xwayland/U_xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
Stefan Dirsch e62daa6f30 - U_xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
* security update for CVE-2022-3550 (bsc#1204412)
- U_xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
  * security update for CVE-2022-3551 (bsc#1204416)

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/X11:XOrg/xwayland?expand=0&rev=31
2022-10-19 11:33:42 +00:00

32 lines
1.1 KiB
Diff

From 11beef0b7f1ed290348e45618e5fa0d2bffcb72e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:06:20 +1000
Subject: [PATCH] xkb: proof GetCountedString against request length attacks
GetCountedString did a check for the whole string to be within the
request buffer but not for the initial 2 bytes that contain the length
field. A swapped client could send a malformed request to trigger a
swaps() on those bytes, writing into random memory.
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
xkb/xkb.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
Index: xwayland-22.1.3/xkb/xkb.c
===================================================================
--- xwayland-22.1.3.orig/xkb/xkb.c
+++ xwayland-22.1.3/xkb/xkb.c
@@ -5138,6 +5138,11 @@ _GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, Cli
CARD16 len;
wire = *wire_inout;
+
+ if (client->req_len <
+ bytes_to_int32(wire + 2 - (char *) client->requestBuffer))
+ return BadValue;
+
len = *(CARD16 *) wire;
if (client->swapped) {
swaps(&len);