8724a18868
config handling stack overflow 55a62eb0-xl-correct-handling-of-extra_config-in-main_cpupoolcreate.patch - bsc#907514 - Bus fatal error & sles12 sudden reboot has been observed - bsc#910258 - SLES12 Xen host crashes with FATAL NMI after shutdown of guest with VT-d NIC - bsc#918984 - Bus fatal error & sles11-SP4 sudden reboot has been observed - bsc#923967 - Partner-L3: Bus fatal error & sles11-SP3 sudden reboot has been observed 552d293b-x86-vMSI-X-honor-all-mask-requests.patch 552d2966-x86-vMSI-X-add-valid-bits-for-read-acceleration.patch 5576f143-x86-adjust-PV-I-O-emulation-functions-types.patch 55795a52-x86-vMSI-X-support-qword-MMIO-access.patch 5583d9c5-x86-MSI-X-cleanup.patch 5583da09-x86-MSI-track-host-and-guest-masking-separately.patch 55b0a218-x86-PCI-CFG-write-intercept.patch 55b0a255-x86-MSI-X-maskall.patch 55b0a283-x86-MSI-X-teardown.patch 55b0a2ab-x86-MSI-X-enable.patch 55b0a2db-x86-MSI-track-guest-masking.patch - Upstream patches from Jan 552d0f49-x86-traps-identify-the-vcpu-in-context-when-dumping-regs.patch 559bc633-x86-cpupool-clear-proper-cpu_valid-bit-on-CPU-teardown.patch 559bc64e-credit1-properly-deal-with-CPUs-not-in-any-pool.patch 559bc87f-x86-hvmloader-avoid-data-corruption-with-xenstore-rw.patch 55a66a1e-make-rangeset_report_ranges-report-all-ranges.patch 55a77e4f-dmar-device-scope-mem-leak-fix.patch OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Virtualization/xen?expand=0&rev=373
106 lines
3.0 KiB
Diff
106 lines
3.0 KiB
Diff
# Commit b399386bcdb9d458f5647476a06fe86f5968d87e
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# Date 2015-06-22 11:36:17 +0200
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# Author David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
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# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
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evtchn: clear xen_consumer when clearing state
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Freeing a xen event channel would clear xen_consumer before clearing
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the channel state, leaving a window where the channel is in a funny
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state (still bound but no consumer).
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Move the clear of xen_consumer into free_evtchn() where the state is
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also cleared.
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Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
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Ditch the pointless evtchn_close() wrapper around __evtchn_close()
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(renaming the latter) as well as some bogus casts of function results
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to void.
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Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
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--- a/xen/common/event_channel.c
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+++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c
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@@ -204,6 +204,7 @@ static void free_evtchn(struct domain *d
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/* Reset binding to vcpu0 when the channel is freed. */
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chn->state = ECS_FREE;
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chn->notify_vcpu_id = 0;
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+ chn->xen_consumer = 0;
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xsm_evtchn_close_post(chn);
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}
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@@ -467,7 +468,7 @@ static long evtchn_bind_pirq(evtchn_bind
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}
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-static long __evtchn_close(struct domain *d1, int port1)
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+static long evtchn_close(struct domain *d1, int port1, bool_t guest)
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{
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struct domain *d2 = NULL;
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struct vcpu *v;
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@@ -487,7 +488,7 @@ static long __evtchn_close(struct domain
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chn1 = evtchn_from_port(d1, port1);
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/* Guest cannot close a Xen-attached event channel. */
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- if ( unlikely(consumer_is_xen(chn1)) )
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+ if ( unlikely(consumer_is_xen(chn1)) && guest )
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{
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rc = -EINVAL;
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goto out;
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@@ -596,12 +597,6 @@ static long __evtchn_close(struct domain
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return rc;
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}
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-
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-static long evtchn_close(evtchn_close_t *close)
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-{
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- return __evtchn_close(current->domain, close->port);
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-}
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-
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int evtchn_send(struct domain *d, unsigned int lport)
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{
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struct evtchn *lchn, *rchn;
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@@ -956,7 +951,7 @@ static long evtchn_reset(evtchn_reset_t
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goto out;
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for ( i = 0; port_is_valid(d, i); i++ )
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- (void)__evtchn_close(d, i);
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+ evtchn_close(d, i, 1);
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spin_lock(&d->event_lock);
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@@ -1063,7 +1058,7 @@ long do_event_channel_op(int cmd, XEN_GU
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struct evtchn_close close;
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if ( copy_from_guest(&close, arg, 1) != 0 )
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return -EFAULT;
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- rc = evtchn_close(&close);
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+ rc = evtchn_close(current->domain, close.port, 1);
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break;
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}
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@@ -1193,11 +1188,10 @@ void free_xen_event_channel(
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BUG_ON(!port_is_valid(d, port));
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chn = evtchn_from_port(d, port);
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BUG_ON(!consumer_is_xen(chn));
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- chn->xen_consumer = 0;
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spin_unlock(&d->event_lock);
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- (void)__evtchn_close(d, port);
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+ evtchn_close(d, port, 0);
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}
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@@ -1296,10 +1290,7 @@ void evtchn_destroy(struct domain *d)
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/* Close all existing event channels. */
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for ( i = 0; port_is_valid(d, i); i++ )
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- {
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- evtchn_from_port(d, i)->xen_consumer = 0;
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- (void)__evtchn_close(d, i);
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- }
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+ evtchn_close(d, i, 0);
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/* Free all event-channel buckets. */
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spin_lock(&d->event_lock);
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