Stefan Dirsch
f15e897874
U_CVE-2025-26594-0002-dix-keep-a-ref-to-the-rootCursor.patch * Use-after-free of the root cursor (CVE-2025-26594, bsc#1237427) - U_CVE-2025-26595-0001-xkb-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-XkbVModMaskText.patch * Buffer overflow in XkbVModMaskText() (CVE-2025-26595, bsc#1237429) - U_CVE-2025-26596-0001-xkb-Fix-computation-of-XkbSizeKeySyms.patch * Heap overflow in XkbWriteKeySyms() (CVE-2025-26596, bsc#1237430) - U_CVE-2025-26597-0001-xkb-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-XkbChangeTypesOfKey.patch * Buffer overflow in XkbChangeTypesOfKey() (CVE-2025-26597, bsc#1237431) - U_CVE-2025-26598-0001-Xi-Fix-barrier-device-search.patch * Out-of-bounds write in CreatePointerBarrierClient() (CVE-2025-26598, bsc#1237432) - U_CVE-2025-26599-0001-composite-Handle-failure-to-redirect-in-compRedirect.patch U_CVE-2025-26599-0002-composite-initialize-border-clip-even-when-pixmap-al.patch * Use of uninitialized pointer in compRedirectWindow() (CVE-2025-26599, bsc#1237433) - U_CVE-2025-26600-0001-dix-Dequeue-pending-events-on-frozen-device-on-remov.patch * Use-after-free in PlayReleasedEvents() (CVE-2025-26600, bsc#1237434) - U_CVE-2025-26601-0001-sync-Do-not-let-sync-objects-uninitialized.patch U_CVE-2025-26601-0002-sync-Check-values-before-applying-changes.patch U_CVE-2025-26601-0003-sync-Do-not-fail-SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject.patch U_CVE-2025-26601-0004-sync-Apply-changes-last-in-SyncChangeAlarmAttributes.patch * Use-after-free in SyncInitTrigger() (CVE-2025-26601, bsc#1237435) OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/X11:XOrg/xorg-x11-server?expand=0&rev=907
50 lines
1.7 KiB
Diff
50 lines
1.7 KiB
Diff
From efca605c45ff51b57f136222b966ce1d610ebc33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
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Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2024 11:27:05 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/2] Cursor: Refuse to free the root cursor
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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If a cursor reference count drops to 0, the cursor is freed.
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The root cursor however is referenced with a specific global variable,
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and when the root cursor is freed, the global variable may still point
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to freed memory.
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Make sure to prevent the rootCursor from being explicitly freed by a
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client.
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CVE-2025-26594, ZDI-CAN-25544
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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v2: Explicitly forbid XFreeCursor() on the root cursor (Peter Hutterer
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<peter.hutterer@who-t.net>)
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v3: Return BadCursor instead of BadValue (Michel Dänzer
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<michel@daenzer.net>)
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Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
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Suggested-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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---
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dix/dispatch.c | 4 ++++
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1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
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Index: xwayland-22.1.5/dix/dispatch.c
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===================================================================
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--- xwayland-22.1.5.orig/dix/dispatch.c
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+++ xwayland-22.1.5/dix/dispatch.c
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@@ -3107,6 +3107,10 @@ ProcFreeCursor(ClientPtr client)
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rc = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &pCursor, stuff->id, RT_CURSOR,
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client, DixDestroyAccess);
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if (rc == Success) {
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+ if (pCursor == rootCursor) {
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+ client->errorValue = stuff->id;
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+ return BadCursor;
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+ }
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FreeResource(stuff->id, RT_NONE);
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return Success;
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}
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