diff --git a/U_xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch b/U_xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff7628f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/U_xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From 18f91b950e22c2a342a4fbc55e9ddf7534a707d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 11:23:09 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] xkb: fix some possible memleaks in XkbGetKbdByName
+
+GetComponentByName returns an allocated string, so let's free that if we
+fail somewhere.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ xkb/xkb.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+Index: xwayland-22.1.3/xkb/xkb.c
+===================================================================
+--- xwayland-22.1.3.orig/xkb/xkb.c
++++ xwayland-22.1.3/xkb/xkb.c
+@@ -5941,18 +5941,32 @@ ProcXkbGetKbdByName(ClientPtr client)
+     xkb = dev->key->xkbInfo->desc;
+     status = Success;
+     str = (unsigned char *) &stuff[1];
+-    if (GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status))  /* keymap, unsupported */
+-        return BadMatch;
++    {
++        char *keymap = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);  /* keymap, unsupported */
++        if (keymap) {
++            free(keymap);
++            return BadMatch;
++        }
++    }
+     names.keycodes = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+     names.types = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+     names.compat = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+     names.symbols = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+     names.geometry = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+-    if (status != Success)
++    if (status == Success) {
++        len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
++        if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
++            status = BadLength;
++    }
++
++    if (status != Success) {
++        free(names.keycodes);
++        free(names.types);
++        free(names.compat);
++        free(names.symbols);
++        free(names.geometry);
+         return status;
+-    len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
+-    if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
+-        return BadLength;
++    }
+ 
+     CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x01, stuff->want, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);
+     CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x02, stuff->need, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);
diff --git a/U_xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch b/U_xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5132891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/U_xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 11beef0b7f1ed290348e45618e5fa0d2bffcb72e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:06:20 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] xkb: proof GetCountedString against request length attacks
+
+GetCountedString did a check for the whole string to be within the
+request buffer but not for the initial 2 bytes that contain the length
+field. A swapped client could send a malformed request to trigger a
+swaps() on those bytes, writing into random memory.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ xkb/xkb.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+Index: xwayland-22.1.3/xkb/xkb.c
+===================================================================
+--- xwayland-22.1.3.orig/xkb/xkb.c
++++ xwayland-22.1.3/xkb/xkb.c
+@@ -5138,6 +5138,11 @@ _GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, Cli
+     CARD16 len;
+ 
+     wire = *wire_inout;
++
++    if (client->req_len <
++        bytes_to_int32(wire + 2 - (char *) client->requestBuffer))
++        return BadValue;
++
+     len = *(CARD16 *) wire;
+     if (client->swapped) {
+         swaps(&len);
diff --git a/xwayland.changes b/xwayland.changes
index 310ec4b..10ccae7 100644
--- a/xwayland.changes
+++ b/xwayland.changes
@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Wed Oct 19 11:19:40 UTC 2022 - Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch@suse.com>
+
+- U_xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
+  * security update for CVE-2022-3550 (bsc#1204412)
+- U_xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
+  * security update for CVE-2022-3551 (bsc#1204416)
+
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Tue Jul 12 14:22:22 UTC 2022 - Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch@suse.com>
 
diff --git a/xwayland.spec b/xwayland.spec
index 5967cf8..97d776e 100644
--- a/xwayland.spec
+++ b/xwayland.spec
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ Group:          System/X11/Servers/XF86_4
 Source0:        %{url}/archive/individual/xserver/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz
 Source1:        %{url}/archive/individual/xserver/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz.sig
 Source2:        xwayland.keyring
-
+Patch1204412:   U_xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
+Patch1204416:   U_xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
 BuildRequires:  meson
 BuildRequires:  ninja
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig