forked from pool/openafs
35 lines
1.7 KiB
Groff
35 lines
1.7 KiB
Groff
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User-Visible OpenAFS Changes
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OpenAFS 1.8.2
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All platforms
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* Fix OPENAFS-SA-2018-002: information leakage in RPC output variables
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Various RPC routines did not always initialize all output fields,
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exposing memory contents to network attackers. The relevant RPCs include
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an AFSCB_ RPC, so cache managers are affected as well as servers.
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All server platforms
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* Fix OPENAFS-SA-2018-003: denial of service due to excess resource consumption
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Various RPCs were defined as allowing unbounded arrays as input, allowing
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an unauthenticated attacker to cause excess memory allocation and tie up
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network bandwidth by sending (or claiming to send) large input arrays.
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* Fix OPENAFS-SA-2018-001: unauthenticated volume operations via butc
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On systems using the in-tree backup system, the butc process was running
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with administrative credentials, but accepted incoming RPCs over
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unauthenticated connections; these incoming RPCs in turn triggered
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outgoing RPCs using the administrative credentials. Unauthenticated
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attackers could construct volue dumps containing arbitrary contents
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and cause these dumps to be restored and overwrite arbitrary volume
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contents; afterward, the backup database could be restored to its
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initial state, hiding evidence of the unauthorized changes.
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Running butc with -localauth now requires authenticated incoming
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connections, and the backup utility makes authenticated connections to
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the butc. Audit capabilities have been added to the butc RPC handlers.
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Command-line arguments are provided to retain the (insecure) historical
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behavior until all systems have been upgraded.
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