forked from pool/libvirt
da9af7a383
- CVE-2019-3886: disallow virDomainGetHostname and virDomainGetTime
for read-only connections and users
CVE-2019-3886-api.patch, CVE-2019-3886-remote.patch
bsc#1131595
- spec: BuildRequires rpcgen since CVE-2019-3886-remote.patch
touches remote_protocol.x
- Update to libvirt 5.2.0
- Many incremental improvements and bug fixes, see
http://libvirt.org/news.html
- Dropped patches:
4ec3cf9a-apparmor-rules.patch,
f38ef0fa-no-RDMA-check.patch,
411cdaf8-apparmor-check-profile-name.patch,
696239ba-qemu-fix-query-cpus-fast.patch,
09eb1ae0-conf-add-xenbus-controller.patch,
fb059757-libxl-add-xenbus-controller.patch,
ec5a1191-libxl-support-max-grant-frames.patch,
5a64c202-xenconfig-support-max-grant-frames.patch
- Added patches:
ff376c62-tests-fix-mocking-stat-lstat.patch,
mprivozn-test-fix-proposal.patch
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/692393
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Virtualization/libvirt?expand=0&rev=745
65 lines
2.5 KiB
Diff
65 lines
2.5 KiB
Diff
SUSE adjustments to qemu.conf
|
|
|
|
This patch contains SUSE-specific adjustments to the upstream
|
|
qemu.conf configuration file. In the future, it might make
|
|
sense to separate these changes into individual patches (e.g.
|
|
suse-qemu-conf-secdriver.patch, suse-qemu-conf-lockmgr.patch,
|
|
etc.), but for now they are all lumped together in this
|
|
single patch.
|
|
|
|
Index: libvirt-5.2.0/src/qemu/qemu.conf
|
|
===================================================================
|
|
--- libvirt-5.2.0.orig/src/qemu/qemu.conf
|
|
+++ libvirt-5.2.0/src/qemu/qemu.conf
|
|
@@ -420,11 +420,20 @@
|
|
# isolation, but it cannot appear in a list of drivers.
|
|
#
|
|
#security_driver = "selinux"
|
|
+#security_driver = "apparmor"
|
|
|
|
# If set to non-zero, then the default security labeling
|
|
# will make guests confined. If set to zero, then guests
|
|
-# will be unconfined by default. Defaults to 1.
|
|
-#security_default_confined = 1
|
|
+# will be unconfined by default. Defaults to 0.
|
|
+#
|
|
+# SUSE Note:
|
|
+# Currently, Apparmor is the default security framework in SUSE
|
|
+# distros. If Apparmor is enabled on the host, libvirtd is
|
|
+# generously confined but users must opt-in to confine qemu
|
|
+# instances. Change this to a non-zero value to enable default
|
|
+# Apparmor confinement of qemu instances.
|
|
+#
|
|
+security_default_confined = 0
|
|
|
|
# If set to non-zero, then attempts to create unconfined
|
|
# guests will be blocked. Defaults to 0.
|
|
@@ -655,11 +664,22 @@
|
|
#relaxed_acs_check = 1
|
|
|
|
|
|
-# In order to prevent accidentally starting two domains that
|
|
-# share one writable disk, libvirt offers two approaches for
|
|
-# locking files. The first one is sanlock, the other one,
|
|
-# virtlockd, is then our own implementation. Accepted values
|
|
-# are "sanlock" and "lockd".
|
|
+# SUSE note:
|
|
+# Two lock managers are supported: lockd and sanlock. lockd, which
|
|
+# is provided by the virtlockd service, uses advisory locks (flock(2))
|
|
+# to protect virtual machine disks. sanlock uses the notion of leases
|
|
+# to protect virtual machine disks and is more appropriate in a SAN
|
|
+# environment.
|
|
+#
|
|
+# For most deployments that require virtual machine disk protection,
|
|
+# lockd is recommended since it is easy to configure and the virtlockd
|
|
+# service can be restarted without terminating any running virtual
|
|
+# machines. sanlock, which may be preferred in some SAN environments,
|
|
+# has the disadvantage of not being able to be restarted without
|
|
+# first terminating all virtual machines for which it holds leases.
|
|
+#
|
|
+# Specify lockd or sanlock to enable protection of virtual machine disk
|
|
+# content.
|
|
#
|
|
#lock_manager = "lockd"
|
|
|