File

@ -8,9 +8,11 @@ References: bnc#656369, bnc#658704
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
@@ -67,12 +67,12 @@ static int enable_local_apic __initdata
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
@@ -67,12 +67,12 @@ static int enable_local_apic __initdata
*/
int apic_verbosity;
@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
/*
* The following vectors are part of the Linux architecture, there
* is no hardware IRQ pin equivalent for them, they are triggered
@@ -944,30 +944,24 @@ no_apic:
@@ -945,30 +945,24 @@ no_apic:
return -1;
}
@ -68,7 +70,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
{
/*
* Interrupt remapping should be also enabled by BIOS when
@@ -977,39 +971,33 @@ static void enable_bsp_x2apic(void)
@@ -978,39 +972,33 @@ static void enable_bsp_x2apic(void)
if ( !intremap_enabled() )
panic("Interrupt remapping is not enabled by BIOS while "
"x2APIC is already enabled by BIOS!\n");
@ -125,7 +127,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
{
printk("Allocate ioapic_entries failed\n");
goto out;
@@ -1031,13 +1019,13 @@ static void enable_bsp_x2apic(void)
@@ -1032,13 +1020,13 @@ static void enable_bsp_x2apic(void)
goto restore_out;
}
@ -142,7 +144,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
}
restore_out:
@@ -1049,24 +1037,6 @@ out:
@@ -1050,24 +1038,6 @@ out:
free_ioapic_entries(ioapic_entries);
}
@ -167,8 +169,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
void __init init_apic_mappings(void)
{
unsigned long apic_phys;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
@@ -250,8 +250,8 @@ static void __init early_cpu_detect(void
c->x86 = 4;
@ -194,8 +198,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
}
}
--- a/xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c
@@ -23,89 +23,44 @@
#include <xen/smp.h>
#include <asm/mach-default/mach_mpparse.h>
@ -305,7 +311,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
{
unsigned int cpu, cfg;
unsigned long flags;
@@ -148,3 +103,34 @@ void send_IPI_mask_x2apic_cluster(const
@@ -148,3 +103,34 @@ void send_IPI_mask_x2apic_cluster(const
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
@ -340,8 +346,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
+{
+ return x2apic_phys ? &apic_x2apic_phys : &apic_x2apic_cluster;
+}
--- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
@@ -1006,9 +1006,6 @@ void __init __start_xen(unsigned long mb
tboot_probe();
@ -362,8 +370,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
percpu_free_unused_areas();
--- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
@@ -325,8 +325,7 @@ void __devinit smp_callin(void)
*/
wait_for_init_deassert(&init_deasserted);
@ -374,8 +384,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
/*
* (This works even if the APIC is not enabled.)
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
@@ -129,15 +129,10 @@ int iommu_supports_eim(void)
struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd;
int apic;
@ -394,8 +406,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
/* We MUST have a DRHD unit for each IOAPIC. */
for ( apic = 0; apic < nr_ioapics; apic++ )
if ( !ioapic_to_drhd(IO_APIC_ID(apic)) )
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/apic.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/apic.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/apic.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/apic.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/apic.h
@@ -25,21 +25,8 @@ extern int apic_verbosity;
extern int x2apic_enabled;
extern int directed_eoi_enabled;
@ -420,9 +434,11 @@ Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
/*
* Define the default level of output to be very little
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/genapic.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/genapic.h
@@ -49,8 +49,6 @@ struct genapic {
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/genapic.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/genapic.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/genapic.h
@@ -49,8 +49,6 @@ struct genapic {
APICFUNC(acpi_madt_oem_check)
extern const struct genapic *genapic;

6
22484-vlapic-tmcct-periodic.patch
View File

@ -7,8 +7,10 @@ hvm vlapic: Fix tmcct read logic when in periodic mode.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
@@ -428,12 +428,19 @@ int vlapic_ipi(
static uint32_t vlapic_get_tmcct(struct vlapic *vlapic)
{

11
22504-iommu-dom0-holes.patch
View File

@ -19,6 +19,17 @@ sitting beyond the end of RAM.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ static unsigned long __init compute_dom0
unsigned int s;
for ( s = 9; s < BITS_PER_LONG; s += 9 )
- avail -= max_page >> s;
+ avail -= max_pdx >> s;
}
/*
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
@@ -239,8 +239,16 @@ static void amd_iommu_dom0_init(struct d

40
22506-x86-iommu-dom0-estimate.patch
View File

@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1292320450 0
# Node ID 618ba64260faf45e6ec391582099d7388f013e81
# Parent 72326371ae8106b91da0ca6b0436dd2b6478b7a7
x86/iommu: account for necessary allocations when calculating Dom0's initial allocation size
References: bnc#658163
As of c/s 21812:e382656e4dcc, IOMMU related allocations for Dom0
happen only after it got all of its memory allocated, and hence the
reserve (mainly for setting up its swiotlb) may get exhausted without
accounting for the necessary allocations up front.
While not precise, the estimate has been found to be within a couple
of pages for the systems it got tested on.
For the calculation to be reasonably correct, this depends on the
patch titled "x86/iommu: don't map RAM holes above 4G" sent out
yesterday.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
@@ -188,6 +188,15 @@ static unsigned long __init compute_dom0
if ( is_pv_32on64_domain(d) )
avail -= opt_dom0_max_vcpus - 1;
+ /* Reserve memory for iommu_dom0_init() (rough estimate). */
+ if ( iommu_enabled )
+ {
+ unsigned int s;
+
+ for ( s = 9; s < BITS_PER_LONG; s += 9 )
+ avail -= max_pdx >> s;
+ }
+
/*
* If domain 0 allocation isn't specified, reserve 1/16th of available
* memory for things like DMA buffers. This reservation is clamped to

123
22526-ept-access-once.patch
View File

@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1292410025 0
# Node ID 7a5ee380041707177ca9c78e800095d1f5f3d373
# Parent 01f3b350902385627d1fa9e8cd1c231953e7610c
ept: Remove lock in ept_get_entry, replace with access-once semantics.
This mirrors the RVI/shadow situation, where p2m read access is
lockless because it's done in the hardware (linear map of the p2m
table).
This fixes the original bug (call it bug A) without introducing bug B
(a deadlock).
Bug A was caused by a race when updating p2m entries: between testing
if it's valid, and testing if it's populate-on-demand, it may have
been changed from populate-on-demand to valid.
My original patch simply introduced a lock into ept_get_entry, but
that caused bug B, caused by circular locking order: p2m_change_type
[grabs p2m lock] -> set_p2m_entry -> ept_set_entry ->
ept_set_middle_level -> p2m_alloc [grabs hap lock] write cr4 ->
hap_update_paging_modes [grabes hap lock] -> hap_update_cr3 ->
gfn_to_mfn -> ept_get_entry -> [grabs p2m lock]
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/p2m-ept.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/p2m-ept.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static int ept_next_level(struct domain
ept_entry_t **table, unsigned long *gfn_remainder,
u32 shift)
{
- ept_entry_t *ept_entry;
+ ept_entry_t *ept_entry, e;
ept_entry_t *next;
u32 index;
@@ -145,9 +145,11 @@ static int ept_next_level(struct domain
ept_entry = (*table) + index;
- if ( !is_epte_present(ept_entry) )
+ e=*ept_entry;
+
+ if ( !is_epte_present(&e) )
{
- if ( ept_entry->avail1 == p2m_populate_on_demand )
+ if ( e.avail1 == p2m_populate_on_demand )
return GUEST_TABLE_POD_PAGE;
if ( read_only )
@@ -155,15 +157,17 @@ static int ept_next_level(struct domain
if ( !ept_set_middle_entry(d, ept_entry) )
return GUEST_TABLE_MAP_FAILED;
+ else
+ e=*ept_entry;
}
/* The only time sp would be set here is if we had hit a superpage */
- if ( is_epte_superpage(ept_entry) )
+ if ( is_epte_superpage(&e) )
return GUEST_TABLE_SUPER_PAGE;
else
{
*gfn_remainder &= (1UL << shift) - 1;
- next = map_domain_page(ept_entry->mfn);
+ next = map_domain_page(e.mfn);
unmap_domain_page(*table);
*table = next;
return GUEST_TABLE_NORMAL_PAGE;
@@ -235,35 +239,39 @@ ept_set_entry(struct domain *d, unsigned
if ( mfn_valid(mfn_x(mfn)) || direct_mmio || p2m_is_paged(p2mt) ||
(p2mt == p2m_ram_paging_in_start) )
{
- ept_entry->emt = epte_get_entry_emt(d, gfn, mfn, &ipat,
+ ept_entry_t new_entry;
+
+ new_entry.emt = epte_get_entry_emt(d, gfn, mfn, &ipat,
direct_mmio);
- ept_entry->ipat = ipat;
- ept_entry->sp = order ? 1 : 0;
+ new_entry.ipat = ipat;
+ new_entry.sp = order ? 1 : 0;
if ( ret == GUEST_TABLE_SUPER_PAGE )
{
- if ( ept_entry->mfn == (mfn_x(mfn) - offset) )
+ if ( new_entry.mfn == (mfn_x(mfn) - offset) )
need_modify_vtd_table = 0;
else
- ept_entry->mfn = mfn_x(mfn) - offset;
+ new_entry.mfn = mfn_x(mfn) - offset;
- if ( (ept_entry->avail1 == p2m_ram_logdirty)
+ if ( (new_entry.avail1 == p2m_ram_logdirty)
&& (p2mt == p2m_ram_rw) )
for ( i = 0; i < 512; i++ )
paging_mark_dirty(d, mfn_x(mfn) - offset + i);
}
else
{
- if ( ept_entry->mfn == mfn_x(mfn) )
+ if ( new_entry.mfn == mfn_x(mfn) )
need_modify_vtd_table = 0;
else
- ept_entry->mfn = mfn_x(mfn);
+ new_entry.mfn = mfn_x(mfn);
}
- ept_entry->avail1 = p2mt;
- ept_entry->avail2 = 0;
+ new_entry.avail1 = p2mt;
+ new_entry.avail2 = 0;
+
+ ept_p2m_type_to_flags(&new_entry, p2mt);
- ept_p2m_type_to_flags(ept_entry, p2mt);
+ ept_entry->epte = new_entry.epte;
}
else
ept_entry->epte = 0;

49
22526-ept-get-entry-no-lock.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1292410025 0
# Node ID 7a5ee380041707177ca9c78e800095d1f5f3d373
# Parent 01f3b350902385627d1fa9e8cd1c231953e7610c
ept: Remove lock in ept_get_entry, replace with access-once semantics.
This mirrors the RVI/shadow situation, where p2m read access is
lockless because it's done in the hardware (linear map of the p2m
table).
This fixes the original bug (call it bug A) without introducing bug B
(a deadlock).
Bug A was caused by a race when updating p2m entries: between testing
if it's valid, and testing if it's populate-on-demand, it may have
been changed from populate-on-demand to valid.
My original patch simply introduced a lock into ept_get_entry, but
that caused bug B, caused by circular locking order: p2m_change_type
[grabs p2m lock] -> set_p2m_entry -> ept_set_entry ->
ept_set_middle_level -> p2m_alloc [grabs hap lock] write cr4 ->
hap_update_paging_modes [grabes hap lock] -> hap_update_cr3 ->
gfn_to_mfn -> ept_get_entry -> [grabs p2m lock]
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/p2m-ept.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/p2m-ept.c
@@ -395,10 +395,6 @@ static mfn_t ept_get_entry(struct domain
int i;
int ret = 0;
mfn_t mfn = _mfn(INVALID_MFN);
- int do_locking = !p2m_locked_by_me(d->arch.p2m);
-
- if ( do_locking )
- p2m_lock(d->arch.p2m);
*t = p2m_mmio_dm;
@@ -476,8 +472,6 @@ static mfn_t ept_get_entry(struct domain
}
out:
- if ( do_locking )
- p2m_unlock(d->arch.p2m);
unmap_domain_page(table);
return mfn;
}

38
22533-x86-32bit-apicid.patch
View File

@ -21,8 +21,10 @@ systems, but at least allows some build time control).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
@@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ static void set_cx(
int get_cpu_id(u8 acpi_id)
{
@ -32,9 +34,11 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
apic_id = x86_acpiid_to_apicid[acpi_id];
if ( apic_id == 0xff )
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
@@ -99,7 +99,8 @@ static int mpc_record;
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
@@ -99,7 +99,8 @@ static int mpc_record;
static struct mpc_config_translation *translation_table[MAX_MPC_ENTRY] __initdata;
/* Return xen's logical cpu_id of the new added cpu or <0 if error */
@ -105,8 +109,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
}
void mp_unregister_lapic(uint32_t apic_id, uint32_t cpu)
--- a/xen/common/sched_sedf.c
+++ b/xen/common/sched_sedf.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/common/sched_sedf.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/common/sched_sedf.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/common/sched_sedf.c
@@ -124,7 +124,6 @@ struct sedf_cpu_info {
#define PERIOD_BEGIN(inf) ((inf)->deadl_abs - (inf)->period)
@ -115,8 +121,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
#define DIV_UP(x,y) (((x) + (y) - 1) / y)
#define extra_runs(inf) ((inf->status) & 6)
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mach-generic/mach_apic.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mach-generic/mach_apic.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/mach-generic/mach_apic.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/mach-generic/mach_apic.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/mach-generic/mach_apic.h
@@ -26,15 +26,15 @@ static inline void enable_apic_mode(void
extern u32 bios_cpu_apicid[];
@ -136,8 +144,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
}
static inline void setup_portio_remap(void)
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mpspec_def.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mpspec_def.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/mpspec_def.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/mpspec_def.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/mpspec_def.h
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
#define SMP_MAGIC_IDENT (('_'<<24)|('P'<<16)|('M'<<8)|'_')
@ -147,8 +157,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
struct intel_mp_floating
{
--- a/xen/include/xen/kernel.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/kernel.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/xen/kernel.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/kernel.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/xen/kernel.h
@@ -33,6 +33,13 @@
#define max_t(type,x,y) \
({ type __x = (x); type __y = (y); __x > __y ? __x: __y; })

36
22534-x86-max-local-apic.patch
View File

@ -24,8 +24,10 @@ appear to be to make the macros depend on __XEN_INTERFACE_VERSION__.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/boot.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/boot.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/acpi/boot.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/acpi/boot.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/acpi/boot.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ u8 acpi_enable_value, acpi_disable_value
#endif
@ -59,8 +61,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
- return 0xff;
+ return INVALID_ACPIID;
}
--- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ int get_cpu_id(u8 acpi_id)
u32 apic_id;
@ -70,8 +74,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
return -1;
for ( i = 0; i < NR_CPUS; i++ )
--- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ struct cpuinfo_x86 cpu_data[NR_CPUS];
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cpu_data);
@ -99,8 +105,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
mp_unregister_lapic(apic_id, cpu);
spin_unlock(&cpu_add_remove_lock);
return node;
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/acpi.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/acpi.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/acpi.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/acpi.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/acpi.h
@@ -150,9 +150,11 @@ struct acpi_sleep_info {
#endif /* CONFIG_ACPI_SLEEP */
@ -115,8 +123,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
extern u32 pmtmr_ioport;
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/numa.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/numa.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/numa.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/numa.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/numa.h
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ extern int setup_node(int pxm);
extern void srat_detect_node(int cpu);
@ -126,8 +136,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
extern void __init init_cpu_to_node(void);
--- a/xen/include/public/vcpu.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/vcpu.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/public/vcpu.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/public/vcpu.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/public/vcpu.h
@@ -187,8 +187,7 @@ DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(vcpu_register_vc
/*
* Get the physical ID information for a pinned vcpu's underlying physical

24
22535-x2apic-preenabled.patch
View File

@ -15,9 +15,11 @@ intremap_enabled() with its only caller gone.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
@@ -963,15 +963,6 @@ void x2apic_setup(void)
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
@@ -964,15 +964,6 @@ void x2apic_setup(void)
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_APICBASE, lo, hi);
if ( lo & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_EXTD )
{
@ -33,7 +35,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
printk("x2APIC mode is already enabled by BIOS.\n");
x2apic_enabled = 1;
}
@@ -1014,6 +1005,10 @@ void x2apic_setup(void)
@@ -1015,6 +1006,10 @@ void x2apic_setup(void)
if ( iommu_enable_IR() )
{
@ -44,9 +46,11 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
printk("Would not enable x2APIC due to interrupt remapping "
"cannot be enabled.\n");
goto restore_out;
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
@@ -884,23 +884,3 @@ void iommu_disable_IR(void)
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
@@ -892,23 +892,3 @@ void iommu_disable_IR(void)
for_each_drhd_unit ( drhd )
disable_qinval(drhd->iommu);
}
@ -70,8 +74,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
-
- return 1;
-}
--- a/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ int iommu_setup(void);
int iommu_supports_eim(void);
int iommu_enable_IR(void);

101
22538-keyhandler-relax.patch
View File

@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1292414674 0
# Node ID a3a29e67aa7e75a094e1b4237b10a68cf829b542
# Parent 16673224c1cc2ca3bb9730f1d7c84fe4d96e5323
Reduce side effects of handling '*' debug key
References: bnc#659284
NMI watchdog should be suppressed when dumping IRQ handlers. Softirqs
should be handled periodically while processing non-IRQ handlers.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1293185578 0
# Node ID dca1b7cf2e2c27cd160bd1d1d284e3f810d4936c
# Parent e8acb9753ff1a5cd3d6a45eda5f4c6f0059c281a
re-add calls accidentally deleted from run_all_nonirq_keyhandlers()
c/s 22538:a3a29e67aa7e, having got applied in a form different from
the one submitted, resulted in the calls to
console_{start,end}_log_everything() getting removed without
replacement. Add them back since, other than run_all_keyhandlers(),
this doesn't run with log-everything already in effect.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/common/keyhandler.c
+++ b/xen/common/keyhandler.c
@@ -407,14 +407,17 @@ static void run_all_nonirq_keyhandlers(u
int k;
console_start_log_everything();
+
for ( k = 0; k < ARRAY_SIZE(key_table); k++ )
{
+ process_pending_softirqs_nested();
h = key_table[k];
if ( (h == NULL) || !h->diagnostic || h->irq_callback )
continue;
printk("[%c: %s]\n", k, h->desc);
(*h->u.fn)(k);
}
+
console_end_log_everything();
}
@@ -426,10 +429,11 @@ static void run_all_keyhandlers(unsigned
struct keyhandler *h;
int k;
+ watchdog_disable();
+
printk("'%c' pressed -> firing all diagnostic keyhandlers\n", key);
/* Fire all the IRQ-context diangostic keyhandlers now */
- console_start_log_everything();
for ( k = 0; k < ARRAY_SIZE(key_table); k++ )
{
h = key_table[k];
@@ -438,7 +442,8 @@ static void run_all_keyhandlers(unsigned
printk("[%c: %s]\n", k, h->desc);
(*h->u.irq_fn)(k, regs);
}
- console_end_log_everything();
+
+ watchdog_enable();
/* Trigger the others from a tasklet in non-IRQ context */
tasklet_schedule(&run_all_keyhandlers_tasklet);
--- a/xen/common/softirq.c
+++ b/xen/common/softirq.c
@@ -54,6 +54,16 @@ void process_pending_softirqs(void)
__do_softirq(1ul<<SCHEDULE_SOFTIRQ);
}
+void process_pending_softirqs_nested(void)
+{
+ ASSERT(!in_irq() && local_irq_is_enabled());
+ /*
+ * Do not enter scheduler as it can preempt the calling context,
+ * and do not run tasklets as we're running one currently.
+ */
+ __do_softirq((1ul<<SCHEDULE_SOFTIRQ) | (1ul<<TASKLET_SOFTIRQ));
+}
+
asmlinkage void do_softirq(void)
{
__do_softirq(0);
--- a/xen/include/xen/softirq.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/softirq.h
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ void raise_softirq(unsigned int nr);
* Use this instead of do_softirq() when you do not want to be preempted.
*/
void process_pending_softirqs(void);
+/* ... and use this instead when running inside a tasklet. */
+void process_pending_softirqs_nested(void);
/*
* TASKLETS -- dynamically-allocatable tasks run in softirq context

21
22540-32on64-hypercall-debug.patch
View File

@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1292415031 0
# Node ID d8279118b4bbb3bb3689b9c20abb25d0c09e2b69
# Parent 20c65aa19075b1a696adb56325827412596ac0d4
x86/32on64: zero-extend hypercall index before use in memory access (debug mode only)
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
@@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ ENTRY(compat_hypercall)
pushq UREGS_rbx(%rsp); pushq %rcx; pushq %rdx; pushq %rsi; pushq %rdi
pushq UREGS_rbp+5*8(%rsp)
leaq compat_hypercall_args_table(%rip),%r10
- movq $6,%rcx
+ movl %eax,%eax
+ movl $6,%ecx
subb (%r10,%rax,1),%cl
movq %rsp,%rdi
movl $0xDEADBEEF,%eax

28
22549-vtd-map-page-leak.patch
View File

@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1292513937 0
# Node ID aa18b8ddaf05084aef3f8cff11d92248a8b6fac8
# Parent f46f46bbb69a788037f866025c88743d55dde416
vtd: Require unmap_vtd_domain_page() on a couple of early exit paths.
From: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@novell.com>
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -1330,6 +1330,7 @@ int domain_context_mapping_one(
if ( context_set_domain_id(context, domain, iommu) )
{
spin_unlock(&iommu->lock);
+ unmap_vtd_domain_page(context_entries);
return -EFAULT;
}
@@ -1671,6 +1672,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_map_page(
if ( old.val == new.val )
{
spin_unlock(&hd->mapping_lock);
+ unmap_vtd_domain_page(page);
return 0;
}
*pte = new;

29
22574-ept-skip-validation.patch
View File

@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1292954974 0
# Node ID b5418c045d029e8bf5eadfd4e1ef0b1822da7186
# Parent ff1b80ccecd9ed049cc694ab117100e83eab179f
x86 hvm ept: Remove EPT guest linear address validation
For EPT violation resulting from an attempt to load the guest PDPTEs
as part of the execution of the MOV CR instruction, the EPT_GLA_VALID
is not valid. This situation should not happen in most situation,
since we always populate guest memory. But this is not ture for PAE
guest under the PoD/Page sharing situation. In that situation, a page
pointed by CR3 may be un-populated, and we need handle it in such
situation.
Signed-off-by: Jiang, Yunhong <yunhong.jiang@intel.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -2129,8 +2129,7 @@ static void ept_handle_violation(unsigne
__trace_var(TRC_HVM_NPF, 0, sizeof(_d), (unsigned char *)&_d);
}
- if ( (qualification & EPT_GLA_VALID) &&
- hvm_hap_nested_page_fault(gfn) )
+ if ( hvm_hap_nested_page_fault(gfn) )
return;
/* Everything else is an error. */

121
22632-vtd-print-entries.patch
View File

@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1293185641 0
# Node ID 7cc87dcf30a13bcf600077aa661694caeb0c290c
# Parent dca1b7cf2e2c27cd160bd1d1d284e3f810d4936c
VT-d: fix and improve print_vtd_entries()
Fix leaking of mapped domain pages (root_entry and ctxt_entry when
falling out of the level traversing loop). Do this by re-arranging
things slightly so that a mapping is retained only as long as it
really is needed.
Fix the failure to use map_domain_page() in the level traversing loop
of the function.
Add a mssing return statement in one of the error paths.
Also I wonder whether not being able to call print_vtd_entries() from
iommu_page_fault_do_one() in ix86 is still correct, now that
map_domain_page() is IRQ safe.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/utils.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/utils.c
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ void print_vtd_entries(struct iommu *iom
struct context_entry *ctxt_entry;
struct root_entry *root_entry;
struct dma_pte pte;
- u64 *l;
+ u64 *l, val;
u32 l_index, level;
printk("print_vtd_entries: iommu = %p bdf = %x:%x.%x gmfn = %"PRIx64"\n",
@@ -112,6 +112,11 @@ void print_vtd_entries(struct iommu *iom
}
root_entry = (struct root_entry *)map_vtd_domain_page(iommu->root_maddr);
+ if ( root_entry == NULL )
+ {
+ printk(" root_entry == NULL\n");
+ return;
+ }
printk(" root_entry = %p\n", root_entry);
printk(" root_entry[%x] = %"PRIx64"\n", bus, root_entry[bus].val);
@@ -122,61 +127,57 @@ void print_vtd_entries(struct iommu *iom
return;
}
- ctxt_entry =
- (struct context_entry *)map_vtd_domain_page(root_entry[bus].val);
+ val = root_entry[bus].val;
+ unmap_vtd_domain_page(root_entry);
+ ctxt_entry = map_vtd_domain_page(val);
if ( ctxt_entry == NULL )
{
- unmap_vtd_domain_page(root_entry);
printk(" ctxt_entry == NULL\n");
return;
}
printk(" context = %p\n", ctxt_entry);
+ val = ctxt_entry[devfn].lo;
printk(" context[%x] = %"PRIx64"_%"PRIx64"\n",
- devfn, ctxt_entry[devfn].hi, ctxt_entry[devfn].lo);
+ devfn, ctxt_entry[devfn].hi, val);
if ( !context_present(ctxt_entry[devfn]) )
{
unmap_vtd_domain_page(ctxt_entry);
- unmap_vtd_domain_page(root_entry);
printk(" ctxt_entry[%x] not present\n", devfn);
return;
}
level = agaw_to_level(context_address_width(ctxt_entry[devfn]));
+ unmap_vtd_domain_page(ctxt_entry);
if ( level != VTD_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL_3 &&
level != VTD_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL_4)
{
- unmap_vtd_domain_page(ctxt_entry);
- unmap_vtd_domain_page(root_entry);
printk("Unsupported VTD page table level (%d)!\n", level);
+ return;
}
- l = maddr_to_virt(ctxt_entry[devfn].lo);
do
{
- l = (u64*)(((unsigned long)l >> PAGE_SHIFT_4K) << PAGE_SHIFT_4K);
+ l = map_vtd_domain_page(val);
printk(" l%d = %p\n", level, l);
if ( l == NULL )
{
- unmap_vtd_domain_page(ctxt_entry);
- unmap_vtd_domain_page(root_entry);
printk(" l%d == NULL\n", level);
break;
}
l_index = get_level_index(gmfn, level);
printk(" l%d_index = %x\n", level, l_index);
- printk(" l%d[%x] = %"PRIx64"\n", level, l_index, l[l_index]);
- pte.val = l[l_index];
+ pte.val = val = l[l_index];
+ unmap_vtd_domain_page(l);
+ printk(" l%d[%x] = %"PRIx64"\n", level, l_index, val);
+
+ pte.val = val;
if ( !dma_pte_present(pte) )
{
- unmap_vtd_domain_page(ctxt_entry);
- unmap_vtd_domain_page(root_entry);
printk(" l%d[%x] not present\n", level, l_index);
break;
}
-
- l = maddr_to_virt(l[l_index]);
} while ( --level );
}

6
22645-amd-flush-filter.patch
View File

@ -11,8 +11,10 @@ command-line config option. Remove it.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
@@ -237,20 +237,6 @@ int cpu_has_amd_erratum(const struct cpu
return 0;
}

22
22693-fam10-mmio-conf-base-protect.patch
View File

@ -19,9 +19,11 @@ use is ourselves, not only when we enabled it.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -1704,6 +1704,10 @@ static int is_cpufreq_controller(struct
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -1716,6 +1716,10 @@ static int is_cpufreq_controller(struct
(d->domain_id == 0));
}
@ -32,7 +34,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
static int emulate_privileged_op(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
{
struct vcpu *v = current;
@@ -2263,7 +2267,13 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct
@@ -2275,7 +2279,13 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct
goto fail;
if ( !IS_PRIV(v->domain) )
break;
@ -47,8 +49,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
(((((u64)h << 32) | l) ^ val) &
~( FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_ENABLE |
(FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BUSRANGE_MASK <<
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig.h
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
#define PCI_VENDOR_ID_NVIDIA 0x10de
@ -58,8 +62,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
/*
* AMD Fam10h CPUs are buggy, and cannot access MMIO config space
* on their northbrige except through the * %eax register. As such, you MUST
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig-shared.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig-shared.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig-shared.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig-shared.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig-shared.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
#include "mmconfig.h"

6
22694-x86_64-no-weak.patch
View File

@ -22,8 +22,10 @@ we cannot trust.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/drivers/acpi/numa.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/acpi/numa.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/acpi/numa.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/acpi/numa.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/acpi/numa.c
@@ -120,14 +120,15 @@ static int __init acpi_parse_slit(struct
return 0;
}

28
22707-x2apic-preenabled-check.patch
View File

@ -17,9 +17,11 @@ Restore the functionality, now calling it from generic_apic_probe().
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
@@ -947,7 +947,6 @@ no_apic:
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
@@ -948,7 +948,6 @@ no_apic:
void x2apic_setup(void)
{
struct IO_APIC_route_entry **ioapic_entries = NULL;
@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
if ( smp_processor_id() != 0 )
{
@@ -959,14 +958,6 @@ void x2apic_setup(void)
@@ -960,14 +959,6 @@ void x2apic_setup(void)
if ( !cpu_has_x2apic )
return;
@ -42,8 +44,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
if ( !opt_x2apic )
{
if ( !x2apic_enabled )
--- a/xen/arch/x86/genapic/probe.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/genapic/probe.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/genapic/probe.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/genapic/probe.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/genapic/probe.c
@@ -59,8 +59,10 @@ custom_param("apic", genapic_apic_force)
void __init generic_apic_probe(void)
@ -57,8 +61,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
for (i = 0; !changed && apic_probe[i]; i++) {
if (apic_probe[i]->probe()) {
--- a/xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
#include <xen/cpumask.h>
#include <asm/apicdef.h>
@ -89,8 +95,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
+ genapic = apic_x2apic_probe();
+ }
+}
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/apic.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/apic.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/apic.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/apic.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/apic.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ extern int apic_verbosity;
extern int x2apic_enabled;
extern int directed_eoi_enabled;

8
22708-xenctx-misc.patch
View File

@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ xenctx: misc adjustments
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/tools/xentrace/xenctx.c
+++ b/tools/xentrace/xenctx.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/xentrace/xenctx.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/xentrace/xenctx.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/xentrace/xenctx.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
@ -30,7 +32,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
char *name;
struct symbol *next;
} *symbol_table = NULL;
@@ -112,12 +112,12 @@ static void insert_symbol(struct symbol
@@ -112,12 +112,12 @@ static void insert_symbol(struct symbol
/* The System.map is usually already sorted... */
if (prev

47
22744-ept-pod-locking.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Tim Deegan <Tim.Deegan@citrix.com>
# Date 1294933573 0
# Node ID b01ef59c8c805df751a8f6ae63cdd5c6a4565255
# Parent 54e91dcae649e23fd267d7afe623fbd52b1b4283
x86/mm: fix EPT PoD locking to match the normal p2m case.
This recursive-locking bug was fixed in the main p2m code in
20269:fd3d5d66c446 (in October 2009) but has lurked unseen in
the EPT side since then. Copy the fix across.
Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <Tim.Deegan@citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/p2m-ept.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/p2m-ept.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/p2m-ept.c
@@ -37,19 +37,26 @@ static int ept_pod_check_and_populate(st
ept_entry_t *entry, int order,
p2m_query_t q)
{
+ /* Only take the lock if we don't already have it. Otherwise it
+ * wouldn't be safe to do p2m lookups with the p2m lock held */
+ int do_locking = !p2m_locked_by_me(d->arch.p2m);
int r;
- p2m_lock(d->arch.p2m);
+
+ if ( do_locking )
+ p2m_lock(d->arch.p2m);
/* Check to make sure this is still PoD */
if ( entry->avail1 != p2m_populate_on_demand )
{
- p2m_unlock(d->arch.p2m);
+ if ( do_locking )
+ p2m_unlock(d->arch.p2m);
return 0;
}
r = p2m_pod_demand_populate(d, gfn, order, q);
- p2m_unlock(d->arch.p2m);
+ if ( do_locking )
+ p2m_unlock(d->arch.p2m);
return r;
}

264
22749-vtd-workarounds.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
References: bnc#633573
# HG changeset patch
# User Allen Kay <allen.m.kay@intel.com>
# Date 1294992706 0
# Node ID 93e7bf0e1845f1a82441fb740522a9b9cb32beda
# Parent 47713825a3f910fc7cf7571947e8b3b4eab23d5f
vt-d: quirks for Sandybridge errata workaround, WLAN, VT-d fault escalation
Adding errata workaround for newly released Sandybridge processor
graphics, additional WLAN device ID's for WLAN quirk, a quirk for
masking VT-d fault escalation to IOH HW that can cause system hangs on
some OEM hardware where the BIOS erroneously escalates VT-d faults to
the platform.
Signed-off-by: Allen Kay <allen.m.kay@intel.com>
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1295625672 0
# Node ID 1637fdbfc21e2c732eca29136943a568f8f341cd
# Parent 43592043cefc8357e6e6a0ab9ba85ca480968cb1
[VTD][QUIRK] turn off Sandybridge IGD quirk by default
Turn off Sandybridge IGD quirk by default until potential issues such
as MMIO register conflict with OS device driver and proper locking in
preamble and postamble functions are addressed.
Signed-off-by: Allen Kay <allen.m.kay@intel.com>
# HG changeset patch
# User Allen Kay <allen.m.kay@intel.com>
# Date 1296587456 0
# Node ID 3edd21ffe407ac0e853d51aa8302d9bdb4068749
# Parent 0e2c8b75f7d233f15f8bb49d9db0579e7a350964
passthrough/vtd: disable 64-bit MMCFG quirk on 32-bit Xen
Attached patch disables pci_vtd_quirk for 32-bit Xen since 32-bit xen
does not support MMCFG access.
Signed-off-by: Allen Kay <allen.m.kay@intel.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
@@ -87,5 +87,6 @@ void __init platform_quirks_init(void);
void vtd_ops_preamble_quirk(struct iommu* iommu);
void vtd_ops_postamble_quirk(struct iommu* iommu);
void me_wifi_quirk(struct domain *domain, u8 bus, u8 devfn, int map);
+void pci_vtd_quirk(struct pci_dev *pdev);
#endif // _VTD_EXTERN_H_
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -1845,6 +1845,7 @@ static void setup_dom0_devices(struct do
list_add(&pdev->domain_list, &d->arch.pdev_list);
domain_context_mapping(d, pdev->bus, pdev->devfn);
pci_enable_acs(pdev);
+ pci_vtd_quirk(pdev);
}
}
spin_unlock(&pcidevs_lock);
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
@@ -47,11 +47,13 @@
#define IS_CTG(id) (id == 0x2a408086)
#define IS_ILK(id) (id == 0x00408086 || id == 0x00448086 || id== 0x00628086 || id == 0x006A8086)
#define IS_CPT(id) (id == 0x01008086 || id == 0x01048086)
+#define IS_SNB_GFX(id) (id == 0x01068086 || id == 0x01168086 || id == 0x01268086 || id == 0x01028086 || id == 0x01128086 || id == 0x01228086 || id == 0x010A8086)
u32 ioh_id;
u32 igd_id;
bool_t rwbf_quirk;
static int is_cantiga_b3;
+static int is_snb_gfx;
static u8 *igd_reg_va;
/*
@@ -92,6 +94,12 @@ static void cantiga_b3_errata_init(void)
is_cantiga_b3 = 1;
}
+/* check for Sandybridge IGD device ID's */
+static void snb_errata_init(void)
+{
+ is_snb_gfx = IS_SNB_GFX(igd_id);
+}
+
/*
* QUIRK to workaround Cantiga IGD VT-d low power errata.
* This errata impacts IGD assignment on Cantiga systems
@@ -104,12 +112,15 @@ static void cantiga_b3_errata_init(void)
/*
* map IGD MMIO+0x2000 page to allow Xen access to IGD 3D register.
*/
-static void map_igd_reg(void)
+static void *map_igd_reg(void)
{
u64 igd_mmio, igd_reg;
- if ( !is_cantiga_b3 || igd_reg_va != NULL )
- return;
+ if ( !is_cantiga_b3 && !is_snb_gfx )
+ return NULL;
+
+ if ( igd_reg_va )
+ return igd_reg_va;
/* get IGD mmio address in PCI BAR */
igd_mmio = ((u64)pci_conf_read32(0, IGD_DEV, 0, 0x14) << 32) +
@@ -121,6 +132,7 @@ static void map_igd_reg(void)
/* ioremap this physical page */
set_fixmap_nocache(FIX_IGD_MMIO, igd_reg);
igd_reg_va = (u8 *)fix_to_virt(FIX_IGD_MMIO);
+ return igd_reg_va;
}
/*
@@ -134,6 +146,9 @@ static int cantiga_vtd_ops_preamble(stru
if ( !is_igd_drhd(drhd) || !is_cantiga_b3 )
return 0;
+ if ( !map_igd_reg() )
+ return 0;
+
/*
* read IGD register at IGD MMIO + 0x20A4 to force IGD
* to exit low power state. Since map_igd_reg()
@@ -144,11 +159,69 @@ static int cantiga_vtd_ops_preamble(stru
}
/*
+ * Sandybridge RC6 power management inhibit state erratum.
+ * This can cause power high power consumption.
+ * Workaround is to prevent graphics get into RC6
+ * state when doing VT-d IOTLB operations, do the VT-d
+ * IOTLB operation, and then re-enable RC6 state.
+ */
+static void snb_vtd_ops_preamble(struct iommu* iommu)
+{
+ struct intel_iommu *intel = iommu->intel;
+ struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd = intel ? intel->drhd : NULL;
+ s_time_t start_time;
+
+ if ( !is_igd_drhd(drhd) || !is_snb_gfx )
+ return;
+
+ if ( !map_igd_reg() )
+ return;
+
+ *((volatile u32 *)(igd_reg_va + 0x54)) = 0x000FFFFF;
+ *((volatile u32 *)(igd_reg_va + 0x700)) = 0;
+
+ start_time = NOW();
+ while ( (*((volatile u32 *)(igd_reg_va + 0x2AC)) & 0xF) != 0 )
+ {
+ if ( NOW() > start_time + DMAR_OPERATION_TIMEOUT )
+ {
+ dprintk(XENLOG_INFO VTDPREFIX,
+ "snb_vtd_ops_preamble: failed to disable idle handshake\n");
+ break;
+ }
+ cpu_relax();
+ }
+
+ *((volatile u32*)(igd_reg_va + 0x50)) = 0x10001;
+}
+
+static void snb_vtd_ops_postamble(struct iommu* iommu)
+{
+ struct intel_iommu *intel = iommu->intel;
+ struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd = intel ? intel->drhd : NULL;
+
+ if ( !is_igd_drhd(drhd) || !is_snb_gfx )
+ return;
+
+ if ( !map_igd_reg() )
+ return;
+
+ *((volatile u32 *)(igd_reg_va + 0x54)) = 0xA;
+ *((volatile u32 *)(igd_reg_va + 0x50)) = 0x10000;
+}
+
+/*
* call before VT-d translation enable and IOTLB flush operations.
*/
+
+static int snb_igd_quirk;
+boolean_param("snb_igd_quirk", snb_igd_quirk);
+
void vtd_ops_preamble_quirk(struct iommu* iommu)
{
cantiga_vtd_ops_preamble(iommu);
+ if ( snb_igd_quirk )
+ snb_vtd_ops_preamble(iommu);
}
/*
@@ -156,7 +229,8 @@ void vtd_ops_preamble_quirk(struct iommu
*/
void vtd_ops_postamble_quirk(struct iommu* iommu)
{
- return;
+ if ( snb_igd_quirk )
+ snb_vtd_ops_postamble(iommu);
}
/* initialize platform identification flags */
@@ -175,6 +249,8 @@ void __init platform_quirks_init(void)
/* initialize cantiga B3 identification */
cantiga_b3_errata_init();
+ snb_errata_init();
+
/* ioremap IGD MMIO+0x2000 page */
map_igd_reg();
}
@@ -246,11 +322,14 @@ void me_wifi_quirk(struct domain *domain
id = pci_conf_read32(bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), 0);
switch (id)
{
- case 0x00878086:
+ case 0x00878086: /* Kilmer Peak */
case 0x00898086:
- case 0x00828086:
+ case 0x00828086: /* Taylor Peak */
case 0x00858086:
- case 0x42388086:
+ case 0x008F8086: /* Rainbow Peak */
+ case 0x00908086:
+ case 0x00918086:
+ case 0x42388086: /* Puma Peak */
case 0x422b8086:
case 0x422c8086:
map_me_phantom_function(domain, 22, map);
@@ -258,6 +337,28 @@ void me_wifi_quirk(struct domain *domain
default:
break;
}
+ }
+}
+/*
+ * Mask reporting Intel VT-d faults to IOH core logic:
+ * - Some platform escalates VT-d faults to platform errors
+ * - This can cause system failure upon non-fatal VT-d faults
+ * - Potential security issue if malicious guest trigger VT-d faults
+ */
+void pci_vtd_quirk(struct pci_dev *pdev)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ int bus = pdev->bus;
+ int dev = PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn);
+ int func = PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn);
+ int id, val;
+
+ id = pci_conf_read32(bus, dev, func, 0);
+ if ( id == 0x342e8086 || id == 0x3c288086 )
+ {
+ val = pci_conf_read32(bus, dev, func, 0x1AC);
+ pci_conf_write32(bus, dev, func, 0x1AC, val | (1 << 31));
}
+#endif
}

110
22777-vtd-ats-fixes.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
# Date 1295353690 0
# Node ID 1e7594758b28706c2b72358598ecf632ddda247b
# Parent 78e2e5a50daa1702e3fd9dbceada700cdaefd511
VT-d/ATS: misc fixes
First of all there were three places potentially de-referencing NULL
(two after an allocation failure, and one after a failed lookup).
Second, if ATS_ENABLE was already set, the device would not have got
added to the ats_devices list, potentially resulting in
dev_invalidate_iotlb() doing an incomplete job.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/ats.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/ats.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/ats.c
@@ -91,6 +91,9 @@ int ats_device(int seg, int bus, int dev
return 0;
pdev = pci_get_pdev(bus, devfn);
+ if ( !pdev )
+ return 0;
+
drhd = acpi_find_matched_drhd_unit(pdev);
if ( !drhd )
return 0;
@@ -108,6 +111,8 @@ int ats_device(int seg, int bus, int dev
if ( pos && (ats_drhd == NULL) )
{
new_drhd = xmalloc(struct acpi_drhd_unit);
+ if ( !new_drhd )
+ return 0;
memcpy(new_drhd, drhd, sizeof(struct acpi_drhd_unit));
list_add_tail(&new_drhd->list, &ats_dev_drhd_units);
}
@@ -116,9 +121,8 @@ int ats_device(int seg, int bus, int dev
int enable_ats_device(int seg, int bus, int devfn)
{
- struct pci_ats_dev *pdev;
+ struct pci_ats_dev *pdev = NULL;
u32 value;
- u16 queue_depth;
int pos;
if ( !acpi_find_matched_atsr_unit(bus, devfn) )
@@ -142,26 +146,43 @@ int enable_ats_device(int seg, int bus,
/* BUGBUG: add back seg when multi-seg platform support is enabled */
value = pci_conf_read16(bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn),
- PCI_FUNC(devfn), pos + ATS_REG_CAP);
- queue_depth = value & ATS_QUEUE_DEPTH_MASK;
-
- value = pci_conf_read16(bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn),
PCI_FUNC(devfn), pos + ATS_REG_CTL);
if ( value & ATS_ENABLE )
- return 0;
+ {
+ list_for_each_entry ( pdev, &ats_devices, list )
+ {
+ if ( pdev->bus == bus && pdev->devfn == devfn )
+ {
+ pos = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if ( pos )
+ pdev = xmalloc(struct pci_ats_dev);
+ if ( !pdev )
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if ( !(value & ATS_ENABLE) )
+ {
+ value |= ATS_ENABLE;
+ pci_conf_write16(bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
+ pos + ATS_REG_CTL, value);
+ }
+
+ if ( pos )
+ {
+ pdev->bus = bus;
+ pdev->devfn = devfn;
+ value = pci_conf_read16(bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn),
+ PCI_FUNC(devfn), pos + ATS_REG_CAP);
+ pdev->ats_queue_depth = value & ATS_QUEUE_DEPTH_MASK;
+ list_add(&pdev->list, &ats_devices);
+ }
- value |= ATS_ENABLE;
- pci_conf_write16(bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
- pos + ATS_REG_CTL, value);
-
- pdev = xmalloc(struct pci_ats_dev);
- pdev->bus = bus;
- pdev->devfn = devfn;
- pdev->ats_queue_depth = queue_depth;
- list_add(&(pdev->list), &ats_devices);
if ( iommu_verbose )
- dprintk(XENLOG_INFO VTDPREFIX, "%x:%x.%x: ATS is enabled\n",
- bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
+ dprintk(XENLOG_INFO VTDPREFIX, "%x:%x.%x: ATS %s enabled\n",
+ bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), pos ? "is" : "was");
return pos;
}

64
22781-pod-hap-logdirty.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
# Date 1295274541 0
# Node ID 3decd02e0b18ae21fb926c6bad96a4cd02c48272
# Parent 97ab84aca65cdcbce2ddccc51629fb24adb056cf
PoD,hap: Fix logdirty mode when using hardware assisted paging
When writing a writable p2m entry for a pfn, we need to mark the pfn
dirty to avoid corruption when doing live migration.
Marking the page dirty exposes another issue, where there are
excessive sweeps for zero pages if there's a mismatch between PoD
entries and cache entries. Only sweep for zero pages if we actually
need more memory.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <Tim.Deegan@citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -1064,14 +1064,22 @@ p2m_pod_demand_populate(struct domain *d
if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) )
goto out_fail;
- /* If we're low, start a sweep */
- if ( order == 9 && page_list_empty(&p2md->pod.super) )
- p2m_pod_emergency_sweep_super(d);
-
- if ( page_list_empty(&p2md->pod.single) &&
- ( ( order == 0 )
- || (order == 9 && page_list_empty(&p2md->pod.super) ) ) )
- p2m_pod_emergency_sweep(d);
+ /* Once we've ballooned down enough that we can fill the remaining
+ * PoD entries from the cache, don't sweep even if the particular
+ * list we want to use is empty: that can lead to thrashing zero pages
+ * through the cache for no good reason. */
+ if ( p2md->pod.entry_count > p2md->pod.count )
+ {
+
+ /* If we're low, start a sweep */
+ if ( order == 9 && page_list_empty(&p2md->pod.super) )
+ p2m_pod_emergency_sweep_super(d);
+
+ if ( page_list_empty(&p2md->pod.single) &&
+ ( ( order == 0 )
+ || (order == 9 && page_list_empty(&p2md->pod.super) ) ) )
+ p2m_pod_emergency_sweep(d);
+ }
/* Keep track of the highest gfn demand-populated by a guest fault */
if ( q == p2m_guest && gfn > p2md->pod.max_guest )
@@ -1098,7 +1106,10 @@ p2m_pod_demand_populate(struct domain *d
set_p2m_entry(d, gfn_aligned, mfn, order, p2m_ram_rw);
for( i = 0 ; i < (1UL << order) ; i++ )
+ {
set_gpfn_from_mfn(mfn_x(mfn) + i, gfn_aligned + i);
+ paging_mark_dirty(d, mfn_x(mfn) + i);
+ }
p2md->pod.entry_count -= (1 << order); /* Lock: p2m */
BUG_ON(p2md->pod.entry_count < 0);

82
22789-i386-no-x2apic.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1295625507 0
# Node ID 9bd5f65050f8014de7d0fcf9d89ed8c441f261fa
# Parent 5852612cd4c461e5219db73cc52de0c643c414e8
x86:x2apic: Disable x2apic on x86-32 permanently
x2apic initialization on x86_32 uses vcpu pointer before it is
initialized. As x2apic is unlikely to be used on x86_32, this patch
disables x2apic permanently on x86_32. It also asserts the sanity of
vcpu pointer before dereference to prevent further misuse.
Signed-off-by: Fengzhe Zhang <fengzhe.zhang@intel.com>
jb: Moved logic into check_x2apic_preenabled(), disabled dead code on
x86_32.
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
@@ -959,6 +959,10 @@ void x2apic_setup(void)
if ( !cpu_has_x2apic )
return;
+#ifdef __i386__
+ BUG();
+#else
+
if ( !opt_x2apic )
{
if ( !x2apic_enabled )
@@ -1020,6 +1024,7 @@ restore_out:
unmask_8259A();
out:
+#endif /* !__i386__ */
if ( ioapic_entries )
free_ioapic_entries(ioapic_entries);
}
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
#include <xen/smp.h>
#include <asm/mach-default/mach_mpparse.h>
+#ifndef __i386__
+
static int x2apic_phys; /* By default we use logical cluster mode. */
boolean_param("x2apic_phys", x2apic_phys);
@@ -137,6 +139,8 @@ const struct genapic *apic_x2apic_probe(
return x2apic_phys ? &apic_x2apic_phys : &apic_x2apic_cluster;
}
+#endif /* !__i386__ */
+
void __init check_x2apic_preenabled(void)
{
u32 lo, hi;
@@ -149,7 +153,19 @@ void __init check_x2apic_preenabled(void
if ( lo & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_EXTD )
{
printk("x2APIC mode is already enabled by BIOS.\n");
+#ifndef __i386__
x2apic_enabled = 1;
genapic = apic_x2apic_probe();
+#else
+ lo &= ~(MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE | MSR_IA32_APICBASE_EXTD);
+ wrmsr(MSR_IA32_APICBASE, lo, hi);
+ lo |= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE;
+ wrmsr(MSR_IA32_APICBASE, lo, hi);
+ printk("x2APIC disabled permanently on x86_32.\n");
+#endif
}
+
+#ifdef __i386__
+ clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_X2APIC, boot_cpu_data.x86_capability);
+#endif
}

24
22790-svm-resume-migrate-pirqs.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1295625605 0
# Node ID 43592043cefc8357e6e6a0ab9ba85ca480968cb1
# Parent 9bd5f65050f8014de7d0fcf9d89ed8c441f261fa
svm: migrate pirq with vcpu
hvm_migrate_pirqs() is missing in svm_do_resume().
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.wang2@amd.com>
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -704,7 +704,7 @@ static void svm_do_resume(struct vcpu *v
{
v->arch.hvm_svm.launch_core = smp_processor_id();
hvm_migrate_timers(v);
-
+ hvm_migrate_pirqs(v);
/* Migrating to another ASID domain. Request a new ASID. */
hvm_asid_flush_vcpu(v);
}

6
32on64-extra-mem.patch
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
@@ -2919,7 +2919,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
self.guest_bitsize = self.image.getBitSize()

30
7410-qemu-alt-gr.patch
View File

@ -20,10 +20,11 @@ Signed-off-by: Chunyan Liu <cyliu@novell.com>
committer: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
git-commit-id: f95d202ed6444dacb15fbea4dee185eb0e048d9a
diff -r 080b5a094d4e -r f71a4c18e34e keymaps.c
--- a/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/keymaps.c Wed Sep 08 16:38:09 2010 +0100
+++ b//tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/keymaps.c Tue Sep 14 17:31:43 2010 +0100
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/keymaps.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/keymaps.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/keymaps.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ typedef struct {
struct key_range *numlock_range;
struct key_range *shift_range;
struct key_range *localstate_range;
@ -31,20 +32,18 @@ diff -r 080b5a094d4e -r f71a4c18e34e keymaps.c
} kbd_layout_t;
static void add_to_key_range(struct key_range **krp, int code) {
@@ -133,7 +134,11 @@
@@ -133,6 +134,10 @@ static kbd_layout_t *parse_keyboard_layo
add_to_key_range(&k->localstate_range, keycode);
//fprintf(stderr, "localstate keysym %04x keycode %d\n", keysym, keycode);
}
-
+ if (rest && strstr(rest, "altgr")) {
+ add_to_key_range(&k->altgr_range, keysym);
+ //fprintf(stderr, "altgr keysym %04x keycode %d\n", keysym, keycode);
+ }
+
/* if(keycode&0x80)
keycode=(keycode<<8)^0x80e0; */
if (keysym < MAX_NORMAL_KEYCODE) {
@@ -233,3 +238,16 @@
@@ -233,3 +238,16 @@ static inline int keycode_is_shiftable(v
return 0;
return 1;
}
@ -61,10 +60,11 @@ diff -r 080b5a094d4e -r f71a4c18e34e keymaps.c
+ return 0;
+}
+
diff -r 080b5a094d4e -r f71a4c18e34e vnc.c
--- a/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vnc.c Wed Sep 08 16:38:09 2010 +0100
+++ b/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vnc.c Tue Sep 14 17:31:43 2010 +0100
@@ -1274,12 +1274,27 @@
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vnc.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vnc.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vnc.c
@@ -1274,12 +1274,27 @@ static void press_key_shift_up(VncState
}
}
@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ diff -r 080b5a094d4e -r f71a4c18e34e vnc.c
if (is_graphic_console()) {
if (sym >= 'A' && sym <= 'Z') {
@@ -1289,8 +1304,11 @@
@@ -1289,8 +1304,11 @@ static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, i
else {
shift = keysym_is_shift(vs->kbd_layout, sym & 0xFFFF);
}
@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ diff -r 080b5a094d4e -r f71a4c18e34e vnc.c
keycode = keysym2scancode(vs->kbd_layout, sym & 0xFFFF);
if (keycode == 0) {
@@ -1357,6 +1375,11 @@
@@ -1357,6 +1375,11 @@ static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, i
}
if (is_graphic_console()) {

6
7426-xenfb-depth.patch
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/hw/xenfb.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/hw/xenfb.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/hw/xenfb.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/hw/xenfb.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/hw/xenfb.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/hw/xenfb.c
@@ -622,6 +622,18 @@ static void xenfb_guest_copy(struct XenF
oops = 1;
}

96
7433-qemu-altgr.patch
View File

@ -1,38 +1,97 @@
--- a/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/keymaps.c Wed Jan 05 23:16:54 2011 +0000
+++ b/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/keymaps.c Wed Jan 05 23:48:36 2011 +0000
@@ -53,6 +53,20 @@ typedef struct {
struct key_range *localstate_range;
# HG changeset patch
# User Chun Yan Liu <cyliu@novell.com>
# Date 1294271316 0
# Node ID a283996796c91dd29ecff444b78798e0ce902047
# Parent 39df13908a3ad54e79dd3b53ed307e57f12f6d3d
fix '|' key display problem in en-us with altgr processing
Commit f95d202ed644 handles altgr-insert problem. Unfortunately, with
that patch, there is a problem in En-us keyboard: '|' (bar) cannot be
displayed. After checking keymap files, we found there are two
definitions to "bar" in en-us: bar 0x56 altgr (in "common") bar 0x2b
shift (in "en-us") First line is actually invalid in en-us
lanuage. The 2nd definition will cover the 1st one.
The previous change in didn't consider multi-definition case. It scans
keymap files, if keysym needs altgr, it will records that, after that,
if keysym is pressed but altgr not pressed, it will add an altgr press
opeartion. It is correct if all keysyms are unique and valid. But in
the above multi-definition case, there is problem: when reading bar
0x56 altgr (in "common") it will record altgr needed, but in fact,
that definition won't be used, it always use the 2nd definition and
won't need altgr. Then if the keysym is pressed, the code will still
add an altgr press operation, that will cause problem.
So, if we cannot avoid multi-definition in keymap files, the altgr
flag (whether altgr needed or not) should also be refreshed according
to the 2nd defintion. In the above case, when reading the 1st line, it
records altgr needed; then reading 2nd line, 2nd definition will cover
the 1st, meanwhile the altgr flag should be reset (the 2nd definition
doesn't need altgr, so altgr flag should be removed.)
Following patch supplements f95d202ed644, and solve the
problem.
Signed-off-by: Chun Yan Liu <cyliu@novell.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
committer: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
git-commit-id: 99d53fbb69d3e03be61ae10506a304a3d08d792f
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
# Date 1295287237 0
# Node ID b47bf8f7a5e1959d6f5c62febaef9e81dc3231a0
# Parent b6bbe8be0afa54774a19ef43767a029ebddb2666
keymaps.c: fix use after free in del_key_range
Commit 99d53fbb69d3e03be61ae10506a304a3d08d792f introduced this, and
the compiler indirectly warned about it.
The patch is only compile tested (I don't even know how to reproduce
the original problem), but I suppose worth applying regardless.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Cc: Chun Yan Liu <cyliu@novell.com>
committer: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
git-commit-id: fdb22f24bc8adb3455b771d804496e11b4570085
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/keymaps.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/keymaps.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/keymaps.c
@@ -54,6 +54,17 @@ typedef struct {
struct key_range *altgr_range;
} kbd_layout_t;
+
+static void del_key_range(struct key_range **krp, int code) {
+ struct key_range *kr;
+ struct key_range *kr_pr;
+ for (kr = *krp; kr; kr_pr = kr, kr = kr->next) {
+ while ((kr = *krp) != NULL) {
+ if (code >= kr->start && code <= kr->end) {
+ if (kr == *krp)
+ *krp = kr->next;
+ else
+ kr_pr->next = kr->next;
+ *krp = kr->next;
+ qemu_free(kr);
+ }
+ } else
+ krp = &kr->next;
+ }
+}
+
static void add_to_key_range(struct key_range **krp, int code) {
struct key_range *kr;
@@ -137,6 +151,8 @@ static kbd_layout_t *parse_keyboard_layo
for (kr = *krp; kr; kr = kr->next) {
@@ -137,6 +148,8 @@ static kbd_layout_t *parse_keyboard_layo
if (rest && strstr(rest, "altgr")) {
add_to_key_range(&k->altgr_range, keysym);
//fprintf(stderr, "altgr keysym %04x keycode %d\n", keysym, keycode);
+ } else {
+ del_key_range(&k->altgr_range, keysym);
}
/* if(keycode&0x80)
--- a/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vnc.c Wed Jan 05 23:16:54 2011 +0000
+++ b/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vnc.c Wed Jan 05 23:48:36 2011 +0000
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vnc.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vnc.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vnc.c
@@ -1279,11 +1279,9 @@ static void press_key_altgr_down(VncStat
kbd_put_keycode(0xe0);
if (down){
@ -44,3 +103,4 @@
- vs->modifiers_state[0xb8] = 0;
}
}

6
7434-qemu-rlimit-as.patch
View File

@ -16,8 +16,10 @@ committer: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
git-commit-id: 2aa36d470e97f4baa219f78df82e2d3fe3d9f96d
--- a/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vl.c
+++ b/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vl.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vl.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vl.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vl.c
@@ -4845,6 +4845,13 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv, char **e
rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max;
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_DATA, &rl) != 0)

6
altgr_2.patch
View File

@ -29,10 +29,10 @@ keycodes up and down events and make sure the intentionally added altgr keycode
Signed-off by Chunyan Liu (cyliu@novell.com)
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vnc.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vnc.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vnc.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vnc.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vnc.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vnc.c
@@ -1308,6 +1308,9 @@ static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, i
shift_keys = vs->modifiers_state[0x2a] | vs->modifiers_state[0x36];
altgr_keys = vs->modifiers_state[0xb8];

6
bdrv_default_rwflag.patch
View File

@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
Subject: modify default read/write flag in bdrv_init.
Signed-off by Chunyan Liu <cyliu@novell.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vl.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vl.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vl.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vl.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vl.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/vl.c
@@ -2612,6 +2612,8 @@ int drive_init(struct drive_opt *arg, in
strncpy(drives_table[nb_drives].serial, serial, sizeof(serial));
nb_drives++;

18
bdrv_open2_fix_flags.patch
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/block.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/block.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/block.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/block.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/block.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/block.c
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ int bdrv_file_open(BlockDriverState **pb
int bdrv_open(BlockDriverState *bs, const char *filename, int flags)
@ -28,10 +28,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/block.c
ret = drv->bdrv_open(bs, filename, open_flags);
if ((ret == -EACCES || ret == -EPERM) && !(flags & BDRV_O_FILE)) {
ret = drv->bdrv_open(bs, filename, open_flags & ~BDRV_O_RDWR);
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/hw/usb-msd.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/hw/usb-msd.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/hw/usb-msd.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/hw/usb-msd.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/hw/usb-msd.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/hw/usb-msd.c
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ USBDevice *usb_msd_init(const char *file
s = qemu_mallocz(sizeof(MSDState));
@ -41,10 +41,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/hw/usb-msd.c
goto fail;
s->bs = bdrv;
*pbs = bdrv;
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/qemu-img.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/qemu-img.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/qemu-img.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/qemu-img.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/qemu-img.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/qemu-img.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
#endif

12
bdrv_open2_flags_2.patch
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/hw/xen_blktap.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/hw/xen_blktap.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/hw/xen_blktap.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/hw/xen_blktap.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/hw/xen_blktap.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/hw/xen_blktap.c
@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ static int open_disk(struct td_state *s,
BlockDriver* drv;
char* devname;
@ -19,10 +19,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/hw/xen_blktap.c
fprintf(stderr, "Could not open image file %s\n", path);
return -ENOMEM;
}
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
@@ -136,7 +136,8 @@ static void insert_media(void *opaque)
else
format = &bdrv_raw;

44
blktap-pv-cdrom.patch
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/block-cdrom.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/block-cdrom.c
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/block-cdrom.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/block-cdrom.c
@@ -0,0 +1,535 @@
+/* block-cdrom.c
+ *
@ -538,10 +538,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/block-cdrom.c
+ .td_get_parent_id = tdcdrom_get_parent_id,
+ .td_validate_parent = tdcdrom_validate_parent
+};
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/include/public/io/cdromif.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/public/io/cdromif.h
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/include/public/io/cdromif.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/public/io/cdromif.h
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/******************************************************************************
+ * cdromif.h
@ -665,10 +665,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/include/public/io/cdromif.h
+ sizeof(struct vcd_generic_command) - sizeof(struct request_sense))
+
+#endif
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/Makefile
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/Makefile
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/blktap/drivers/Makefile
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/Makefile
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/blktap/drivers/Makefile
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/Makefile
@@ -28,8 +28,9 @@ CFLAGS += -DMEMSHR
MEMSHRLIBS += $(MEMSHR_DIR)/libmemshr.a
endif
@ -689,10 +689,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/Makefile
BLK-OBJS-y += aes.o
BLK-OBJS-y += tapaio.o
BLK-OBJS-$(CONFIG_Linux) += blk_linux.o
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h
@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ struct tap_disk {
int (*td_get_parent_id) (struct disk_driver *dd, struct disk_id *id);
int (*td_validate_parent)(struct disk_driver *dd,
@ -737,10 +737,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h
};
typedef struct driver_list_entry {
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/blktap/lib/blktaplib.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/blktap/lib/blktaplib.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/blktap/lib/blktaplib.h
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/blktap/lib/blktaplib.h
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/blktap/lib/blktaplib.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/blktap/lib/blktaplib.h
@@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ typedef struct msg_pid {
#define DISK_TYPE_RAM 3
#define DISK_TYPE_QCOW 4
@ -749,10 +749,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/blktap/lib/blktaplib.h
/* xenstore/xenbus: */
#define DOMNAME "Domain-0"
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/include/public/io/blkif.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/public/io/blkif.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/xen/include/public/io/blkif.h
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/include/public/io/blkif.h
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/xen/include/public/io/blkif.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/xen/include/public/io/blkif.h
@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@
* "feature-flush-cache" node!
*/
@ -764,10 +764,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/xen/include/public/io/blkif.h
/*
* Maximum scatter/gather segments per request.
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.c
@@ -735,6 +735,22 @@ static void get_io_request(struct td_sta
goto out;
}
@ -791,10 +791,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.c
default:
DPRINTF("Unknown block operation\n");
break;
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/BlktapController.py
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/BlktapController.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/server/BlktapController.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/BlktapController.py
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/server/BlktapController.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/BlktapController.py
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ blktap1_disk_types = [
'ram',
'qcow',

14
blktap.patch
View File

@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
bug #239173
bug #242953
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
@@ -3290,7 +3290,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
@@ -3291,7 +3291,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
(fn, BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICE))
vbd = {
@ -14,10 +14,10 @@ Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
'device': BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICE,
}
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
@@ -397,9 +397,9 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv
{
char **e_danger = NULL;

6
blktap2.patch
View File

@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ Change it to VmError.
Signed-off-by ChunyanLiu <cyliu@novell.com>
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/BlktapController.py
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/BlktapController.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/server/BlktapController.py
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/BlktapController.py
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/server/BlktapController.py
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/BlktapController.py
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import string, re
from xen.xend.server.blkif import BlkifController
from xen.xend.XendLogging import log

6
blktapctrl-default-to-ioemu.patch
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
Index: xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h
Index: xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.0.1-testing.orig/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h
+++ xen-4.0.1-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h
--- xen-4.0.2-testing.orig/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h
+++ xen-4.0.2-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static disk_info_t aio_disk = {
"raw image (aio)",
"aio",

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