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openssh/openssh-7.2p2-limit_password_length.patch

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# HG changeset patch
2017-06-01 01:09:14 +02:00
# Parent 9888bc3f536eab9f528d9c96e5e8a2501ed168f5
Limit accepted passwords length to prevent DoS by resource consumption
(via crypt() eating CPU cycles).
CVE-2016-6515
bsc#992533
upstream commit: fcd135c9df440bcd2d5870405ad3311743d78d97
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-passwd.c
@@ -61,16 +61,18 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
extern login_cap_t *lc;
#endif
#define DAY (24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
#define TWO_WEEKS (2L * 7 * DAY) /* 2 weeks in seconds */
+#define MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 1024
+
void
disable_forwarding(void)
{
no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
}
@@ -82,16 +84,19 @@ int
auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
{
struct passwd * pw = authctxt->pw;
int result, ok = authctxt->valid;
#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
static int expire_checked = 0;
#endif
+ if (strlen(password) > MAX_PASSWORD_LEN)
+ return 0;
+
#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)
ok = 0;
#endif
if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0)
return 0;
#ifdef KRB5