97a0425e04
xen-4.5.1-testing-src.tar.bz2 - Dropped patches now contained in tarball 556c2cf2-x86-don-t-crash-mapping-a-page-using-EFI-rt-page-tables.patch 556d9718-efi-fix-allocation-problems-if-ExitBootServices-fails.patch 556eabf7-x86-apic-Disable-the-LAPIC-later-in-smp_send_stop.patch 556eac15-x86-crash-don-t-use-set_fixmap-in-the-crash-path.patch 55780aaa-efi-avoid-calling-boot-services-after-ExitBootServices.patch 55780aff-x86-EFI-fix-EFI_MEMORY_WP-handling.patch 55780b43-EFI-early-add-mapbs-to-map-EfiBootServices-Code-Data.patch 55780b97-EFI-support-default-attributes-to-map-Runtime-service-areas.patch - Replace 5124efbe-add-qxl-support.patch with the variant that finally made it upstream, 554cc211-libxl-add-qxl.patch - bsc#931627 - VUL-0: CVE-2015-4105: XSA-130: xen: Guest triggerable qemu MSI-X pass-through error messages qemu-MSI-X-latch-writes.patch - bsc#907514 - Bus fatal error & sles12 sudden reboot has been observed - bsc#910258 - SLES12 Xen host crashes with FATAL NMI after shutdown of guest with VT-d NIC - bsc#918984 - Bus fatal error & sles11-SP4 sudden reboot has been observed - bsc#923967 - Partner-L3: Bus fatal error & sles11-SP3 sudden reboot has been observed x86-MSI-X-teardown.patch x86-MSI-X-enable.patch x86-MSI-X-guest-mask.patch x86-MSI-X-maskall.patch qemu-MSI-X-enable-maskall.patch OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Virtualization/xen?expand=0&rev=364
34 lines
1.1 KiB
Diff
34 lines
1.1 KiB
Diff
# Commit 017e667c433a1040306db6265b05e104568c70c8
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# Date 2015-05-05 18:00:03 +0200
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# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
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# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
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domctl: don't truncate XEN_DOMCTL_max_mem requests
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Instead saturate the value if the input can't be represented in the
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respective struct domain field.
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Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
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Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
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Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
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--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
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+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
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@@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
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case XEN_DOMCTL_max_mem:
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{
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- unsigned long new_max;
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+ uint64_t new_max;
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ret = -EINVAL;
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new_max = op->u.max_mem.max_memkb >> (PAGE_SHIFT-10);
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@@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
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* that the domain will now be allowed to "ratchet" down to new_max. In
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* the meantime, while tot > max, all new allocations are disallowed.
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*/
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- d->max_pages = new_max;
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+ d->max_pages = min(new_max, (uint64_t)(typeof(d->max_pages))-1);
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ret = 0;
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spin_unlock(&d->page_alloc_lock);
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}
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