xen/25952-x86-MMIO-remap-permissions.patch
Olaf Hering b9d38dfc8d - add xorg-x11-util-devel to BuildRequires to get lndir(1)
- remove xen.migrate.tools_notify_restore_to_hangup_during_migration_--abort_if_busy.patch
  It changed migration protocol and upstream wants a different solution

- bnc#802221 - fix xenpaging
  readd xenpaging.qemu.flush-cache.patch

- Upstream patches from Jan
  26891-x86-S3-Fix-cpu-pool-scheduling-after-suspend-resume.patch
  26930-x86-EFI-fix-runtime-call-status-for-compat-mode-Dom0.patch
- Additional fix for bnc#816159
  CVE-2013-1918-xsa45-followup.patch

- bnc#817068 - Xen guest with >1 sr-iov vf won't start
  xen-managed-pci-device.patch

- Update to Xen 4.2.2 c/s 26064
  The following recent security patches are included in the tarball
  CVE-2013-0151-xsa34.patch (bnc#797285)
  CVE-2012-6075-xsa41.patch (bnc#797523)
  CVE-2013-1917-xsa44.patch (bnc#813673)
  CVE-2013-1919-xsa46.patch (bnc#813675)

- Upstream patch from Jan
  26902-x86-EFI-pass-boot-services-variable-info-to-runtime-code.patch 

- bnc#816159 - VUL-0: xen: CVE-2013-1918: XSA-45: Several long
  latency operations are not preemptible
  CVE-2013-1918-xsa45-1-vcpu-destroy-pagetables-preemptible.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Virtualization/xen?expand=0&rev=237
2013-05-07 14:35:00 +00:00

44 lines
1.7 KiB
Diff

# HG changeset patch
# User Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
# Date 1348653367 -7200
# Node ID 8278d7d8fa485996f51134c5265fceaf239adf6a
# Parent b83f414ccf7a6e4e077a10bc422cf3f6c7d30566
x86: check remote MMIO remap permissions
When a domain is mapping pages from a different pg_owner domain, the
iomem_access checks are currently only applied to the pg_owner domain,
potentially allowing a domain with a more restrictive iomem_access
policy to have the pages mapped into its page tables. To catch this,
also check the owner of the page tables. The current domain does not
need to be checked because the ability to manipulate a domain's page
tables implies full access to the target domain, so checking that
domain's permission is sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -884,6 +884,19 @@ get_page_from_l1e(
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if ( pg_owner != l1e_owner &&
+ !iomem_access_permitted(l1e_owner, mfn, mfn) )
+ {
+ if ( mfn != (PADDR_MASK >> PAGE_SHIFT) ) /* INVALID_MFN? */
+ {
+ MEM_LOG("Dom%u attempted to map I/O space %08lx in dom%u to dom%u",
+ curr->domain->domain_id, mfn, pg_owner->domain_id,
+ l1e_owner->domain_id);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
if ( !(l1f & _PAGE_RW) ||
!rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn) )
return 0;