grub2/0021-appended-signatures-documentation.patch

From 4edb825a012e9e7b9ad08aa693cfdebf42ae40e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2020 13:02:09 +1000
Subject: [PATCH 21/23] appended signatures: documentation

This explains how appended signatures can be used to form part of
a secure boot chain, and documents the commands and variables
introduced.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>

---

v2: fix a grammar issue, thanks Stefan Berger.
---
 docs/grub.texi | 193 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 176 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

--- a/docs/grub.texi
+++ b/docs/grub.texi
@@ -3270,6 +3270,7 @@
 
 @menu
 * biosnum::
+* check_appended_signatures::
 * check_signatures::
 * chosen::
 * cmdpath::
@@ -3334,11 +3335,18 @@
 chain-loaded system, @pxref{drivemap}.
 
 
+@node check_appended_signatures
+@subsection check_appended_signatures
+
+This variable controls whether GRUB enforces appended signature validation on
+certain loaded files. @xref{Using appended signatures}.
+
+
 @node check_signatures
 @subsection check_signatures
 
-This variable controls whether GRUB enforces digital signature
-validation on loaded files. @xref{Using digital signatures}.
+This variable controls whether GRUB enforces GPG-style digital signature
+validation on loaded files. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}.
 
 @node chosen
 @subsection chosen
@@ -4357,6 +4365,7 @@
 * date::                        Display or set current date and time
 * devicetree::                  Load a device tree blob
 * distrust::                    Remove a pubkey from trusted keys
+* distrust_certificate::        Remove a certificate from the list of trusted certificates
 * drivemap::                    Map a drive to another
 * echo::                        Display a line of text
 * efitextmode::                 Set/Get text output mode resolution
@@ -4373,6 +4382,7 @@
 * hexdump::                     Show raw contents of a file or memory
 * insmod::                      Insert a module
 * keystatus::                   Check key modifier status
+* list_certificates::           List trusted certificates
 * list_env::                    List variables in environment block
 * list_trusted::                List trusted public keys
 * load_env::                    Load variables from environment block
@@ -4411,8 +4421,10 @@
 * test::                        Check file types and compare values
 * true::                        Do nothing, successfully
 * trust::                       Add public key to list of trusted keys
+* trust_certificate::           Add an x509 certificate to the list of trusted certificates
 * unset::                       Unset an environment variable
 @comment * vbeinfo::                     List available video modes
+* verify_appended::             Verify appended digital signature
 * verify_detached::             Verify detached digital signature
 * videoinfo::                   List available video modes
 * wrmsr::                       Write values to model-specific registers
@@ -4752,9 +4764,28 @@
 @code{check_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}
 (@pxref{check_signatures}), and by some invocations of
 @command{verify_detached} (@pxref{verify_detached}).  @xref{Using
-digital signatures}, for more information.
+GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+
+@node distrust_certificate
+@subsection distrust_certificate
+
+@deffn Command distrust_certificate cert_number
+Remove the x509 certificate numbered @var{cert_number} from GRUB's keyring of
+trusted x509 certificates for verifying appended signatures.
+
+@var{cert_number} is the certificate number as listed by
+@command{list_certificates} (@pxref{list_certificates}).
+
+These certificates are used to validate appended signatures when environment
+variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}
+(@pxref{check_appended_signatures}), and by @command{verify_appended}
+(@pxref{verify_appended}). See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more
+information.
 @end deffn
 
+
 @node drivemap
 @subsection drivemap
 
@@ -5031,6 +5062,21 @@
 @end deffn
 
 
+@node list_certificates
+@subsection list_certificates
+
+@deffn Command list_certificates
+List all x509 certificates trusted by GRUB for validating appended signatures.
+The output is a numbered list of certificates, showing the certificate's serial
+number and Common Name.
+
+The certificate number can be used as an argument to
+@command{distrust_certificate} (@pxref{distrust_certificate}).
+
+See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+
 @node list_env
 @subsection list_env
 
@@ -5050,7 +5096,7 @@
 @code{gpg --fingerprint}).  The least significant four bytes (last
 eight hexadecimal digits) can be used as an argument to
 @command{distrust} (@pxref{distrust}).
-@xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information about uses for
+@xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information about uses for
 these keys.
 @end deffn
 
@@ -5085,8 +5131,12 @@
 administrator to configure a system to boot only signed
 configurations, but to allow the user to select from among multiple
 configurations, and to enable ``one-shot'' boot attempts and
-``savedefault'' behavior.  @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more
+``savedefault'' behavior.  @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more
 information.
+
+Extra care should be taken when combining this command with appended signatures
+(@pxref{Using appended signatures}), as this file is not validated by an
+appended signature and could set @code{check_appended_signatures=no}.
 @end deffn
 
 
@@ -5457,7 +5507,7 @@
 file from within GRUB using this command, such that its signature will
 no longer be valid on subsequent boots.  Care should be taken in such
 advanced configurations to avoid rendering the system
-unbootable. @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information.
+unbootable. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information.
 @end deffn
 
 
@@ -5873,11 +5923,31 @@
 must itself be properly signed.  The @option{--skip-sig} option can be
 used to disable signature-checking when reading @var{pubkey_file}
 itself. It is expected that @option{--skip-sig} is useful for testing
-and manual booting. @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more
+and manual booting. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more
 information.
 @end deffn
 
 
+@node trust_certificate
+@subsection trust_certificate
+
+@deffn Command trust_certificate x509_certificate
+Read a DER-formatted x509 certificate from the file @var{x509_certificate}
+and add it to GRUB's internal list of trusted x509 certificates. These
+certificates are used to validate appended signatures when the environment
+variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}.
+
+Note that if @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}
+when @command{trust_certificate} is executed, then @var{x509_certificate}
+must itself bear an appended signature. (It is not sufficient that
+@var{x509_certificate} be signed by a trusted certificate according to the
+x509 rules: grub does not include support for validating signatures within x509
+certificates themselves.)
+
+See @xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+
 @node unset
 @subsection unset
 
@@ -5896,6 +5966,18 @@
 @end deffn
 @end ignore
 
+@node verify_appended
+@subsection verify_appended
+
+@deffn Command verify_appended file
+Verifies an appended signature on @var{file} against the trusted certificates
+known to GRUB (See @pxref{list_certificates}, @pxref{trust_certificate}, and
+@pxref{distrust_certificate}).
+
+Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates
+successfully.  If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value.
+See @xref{Using appended signatures}, for more information.
+@end deffn
 
 @node verify_detached
 @subsection verify_detached
@@ -5914,7 +5996,7 @@
 
 Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates
 successfully.  If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value.
-@xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information.
+@xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information.
 @end deffn
 
 @node videoinfo
@@ -6394,13 +6476,14 @@
 @chapter Security
 
 @menu
-* Authentication and authorisation:: Users and access control
-* Using digital signatures::         Booting digitally signed code
-* UEFI secure boot and shim::        Booting digitally signed PE files
-* Secure Boot Advanced Targeting::   Embedded information for generation number based revocation
-* Measured Boot::                    Measuring boot components
-* Lockdown::                         Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
-* Signing GRUB itself::              Ensuring the integrity of the GRUB core image
+* Authentication and authorisation::   Users and access control
+* Using GPG-style digital signatures:: Booting digitally signed code
+* Using appended signatures::          An alternative approach to booting digitally signed code
+* UEFI secure boot and shim::          Booting digitally signed PE files
+* Secure Boot Advanced Targeting::     Embedded information for generation number based revocation
+* Measured Boot::                      Measuring boot components
+* Lockdown::                           Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
+* Signing GRUB itself::                Ensuring the integrity of the GRUB core image
 @end menu
 
 @node Authentication and authorisation
@@ -6474,8 +6557,8 @@
 adding @kbd{set superusers=} and @kbd{password} or @kbd{password_pbkdf2}
 commands.
 
-@node Using digital signatures
-@section Using digital signatures in GRUB
+@node Using GPG-style digital signatures
+@section Using GPG-style digital signatures in GRUB
 
 GRUB's @file{core.img} can optionally provide enforcement that all files
 subsequently read from disk are covered by a valid digital signature.
@@ -6558,6 +6641,82 @@
 (attacker-controlled) device.  GRUB is at best only one link in a
 secure boot chain.
 
+@node Using appended signatures
+@section Using appended signatures in GRUB
+
+GRUB supports verifying Linux-style 'appended signatures' for secure boot.
+Appended signatures are PKCS#7 messages containing a signature over the
+contents of a file, plus some metadata, appended to the end of a file. A file
+with an appended signature ends with the magic string:
+
+@example
+~Module signature appended~\n
+@end example
+
+where @code{\n} represents the carriage-return character, @code{0x0a}.
+
+To enable appended signature verification, load the appendedsig module and an
+x509 certificate for verification. Building the appendedsig module into the
+core grub image is recommended.
+
+Certificates can be managed at boot time using the @pxref{trust_certificate},
+@pxref{distrust_certificate} and @pxref{list_certificates} commands.
+Certificates can also be built in to the core image using the @code{--x509}
+parameter to @command{grub-install} or @command{grub-mkimage}.
+
+A file can be explictly verified using the @pxref{verify_appended} command.
+
+Only signatures made with the SHA-256 or SHA-512 hash algorithm are supported,
+and only RSA signatures are supported.
+
+A file can be signed with the @command{sign-file} utility supplied with the
+Linux kernel source. For example, if you have @code{signing.key} as the private
+key and @code{certificate.der} as the x509 certificate containing the public key:
+
+@example
+sign-file SHA256 signing.key certificate.der vmlinux vmlinux.signed
+@end example
+
+Enforcement of signature verification is controlled by the
+@code{check_appended_signatures} variable. Verification will only take place
+when files are loaded if the variable is set to @code{enforce}. If a
+certificate is built into the grub core image with the @code{--x509} parameter,
+the variable will be automatically set to @code{enforce} when the appendedsig
+module is loaded.
+
+Unlike GPG-style signatures, not all files loaded by GRUB are required to be
+signed. Once verification is turned on, the following file types must carry
+appended signatures:
+
+@enumerate
+@item Linux, Multiboot, BSD, XNU and Plan9 kernels
+@item Grub modules, except those built in to the core image
+@item Any new certificate files to be trusted
+@end enumerate
+
+ACPI tables and Device Tree images will not be checked for appended signatures
+but must be verified by another mechanism such as GPG-style signatures before
+they will be loaded.
+
+No attempt is made to validate any other file type. In particular,
+chain-loaded binaries are not verified - if your platform supports
+chain-loading and this cannot be disabled, consider an alternative secure
+boot mechanism.
+
+As with GPG-style appended signatures, signature checking does @strong{not}
+stop an attacker with console access from dropping manually to the GRUB
+console and executing:
+
+@example
+set check_appended_signatures=no
+@end example
+
+Refer to the section on password-protecting GRUB (@pxref{Authentication
+and authorisation}) for more information on preventing this.
+
+Additionally, special care must be taken around the @command{loadenv} command,
+which can be used to turn off @code{check_appended_signature}.
+
 @node UEFI secure boot and shim
 @section UEFI secure boot and shim support