8724a18868
config handling stack overflow 55a62eb0-xl-correct-handling-of-extra_config-in-main_cpupoolcreate.patch - bsc#907514 - Bus fatal error & sles12 sudden reboot has been observed - bsc#910258 - SLES12 Xen host crashes with FATAL NMI after shutdown of guest with VT-d NIC - bsc#918984 - Bus fatal error & sles11-SP4 sudden reboot has been observed - bsc#923967 - Partner-L3: Bus fatal error & sles11-SP3 sudden reboot has been observed 552d293b-x86-vMSI-X-honor-all-mask-requests.patch 552d2966-x86-vMSI-X-add-valid-bits-for-read-acceleration.patch 5576f143-x86-adjust-PV-I-O-emulation-functions-types.patch 55795a52-x86-vMSI-X-support-qword-MMIO-access.patch 5583d9c5-x86-MSI-X-cleanup.patch 5583da09-x86-MSI-track-host-and-guest-masking-separately.patch 55b0a218-x86-PCI-CFG-write-intercept.patch 55b0a255-x86-MSI-X-maskall.patch 55b0a283-x86-MSI-X-teardown.patch 55b0a2ab-x86-MSI-X-enable.patch 55b0a2db-x86-MSI-track-guest-masking.patch - Upstream patches from Jan 552d0f49-x86-traps-identify-the-vcpu-in-context-when-dumping-regs.patch 559bc633-x86-cpupool-clear-proper-cpu_valid-bit-on-CPU-teardown.patch 559bc64e-credit1-properly-deal-with-CPUs-not-in-any-pool.patch 559bc87f-x86-hvmloader-avoid-data-corruption-with-xenstore-rw.patch 55a66a1e-make-rangeset_report_ranges-report-all-ranges.patch 55a77e4f-dmar-device-scope-mem-leak-fix.patch OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Virtualization/xen?expand=0&rev=373
111 lines
3.0 KiB
Diff
111 lines
3.0 KiB
Diff
# Commit a753f0e53ff973a8a066e86c1cb3d6dd5c68d59f
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# Date 2015-06-22 11:38:01 +0200
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# Author David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
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# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
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evtchn: defer freeing struct evtchn's until evtchn_destroy_final()
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notify_via_xen_event_channel() and free_xen_event_channel() had to
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check if the domain was dying because they may be called while the
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domain is being destroyed and the struct evtchn's are being freed.
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By deferring the freeing of the struct evtchn's until all references
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to the domain are dropped, these functions can rely on the channel
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state being present and valid.
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Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
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--- a/xen/common/event_channel.c
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+++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c
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@@ -1174,22 +1174,8 @@ int alloc_unbound_xen_event_channel(
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void free_xen_event_channel(
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struct vcpu *local_vcpu, int port)
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{
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- struct evtchn *chn;
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struct domain *d = local_vcpu->domain;
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-
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- spin_lock(&d->event_lock);
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-
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- if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) )
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- {
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- spin_unlock(&d->event_lock);
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- return;
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- }
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-
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BUG_ON(!port_is_valid(d, port));
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- chn = evtchn_from_port(d, port);
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- BUG_ON(!consumer_is_xen(chn));
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-
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- spin_unlock(&d->event_lock);
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evtchn_close(d, port, 0);
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}
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@@ -1203,18 +1189,12 @@ void notify_via_xen_event_channel(struct
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spin_lock(&ld->event_lock);
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- if ( unlikely(ld->is_dying) )
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- {
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- spin_unlock(&ld->event_lock);
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- return;
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- }
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-
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ASSERT(port_is_valid(ld, lport));
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lchn = evtchn_from_port(ld, lport);
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- ASSERT(consumer_is_xen(lchn));
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if ( likely(lchn->state == ECS_INTERDOMAIN) )
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{
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+ ASSERT(consumer_is_xen(lchn));
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rd = lchn->u.interdomain.remote_dom;
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rport = lchn->u.interdomain.remote_port;
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rchn = evtchn_from_port(rd, rport);
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@@ -1282,7 +1262,7 @@ int evtchn_init(struct domain *d)
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void evtchn_destroy(struct domain *d)
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{
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- unsigned int i, j;
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+ unsigned int i;
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/* After this barrier no new event-channel allocations can occur. */
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BUG_ON(!d->is_dying);
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@@ -1292,8 +1272,17 @@ void evtchn_destroy(struct domain *d)
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for ( i = 0; port_is_valid(d, i); i++ )
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evtchn_close(d, i, 0);
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+ clear_global_virq_handlers(d);
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+
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+ evtchn_fifo_destroy(d);
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+}
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+
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+
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+void evtchn_destroy_final(struct domain *d)
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+{
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+ unsigned int i, j;
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+
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/* Free all event-channel buckets. */
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- spin_lock(&d->event_lock);
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for ( i = 0; i < NR_EVTCHN_GROUPS; i++ )
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{
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if ( !d->evtchn_group[i] )
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@@ -1301,20 +1290,9 @@ void evtchn_destroy(struct domain *d)
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for ( j = 0; j < BUCKETS_PER_GROUP; j++ )
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free_evtchn_bucket(d, d->evtchn_group[i][j]);
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xfree(d->evtchn_group[i]);
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- d->evtchn_group[i] = NULL;
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}
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free_evtchn_bucket(d, d->evtchn);
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- d->evtchn = NULL;
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- spin_unlock(&d->event_lock);
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- clear_global_virq_handlers(d);
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-
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- evtchn_fifo_destroy(d);
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-}
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-
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-
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-void evtchn_destroy_final(struct domain *d)
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-{
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#if MAX_VIRT_CPUS > BITS_PER_LONG
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xfree(d->poll_mask);
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d->poll_mask = NULL;
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