forked from pool/grub2
d6d145b71a
- Power guest secure boot with static keys: GRUB2 signing portion (jsc#SLE-18271) (bsc#1192764) * grub2.spec - Power guest secure boot with static keys: GRUB2 portion (jsc#SLE-18144) (bsc#1192686) * 0001-ieee1275-Drop-HEAP_MAX_ADDR-and-HEAP_MIN_SIZE-consta.patch * 0002-ieee1275-claim-more-memory.patch * 0003-ieee1275-request-memory-with-ibm-client-architecture.patch * 0004-Add-suport-for-signing-grub-with-an-appended-signatu.patch * 0005-docs-grub-Document-signing-grub-under-UEFI.patch * 0006-docs-grub-Document-signing-grub-with-an-appended-sig.patch * 0007-dl-provide-a-fake-grub_dl_set_persistent-for-the-emu.patch * 0008-pgp-factor-out-rsa_pad.patch * 0009-crypto-move-storage-for-grub_crypto_pk_-to-crypto.c.patch * 0010-posix_wrap-tweaks-in-preparation-for-libtasn1.patch * 0011-libtasn1-import-libtasn1-4.18.0.patch * 0012-libtasn1-disable-code-not-needed-in-grub.patch * 0013-libtasn1-changes-for-grub-compatibility.patch * 0014-libtasn1-compile-into-asn1-module.patch * 0015-test_asn1-test-module-for-libtasn1.patch * 0016-grub-install-support-embedding-x509-certificates.patch * 0017-appended-signatures-import-GNUTLS-s-ASN.1-descriptio.patch * 0018-appended-signatures-parse-PKCS-7-signedData-and-X.50.patch * 0019-appended-signatures-support-verifying-appended-signa.patch * 0020-appended-signatures-verification-tests.patch * 0021-appended-signatures-documentation.patch * 0022-ieee1275-enter-lockdown-based-on-ibm-secure-boot.patch * 0023-x509-allow-Digitial-Signature-plus-other-Key-Usages.patch - Fix no menuentry is found if hibernation on btrfs RAID1 (bsc#1193090) OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/945751 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Base:System/grub2?expand=0&rev=401
65 lines
2.6 KiB
Diff
65 lines
2.6 KiB
Diff
From f7b9580133cf346d77f345d175fa5cb8a591be16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
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Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2020 02:00:57 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH 05/23] docs/grub: Document signing grub under UEFI
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Before adding information about how grub is signed with an appended
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signature scheme, it's worth adding some information about how it
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can currently be signed for UEFI.
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Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
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---
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docs/grub.texi | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
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1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
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index e48018c5f..b1d808d93 100644
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--- a/docs/grub.texi
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+++ b/docs/grub.texi
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@@ -5814,6 +5814,7 @@ environment variables and commands are listed in the same order.
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* Secure Boot Advanced Targeting:: Embedded information for generation number based revocation
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* Measured Boot:: Measuring boot components
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* Lockdown:: Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
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+* Signing GRUB itself:: Ensuring the integrity of the GRUB core image
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@end menu
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@node Authentication and authorisation
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@@ -5892,7 +5893,7 @@ commands.
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GRUB's @file{core.img} can optionally provide enforcement that all files
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subsequently read from disk are covered by a valid digital signature.
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-This document does @strong{not} cover how to ensure that your
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+This section does @strong{not} cover how to ensure that your
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platform's firmware (e.g., Coreboot) validates @file{core.img}.
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If environment variable @code{check_signatures}
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@@ -6054,6 +6055,25 @@ be restricted and some operations/commands cannot be executed.
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The @samp{lockdown} variable is set to @samp{y} when the GRUB is locked down.
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Otherwise it does not exit.
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+@node Signing GRUB itself
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+@section Signing GRUB itself
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+
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+To ensure a complete secure-boot chain, there must be a way for the code that
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+loads GRUB to verify the integrity of the core image.
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+
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+This is ultimately platform-specific and individual platforms can define their
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+own mechanisms. However, there are general-purpose mechanisms that can be used
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+with GRUB.
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+
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+@section Signing GRUB for UEFI secure boot
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+
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+On UEFI platforms, @file{core.img} is a PE binary. Therefore, it can be signed
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+with a tool such as @command{pesign} or @command{sbsign}. Refer to the
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+suggestions in @pxref{UEFI secure boot and shim} to ensure that the final
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+image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It
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+will also be necessary to enrol the public key used into a relevant firmware
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+key database.
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+
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@node Platform limitations
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@chapter Platform limitations
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--
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2.31.1
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