From 44a643812ce3c07cd38972abfa9dbd163529c192 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthias Gerstner Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2017 14:58:04 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Use better fallbacks to generate cookies if arc4random_buf(3) is unavailable References: bsc#1025084 If arc4random_buf() is not available for generating cookies: - use getentropy(), if available (which was only recently added to glibc) - use getrandom() via syscall(), if available (there was no glibc wrapper for this syscall for a long time) - if all else fails, directly read from /dev/urandom as before, but employ O_CLOEXEC, do an OsAbort() in case the random data couldn't be read to avoid unsecure situations. Don't know if that's too hard a measure but it shouldn't actually occur except on maximum number of FDs reached Reviewed-by: Stefan Dirsch --- configure.ac | 4 +- include/dix-config.h.in | 6 +++ os/auth.c | 138 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) Index: xorg-server-1.19.3/configure.ac =================================================================== --- xorg-server-1.19.3.orig/configure.ac +++ xorg-server-1.19.3/configure.ac @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ AM_CONDITIONAL(SPECIAL_DTRACE_OBJECTS, [ AC_HEADER_DIRENT AC_HEADER_STDC AC_CHECK_HEADERS([fcntl.h stdlib.h string.h unistd.h dlfcn.h stropts.h \ - fnmatch.h sys/mkdev.h sys/sysmacros.h sys/utsname.h]) + fnmatch.h sys/mkdev.h sys/sysmacros.h sys/utsname.h sys/syscall.h]) dnl Checks for typedefs, structures, and compiler characteristics. AC_C_CONST @@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ AC_REPLACE_FUNCS([reallocarray strcasecm AM_CONDITIONAL(POLL, [test "x$ac_cv_func_poll" = "xyes"]) AC_CHECK_LIB([bsd], [arc4random_buf]) -AC_CHECK_FUNCS([arc4random_buf]) +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([arc4random_buf getentropy]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([program_invocation_short_name], [], [], [[#include ]]) Index: xorg-server-1.19.3/include/dix-config.h.in =================================================================== --- xorg-server-1.19.3.orig/include/dix-config.h.in +++ xorg-server-1.19.3/include/dix-config.h.in @@ -167,6 +167,9 @@ /* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_buf' function. */ #undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getentropy' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETENTROPY + /* Define to use libc SHA1 functions */ #undef HAVE_SHA1_IN_LIBC @@ -244,6 +247,9 @@ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_UTSNAME_H +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSCALL_H + /* Define to 1 if you have the `timingsafe_memcmp' function. */ #undef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_MEMCMP Index: xorg-server-1.19.3/os/auth.c =================================================================== --- xorg-server-1.19.3.orig/os/auth.c +++ xorg-server-1.19.3/os/auth.c @@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ from The Open Group. #ifdef HAVE_LIBBSD #include /* for arc4random_buf() */ #endif +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSCALL_H +#include +#endif struct protocol { unsigned short name_length; @@ -304,16 +308,140 @@ GenerateAuthorization(unsigned name_length, #endif /* XCSECURITY */ +#if ! defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) + +// fallback function to get random data directly from /dev/urandom + +static int +GetUrandom ( char *buffer, size_t length ) +{ + int random_fd = -1; + int res = -1; + size_t filled = 0; + + // larger requests are typically rejected by getentropy() / getrandom() + // because they could block or return partially filled buffers + if( length > 256 ) { + errno = EIO; + return -1; + } + + random_fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + + if( random_fd == -1 ) { + return -1; + } + + while( filled < length ) { + res = read(random_fd, (char*)buffer + filled, length - filled); + + if( res == -1 ) { + // shouldn't actually happen acc. to man(4) random, + // but you never know + if( errno == EINTR ) { + continue; + } + + res = errno; + close(random_fd); + errno = res; + return -1; + } + else if( res == 0 ) { + close(random_fd); + // no more bytes available? should not happen + errno = EIO; + return -1; + } + + filled += res; + } + + close(random_fd); + + return 0; +} + +#endif // ! defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) + +#if !defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY) && defined(HAVE_SYS_SYSCALL_H) && defined(SYS_getrandom) +# define TRY_GETRANDOM +#endif + +#ifdef TRY_GETRANDOM + +/* + * wrapper for the getrandom() syscall which was for a long time implemented + * in the Linux kernel, but not wrapped in glibc + */ +static int +GetRandom ( char *buffer, size_t length ) +{ + int res; + size_t filled = 0; + + // larger requests are typically rejected by getentropy() / getrandom() + // because they could block or return partially filled buffers + if( length > 256 ) + { + errno = EIO; + return -1; + } + + while( filled < length ) + { + /* + * glibc does not contain a syscall wrapper for this in older + * versions + */ + res = syscall(SYS_getrandom, (char*)buffer + filled, length - filled, 0); + + if( res == -1 ) + { + if( errno == EINTR ) { + continue; + } + + return -1; + } + else if( res == 0 ) + { + // no more bytes available? should not happen + errno = EIO; + return -1; + } + + filled += res; + } + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* TRY_GETRANDOM */ + void GenerateRandomData(int len, char *buf) { #ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF arc4random_buf(buf, len); #else - int fd; + int ret = -1; +# ifdef HAVE_GETENTROPY + /* use getentropy instead */ + ret = getentropy (buf, len); +# elif defined(TRY_GETRANDOM) + /* try getrandom() wrapper */ + ret = GetRandom(buf, len); +# endif + + if( ret == -1 ) { + // fallback to manual reading of /dev/urandom + ret = GetUrandom(buf, len); + } - fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY); - read(fd, buf, len); - close(fd); -#endif + if( ret == -1 ) { + // no error return possible, rather abort than have security problems + OsAbort(); + } +#endif // HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF }