pool/xorg-x11-server
SHA256
2
0
Fork 1
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

- U_0001-Correct-bounds-checking-in-XkbSetNames.patch

Browse Source 
* Correct bounds checking in XkbSetNames() 
    [CVE-2020-14345 / ZDI 11428, boo#1174635]
- U_0002-Fix-XIChangeHierarchy-integer-underflow.patch
  * Fix XIChangeHierarchy() integer underflow
    [CVE-2020-14346 / ZDI-CAN-11429, boo#1174638]
- U_0003-Fix-XkbSelectEvents-integer-underflow.patch
  * Fix XkbSelectEvents() integer underflow
    [CVE-2020-14361 / ZDI-CAN 11573, boo#1174910]
- U_0004-Fix-XRecordRegisterClients-Integer-underflow.patch
  * Fix XRecordRegisterClients() Integer underflow
    [CVE-2020-14362 / ZDI-CAN-11574, boo#1174913]

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/X11:XOrg/xorg-x11-server?expand=0&rev=773
This commit is contained in:
Stefan Dirsch 2020-08-25 16:11:08 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
parent d7e8d0e628
commit fec607fe57
6 changed files with 325 additions and 0 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

175
U_0001-Correct-bounds-checking-in-XkbSetNames.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
From f7cd1276bbd4fe3a9700096dec33b52b8440788d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 14:46:32 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] Correct bounds checking in XkbSetNames()
CVE-2020-14345 / ZDI 11428
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
---
xkb/xkb.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 48 insertions(+)
Index: xserver-1.20.8+0/xkb/xkb.c
===================================================================
--- xserver-1.20.8+0.orig/xkb/xkb.c
+++ xserver-1.20.8+0/xkb/xkb.c
@@ -152,6 +152,19 @@ static RESTYPE RT_XKBCLIENT;
#define CHK_REQ_KEY_RANGE(err,first,num,r) \
CHK_REQ_KEY_RANGE2(err,first,num,r,client->errorValue,BadValue)
+static Bool
+_XkbCheckRequestBounds(ClientPtr client, void *stuff, void *from, void *to) {
+ char *cstuff = (char *)stuff;
+ char *cfrom = (char *)from;
+ char *cto = (char *)to;
+
+ return cfrom < cto &&
+ cfrom >= cstuff &&
+ cfrom < cstuff + ((size_t)client->req_len << 2) &&
+ cto >= cstuff &&
+ cto <= cstuff + ((size_t)client->req_len << 2);
+}
+
/***====================================================================***/
int
@@ -4045,6 +4058,8 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode2(0x04, stuff->firstType);
return BadAccess;
}
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + stuff->nTypes))
+ return BadLength;
old = tmp;
tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, stuff->nTypes, client->swapped, &bad);
if (!tmp) {
@@ -4074,6 +4089,8 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
}
width = (CARD8 *) tmp;
tmp = (CARD32 *) (((char *) tmp) + XkbPaddedSize(stuff->nKTLevels));
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, width, tmp))
+ return BadLength;
type = &xkb->map->types[stuff->firstKTLevel];
for (i = 0; i < stuff->nKTLevels; i++, type++) {
if (width[i] == 0)
@@ -4083,6 +4100,8 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
type->num_levels, width[i]);
return BadMatch;
}
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + width[i]))
+ return BadLength;
tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, width[i], client->swapped, &bad);
if (!tmp) {
client->errorValue = bad;
@@ -4095,6 +4114,9 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
client->errorValue = 0x08;
return BadMatch;
}
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp,
+ tmp + Ones(stuff->indicators)))
+ return BadLength;
tmp = _XkbCheckMaskedAtoms(tmp, XkbNumIndicators, stuff->indicators,
client->swapped, &bad);
if (!tmp) {
@@ -4107,6 +4129,9 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
client->errorValue = 0x09;
return BadMatch;
}
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp,
+ tmp + Ones(stuff->virtualMods)))
+ return BadLength;
tmp = _XkbCheckMaskedAtoms(tmp, XkbNumVirtualMods,
(CARD32) stuff->virtualMods,
client->swapped, &bad);
@@ -4120,6 +4145,9 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
client->errorValue = 0x0a;
return BadMatch;
}
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp,
+ tmp + Ones(stuff->groupNames)))
+ return BadLength;
tmp = _XkbCheckMaskedAtoms(tmp, XkbNumKbdGroups,
(CARD32) stuff->groupNames,
client->swapped, &bad);
@@ -4141,9 +4169,14 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
stuff->nKeys);
return BadValue;
}
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + stuff->nKeys))
+ return BadLength;
tmp += stuff->nKeys;
}
if ((stuff->which & XkbKeyAliasesMask) && (stuff->nKeyAliases > 0)) {
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp,
+ tmp + (stuff->nKeyAliases * 2)))
+ return BadLength;
tmp += stuff->nKeyAliases * 2;
}
if (stuff->which & XkbRGNamesMask) {
@@ -4151,6 +4184,9 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode2(0x0d, stuff->nRadioGroups);
return BadValue;
}
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp,
+ tmp + stuff->nRadioGroups))
+ return BadLength;
tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, stuff->nRadioGroups, client->swapped, &bad);
if (!tmp) {
client->errorValue = bad;
@@ -4344,6 +4380,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client)
/* check device-independent stuff */
tmp = (CARD32 *) &stuff[1];
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1))
+ return BadLength;
if (stuff->which & XkbKeycodesNameMask) {
tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad);
if (!tmp) {
@@ -4351,6 +4389,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client)
return BadAtom;
}
}
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1))
+ return BadLength;
if (stuff->which & XkbGeometryNameMask) {
tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad);
if (!tmp) {
@@ -4358,6 +4398,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client)
return BadAtom;
}
}
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1))
+ return BadLength;
if (stuff->which & XkbSymbolsNameMask) {
tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad);
if (!tmp) {
@@ -4365,6 +4407,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client)
return BadAtom;
}
}
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1))
+ return BadLength;
if (stuff->which & XkbPhysSymbolsNameMask) {
tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad);
if (!tmp) {
@@ -4372,6 +4416,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client)
return BadAtom;
}
}
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1))
+ return BadLength;
if (stuff->which & XkbTypesNameMask) {
tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad);
if (!tmp) {
@@ -4379,6 +4425,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client)
return BadAtom;
}
}
+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1))
+ return BadLength;
if (stuff->which & XkbCompatNameMask) {
tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad);
if (!tmp) {

31
U_0002-Fix-XIChangeHierarchy-integer-underflow.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
From c940cc8b6c0a2983c1ec974f1b3f019795dd4cff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 14:49:04 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] Fix XIChangeHierarchy() integer underflow
CVE-2020-14346 / ZDI-CAN-11429
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
---
Xi/xichangehierarchy.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
index cbdd91258..504defe56 100644
--- a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
+++ b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
if (!stuff->num_changes)
return rc;
- len = ((size_t)stuff->length << 2) - sizeof(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
+ len = ((size_t)client->req_len << 2) - sizeof(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) &stuff[1];
while (stuff->num_changes--) {
--
2.16.4

31
U_0003-Fix-XkbSelectEvents-integer-underflow.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
From 144849ea27230962227e62a943b399e2ab304787 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 14:52:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] Fix XkbSelectEvents() integer underflow
CVE-2020-14361 ZDI-CAN 11573
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
---
xkb/xkbSwap.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/xkb/xkbSwap.c b/xkb/xkbSwap.c
index 1c1ed5ff4..50cabb90e 100644
--- a/xkb/xkbSwap.c
+++ b/xkb/xkbSwap.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ SProcXkbSelectEvents(ClientPtr client)
register unsigned bit, ndx, maskLeft, dataLeft, size;
from.c8 = (CARD8 *) &stuff[1];
- dataLeft = (stuff->length * 4) - SIZEOF(xkbSelectEventsReq);
+ dataLeft = (client->req_len * 4) - SIZEOF(xkbSelectEventsReq);
maskLeft = (stuff->affectWhich & (~XkbMapNotifyMask));
for (ndx = 0, bit = 1; (maskLeft != 0); ndx++, bit <<= 1) {
if (((bit & maskLeft) == 0) || (ndx == XkbMapNotify))
--
2.16.4

62
U_0004-Fix-XRecordRegisterClients-Integer-underflow.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
From 2902b78535ecc6821cc027351818b28a5c7fdbdc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 14:55:01 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] Fix XRecordRegisterClients() Integer underflow
CVE-2020-14362 ZDI-CAN-11574
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
---
record/record.c | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Index: xserver-1.20.8+0/record/record.c
===================================================================
--- xserver-1.20.8+0.orig/record/record.c
+++ xserver-1.20.8+0/record/record.c
@@ -2499,7 +2499,7 @@ SProcRecordQueryVersion(ClientPtr client
} /* SProcRecordQueryVersion */
static int _X_COLD
-SwapCreateRegister(xRecordRegisterClientsReq * stuff)
+SwapCreateRegister(ClientPtr client, xRecordRegisterClientsReq * stuff)
{
int i;
XID *pClientID;
@@ -2509,13 +2509,13 @@ SwapCreateRegister(xRecordRegisterClient
swapl(&stuff->nRanges);
pClientID = (XID *) &stuff[1];
if (stuff->nClients >
- stuff->length - bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRegisterClientsReq))
+ client->req_len - bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRegisterClientsReq))
return BadLength;
for (i = 0; i < stuff->nClients; i++, pClientID++) {
swapl(pClientID);
}
if (stuff->nRanges >
- stuff->length - bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRegisterClientsReq)
+ client->req_len - bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRegisterClientsReq)
- stuff->nClients)
return BadLength;
RecordSwapRanges((xRecordRange *) pClientID, stuff->nRanges);
@@ -2530,7 +2530,7 @@ SProcRecordCreateContext(ClientPtr clien
swaps(&stuff->length);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRecordCreateContextReq);
- if ((status = SwapCreateRegister((void *) stuff)) != Success)
+ if ((status = SwapCreateRegister(client, (void *) stuff)) != Success)
return status;
return ProcRecordCreateContext(client);
} /* SProcRecordCreateContext */
@@ -2543,7 +2543,7 @@ SProcRecordRegisterClients(ClientPtr cli
swaps(&stuff->length);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRecordRegisterClientsReq);
- if ((status = SwapCreateRegister((void *) stuff)) != Success)
+ if ((status = SwapCreateRegister(client, (void *) stuff)) != Success)
return status;
return ProcRecordRegisterClients(client);
} /* SProcRecordRegisterClients */

16
xorg-x11-server.changes
View File

@ -1,3 +1,19 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tue Aug 25 15:46:49 UTC 2020 - Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch@suse.com>
- U_0001-Correct-bounds-checking-in-XkbSetNames.patch
* Correct bounds checking in XkbSetNames()
[CVE-2020-14345 / ZDI 11428, boo#1174635]
- U_0002-Fix-XIChangeHierarchy-integer-underflow.patch
* Fix XIChangeHierarchy() integer underflow
[CVE-2020-14346 / ZDI-CAN-11429, boo#1174638]
- U_0003-Fix-XkbSelectEvents-integer-underflow.patch
* Fix XkbSelectEvents() integer underflow
[CVE-2020-14361 / ZDI-CAN 11573, boo#1174910]
- U_0004-Fix-XRecordRegisterClients-Integer-underflow.patch
* Fix XRecordRegisterClients() Integer underflow
[CVE-2020-14362 / ZDI-CAN-11574, boo#1174913]
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fri Jul 31 19:54:05 UTC 2020 - Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch@suse.com>

10
xorg-x11-server.spec
View File

@ -250,6 +250,11 @@ Patch1505: U_xwayland-Allow-passing-a-fd.patch
Patch1600: U_glamor_egl-Reject-OpenGL-2.1-early-on.patch
Patch1701: U_0001-Correct-bounds-checking-in-XkbSetNames.patch
Patch1702: U_0002-Fix-XIChangeHierarchy-integer-underflow.patch
Patch1703: U_0003-Fix-XkbSelectEvents-integer-underflow.patch
Patch1704: U_0004-Fix-XRecordRegisterClients-Integer-underflow.patch
Patch1174633: U_FixForZDI-11426.patch
%description
@ -401,6 +406,11 @@ sh %{SOURCE92} --verify . %{SOURCE91}
%patch1505 -p1
%patch1600 -p1
%patch1701 -p1
%patch1702 -p1
%patch1703 -p1
%patch1704 -p1
%patch1174633 -p1
%build