2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
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# HG changeset patch
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# Parent 92d953171b34f6fba18d24085eeeaa24b1d2d5b5
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FIPS 140-2 compliance. Perform selftests on start and use only FIPS approved
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algorithms.
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Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
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Index: openssh-9.6p1/Makefile.in
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2021-01-18 02:12:55 +01:00
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===================================================================
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
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--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/Makefile.in
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+++ openssh-9.6p1/Makefile.in
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@@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
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2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
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2020-06-06 08:49:00 +02:00
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SKOBJS= ssh-sk-client.o
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2019-10-10 15:32:50 +02:00
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2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
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+LIBSSH_OBJS += fips.o
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+
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SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
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2020-06-06 08:49:00 +02:00
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sshconnect.o sshconnect2.o mux.o $(SKOBJS)
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2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
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|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
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Index: openssh-9.6p1/cipher.c
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2021-01-18 02:12:55 +01:00
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===================================================================
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
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--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/cipher.c
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+++ openssh-9.6p1/cipher.c
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2019-10-10 15:32:50 +02:00
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@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@
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2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
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#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
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+#include "fips.h"
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+#include "log.h"
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2019-10-10 15:32:50 +02:00
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+
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#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
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#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX void
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#endif
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@@ -83,7 +86,7 @@ struct sshcipher {
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2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
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#endif
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};
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-static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = {
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+static const struct sshcipher ciphers_all[] = {
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#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
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{ "3des-cbc", 8, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
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2024-04-05 09:57:21 +02:00
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@@ -110,8 +113,50 @@ static const struct sshcipher ciphers[]
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2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
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{ NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
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};
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+static const struct sshcipher ciphers_fips140_2[] = {
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+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
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+ { "aes128-cbc", 16, 16, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
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+ { "aes192-cbc", 16, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
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+ { "aes256-cbc", 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
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+ { "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
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+ 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
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+ { "aes128-ctr", 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr },
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+ { "aes192-ctr", 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr },
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+ { "aes256-ctr", 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr },
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+ { "aes128-gcm@openssh.com",
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+ 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm },
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+ { "aes256-gcm@openssh.com",
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+ 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm },
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+#else
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+ { "aes128-ctr", 16, 16, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL },
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+ { "aes192-ctr", 16, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL },
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+ { "aes256-ctr", 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL },
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+#endif
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+ { "none", 8, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_NONE, NULL },
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+
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+ { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
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+};
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+
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/*--*/
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+/* Returns array of ciphers available depending on selected FIPS mode */
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+static const struct sshcipher *
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+fips_select_ciphers(void)
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+{
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+ int fips = fips_mode();
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+ switch (fips) {
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+ case 0:
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+ return ciphers_all;
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+ case 1:
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+ return ciphers_fips140_2;
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+ default:
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+ /* should not be reached */
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+ fatal("Fatal error: incorrect FIPS mode '%i' at %s:%u",
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+ fips, __FILE__, __LINE__);
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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+}
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+
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/* Returns a comma-separated list of supported ciphers. */
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char *
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cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only)
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Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
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@@ -120,7 +167,7 @@ cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only)
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2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
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size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
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const struct sshcipher *c;
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- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) {
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+ for (c = fips_select_ciphers(); c->name != NULL; c++) {
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if ((c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0)
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continue;
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if (auth_only && c->auth_len == 0)
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Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
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@@ -203,7 +250,7 @@ const struct sshcipher *
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2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
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cipher_by_name(const char *name)
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{
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const struct sshcipher *c;
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- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
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+ for (c = fips_select_ciphers(); c->name != NULL; c++)
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if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
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return c;
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return NULL;
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
Index: openssh-9.6p1/fips.c
|
2021-01-18 02:12:55 +01:00
|
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===================================================================
|
2019-10-10 15:32:50 +02:00
|
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--- /dev/null
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
+++ openssh-9.6p1/fips.c
|
2019-03-12 16:19:34 +01:00
|
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|
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
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+/*
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+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Petr Cerny. All rights reserved.
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+ *
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+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
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+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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+ * are met:
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+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
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+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
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+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
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+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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+ *
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+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
|
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+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
|
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+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
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+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
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+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
|
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|
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
|
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+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
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|
|
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+#include "includes.h"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+#include "fips.h"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+#include "cipher.h"
|
|
|
|
|
+#include "dh.h"
|
|
|
|
|
+#include "digest.h"
|
|
|
|
|
+#include "kex.h"
|
|
|
|
|
+#include "sshkey.h"
|
|
|
|
|
+#include "mac.h"
|
|
|
|
|
+#include "log.h"
|
|
|
|
|
+#include "xmalloc.h"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+#include <string.h>
|
|
|
|
|
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+static int fips_state = -1;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+static int
|
|
|
|
|
+fips_check_required_env(void)
|
|
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
|
|
+ int fips_required = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
+ char *env = getenv(SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV);
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (env) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ errno = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
+ fips_required = strtol(env, NULL, 10);
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (errno) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ debug("bogus value in the %s environment variable, ignoring\n"
|
|
|
|
|
+ , SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV);
|
|
|
|
|
+ fips_required = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
+ } else
|
|
|
|
|
+ fips_required = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ return fips_required;
|
|
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+int
|
|
|
|
|
+fips_mode(void)
|
|
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (-1 == fips_state) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ fips_state = FIPS_mode();
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (fips_state)
|
|
|
|
|
+ debug("FIPS mode initialized");
|
|
|
|
|
+ else {
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (fips_check_required_env()) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ debug("FIPS mode requested through the environment variable '%s'"
|
|
|
|
|
+ , SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV);
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (!FIPS_mode_set(1))
|
|
|
|
|
+ fatal("Unable to enter FIPS mode as requested through the environment variable '%s'"
|
|
|
|
|
+ , SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV);
|
|
|
|
|
+ fips_state = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ return fips_state;
|
|
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+int
|
|
|
|
|
+fips_correct_dgst(int digest)
|
|
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
|
|
+ int fips;
|
|
|
|
|
+ int rv = -1;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ fips = fips_mode();
|
|
|
|
|
+ switch (fips) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ case 0:
|
|
|
|
|
+ rv = digest;
|
|
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
|
|
+ case 1:
|
|
|
|
|
+ switch (digest) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ case SSH_DIGEST_MD5:
|
|
|
|
|
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
|
|
|
|
|
+ debug("MD5/RIPEMD160 digests not allowed in FIPS 140-2 mode"
|
|
|
|
|
+ "using SHA-256 instead.");
|
|
|
|
|
+ rv = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
|
|
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
|
|
+ default:
|
|
|
|
|
+ rv = digest;
|
|
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
|
|
+ default:
|
|
|
|
|
+ /* should not be reached */
|
|
|
|
|
+ fatal("Fatal error: incorrect FIPS mode '%i' at %s:%u",
|
|
|
|
|
+ fips, __FILE__, __LINE__);
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ return rv;
|
|
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
|
|
+ * filter out FIPS disallowed algorithms
|
|
|
|
|
+ * *crypto MUST be free()-able - it is assigned newly allocated memory and
|
|
|
|
|
+ * the previous one is freed
|
|
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
|
|
+ * returns zero if all algorithms were rejected, non-zero otherwise
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
+int
|
|
|
|
|
+fips_filter_crypto(char **crypto, fips_filters filter)
|
|
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
|
|
+ char *token, *tmp, *tmp_sav, *new;
|
|
|
|
|
+ int plus = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
+ int valid;
|
|
|
|
|
+ int comma = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
+ int empty = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
+ size_t len;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ tmp = tmp_sav = xstrdup(*crypto);
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ len = strlen(tmp) + 1;
|
|
|
|
|
+ new = xcalloc(1, len);
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ if ('+' == *tmp) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ plus = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
+ tmp++;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ while ((token = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ switch(filter) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ case FIPS_FILTER_CIPHERS:
|
|
|
|
|
+ valid = ciphers_valid(token);
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (!valid)
|
|
|
|
|
+ debug("Cipher '%s' is not allowed in FIPS mode",
|
|
|
|
|
+ token);
|
|
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
|
|
+ case FIPS_FILTER_MACS:
|
|
|
|
|
+ valid = mac_valid(token);
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (!valid)
|
|
|
|
|
+ debug("MAC '%s' is not allowed in FIPS mode",
|
|
|
|
|
+ token);
|
|
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
|
|
+ case FIPS_FILTER_KEX_ALGS:
|
|
|
|
|
+ valid = kex_names_valid(token);
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (!valid)
|
|
|
|
|
+ debug("KEX '%s' is not allowed in FIPS mode",
|
|
|
|
|
+ token);
|
|
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
|
|
+ default:
|
|
|
|
|
+ /* should not be reached */
|
|
|
|
|
+ fatal("Fatal error: incorrect FIPS filter '%i' requested at %s:%u",
|
|
|
|
|
+ filter, __FILE__, __LINE__);
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (valid) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ empty = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (plus) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ strlcat(new, "+", len);
|
|
|
|
|
+ plus = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (comma)
|
|
|
|
|
+ strlcat(new, ",", len);
|
|
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
|
|
+ comma = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
+ strlcat(new, token, len);
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ /* free tmp and re-allocate shorter buffer for result if necessary */
|
|
|
|
|
+ free(tmp_sav);
|
|
|
|
|
+ free(*crypto);
|
|
|
|
|
+ *crypto = new;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ return (!empty);
|
|
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+int
|
|
|
|
|
+fips_dgst_min(void)
|
|
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
|
|
+ int fips;
|
|
|
|
|
+ int dgst;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ fips = fips_mode();
|
|
|
|
|
+ switch (fips) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ case 0:
|
|
|
|
|
+ dgst = SSH_DIGEST_MD5;
|
|
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
|
|
+ case 1:
|
|
|
|
|
+ dgst = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
|
|
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
|
|
+ default:
|
|
|
|
|
+ /* should not be reached */
|
|
|
|
|
+ fatal("Fatal error: incorrect FIPS mode '%i' at %s:%u",
|
|
|
|
|
+ fips, __FILE__, __LINE__);
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ return dgst;
|
|
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
Index: openssh-9.6p1/fips.h
|
2021-01-18 02:12:55 +01:00
|
|
|
===================================================================
|
2019-10-10 15:32:50 +02:00
|
|
|
--- /dev/null
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
+++ openssh-9.6p1/fips.h
|
2019-02-27 16:39:11 +01:00
|
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
|
|
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Petr Cerny. All rights reserved.
|
|
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
|
|
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
|
|
|
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
|
|
|
+ * are met:
|
|
|
|
|
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
|
|
|
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
|
|
|
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
|
|
|
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
|
|
|
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
|
|
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
|
|
|
|
|
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
|
|
|
|
|
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
|
|
|
|
|
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
|
|
|
|
|
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
|
|
|
|
|
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
|
|
|
|
|
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
|
|
|
|
|
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
|
|
|
|
|
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
|
|
|
|
|
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
+#ifndef FIPS_H
|
|
|
|
|
+#define FIPS_H
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+#include "sshkey.h"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+#define SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV "SSH_FORCE_FIPS"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+typedef enum {
|
|
|
|
|
+ FIPS_FILTER_CIPHERS,
|
|
|
|
|
+ FIPS_FILTER_MACS,
|
|
|
|
|
+ FIPS_FILTER_KEX_ALGS
|
|
|
|
|
+} fips_filters;
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+int fips_mode(void);
|
|
|
|
|
+int fips_correct_dgst(int);
|
|
|
|
|
+int fips_dgst_min(void);
|
|
|
|
|
+enum fp_type fips_correct_fp_type(enum fp_type);
|
|
|
|
|
+int fips_filter_crypto(char **, fips_filters);
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
Index: openssh-9.6p1/hmac.c
|
2021-01-18 02:12:55 +01:00
|
|
|
===================================================================
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/hmac.c
|
|
|
|
|
+++ openssh-9.6p1/hmac.c
|
2021-01-18 02:12:55 +01:00
|
|
|
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ hmac_test(void *key, size_t klen, void *
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
|
u_char digest[16];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
|
+ if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(fips_correct_dgst(SSH_DIGEST_MD5))) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
|
printf("ssh_hmac_start failed");
|
|
|
|
|
if (ssh_hmac_init(ctx, key, klen) < 0 ||
|
|
|
|
|
ssh_hmac_update(ctx, m, mlen) < 0 ||
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
Index: openssh-9.6p1/kex.c
|
2021-01-18 02:12:55 +01:00
|
|
|
===================================================================
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/kex.c
|
|
|
|
|
+++ openssh-9.6p1/kex.c
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "digest.h"
|
2023-05-22 21:32:26 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "xmalloc.h"
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+#include "fips.h"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
/* prototype */
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
@@ -87,7 +89,7 @@ struct kexalg {
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
int ec_nid;
|
|
|
|
|
int hash_alg;
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
-static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
|
|
|
|
|
+static const struct kexalg kexalgs_all[] = {
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
|
|
|
|
|
{ KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
|
|
|
|
|
{ KEX_DH14_SHA1, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
@@ -120,6 +122,47 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
|
2019-10-10 15:32:50 +02:00
|
|
|
{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+static const struct kexalg kexalgs_fips140_2[] = {
|
|
|
|
|
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
|
|
|
|
|
+ { KEX_DH14_SHA1, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
|
|
|
|
|
+ { KEX_DH14_SHA256, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
|
|
|
|
|
+ { KEX_DH16_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
|
|
|
|
|
+ { KEX_DH18_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
|
|
|
|
|
+ { KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
|
|
|
|
|
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
|
|
|
|
|
+ { KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
|
|
|
|
|
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */
|
|
|
|
|
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
|
|
|
|
|
+ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
|
|
|
|
|
+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
|
|
|
|
|
+ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1,
|
|
|
|
|
+ SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 },
|
|
|
|
|
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
|
|
|
|
|
+ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1,
|
|
|
|
|
+ SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
|
|
|
|
|
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
|
|
|
|
|
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
|
|
|
|
|
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
|
|
|
|
|
+ { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
|
|
|
|
|
+};
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+/* Returns array of macs available depending on selected FIPS mode */
|
|
|
|
|
+static const struct kexalg *
|
|
|
|
|
+fips_select_kexalgs(void)
|
|
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
|
|
+ int fips = fips_mode();
|
|
|
|
|
+ switch (fips) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ case 0:
|
|
|
|
|
+ return kexalgs_all;
|
|
|
|
|
+ case 1:
|
|
|
|
|
+ return kexalgs_fips140_2;
|
|
|
|
|
+ default:
|
|
|
|
|
+ /* should not be reached */
|
|
|
|
|
+ fatal("Fatal error: incorrect FIPS mode '%i' at %s:%u",
|
|
|
|
|
+ fips, __FILE__, __LINE__);
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
char *
|
|
|
|
|
kex_alg_list(char sep)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
@@ -127,7 +170,7 @@ kex_alg_list(char sep)
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
const struct kexalg *k;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ for (k = fips_select_kexalgs(); k->name != NULL; k++) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret != NULL)
|
|
|
|
|
ret[rlen++] = sep;
|
|
|
|
|
nlen = strlen(k->name);
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
@@ -147,7 +190,7 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
const struct kexalg *k;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ for (k = fips_select_kexalgs(); k->name != NULL; k++) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
return k;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
@@ -167,7 +210,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
|
|
|
|
|
(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ /* do not complain here - MACs and ciphers checks
|
|
|
|
|
+ * are silent here
|
|
|
|
|
error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
free(s);
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
Index: openssh-9.6p1/mac.c
|
2021-01-18 02:12:55 +01:00
|
|
|
===================================================================
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/mac.c
|
|
|
|
|
+++ openssh-9.6p1/mac.c
|
2019-10-10 15:32:50 +02:00
|
|
|
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+#include "fips.h"
|
|
|
|
|
+#include "log.h"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSH_DIGEST 1 /* SSH_DIGEST_XXX */
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSH_UMAC 2 /* UMAC (not integrated with OpenSSL) */
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSH_UMAC128 3
|
2019-10-10 15:32:50 +02:00
|
|
|
@@ -55,7 +58,7 @@ struct macalg {
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
int etm; /* Encrypt-then-MAC */
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
-static const struct macalg macs[] = {
|
|
|
|
|
+static const struct macalg macs_all[] = {
|
|
|
|
|
/* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */
|
|
|
|
|
{ "hmac-sha1", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
|
|
|
|
|
{ "hmac-sha1-96", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
|
2019-10-10 15:32:50 +02:00
|
|
|
@@ -79,6 +82,41 @@ static const struct macalg macs[] = {
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
{ NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+static const struct macalg macs_fips140_2[] = {
|
|
|
|
|
+ /* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */
|
|
|
|
|
+ { "hmac-sha1", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
|
|
|
|
|
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
|
|
|
|
|
+ { "hmac-sha2-256", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
|
|
|
|
|
+ { "hmac-sha2-512", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
|
|
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ /* Encrypt-then-MAC variants */
|
|
|
|
|
+ { "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
|
|
|
|
|
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
|
|
|
|
|
+ { "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
|
|
|
|
|
+ { "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
|
|
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
|
|
|
|
|
+};
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+/* Returns array of macs available depending on selected FIPS mode */
|
|
|
|
|
+static const struct macalg *
|
|
|
|
|
+fips_select_macs(void)
|
|
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
|
|
+ int fips = fips_mode();
|
|
|
|
|
+ switch (fips) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ case 0:
|
|
|
|
|
+ return macs_all;
|
|
|
|
|
+ case 1:
|
|
|
|
|
+ return macs_fips140_2;
|
|
|
|
|
+ default:
|
|
|
|
|
+ /* should not be reached */
|
|
|
|
|
+ fatal("Fatal error: incorrect FIPS mode '%i' at %s:%u",
|
|
|
|
|
+ fips, __FILE__, __LINE__);
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
/* Returns a list of supported MACs separated by the specified char. */
|
|
|
|
|
char *
|
|
|
|
|
mac_alg_list(char sep)
|
2019-10-10 15:32:50 +02:00
|
|
|
@@ -87,7 +125,7 @@ mac_alg_list(char sep)
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
const struct macalg *m;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ for (m = fips_select_macs(); m->name != NULL; m++) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret != NULL)
|
|
|
|
|
ret[rlen++] = sep;
|
|
|
|
|
nlen = strlen(m->name);
|
2021-01-18 02:12:55 +01:00
|
|
|
@@ -126,7 +164,7 @@ mac_setup(struct sshmac *mac, char *name
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
const struct macalg *m;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ for (m = fips_select_macs(); m->name != NULL; m++) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(name, m->name) != 0)
|
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
if (mac != NULL)
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
Index: openssh-9.6p1/readconf.c
|
2021-01-18 02:12:55 +01:00
|
|
|
===================================================================
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/readconf.c
|
|
|
|
|
+++ openssh-9.6p1/readconf.c
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "myproposal.h"
|
|
|
|
|
#include "digest.h"
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-02-27 16:39:11 +01:00
|
|
|
+#include "fips.h"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Format of the configuration file:
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-02-27 16:39:11 +01:00
|
|
|
# Configuration data is parsed as follows:
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
@@ -2478,6 +2480,23 @@ config_has_permitted_cnames(Options *opt
|
Accepting request 922068 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Version upgrade to 8.8p1
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details
- Version update to 8.8p1:
= Security
* sshd(8) from OpenSSH 6.2 through 8.7 failed to correctly initialise
supplemental groups when executing an AuthorizedKeysCommand or
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, where a AuthorizedKeysCommandUser or
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser directive has been set to run the
command as a different user. Instead these commands would inherit
the groups that sshd(8) was started with.
Depending on system configuration, inherited groups may allow
AuthorizedKeysCommand/AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand helper programs to
gain unintended privilege.
Neither AuthorizedKeysCommand nor AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand are
enabled by default in sshd_config(5).
= Potentially-incompatible changes
* This release disables RSA signatures using the SHA-1 hash algorithm
by default. This change has been made as the SHA-1 hash algorithm is
cryptographically broken, and it is possible to create chosen-prefix
hash collisions for <USD$50K.
For most users, this change should be invisible and there is
no need to replace ssh-rsa keys. OpenSSH has supported RFC8332
RSA/SHA-256/512 signatures since release 7.2 and existing ssh-rsa keys
will automatically use the stronger algorithm where possible.
Incompatibility is more likely when connecting to older SSH
implementations that have not been upgraded or have not closely tracked
improvements in the SSH protocol. For these cases, it may be necessary
to selectively re-enable RSA/SHA1 to allow connection and/or user
authentication via the HostkeyAlgorithms and PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
options.
= New features
* ssh(1): allow the ssh_config(5) CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
directive to accept a "none" argument to specify the default
behaviour.
= Bugfixes
* scp(1): when using the SFTP protocol, continue transferring files
after a transfer error occurs, better matching original scp/rcp
behaviour.
* ssh(1): fixed a number of memory leaks in multiplexing,
* ssh-keygen(1): avoid crash when using the -Y find-principals
command.
* A number of documentation and manual improvements, including
bz#3340, PR139, PR215, PR241, PR257
- Additional changes from 8.7p1 release:
= Potentially-incompatible changes
* scp(1): this release changes the behaviour of remote to remote
copies (e.g. "scp host-a:/path host-b:") to transfer through the
local host by default. This was previously available via the -3
flag. This mode avoids the need to expose credentials on the
origin hop, avoids triplicate interpretation of filenames by the
shell (by the local system, the copy origin and the destination)
and, in conjunction with the SFTP support for scp(1) mentioned
below, allows use of all authentication methods to the remote
hosts (previously, only non-interactive methods could be used).
A -R flag has been added to select the old behaviour.
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): both the client and server are now using a
stricter configuration file parser. The new parser uses more
shell-like rules for quotes, space and escape characters. It is
also more strict in rejecting configurations that include options
lacking arguments. Previously some options (e.g. DenyUsers) could
appear on a line with no subsequent arguments. This release will
reject such configurations. The new parser will also reject
configurations with unterminated quotes and multiple '='
characters after the option name.
* ssh(1): when using SSHFP DNS records for host key verification,
ssh(1) will verify all matching records instead of just those
with the specific signature type requested. This may cause host
key verification problems if stale SSHFP records of a different
or legacy signature type exist alongside other records for a
particular host. bz#3322
* ssh-keygen(1): when generating a FIDO key and specifying an
explicit attestation challenge (using -Ochallenge), the challenge
will now be hashed by the builtin security key middleware. This
removes the (undocumented) requirement that challenges be exactly
32 bytes in length and matches the expectations of libfido2.
* sshd(8): environment="..." directives in authorized_keys files are
now first-match-wins and limited to 1024 discrete environment
variable names.
= New features
* scp(1): experimental support for transfers using the SFTP protocol
as a replacement for the venerable SCP/RCP protocol that it has
traditionally used. SFTP offers more predictable filename handling
and does not require expansion of glob(3) patterns via the shell
on the remote side.
* sftp-server(8): add a protocol extension to support expansion of
~/ and ~user/ prefixed paths. This was added to support these
paths when used by scp(1) while in SFTP mode.
* ssh(1): add a ForkAfterAuthentication ssh_config(5) counterpart to
the ssh(1) -f flag. GHPR231
* ssh(1): add a StdinNull directive to ssh_config(5) that allows the
config file to do the same thing as -n does on the ssh(1) command-
line. GHPR231
* ssh(1): add a SessionType directive to ssh_config, allowing the
configuration file to offer equivalent control to the -N (no
session) and -s (subsystem) command-line flags. GHPR231
* ssh-keygen(1): allowed signers files used by ssh-keygen(1)
signatures now support listing key validity intervals alongside
they key, and ssh-keygen(1) can optionally check during signature
verification whether a specified time falls inside this interval.
This feature is intended for use by git to support signing and
verifying objects using ssh keys.
* ssh-keygen(8): support printing of the full public key in a sshsig
signature via a -Oprint-pubkey flag.
= Bugfixes
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): start time-based re-keying exactly on schedule in
the client and server mainloops. Previously the re-key timeout
could expire but re-keying would not start until a packet was sent
or received, causing a spin in select() if the connection was
quiescent.
* ssh-keygen(1): avoid Y2038 problem in printing certificate
validity lifetimes. Dates past 2^31-1 seconds since epoch were
displayed incorrectly on some platforms. bz#3329
* scp(1): allow spaces to appear in usernames for local to remote
and scp -3 remote to remote copies. bz#1164
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): remove references to ChallengeResponseAuthentication
in favour of KbdInteractiveAuthentication. The former is what was in
SSHv1, the latter is what is in SSHv2 (RFC4256) and they were
treated as somewhat but not entirely equivalent. We retain the old
name as a deprecated alias so configuration files continue to work
as well as a reference in the man page for people looking for it.
bz#3303
* ssh(1)/ssh-add(1)/ssh-keygen(1): fix decoding of X.509 subject name
when extracting a key from a PKCS#11 certificate. bz#3327
* ssh(1): restore blocking status on stdio fds before close. ssh(1)
needs file descriptors in non-blocking mode to operate but it was
not restoring the original state on exit. This could cause
problems with fds shared with other programs via the shell,
bz#3280 and GHPR246
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): switch both client and server mainloops from
select(3) to pselect(3). Avoids race conditions where a signal
may arrive immediately before select(3) and not be processed until
an event fires. bz#2158
* ssh(1): sessions started with ControlPersist were incorrectly
executing a shell when the -N (no shell) option was specified.
bz#3290
* ssh(1): check if IPQoS or TunnelDevice are already set before
overriding. Prevents values in config files from overriding values
supplied on the command line. bz#3319
* ssh(1): fix debug message when finding a private key to match a
certificate being attempted for user authentication. Previously it
would print the certificate's path, whereas it was supposed to be
showing the private key's path. GHPR247
* sshd(8): match host certificates against host public keys, not
private keys. Allows use of certificates with private keys held in
a ssh-agent. bz#3524
* ssh(1): add a workaround for a bug in OpenSSH 7.4 sshd(8), which
allows RSA/SHA2 signatures for public key authentication but fails
to advertise this correctly via SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO. This causes
clients of these server to incorrectly match
PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithmse and potentially refuse to offer valid
keys. bz#3213
* sftp(1)/scp(1): degrade gracefully if a sftp-server offers the
limits@openssh.com extension but fails when the client tries to
invoke it. bz#3318
* ssh(1): allow ssh_config SetEnv to override $TERM, which is
otherwise handled specially by the protocol. Useful in ~/.ssh/config
to set TERM to something generic (e.g. "xterm" instead of
"xterm-256color") for destinations that lack terminfo entries.
* sftp-server(8): the limits@openssh.com extension was incorrectly
marked as an operation that writes to the filesystem, which made it
unavailable in sftp-server read-only mode. bz#3318
* ssh(1): fix SEGV in UpdateHostkeys debug() message, triggered when
the update removed more host keys than remain present.
* Many manual page fixes.
- Additional changes from 8.6p1 release:
= Security
* sshd(8): OpenSSH 8.5 introduced the LogVerbose keyword. When this
option was enabled with a set of patterns that activated logging
in code that runs in the low-privilege sandboxed sshd process, the
log messages were constructed in such a way that printf(3) format
strings could effectively be specified the low-privilege code.
= New features
* sftp-server(8): add a new limits@openssh.com protocol extension
that allows a client to discover various server limits, including
maximum packet size and maximum read/write length.
* sftp(1): use the new limits@openssh.com extension (when available)
to select better transfer lengths in the client.
* sshd(8): Add ModuliFile keyword to sshd_config to specify the
location of the "moduli" file containing the groups for DH-GEX.
* unit tests: Add a TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES environment variable to
enable printing of the elapsed time in seconds of each test.
= Bugfixes
* ssh_config(5), sshd_config(5): sync CASignatureAlgorithms lists in
manual pages with the current default. GHPR174
* ssh(1): ensure that pkcs11_del_provider() is called before exit.
GHPR234
* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix problems in string->argv conversion. Multiple
backslashes were not being dequoted correctly and quoted space in
the middle of a string was being incorrectly split. GHPR223
* ssh(1): return non-zero exit status when killed by signal; bz#3281
* sftp-server(8): increase maximum SSH2_FXP_READ to match the maximum
packet size. Also handle zero-length reads that are not explicitly
banned by the spec.
- Additional changes from 8.5p1 release:
= Security
* ssh-agent(1): fixed a double-free memory corruption that was
introduced in OpenSSH 8.2 . We treat all such memory faults as
potentially exploitable. This bug could be reached by an attacker
with access to the agent socket.
= Potentially-incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): this release changes the first-preference signature
algorithm from ECDSA to ED25519.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): set the TOS/DSCP specified in the configuration
for interactive use prior to TCP connect. The connection phase of
the SSH session is time-sensitive and often explicitly interactive.
The ultimate interactive/bulk TOS/DSCP will be set after
authentication completes.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): remove the pre-standardization cipher
rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se. It is an alias for aes256-cbc before
it was standardized in RFC4253 (2006), has been deprecated and
disabled by default since OpenSSH 7.2 (2016) and was only briefly
documented in ssh.1 in 2001.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): update/replace the experimental post-quantum
hybrid key exchange method based on Streamlined NTRU Prime coupled
with X25519. The previous sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org
method is replaced with sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com.
* ssh(1): disable CheckHostIP by default. It provides insignificant
benefits while making key rotation significantly more difficult,
especially for hosts behind IP-based load-balancers.
= New features
* ssh(1): this release enables UpdateHostkeys by default subject to
some conservative preconditions:
- The key was matched in the UserKnownHostsFile (and not in the
GlobalKnownHostsFile).
- The same key does not exist under another name.
- A certificate host key is not in use.
- known_hosts contains no matching wildcard hostname pattern.
- VerifyHostKeyDNS is not enabled.
- The default UserKnownHostsFile is in use.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): add a new LogVerbose configuration directive for
that allows forcing maximum debug logging by file/function/line
pattern-lists.
* ssh(1): when prompting the user to accept a new hostkey, display
any other host names/addresses already associated with the key.
* ssh(1): allow UserKnownHostsFile=none to indicate that no
known_hosts file should be used to identify host keys.
* ssh(1): add a ssh_config KnownHostsCommand option that allows the
client to obtain known_hosts data from a command in addition to
the usual files.
* ssh(1): add a ssh_config PermitRemoteOpen option that allows the
client to restrict the destination when RemoteForward is used
with SOCKS.
* ssh(1): for FIDO keys, if a signature operation fails with a
"incorrect PIN" reason and no PIN was initially requested from the
user, then request a PIN and retry the operation. This supports
some biometric devices that fall back to requiring PIN when reading
of the biometric failed, and devices that require PINs for all
hosted credentials.
* sshd(8): implement client address-based rate-limiting via new
sshd_config(5) PerSourceMaxStartups and PerSourceNetBlockSize
directives that provide more fine-grained control on a per-origin
address basis than the global MaxStartups limit.
= Bugfixes
* ssh(1): Prefix keyboard interactive prompts with "(user@host)" to
make it easier to determine which connection they are associated
with in cases like scp -3, ProxyJump, etc. bz#3224
* sshd(8): fix sshd_config SetEnv directives located inside Match
blocks. GHPR201
* ssh(1): when requesting a FIDO token touch on stderr, inform the
user once the touch has been recorded.
* ssh(1): prevent integer overflow when ridiculously large
ConnectTimeout values are specified, capping the effective value
(for most platforms) at 24 days. bz#3229
* ssh(1): consider the ECDSA key subtype when ordering host key
algorithms in the client.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): rename the PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes keyword to
PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms. The previous name incorrectly suggested
that it control allowed key algorithms, when this option actually
specifies the signature algorithms that are accepted. The previous
name remains available as an alias. bz#3253
* ssh(1), sshd(8): similarly, rename HostbasedKeyTypes (ssh) and
HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes (sshd) to HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms.
* sftp-server(8): add missing lsetstat@openssh.com documentation
and advertisement in the server's SSH2_FXP_VERSION hello packet.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): more strictly enforce KEX state-machine by
banning packet types once they are received. Fixes memleak caused
by duplicate SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST (oss-fuzz #30078).
* sftp(1): allow the full range of UIDs/GIDs for chown/chgrp on 32bit
platforms instead of being limited by LONG_MAX. bz#3206
* Minor man page fixes (capitalization, commas, etc.) bz#3223
* sftp(1): when doing an sftp recursive upload or download of a
read-only directory, ensure that the directory is created with
write and execute permissions in the interim so that the transfer
can actually complete, then set the directory permission as the
final step. bz#3222
* ssh-keygen(1): document the -Z, check the validity of its argument
earlier and provide a better error message if it's not correct.
bz#2879
* ssh(1): ignore comments at the end of config lines in ssh_config,
similar to what we already do for sshd_config. bz#2320
* sshd_config(5): mention that DisableForwarding is valid in a
sshd_config Match block. bz3239
* sftp(1): fix incorrect sorting of "ls -ltr" under some
circumstances. bz3248.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix potential integer truncation of (unlikely)
timeout values. bz#3250
* ssh(1): make hostbased authentication send the signature algorithm
in its SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST packets instead of the key type.
This make HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms do what it is supposed to -
filter on signature algorithm and not key type.
- Rebased patches:
* openssh-7.7p1-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-ctr.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-eal3.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-enable_PAM_by_default.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-host_ident.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-pts_names_formatting.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_ipc_flock.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_stat.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-send_locale.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-sftp_force_permissions.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch
* openssh-7.9p1-keygen-preserve-perms.patch
* openssh-7.9p1-revert-new-qos-defaults.patch
* openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-audit.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-seccomp-clock_gettime64.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-seccomp-clock_nanosleep.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-seccomp-clock_nanosleep_time64.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-use-openssl-kdf.patch
* openssh-8.4p1-vendordir.patch
* openssh-fips-ensure-approved-moduli.patch
* openssh-link-with-sk.patch
* openssh-reenable-dh-group14-sha1-default.patch
* openssh-whitelist-syscalls.patch
- Removed openssh-fix-ssh-copy-id.patch (fixed upstream).
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/922068
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=235
2021-10-07 10:06:58 +02:00
|
|
|
return options->num_permitted_cnames > 0;
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+/* remove algorithms not approved for use in FIPS mode, when running in FIPS
|
|
|
|
|
+ * mode
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
+void
|
|
|
|
|
+filter_fips_algorithms(Options *o)
|
|
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (fips_mode()) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (!fips_filter_crypto(&o->ciphers, FIPS_FILTER_CIPHERS))
|
|
|
|
|
+ fatal("None of selected ciphers can be used in FIPS mode");
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (!fips_filter_crypto(&o->macs, FIPS_FILTER_MACS))
|
|
|
|
|
+ fatal("None of selected MAC algorithms can be used in FIPS mode");
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (!fips_filter_crypto(&o->kex_algorithms, FIPS_FILTER_KEX_ALGS))
|
|
|
|
|
+ fatal("None of selected KEX algorithms can be used in FIPS mode");
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet
|
|
|
|
|
* been set. Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
@@ -2796,6 +2815,9 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO;
|
|
|
|
|
if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1)
|
|
|
|
|
options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
+ options->fingerprint_hash =
|
|
|
|
|
+ fips_correct_dgst(options->fingerprint_hash);
|
2020-06-06 08:49:00 +02:00
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
|
|
|
|
|
if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
|
|
|
|
|
options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal");
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
@@ -2840,6 +2862,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
|
2020-06-06 08:49:00 +02:00
|
|
|
ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, def_sig, all_sig);
|
|
|
|
|
#undef ASSEMBLE
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2020-06-06 08:49:00 +02:00
|
|
|
+ filter_fips_algorithms(options);
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
2019-02-28 21:03:36 +01:00
|
|
|
#define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \
|
|
|
|
|
do { \
|
2020-06-06 08:49:00 +02:00
|
|
|
if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
Index: openssh-9.6p1/readconf.h
|
2021-01-18 02:12:55 +01:00
|
|
|
===================================================================
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/readconf.h
|
|
|
|
|
+++ openssh-9.6p1/readconf.h
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ typedef struct {
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSH_KEYSTROKE_CHAFF_MIN_MS 1024
|
|
|
|
|
#define SSH_KEYSTROKE_CHAFF_RNG_MS 2048
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+void filter_fips_algorithms(Options *o);
|
2020-06-06 08:49:00 +02:00
|
|
|
const char *kex_default_pk_alg(void);
|
|
|
|
|
char *ssh_connection_hash(const char *thishost, const char *host,
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
const char *portstr, const char *user, const char *jump_host);
|
|
|
|
|
Index: openssh-9.6p1/servconf.c
|
2021-01-18 02:12:55 +01:00
|
|
|
===================================================================
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/servconf.c
|
|
|
|
|
+++ openssh-9.6p1/servconf.c
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
|
2019-02-27 16:39:11 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "auth.h"
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "myproposal.h"
|
|
|
|
|
#include "digest.h"
|
|
|
|
|
+#include "fips.h"
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-02-27 16:39:11 +01:00
|
|
|
static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
|
|
|
|
|
const char *, int);
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
@@ -207,6 +208,23 @@ option_clear_or_none(const char *o)
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+/* remove algorithms not approved for use in FIPS mode, when running in FIPS
|
|
|
|
|
+ * mode
|
|
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
|
|
+static void
|
|
|
|
|
+filter_fips_algorithms_s(ServerOptions *o)
|
|
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (fips_mode()) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (!fips_filter_crypto(&o->ciphers, FIPS_FILTER_CIPHERS))
|
|
|
|
|
+ fatal("None of selected ciphers can be used in FIPS mode");
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (!fips_filter_crypto(&o->macs, FIPS_FILTER_MACS))
|
|
|
|
|
+ fatal("None of selected MAC algorithms can be used in FIPS mode");
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (!fips_filter_crypto(&o->kex_algorithms, FIPS_FILTER_KEX_ALGS))
|
|
|
|
|
+ fatal("None of selected KEX algorithms can be used in FIPS mode");
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
@@ -248,6 +266,8 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
|
2020-06-06 08:49:00 +02:00
|
|
|
free(def_kex);
|
|
|
|
|
free(def_key);
|
|
|
|
|
free(def_sig);
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+ filter_fips_algorithms_s(o);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
Accepting request 922068 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Version upgrade to 8.8p1
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details
- Version update to 8.8p1:
= Security
* sshd(8) from OpenSSH 6.2 through 8.7 failed to correctly initialise
supplemental groups when executing an AuthorizedKeysCommand or
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, where a AuthorizedKeysCommandUser or
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser directive has been set to run the
command as a different user. Instead these commands would inherit
the groups that sshd(8) was started with.
Depending on system configuration, inherited groups may allow
AuthorizedKeysCommand/AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand helper programs to
gain unintended privilege.
Neither AuthorizedKeysCommand nor AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand are
enabled by default in sshd_config(5).
= Potentially-incompatible changes
* This release disables RSA signatures using the SHA-1 hash algorithm
by default. This change has been made as the SHA-1 hash algorithm is
cryptographically broken, and it is possible to create chosen-prefix
hash collisions for <USD$50K.
For most users, this change should be invisible and there is
no need to replace ssh-rsa keys. OpenSSH has supported RFC8332
RSA/SHA-256/512 signatures since release 7.2 and existing ssh-rsa keys
will automatically use the stronger algorithm where possible.
Incompatibility is more likely when connecting to older SSH
implementations that have not been upgraded or have not closely tracked
improvements in the SSH protocol. For these cases, it may be necessary
to selectively re-enable RSA/SHA1 to allow connection and/or user
authentication via the HostkeyAlgorithms and PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
options.
= New features
* ssh(1): allow the ssh_config(5) CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
directive to accept a "none" argument to specify the default
behaviour.
= Bugfixes
* scp(1): when using the SFTP protocol, continue transferring files
after a transfer error occurs, better matching original scp/rcp
behaviour.
* ssh(1): fixed a number of memory leaks in multiplexing,
* ssh-keygen(1): avoid crash when using the -Y find-principals
command.
* A number of documentation and manual improvements, including
bz#3340, PR139, PR215, PR241, PR257
- Additional changes from 8.7p1 release:
= Potentially-incompatible changes
* scp(1): this release changes the behaviour of remote to remote
copies (e.g. "scp host-a:/path host-b:") to transfer through the
local host by default. This was previously available via the -3
flag. This mode avoids the need to expose credentials on the
origin hop, avoids triplicate interpretation of filenames by the
shell (by the local system, the copy origin and the destination)
and, in conjunction with the SFTP support for scp(1) mentioned
below, allows use of all authentication methods to the remote
hosts (previously, only non-interactive methods could be used).
A -R flag has been added to select the old behaviour.
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): both the client and server are now using a
stricter configuration file parser. The new parser uses more
shell-like rules for quotes, space and escape characters. It is
also more strict in rejecting configurations that include options
lacking arguments. Previously some options (e.g. DenyUsers) could
appear on a line with no subsequent arguments. This release will
reject such configurations. The new parser will also reject
configurations with unterminated quotes and multiple '='
characters after the option name.
* ssh(1): when using SSHFP DNS records for host key verification,
ssh(1) will verify all matching records instead of just those
with the specific signature type requested. This may cause host
key verification problems if stale SSHFP records of a different
or legacy signature type exist alongside other records for a
particular host. bz#3322
* ssh-keygen(1): when generating a FIDO key and specifying an
explicit attestation challenge (using -Ochallenge), the challenge
will now be hashed by the builtin security key middleware. This
removes the (undocumented) requirement that challenges be exactly
32 bytes in length and matches the expectations of libfido2.
* sshd(8): environment="..." directives in authorized_keys files are
now first-match-wins and limited to 1024 discrete environment
variable names.
= New features
* scp(1): experimental support for transfers using the SFTP protocol
as a replacement for the venerable SCP/RCP protocol that it has
traditionally used. SFTP offers more predictable filename handling
and does not require expansion of glob(3) patterns via the shell
on the remote side.
* sftp-server(8): add a protocol extension to support expansion of
~/ and ~user/ prefixed paths. This was added to support these
paths when used by scp(1) while in SFTP mode.
* ssh(1): add a ForkAfterAuthentication ssh_config(5) counterpart to
the ssh(1) -f flag. GHPR231
* ssh(1): add a StdinNull directive to ssh_config(5) that allows the
config file to do the same thing as -n does on the ssh(1) command-
line. GHPR231
* ssh(1): add a SessionType directive to ssh_config, allowing the
configuration file to offer equivalent control to the -N (no
session) and -s (subsystem) command-line flags. GHPR231
* ssh-keygen(1): allowed signers files used by ssh-keygen(1)
signatures now support listing key validity intervals alongside
they key, and ssh-keygen(1) can optionally check during signature
verification whether a specified time falls inside this interval.
This feature is intended for use by git to support signing and
verifying objects using ssh keys.
* ssh-keygen(8): support printing of the full public key in a sshsig
signature via a -Oprint-pubkey flag.
= Bugfixes
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): start time-based re-keying exactly on schedule in
the client and server mainloops. Previously the re-key timeout
could expire but re-keying would not start until a packet was sent
or received, causing a spin in select() if the connection was
quiescent.
* ssh-keygen(1): avoid Y2038 problem in printing certificate
validity lifetimes. Dates past 2^31-1 seconds since epoch were
displayed incorrectly on some platforms. bz#3329
* scp(1): allow spaces to appear in usernames for local to remote
and scp -3 remote to remote copies. bz#1164
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): remove references to ChallengeResponseAuthentication
in favour of KbdInteractiveAuthentication. The former is what was in
SSHv1, the latter is what is in SSHv2 (RFC4256) and they were
treated as somewhat but not entirely equivalent. We retain the old
name as a deprecated alias so configuration files continue to work
as well as a reference in the man page for people looking for it.
bz#3303
* ssh(1)/ssh-add(1)/ssh-keygen(1): fix decoding of X.509 subject name
when extracting a key from a PKCS#11 certificate. bz#3327
* ssh(1): restore blocking status on stdio fds before close. ssh(1)
needs file descriptors in non-blocking mode to operate but it was
not restoring the original state on exit. This could cause
problems with fds shared with other programs via the shell,
bz#3280 and GHPR246
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): switch both client and server mainloops from
select(3) to pselect(3). Avoids race conditions where a signal
may arrive immediately before select(3) and not be processed until
an event fires. bz#2158
* ssh(1): sessions started with ControlPersist were incorrectly
executing a shell when the -N (no shell) option was specified.
bz#3290
* ssh(1): check if IPQoS or TunnelDevice are already set before
overriding. Prevents values in config files from overriding values
supplied on the command line. bz#3319
* ssh(1): fix debug message when finding a private key to match a
certificate being attempted for user authentication. Previously it
would print the certificate's path, whereas it was supposed to be
showing the private key's path. GHPR247
* sshd(8): match host certificates against host public keys, not
private keys. Allows use of certificates with private keys held in
a ssh-agent. bz#3524
* ssh(1): add a workaround for a bug in OpenSSH 7.4 sshd(8), which
allows RSA/SHA2 signatures for public key authentication but fails
to advertise this correctly via SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO. This causes
clients of these server to incorrectly match
PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithmse and potentially refuse to offer valid
keys. bz#3213
* sftp(1)/scp(1): degrade gracefully if a sftp-server offers the
limits@openssh.com extension but fails when the client tries to
invoke it. bz#3318
* ssh(1): allow ssh_config SetEnv to override $TERM, which is
otherwise handled specially by the protocol. Useful in ~/.ssh/config
to set TERM to something generic (e.g. "xterm" instead of
"xterm-256color") for destinations that lack terminfo entries.
* sftp-server(8): the limits@openssh.com extension was incorrectly
marked as an operation that writes to the filesystem, which made it
unavailable in sftp-server read-only mode. bz#3318
* ssh(1): fix SEGV in UpdateHostkeys debug() message, triggered when
the update removed more host keys than remain present.
* Many manual page fixes.
- Additional changes from 8.6p1 release:
= Security
* sshd(8): OpenSSH 8.5 introduced the LogVerbose keyword. When this
option was enabled with a set of patterns that activated logging
in code that runs in the low-privilege sandboxed sshd process, the
log messages were constructed in such a way that printf(3) format
strings could effectively be specified the low-privilege code.
= New features
* sftp-server(8): add a new limits@openssh.com protocol extension
that allows a client to discover various server limits, including
maximum packet size and maximum read/write length.
* sftp(1): use the new limits@openssh.com extension (when available)
to select better transfer lengths in the client.
* sshd(8): Add ModuliFile keyword to sshd_config to specify the
location of the "moduli" file containing the groups for DH-GEX.
* unit tests: Add a TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES environment variable to
enable printing of the elapsed time in seconds of each test.
= Bugfixes
* ssh_config(5), sshd_config(5): sync CASignatureAlgorithms lists in
manual pages with the current default. GHPR174
* ssh(1): ensure that pkcs11_del_provider() is called before exit.
GHPR234
* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix problems in string->argv conversion. Multiple
backslashes were not being dequoted correctly and quoted space in
the middle of a string was being incorrectly split. GHPR223
* ssh(1): return non-zero exit status when killed by signal; bz#3281
* sftp-server(8): increase maximum SSH2_FXP_READ to match the maximum
packet size. Also handle zero-length reads that are not explicitly
banned by the spec.
- Additional changes from 8.5p1 release:
= Security
* ssh-agent(1): fixed a double-free memory corruption that was
introduced in OpenSSH 8.2 . We treat all such memory faults as
potentially exploitable. This bug could be reached by an attacker
with access to the agent socket.
= Potentially-incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): this release changes the first-preference signature
algorithm from ECDSA to ED25519.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): set the TOS/DSCP specified in the configuration
for interactive use prior to TCP connect. The connection phase of
the SSH session is time-sensitive and often explicitly interactive.
The ultimate interactive/bulk TOS/DSCP will be set after
authentication completes.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): remove the pre-standardization cipher
rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se. It is an alias for aes256-cbc before
it was standardized in RFC4253 (2006), has been deprecated and
disabled by default since OpenSSH 7.2 (2016) and was only briefly
documented in ssh.1 in 2001.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): update/replace the experimental post-quantum
hybrid key exchange method based on Streamlined NTRU Prime coupled
with X25519. The previous sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org
method is replaced with sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com.
* ssh(1): disable CheckHostIP by default. It provides insignificant
benefits while making key rotation significantly more difficult,
especially for hosts behind IP-based load-balancers.
= New features
* ssh(1): this release enables UpdateHostkeys by default subject to
some conservative preconditions:
- The key was matched in the UserKnownHostsFile (and not in the
GlobalKnownHostsFile).
- The same key does not exist under another name.
- A certificate host key is not in use.
- known_hosts contains no matching wildcard hostname pattern.
- VerifyHostKeyDNS is not enabled.
- The default UserKnownHostsFile is in use.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): add a new LogVerbose configuration directive for
that allows forcing maximum debug logging by file/function/line
pattern-lists.
* ssh(1): when prompting the user to accept a new hostkey, display
any other host names/addresses already associated with the key.
* ssh(1): allow UserKnownHostsFile=none to indicate that no
known_hosts file should be used to identify host keys.
* ssh(1): add a ssh_config KnownHostsCommand option that allows the
client to obtain known_hosts data from a command in addition to
the usual files.
* ssh(1): add a ssh_config PermitRemoteOpen option that allows the
client to restrict the destination when RemoteForward is used
with SOCKS.
* ssh(1): for FIDO keys, if a signature operation fails with a
"incorrect PIN" reason and no PIN was initially requested from the
user, then request a PIN and retry the operation. This supports
some biometric devices that fall back to requiring PIN when reading
of the biometric failed, and devices that require PINs for all
hosted credentials.
* sshd(8): implement client address-based rate-limiting via new
sshd_config(5) PerSourceMaxStartups and PerSourceNetBlockSize
directives that provide more fine-grained control on a per-origin
address basis than the global MaxStartups limit.
= Bugfixes
* ssh(1): Prefix keyboard interactive prompts with "(user@host)" to
make it easier to determine which connection they are associated
with in cases like scp -3, ProxyJump, etc. bz#3224
* sshd(8): fix sshd_config SetEnv directives located inside Match
blocks. GHPR201
* ssh(1): when requesting a FIDO token touch on stderr, inform the
user once the touch has been recorded.
* ssh(1): prevent integer overflow when ridiculously large
ConnectTimeout values are specified, capping the effective value
(for most platforms) at 24 days. bz#3229
* ssh(1): consider the ECDSA key subtype when ordering host key
algorithms in the client.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): rename the PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes keyword to
PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms. The previous name incorrectly suggested
that it control allowed key algorithms, when this option actually
specifies the signature algorithms that are accepted. The previous
name remains available as an alias. bz#3253
* ssh(1), sshd(8): similarly, rename HostbasedKeyTypes (ssh) and
HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes (sshd) to HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms.
* sftp-server(8): add missing lsetstat@openssh.com documentation
and advertisement in the server's SSH2_FXP_VERSION hello packet.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): more strictly enforce KEX state-machine by
banning packet types once they are received. Fixes memleak caused
by duplicate SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST (oss-fuzz #30078).
* sftp(1): allow the full range of UIDs/GIDs for chown/chgrp on 32bit
platforms instead of being limited by LONG_MAX. bz#3206
* Minor man page fixes (capitalization, commas, etc.) bz#3223
* sftp(1): when doing an sftp recursive upload or download of a
read-only directory, ensure that the directory is created with
write and execute permissions in the interim so that the transfer
can actually complete, then set the directory permission as the
final step. bz#3222
* ssh-keygen(1): document the -Z, check the validity of its argument
earlier and provide a better error message if it's not correct.
bz#2879
* ssh(1): ignore comments at the end of config lines in ssh_config,
similar to what we already do for sshd_config. bz#2320
* sshd_config(5): mention that DisableForwarding is valid in a
sshd_config Match block. bz3239
* sftp(1): fix incorrect sorting of "ls -ltr" under some
circumstances. bz3248.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix potential integer truncation of (unlikely)
timeout values. bz#3250
* ssh(1): make hostbased authentication send the signature algorithm
in its SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST packets instead of the key type.
This make HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms do what it is supposed to -
filter on signature algorithm and not key type.
- Rebased patches:
* openssh-7.7p1-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-ctr.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-eal3.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-enable_PAM_by_default.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-host_ident.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-pts_names_formatting.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_ipc_flock.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_stat.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-send_locale.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-sftp_force_permissions.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch
* openssh-7.9p1-keygen-preserve-perms.patch
* openssh-7.9p1-revert-new-qos-defaults.patch
* openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-audit.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-seccomp-clock_gettime64.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-seccomp-clock_nanosleep.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-seccomp-clock_nanosleep_time64.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-use-openssl-kdf.patch
* openssh-8.4p1-vendordir.patch
* openssh-fips-ensure-approved-moduli.patch
* openssh-link-with-sk.patch
* openssh-reenable-dh-group14-sha1-default.patch
* openssh-whitelist-syscalls.patch
- Removed openssh-fix-ssh-copy-id.patch (fixed upstream).
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/922068
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=235
2021-10-07 10:06:58 +02:00
|
|
|
void
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
@@ -440,6 +460,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1)
|
|
|
|
|
options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
+ options->fingerprint_hash =
|
|
|
|
|
+ fips_correct_dgst(options->fingerprint_hash);
|
|
|
|
|
if (options->disable_forwarding == -1)
|
|
|
|
|
options->disable_forwarding = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
if (options->expose_userauth_info == -1)
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
Index: openssh-9.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
|
2021-01-18 02:12:55 +01:00
|
|
|
===================================================================
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/ssh-keygen.c
|
|
|
|
|
+++ openssh-9.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/socket.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/stat.h>
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+#include "fips.h"
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/pem.h>
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@@ -1040,11 +1042,13 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
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2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
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static void
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do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
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{
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- struct {
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+ struct Key_types {
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char *key_type;
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char *key_type_display;
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char *path;
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- } key_types[] = {
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+ };
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+
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+ struct Key_types key_types_all[] = {
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#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
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{ "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE },
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2023-05-22 21:32:26 +02:00
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#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
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@@ -1058,6 +1062,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
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{ NULL, NULL, NULL }
|
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};
|
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+ struct Key_types key_types_fips140_2[] = {
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+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
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+ { "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE },
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+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
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+ { "ecdsa", "ECDSA",_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE },
|
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+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
|
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+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
|
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+ { NULL, NULL, NULL }
|
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+ };
|
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+
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+ struct Key_types *key_types;
|
2019-10-10 15:32:50 +02:00
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u_int32_t bits = 0;
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
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int first = 0;
|
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|
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|
struct stat st;
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
@@ -1065,6 +1080,12 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
|
2020-06-06 08:49:00 +02:00
|
|
|
char comment[1024], *prv_tmp, *pub_tmp, *prv_file, *pub_file;
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
|
|
int i, type, fd, r;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (fips_mode()) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ key_types = key_types_fips140_2;
|
|
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
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|
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+ key_types = key_types_all;
|
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|
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+ }
|
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+
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; key_types[i].key_type; i++) {
|
|
|
|
|
public = private = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
prv_tmp = pub_tmp = prv_file = pub_file = NULL;
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
@@ -3794,6 +3815,15 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
|
2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
|
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|
key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
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|
|
|
|
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|
type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name);
|
|
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+
|
|
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|
|
+ /* protocol v1 is not allowed in FIPS mode, DSA is not acceptable because
|
|
|
|
|
+ * it has to be 1024 bit due to RFC 4253 using SHA-1 which implies 1024 bit
|
|
|
|
|
+ * keys due to FIPS-186 specification for DSS */
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (fips_mode() &&
|
|
|
|
|
+ (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519 ||
|
|
|
|
|
+ type == KEY_DSA_CERT || type == KEY_ED25519_CERT))
|
|
|
|
|
+ fatal("Key type %s not alowed in FIPS mode", key_type_name);
|
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+
|
|
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|
|
type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!quiet)
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
Index: openssh-9.6p1/ssh_config.5
|
2021-01-18 02:12:55 +01:00
|
|
|
===================================================================
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
|
|
|
--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/ssh_config.5
|
|
|
|
|
+++ openssh-9.6p1/ssh_config.5
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -831,6 +831,8 @@ The argument to this keyword must be
|
Accepting request 922068 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Version upgrade to 8.8p1
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details
- Version update to 8.8p1:
= Security
* sshd(8) from OpenSSH 6.2 through 8.7 failed to correctly initialise
supplemental groups when executing an AuthorizedKeysCommand or
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, where a AuthorizedKeysCommandUser or
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser directive has been set to run the
command as a different user. Instead these commands would inherit
the groups that sshd(8) was started with.
Depending on system configuration, inherited groups may allow
AuthorizedKeysCommand/AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand helper programs to
gain unintended privilege.
Neither AuthorizedKeysCommand nor AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand are
enabled by default in sshd_config(5).
= Potentially-incompatible changes
* This release disables RSA signatures using the SHA-1 hash algorithm
by default. This change has been made as the SHA-1 hash algorithm is
cryptographically broken, and it is possible to create chosen-prefix
hash collisions for <USD$50K.
For most users, this change should be invisible and there is
no need to replace ssh-rsa keys. OpenSSH has supported RFC8332
RSA/SHA-256/512 signatures since release 7.2 and existing ssh-rsa keys
will automatically use the stronger algorithm where possible.
Incompatibility is more likely when connecting to older SSH
implementations that have not been upgraded or have not closely tracked
improvements in the SSH protocol. For these cases, it may be necessary
to selectively re-enable RSA/SHA1 to allow connection and/or user
authentication via the HostkeyAlgorithms and PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
options.
= New features
* ssh(1): allow the ssh_config(5) CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
directive to accept a "none" argument to specify the default
behaviour.
= Bugfixes
* scp(1): when using the SFTP protocol, continue transferring files
after a transfer error occurs, better matching original scp/rcp
behaviour.
* ssh(1): fixed a number of memory leaks in multiplexing,
* ssh-keygen(1): avoid crash when using the -Y find-principals
command.
* A number of documentation and manual improvements, including
bz#3340, PR139, PR215, PR241, PR257
- Additional changes from 8.7p1 release:
= Potentially-incompatible changes
* scp(1): this release changes the behaviour of remote to remote
copies (e.g. "scp host-a:/path host-b:") to transfer through the
local host by default. This was previously available via the -3
flag. This mode avoids the need to expose credentials on the
origin hop, avoids triplicate interpretation of filenames by the
shell (by the local system, the copy origin and the destination)
and, in conjunction with the SFTP support for scp(1) mentioned
below, allows use of all authentication methods to the remote
hosts (previously, only non-interactive methods could be used).
A -R flag has been added to select the old behaviour.
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): both the client and server are now using a
stricter configuration file parser. The new parser uses more
shell-like rules for quotes, space and escape characters. It is
also more strict in rejecting configurations that include options
lacking arguments. Previously some options (e.g. DenyUsers) could
appear on a line with no subsequent arguments. This release will
reject such configurations. The new parser will also reject
configurations with unterminated quotes and multiple '='
characters after the option name.
* ssh(1): when using SSHFP DNS records for host key verification,
ssh(1) will verify all matching records instead of just those
with the specific signature type requested. This may cause host
key verification problems if stale SSHFP records of a different
or legacy signature type exist alongside other records for a
particular host. bz#3322
* ssh-keygen(1): when generating a FIDO key and specifying an
explicit attestation challenge (using -Ochallenge), the challenge
will now be hashed by the builtin security key middleware. This
removes the (undocumented) requirement that challenges be exactly
32 bytes in length and matches the expectations of libfido2.
* sshd(8): environment="..." directives in authorized_keys files are
now first-match-wins and limited to 1024 discrete environment
variable names.
= New features
* scp(1): experimental support for transfers using the SFTP protocol
as a replacement for the venerable SCP/RCP protocol that it has
traditionally used. SFTP offers more predictable filename handling
and does not require expansion of glob(3) patterns via the shell
on the remote side.
* sftp-server(8): add a protocol extension to support expansion of
~/ and ~user/ prefixed paths. This was added to support these
paths when used by scp(1) while in SFTP mode.
* ssh(1): add a ForkAfterAuthentication ssh_config(5) counterpart to
the ssh(1) -f flag. GHPR231
* ssh(1): add a StdinNull directive to ssh_config(5) that allows the
config file to do the same thing as -n does on the ssh(1) command-
line. GHPR231
* ssh(1): add a SessionType directive to ssh_config, allowing the
configuration file to offer equivalent control to the -N (no
session) and -s (subsystem) command-line flags. GHPR231
* ssh-keygen(1): allowed signers files used by ssh-keygen(1)
signatures now support listing key validity intervals alongside
they key, and ssh-keygen(1) can optionally check during signature
verification whether a specified time falls inside this interval.
This feature is intended for use by git to support signing and
verifying objects using ssh keys.
* ssh-keygen(8): support printing of the full public key in a sshsig
signature via a -Oprint-pubkey flag.
= Bugfixes
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): start time-based re-keying exactly on schedule in
the client and server mainloops. Previously the re-key timeout
could expire but re-keying would not start until a packet was sent
or received, causing a spin in select() if the connection was
quiescent.
* ssh-keygen(1): avoid Y2038 problem in printing certificate
validity lifetimes. Dates past 2^31-1 seconds since epoch were
displayed incorrectly on some platforms. bz#3329
* scp(1): allow spaces to appear in usernames for local to remote
and scp -3 remote to remote copies. bz#1164
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): remove references to ChallengeResponseAuthentication
in favour of KbdInteractiveAuthentication. The former is what was in
SSHv1, the latter is what is in SSHv2 (RFC4256) and they were
treated as somewhat but not entirely equivalent. We retain the old
name as a deprecated alias so configuration files continue to work
as well as a reference in the man page for people looking for it.
bz#3303
* ssh(1)/ssh-add(1)/ssh-keygen(1): fix decoding of X.509 subject name
when extracting a key from a PKCS#11 certificate. bz#3327
* ssh(1): restore blocking status on stdio fds before close. ssh(1)
needs file descriptors in non-blocking mode to operate but it was
not restoring the original state on exit. This could cause
problems with fds shared with other programs via the shell,
bz#3280 and GHPR246
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): switch both client and server mainloops from
select(3) to pselect(3). Avoids race conditions where a signal
may arrive immediately before select(3) and not be processed until
an event fires. bz#2158
* ssh(1): sessions started with ControlPersist were incorrectly
executing a shell when the -N (no shell) option was specified.
bz#3290
* ssh(1): check if IPQoS or TunnelDevice are already set before
overriding. Prevents values in config files from overriding values
supplied on the command line. bz#3319
* ssh(1): fix debug message when finding a private key to match a
certificate being attempted for user authentication. Previously it
would print the certificate's path, whereas it was supposed to be
showing the private key's path. GHPR247
* sshd(8): match host certificates against host public keys, not
private keys. Allows use of certificates with private keys held in
a ssh-agent. bz#3524
* ssh(1): add a workaround for a bug in OpenSSH 7.4 sshd(8), which
allows RSA/SHA2 signatures for public key authentication but fails
to advertise this correctly via SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO. This causes
clients of these server to incorrectly match
PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithmse and potentially refuse to offer valid
keys. bz#3213
* sftp(1)/scp(1): degrade gracefully if a sftp-server offers the
limits@openssh.com extension but fails when the client tries to
invoke it. bz#3318
* ssh(1): allow ssh_config SetEnv to override $TERM, which is
otherwise handled specially by the protocol. Useful in ~/.ssh/config
to set TERM to something generic (e.g. "xterm" instead of
"xterm-256color") for destinations that lack terminfo entries.
* sftp-server(8): the limits@openssh.com extension was incorrectly
marked as an operation that writes to the filesystem, which made it
unavailable in sftp-server read-only mode. bz#3318
* ssh(1): fix SEGV in UpdateHostkeys debug() message, triggered when
the update removed more host keys than remain present.
* Many manual page fixes.
- Additional changes from 8.6p1 release:
= Security
* sshd(8): OpenSSH 8.5 introduced the LogVerbose keyword. When this
option was enabled with a set of patterns that activated logging
in code that runs in the low-privilege sandboxed sshd process, the
log messages were constructed in such a way that printf(3) format
strings could effectively be specified the low-privilege code.
= New features
* sftp-server(8): add a new limits@openssh.com protocol extension
that allows a client to discover various server limits, including
maximum packet size and maximum read/write length.
* sftp(1): use the new limits@openssh.com extension (when available)
to select better transfer lengths in the client.
* sshd(8): Add ModuliFile keyword to sshd_config to specify the
location of the "moduli" file containing the groups for DH-GEX.
* unit tests: Add a TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES environment variable to
enable printing of the elapsed time in seconds of each test.
= Bugfixes
* ssh_config(5), sshd_config(5): sync CASignatureAlgorithms lists in
manual pages with the current default. GHPR174
* ssh(1): ensure that pkcs11_del_provider() is called before exit.
GHPR234
* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix problems in string->argv conversion. Multiple
backslashes were not being dequoted correctly and quoted space in
the middle of a string was being incorrectly split. GHPR223
* ssh(1): return non-zero exit status when killed by signal; bz#3281
* sftp-server(8): increase maximum SSH2_FXP_READ to match the maximum
packet size. Also handle zero-length reads that are not explicitly
banned by the spec.
- Additional changes from 8.5p1 release:
= Security
* ssh-agent(1): fixed a double-free memory corruption that was
introduced in OpenSSH 8.2 . We treat all such memory faults as
potentially exploitable. This bug could be reached by an attacker
with access to the agent socket.
= Potentially-incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): this release changes the first-preference signature
algorithm from ECDSA to ED25519.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): set the TOS/DSCP specified in the configuration
for interactive use prior to TCP connect. The connection phase of
the SSH session is time-sensitive and often explicitly interactive.
The ultimate interactive/bulk TOS/DSCP will be set after
authentication completes.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): remove the pre-standardization cipher
rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se. It is an alias for aes256-cbc before
it was standardized in RFC4253 (2006), has been deprecated and
disabled by default since OpenSSH 7.2 (2016) and was only briefly
documented in ssh.1 in 2001.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): update/replace the experimental post-quantum
hybrid key exchange method based on Streamlined NTRU Prime coupled
with X25519. The previous sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org
method is replaced with sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com.
* ssh(1): disable CheckHostIP by default. It provides insignificant
benefits while making key rotation significantly more difficult,
especially for hosts behind IP-based load-balancers.
= New features
* ssh(1): this release enables UpdateHostkeys by default subject to
some conservative preconditions:
- The key was matched in the UserKnownHostsFile (and not in the
GlobalKnownHostsFile).
- The same key does not exist under another name.
- A certificate host key is not in use.
- known_hosts contains no matching wildcard hostname pattern.
- VerifyHostKeyDNS is not enabled.
- The default UserKnownHostsFile is in use.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): add a new LogVerbose configuration directive for
that allows forcing maximum debug logging by file/function/line
pattern-lists.
* ssh(1): when prompting the user to accept a new hostkey, display
any other host names/addresses already associated with the key.
* ssh(1): allow UserKnownHostsFile=none to indicate that no
known_hosts file should be used to identify host keys.
* ssh(1): add a ssh_config KnownHostsCommand option that allows the
client to obtain known_hosts data from a command in addition to
the usual files.
* ssh(1): add a ssh_config PermitRemoteOpen option that allows the
client to restrict the destination when RemoteForward is used
with SOCKS.
* ssh(1): for FIDO keys, if a signature operation fails with a
"incorrect PIN" reason and no PIN was initially requested from the
user, then request a PIN and retry the operation. This supports
some biometric devices that fall back to requiring PIN when reading
of the biometric failed, and devices that require PINs for all
hosted credentials.
* sshd(8): implement client address-based rate-limiting via new
sshd_config(5) PerSourceMaxStartups and PerSourceNetBlockSize
directives that provide more fine-grained control on a per-origin
address basis than the global MaxStartups limit.
= Bugfixes
* ssh(1): Prefix keyboard interactive prompts with "(user@host)" to
make it easier to determine which connection they are associated
with in cases like scp -3, ProxyJump, etc. bz#3224
* sshd(8): fix sshd_config SetEnv directives located inside Match
blocks. GHPR201
* ssh(1): when requesting a FIDO token touch on stderr, inform the
user once the touch has been recorded.
* ssh(1): prevent integer overflow when ridiculously large
ConnectTimeout values are specified, capping the effective value
(for most platforms) at 24 days. bz#3229
* ssh(1): consider the ECDSA key subtype when ordering host key
algorithms in the client.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): rename the PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes keyword to
PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms. The previous name incorrectly suggested
that it control allowed key algorithms, when this option actually
specifies the signature algorithms that are accepted. The previous
name remains available as an alias. bz#3253
* ssh(1), sshd(8): similarly, rename HostbasedKeyTypes (ssh) and
HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes (sshd) to HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms.
* sftp-server(8): add missing lsetstat@openssh.com documentation
and advertisement in the server's SSH2_FXP_VERSION hello packet.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): more strictly enforce KEX state-machine by
banning packet types once they are received. Fixes memleak caused
by duplicate SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST (oss-fuzz #30078).
* sftp(1): allow the full range of UIDs/GIDs for chown/chgrp on 32bit
platforms instead of being limited by LONG_MAX. bz#3206
* Minor man page fixes (capitalization, commas, etc.) bz#3223
* sftp(1): when doing an sftp recursive upload or download of a
read-only directory, ensure that the directory is created with
write and execute permissions in the interim so that the transfer
can actually complete, then set the directory permission as the
final step. bz#3222
* ssh-keygen(1): document the -Z, check the validity of its argument
earlier and provide a better error message if it's not correct.
bz#2879
* ssh(1): ignore comments at the end of config lines in ssh_config,
similar to what we already do for sshd_config. bz#2320
* sshd_config(5): mention that DisableForwarding is valid in a
sshd_config Match block. bz3239
* sftp(1): fix incorrect sorting of "ls -ltr" under some
circumstances. bz3248.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix potential integer truncation of (unlikely)
timeout values. bz#3250
* ssh(1): make hostbased authentication send the signature algorithm
in its SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST packets instead of the key type.
This make HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms do what it is supposed to -
filter on signature algorithm and not key type.
- Rebased patches:
* openssh-7.7p1-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-ctr.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-eal3.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-enable_PAM_by_default.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-host_ident.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-pts_names_formatting.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_ipc_flock.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_stat.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-send_locale.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-sftp_force_permissions.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch
* openssh-7.9p1-keygen-preserve-perms.patch
* openssh-7.9p1-revert-new-qos-defaults.patch
* openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-audit.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-seccomp-clock_gettime64.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-seccomp-clock_nanosleep.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-seccomp-clock_nanosleep_time64.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-use-openssl-kdf.patch
* openssh-8.4p1-vendordir.patch
* openssh-fips-ensure-approved-moduli.patch
* openssh-link-with-sk.patch
* openssh-reenable-dh-group14-sha1-default.patch
* openssh-whitelist-syscalls.patch
- Removed openssh-fix-ssh-copy-id.patch (fixed upstream).
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/922068
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=235
2021-10-07 10:06:58 +02:00
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option) or
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.Cm no
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2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
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(the default).
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+.Pp
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+In the FIPS mode the minimum of SHA-1 is enforced (which means sha256).
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.It Cm ForwardAgent
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Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any)
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will be forwarded to the remote machine.
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Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
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Index: openssh-9.6p1/sshd.c
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2021-01-18 02:12:55 +01:00
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===================================================================
|
Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
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--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/sshd.c
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+++ openssh-9.6p1/sshd.c
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@@ -128,6 +128,8 @@
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Accepting request 922068 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Version upgrade to 8.8p1
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details
- Version update to 8.8p1:
= Security
* sshd(8) from OpenSSH 6.2 through 8.7 failed to correctly initialise
supplemental groups when executing an AuthorizedKeysCommand or
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, where a AuthorizedKeysCommandUser or
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser directive has been set to run the
command as a different user. Instead these commands would inherit
the groups that sshd(8) was started with.
Depending on system configuration, inherited groups may allow
AuthorizedKeysCommand/AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand helper programs to
gain unintended privilege.
Neither AuthorizedKeysCommand nor AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand are
enabled by default in sshd_config(5).
= Potentially-incompatible changes
* This release disables RSA signatures using the SHA-1 hash algorithm
by default. This change has been made as the SHA-1 hash algorithm is
cryptographically broken, and it is possible to create chosen-prefix
hash collisions for <USD$50K.
For most users, this change should be invisible and there is
no need to replace ssh-rsa keys. OpenSSH has supported RFC8332
RSA/SHA-256/512 signatures since release 7.2 and existing ssh-rsa keys
will automatically use the stronger algorithm where possible.
Incompatibility is more likely when connecting to older SSH
implementations that have not been upgraded or have not closely tracked
improvements in the SSH protocol. For these cases, it may be necessary
to selectively re-enable RSA/SHA1 to allow connection and/or user
authentication via the HostkeyAlgorithms and PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
options.
= New features
* ssh(1): allow the ssh_config(5) CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
directive to accept a "none" argument to specify the default
behaviour.
= Bugfixes
* scp(1): when using the SFTP protocol, continue transferring files
after a transfer error occurs, better matching original scp/rcp
behaviour.
* ssh(1): fixed a number of memory leaks in multiplexing,
* ssh-keygen(1): avoid crash when using the -Y find-principals
command.
* A number of documentation and manual improvements, including
bz#3340, PR139, PR215, PR241, PR257
- Additional changes from 8.7p1 release:
= Potentially-incompatible changes
* scp(1): this release changes the behaviour of remote to remote
copies (e.g. "scp host-a:/path host-b:") to transfer through the
local host by default. This was previously available via the -3
flag. This mode avoids the need to expose credentials on the
origin hop, avoids triplicate interpretation of filenames by the
shell (by the local system, the copy origin and the destination)
and, in conjunction with the SFTP support for scp(1) mentioned
below, allows use of all authentication methods to the remote
hosts (previously, only non-interactive methods could be used).
A -R flag has been added to select the old behaviour.
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): both the client and server are now using a
stricter configuration file parser. The new parser uses more
shell-like rules for quotes, space and escape characters. It is
also more strict in rejecting configurations that include options
lacking arguments. Previously some options (e.g. DenyUsers) could
appear on a line with no subsequent arguments. This release will
reject such configurations. The new parser will also reject
configurations with unterminated quotes and multiple '='
characters after the option name.
* ssh(1): when using SSHFP DNS records for host key verification,
ssh(1) will verify all matching records instead of just those
with the specific signature type requested. This may cause host
key verification problems if stale SSHFP records of a different
or legacy signature type exist alongside other records for a
particular host. bz#3322
* ssh-keygen(1): when generating a FIDO key and specifying an
explicit attestation challenge (using -Ochallenge), the challenge
will now be hashed by the builtin security key middleware. This
removes the (undocumented) requirement that challenges be exactly
32 bytes in length and matches the expectations of libfido2.
* sshd(8): environment="..." directives in authorized_keys files are
now first-match-wins and limited to 1024 discrete environment
variable names.
= New features
* scp(1): experimental support for transfers using the SFTP protocol
as a replacement for the venerable SCP/RCP protocol that it has
traditionally used. SFTP offers more predictable filename handling
and does not require expansion of glob(3) patterns via the shell
on the remote side.
* sftp-server(8): add a protocol extension to support expansion of
~/ and ~user/ prefixed paths. This was added to support these
paths when used by scp(1) while in SFTP mode.
* ssh(1): add a ForkAfterAuthentication ssh_config(5) counterpart to
the ssh(1) -f flag. GHPR231
* ssh(1): add a StdinNull directive to ssh_config(5) that allows the
config file to do the same thing as -n does on the ssh(1) command-
line. GHPR231
* ssh(1): add a SessionType directive to ssh_config, allowing the
configuration file to offer equivalent control to the -N (no
session) and -s (subsystem) command-line flags. GHPR231
* ssh-keygen(1): allowed signers files used by ssh-keygen(1)
signatures now support listing key validity intervals alongside
they key, and ssh-keygen(1) can optionally check during signature
verification whether a specified time falls inside this interval.
This feature is intended for use by git to support signing and
verifying objects using ssh keys.
* ssh-keygen(8): support printing of the full public key in a sshsig
signature via a -Oprint-pubkey flag.
= Bugfixes
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): start time-based re-keying exactly on schedule in
the client and server mainloops. Previously the re-key timeout
could expire but re-keying would not start until a packet was sent
or received, causing a spin in select() if the connection was
quiescent.
* ssh-keygen(1): avoid Y2038 problem in printing certificate
validity lifetimes. Dates past 2^31-1 seconds since epoch were
displayed incorrectly on some platforms. bz#3329
* scp(1): allow spaces to appear in usernames for local to remote
and scp -3 remote to remote copies. bz#1164
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): remove references to ChallengeResponseAuthentication
in favour of KbdInteractiveAuthentication. The former is what was in
SSHv1, the latter is what is in SSHv2 (RFC4256) and they were
treated as somewhat but not entirely equivalent. We retain the old
name as a deprecated alias so configuration files continue to work
as well as a reference in the man page for people looking for it.
bz#3303
* ssh(1)/ssh-add(1)/ssh-keygen(1): fix decoding of X.509 subject name
when extracting a key from a PKCS#11 certificate. bz#3327
* ssh(1): restore blocking status on stdio fds before close. ssh(1)
needs file descriptors in non-blocking mode to operate but it was
not restoring the original state on exit. This could cause
problems with fds shared with other programs via the shell,
bz#3280 and GHPR246
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): switch both client and server mainloops from
select(3) to pselect(3). Avoids race conditions where a signal
may arrive immediately before select(3) and not be processed until
an event fires. bz#2158
* ssh(1): sessions started with ControlPersist were incorrectly
executing a shell when the -N (no shell) option was specified.
bz#3290
* ssh(1): check if IPQoS or TunnelDevice are already set before
overriding. Prevents values in config files from overriding values
supplied on the command line. bz#3319
* ssh(1): fix debug message when finding a private key to match a
certificate being attempted for user authentication. Previously it
would print the certificate's path, whereas it was supposed to be
showing the private key's path. GHPR247
* sshd(8): match host certificates against host public keys, not
private keys. Allows use of certificates with private keys held in
a ssh-agent. bz#3524
* ssh(1): add a workaround for a bug in OpenSSH 7.4 sshd(8), which
allows RSA/SHA2 signatures for public key authentication but fails
to advertise this correctly via SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO. This causes
clients of these server to incorrectly match
PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithmse and potentially refuse to offer valid
keys. bz#3213
* sftp(1)/scp(1): degrade gracefully if a sftp-server offers the
limits@openssh.com extension but fails when the client tries to
invoke it. bz#3318
* ssh(1): allow ssh_config SetEnv to override $TERM, which is
otherwise handled specially by the protocol. Useful in ~/.ssh/config
to set TERM to something generic (e.g. "xterm" instead of
"xterm-256color") for destinations that lack terminfo entries.
* sftp-server(8): the limits@openssh.com extension was incorrectly
marked as an operation that writes to the filesystem, which made it
unavailable in sftp-server read-only mode. bz#3318
* ssh(1): fix SEGV in UpdateHostkeys debug() message, triggered when
the update removed more host keys than remain present.
* Many manual page fixes.
- Additional changes from 8.6p1 release:
= Security
* sshd(8): OpenSSH 8.5 introduced the LogVerbose keyword. When this
option was enabled with a set of patterns that activated logging
in code that runs in the low-privilege sandboxed sshd process, the
log messages were constructed in such a way that printf(3) format
strings could effectively be specified the low-privilege code.
= New features
* sftp-server(8): add a new limits@openssh.com protocol extension
that allows a client to discover various server limits, including
maximum packet size and maximum read/write length.
* sftp(1): use the new limits@openssh.com extension (when available)
to select better transfer lengths in the client.
* sshd(8): Add ModuliFile keyword to sshd_config to specify the
location of the "moduli" file containing the groups for DH-GEX.
* unit tests: Add a TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES environment variable to
enable printing of the elapsed time in seconds of each test.
= Bugfixes
* ssh_config(5), sshd_config(5): sync CASignatureAlgorithms lists in
manual pages with the current default. GHPR174
* ssh(1): ensure that pkcs11_del_provider() is called before exit.
GHPR234
* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix problems in string->argv conversion. Multiple
backslashes were not being dequoted correctly and quoted space in
the middle of a string was being incorrectly split. GHPR223
* ssh(1): return non-zero exit status when killed by signal; bz#3281
* sftp-server(8): increase maximum SSH2_FXP_READ to match the maximum
packet size. Also handle zero-length reads that are not explicitly
banned by the spec.
- Additional changes from 8.5p1 release:
= Security
* ssh-agent(1): fixed a double-free memory corruption that was
introduced in OpenSSH 8.2 . We treat all such memory faults as
potentially exploitable. This bug could be reached by an attacker
with access to the agent socket.
= Potentially-incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): this release changes the first-preference signature
algorithm from ECDSA to ED25519.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): set the TOS/DSCP specified in the configuration
for interactive use prior to TCP connect. The connection phase of
the SSH session is time-sensitive and often explicitly interactive.
The ultimate interactive/bulk TOS/DSCP will be set after
authentication completes.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): remove the pre-standardization cipher
rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se. It is an alias for aes256-cbc before
it was standardized in RFC4253 (2006), has been deprecated and
disabled by default since OpenSSH 7.2 (2016) and was only briefly
documented in ssh.1 in 2001.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): update/replace the experimental post-quantum
hybrid key exchange method based on Streamlined NTRU Prime coupled
with X25519. The previous sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org
method is replaced with sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com.
* ssh(1): disable CheckHostIP by default. It provides insignificant
benefits while making key rotation significantly more difficult,
especially for hosts behind IP-based load-balancers.
= New features
* ssh(1): this release enables UpdateHostkeys by default subject to
some conservative preconditions:
- The key was matched in the UserKnownHostsFile (and not in the
GlobalKnownHostsFile).
- The same key does not exist under another name.
- A certificate host key is not in use.
- known_hosts contains no matching wildcard hostname pattern.
- VerifyHostKeyDNS is not enabled.
- The default UserKnownHostsFile is in use.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): add a new LogVerbose configuration directive for
that allows forcing maximum debug logging by file/function/line
pattern-lists.
* ssh(1): when prompting the user to accept a new hostkey, display
any other host names/addresses already associated with the key.
* ssh(1): allow UserKnownHostsFile=none to indicate that no
known_hosts file should be used to identify host keys.
* ssh(1): add a ssh_config KnownHostsCommand option that allows the
client to obtain known_hosts data from a command in addition to
the usual files.
* ssh(1): add a ssh_config PermitRemoteOpen option that allows the
client to restrict the destination when RemoteForward is used
with SOCKS.
* ssh(1): for FIDO keys, if a signature operation fails with a
"incorrect PIN" reason and no PIN was initially requested from the
user, then request a PIN and retry the operation. This supports
some biometric devices that fall back to requiring PIN when reading
of the biometric failed, and devices that require PINs for all
hosted credentials.
* sshd(8): implement client address-based rate-limiting via new
sshd_config(5) PerSourceMaxStartups and PerSourceNetBlockSize
directives that provide more fine-grained control on a per-origin
address basis than the global MaxStartups limit.
= Bugfixes
* ssh(1): Prefix keyboard interactive prompts with "(user@host)" to
make it easier to determine which connection they are associated
with in cases like scp -3, ProxyJump, etc. bz#3224
* sshd(8): fix sshd_config SetEnv directives located inside Match
blocks. GHPR201
* ssh(1): when requesting a FIDO token touch on stderr, inform the
user once the touch has been recorded.
* ssh(1): prevent integer overflow when ridiculously large
ConnectTimeout values are specified, capping the effective value
(for most platforms) at 24 days. bz#3229
* ssh(1): consider the ECDSA key subtype when ordering host key
algorithms in the client.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): rename the PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes keyword to
PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms. The previous name incorrectly suggested
that it control allowed key algorithms, when this option actually
specifies the signature algorithms that are accepted. The previous
name remains available as an alias. bz#3253
* ssh(1), sshd(8): similarly, rename HostbasedKeyTypes (ssh) and
HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes (sshd) to HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms.
* sftp-server(8): add missing lsetstat@openssh.com documentation
and advertisement in the server's SSH2_FXP_VERSION hello packet.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): more strictly enforce KEX state-machine by
banning packet types once they are received. Fixes memleak caused
by duplicate SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST (oss-fuzz #30078).
* sftp(1): allow the full range of UIDs/GIDs for chown/chgrp on 32bit
platforms instead of being limited by LONG_MAX. bz#3206
* Minor man page fixes (capitalization, commas, etc.) bz#3223
* sftp(1): when doing an sftp recursive upload or download of a
read-only directory, ensure that the directory is created with
write and execute permissions in the interim so that the transfer
can actually complete, then set the directory permission as the
final step. bz#3222
* ssh-keygen(1): document the -Z, check the validity of its argument
earlier and provide a better error message if it's not correct.
bz#2879
* ssh(1): ignore comments at the end of config lines in ssh_config,
similar to what we already do for sshd_config. bz#2320
* sshd_config(5): mention that DisableForwarding is valid in a
sshd_config Match block. bz3239
* sftp(1): fix incorrect sorting of "ls -ltr" under some
circumstances. bz3248.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix potential integer truncation of (unlikely)
timeout values. bz#3250
* ssh(1): make hostbased authentication send the signature algorithm
in its SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST packets instead of the key type.
This make HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms do what it is supposed to -
filter on signature algorithm and not key type.
- Rebased patches:
* openssh-7.7p1-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-ctr.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-eal3.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-enable_PAM_by_default.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-host_ident.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-pts_names_formatting.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_ipc_flock.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_stat.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-send_locale.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-sftp_force_permissions.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch
* openssh-7.9p1-keygen-preserve-perms.patch
* openssh-7.9p1-revert-new-qos-defaults.patch
* openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-audit.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-seccomp-clock_gettime64.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-seccomp-clock_nanosleep.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-seccomp-clock_nanosleep_time64.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-use-openssl-kdf.patch
* openssh-8.4p1-vendordir.patch
* openssh-fips-ensure-approved-moduli.patch
* openssh-link-with-sk.patch
* openssh-reenable-dh-group14-sha1-default.patch
* openssh-whitelist-syscalls.patch
- Removed openssh-fix-ssh-copy-id.patch (fixed upstream).
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/922068
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=235
2021-10-07 10:06:58 +02:00
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#include "srclimit.h"
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#include "dh.h"
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2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
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+#include "fips.h"
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+
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/* Re-exec fds */
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#define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
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#define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
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Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
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Index: openssh-9.6p1/sshd_config.5
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2021-01-18 02:12:55 +01:00
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===================================================================
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Accepting request 1150500 from home:hpjansson:branches:network
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
2024-02-25 19:43:17 +01:00
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--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/sshd_config.5
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+++ openssh-9.6p1/sshd_config.5
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@@ -681,6 +681,8 @@ and
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2018-10-17 10:57:56 +02:00
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.Cm sha256 .
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The default is
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.Cm sha256 .
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+.Pp
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+In the FIPS mode the minimum of SHA-1 is enforced (which means sha256).
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.It Cm ForceCommand
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Forces the execution of the command specified by
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.Cm ForceCommand ,
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