diff --git a/hostapd.changes b/hostapd.changes
index dc8b3c7..85e7a74 100644
--- a/hostapd.changes
+++ b/hostapd.changes
@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Fri Oct 19 10:32:25 UTC 2018 - Karol Babioch <kbabioch@suse.com>
+
+- Added rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
+  Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data (CVE-2018-14526, bsc#1104205).
+
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Wed Oct 18 21:59:01 UTC 2017 - chris@intrbiz.com
 
diff --git a/hostapd.spec b/hostapd.spec
index 51b6acc..0a794ba 100644
--- a/hostapd.spec
+++ b/hostapd.spec
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #
 # spec file for package hostapd
 #
-# Copyright (c) 2017 SUSE LINUX GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
+# Copyright (c) 2018 SUSE LINUX GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
 #
 # All modifications and additions to the file contributed by third parties
 # remain the property of their copyright owners, unless otherwise agreed
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 # license that conforms to the Open Source Definition (Version 1.9)
 # published by the Open Source Initiative.
 
-# Please submit bugfixes or comments via http://bugs.opensuse.org/
+# Please submit bugfixes or comments via https://bugs.opensuse.org/
 #
 
 
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ BuildRequires:  sqlite3-devel
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(libnl-3.0) >= 3.0
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(systemd)
 Summary:        Turns Your WLAN Card into a WPA capable Access Point
-License:        GPL-2.0 or BSD-3-Clause
+License:        GPL-2.0-only OR BSD-3-Clause
 Group:          Hardware/Wifi
 Version:        2.6
 Release:        0
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ Patch4:         rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
 Patch5:         rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
 Patch6:         rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
 Patch7:         rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
+Patch8:         rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
 %{?systemd_requires}
 
 %description
@@ -61,6 +62,7 @@ authentication via any ethernet driver.
 %patch5 -p1
 %patch6 -p1
 %patch7 -p1
+%patch8 -p1
 
 cd hostapd
 cp defconfig .config
diff --git a/rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch b/rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..99b0549
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2018 01:25:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] WPA: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data
+
+Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant
+processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted
+flag set, but not the MIC flag.
+
+When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but
+not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying
+the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when
+negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that
+unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary
+could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information
+in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key).
+(CVE-2018-14526)
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff -upr wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+--- wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c	2016-10-02 21:51:11.000000000 +0300
++++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c	2018-08-08 16:55:11.506831029 +0300
+@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, c
+ 
+ 	if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) &&
+ 	    (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) {
++		/*
++		 * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity
++		 * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not
++		 * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0
++		 * which is the case in this code branch.
++		 */
++		if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
++			wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++				"WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but unauthenticated data");
++			goto out;
++		}
+ 		if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data,
+ 						    &key_data_len))
+ 			goto out;