pool/xen
SHA256
3
0
Fork 1
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

- Upstream patches from Jan

Browse Source 
5347b524-evtchn-eliminate-64k-ports-limitation.patch
  53aac342-x86-HVM-consolidate-and-sanitize-CR4-guest-reserved-bit-determination.patch
  53b16cd4-VT-d-ATS-correct-and-clean-up-dev_invalidate_iotlb.patch
  53b56de1-properly-reference-count-DOMCTL_-un-pausedomain-hypercalls.patch
  53cfdcc7-avoid-crash-when-doing-shutdown-with-active-cpupools.patch
  53cfddaf-x86-mem_event-validate-the-response-vcpu_id-before-acting-on-it.patch
  53cfdde4-x86-mem_event-prevent-underflow-of-vcpu-pause-counts.patch

- bnc#886801 - xl vncviewer: The first domu can be accessed by any id
  53c9151b-Fix-xl-vncviewer-accesses-port-0-by-any-invalid-domid.patch

- Upstream pygrub bug fix
  5370e03b-pygrub-fix-error-handling-if-no-valid-partitions-are-found.patch

- Fix pygrub to handle old 32 bit VMs
  pygrub-boot-legacy-sles.patch (Mike Latimer)

- Remove xen-vmresync utility.  It is an old Platespin Orchestrate
  utility that should have never been included in the Xen package.
  Updated xen.spec

- Rework xen-destroy utility included in xen-utils
  bnc#885292 and bnc#886063
  Updated xen-utils-0.1.tar.bz2

- bnc#886063 - Xen monitor fails (xl list --long output different
  from xm list --long output)
- bnc#885292 - VirtualDomain: pid_status does not know how to check
  status on SLE12

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Virtualization/xen?expand=0&rev=322
This commit is contained in:
Charles Arnold 2014-07-24 19:43:18 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
parent ba5dde9750
commit b94eda4466
18 changed files with 1040 additions and 69 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

59
5347b524-evtchn-eliminate-64k-ports-limitation.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
# Commit 8f7f6ab879a9ad9d2bf66b8c6b46a0653086b79f
# Date 2014-04-11 11:25:56 +0200
# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
evtchn: eliminate 64k ports limitation
The introduction of FIFO event channels claimed to support over 100k
ports, but failed to widen a number of 16-bit variables/operations.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/common/event_channel.c
+++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c
@@ -275,12 +275,12 @@ static long evtchn_bind_interdomain(evtc
goto out;
lchn->u.interdomain.remote_dom = rd;
- lchn->u.interdomain.remote_port = (u16)rport;
+ lchn->u.interdomain.remote_port = rport;
lchn->state = ECS_INTERDOMAIN;
evtchn_port_init(ld, lchn);
rchn->u.interdomain.remote_dom = ld;
- rchn->u.interdomain.remote_port = (u16)lport;
+ rchn->u.interdomain.remote_port = lport;
rchn->state = ECS_INTERDOMAIN;
/*
--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
@@ -86,13 +86,13 @@ struct evtchn
domid_t remote_domid;
} unbound; /* state == ECS_UNBOUND */
struct {
- u16 remote_port;
+ evtchn_port_t remote_port;
struct domain *remote_dom;
} interdomain; /* state == ECS_INTERDOMAIN */
struct {
- u16 irq;
- u16 next_port;
- u16 prev_port;
+ u32 irq;
+ evtchn_port_t next_port;
+ evtchn_port_t prev_port;
} pirq; /* state == ECS_PIRQ */
u16 virq; /* state == ECS_VIRQ */
} u;
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ struct vcpu
atomic_t pause_count;
/* IRQ-safe virq_lock protects against delivering VIRQ to stale evtchn. */
- u16 virq_to_evtchn[NR_VIRQS];
+ evtchn_port_t virq_to_evtchn[NR_VIRQS];
spinlock_t virq_lock;
/* Bitmask of CPUs on which this VCPU may run. */

40
5370e03b-pygrub-fix-error-handling-if-no-valid-partitions-are-found.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
Subject: tools/pygrub: Fix error handling if no valid partitions are found
From: Andrew Cooper andrew.cooper3@citrix.com Sat May 10 02:18:33 2014 +0100
Date: Mon May 12 15:52:43 2014 +0100:
Git: d75215805ce6ed20b3807955fab6a7f7a3368bee
If no partitions at all are found, pygrub never creates the name 'fs',
resulting in a NameError indicating the lack of fs, rather than a
RuntimeError explaining that no partitions were found.
Set fs to None right at the start, and use the pythonic idiom "if fs is None:"
to protect against otherwise valid values for fs which compare equal to
0/False.
Reported-by: Sven Köhler <sven.koehler@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub
===================================================================
--- xen-4.4.0-testing.orig/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub
+++ xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub
@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
usage()
sys.exit(1)
file = args[0]
-
+ fs = None
output = None
entry = None
interactive = True
@@ -882,7 +882,7 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(0)
# Did looping through partitions find us a kernel?
- if not fs:
+ if fs is None:
raise RuntimeError, "Unable to find partition containing kernel"
bootcfg["kernel"] = copy_from_image(fs, chosencfg["kernel"], "kernel",

165
53aac342-x86-HVM-consolidate-and-sanitize-CR4-guest-reserved-bit-determination.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
# Commit dab11417da4e21f43625f4ebbb68158f07003d04
# Date 2014-06-25 14:40:34 +0200
# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
x86/HVM: consolidate and sanitize CR4 guest reserved bit determination
First of all, this is needed by just a single source file, so it gets
moved there instead of getting fed to the compiler for most other
source files too. With that it becomes sensible for this to no longer
be a macro, allowing elimination of the mostly redundant helpers
hvm_vcpu_has_{smep,smap}(). And finally, following the model SMEP and
SMAP already used, tie the determination of reserved bits to the
features the guest is shown rather than the host's.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -828,6 +828,73 @@ static bool_t hvm_efer_valid(struct doma
((value & (EFER_LME|EFER_LMA)) == EFER_LMA));
}
+/* These reserved bits in lower 32 remain 0 after any load of CR0 */
+#define HVM_CR0_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS \
+ (~((unsigned long) \
+ (X86_CR0_PE | X86_CR0_MP | X86_CR0_EM | \
+ X86_CR0_TS | X86_CR0_ET | X86_CR0_NE | \
+ X86_CR0_WP | X86_CR0_AM | X86_CR0_NW | \
+ X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_PG)))
+
+/* These bits in CR4 cannot be set by the guest. */
+static unsigned long hvm_cr4_guest_reserved_bits(const struct vcpu *v,
+ bool_t restore)
+{
+ unsigned int leaf1_ecx = 0, leaf1_edx = 0;
+ unsigned int leaf7_0_ebx = 0, leaf7_0_ecx = 0;
+
+ if ( likely(!restore) )
+ {
+ unsigned int level;
+
+ ASSERT(v == current);
+ hvm_cpuid(0, &level, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if ( level >= 1 )
+ hvm_cpuid(1, NULL, NULL, &leaf1_ecx, &leaf1_edx);
+ if ( level >= 7 )
+ hvm_cpuid(7, NULL, &leaf7_0_ebx, &leaf7_0_ecx, NULL);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ leaf1_edx = boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[X86_FEATURE_VME / 32];
+ leaf1_ecx = boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[X86_FEATURE_PCID / 32];
+ leaf7_0_ebx = boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE / 32];
+ }
+
+ return ~(unsigned long)
+ ((leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_VME) ?
+ X86_CR4_VME | X86_CR4_PVI : 0) |
+ (leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_TSC) ?
+ X86_CR4_TSD : 0) |
+ (leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_DE) ?
+ X86_CR4_DE : 0) |
+ (leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_PSE) ?
+ X86_CR4_PSE : 0) |
+ (leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_PAE) ?
+ X86_CR4_PAE : 0) |
+ (leaf1_edx & (cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MCE) |
+ cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MCA)) ?
+ X86_CR4_MCE : 0) |
+ (leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_PGE) ?
+ X86_CR4_PGE : 0) |
+ X86_CR4_PCE |
+ (leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_FXSR) ?
+ X86_CR4_OSFXSR : 0) |
+ (leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_XMM) ?
+ X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT : 0) |
+ ((restore || nestedhvm_enabled(v->domain)) &&
+ (leaf1_ecx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_VMXE)) ?
+ X86_CR4_VMXE : 0) |
+ (leaf7_0_ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE) ?
+ X86_CR4_FSGSBASE : 0) |
+ (leaf1_ecx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_PCID) ?
+ X86_CR4_PCIDE : 0) |
+ (leaf1_ecx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) ?
+ X86_CR4_OSXSAVE : 0) |
+ (leaf7_0_ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMEP) ?
+ X86_CR4_SMEP : 0));
+}
+
static int hvm_load_cpu_ctxt(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
{
int vcpuid;
@@ -858,7 +925,7 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_ctxt(struct doma
return -EINVAL;
}
- if ( ctxt.cr4 & HVM_CR4_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS(v, 1) )
+ if ( ctxt.cr4 & hvm_cr4_guest_reserved_bits(v, 1) )
{
printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "HVM%d restore: bad CR4 %#" PRIx64 "\n",
d->domain_id, ctxt.cr4);
@@ -1977,7 +2044,7 @@ int hvm_set_cr4(unsigned long value)
struct vcpu *v = current;
unsigned long old_cr;
- if ( value & HVM_CR4_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS(v, 0) )
+ if ( value & hvm_cr4_guest_reserved_bits(v, 0) )
{
HVM_DBG_LOG(DBG_LEVEL_1,
"Guest attempts to set reserved bit in CR4: %lx",
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
@@ -347,51 +347,10 @@ static inline int hvm_event_pending(stru
return hvm_funcs.event_pending(v);
}
-static inline bool_t hvm_vcpu_has_smep(void)
-{
- unsigned int eax, ebx;
-
- hvm_cpuid(0, &eax, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-
- if ( eax < 7 )
- return 0;
-
- hvm_cpuid(7, NULL, &ebx, NULL, NULL);
- return !!(ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMEP));
-}
-
-/* These reserved bits in lower 32 remain 0 after any load of CR0 */
-#define HVM_CR0_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS \
- (~((unsigned long) \
- (X86_CR0_PE | X86_CR0_MP | X86_CR0_EM | \
- X86_CR0_TS | X86_CR0_ET | X86_CR0_NE | \
- X86_CR0_WP | X86_CR0_AM | X86_CR0_NW | \
- X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_PG)))
-
/* These bits in CR4 are owned by the host. */
#define HVM_CR4_HOST_MASK (mmu_cr4_features & \
(X86_CR4_VMXE | X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_MCE))
-/* These bits in CR4 cannot be set by the guest. */
-#define HVM_CR4_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS(v, restore) ({ \
- const struct vcpu *_v = (v); \
- bool_t _restore = !!(restore); \
- ASSERT((_restore) || _v == current); \
- (~((unsigned long) \
- (X86_CR4_VME | X86_CR4_PVI | X86_CR4_TSD | \
- X86_CR4_DE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PAE | \
- X86_CR4_MCE | X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PCE | \
- X86_CR4_OSFXSR | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | \
- (((_restore) ? cpu_has_smep : \
- hvm_vcpu_has_smep()) ? \
- X86_CR4_SMEP : 0) | \
- (cpu_has_fsgsbase ? X86_CR4_FSGSBASE : 0) | \
- ((nestedhvm_enabled(_v->domain) && cpu_has_vmx) \
- ? X86_CR4_VMXE : 0) | \
- (cpu_has_pcid ? X86_CR4_PCIDE : 0) | \
- (cpu_has_xsave ? X86_CR4_OSXSAVE : 0)))); \
-})
-
/* These exceptions must always be intercepted. */
#define HVM_TRAP_MASK ((1U << TRAP_machine_check) | (1U << TRAP_invalid_op))

103
53b16cd4-VT-d-ATS-correct-and-clean-up-dev_invalidate_iotlb.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
# Commit fd33987ba27607c3cc7da258cf1d86d21beeb735
# Date 2014-06-30 15:57:40 +0200
# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
VT-d/ATS: correct and clean up dev_invalidate_iotlb()
While this was intended to only do cleanup (replace the two bogus
"ret |= " constructs, and a simple formatting correction), this now
also
- fixes the bit manipulations for size_order > 0
a) correct an off-by-one in the use of size_order for shifting (till
now double the requested size got invalidated)
b) in fact setting bit 12 and up if necessary (without which too
small a region might have got invalidated)
c) making them capable of dealing with regions of 4Gb size and up
- corrects the return value handling, such that a later iteration's
success won't clear an earlier iteration's error indication
- uses PCI_BDF2() instead of open coding it
- bail immediately on bad passed in invalidation type, rather than
repeatedly printing the same message for each ATS-capable device, at
once also no longer hiding that failure from the caller
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/ats.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/ats.c
@@ -110,21 +110,23 @@ int dev_invalidate_iotlb(struct iommu *i
u64 addr, unsigned int size_order, u64 type)
{
struct pci_ats_dev *pdev;
- int sbit, ret = 0;
- u16 sid;
+ int ret = 0;
if ( !ecap_dev_iotlb(iommu->ecap) )
return ret;
list_for_each_entry( pdev, &ats_devices, list )
{
- sid = (pdev->bus << 8) | pdev->devfn;
+ u16 sid = PCI_BDF2(pdev->bus, pdev->devfn);
+ bool_t sbit;
+ int rc = 0;
/* Only invalidate devices that belong to this IOMMU */
if ( pdev->iommu != iommu )
continue;
- switch ( type ) {
+ switch ( type )
+ {
case DMA_TLB_DSI_FLUSH:
if ( !device_in_domain(iommu, pdev, did) )
break;
@@ -133,32 +135,37 @@ int dev_invalidate_iotlb(struct iommu *i
/* invalidate all translations: sbit=1,bit_63=0,bit[62:12]=1 */
sbit = 1;
addr = (~0 << PAGE_SHIFT_4K) & 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF;
- ret |= qinval_device_iotlb(iommu, pdev->ats_queue_depth,
- sid, sbit, addr);
+ rc = qinval_device_iotlb(iommu, pdev->ats_queue_depth,
+ sid, sbit, addr);
break;
case DMA_TLB_PSI_FLUSH:
if ( !device_in_domain(iommu, pdev, did) )
break;
- addr &= ~0 << (PAGE_SHIFT + size_order);
-
/* if size <= 4K, set sbit = 0, else set sbit = 1 */
sbit = size_order ? 1 : 0;
/* clear lower bits */
- addr &= (~0 << (PAGE_SHIFT + size_order));
+ addr &= ~0 << PAGE_SHIFT_4K;
/* if sbit == 1, zero out size_order bit and set lower bits to 1 */
if ( sbit )
- addr &= (~0 & ~(1 << (PAGE_SHIFT + size_order)));
+ {
+ addr &= ~((u64)PAGE_SIZE_4K << (size_order - 1));
+ addr |= (((u64)1 << (size_order - 1)) - 1) << PAGE_SHIFT_4K;
+ }
- ret |= qinval_device_iotlb(iommu, pdev->ats_queue_depth,
- sid, sbit, addr);
+ rc = qinval_device_iotlb(iommu, pdev->ats_queue_depth,
+ sid, sbit, addr);
break;
default:
dprintk(XENLOG_WARNING VTDPREFIX, "invalid vt-d flush type\n");
- break;
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
+
+ if ( !ret )
+ ret = rc;
}
+
return ret;
}

218
53b56de1-properly-reference-count-DOMCTL_-un-pausedomain-hypercalls.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
# Commit 3eb1c708ab0fe1067a436498a684907afa14dacf
# Date 2014-07-03 16:51:13 +0200
# Author Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
properly reference count DOMCTL_{,un}pausedomain hypercalls
For safety reasons, c/s 6ae2df93c27 "mem_access: Add helper API to setup
ring and enable mem_access" has to pause the domain while it performs a set of
operations.
However without properly reference counted hypercalls, xc_mem_event_enable()
now unconditionally unpauses a previously paused domain.
To prevent toolstack software running wild, there is an arbitrary limit of 255
on the toolstack pause count. This is high enough for several components of
the toolstack to safely use, but prevents over/underflow of d->pause_count.
The previous domain_{,un}pause_by_systemcontroller() functions are updated to
return an error code. domain_pause_by_systemcontroller() is modified to have
a common stub and take a pause_fn pointer, allowing for both sync and nosync
domain pauses. domain_pause_for_debugger() has a hand-rolled nosync pause
replaced with the new domain_pause_by_systemcontroller_nosync(), and has its
variables shuffled slightly to avoid rereading current multiple times.
Suggested-by: Don Slutz <dslutz@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
With a couple of formatting adjustments:
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
@@ -1019,7 +1019,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
struct vcpu *v;
ret = -EBUSY;
- if ( !d->is_paused_by_controller )
+ if ( !d->controller_pause_count )
break;
ret = -EINVAL;
if ( domctl->u.gdbsx_pauseunp_vcpu.vcpu >= MAX_VIRT_CPUS ||
@@ -1035,7 +1035,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
struct vcpu *v;
ret = -EBUSY;
- if ( !d->is_paused_by_controller )
+ if ( !d->controller_pause_count )
break;
ret = -EINVAL;
if ( domctl->u.gdbsx_pauseunp_vcpu.vcpu >= MAX_VIRT_CPUS ||
@@ -1053,7 +1053,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
struct vcpu *v;
domctl->u.gdbsx_domstatus.vcpu_id = -1;
- domctl->u.gdbsx_domstatus.paused = d->is_paused_by_controller;
+ domctl->u.gdbsx_domstatus.paused = d->controller_pause_count > 0;
if ( domctl->u.gdbsx_domstatus.paused )
{
for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
--- a/xen/common/domain.c
+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ struct domain *domain_create(
if ( (err = xsm_domain_create(XSM_HOOK, d, ssidref)) != 0 )
goto fail;
- d->is_paused_by_controller = 1;
+ d->controller_pause_count = 1;
atomic_inc(&d->pause_count);
if ( domid )
@@ -680,18 +680,13 @@ void vcpu_end_shutdown_deferral(struct v
#ifdef HAS_GDBSX
void domain_pause_for_debugger(void)
{
- struct domain *d = current->domain;
- struct vcpu *v;
-
- atomic_inc(&d->pause_count);
- if ( test_and_set_bool(d->is_paused_by_controller) )
- domain_unpause(d); /* race-free atomic_dec(&d->pause_count) */
+ struct vcpu *curr = current;
+ struct domain *d = curr->domain;
- for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
- vcpu_sleep_nosync(v);
+ domain_pause_by_systemcontroller_nosync(d);
/* if gdbsx active, we just need to pause the domain */
- if (current->arch.gdbsx_vcpu_event == 0)
+ if ( curr->arch.gdbsx_vcpu_event == 0 )
send_global_virq(VIRQ_DEBUGGER);
}
#endif
@@ -839,17 +834,49 @@ void domain_unpause(struct domain *d)
vcpu_wake(v);
}
-void domain_pause_by_systemcontroller(struct domain *d)
+int __domain_pause_by_systemcontroller(struct domain *d,
+ void (*pause_fn)(struct domain *d))
{
- domain_pause(d);
- if ( test_and_set_bool(d->is_paused_by_controller) )
- domain_unpause(d);
+ int old, new, prev = d->controller_pause_count;
+
+ do
+ {
+ old = prev;
+ new = old + 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Limit the toolstack pause count to an arbitrary 255 to prevent the
+ * toolstack overflowing d->pause_count with many repeated hypercalls.
+ */
+ if ( new > 255 )
+ return -EUSERS;
+
+ prev = cmpxchg(&d->controller_pause_count, old, new);
+ } while ( prev != old );
+
+ pause_fn(d);
+
+ return 0;
}
-void domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(struct domain *d)
+int domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(struct domain *d)
{
- if ( test_and_clear_bool(d->is_paused_by_controller) )
- domain_unpause(d);
+ int old, new, prev = d->controller_pause_count;
+
+ do
+ {
+ old = prev;
+ new = old - 1;
+
+ if ( new < 0 )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ prev = cmpxchg(&d->controller_pause_count, old, new);
+ } while ( prev != old );
+
+ domain_unpause(d);
+
+ return 0;
}
int vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *v)
--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ void getdomaininfo(struct domain *d, str
info->flags = (info->nr_online_vcpus ? flags : 0) |
((d->is_dying == DOMDYING_dead) ? XEN_DOMINF_dying : 0) |
(d->is_shut_down ? XEN_DOMINF_shutdown : 0) |
- (d->is_paused_by_controller ? XEN_DOMINF_paused : 0) |
+ (d->controller_pause_count > 0 ? XEN_DOMINF_paused : 0) |
(d->debugger_attached ? XEN_DOMINF_debugged : 0) |
d->shutdown_code << XEN_DOMINF_shutdownshift;
@@ -384,22 +384,14 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
break;
case XEN_DOMCTL_pausedomain:
- {
ret = -EINVAL;
if ( d != current->domain )
- {
- domain_pause_by_systemcontroller(d);
- ret = 0;
- }
- }
- break;
+ ret = domain_pause_by_systemcontroller(d);
+ break;
case XEN_DOMCTL_unpausedomain:
- {
- domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(d);
- ret = 0;
- }
- break;
+ ret = domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(d);
+ break;
case XEN_DOMCTL_resumedomain:
{
--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ struct domain
/* Is this guest dying (i.e., a zombie)? */
enum { DOMDYING_alive, DOMDYING_dying, DOMDYING_dead } is_dying;
/* Domain is paused by controller software? */
- bool_t is_paused_by_controller;
+ int controller_pause_count;
/* Domain's VCPUs are pinned 1:1 to physical CPUs? */
bool_t is_pinned;
@@ -742,8 +742,17 @@ void domain_pause(struct domain *d);
void domain_pause_nosync(struct domain *d);
void vcpu_unpause(struct vcpu *v);
void domain_unpause(struct domain *d);
-void domain_pause_by_systemcontroller(struct domain *d);
-void domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(struct domain *d);
+int domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(struct domain *d);
+int __domain_pause_by_systemcontroller(struct domain *d,
+ void (*pause_fn)(struct domain *d));
+static inline int domain_pause_by_systemcontroller(struct domain *d)
+{
+ return __domain_pause_by_systemcontroller(d, domain_pause);
+}
+static inline int domain_pause_by_systemcontroller_nosync(struct domain *d)
+{
+ return __domain_pause_by_systemcontroller(d, domain_pause_nosync);
+}
void cpu_init(void);
struct scheduler;

39
53c9151b-Fix-xl-vncviewer-accesses-port-0-by-any-invalid-domid.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
Subject: xl: 'xl vncviewer' accesses port 0 by any invalid domid
From: Chunyan Liu cyliu@suse.com Fri Jul 18 14:18:04 2014 +0800
Date: Fri Jul 18 13:37:47 2014 +0100:
Git: 2a8cc1a55329ead252ed323ec4bbee534d5c0f23
Currently, with command:
xl vncviewer invalid_domid
it always brings user to the domU using vncport 5900.
The invalid domid could be an non-existing one or Dom0.
It's better to report error in this case.
Correct libxl_vncviewer_exec:
In existing code, when vncport is NULL, it still continues
and will show vncport 5900. So, with 'xl vncviewer 0' it also
wrongly shows domU using vncport 5900. Correct it to report error
if vncport is NULL.
Signed-off-by: Chunyan Liu <cyliu@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.4.0-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl.c
+++ xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
@@ -1635,8 +1635,12 @@ int libxl_vncviewer_exec(libxl_ctx *ctx,
vnc_port = libxl__xs_read(gc, XBT_NULL,
libxl__sprintf(gc,
"/local/domain/%d/console/vnc-port", domid));
- if ( vnc_port )
- port = atoi(vnc_port) - 5900;
+ if (!vnc_port) {
+ LOG(ERROR, "Cannot get vnc-port of domain %d", domid);
+ goto x_fail;
+ }
+
+ port = atoi(vnc_port) - 5900;
vnc_listen = libxl__xs_read(gc, XBT_NULL,
libxl__sprintf(gc,

46
53cfdcc7-avoid-crash-when-doing-shutdown-with-active-cpupools.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
# Commit 05377dede434c746e6708f055858378d20f619db
# Date 2014-07-23 18:03:19 +0200
# Author Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
avoid crash when doing shutdown with active cpupools
When shutting down the machine while there are cpus in a cpupool other than
Pool-0 a crash is triggered due to cpupool handling rejecting offlining the
non-boot cpus in other cpupools.
It is easy to detect this case and allow offlining those cpus.
Reported-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
--- a/xen/common/cpupool.c
+++ b/xen/common/cpupool.c
@@ -471,12 +471,24 @@ static void cpupool_cpu_add(unsigned int
*/
static int cpupool_cpu_remove(unsigned int cpu)
{
- int ret = 0;
+ int ret = -EBUSY;
+ struct cpupool **c;
spin_lock(&cpupool_lock);
- if ( !cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, cpupool0->cpu_valid))
- ret = -EBUSY;
+ if ( cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, cpupool0->cpu_valid) )
+ ret = 0;
else
+ {
+ for_each_cpupool(c)
+ {
+ if ( cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, (*c)->cpu_suspended ) )
+ {
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if ( !ret )
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, &cpupool_locked_cpus);
spin_unlock(&cpupool_lock);

86
53cfddaf-x86-mem_event-validate-the-response-vcpu_id-before-acting-on-it.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
# Commit ee75480b3c8856db9ef1aa45418f35ec0d78989d
# Date 2014-07-23 18:07:11 +0200
# Author Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
x86/mem_event: validate the response vcpu_id before acting on it
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andres@lagarcavilla.org>
Tested-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c
@@ -596,11 +596,20 @@ int mem_sharing_sharing_resume(struct do
/* Get all requests off the ring */
while ( mem_event_get_response(d, &d->mem_event->share, &rsp) )
{
+ struct vcpu *v;
+
if ( rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_DUMMY )
continue;
+
+ /* Validate the vcpu_id in the response. */
+ if ( (rsp.vcpu_id >= d->max_vcpus) || !d->vcpu[rsp.vcpu_id] )
+ continue;
+
+ v = d->vcpu[rsp.vcpu_id];
+
/* Unpause domain/vcpu */
if ( rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED )
- vcpu_unpause(d->vcpu[rsp.vcpu_id]);
+ vcpu_unpause(v);
}
return 0;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -1228,8 +1228,17 @@ void p2m_mem_paging_resume(struct domain
/* Pull all responses off the ring */
while( mem_event_get_response(d, &d->mem_event->paging, &rsp) )
{
+ struct vcpu *v;
+
if ( rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_DUMMY )
continue;
+
+ /* Validate the vcpu_id in the response. */
+ if ( (rsp.vcpu_id >= d->max_vcpus) || !d->vcpu[rsp.vcpu_id] )
+ continue;
+
+ v = d->vcpu[rsp.vcpu_id];
+
/* Fix p2m entry if the page was not dropped */
if ( !(rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_DROP_PAGE) )
{
@@ -1248,7 +1257,7 @@ void p2m_mem_paging_resume(struct domain
}
/* Unpause domain */
if ( rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED )
- vcpu_unpause(d->vcpu[rsp.vcpu_id]);
+ vcpu_unpause(v);
}
}
@@ -1356,11 +1365,20 @@ void p2m_mem_access_resume(struct domain
/* Pull all responses off the ring */
while( mem_event_get_response(d, &d->mem_event->access, &rsp) )
{
+ struct vcpu *v;
+
if ( rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_DUMMY )
continue;
+
+ /* Validate the vcpu_id in the response. */
+ if ( (rsp.vcpu_id >= d->max_vcpus) || !d->vcpu[rsp.vcpu_id] )
+ continue;
+
+ v = d->vcpu[rsp.vcpu_id];
+
/* Unpause domain */
if ( rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED )
- vcpu_unpause(d->vcpu[rsp.vcpu_id]);
+ vcpu_unpause(v);
}
}

145
53cfdde4-x86-mem_event-prevent-underflow-of-vcpu-pause-counts.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
# Commit 868d9b99b39c53dc1f6ae9bfd7b148c206fd7240
# Date 2014-07-23 18:08:04 +0200
# Author Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
x86/mem_event: prevent underflow of vcpu pause counts
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Reviewed-by: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andres@lagarcavilla.org>
Tested-by: Aravindh Puthiyaparambil <aravindp@cisco.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -4762,7 +4762,7 @@ static int hvm_memory_event_traps(long p
if ( (p & HVMPME_MODE_MASK) == HVMPME_mode_sync )
{
req.flags |= MEM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED;
- vcpu_pause_nosync(v);
+ mem_event_vcpu_pause(v);
}
req.gfn = value;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_event.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_event.c
@@ -655,6 +655,38 @@ int mem_event_domctl(struct domain *d, x
return rc;
}
+void mem_event_vcpu_pause(struct vcpu *v)
+{
+ ASSERT(v == current);
+
+ atomic_inc(&v->mem_event_pause_count);
+ vcpu_pause_nosync(v);
+}
+
+void mem_event_vcpu_unpause(struct vcpu *v)
+{
+ int old, new, prev = v->mem_event_pause_count.counter;
+
+ /* All unpause requests as a result of toolstack responses. Prevent
+ * underflow of the vcpu pause count. */
+ do
+ {
+ old = prev;
+ new = old - 1;
+
+ if ( new < 0 )
+ {
+ printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
+ "d%d:v%d mem_event: Too many unpause attempts\n",
+ v->domain->domain_id, v->vcpu_id);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ prev = cmpxchg(&v->mem_event_pause_count.counter, old, new);
+ } while ( prev != old );
+
+ vcpu_unpause(v);
+}
/*
* Local variables:
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ int mem_sharing_notify_enomem(struct dom
if ( v->domain == d )
{
req.flags = MEM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED;
- vcpu_pause_nosync(v);
+ mem_event_vcpu_pause(v);
}
req.p2mt = p2m_ram_shared;
@@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ int mem_sharing_sharing_resume(struct do
/* Unpause domain/vcpu */
if ( rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED )
- vcpu_unpause(v);
+ mem_event_vcpu_unpause(v);
}
return 0;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@ void p2m_mem_paging_populate(struct doma
/* Pause domain if request came from guest and gfn has paging type */
if ( p2m_is_paging(p2mt) && v->domain == d )
{
- vcpu_pause_nosync(v);
+ mem_event_vcpu_pause(v);
req.flags |= MEM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED;
}
/* No need to inform pager if the gfn is not in the page-out path */
@@ -1257,7 +1257,7 @@ void p2m_mem_paging_resume(struct domain
}
/* Unpause domain */
if ( rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED )
- vcpu_unpause(v);
+ mem_event_vcpu_unpause(v);
}
}
@@ -1352,7 +1352,7 @@ bool_t p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa,
/* Pause the current VCPU */
if ( p2ma != p2m_access_n2rwx )
- vcpu_pause_nosync(v);
+ mem_event_vcpu_pause(v);
/* VCPU may be paused, return whether we promoted automatically */
return (p2ma == p2m_access_n2rwx);
@@ -1378,7 +1378,7 @@ void p2m_mem_access_resume(struct domain
/* Unpause domain */
if ( rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED )
- vcpu_unpause(v);
+ mem_event_vcpu_unpause(v);
}
}
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mem_event.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mem_event.h
@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ int do_mem_event_op(int op, uint32_t dom
int mem_event_domctl(struct domain *d, xen_domctl_mem_event_op_t *mec,
XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) u_domctl);
+void mem_event_vcpu_pause(struct vcpu *v);
+void mem_event_vcpu_unpause(struct vcpu *v);
+
#endif /* __MEM_EVENT_H__ */
--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
@@ -189,6 +189,9 @@ struct vcpu
unsigned long pause_flags;
atomic_t pause_count;
+ /* VCPU paused for mem_event replies. */
+ atomic_t mem_event_pause_count;
+
/* IRQ-safe virq_lock protects against delivering VIRQ to stale evtchn. */
evtchn_port_t virq_to_evtchn[NR_VIRQS];
spinlock_t virq_lock;

2
libxl.add-option-for-discard-support-to-xl-disk-conf.patch
View File

@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.4.0-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl.c
+++ xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
@@ -2480,6 +2480,8 @@ static void device_disk_add(libxl__egc *
@@ -2484,6 +2484,8 @@ static void device_disk_add(libxl__egc *
flexarray_append(back, disk->readwrite ? "w" : "r");
flexarray_append(back, "device-type");
flexarray_append(back, disk->is_cdrom ? "cdrom" : "disk");

2
libxl.add-option-to-disable-disk-cache-flushes-in-qdisk.patch
View File

@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.4.0-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl.c
+++ xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
@@ -2484,6 +2484,8 @@ static void device_disk_add(libxl__egc *
@@ -2488,6 +2488,8 @@ static void device_disk_add(libxl__egc *
flexarray_append_pair(back, "direct-io-safe", "1");
if ((disk->readwrite & ~LIBXL_HAVE_LIBXL_DEVICE_DISK_DISCARD_DISABLE_MASK) == LIBXL_HAVE_LIBXL_DEVICE_DISK_DISCARD_DISABLE_MAGIC)
flexarray_append_pair(back, "discard-enable", "0");

2
libxl.introduce-an-option-to-disable-the-non-O_DIRECT-workaround.patch
View File

@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.4.0-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl.c
+++ xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
@@ -2480,6 +2480,8 @@ static void device_disk_add(libxl__egc *
@@ -2484,6 +2484,8 @@ static void device_disk_add(libxl__egc *
flexarray_append(back, disk->readwrite ? "w" : "r");
flexarray_append(back, "device-type");
flexarray_append(back, disk->is_cdrom ? "cdrom" : "disk");

12
libxl.pvscsi.patch
View File

@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.4.0-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl.c
+++ xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
@@ -2017,6 +2017,273 @@ int libxl_devid_to_device_vtpm(libxl_ctx
@@ -2021,6 +2021,273 @@ int libxl_devid_to_device_vtpm(libxl_ctx
return rc;
}
@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
/******************************************************************************/
@@ -3485,6 +3752,8 @@ out:
@@ -3489,6 +3756,8 @@ out:
* libxl_device_vkb_destroy
* libxl_device_vfb_remove
* libxl_device_vfb_destroy
@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
*/
#define DEFINE_DEVICE_REMOVE(type, removedestroy, f) \
int libxl_device_##type##_##removedestroy(libxl_ctx *ctx, \
@@ -3536,6 +3805,10 @@ DEFINE_DEVICE_REMOVE(vfb, destroy, 1)
@@ -3540,6 +3809,10 @@ DEFINE_DEVICE_REMOVE(vfb, destroy, 1)
DEFINE_DEVICE_REMOVE(vtpm, remove, 0)
DEFINE_DEVICE_REMOVE(vtpm, destroy, 1)
@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
#undef DEFINE_DEVICE_REMOVE
/******************************************************************************/
@@ -3545,6 +3818,7 @@ DEFINE_DEVICE_REMOVE(vtpm, destroy, 1)
@@ -3549,6 +3822,7 @@ DEFINE_DEVICE_REMOVE(vtpm, destroy, 1)
* libxl_device_disk_add
* libxl_device_nic_add
* libxl_device_vtpm_add
@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
*/
#define DEFINE_DEVICE_ADD(type) \
@@ -3574,6 +3848,9 @@ DEFINE_DEVICE_ADD(nic)
@@ -3578,6 +3852,9 @@ DEFINE_DEVICE_ADD(nic)
/* vtpm */
DEFINE_DEVICE_ADD(vtpm)
@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
#undef DEFINE_DEVICE_ADD
/******************************************************************************/
@@ -5678,6 +5955,20 @@ int libxl_fd_set_cloexec(libxl_ctx *ctx,
@@ -5682,6 +5959,20 @@ int libxl_fd_set_cloexec(libxl_ctx *ctx,
int libxl_fd_set_nonblock(libxl_ctx *ctx, int fd, int nonblock)
{ return fd_set_flags(ctx,fd, F_GETFL,F_SETFL,"FL", O_NONBLOCK, nonblock); }

8
local_attach_support_for_phy.patch
View File

@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.4.0-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl.c
+++ xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
@@ -2630,6 +2630,16 @@ void libxl__device_disk_local_initiate_a
@@ -2634,6 +2634,16 @@ void libxl__device_disk_local_initiate_a
switch (disk->backend) {
case LIBXL_DISK_BACKEND_PHY:
@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
LIBXL__LOG(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_DEBUG, "locally attaching PHY disk %s",
disk->pdev_path);
dev = disk->pdev_path;
@@ -2709,7 +2719,7 @@ static void local_device_attach_cb(libxl
@@ -2713,7 +2723,7 @@ static void local_device_attach_cb(libxl
}
dev = GCSPRINTF("/dev/%s", disk->vdev);
@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
rc = libxl__device_from_disk(gc, LIBXL_TOOLSTACK_DOMID, disk, &device);
if (rc < 0)
@@ -2749,6 +2759,7 @@ void libxl__device_disk_local_initiate_d
@@ -2753,6 +2763,7 @@ void libxl__device_disk_local_initiate_d
if (!dls->diskpath) goto out;
switch (disk->backend) {
@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
case LIBXL_DISK_BACKEND_QDISK:
if (disk->vdev != NULL) {
GCNEW(device);
@@ -2766,7 +2777,6 @@ void libxl__device_disk_local_initiate_d
@@ -2770,7 +2781,6 @@ void libxl__device_disk_local_initiate_d
/* disk->vdev == NULL; fall through */
default:
/*

15
pygrub-boot-legacy-sles.patch
View File

@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub
+ # If missing config or grub has no menu entries to select, look for
+ # vmlinuz-xen and initrd-xen in /boot
+ if g.__dict__.get('cf', None) is None or len(g.cf.images) == 0:
+ if g.__dict__.get('cf', None) is None or len(g.cf.images) == 0 or re.search(r"xen(-pae)?\.gz",g.cf.images[0].kernel[1]):
+ if not list_entries:
+ chosencfg = { "kernel": None, "ramdisk": None, "args": "" }
+ chosencfg = sniff_xen_kernel(fs, incfg)
@ -32,22 +32,27 @@ Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub
if list_entries:
for i in range(len(g.cf.images)):
img = g.cf.images[i]
@@ -693,6 +707,14 @@ def sniff_netware(fs, cfg):
@@ -693,6 +707,19 @@ def sniff_netware(fs, cfg):
return cfg
+def sniff_xen_kernel(fs, cfg):
+ if not cfg["kernel"] and fs.file_exists('/boot/vmlinuz-xen'):
+ cfg["kernel"] = '/boot/vmlinuz-xen'
+ if not cfg["kernel"]:
+ if fs.file_exists('/boot/vmlinuz-xen'):
+ cfg["kernel"] = '/boot/vmlinuz-xen'
+ elif fs.file_exists('/boot/vmlinuz-xenpae'):
+ cfg["kernel"] = '/boot/vmlinuz-xenpae'
+ if cfg["kernel"] and not cfg["ramdisk"]:
+ if fs.file_exists('/boot/initrd-xen'):
+ cfg["ramdisk"] = '/boot/initrd-xen'
+ elif fs.file_exists('/boot/initrd-xenpae'):
+ cfg["ramdisk"] = '/boot/initrd-xenpae'
+ return cfg
+
def format_sxp(kernel, ramdisk, args):
s = "linux (kernel %s)" % kernel
if ramdisk:
@@ -773,7 +795,7 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
@@ -773,7 +800,7 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
debug = False
not_really = False
output_format = "sxp"

4
xen-utils-0.1.tar.bz2
View File

@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:991414430321489fa2f31d2ad3cf0fcea00f5cc0312a48b90e14702e02559b42
size 8438
oid sha256:7c17e060de0b507ec0673f84dde727c6d583f781051981b75204e46f31704e14
size 6171

55
xen.changes
View File

@ -1,3 +1,58 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Jul 24 07:54:34 MDT 2014 - carnold@suse.com
- Upstream patches from Jan
5347b524-evtchn-eliminate-64k-ports-limitation.patch
53aac342-x86-HVM-consolidate-and-sanitize-CR4-guest-reserved-bit-determination.patch
53b16cd4-VT-d-ATS-correct-and-clean-up-dev_invalidate_iotlb.patch
53b56de1-properly-reference-count-DOMCTL_-un-pausedomain-hypercalls.patch
53cfdcc7-avoid-crash-when-doing-shutdown-with-active-cpupools.patch
53cfddaf-x86-mem_event-validate-the-response-vcpu_id-before-acting-on-it.patch
53cfdde4-x86-mem_event-prevent-underflow-of-vcpu-pause-counts.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Jul 21 03:05:48 UTC 2014 - cyliu@suse.com
- bnc#886801 - xl vncviewer: The first domu can be accessed by any id
53c9151b-Fix-xl-vncviewer-accesses-port-0-by-any-invalid-domid.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Jul 14 11:14:38 MDT 2014 - carnold@suse.com
- Upstream pygrub bug fix
5370e03b-pygrub-fix-error-handling-if-no-valid-partitions-are-found.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Wed Jul 9 16:45:58 MDT 2014 - carnold@suse.com
- Fix pygrub to handle old 32 bit VMs
pygrub-boot-legacy-sles.patch (Mike Latimer)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Jul 7 17:54:58 MDT 2014 - jfehlig@suse.com
- Remove xen-vmresync utility. It is an old Platespin Orchestrate
utility that should have never been included in the Xen package.
Updated xen.spec
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Jul 7 17:01:59 MDT 2014 - jfehlig@suse.com
- Rework xen-destroy utility included in xen-utils
bnc#885292 and bnc#886063
Updated xen-utils-0.1.tar.bz2
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Jul 07 11:40:32 MDT 2014 - carnold@suse.com
- bnc#886063 - Xen monitor fails (xl list --long output different
from xm list --long output)
- bnc#885292 - VirtualDomain: pid_status does not know how to check
status on SLE12
Re-enable building xen-utils for sle12 and include xen-list and
xen-destroy in the xen-tools package for HA.
xen.spec
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fri Jun 27 12:21:47 MDT 2014 - carnold@suse.com

108
xen.spec
View File

@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
# Please submit bugfixes or comments via http://bugs.opensuse.org/
#
# needssslcertforbuild
Name: xen
@ -154,7 +153,7 @@ BuildRequires: xorg-x11-util-devel
%endif
%endif
Version: 4.4.0_24
Version: 4.4.0_26
Release: 0
PreReq: %insserv_prereq %fillup_prereq
Summary: Xen Virtualization: Hypervisor (aka VMM aka Microkernel)
@ -239,42 +238,51 @@ Patch23: 533ad1ee-VMX-fix-PAT-value-seen-by-guest.patch
Patch24: 533d413b-x86-mm-fix-checks-against-max_mapped_pfn.patch
Patch25: 53455585-x86-AMD-feature-masking-is-unavailable-on-Fam11.patch
Patch26: 5346a7a0-x86-AMD-support-further-feature-masking-MSRs.patch
Patch27: 534bbd90-x86-nested-HAP-don-t-BUG-on-legitimate-error.patch
Patch28: 534bdf47-x86-HAP-also-flush-TLB-when-altering-a-present-1G-or-intermediate-entry.patch
Patch29: 53563ea4-x86-MSI-drop-workaround-for-insecure-Dom0-kernels.patch
Patch30: 5357baff-x86-add-missing-break-in-dom0_pit_access.patch
Patch31: 535a34eb-VT-d-suppress-UR-signaling-for-server-chipsets.patch
Patch32: 535a3516-VT-d-suppress-UR-signaling-for-desktop-chipsets.patch
Patch33: 535a354b-passthrough-allow-to-suppress-SERR-and-PERR-signaling.patch
Patch34: 535e31bc-x86-HVM-correct-the-SMEP-logic-for-HVM_CR0_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS.patch
Patch35: 535fa503-x86-HVM-restrict-HVMOP_set_mem_type.patch
Patch36: 53636978-hvm_set_ioreq_page-releases-wrong-page-in-error-path.patch
Patch37: 53636ebf-x86-fix-guest-CPUID-handling.patch
Patch38: 53709b77-Nested-VMX-load-current_vmcs-only-when-it-exists.patch
Patch39: 53732f4f-x86-MCE-bypass-uninitialized-vcpu-in-vMCE-injection.patch
Patch40: 537b5e50-VT-d-apply-quirks-at-device-setup-time-rather-than-only-at-boot.patch
Patch41: 537b5e79-VT-d-extend-error-report-masking-workaround-to-newer-chipsets.patch
Patch42: 537b5ede-move-domain-to-cpupool0-before-destroying-it.patch
Patch43: 537cd0b0-hvmloader-also-cover-PCI-MMIO-ranges-above-4G-with-UC-MTRR-ranges.patch
Patch44: 537cd0cc-hvmloader-PA-range-0xfc000000-0xffffffff-should-be-UC.patch
Patch45: 5383167d-ACPI-ERST-fix-table-mapping.patch
Patch46: 5383175e-VT-d-fix-mask-applied-to-DMIBAR-in-desktop-chipset-XSA-59-workaround.patch
Patch47: 53859549-AMD-IOMMU-don-t-free-page-table-prematurely.patch
Patch48: 5385956b-x86-don-t-use-VA-for-cache-flush-when-also-flushing-TLB.patch
Patch49: 53859956-timers-set-the-deadline-more-accurately.patch
Patch50: 538c338f-x86-amd_ucode-flip-revision-numbers-in-printk.patch
Patch51: 538dcada-x86-HVM-eliminate-vulnerabilities-from-hvm_inject_msi.patch
Patch52: 538ee637-ACPI-Prevent-acpi_table_entries-from-falling-into-a-infinite-loop.patch
Patch53: 5390917a-VT-d-honor-APEI-firmware-first-mode-in-XSA-59-workaround-code.patch
Patch54: 53909259-x86-domctl-two-functional-fixes-to-XEN_DOMCTL_-gs-etvcpuextstate.patch
Patch55: 5390927f-x86-fix-reboot-shutdown-with-running-HVM-guests.patch
Patch56: 5396d818-avoid-crash-on-HVM-domain-destroy-with-PCI-passthrough.patch
Patch57: 5396e805-x86-HVM-refine-SMEP-test-in-HVM_CR4_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS.patch
Patch58: 539ebe62-x86-EFI-improve-boot-time-diagnostics.patch
Patch59: 539ec004-x86-mce-don-t-spam-the-console-with-CPUx-Temperature-z.patch
Patch60: 53a040c6-page-alloc-scrub-pages-used-by-hypervisor-upon-freeing.patch
Patch61: 53a1990a-IOMMU-prevent-VT-d-device-IOTLB-operations-on-wrong-IOMMU.patch
Patch62: 53a199d7-x86-EFI-allow-FPU-XMM-use-in-runtime-service-functions.patch
Patch27: 5347b524-evtchn-eliminate-64k-ports-limitation.patch
Patch28: 534bbd90-x86-nested-HAP-don-t-BUG-on-legitimate-error.patch
Patch29: 534bdf47-x86-HAP-also-flush-TLB-when-altering-a-present-1G-or-intermediate-entry.patch
Patch30: 53563ea4-x86-MSI-drop-workaround-for-insecure-Dom0-kernels.patch
Patch31: 5357baff-x86-add-missing-break-in-dom0_pit_access.patch
Patch32: 535a34eb-VT-d-suppress-UR-signaling-for-server-chipsets.patch
Patch33: 535a3516-VT-d-suppress-UR-signaling-for-desktop-chipsets.patch
Patch34: 535a354b-passthrough-allow-to-suppress-SERR-and-PERR-signaling.patch
Patch35: 535e31bc-x86-HVM-correct-the-SMEP-logic-for-HVM_CR0_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS.patch
Patch36: 535fa503-x86-HVM-restrict-HVMOP_set_mem_type.patch
Patch37: 53636978-hvm_set_ioreq_page-releases-wrong-page-in-error-path.patch
Patch38: 53636ebf-x86-fix-guest-CPUID-handling.patch
Patch39: 53709b77-Nested-VMX-load-current_vmcs-only-when-it-exists.patch
Patch40: 5370e03b-pygrub-fix-error-handling-if-no-valid-partitions-are-found.patch
Patch41: 53732f4f-x86-MCE-bypass-uninitialized-vcpu-in-vMCE-injection.patch
Patch42: 537b5e50-VT-d-apply-quirks-at-device-setup-time-rather-than-only-at-boot.patch
Patch43: 537b5e79-VT-d-extend-error-report-masking-workaround-to-newer-chipsets.patch
Patch44: 537b5ede-move-domain-to-cpupool0-before-destroying-it.patch
Patch45: 537cd0b0-hvmloader-also-cover-PCI-MMIO-ranges-above-4G-with-UC-MTRR-ranges.patch
Patch46: 537cd0cc-hvmloader-PA-range-0xfc000000-0xffffffff-should-be-UC.patch
Patch47: 5383167d-ACPI-ERST-fix-table-mapping.patch
Patch48: 5383175e-VT-d-fix-mask-applied-to-DMIBAR-in-desktop-chipset-XSA-59-workaround.patch
Patch49: 53859549-AMD-IOMMU-don-t-free-page-table-prematurely.patch
Patch50: 5385956b-x86-don-t-use-VA-for-cache-flush-when-also-flushing-TLB.patch
Patch51: 53859956-timers-set-the-deadline-more-accurately.patch
Patch52: 538c338f-x86-amd_ucode-flip-revision-numbers-in-printk.patch
Patch53: 538dcada-x86-HVM-eliminate-vulnerabilities-from-hvm_inject_msi.patch
Patch54: 538ee637-ACPI-Prevent-acpi_table_entries-from-falling-into-a-infinite-loop.patch
Patch55: 5390917a-VT-d-honor-APEI-firmware-first-mode-in-XSA-59-workaround-code.patch
Patch56: 53909259-x86-domctl-two-functional-fixes-to-XEN_DOMCTL_-gs-etvcpuextstate.patch
Patch57: 5390927f-x86-fix-reboot-shutdown-with-running-HVM-guests.patch
Patch58: 5396d818-avoid-crash-on-HVM-domain-destroy-with-PCI-passthrough.patch
Patch59: 5396e805-x86-HVM-refine-SMEP-test-in-HVM_CR4_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS.patch
Patch60: 539ebe62-x86-EFI-improve-boot-time-diagnostics.patch
Patch61: 539ec004-x86-mce-don-t-spam-the-console-with-CPUx-Temperature-z.patch
Patch62: 53a040c6-page-alloc-scrub-pages-used-by-hypervisor-upon-freeing.patch
Patch63: 53a1990a-IOMMU-prevent-VT-d-device-IOTLB-operations-on-wrong-IOMMU.patch
Patch64: 53a199d7-x86-EFI-allow-FPU-XMM-use-in-runtime-service-functions.patch
Patch65: 53aac342-x86-HVM-consolidate-and-sanitize-CR4-guest-reserved-bit-determination.patch
Patch66: 53b16cd4-VT-d-ATS-correct-and-clean-up-dev_invalidate_iotlb.patch
Patch67: 53b56de1-properly-reference-count-DOMCTL_-un-pausedomain-hypercalls.patch
Patch68: 53c9151b-Fix-xl-vncviewer-accesses-port-0-by-any-invalid-domid.patch
Patch69: 53cfdcc7-avoid-crash-when-doing-shutdown-with-active-cpupools.patch
Patch70: 53cfddaf-x86-mem_event-validate-the-response-vcpu_id-before-acting-on-it.patch
Patch71: 53cfdde4-x86-mem_event-prevent-underflow-of-vcpu-pause-counts.patch
# Upstream qemu
Patch250: VNC-Support-for-ExtendedKeyEvent-client-message.patch
Patch251: 0001-net-move-the-tap-buffer-into-TAPState.patch
@ -702,6 +710,15 @@ Authors:
%patch60 -p1
%patch61 -p1
%patch62 -p1
%patch63 -p1
%patch64 -p1
%patch65 -p1
%patch66 -p1
%patch67 -p1
%patch68 -p1
%patch69 -p1
%patch70 -p1
%patch71 -p1
# Upstream qemu patches
%patch250 -p1
%patch251 -p1
@ -889,9 +906,7 @@ make -C xenalyze.hg CC="gcc -I../xen/include -DMAX_CPUS=%{max_cpus} ${RPM_OPT_FL
%endif
make -C tools/include/xen-foreign %{?_smp_mflags}
make tools docs %{?_smp_mflags}
%if %{?with_xend}0
make -C tools/xen-utils-0.1 XEN_INTREE_BUILD=yes XEN_ROOT=$PWD
%endif
%else
make -C tools/include/xen-foreign %{?_smp_mflags}
make tools docs %{?_smp_mflags}
@ -1041,7 +1056,6 @@ ln -s /etc/init.d/xend $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/rcxend
install -m755 %SOURCE51 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/xen/scripts/
mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_fwdefdir}
install -m 644 %{S:26} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_fwdefdir}/xend-relocation-server
make -C tools/xen-utils-0.1 install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT XEN_INTREE_BUILD=yes XEN_ROOT=$PWD
install -m755 %SOURCE53 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/lib/xen/boot/
mv $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/xen/xmexample* $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/xen/examples
install -m644 %SOURCE54 %SOURCE55 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/xen/examples/
@ -1051,6 +1065,7 @@ mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}
install -m 644 %{SOURCE56} %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/xend.service
%endif
%endif
make -C tools/xen-utils-0.1 install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT XEN_INTREE_BUILD=yes XEN_ROOT=$PWD
install -m755 %SOURCE37 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/xen2libvirt
# Example config
@ -1142,9 +1157,6 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/xm
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/xend
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/xen-bugtool
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/xen-python-path
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/xen-list
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/xen-destroy
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/xen-vmresync
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/blktapctrl
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/xen/scripts/xend-relocation.sh
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/xen/scripts/domain-lock*
@ -1155,7 +1167,6 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/xen/*.sxp
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/man/man1/xm*
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/man/man5/xmdomain.cfg*
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/man/man5/xend-config.sxp*
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/man/man1/xen-list.1.gz
%endif
# Create symlinks for keymaps
@ -1266,6 +1277,8 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/libexec/qemu-bridge-helper
/usr/sbin/xen-lowmemd
/usr/sbin/kdd
%endif
/usr/sbin/xen-list
/usr/sbin/xen-destroy
%dir %attr(700,root,root) /etc/xen
%dir /etc/xen/scripts
%if %{?with_qemu_traditional}0
@ -1362,6 +1375,7 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/libexec/qemu-bridge-helper
%{_mandir}/man5/xl.conf.5.gz
%{_mandir}/man5/xlcpupool.cfg.5.gz
%{_mandir}/man8/*.8.gz
%{_mandir}/man1/xen-list.1.gz
%if %{?with_xend}0
%if %{?with_xend_tools_pkg}0
@ -1374,9 +1388,6 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/libexec/qemu-bridge-helper
/usr/sbin/xend
/usr/sbin/xen-bugtool
/usr/sbin/xen-python-path
/usr/sbin/xen-list
/usr/sbin/xen-destroy
/usr/sbin/xen-vmresync
/usr/sbin/blktapctrl
%dir /var/lib/xen/xend-db
%dir /var/lib/xen/xend-db/domain
@ -1410,7 +1421,6 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/libexec/qemu-bridge-helper
%{_mandir}/man1/xm.1.gz
%{_mandir}/man5/xmdomain.cfg.5.gz
%{_mandir}/man5/xend-config.sxp.5.gz
%{_mandir}/man1/xen-list.1.gz
%endif
# with_dom0_support
%endif