9e9b5acb9c
5604f239-x86-PV-properly-populate-descriptor-tables.patch 561bbc8b-VT-d-don-t-suppress-invalidation-address-write-when-0.patch 561d2046-VT-d-use-proper-error-codes-in-iommu_enable_x2apic_IR.patch 561d20a0-x86-hide-MWAITX-from-PV-domains.patch 561e3283-x86-NUMA-fix-SRAT-table-processor-entry-handling.patch - bsc#951845 - VUL-0: CVE-2015-7972: xen: x86: populate-on-demand balloon size inaccuracy can crash guests (XSA-153) xsa153-libxl.patch - bsc#950703 - VUL-1: CVE-2015-7969: xen: leak of main per-domain vcpu pointer array (DoS) (XSA-149) xsa149.patch - bsc#950705 - VUL-1: CVE-2015-7969: xen: x86: leak of per-domain profiling-related vcpu pointer array (DoS) (XSA-151) xsa151.patch - bsc#950706 - VUL-0: CVE-2015-7971: xen: x86: some pmu and profiling hypercalls log without rate limiting (XSA-152) xsa152.patch - Dropped 55dc7937-x86-IO-APIC-don-t-create-pIRQ-mapping-from-masked-RTE.patch 5604f239-x86-PV-properly-populate-descriptor-tables.patch - bsc#932267 - VUL-1: CVE-2015-4037: qemu,kvm,xen: insecure temporary file use in /net/slirp.c CVE-2015-4037-qemuu-smb-config-dir-name.patch CVE-2015-4037-qemut-smb-config-dir-name.patch - bsc#877642 - VUL-0: CVE-2014-0222: qemu: qcow1: validate L2 table size to avoid integer overflows OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Virtualization/xen?expand=0&rev=382
84 lines
3.4 KiB
Diff
84 lines
3.4 KiB
Diff
From 27593ec62bdad8621df910931349d964a6dbaa8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2015 16:18:30 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH XSA-153 v3] libxl: adjust PoD target by memory fudge, too
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PoD guests need to balloon at least as far as required by PoD, or risk
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crashing. Currently they don't necessarily know what the right value
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is, because our memory accounting is (at the very least) confusing.
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Apply the memory limit fudge factor to the in-hypervisor PoD memory
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target, too. This will increase the size of the guest's PoD cache by
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the fudge factor LIBXL_MAXMEM_CONSTANT (currently 1Mby). This ensures
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that even with a slightly-off balloon driver, the guest will be
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stable even under memory pressure.
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There are two call sites of xc_domain_set_pod_target that need fixing:
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The one in libxl_set_memory_target is straightforward.
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The one in xc_hvm_build_x86.c:setup_guest is more awkward. Simply
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setting the PoD target differently does not work because the various
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amounts of memory during domain construction no longer match up.
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Instead, we adjust the guest memory target in xenstore (but only for
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PoD guests).
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This introduces a 1Mby discrepancy between the balloon target of a PoD
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guest at boot, and the target set by an apparently-equivalent `xl
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mem-set' (or similar) later. This approach is low-risk for a security
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fix but we need to fix this up properly in xen.git#staging and
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probably also in stable trees.
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This is XSA-153.
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Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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---
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tools/libxl/libxl.c | 2 +-
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tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c | 9 ++++++++-
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2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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Index: xen-4.5.1-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
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===================================================================
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--- xen-4.5.1-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl.c
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+++ xen-4.5.1-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c
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@@ -4859,7 +4859,7 @@ retry_transaction:
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new_target_memkb -= videoram;
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rc = xc_domain_set_pod_target(ctx->xch, domid,
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- new_target_memkb / 4, NULL, NULL, NULL);
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+ (new_target_memkb + LIBXL_MAXMEM_CONSTANT) / 4, NULL, NULL, NULL);
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if (rc != 0) {
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LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR,
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"xc_domain_set_pod_target domid=%d, memkb=%d "
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Index: xen-4.5.1-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
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===================================================================
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--- xen-4.5.1-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
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+++ xen-4.5.1-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
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@@ -446,6 +446,7 @@ int libxl__build_post(libxl__gc *gc, uin
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xs_transaction_t t;
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char **ents;
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int i, rc;
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+ int64_t mem_target_fudge;
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rc = libxl_domain_sched_params_set(CTX, domid, &info->sched_params);
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if (rc)
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@@ -472,11 +473,17 @@ int libxl__build_post(libxl__gc *gc, uin
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}
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}
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+ mem_target_fudge =
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+ (info->type == LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_HVM &&
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+ info->max_memkb > info->target_memkb)
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+ ? LIBXL_MAXMEM_CONSTANT : 0;
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+
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ents = libxl__calloc(gc, 12 + (info->max_vcpus * 2) + 2, sizeof(char *));
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ents[0] = "memory/static-max";
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ents[1] = GCSPRINTF("%"PRId64, info->max_memkb);
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ents[2] = "memory/target";
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- ents[3] = GCSPRINTF("%"PRId64, info->target_memkb - info->video_memkb);
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+ ents[3] = GCSPRINTF("%"PRId64, info->target_memkb - info->video_memkb
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+ - mem_target_fudge);
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ents[4] = "memory/videoram";
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ents[5] = GCSPRINTF("%"PRId64, info->video_memkb);
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ents[6] = "domid";
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