diff --git a/U_bsc1217765-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch b/U_bsc1217765-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..94c4b69 --- /dev/null +++ b/U_bsc1217765-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +From 924fbcb74ae5434afa7ce4603cd85ebcbdcccad5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 15:19:04 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: allocate enough XkbActions for our buttons + +button->xkb_acts is supposed to be an array sufficiently large for all +our buttons, not just a single XkbActions struct. Allocating +insufficient memory here means when we memcpy() later in +XkbSetDeviceInfo we write into memory that wasn't ours to begin with, +leading to the usual security ooopsiedaisies. + +CVE-2023-6377, ZDI-CAN-22412, ZDI-CAN-22413 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative +--- + Xi/exevents.c | 12 ++++++------ + dix/devices.c | 10 ++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) +--- a/Xi/exevents.c ++++ a/Xi/exevents.c +@@ -611,13 +611,13 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to) + } + + if (from->button->xkb_acts) { +- if (!to->button->xkb_acts) { +- to->button->xkb_acts = calloc(1, sizeof(XkbAction)); +- if (!to->button->xkb_acts) +- FatalError("[Xi] not enough memory for xkb_acts.\n"); +- } ++ size_t maxbuttons = max(to->button->numButtons, from->button->numButtons); ++ to->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(to->button->xkb_acts, ++ maxbuttons, ++ sizeof(XkbAction)); ++ memset(to->button->xkb_acts, 0, maxbuttons * sizeof(XkbAction)); + memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts, +- sizeof(XkbAction)); ++ from->button->numButtons * sizeof(XkbAction)); + } + else { + free(to->button->xkb_acts); +--- a/dix/devices.c ++++ a/dix/devices.c +@@ -2530,6 +2530,8 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave) + + if (master->button && master->button->numButtons != maxbuttons) { + int i; ++ int last_num_buttons = master->button->numButtons; ++ + DeviceChangedEvent event = { + .header = ET_Internal, + .type = ET_DeviceChanged, +@@ -2540,6 +2542,14 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave) + }; + + master->button->numButtons = maxbuttons; ++ if (last_num_buttons < maxbuttons) { ++ master->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(master->button->xkb_acts, ++ maxbuttons, ++ sizeof(XkbAction)); ++ memset(&master->button->xkb_acts[last_num_buttons], ++ 0, ++ (maxbuttons - last_num_buttons) * sizeof(XkbAction)); ++ } + + memcpy(&event.buttons.names, master->button->labels, maxbuttons * + sizeof(Atom)); +-- diff --git a/U_bsc1217766-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch b/U_bsc1217766-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3a74787 --- /dev/null +++ b/U_bsc1217766-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From bd59316fe54b2bcad94c883e81fe7cae2a90cdd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 16:27:49 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] randr: avoid integer truncation in length check of + ProcRRChange*Property + +Affected are ProcRRChangeProviderProperty and ProcRRChangeOutputProperty. +See also xserver@8f454b79 where this same bug was fixed for the core +protocol and XI. + +This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure. + +Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With +the correct stuff->nUnits value the expected request size was +truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check. + +The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes +(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it +finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least +stuff->nUnits bytes, i.e. 4GB. + +CVE-2023-XXXXX, ZDI-CAN-22561 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative +--- + randr/rrproperty.c | 2 +- + randr/rrproviderproperty.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c +index 25469f57b2..c4fef8a1f6 100644 +--- a/randr/rrproperty.c ++++ b/randr/rrproperty.c +@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ ProcRRChangeOutputProperty(ClientPtr client) + char format, mode; + unsigned long len; + int sizeInBytes; +- int totalSize; ++ uint64_t totalSize; + int err; + + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeOutputPropertyReq); +diff --git a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c +index b79c17f9bf..90c5a9a933 100644 +--- a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c ++++ b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c +@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ ProcRRChangeProviderProperty(ClientPtr client) + char format, mode; + unsigned long len; + int sizeInBytes; +- int totalSize; ++ uint64_t totalSize; + int err; + + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeProviderPropertyReq); +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/xwayland.changes b/xwayland.changes index 4d61d75..c13382a 100644 --- a/xwayland.changes +++ b/xwayland.changes @@ -1,3 +1,14 @@ +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Mon Dec 4 18:33:56 UTC 2023 - Stefan Dirsch + +- U_bsc1217765-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch + * Out-of-bounds memory write in XKB button actions (CVE-2023-6377, + ZDI-CAN-22412, ZDI-CAN-22413, bsc#1217765) +- U_bsc1217766-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch + * Out-of-bounds memory read in RRChangeOutputProperty and + RRChangeProviderProperty (CVE-2023-6478, ZDI-CAN-22561, + bsc#1217766) + ------------------------------------------------------------------- Fri Nov 24 10:29:56 UTC 2023 - Stefan Dirsch diff --git a/xwayland.spec b/xwayland.spec index 1e89290..b1756e1 100644 --- a/xwayland.spec +++ b/xwayland.spec @@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ Source0: %{url}/archive/individual/xserver/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz Source1: %{url}/archive/individual/xserver/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz.sig Source2: xwayland.keyring +Patch1217765: U_bsc1217765-Xi-allocate-enough-XkbActions-for-our-buttons.patch +Patch1217766: U_bsc1217766-randr-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-Pr.patch BuildRequires: meson BuildRequires: ninja