- U_0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch

* XkbGetKbdByName use-after-free (ZDI-CAN-19530, CVE-2022-4283,
    bsc#1206017)

- U_0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch
  * Server XTestSwapFakeInput stack overflow (ZDI-CAN 19265,
    CVE-2022-46340, bsc#1205874)
- U_0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch
  * Xi: return an error from XI property changes if verification
    failed (no ZDI-CAN id, no CVE id, bsc#1205875)
- U_0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch
  * Server XIChangeProperty out-of-bounds access (ZDI-CAN 19405,
    CVE-2022-46344, bsc#1205876)
- U_0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch
  * Server XIPassiveUngrabDevice out-of-bounds access (ZDI-CAN 19381,
    CVE-2022-46341, bsc#1205877)
- U_0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch
  * Server ScreenSaverSetAttributes use-after-free (ZDI-CAN 19404,
    CVE-2022-46343, bsc#1205878)
- U_0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch
  * Server XvdiSelectVideoNotify use-after-free (ZDI-CAN 19400,
    CVE-2022-46342, bsc#1205879)

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/X11:XOrg/xorg-x11-server?expand=0&rev=843

U_0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From 2e8916efe9a8566f97a4c2231891ad0f555fced1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 12:55:45 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/6] Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in
+ XTestSwapFakeInput
+
+XTestSwapFakeInput assumes all events in this request are
+sizeof(xEvent) and iterates through these in 32-byte increments.
+However, a GenericEvent may be of arbitrary length longer than 32 bytes,
+so any GenericEvent in this list would result in subsequent events to be
+misparsed.
+
+Additional, the swapped event is written into a stack-allocated struct
+xEvent (size 32 bytes). For any GenericEvent longer than 32 bytes,
+swapping the event may thus smash the stack like an avocado on toast.
+
+Catch this case early and return BadValue for any GenericEvent.
+Which is what would happen in unswapped setups anyway since XTest
+doesn't support GenericEvent.
+
+ZDI-CAN 19265
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ Xext/xtest.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c
+index bf27eb590b..2985a4ce6e 100644
+--- a/Xext/xtest.c
++++ b/Xext/xtest.c
+@@ -502,10 +502,11 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req)
+ 
+     nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent);
+     for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) {
++        int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177;
+         /* Swap event */
+-        proc = EventSwapVector[ev->u.u.type & 0177];
++        proc = EventSwapVector[evtype];
+         /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
+-        if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented) {
++        if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented || evtype == GenericEvent) {
+             client->errorValue = ev->u.u.type;
+             return BadValue;
+         }
+-- 
+2.38.1
+

U_0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From bee46f23fbc2b2722753c3b7769c990b90c235a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:24:00 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/6] Xi: return an error from XI property changes if
+ verification failed
+
+Both ProcXChangeDeviceProperty and ProcXIChangeProperty checked the
+property for validity but didn't actually return the potential error.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ Xi/xiproperty.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
+index a36f7d61df..68c362c628 100644
+--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
++++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
+@@ -902,6 +902,8 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client)
+ 
+     rc = check_change_property(client, stuff->property, stuff->type,
+                                stuff->format, stuff->mode, stuff->nUnits);
++    if (rc != Success)
++        return rc;
+ 
+     len = stuff->nUnits;
+     if (len > (bytes_to_int32(0xffffffff - sizeof(xChangeDevicePropertyReq))))
+@@ -1141,6 +1143,9 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
+ 
+     rc = check_change_property(client, stuff->property, stuff->type,
+                                stuff->format, stuff->mode, stuff->num_items);
++    if (rc != Success)
++        return rc;
++
+     len = stuff->num_items;
+     if (len > bytes_to_int32(0xffffffff - sizeof(xXIChangePropertyReq)))
+         return BadLength;
+-- 
+2.38.1
+

U_0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+From 6f01a643c90724f32c19985e39de3bee9b14a310 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:26:57 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/6] Xi: avoid integer truncation in length check of
+ ProcXIChangeProperty
+
+This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.
+
+Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
+the correct stuff->num_items value the expected request size was
+truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.
+
+The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes
+(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it
+finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
+stuff->num_items bytes, i.e. 4GB.
+
+The same bug exists in ProcChangeProperty and ProcXChangeDeviceProperty,
+so let's fix that too.
+
+ZDI-CAN 19405
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++--
+ dix/property.c  | 3 ++-
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
+index 68c362c628..066ba21fba 100644
+--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
++++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
+@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client)
+     REQUEST(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
+     DeviceIntPtr dev;
+     unsigned long len;
+-    int totalSize;
++    uint64_t totalSize;
+     int rc;
+ 
+     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
+@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
+ {
+     int rc;
+     DeviceIntPtr dev;
+-    int totalSize;
++    uint64_t totalSize;
+     unsigned long len;
+ 
+     REQUEST(xXIChangePropertyReq);
+diff --git a/dix/property.c b/dix/property.c
+index 94ef5a0ec0..acce94b2c6 100644
+--- a/dix/property.c
++++ b/dix/property.c
+@@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ ProcChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
+     WindowPtr pWin;
+     char format, mode;
+     unsigned long len;
+-    int sizeInBytes, totalSize, err;
++    int sizeInBytes, err;
++    uint64_t totalSize;
+ 
+     REQUEST(xChangePropertyReq);
+ 
+-- 
+2.38.1
+

U_0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+From 9dc018a5a1a183e0a2cb945572454779b499430c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:55:32 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/6] Xi: disallow passive grabs with a detail > 255
+
+The XKB protocol effectively prevents us from ever using keycodes above
+255. For buttons it's theoretically possible but realistically too niche
+to worry about. For all other passive grabs, the detail must be zero
+anyway.
+
+This fixes an OOB write:
+
+ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice() calls DeletePassiveGrabFromList with a
+temporary grab struct which contains tempGrab->detail.exact = stuff->detail.
+For matching existing grabs, DeleteDetailFromMask is called with the
+stuff->detail value. This function creates a new mask with the one bit
+representing stuff->detail cleared.
+
+However, the array size for the new mask is 8 * sizeof(CARD32) bits,
+thus any detail above 255 results in an OOB array write.
+
+ZDI-CAN 19381
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ Xi/xipassivegrab.c | 22 ++++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
+index 2769fb7c94..c9ac2f8553 100644
+--- a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
++++ b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
+@@ -137,6 +137,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
+         return BadValue;
+     }
+ 
++    /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never
++     * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that
++     * cannot work anyway, same for buttons > 255. */
++    if (stuff->detail > 255)
++        return XIAlreadyGrabbed;
++
+     if (XICheckInvalidMaskBits(client, (unsigned char *) &stuff[1],
+                                stuff->mask_len * 4) != Success)
+         return BadValue;
+@@ -207,14 +213,8 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
+                                 &param, XI2, &mask);
+             break;
+         case XIGrabtypeKeycode:
+-            /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never
+-             * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that
+-             * cannot work anyway */
+-            if (stuff->detail > 255)
+-                status = XIAlreadyGrabbed;
+-            else
+-                status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail,
+-                                 &param, XI2, &mask);
++            status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail,
++                             &param, XI2, &mask);
+             break;
+         case XIGrabtypeEnter:
+         case XIGrabtypeFocusIn:
+@@ -334,6 +334,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
+         return BadValue;
+     }
+ 
++    /* We don't allow passive grabs for details > 255 anyway */
++    if (stuff->detail > 255) {
++        client->errorValue = stuff->detail;
++        return BadValue;
++    }
++
+     rc = dixLookupWindow(&win, stuff->grab_window, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
+     if (rc != Success)
+         return rc;
+-- 
+2.38.1
+

U_0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 06eb55528bb62f7418f740152642f2066d593bbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 14:53:07 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver 5/6] Xext: free the screen saver resource when
+ replacing it
+
+This fixes a use-after-free bug:
+
+When a client first calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes(), a struct
+ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated and added to the client's
+resources.
+
+When the same client calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes() again, a new
+struct ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated, replacing the old struct. The
+old struct was freed but not removed from the clients resources.
+
+Later, when the client is destroyed the resource system invokes
+ScreenSaverFreeAttr and attempts to clean up the already freed struct.
+
+Fix this by letting the resource system free the old attrs instead.
+
+ZDI-CAN 19404
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ Xext/saver.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xext/saver.c b/Xext/saver.c
+index f813ba08d1..fd6153c313 100644
+--- a/Xext/saver.c
++++ b/Xext/saver.c
+@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ ScreenSaverSetAttributes(ClientPtr client)
+         pVlist++;
+     }
+     if (pPriv->attr)
+-        FreeScreenAttr(pPriv->attr);
++        FreeResource(pPriv->attr->resource, AttrType);
+     pPriv->attr = pAttr;
+     pAttr->resource = FakeClientID(client->index);
+     if (!AddResource(pAttr->resource, AttrType, (void *) pAttr))
+-- 
+2.38.1
+

U_0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From 4ca304326d3b222a446aca82ec3c28ee8adf8446 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 11:20:40 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver 6/6] Xext: free the XvRTVideoNotify when turning off
+ from the same client
+
+This fixes a use-after-free bug:
+
+When a client first calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on a drawable with a
+TRUE onoff argument, a struct XvVideoNotifyRec is allocated. This struct
+is added twice to the resources:
+  - as the drawable's XvRTVideoNotifyList. This happens only once per
+    drawable, subsequent calls append to this list.
+  - as the client's XvRTVideoNotify. This happens for every client.
+
+The struct keeps the ClientPtr around once it has been added for a
+client. The idea, presumably, is that if the client disconnects we can remove
+all structs from the drawable's list that match the client (by resetting
+the ClientPtr to NULL), but if the drawable is destroyed we can remove
+and free the whole list.
+
+However, if the same client then calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on the
+same drawable with a FALSE onoff argument, only the ClientPtr on the
+existing struct was set to NULL. The struct itself remained in the
+client's resources.
+
+If the drawable is now destroyed, the resource system invokes
+XvdiDestroyVideoNotifyList which frees the whole list for this drawable
+- including our struct. This function however does not free the resource
+for the client since our ClientPtr is NULL.
+
+Later, when the client is destroyed and the resource system invokes
+XvdiDestroyVideoNotify, we unconditionally set the ClientPtr to NULL. On
+a struct that has been freed previously. This is generally frowned upon.
+
+Fix this by calling FreeResource() on the second call instead of merely
+setting the ClientPtr to NULL. This removes the struct from the client
+resources (but not from the list), ensuring that it won't be accessed
+again when the client quits.
+
+Note that the assignment tpn->client = NULL; is superfluous since the
+XvdiDestroyVideoNotify function will do this anyway. But it's left for
+clarity and to match a similar invocation in XvdiSelectPortNotify.
+
+ZDI-CAN 19400
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ Xext/xvmain.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xext/xvmain.c b/Xext/xvmain.c
+index f627471938..2a08f8744a 100644
+--- a/Xext/xvmain.c
++++ b/Xext/xvmain.c
+@@ -811,8 +811,10 @@ XvdiSelectVideoNotify(ClientPtr client, DrawablePtr pDraw, BOOL onoff)
+         tpn = pn;
+         while (tpn) {
+             if (tpn->client == client) {
+-                if (!onoff)
++                if (!onoff) {
+                     tpn->client = NULL;
++                    FreeResource(tpn->id, XvRTVideoNotify);
++                }
+                 return Success;
+             }
+             if (!tpn->client)
+-- 
+2.38.1
+

U_0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 79916ec4eed724b481d24d97686d3ed05a939859 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2022 15:55:54 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: reset the radio_groups pointer to NULL after
+ freeing it
+
+Unlike other elements of the keymap, this pointer was freed but not
+reset. On a subsequent XkbGetKbdByName request, the server may access
+already freed memory.
+
+ZDI-CAN-19530
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ xkb/xkbUtils.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/xkb/xkbUtils.c b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
+index dd089c2046..3f5791a183 100644
+--- a/xkb/xkbUtils.c
++++ b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
+@@ -1326,6 +1326,7 @@ _XkbCopyNames(XkbDescPtr src, XkbDescPtr dst)
+         }
+         else {
+             free(dst->names->radio_groups);
++            dst->names->radio_groups = NULL;
+         }
+         dst->names->num_rg = src->names->num_rg;
+ 
+-- 
+2.38.1
+

xorg-x11-server.changes

@@ -1,3 +1,32 @@
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Tue Dec  6 14:26:07 UTC 2022 - Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch@suse.com>
+
+- U_0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch
+  * XkbGetKbdByName use-after-free (ZDI-CAN-19530, CVE-2022-4283,
+    bsc#1206017)
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Wed Nov 30 14:51:14 UTC 2022 - Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch@suse.com>
+
+- U_0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch
+  * Server XTestSwapFakeInput stack overflow (ZDI-CAN 19265,
+    CVE-2022-46340, bsc#1205874)
+- U_0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch
+  * Xi: return an error from XI property changes if verification
+    failed (no ZDI-CAN id, no CVE id, bsc#1205875)
+- U_0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch
+  * Server XIChangeProperty out-of-bounds access (ZDI-CAN 19405,
+    CVE-2022-46344, bsc#1205876)
+- U_0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch
+  * Server XIPassiveUngrabDevice out-of-bounds access (ZDI-CAN 19381,
+    CVE-2022-46341, bsc#1205877)
+- U_0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch
+  * Server ScreenSaverSetAttributes use-after-free (ZDI-CAN 19404,
+    CVE-2022-46343, bsc#1205878)
+- U_0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch
+  * Server XvdiSelectVideoNotify use-after-free (ZDI-CAN 19400,
+    CVE-2022-46342, bsc#1205879)
+
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Mon Nov  7 15:21:27 UTC 2022 - Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch@suse.com>
 

xorg-x11-server.spec

@@ -249,6 +249,14 @@ Patch1960:      u_sync-pci-ids-with-Mesa.patch
 Patch1204412:   U_xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
 Patch1204416:   U_xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
 
+Patch1205874:   U_0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch
+Patch1205875:   U_0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch
+Patch1205876:   U_0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch
+Patch1205877:   U_0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch
+Patch1205878:   U_0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch
+Patch1205879:   U_0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch
+Patch1206017:   U_0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch
+
 %description
 This package contains the X.Org Server.
 
@@ -408,6 +416,13 @@ sh %{SOURCE92} --verify . %{SOURCE91}
 %patch1960 -p1
 %patch1204412 -p1
 %patch1204416 -p1
+%patch1205874 -p1
+%patch1205875 -p1
+%patch1205876 -p1
+%patch1205877 -p1
+%patch1205878 -p1
+%patch1205879 -p1
+%patch1206017 -p1
 
 %build
 # We have some -z now related errors during X default startup (boo#1197994):