Accepting request 415094 from network

- fixed url

- upgrade to 7.2p2

- changing license to 2-clause BSD to match source

- added gpg signature 

- enable support for SSHv1 protocol and discourage its usage
  (bsc#983307)
- enable DSA by default for backward compatibility and discourage
  its usage (bsc#983784)
  [openssh-7.2p2-allow_DSS_by_default.patch]

- enable trusted X11 forwarding by default
  [openssh-7.2p2-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch]
- set UID for lastlog properly 
  [openssh-7.2p2-lastlog.patch]
- enable use of PAM by default 
  [openssh-7.2p2-enable_PAM_by_default.patch]
- copy command line arguments properly 
  [openssh-7.2p2-saveargv-fix.patch]
- do not use pthreads in PAM code 
  [openssh-7.2p2-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM.patch]
- fix paths in documentation 
  [openssh-7.2p2-eal3.patch]
- prevent race consitions triggered by SIGALRM 
  [openssh-7.2p2-blocksigalrm.patch]
- do send and accept locale environment variables by default
  [openssh-7.2p2-send_locale.patch]

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/415094
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=106

CVE-2016-0777_CVE-2016-0778.patch

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-References: https://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-announce/2016-January/000124.html https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=961645 https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=961642
---- readconf.c	30 Jul 2015 00:01:34 -0000	1.239
-+++ readconf.c	13 Jan 2016 23:17:23 -0000
-@@ -1648,7 +1648,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
- 	options->tun_remote = -1;
- 	options->local_command = NULL;
- 	options->permit_local_command = -1;
--	options->use_roaming = -1;
-+	options->use_roaming = 0;
- 	options->visual_host_key = -1;
- 	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
- 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
-@@ -1819,8 +1819,7 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- 		options->tun_remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
- 	if (options->permit_local_command == -1)
- 		options->permit_local_command = 0;
--	if (options->use_roaming == -1)
--		options->use_roaming = 1;
-+	options->use_roaming = 0;
- 	if (options->visual_host_key == -1)
- 		options->visual_host_key = 0;
- 	if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
---- ssh.c	30 Jul 2015 00:01:34 -0000	1.420
-+++ ssh.c	13 Jan 2016 23:17:23 -0000
-@@ -1882,9 +1882,6 @@ ssh_session2(void)
- 			fork_postauth();
- 	}
- 
--	if (options.use_roaming)
--		request_roaming();
--
- 	return client_loop(tty_flag, tty_flag ?
- 	    options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id);
- }

README.SUSE

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+This is OpenSSH version 7.2p2 for SLE12
+
+There are following changes in default settings of ssh client and server:
+
+* Accepting and sending of locale environment variables in protocol 2 is
+  enabled.
+
+* PAM authentication is enabled.
+
+* root authentiation with password is enabled by default (PermitRootLogin yes).
+  NOTE: this has security implications and is only done in order to not change
+  behaviour of the server in an update. We strongly suggest setting this option
+  either "prohibit-password" or even better to "no" (which disables direct
+  remote root login entirely).
+
+* SSH protocol version 1 is enabled for maximum compatibility.
+  NOTE: do not use protocol version 1. It is less secure then v2 and should
+  generally be phased out.
+
+* DSA authentication is enabled by default for maximum compatibility.
+  NOTE: do not use DSA authentication since it is being phased out for a reason
+  - the size of DSA keys is limited by the standard to 1024 bits which cannot
+  be considered safe any more.
+
+For more information on differences in SUSE OpenSSH package see README.FIPS
+

README.SuSE

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-This is OpenSSH version 5.6p1.
-
-There are following changes in default settings of ssh client: 
-
-* Accepting and sending of locale environment variables in protocol 2 is
-  enabled.
-
-* New host keys will be hashed to and them unusable for malicious people or
-  software trying to use known_hosts to find further hops.
-
-* Tunneled clear text passwords are disabled.
-
-* PAM authentication is enabled.
-
-* Only support for protocol 2 is enabled. 

cavs_driver-ssh.pl

@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+#
+# CAVS test driver for OpenSSH
+#
+# Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+#
+# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+# in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+# to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+# copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+#
+# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
+# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+#
+#                            NO WARRANTY
+#
+#    BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
+#    FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW.  EXCEPT WHEN
+#    OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
+#    PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
+#    OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+#    MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  THE ENTIRE RISK AS
+#    TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU.  SHOULD THE
+#    PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
+#    REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
+#
+#    IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
+#    WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
+#    REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
+#    INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
+#    OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
+#    TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
+#    YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
+#    PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
+#    POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
+#
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use IPC::Open2;
+
+# Executing a program by feeding STDIN and retrieving
+# STDOUT
+# $1: data string to be piped to the app on STDIN
+# rest: program and args
+# returns: STDOUT of program as string
+sub pipe_through_program($@) {
+	my $in = shift;
+	my @args = @_;
+
+	my ($CO, $CI);
+	my $pid = open2($CO, $CI, @args);
+
+	my $out = "";
+	my $len = length($in);
+	my $first = 1;
+	while (1) {
+		my $rin = "";
+		my $win = "";
+		# Output of prog is FD that we read
+		vec($rin,fileno($CO),1) = 1;
+		# Input of prog is FD that we write
+		# check for $first is needed because we can have NULL input
+		# that is to be written to the app
+		if ( $len > 0 || $first) {
+			(vec($win,fileno($CI),1) = 1);
+			$first=0;
+		}
+		# Let us wait for 100ms
+		my $nfound = select(my $rout=$rin, my $wout=$win, undef, 0.1);
+		if ( $wout ) {
+			my $written = syswrite($CI, $in, $len);
+			die "broken pipe" if !defined $written;
+			$len -= $written;
+			substr($in, 0, $written) = "";
+			if ($len <= 0) {
+				close $CI or die "broken pipe: $!";
+			}
+		}
+		if ( $rout ) {
+			my $tmp_out = "";
+			my $bytes_read = sysread($CO, $tmp_out, 4096);
+			$out .= $tmp_out;
+			last if ($bytes_read == 0);
+		}
+	}
+	close $CO or die "broken pipe: $!";
+	waitpid $pid, 0;
+
+	return $out;
+}
+
+# Parser of CAVS test vector file
+# $1: Test vector file
+# $2: Output file for test results
+# return: nothing
+sub parse($$) {
+	my $infile = shift;
+	my $outfile = shift;
+
+	my $out = "";
+
+	my $K = "";
+	my $H = "";
+	my $session_id = "";
+	my $ivlen = 0;
+	my $eklen = "";
+	my $iklen = "";
+
+	open(IN, "<$infile");
+	while(<IN>) {
+
+		my $line = $_;
+		chomp($line);
+		$line =~ s/\r//;
+
+		if ($line =~ /\[SHA-1\]/) {
+			$iklen = 20;
+		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-256\]/) {
+			$iklen = 32;
+		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-384\]/) {
+			$iklen = 48;
+		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-512\]/) {
+			$iklen = 64;
+		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[IV length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
+			$ivlen = $1;
+			$ivlen = $ivlen / 8;
+		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[encryption key length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
+			$eklen = $1;
+			$eklen = $eklen / 8;
+		} elsif ($line =~ /^K\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
+			$K = $1;
+			$K = substr($K, 8);
+			$K = "00" . $K;
+		} elsif ($line =~ /^H\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
+			$H = $1;
+		} elsif ($line =~ /^session_id\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
+			$session_id = $1;
+		}
+		$out .= $line . "\n";
+
+		if ($K ne "" && $H ne "" && $session_id ne "" &&
+		    $ivlen ne "" && $eklen ne "" && $iklen > 0) {
+			$out .= pipe_through_program("", "@LIBEXECDIR@/ssh/cavstest-kdf -H $H -K $K -s $session_id -i $ivlen -e $eklen -m $iklen");
+
+			$K = "";
+			$H = "";
+			$session_id = "";
+		}
+	}
+	close IN;
+	$out =~ s/\n/\r\n/g; # make it a dos file
+	open(OUT, ">$outfile") or die "Cannot create output file $outfile: $?";
+	print OUT $out;
+	close OUT;
+}
+
+############################################################
+#
+# let us pretend to be C :-)
+sub main() {
+
+	my $infile=$ARGV[0];
+	die "Error: Test vector file $infile not found" if (! -f $infile);
+
+	my $outfile = $infile;
+	# let us add .rsp regardless whether we could strip .req
+	$outfile =~ s/\.req$//;
+	$outfile .= ".rsp";
+	if (-f $outfile) {
+		die "Output file $outfile could not be removed: $?"
+			unless unlink($outfile);
+	}
+	print STDERR "Performing tests from source file $infile with results stored in destination file $outfile\n";
+
+	# Do the job
+	parse($infile, $outfile);
+}
+
+###########################################
+# Call it
+main();
+1;

openssh-6.6p1-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent 1055b218140c3cc19228c47878a68740363d80dd
-Do not throw away already open sockets for X11 forwarding if another socket
-family is not available for bind()
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/channels.c b/openssh-6.6p1/channels.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/channels.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/channels.c
-@@ -3476,22 +3476,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
- 			}
- 			if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
- 				sock_set_v6only(sock);
- 			if (x11_use_localhost)
- 				channel_set_reuseaddr(sock);
- 			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
- 				debug2("bind port %d: %.100s", port, strerror(errno));
- 				close(sock);
--
-+				continue;
-+				/* do not remove successfully opened sockets
- 				for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
- 					close(socks[n]);
- 				}
- 				num_socks = 0;
- 				break;
-+				*/
- 			}
- 			socks[num_socks++] = sock;
- 			if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
- 				break;
- 		}
- 		freeaddrinfo(aitop);
- 		if (num_socks > 0)
- 			break;

openssh-6.6p1-audit1-remove_duplicit_audit.patch

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-# Don't audit SSH_INVALID_USER twice.
-# PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow()) a few lines above already did this.
-#
-# based on:
-#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
-#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=2010
-#   by jchadima@redhat.com
-#
-# PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow()) a few lines above already did this.
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c
-@@ -236,19 +236,16 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 		authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user));
- 		authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
- 		if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
- 			authctxt->valid = 1;
- 			debug2("input_userauth_request: setting up authctxt for %s", user);
- 		} else {
- 			logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user);
- 			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
--#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
--			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
--#endif
- 		}
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 		if (options.use_pam)
- 			PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
- #endif
- 		setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
- 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
- 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);

openssh-6.6p1-audit2-better_audit_of_user_actions.patch

@@ -1,867 +0,0 @@
-# extended auditing of user actions
-# based on:
-#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
-#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=2011
-#   by jchadima@redhat.com
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
-@@ -370,20 +370,33 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, 
- 	/* this is used on IPv4-only machines */
- 	tid->port = (dev_t)port;
- 	tid->machine = inet_addr(host);
- 	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%08x", tid->machine);
- 	debug3("BSM audit: machine ID %s", buf);
- #endif
- }
- 
--void
-+int
- audit_run_command(const char *command)
- {
- 	/* not implemented */
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_count_session_open(void)
-+{
-+	/* not necessary */
- }
- 
- void
- audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
- {
- 	/* not implemented */
- }
- 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
-@@ -30,97 +30,210 @@
- #include "includes.h"
- #if defined(USE_LINUX_AUDIT)
- #include <libaudit.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
- #include <string.h>
- 
- #include "log.h"
- #include "audit.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "hostfile.h"
-+#include "auth.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
- #include "canohost.h"
- 
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
-+extern u_int utmp_len;
- const char* audit_username(void);
- 
--int
--linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
--    const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
-+static void
-+linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
-+    const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
- {
- 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
- 
- 	audit_fd = audit_open();
- 	if (audit_fd < 0) {
- 		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
- 		    errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
--			return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
-+			return; /* No audit support in kernel */
- 		else
--			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
-+			goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
- 	}
--	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
-+	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
- 	    NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
- 	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
- 	saved_errno = errno;
- 	close(audit_fd);
- 	/*
- 	 * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
- 	 * root user.
- 	 */
- 	if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
- 		rc = 0;
- 	errno = saved_errno;
--	return (rc >= 0);
-+	if (rc < 0) {
-+fatal_report:
-+		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-+	}
- }
- 
-+static void
-+linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const char *username,
-+    const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
-+{
-+	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
-+	static const char *event_name[] = {
-+		"maxtries exceeded",
-+		"root denied",
-+		"success",
-+		"none",
-+		"password",
-+		"challenge-response",
-+		"pubkey",
-+		"hostbased",
-+		"gssapi",
-+		"invalid user",
-+		"nologin",
-+		"connection closed",
-+		"connection abandoned",
-+		"unknown"
-+	};
-+
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
-+		    errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+			return; /* No audit support in kernel */
-+		else
-+			goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
-+	}
-+	
-+	if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN))
-+		event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
-+
-+	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH,
-+	    NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)",
-+	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
-+	saved_errno = errno;
-+	close(audit_fd);
-+	/*
-+	 * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
-+	 * root user.
-+	 */
-+	if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
-+		rc = 0;
-+	errno = saved_errno;
-+	if (rc < 0) {
-+fatal_report:
-+		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+static int user_login_count = 0;
-+
- /* Below is the sshd audit API code */
- 
- void
- audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
- {
-+	/* not implemented */
- }
--	/* not implemented */
-+
-+int
-+audit_run_command(const char *command)
-+{
-+	if (!user_login_count++) 
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
-+		    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
-+	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
-+	    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
-+	return 0;
-+}
- 
- void
--audit_run_command(const char *command)
-+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
- {
--	/* not implemented */
-+	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
-+	    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
-+	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) 
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
-+		    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_count_session_open(void)
-+{
-+	user_login_count++;
- }
- 
- void
- audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
- {
--	if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
--	    NULL, li->line, 1) == 0)
--		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-+	if (!user_login_count++) 
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+		    NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
-+	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+	    NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
- }
- 
- void
- audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
- {
--	/* not implemented */
-+	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+	    NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
-+	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) 
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+		    NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
- }
- 
- void
- audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
- {
- 	switch(event) {
- 	case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
--	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
--	case SSH_NOLOGIN:
--	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
--	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
-+		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
-+			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 1, event);
- 		break;
- 
-+	case SSH_NOLOGIN:
-+	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
-+		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
-+			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event);
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
-+			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
-+		break;
-+
-+	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
- 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
- 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
- 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
- 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
- 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
- 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
-+		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
-+			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event);
-+		break;
-+
-+	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
-+		if (user_login_count) {
-+			while (user_login_count--)
-+				linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
-+				    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
-+			linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
-+			    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
-+		}
-+		break;
-+
-+	case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON:
- 	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
--		linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
--			get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0);
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
-+			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
- 		break;
- 
- 	default:
- 		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
- 	}
- }
- 
- #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
-@@ -135,16 +135,27 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, 
- void
- audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
- {
- 	debug("audit event euid %d user %s event %d (%s)", geteuid(),
- 	    audit_username(), event, audit_event_lookup(event));
- }
- 
- /*
-+ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call,
-+ * audit_session_open.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_count_session_open(void)
-+{
-+	debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(),
-+	      audit_username());
-+}
-+
-+/*
-  * Called when a user session is started.  Argument is the tty allocated to
-  * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
-  *
-  * Note that this may be called multiple times if multiple sessions are used
-  * within a single connection.
-  */
- void
- audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
-@@ -169,18 +180,34 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
- 
- 	debug("audit session close euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(),
- 	    audit_username(), t);
- }
- 
- /*
-  * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command.  Note that
-  * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
-- * multiple sessions within a single connection.
-+ * multiple sessions within a single connection.  Returns a "handle" for
-+ * audit_end_command.
-  */
--void
-+int
- audit_run_command(const char *command)
- {
- 	debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
- 	    audit_username(), command);
-+	return 0;
- }
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes.  Note that
-+ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
-+ * multiple sessions within a single connection.  "handle" should come from
-+ * the corresponding audit_run_command.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
-+{
-+	debug("audit end nopty exec  euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
-+	    audit_username(), command);
-+}
-+
- # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
-@@ -44,14 +44,16 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type {
- 	SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE,	/* closed after attempting auth or session */
- 	SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON,	/* closed without completing auth */
- 	SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN
- };
- typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
- 
- void	audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
- void	audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
-+void	audit_count_session_open(void);
- void	audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
- void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
--void	audit_run_command(const char *);
-+int	audit_run_command(const char *);
-+void 	audit_end_command(int, const char *);
- ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
- 
- #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
-@@ -175,16 +175,17 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer 
- int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
- #endif
- 
- static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
- 
- static Authctxt *authctxt;
- static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL;	/* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
- 
- /* local state for key verify */
-@@ -255,16 +256,17 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
-     {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
- 
- struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
-@@ -297,16 +299,17 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] 
- 
- struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
- 
- struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
- 
- /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
- 
-@@ -1420,16 +1423,22 @@ mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passw
- static void
- mm_session_close(Session *s)
- {
- 	debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
- 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
- 		debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
- 		session_pty_cleanup2(s);
- 	}
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	if (s->command != NULL) {
-+		debug3("%s: command %d", __func__, s->command_handle);
-+		session_end_command2(s);
-+	}
-+#endif
- 	session_unused(s->self);
- }
- 
- int
- mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
- {
- 	extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
- 	Session *s;
-@@ -1742,21 +1751,53 @@ mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer
- 	return (0);
- }
- 
- int
- mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
- {
- 	u_int len;
- 	char *cmd;
-+	Session *s;
- 
- 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
- 	cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- 	/* sanity check command, if so how? */
--	audit_run_command(cmd);
-+	s = session_new();
-+	if (s == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: error allocating a session", __func__);
-+	s->command = cmd;
-+	s->command_handle = audit_run_command(cmd);
-+
-+	buffer_clear(m);
-+	buffer_put_int(m, s->self);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
-+
-+	return (0);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_audit_end_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+	int handle;
-+	u_int len;
-+	char *cmd;
-+	Session *s;
-+
-+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-+	handle = buffer_get_int(m);
-+	cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+
-+	s = session_by_id(handle);
-+	if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL ||
-+	    strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: invalid handle", __func__);
-+	mm_session_close(s);
-+
- 	free(cmd);
- 	return (0);
- }
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- 
- void
- monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
- {
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
-@@ -59,16 +59,17 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
- 
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
-+	MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 115,
- 
- };
- 
- struct mm_master;
- struct monitor {
- 	int			 m_recvfd;
- 	int			 m_sendfd;
- 	int			 m_log_recvfd;
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
-@@ -1184,27 +1184,48 @@ mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
- 
- 	buffer_init(&m);
- 	buffer_put_int(&m, event);
- 
- 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, &m);
- 	buffer_free(&m);
- }
- 
--void
-+int
- mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
- {
- 	Buffer m;
-+	int handle;
- 
- 	debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
- 
- 	buffer_init(&m);
- 	buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
- 
- 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
-+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
-+
-+	handle = buffer_get_int(&m);
-+	buffer_free(&m);
-+
-+	return (handle);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+mm_audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
-+{
-+	Buffer m;
-+
-+	debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
-+
-+	buffer_init(&m);
-+	buffer_put_int(&m, handle);
-+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, &m);
- 	buffer_free(&m);
- }
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- 
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- OM_uint32
- mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid)
- {
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
-@@ -69,17 +69,18 @@ void *mm_sshpam_init_ctx(struct Authctxt
- int mm_sshpam_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
- int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
- void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- #include "audit.h"
- void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
--void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
-+int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
-+void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
- #endif
- 
- struct Session;
- void mm_terminate(void);
- int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
- void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
- 
- /* SSHv1 interfaces */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
-@@ -740,16 +740,24 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
- 	cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
- #endif
- 
- 	s->pid = pid;
- 
- 	/* Parent.  Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
- 	close(ttyfd);
- 
-+#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
-+	/* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process,
-+	   compensate.  From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely
-+	   ugly. */
-+	if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL))
-+		audit_count_session_open();
-+#endif
-+
- 	/* Enter interactive session. */
- 	s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
- 	packet_set_interactive(1, 
- 	    options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
- 	if (compat20) {
- 		session_set_fds(s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1);
- 	} else {
- 		server_loop(pid, ptyfd, fdout, -1);
-@@ -834,25 +842,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
- 	    session_type,
- 	    tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
- 	    tty == NULL ? "" : tty,
- 	    s->pw->pw_name,
- 	    get_remote_ipaddr(),
- 	    get_remote_port());
- 
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
-+		fatal("do_exec: command already set");
- 	if (command != NULL)
--		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
-+		s->command = xstrdup(command);
- 	else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
- 		char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
- 
- 		if (shell[0] == '\0')	/* empty shell means /bin/sh */
- 			shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
--		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
-+		s->command = xstrdup(shell);
- 	}
-+	if (s->command != NULL)
-+		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command));
- #endif
- 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
- 		ret = do_exec_pty(s, command);
- 	else
- 		ret = do_exec_no_pty(s, command);
- 
- 	original_command = NULL;
- 
-@@ -1908,16 +1920,17 @@ session_unused(int id)
- 	memset(&sessions[id], 0, sizeof(*sessions));
- 	sessions[id].self = id;
- 	sessions[id].used = 0;
- 	sessions[id].chanid = -1;
- 	sessions[id].ptyfd = -1;
- 	sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
- 	sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
- 	sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
-+	sessions[id].command_handle = -1;
- 	sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
- 	sessions_first_unused = id;
- }
- 
- Session *
- session_new(void)
- {
- 	Session *s, *tmp;
-@@ -1990,16 +2003,29 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha
- 	if (s->pw == NULL || !authctxt->valid)
- 		fatal("no user for session %d", s->self);
- 	debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid);
- 	s->chanid = chanid;
- 	return 1;
- }
- 
- Session *
-+session_by_id(int id)
-+{
-+	if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) {
-+		Session *s = &sessions[id];
-+		if (s->used)
-+			return s;
-+	}
-+	debug("session_by_id: unknown id %d", id);
-+	session_dump();
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+Session *
- session_by_tty(char *tty)
- {
- 	int i;
- 	for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
- 		Session *s = &sessions[i];
- 		if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) {
- 			debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty);
- 			return s;
-@@ -2506,16 +2532,40 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int sta
- 	 * interested in data we write.
- 	 * Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there could
- 	 * be some more data waiting in the pipe.
- 	 */
- 	if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
- 		chan_write_failed(c);
- }
- 
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+void
-+session_end_command2(Session *s)
-+{
-+	if (s->command != NULL) {
-+		audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command);
-+		free(s->command);
-+		s->command = NULL;
-+		s->command_handle = -1;
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+session_end_command(Session *s)
-+{
-+	if (s->command != NULL) {
-+		PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command));
-+		free(s->command);
-+		s->command = NULL;
-+		s->command_handle = -1;
-+	}
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- void
- session_close(Session *s)
- {
- 	u_int i;
- 	int do_xauth;
- 
- 	debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
- 
-@@ -2546,16 +2596,20 @@ session_close(Session *s)
- 			int status;
- 
- 			waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
- 		}
- 	}
- 
- 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
- 		session_pty_cleanup(s);
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	if (s->command)
-+		session_end_command(s);
-+#endif
- 	free(s->term);
- 	free(s->display);
- 	free(s->x11_chanids);
- 	free(s->auth_display);
- 	free(s->auth_data);
- 	free(s->auth_proto);
- 	free(s->subsys);
- 	if (s->env != NULL) {
-@@ -2760,16 +2814,25 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
- }
- 
- static void
- do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
- 	server_loop2(authctxt);
- }
- 
-+static void
-+do_cleanup_one_session(Session *s)
-+{
-+	session_pty_cleanup2(s);
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	session_end_command2(s);
-+#endif
-+}
-+
- void
- do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
- 	static int called = 0;
- 
- 	debug("do_cleanup");
- 
- 	/* no cleanup if we're in the child for login shell */
-@@ -2808,10 +2871,10 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	/* remove agent socket */
- 	auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled,
- 	 * or if running in monitor.
- 	 */
- 	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
--		session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2);
-+		session_destroy_all(do_cleanup_one_session);
- }
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.h b/openssh-6.6p1/session.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/session.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/session.h
-@@ -56,29 +56,37 @@ struct Session {
- 	int	*x11_chanids;
- 	int	is_subsystem;
- 	char	*subsys;
- 	u_int	num_env;
- 	struct {
- 		char	*name;
- 		char	*val;
- 	} *env;
-+
-+	/* exec */
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	int	command_handle;
-+	char	*command;
-+#endif
- };
- 
- void	 do_authenticated(Authctxt *);
- void	 do_cleanup(Authctxt *);
- 
- int	 session_open(Authctxt *, int);
- void	 session_unused(int);
- int	 session_input_channel_req(Channel *, const char *);
- void	 session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int);
- void	 session_close_by_channel(int, void *);
- void	 session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *));
- void	 session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
-+void	 session_end_command2(Session *);
- 
- Session	*session_new(void);
-+Session *session_by_id(int);
- Session	*session_by_tty(char *);
- void	 session_close(Session *);
- void	 do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
- void	 child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
- 		       const char *value);
- 
- #endif
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
-@@ -2532,13 +2532,14 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
- 			if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
- 			    errno != ESRCH)
- 				error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__,
- 				    pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
- 		}
- 	}
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- 	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
--	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
-+	if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
-+	    (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
- 		audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
- #endif
- 	_exit(i);
- }

openssh-6.6p1-audit3-key_auth_usage-fips.patch

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent 5482d21e8bd06309af51dea77a5f3668859fb2a0
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c
-@@ -94,16 +94,20 @@ int
- auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge,
-     u_char response[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH])
- {
- 	u_char buf[2 * SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], mdbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
- 	struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
- 	int len;
- 	int dgst;
- 	size_t dgst_len;
-+	int rv;
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	char *fp;
-+#endif
- 
- 	/* don't allow short keys */
- 	if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
- 		error("%s: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
- 		    __func__,
- 		    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
- 		return (0);
- 	}
-@@ -121,22 +125,28 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNU
- 	if ((md = ssh_digest_start(dgst)) == NULL ||
- 	    ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 2 * dgst_len) < 0 ||
- 	    ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, dgst_len) < 0 ||
- 	    ssh_digest_final(md, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf)) < 0)
- 		fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
- 	ssh_digest_free(md);
- 
- 	/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
--	if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, dgst_len) != 0) {
--		/* Wrong answer. */
--		return (0);
-+	rv = timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, dgst_len) == 0;
-+
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	if (audit_keyusage(1, "ssh-rsa1", RSA_size(key->rsa) * 8, fp, rv) == 0) {
-+		debug("unsuccessful audit");
-+		rv = 0;
- 	}
--	/* Correct answer. */
--	return (1);
-+	free(fp);
-+#endif
-+
-+	return rv;
- }
- 
- /*
-  * Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client,
-  * and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to
-  * our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer.
-  */
- 

openssh-6.6p1-audit3-key_auth_usage.patch

@@ -1,506 +0,0 @@
-# auditing key-based authentication (both server and client)
-# based on:
-#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
-#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=2012
-#   (replaces: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=1975)
-#   by jchadima@redhat.com
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
-@@ -401,16 +401,22 @@ audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
- }
- 
- void
- audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
- {
- 	/* not implemented */
- }
- 
-+int
-+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
-+
- void
- audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
- {
- 	char    textbuf[BSM_TEXTBUFSZ];
- 	static int logged_in = 0;
- 	const char *user = the_authctxt ? the_authctxt->user : "(unknown user)";
- 
- 	if (cannot_audit(0))
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
-@@ -36,16 +36,18 @@
- #include "log.h"
- #include "audit.h"
- #include "key.h"
- #include "hostfile.h"
- #include "auth.h"
- #include "servconf.h"
- #include "canohost.h"
- 
-+#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 128
-+
- extern ServerOptions options;
- extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
- extern u_int utmp_len;
- const char* audit_username(void);
- 
- static void
- linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
-     const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
-@@ -125,16 +127,47 @@ linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const cha
- 		rc = 0;
- 	errno = saved_errno;
- 	if (rc < 0) {
- fatal_report:
- 		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
- 	}
- }
- 
-+int
-+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
-+{
-+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
-+
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
-+					 errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+			return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
-+		else                                                                                                                                       
-+			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
-+	}
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth rport=%d", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", get_remote_port());
-+	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
-+		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv);
-+	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+		goto out;
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s rport=%d",
-+			type, bits, fp, get_remote_port());
-+	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
-+		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv);
-+out:
-+	saved_errno = errno;
-+	audit_close(audit_fd);
-+	errno = saved_errno;
-+	/* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
-+	return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0));
-+}
-+
- static int user_login_count = 0;
- 
- /* Below is the sshd audit API code */
- 
- void
- audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
- {
- 	/* not implemented */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
-@@ -31,16 +31,17 @@
- 
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- 
- #include "audit.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "key.h"
- #include "hostfile.h"
- #include "auth.h"
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
- 
- /*
-  * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
-  * audit_connection_from() is called and MAY NOT be initialized when
-  * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called.  Test for NULL before using.
-  */
- extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
- 
-@@ -106,16 +107,32 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
- 	};
- 
- 	for (i = 0; event_lookup[i].event != SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; i++)
- 		if (event_lookup[i].event == ev)
- 			break;
- 	return(event_lookup[i].name);
- }
- 
-+void
-+audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const Key *key)
-+{
-+	char *fp;
-+	const char *crypto_name;
-+
-+	fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	if (key->type == KEY_RSA1)
-+		crypto_name = "ssh-rsa1";
-+	else
-+		crypto_name = key_ssh_name(key);
-+	if (audit_keyusage(host_user, crypto_name, key_size(key), fp, *rv) == 0)
-+		*rv = 0;
-+	free(fp);
-+}
-+
- # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- /*
-  * Null implementations of audit functions.
-  * These get used if SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled.
-  */
- 
- /*
-  * Called after a connection has been accepted but before any authentication
-@@ -204,10 +221,22 @@ audit_run_command(const char *command)
-  */
- void
- audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
- {
- 	debug("audit end nopty exec  euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
- 	    audit_username(), command);
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key.
-+ *
-+ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key.
-+ */
-+int
-+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
-+{
-+	debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s key type %s key length %d fingerprint %s, result %d", 
-+		host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits,
-+		fp, rv);
-+}
- # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
-@@ -23,16 +23,17 @@
-  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-  */
- 
- #ifndef _SSH_AUDIT_H
- # define _SSH_AUDIT_H
- 
- #include "loginrec.h"
-+#include "key.h"
- 
- enum ssh_audit_event_type {
- 	SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,
- 	SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED,
- 	SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS,
- 	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE,
- 	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD,
- 	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT,	/* keyboard-interactive or challenge-response */
-@@ -50,10 +51,12 @@ typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_au
- void	audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
- void	audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
- void	audit_count_session_open(void);
- void	audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
- void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
- int	audit_run_command(const char *);
- void 	audit_end_command(int, const char *);
- ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
-+int	audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
-+void	audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
- 
- #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth.h b/openssh-6.6p1/auth.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth.h
-@@ -178,16 +178,17 @@ int	allowed_user(struct passwd *);
- struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user);
- 
- char	*get_challenge(Authctxt *);
- int	verify_response(Authctxt *, const char *);
- void	abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *);
- 
- char	*expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
- char	*authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
-+int	 user_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
- 
- FILE	*auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
- FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
- int	 auth_key_is_revoked(Key *);
- 
- HostStatus
- check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *, const char *,
-     const char *, const char *);
-@@ -195,16 +196,17 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, 
- /* hostkey handling */
- Key	*get_hostkey_by_index(int);
- Key	*get_hostkey_public_by_index(int);
- Key	*get_hostkey_public_by_type(int);
- Key	*get_hostkey_private_by_type(int);
- int	 get_hostkey_index(Key *);
- int	 ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
- void	 sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
-+int	 hostbased_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
- 
- /* debug messages during authentication */
- void	 auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
- void	 auth_debug_send(void);
- void	 auth_debug_reset(void);
- 
- struct passwd *fakepw(void);
- 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
-@@ -124,33 +124,45 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
- #endif
- 
- 	pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
- 	    "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost);
- 
- 	/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
- 	authenticated = 0;
- 	if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
--	    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
-+	    PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
- 			buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
- 		authenticated = 1;
- 
- 	buffer_free(&b);
- done:
- 	debug2("userauth_hostbased: authenticated %d", authenticated);
- 	if (key != NULL)
- 		key_free(key);
- 	free(pkalg);
- 	free(pkblob);
- 	free(cuser);
- 	free(chost);
- 	free(sig);
- 	return authenticated;
- }
- 
-+int
-+hostbased_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-+{
-+	int rv;
-+
-+	rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	audit_key(0, &rv, key);
-+#endif
-+	return rv;
-+}
-+
- /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
- int
- hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
-     Key *key)
- {
- 	const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup, *reason;
- 	HostStatus host_status;
- 	int len;
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
-@@ -153,17 +153,17 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
- #ifdef DEBUG_PK
- 		buffer_dump(&b);
- #endif
- 		pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
- 
- 		/* test for correct signature */
- 		authenticated = 0;
- 		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) &&
--		    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
-+		    PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
- 		    buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
- 			authenticated = 1;
- 		buffer_free(&b);
- 		free(sig);
- 	} else {
- 		debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable");
- 		packet_check_eom();
- 
-@@ -190,16 +190,28 @@ done:
- 	debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg);
- 	if (key != NULL)
- 		key_free(key);
- 	free(pkalg);
- 	free(pkblob);
- 	return authenticated;
- }
- 
-+int
-+user_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-+{
-+	int rv;
-+
-+	rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	audit_key(1, &rv, key);
-+#endif
-+	return rv;
-+}
-+
- void
- pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
- {
- 	char *fp, *extra;
- 	va_list ap;
- 	int i;
- 
- 	extra = NULL;
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
-@@ -1340,26 +1340,30 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
- }
- 
- int
- mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
- {
- 	Key *key;
- 	u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
- 	u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
-+	int type = 0;
- 	int verified = 0;
- 	int valid_data = 0;
- 
-+	type = buffer_get_int(m);
- 	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
- 	signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
- 	data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
- 
- 	if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
- 	  !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
- 		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
-+	if (type != key_blobtype)
-+		fatal("%s: bad key type", __func__);
- 
- 	key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
- 	if (key == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
- 
- 	switch (key_blobtype) {
- 	case MM_USERKEY:
- 		valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
-@@ -1370,17 +1374,27 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
- 		break;
- 	default:
- 		valid_data = 0;
- 		break;
- 	}
- 	if (!valid_data)
- 		fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
- 
--	verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
-+	switch (key_blobtype) {
-+	case MM_USERKEY:
-+		verified = user_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
-+		break;
-+	case MM_HOSTKEY:
-+		verified = hostbased_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
-+		break;
-+	default:
-+		verified = 0;
-+		break;
-+	}
- 	debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
- 	    __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
- 
- 	key_free(key);
- 	free(blob);
- 	free(signature);
- 	free(data);
- 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
-@@ -426,30 +426,31 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, cha
- 
- /*
-  * This key verify needs to send the key type along, because the
-  * privileged parent makes the decision if the key is allowed
-  * for authentication.
-  */
- 
- int
--mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-+mm_key_verify(enum mm_keytype type, Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
- {
- 	Buffer m;
- 	u_char *blob;
- 	u_int len;
- 	int verified = 0;
- 
- 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
- 
- 	/* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */
- 	if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len))
- 		return (0);
- 
- 	buffer_init(&m);
-+	buffer_put_int(&m, type);
- 	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
- 	buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen);
- 	buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
- 	free(blob);
- 
- 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, &m);
- 
- 	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __func__);
-@@ -457,16 +458,29 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i
- 
- 	verified = buffer_get_int(&m);
- 
- 	buffer_free(&m);
- 
- 	return (verified);
- }
- 
-+int
-+mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-+{
-+	return mm_key_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_user_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-+{
-+	return mm_key_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
-+}
-+
-+
- /* Export key state after authentication */
- Newkeys *
- mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen)
- {
- 	Buffer b;
- 	u_int len;
- 	Newkeys *newkey = NULL;
- 	Enc *enc;
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
-@@ -44,17 +44,18 @@ int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int 
- void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
- struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
- char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
- int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
- int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *);
- int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
- int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
- int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
--int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
-+int mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
-+int mm_user_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
- int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
- int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);
- BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
- 
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
-    gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);

openssh-6.6p1-audit4-kex_results-fips.patch

@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent 274a545b591567f1378c1086ad3ba40c911a8bd6
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in b/openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in
-@@ -72,17 +72,18 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o
- 	atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
- 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
- 	kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
- 	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
- 	ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
- 	kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
- 	ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o hmac.o \
- 	sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \
--	fips.o
-+	fips.o \
-+	auditstub.o
- 
- SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
- 	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \
- 	roaming_common.o roaming_client.o
- 
- SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
- 	audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \
- 	sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/cipher.c b/openssh-6.6p1/cipher.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/cipher.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/cipher.c
-@@ -54,30 +54,16 @@
- 
- /* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- 
- extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void);
- extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
- extern void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int);
- 
--struct Cipher {
--	char	*name;
--	int	number;		/* for ssh1 only */
--	u_int	block_size;
--	u_int	key_len;
--	u_int	iv_len;		/* defaults to block_size */
--	u_int	auth_len;
--	u_int	discard_len;
--	u_int	flags;
--#define CFLAG_CBC		(1<<0)
--#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY	(1<<1)
--	const EVP_CIPHER	*(*evptype)(void);
--};
--
- static const struct Cipher ciphers_all[] = {
- 	{ "none",	SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
- 	{ "des",	SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc },
- 	{ "3des",	SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des },
- 	{ "blowfish",	SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_bf },
- 
- 	{ "3des-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
- 	{ "blowfish-cbc",
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
-@@ -119,16 +119,18 @@
- #endif
- #include "monitor_wrap.h"
- #include "roaming.h"
- #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
- #include "version.h"
- 
- #include "fips.h"
- 
-+#include "audit.h"
-+
- #ifdef LIBWRAP
- #include <tcpd.h>
- #include <syslog.h>
- int allow_severity;
- int deny_severity;
- #endif /* LIBWRAP */
- 
- #ifndef O_NOCTTY

openssh-6.6p1-audit4-kex_results.patch

@@ -1,701 +0,0 @@
-# key exhange auditing
-# based on:
-#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
-#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=2013
-#   (replaces: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=1976)
-#   by jchadima@redhat.com
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
-@@ -468,9 +468,21 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
- 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
- 		bsm_audit_bad_login("interactive password entry");
- 		break;
- 
- 	default:
- 		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
- 	}
- }
-+
-+void
-+audit_unsupported_body(int what)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
- #endif /* BSM */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
-@@ -35,16 +35,18 @@
- 
- #include "log.h"
- #include "audit.h"
- #include "key.h"
- #include "hostfile.h"
- #include "auth.h"
- #include "servconf.h"
- #include "canohost.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
- 
- #define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 128
- 
- extern ServerOptions options;
- extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
- extern u_int utmp_len;
- const char* audit_username(void);
- 
-@@ -264,9 +266,65 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
- 			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
- 		break;
- 
- 	default:
- 		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
- 	}
- }
- 
-+void
-+audit_unsupported_body(int what)
-+{
-+#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
-+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" };
-+	char *s;
-+	int audit_fd;
-+
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=unsupported-%s direction=? cipher=? ksize=? rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
-+		name[what], get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())),
-+		get_local_port());
-+	free(s);
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0)
-+		/* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */
-+		return;
-+	audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
-+			buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 0);
-+	audit_close(audit_fd);
-+#endif
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
-+	       uid_t uid)
-+{
-+#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
-+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
-+	const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
-+	Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);
-+	char *s;
-+
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
-+		direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0,
-+		(intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
-+		get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), get_local_port());
-+	free(s);
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
-+					 errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+			return; /* No audit support in kernel */
-+		else                                                                                                                                       
-+			fatal("cannot open audit"); /* Must prevent login */
-+	}
-+	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
-+			buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
-+	audit_close(audit_fd);
-+	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
-+	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+		fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */
-+#endif
-+}
-+
- #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
-@@ -23,24 +23,27 @@
-  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-  */
- 
- #include "includes.h"
- 
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <string.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
- 
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- 
- #include "audit.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "key.h"
- #include "hostfile.h"
- #include "auth.h"
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- 
- /*
-  * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
-  * audit_connection_from() is called and MAY NOT be initialized when
-  * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called.  Test for NULL before using.
-  */
- extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
-@@ -123,16 +126,28 @@ audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const 
- 		crypto_name = "ssh-rsa1";
- 	else
- 		crypto_name = key_ssh_name(key);
- 	if (audit_keyusage(host_user, crypto_name, key_size(key), fp, *rv) == 0)
- 		*rv = 0;
- 	free(fp);
- }
- 
-+void
-+audit_unsupported(int what)
-+{
-+	PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(what));
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
-+{
-+	PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid()));
-+}
-+
- # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- /*
-  * Null implementations of audit functions.
-  * These get used if SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled.
-  */
- 
- /*
-  * Called after a connection has been accepted but before any authentication
-@@ -233,10 +248,31 @@ audit_end_command(int handle, const char
-  */
- int
- audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
- {
- 	debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s key type %s key length %d fingerprint %s, result %d", 
- 		host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits,
- 		fp, rv);
- }
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_unsupported_body(int what)
-+{
-+	debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
-+	       uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s from pid %ld uid %u",
-+		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid,
-+	        (unsigned)uid);
-+}
- # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
-@@ -53,10 +53,14 @@ void	audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
- void	audit_count_session_open(void);
- void	audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
- void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
- int	audit_run_command(const char *);
- void 	audit_end_command(int, const char *);
- ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
- int	audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
- void	audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
-+void	audit_unsupported(int);
-+void	audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
-+void	audit_unsupported_body(int);
-+void	audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- 
- #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auditstub.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auditstub.c
-new file mode 100644
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auditstub.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
-+/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc.  All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ *
-+ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
-+ */
-+
-+void
-+audit_unsupported(int n)
-+{
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
-+{
-+}
-+
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/cipher.h b/openssh-6.6p1/cipher.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/cipher.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/cipher.h
-@@ -58,17 +58,30 @@
- #define SSH_CIPHER_MAX		31
- 
- #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT		1
- #define CIPHER_DECRYPT		0
- 
- typedef struct Cipher Cipher;
- typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext;
- 
--struct Cipher;
-+struct Cipher {
-+	char	*name;
-+	int	number;		/* for ssh1 only */
-+	u_int	block_size;
-+	u_int	key_len;
-+	u_int	iv_len;		/* defaults to block_size */
-+	u_int	auth_len;
-+	u_int	discard_len;
-+	u_int	flags;
-+#define CFLAG_CBC		(1<<0)
-+#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY	(1<<1)
-+	const EVP_CIPHER	*(*evptype)(void);
-+};
-+
- struct CipherContext {
- 	int	plaintext;
- 	int	encrypt;
- 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX evp;
- 	struct chachapoly_ctx cp_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */
- 	const Cipher *cipher;
- };
- 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/kex.c b/openssh-6.6p1/kex.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/kex.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/kex.c
-@@ -45,16 +45,17 @@
- #include "kex.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "mac.h"
- #include "match.h"
- #include "dispatch.h"
- #include "monitor.h"
- #include "roaming.h"
- #include "digest.h"
-+#include "audit.h"
- 
- #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
- # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
- # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
- # else
- extern const EVP_MD *evp_ssh_sha256(void);
- # endif
- #endif
-@@ -346,53 +347,65 @@ kex_kexinit_finish(Kex *kex)
- 		fatal("Unsupported key exchange %d", kex->kex_type);
- 	}
- }
- 
- static void
- choose_enc(Enc *enc, char *client, char *server)
- {
- 	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
--	if (name == NULL)
-+	if (name == NULL) {
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+		audit_unsupported(0);
-+#endif
- 		fatal("no matching cipher found: client %s server %s",
- 		    client, server);
-+	}
- 	if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL)
- 		fatal("matching cipher is not supported: %s", name);
- 	enc->name = name;
- 	enc->enabled = 0;
- 	enc->iv = NULL;
- 	enc->iv_len = cipher_ivlen(enc->cipher);
- 	enc->key = NULL;
- 	enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher);
- 	enc->block_size = cipher_blocksize(enc->cipher);
- }
- 
- static void
- choose_mac(Mac *mac, char *client, char *server)
- {
- 	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
--	if (name == NULL)
-+	if (name == NULL) {
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+		audit_unsupported(1);
-+#endif
- 		fatal("no matching mac found: client %s server %s",
- 		    client, server);
-+	}
- 	if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0)
- 		fatal("unsupported mac %s", name);
- 	/* truncate the key */
- 	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_HMAC)
- 		mac->key_len = 16;
- 	mac->name = name;
- 	mac->key = NULL;
- 	mac->enabled = 0;
- }
- 
- static void
- choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server)
- {
- 	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
--	if (name == NULL)
-+	if (name == NULL) {
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+		audit_unsupported(2);
-+#endif
- 		fatal("no matching comp found: client %s server %s", client, server);
-+	}
- 	if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
- 		comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
- 	} else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
- 		comp->type = COMP_ZLIB;
- 	} else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
- 		comp->type = COMP_NONE;
- 	} else {
- 		fatal("unsupported comp %s", name);
-@@ -497,16 +510,19 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
- 		if (authlen == 0)
- 			choose_mac(&newkeys->mac, cprop[nmac], sprop[nmac]);
- 		choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp], sprop[ncomp]);
- 		debug("kex: %s %s %s %s",
- 		    ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client",
- 		    newkeys->enc.name,
- 		    authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
- 		    newkeys->comp.name);
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+		audit_kex(ctos, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name);
-+#endif
- 	}
- 	choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
- 	choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
- 	    sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]);
- 	need = dh_need = 0;
- 	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
- 		newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode];
- 		need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.key_len);
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
-@@ -92,16 +92,17 @@
- #endif
- #include "monitor_wrap.h"
- #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "compat.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
- #include "roaming.h"
- #include "authfd.h"
-+#include "audit.h"
- 
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
- #endif
- 
- /* Imports */
- extern ServerOptions options;
- extern u_int utmp_len;
-@@ -176,16 +177,18 @@ int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer
- int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
- #endif
- 
- static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
- 
- static Authctxt *authctxt;
- static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL;	/* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
- 
- /* local state for key verify */
-@@ -227,16 +230,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] 
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
- #endif
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
- #endif
- #ifdef BSD_AUTH
-     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
- #endif
- #ifdef SKEY
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
-@@ -257,16 +262,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
- 
- struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
-@@ -288,28 +295,32 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] 
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
- #endif
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
- 
- struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
- 
- struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
- 
- /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
- 
-@@ -2187,8 +2198,52 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m
- 
- 	auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
- 
- 	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
- 	return (authenticated);
- }
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
- 
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+int
-+mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+	int what;
-+
-+	what = buffer_get_int(m);
-+
-+	audit_unsupported_body(what);
-+
-+	buffer_clear(m);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+	int ctos, len;
-+	char *cipher, *mac, *compress;
-+	pid_t pid;
-+	uid_t uid;
-+
-+	ctos = buffer_get_int(m);
-+	cipher = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+	mac = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+	compress = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+	pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
-+	uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
-+
-+	audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pid, uid);
-+
-+	free(cipher);
-+	free(mac);
-+	free(compress);
-+	buffer_clear(m);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-+
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
-@@ -60,16 +60,18 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
- 	MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 115,
-+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 116, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 117,
-+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 119,
- 
- };
- 
- struct mm_master;
- struct monitor {
- 	int			 m_recvfd;
- 	int			 m_sendfd;
- 	int			 m_log_recvfd;
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
-@@ -1320,8 +1320,46 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
- 	authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m);
- 
- 	buffer_free(&m);
- 	debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
- 	return (authenticated);
- }
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
- 
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+void
-+mm_audit_unsupported_body(int what)
-+{
-+	Buffer m;
-+
-+	buffer_init(&m);
-+	buffer_put_int(&m, what);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, &m);
-+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED,
-+				  &m);
-+
-+	buffer_free(&m);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
-+		  uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	Buffer m;
-+
-+	buffer_init(&m);
-+	buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
-+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, cipher ? cipher : "");
-+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, mac ? mac : "");
-+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, compress ? compress : "");
-+	buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
-+	buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, &m);
-+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
-+				  &m);
-+
-+	buffer_free(&m);
-+}
-+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-+
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
-@@ -72,16 +72,18 @@ int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, cha
- void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- #include "audit.h"
- void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
- int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
- void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
-+void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
-+void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- #endif
- 
- struct Session;
- void mm_terminate(void);
- int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
- void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
- 
- /* SSHv1 interfaces */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
-@@ -2325,16 +2325,20 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
- 		packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher.");
- 
- 	/* Get check bytes from the packet.  These must match those we
- 	   sent earlier with the public key packet. */
- 	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
- 		if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
- 			packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
- 
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	audit_kex(2, cipher_name(cipher_type), "crc", "none");
-+#endif
-+
- 	debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
- 
- 	/* Get the encrypted integer. */
- 	if ((session_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
- 		fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
- 	packet_get_bignum(session_key_int);
- 
- 	protocol_flags = packet_get_int();

openssh-6.6p1-audit5-session_key_destruction.patch

@@ -1,983 +0,0 @@
-# session key destruction and auditing
-# based on:
-#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
-#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=2014
-#   by jchadima@redhat.com
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
-@@ -480,9 +480,15 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what)
- 	/* not implemented */
- }
- 
- void
- audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
- {
- 	/* not implemented */
- }
-+
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
- #endif /* BSM */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
-@@ -289,24 +289,25 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what)
- 		/* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */
- 		return;
- 	audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
- 			buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 0);
- 	audit_close(audit_fd);
- #endif
- }
- 
-+const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
-+
- void
- audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
- 	       uid_t uid)
- {
- #ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
- 	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
- 	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
--	const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
- 	Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);
- 	char *s;
- 
- 	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
- 		direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0,
- 		(intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
- 		get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), get_local_port());
- 	free(s);
-@@ -322,9 +323,37 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
- 			buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
- 	audit_close(audit_fd);
- 	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
- 	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
- 		fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */
- #endif
- }
- 
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
-+	char *s;
-+
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
-+		 direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
-+		 get_remote_port(),
-+		 (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())),
-+		 get_local_port());
-+	free(s);
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
-+					 errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+			error("cannot open audit");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
-+			buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
-+	audit_close(audit_fd);
-+	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
-+	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+		error("cannot write into audit");
-+}
-+
- #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
-@@ -138,16 +138,22 @@ audit_unsupported(int what)
- }
- 
- void
- audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
- {
- 	PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid()));
- }
- 
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
-+{
-+	PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, getpid(), getuid()));
-+}
-+
- # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- /*
-  * Null implementations of audit functions.
-  * These get used if SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled.
-  */
- 
- /*
-  * Called after a connection has been accepted but before any authentication
-@@ -269,10 +275,20 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what)
- void
- audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
- 	       uid_t uid)
- {
- 	debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s from pid %ld uid %u",
- 		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid,
- 	        (unsigned)uid);
- }
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
-+		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
-+}
- # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
-@@ -57,10 +57,12 @@ int	audit_run_command(const char *);
- void 	audit_end_command(int, const char *);
- ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
- int	audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
- void	audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
- void	audit_unsupported(int);
- void	audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
- void	audit_unsupported_body(int);
- void	audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void	audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
-+void	audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
- 
- #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auditstub.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auditstub.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/auditstub.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auditstub.c
-@@ -22,18 +22,29 @@
-  * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-  *
-  * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
-  */
- 
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
- void
- audit_unsupported(int n)
- {
- }
- 
- void
- audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
- {
- }
- 
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
-+{
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+}
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/kex.c b/openssh-6.6p1/kex.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/kex.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/kex.c
-@@ -700,8 +700,39 @@ dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, i
- 		if (i%32 == 31)
- 			fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- 		else if (i%8 == 7)
- 			fprintf(stderr, " ");
- 	}
- 	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
- #endif
-+
-+static void
-+enc_destroy(Enc *enc)
-+{
-+	if (enc == NULL)
-+		return;
-+
-+	if (enc->key) {
-+		memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
-+		free(enc->key);
-+	}
-+
-+	if (enc->iv) {
-+		memset(enc->iv,  0, enc->block_size);
-+		free(enc->iv);
-+	}
-+
-+	memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc));
-+}
-+
-+void
-+newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys)
-+{
-+	if (newkeys == NULL)
-+		return;
-+
-+	enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc);
-+	mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac);
-+	memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp));
-+}
-+
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/kex.h b/openssh-6.6p1/kex.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/kex.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/kex.h
-@@ -162,16 +162,18 @@ void	 kexdh_client(Kex *);
- void	 kexdh_server(Kex *);
- void	 kexgex_client(Kex *);
- void	 kexgex_server(Kex *);
- void	 kexecdh_client(Kex *);
- void	 kexecdh_server(Kex *);
- void	 kexc25519_client(Kex *);
- void	 kexc25519_server(Kex *);
- 
-+void	 newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys);
-+
- void
- kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
-     BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
- void
- kexgex_hash(int, char *, char *, char *, int, char *,
-     int, u_char *, int, int, int, int, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
-     BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
- #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/mac.c b/openssh-6.6p1/mac.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/mac.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/mac.c
-@@ -253,16 +253,30 @@ mac_clear(Mac *mac)
- 		if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL)
- 			umac128_delete(mac->umac_ctx);
- 	} else if (mac->hmac_ctx != NULL)
- 		ssh_hmac_free(mac->hmac_ctx);
- 	mac->hmac_ctx = NULL;
- 	mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
- }
- 
-+void
-+mac_destroy(Mac *mac)
-+{
-+	if (mac == NULL)
-+		return;
-+
-+	if (mac->key) {
-+		memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
-+		free(mac->key);
-+	}
-+
-+	memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac));
-+}
-+
- /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
- #define	MAC_SEP	","
- int
- mac_valid(const char *names)
- {
- 	char *maclist, *cp, *p;
- 
- 	if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/mac.h b/openssh-6.6p1/mac.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/mac.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/mac.h
-@@ -24,8 +24,9 @@
-  */
- 
- int	 mac_valid(const char *);
- char	*mac_alg_list(char);
- int	 mac_setup(Mac *, char *);
- int	 mac_init(Mac *);
- u_char	*mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int);
- void	 mac_clear(Mac *);
-+void	 mac_destroy(Mac *);
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
-@@ -179,16 +179,17 @@ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *);
- #endif
- 
- static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
- 
- static Authctxt *authctxt;
- static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL;	/* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
- 
- /* local state for key verify */
-@@ -232,16 +233,17 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] 
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
- #endif
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
- #endif
- #ifdef BSD_AUTH
-     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
- #endif
- #ifdef SKEY
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
-@@ -264,16 +266,17 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
- 
- struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
-@@ -297,30 +300,32 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] 
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
- #endif
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
- 
- struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
- 
- struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
- 
- /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
- 
-@@ -1949,21 +1954,23 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor
- 		goto skip;
- 	} else {
- 		/* Get the Kex for rekeying */
- 		*pmonitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m);
- 	}
- 
- 	blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
- 	current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
-+	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
- 	free(blob);
- 
- 	debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
- 	blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
- 	current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
-+	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
- 	free(blob);
- 
- 	/* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
- 	seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
- 	blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
- 	packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
- 	bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
- 	packet_set_state(MODE_OUT, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
-@@ -1999,16 +2006,31 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor
- 
- 	/* Roaming */
- 	if (compat20) {
- 		child_state.sent_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
- 		child_state.recv_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
- 	}
- 
- 	buffer_free(&m);
-+
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	if (compat20) {
-+		buffer_init(&m);
-+		mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
-+					  MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
-+		mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
-+		buffer_free(&m);
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
-+	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
-+	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
-+		;
-+
- }
- 
- 
- /* Allocation functions for zlib */
- void *
- mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
- {
- 	size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
-@@ -2240,10 +2262,28 @@ mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffe
- 	free(mac);
- 	free(compress);
- 	buffer_clear(m);
- 
- 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m);
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+int
-+mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+	int ctos;
-+	pid_t pid;
-+	uid_t uid;
-+
-+	ctos = buffer_get_int(m);
-+	pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
-+	uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
-+
-+	audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid);
-+
-+	buffer_clear(m);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
-+	return 0;
-+}
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
-@@ -62,16 +62,17 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
- 	MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 115,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 116, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 117,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 119,
-+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 121,
- 
- };
- 
- struct mm_master;
- struct monitor {
- 	int			 m_recvfd;
- 	int			 m_sendfd;
- 	int			 m_log_recvfd;
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
-@@ -649,22 +649,24 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor
- 	    __func__, packet_get_newkeys(MODE_OUT),
- 	    packet_get_newkeys(MODE_IN));
- 
- 	/* Keys from Kex */
- 	if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_OUT, &blob, &bloblen))
- 		fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
- 
- 	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
-+	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
- 	free(blob);
- 
- 	if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen))
- 		fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
- 
- 	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
-+	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
- 	free(blob);
- 
- 	packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes);
- 	buffer_put_int(&m, seqnr);
- 	buffer_put_int64(&m, blocks);
- 	buffer_put_int(&m, packets);
- 	buffer_put_int64(&m, bytes);
- 	packet_get_state(MODE_IN, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes);
-@@ -1356,10 +1358,25 @@ mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher
- 	buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
- 
- 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, &m);
- 	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
- 				  &m);
- 
- 	buffer_free(&m);
- }
-+
-+void
-+mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	Buffer m;
-+
-+	buffer_init(&m);
-+	buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
-+	buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
-+	buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
-+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
-+				  &m);
-+	buffer_free(&m);
-+}
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
-@@ -74,16 +74,17 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
- 
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- #include "audit.h"
- void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
- int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
- void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
- void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
- void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
- #endif
- 
- struct Session;
- void mm_terminate(void);
- int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
- void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
- 
- /* SSHv1 interfaces */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/packet.c b/openssh-6.6p1/packet.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/packet.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/packet.c
-@@ -56,16 +56,17 @@
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
- #include <signal.h>
- #include <time.h>
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "audit.h"
- #include "buffer.h"
- #include "packet.h"
- #include "crc32.h"
- #include "compress.h"
- #include "deattack.h"
- #include "channels.h"
- #include "compat.h"
- #include "ssh1.h"
-@@ -469,41 +470,51 @@ packet_get_connection_in(void)
- /* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */
- 
- int
- packet_get_connection_out(void)
- {
- 	return active_state->connection_out;
- }
- 
-+static int
-+packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state)
-+{
-+	return state != NULL &&
-+		(state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL);
-+}
-+
- /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
- 
- void
- packet_close(void)
- {
- 	if (!active_state->initialized)
- 		return;
- 	active_state->initialized = 0;
--	if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
--		shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
--		close(active_state->connection_out);
--	} else {
--		close(active_state->connection_in);
--		close(active_state->connection_out);
--	}
- 	buffer_free(&active_state->input);
- 	buffer_free(&active_state->output);
- 	buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
- 	buffer_free(&active_state->incoming_packet);
- 	if (active_state->compression_buffer_ready) {
- 		buffer_free(&active_state->compression_buffer);
- 		buffer_compress_uninit();
- 	}
--	cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
--	cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
-+	if (packet_state_has_keys(active_state)) {
-+		cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
-+		cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
-+		audit_session_key_free(2);
-+	}
-+	if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
-+		shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
-+		close(active_state->connection_out);
-+	} else {
-+		close(active_state->connection_in);
-+		close(active_state->connection_out);
-+	}
- }
- 
- /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
- 
- void
- packet_set_protocol_flags(u_int protocol_flags)
- {
- 	active_state->remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags;
-@@ -729,16 +740,35 @@ packet_send1(void)
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * Note that the packet is now only buffered in output.  It won't be
- 	 * actually sent until packet_write_wait or packet_write_poll is
- 	 * called.
- 	 */
- }
- 
-+static void
-+newkeys_destroy_and_free(Newkeys *newkeys)
-+{
-+	if (newkeys == NULL)
-+		return;
-+
-+	free(newkeys->enc.name);
-+
-+	mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);
-+	/* MAC may happen to be empty - if the GCM mode of AES is used */
-+	if (newkeys->mac.name)
-+		free(newkeys->mac.name);
-+
-+	free(newkeys->comp.name);
-+
-+	newkeys_destroy(newkeys);
-+	free(newkeys);
-+}
-+
- void
- set_newkeys(int mode)
- {
- 	Enc *enc;
- 	Mac *mac;
- 	Comp *comp;
- 	CipherContext *cc;
- 	u_int64_t *max_blocks;
-@@ -754,31 +784,19 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
- 	} else {
- 		cc = &active_state->receive_context;
- 		crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT;
- 		active_state->p_read.packets = active_state->p_read.blocks = 0;
- 		max_blocks = &active_state->max_blocks_in;
- 	}
- 	if (active_state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
- 		debug("set_newkeys: rekeying");
-+		audit_session_key_free(mode);
- 		cipher_cleanup(cc);
--		enc  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
--		mac  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
--		comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
--		mac_clear(mac);
--		explicit_bzero(enc->iv,  enc->iv_len);
--		explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len);
--		explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len);
--		free(enc->name);
--		free(enc->iv);
--		free(enc->key);
--		free(mac->name);
--		free(mac->key);
--		free(comp->name);
--		free(active_state->newkeys[mode]);
-+		newkeys_destroy_and_free(active_state->newkeys[mode]);
- 	}
- 	active_state->newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode);
- 	if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
- 		fatal("newkeys: no keys for mode %d", mode);
- 	enc  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
- 	mac  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
- 	comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
- 	if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0 && mac_init(mac) == 0)
-@@ -2004,54 +2022,93 @@ packet_get_output(void)
- }
- 
- void *
- packet_get_newkeys(int mode)
- {
- 	return (void *)active_state->newkeys[mode];
- }
- 
-+static void
-+packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state)
-+{
-+	if (state == NULL)
-+		return;
-+
-+	cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context);
-+	cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context);
-+
-+	buffer_free(&state->input);
-+	buffer_free(&state->output);
-+	buffer_free(&state->outgoing_packet);
-+	buffer_free(&state->incoming_packet);
-+	buffer_free(&state->compression_buffer);
-+	newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]);
-+	state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL;
-+	newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]);
-+	state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
-+	mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac);
-+//	TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
-+//	memset(state, 0, sizeof(state));
-+}
-+
-+void
-+packet_destroy_all(int audit_it, int privsep)
-+{
-+	if (audit_it)
-+		audit_it = packet_state_has_keys (active_state) ||
-+			packet_state_has_keys (backup_state);
-+	packet_destroy_state(active_state);
-+	packet_destroy_state(backup_state);
-+	if (audit_it) {
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+		if (privsep)
-+			audit_session_key_free(2);
-+		else
-+			audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());
-+#endif
-+	}
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when
-  * resuming a suspended connection.
-  */
- void
- packet_backup_state(void)
- {
--	struct session_state *tmp;
--
- 	close(active_state->connection_in);
- 	active_state->connection_in = -1;
- 	close(active_state->connection_out);
- 	active_state->connection_out = -1;
--	if (backup_state)
--		tmp = backup_state;
--	else
--		tmp = alloc_session_state();
- 	backup_state = active_state;
--	active_state = tmp;
-+	active_state = alloc_session_state();
- }
- 
- /*
-  * Swap in the old state when resuming a connecion.
-  */
- void
- packet_restore_state(void)
- {
- 	struct session_state *tmp;
- 	void *buf;
- 	u_int len;
- 
- 	tmp = backup_state;
- 	backup_state = active_state;
- 	active_state = tmp;
- 	active_state->connection_in = backup_state->connection_in;
--	backup_state->connection_in = -1;
- 	active_state->connection_out = backup_state->connection_out;
--	backup_state->connection_out = -1;
- 	len = buffer_len(&backup_state->input);
- 	if (len > 0) {
- 		buf = buffer_ptr(&backup_state->input);
- 		buffer_append(&active_state->input, buf, len);
- 		buffer_clear(&backup_state->input);
- 		add_recv_bytes(len);
- 	}
-+	backup_state->connection_in = -1;
-+	backup_state->connection_out = -1;
-+	packet_destroy_state(backup_state);
-+	free(backup_state);
-+	backup_state = NULL;
- }
-+
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/packet.h b/openssh-6.6p1/packet.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/packet.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/packet.h
-@@ -119,9 +119,10 @@ void	 packet_set_rekey_limits(u_int32_t,
- time_t	 packet_get_rekey_timeout(void);
- 
- void	 packet_backup_state(void);
- void	 packet_restore_state(void);
- 
- void	*packet_get_input(void);
- void	*packet_get_output(void);
- 
-+void	 packet_destroy_all(int, int);
- #endif				/* PACKET_H */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
-@@ -1694,16 +1694,19 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 	int env_size;
- 	char *argv[ARGV_MAX];
- 	const char *shell, *shell0, *hostname = NULL;
- 	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
- 	int r = 0;
- 
- 	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
- 	destroy_sensitive_data();
-+	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
-+	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
-+	packet_destroy_all(0, 1);
- 
- 	/* Force a password change */
- 	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
- 		do_setusercontext(pw);
- 		child_close_fds();
- 		do_pwchange(s);
- 		exit(1);
- 	}
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
-@@ -720,16 +720,18 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
- 		if (box != NULL)
- 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
- 
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- }
- 
-+extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
-+
- static void
- privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
- 	u_int32_t rnd[256];
- 
- #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
- 	if (1) {
- #else
-@@ -744,16 +746,20 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
- 
- 	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
- 	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
- 		fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
- 	else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
- 		verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
- 		buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
-+ 		newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_OUT]);
-+		newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_IN]);
-+		audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());
-+		packet_destroy_all(0, 0);
- 		monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
- 
- 		/* NEVERREACHED */
- 		exit(0);
- 	}
- 
- 	/* child */
- 
-@@ -2118,16 +2124,17 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		do_authentication(authctxt);
- 	}
- 	/*
- 	 * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
- 	 * the current keystate and exits
- 	 */
- 	if (use_privsep) {
- 		mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
-+		packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
- 		exit(0);
- 	}
- 
-  authenticated:
- 	/*
- 	 * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
- 	 * authentication.
- 	 */
-@@ -2170,16 +2177,18 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 
- 	packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval,
- 	    options.client_alive_count_max);
- 
- 	/* Start session. */
- 	do_authenticated(authctxt);
- 
- 	/* The connection has been terminated. */
-+	packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
-+
- 	packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);
- 	packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);
- 	verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
- 	    (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
- 
- 	verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
- 
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -2526,26 +2535,38 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- #endif
- 	debug("KEX done");
- }
- 
- /* server specific fatal cleanup */
- void
- cleanup_exit(int i)
- {
-+	static int in_cleanup = 0;
-+	int is_privsep_child;
-+
-+	/* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep
-+	   wrappers used for auditing.  Make sure we don't recurse
-+	   indefinitely. */
-+	if (in_cleanup)
-+		_exit(i);
-+	in_cleanup = 1;
-+
- 	if (the_authctxt) {
- 		do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
- 		if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) {
- 			debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid);
- 			if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
- 			    errno != ESRCH)
- 				error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__,
- 				    pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
- 		}
- 	}
-+	is_privsep_child = use_privsep && (pmonitor != NULL) && !mm_is_monitor();
-+	packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child);
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- 	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
- 	if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
- 	    (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
- 		audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
- #endif
- 	_exit(i);
- }

openssh-6.6p1-audit6-server_key_destruction.patch

@@ -1,742 +0,0 @@
-# server key destruction and auditing
-# based on:
-#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
-#   https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/attachment.cgi?id=2015
-#   by jchadima@redhat.com
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
-@@ -486,9 +486,27 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
- 	/* not implemented */
- }
- 
- void
- audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
- {
- 	/* not implemented */
- }
-+
-+void
-+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
- #endif /* BSM */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
-@@ -351,9 +351,55 @@ audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pi
- 	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
- 			buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
- 	audit_close(audit_fd);
- 	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
- 	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
- 		error("cannot write into audit");
- }
- 
-+void
-+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
-+
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=server fp=%s direction=? spid=%jd suid=%jd ",
-+		fp, (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid);
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
-+					 errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+			error("cannot open audit");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
-+			buf, NULL,
-+			listening_for_clients() ? NULL : get_remote_ipaddr(),
-+			NULL, 1);
-+	audit_close(audit_fd);
-+	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
-+	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+		error("cannot write into audit");
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
-+{
-+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
-+
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=create kind=server fp=%s direction=? ", fp);
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
-+					 errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+			error("cannot open audit");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
-+			buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
-+	audit_close(audit_fd);
-+	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
-+	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+		error("cannot write into audit");
-+}
- #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
-@@ -285,10 +285,29 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
-  * This will be called on succesfull session key discard
-  */
- void
- audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
- {
- 	debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
- 		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
- }
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u",
-+		geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *)
-+{
-+	debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp);
-+}
- # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
-@@ -43,26 +43,30 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type {
- 	SSH_INVALID_USER,
- 	SSH_NOLOGIN,		/* denied by /etc/nologin, not implemented */
- 	SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE,	/* closed after attempting auth or session */
- 	SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON,	/* closed without completing auth */
- 	SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN
- };
- typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
- 
-+int	listening_for_clients(void);
-+
- void	audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
- void	audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
- void	audit_count_session_open(void);
- void	audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
- void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
- int	audit_run_command(const char *);
- void 	audit_end_command(int, const char *);
- ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
- int	audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
- void	audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
- void	audit_unsupported(int);
- void	audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
- void	audit_unsupported_body(int);
- void	audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- void	audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
- void	audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void	audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *);
- 
- #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/key.c b/openssh-6.6p1/key.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/key.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/key.c
-@@ -1964,16 +1964,43 @@ key_demote(const Key *k)
- 		fatal("key_demote: bad key type %d", k->type);
- 		break;
- 	}
- 
- 	return (pk);
- }
- 
- int
-+key_is_private(const Key *k)
-+{
-+	switch (k->type) {
-+	case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
-+	case KEY_RSA_CERT:
-+	case KEY_RSA1:
-+	case KEY_RSA:
-+		return k->rsa->d != NULL;
-+	case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
-+	case KEY_DSA_CERT:
-+	case KEY_DSA:
-+		return k->dsa->priv_key != NULL;
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-+	case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
-+	case KEY_ECDSA:
-+		return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL;
-+#endif
-+	case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
-+	case KEY_ED25519:
-+		return k->ed25519_sk != NULL;
-+	default:
-+		fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type);
-+		return 1;
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+int
- key_is_cert(const Key *k)
- {
- 	if (k == NULL)
- 		return 0;
- 	return key_type_is_cert(k->type);
- }
- 
- /* Return the cert-less equivalent to a certified key type */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/key.h b/openssh-6.6p1/key.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/key.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/key.h
-@@ -113,16 +113,17 @@ int		 key_read(Key *, char **);
- u_int		 key_size(const Key *);
- enum fp_type	 key_fp_type_select(void);
- char		*key_fp_type_str(enum fp_type);
- 
- Key	*key_generate(int, u_int);
- Key	*key_from_private(const Key *);
- int	 key_type_from_name(char *);
- int	 key_is_cert(const Key *);
-+int	 key_is_private(const Key *k);
- int	 key_type_is_cert(int);
- int	 key_type_plain(int);
- int	 key_to_certified(Key *, int);
- int	 key_drop_cert(Key *);
- int	 key_certify(Key *, Key *);
- void	 key_cert_copy(const Key *, struct Key *);
- int	 key_cert_check_authority(const Key *, int, int, const char *,
- 	    const char **);
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
-@@ -109,16 +109,18 @@ extern u_int utmp_len;
- extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
- extern z_stream incoming_stream;
- extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
- extern u_char session_id[];
- extern Buffer auth_debug;
- extern int auth_debug_init;
- extern Buffer loginmsg;
- 
-+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
-+
- /* State exported from the child */
- 
- struct {
- 	z_stream incoming;
- 	z_stream outgoing;
- 	u_char *keyin;
- 	u_int keyinlen;
- 	u_char *keyout;
-@@ -180,16 +182,17 @@ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *
- 
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int, Buffer *);
- #endif
- 
- static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
- 
- static Authctxt *authctxt;
- static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL;	/* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
- 
- /* local state for key verify */
-@@ -234,16 +237,17 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] 
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
- #endif
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
- #endif
- #ifdef BSD_AUTH
-     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
- #endif
- #ifdef SKEY
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
-@@ -267,16 +271,17 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
-     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
- 
- struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
-@@ -301,31 +306,33 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] 
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
- #endif
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
- 
- struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
- 
- struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
- 
- /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
- 
-@@ -1739,16 +1746,18 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
- 	/* The child is terminating */
- 	session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
- 
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 	if (options.use_pam)
- 		sshpam_cleanup();
- #endif
- 
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(0);
-+
- 	while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
- 		if (errno != EINTR)
- 			exit(1);
- 
- 	res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
- 
- 	/* Terminate process */
- 	exit(res);
-@@ -2280,10 +2289,31 @@ mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(in
- 
- 	audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid);
- 
- 	buffer_clear(m);
- 
- 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
- 	return 0;
- }
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int sock, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+	int len;
-+	char *fp;
-+	pid_t pid;
-+	uid_t uid;
-+
-+	fp = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+	pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
-+	uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
-+
-+	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid);
-+
-+	free(fp);
-+	buffer_clear(m);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
-+	return 0;
-+}
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor.h
-@@ -63,16 +63,17 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
- 	MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 115,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 116, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 117,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 119,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 121,
-+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 123,
- 
- };
- 
- struct mm_master;
- struct monitor {
- 	int			 m_recvfd;
- 	int			 m_sendfd;
- 	int			 m_log_recvfd;
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
-@@ -1373,10 +1373,26 @@ mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos,
- 	buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
- 	buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
- 	buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
- 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
- 	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
- 				  &m);
- 	buffer_free(&m);
- }
-+
-+void
-+mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	Buffer m;
-+
-+	buffer_init(&m);
-+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, fp);
-+	buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
-+	buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, &m);
-+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE,
-+				  &m);
-+	buffer_free(&m);
-+}
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
-@@ -75,16 +75,17 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- #include "audit.h"
- void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
- int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
- void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
- void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
- void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- #endif
- 
- struct Session;
- void mm_terminate(void);
- int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
- void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
- 
- /* SSHv1 interfaces */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
-@@ -132,17 +132,17 @@ static int session_pty_req(Session *);
- 
- /* import */
- extern ServerOptions options;
- extern char *__progname;
- extern int log_stderr;
- extern int debug_flag;
- extern u_int utmp_len;
- extern int startup_pipe;
--extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
-+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
- extern Buffer loginmsg;
- 
- /* original command from peer. */
- const char *original_command = NULL;
- 
- /* data */
- static int sessions_first_unused = -1;
- static int sessions_nalloc = 0;
-@@ -1693,17 +1693,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 	char **env;
- 	int env_size;
- 	char *argv[ARGV_MAX];
- 	const char *shell, *shell0, *hostname = NULL;
- 	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
- 	int r = 0;
- 
- 	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
--	destroy_sensitive_data();
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(1);
- 	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
- 	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
- 	packet_destroy_all(0, 1);
- 
- 	/* Force a password change */
- 	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
- 		do_setusercontext(pw);
- 		child_close_fds();
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
-@@ -259,17 +259,17 @@ Buffer cfg;
- 
- /* message to be displayed after login */
- Buffer loginmsg;
- 
- /* Unprivileged user */
- struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
- 
- /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
--void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
-+void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
- void demote_sensitive_data(void);
- 
- static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
- static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
- 
- /*
-  * Close all listening sockets
-  */
-@@ -278,16 +278,25 @@ close_listen_socks(void)
- {
- 	int i;
- 
- 	for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
- 		close(listen_socks[i]);
- 	num_listen_socks = -1;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific
-+ * client connection?)
-+ */
-+int listening_for_clients(void)
-+{
-+	return num_listen_socks > 0;
-+}
-+
- static void
- close_startup_pipes(void)
- {
- 	int i;
- 
- 	if (startup_pipes)
- 		for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
- 			if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
-@@ -557,60 +566,99 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in
- 		close(sock_out);
- 		logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s",
- 		    get_remote_ipaddr(),
- 		    server_version_string, client_version_string);
- 		cleanup_exit(255);
- 	}
- }
- 
--/* Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed. */
-+/*
-+ * Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed.  Careful,
-+ * this can be called from cleanup_exit() - i.e. from just about anywhere.
-+ */
- void
--destroy_sensitive_data(void)
-+destroy_sensitive_data(int privsep)
- {
- 	int i;
-+	pid_t pid;
-+	uid_t uid;
- 
- 	if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
- 		key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
- 		sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
- 	}
-+	pid = getpid();
-+	uid = getuid();
- 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- 		if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
-+			char *fp;
-+
-+			if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
-+				fp = key_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i],
-+					key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			else
-+				fp = NULL;
- 			key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
- 			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
-+			if (fp != NULL) {
-+				if (privsep)
-+					PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp,
-+						pid, uid));
-+				else
-+					audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp,
-+						pid, uid);
-+				free(fp);
-+			}
- 		}
--		if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
-+		if (sensitive_data.host_certificates
-+		    && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
- 			key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
- 			sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
- 		}
- 	}
- 	sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
- 	explicit_bzero(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
- }
- 
- /* Demote private to public keys for network child */
- void
- demote_sensitive_data(void)
- {
- 	Key *tmp;
-+	pid_t pid;
-+	uid_t uid;
- 	int i;
- 
-+	pid = getpid();
-+	uid = getuid();
- 	if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
- 		tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key);
- 		key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
- 		sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
- 	}
- 
- 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- 		if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
-+			char *fp;
-+
-+			if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
-+				fp = key_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i],
-+					key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			else
-+				fp = NULL;
- 			tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
- 			key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
- 			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
- 			if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
- 				sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
-+			if (fp != NULL) {
-+				audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid);
-+				free(fp);
-+			}
- 		}
- 		/* Certs do not need demotion */
- 	}
- 
- 	/* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie.  XXX - Okay Niels? */
- }
- 
- static void
-@@ -1201,16 +1249,17 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
- 
- 		/* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
- 		ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- 		if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
- 			error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- 		if (received_sigterm) {
- 			logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
- 			    (int) received_sigterm);
-+			destroy_sensitive_data(0);
- 			close_listen_socks();
- 			unlink(options.pid_file);
- 			exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255);
- 		}
- 		if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
- 			generate_ephemeral_server_key();
- 			key_used = 0;
- 			key_do_regen = 0;
-@@ -2167,27 +2216,28 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	/*
- 	 * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
- 	 * file descriptor passing.
- 	 */
- 	if (use_privsep) {
- 		privsep_postauth(authctxt);
- 		/* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
- 		if (!compat20)
--			destroy_sensitive_data();
-+			destroy_sensitive_data(0);
- 	}
- 
- 	packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval,
- 	    options.client_alive_count_max);
- 
- 	/* Start session. */
- 	do_authenticated(authctxt);
- 
- 	/* The connection has been terminated. */
- 	packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(1);
- 
- 	packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);
- 	packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);
- 	verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
- 	    (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
- 
- 	verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
- 
-@@ -2412,17 +2462,17 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
- 			fatal("%s: hash failed", __func__);
- 		ssh_digest_free(md);
- 		explicit_bzero(buf, bytes);
- 		free(buf);
- 		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- 			session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
- 	}
- 	/* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
--	destroy_sensitive_data();
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(0);
- 
- 	if (use_privsep)
- 		mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
- 
- 	/* Destroy the decrypted integer.  It is no longer needed. */
- 	BN_clear_free(session_key_int);
- 
- 	/* Set the session key.  From this on all communications will be encrypted. */
-@@ -2556,16 +2606,18 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
- 			debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid);
- 			if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
- 			    errno != ESRCH)
- 				error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__,
- 				    pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
- 		}
- 	}
- 	is_privsep_child = use_privsep && (pmonitor != NULL) && !mm_is_monitor();
-+	if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL)
-+		destroy_sensitive_data(is_privsep_child);
- 	packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child);
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- 	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
- 	if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
- 	    (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
- 		audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
- #endif
- 	_exit(i);

openssh-6.6p1-audit7-libaudit_compat.patch

@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-# definitions for AUDIT_CRYPTO_* symbols fom libaudit 2.x
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
-@@ -25,16 +25,17 @@
-  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-  *
-  * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
-  */
- 
- #include "includes.h"
- #if defined(USE_LINUX_AUDIT)
- #include <libaudit.h>
-+#include "compat-libaudit.h"
- #include <unistd.h>
- #include <string.h>
- 
- #include "log.h"
- #include "audit.h"
- #include "key.h"
- #include "hostfile.h"
- #include "auth.h"
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/compat-libaudit.h b/openssh-6.6p1/compat-libaudit.h
-new file mode 100644
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/compat-libaudit.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
-+/* AUDIT_CRYPTO symbol definitions from libaudit 2.x */
-+/* libaudit.h -- 
-+ * Copyright 2004-2011 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
-+ * All Rights Reserved.
-+ *
-+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
-+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
-+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
-+ *
-+ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
-+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
-+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
-+ *
-+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
-+ * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
-+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA
-+ * 
-+ * Authors:
-+ *	Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
-+ *	Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
-+ */
-+#ifndef _COMPAT_LIBAUDIT_H_
-+#define _COMPAT_LIBAUDIT_H_
-+
-+#ifdef __cplusplus
-+extern "C" {
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef AUDIT_FIRST_CRYPTO_MSG
-+#define AUDIT_FIRST_CRYPTO_MSG		2400
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_TEST_USER
-+#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_TEST_USER		2400 /* Crypto test results */
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_PARAM_CHANGE_USER
-+#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_PARAM_CHANGE_USER	2401 /* Crypto attribute change */
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_LOGIN
-+#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_LOGIN		2402 /* Logged in as crypto officer */
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_LOGOUT
-+#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_LOGOUT		2403 /* Logged out from crypto */
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER
-+#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER		2404 /* Create,delete,negotiate */
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_FAILURE_USER
-+#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_FAILURE_USER	2405 /* Fail decrypt,encrypt,randomiz */
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_REPLAY_USER
-+#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_REPLAY_USER	2406 /* Crypto replay detected */
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
-+#define AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION		2407 /* Record parameters set during
-+						TLS session establishment */
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+#ifndef AUDIT_LAST_CRYPTO_MSG
-+#define AUDIT_LAST_CRYPTO_MSG		2499
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+#ifdef __cplusplus
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+#endif /* _COMPAT_LIBAUDIT_H_ */
-+

openssh-6.6p1-audit8-libaudit_dns_timeouts.patch

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-# bnc#752354, bnc#757360
-# prevent timeouts in libaudit code caused by DNS misconfiguration by
-# explicitely disabling DNS lookups in libaudit when UseDNS is false.
-# Note that this particular solution causes the logs to always contain
-# "hostname=?, addr=?" when DNS lookups are disabled.
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
-@@ -62,17 +62,17 @@ linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const c
- 		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
- 		    errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
- 			return; /* No audit support in kernel */
- 		else
- 			goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
- 	}
- 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
- 	    NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
--	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
-+	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, options.use_dns ? hostname : NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
- 	saved_errno = errno;
- 	close(audit_fd);
- 	/*
- 	 * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
- 	 * root user.
- 	 */
- 	if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
- 		rc = 0;
-@@ -114,17 +114,17 @@ linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const cha
- 			goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
- 	}
- 	
- 	if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN))
- 		event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
- 
- 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH,
- 	    NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)",
--	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
-+	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, options.use_dns ? hostname : NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
- 	saved_errno = errno;
- 	close(audit_fd);
- 	/*
- 	 * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
- 	 * root user.
- 	 */
- 	if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
- 		rc = 0;

openssh-6.6p1-curve25519-6.6.1p1.patch

@@ -1,205 +0,0 @@
-# Date: Sun, 20 Apr 2014 17:14:08 +1000 (EST)
-# From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-# To: openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org
-# Subject: bad bignum encoding for curve25519-sha256@libssh.org
-# Message-ID: <alpine.BSO.2.11.1404201713390.26134@natsu.mindrot.org>
-#
-# Hi,
-#
-# So I screwed up when writing the support for the curve25519 KEX method
-# that doesn't depend on OpenSSL's BIGNUM type - a bug in my code left
-# leading zero bytes where they should have been skipped. The impact of
-# this is that OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 will fail during key exchange with a
-# peer that implements curve25519-sha256@libssh.org properly about 0.2%
-# of the time (one in every 512ish connections).
-#
-# We've fixed this for OpenSSH 6.7 by avoiding the curve25519-sha256
-# key exchange for previous versions, but I'd recommend distributors
-# of OpenSSH apply this patch so the affected code doesn't become
-# too entrenched in LTS releases.
-#
-# The patch fixes the bug and makes OpenSSH identify itself as 6.6.1 so as
-# to distinguish itself from the incorrect versions so the compatibility
-# code to disable the affected KEX isn't activated.
-#
-# I've committed this on the 6.6 branch too.
-#
-# Apologies for the hassle.
-#
-# -d
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/bufaux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/bufaux.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/bufaux.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/bufaux.c
-@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
--/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.56 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-+/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.57 2014/04/16 23:22:45 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
-  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
-  *                    All rights reserved
-  * Auxiliary functions for storing and retrieving various data types to/from
-  * Buffers.
-  *
-  * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
-@@ -367,16 +367,19 @@ buffer_get_bignum2_as_string(Buffer *buf
- void
- buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(Buffer *buffer, const u_char *s, u_int l)
- {
- 	u_char *buf, *p;
- 	int pad = 0;
- 
- 	if (l > 8 * 1024)
- 		fatal("%s: length %u too long", __func__, l);
-+	/* Skip leading zero bytes */
-+	for (; l > 0 && *s == 0; l--, s++)
-+		;
- 	p = buf = xmalloc(l + 1);
- 	/*
- 	 * If most significant bit is set then prepend a zero byte to
- 	 * avoid interpretation as a negative number.
- 	 */
- 	if (l > 0 && (s[0] & 0x80) != 0) {
- 		*p++ = '\0';
- 		pad = 1;
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/compat.c b/openssh-6.6p1/compat.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/compat.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/compat.c
-@@ -90,16 +90,19 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version)
- 					SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
- 		{ "OpenSSH_2.*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_3.0*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_3.1*",	SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
- 		{ "OpenSSH_3.*",	SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR },
- 		{ "Sun_SSH_1.0*",	SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
- 		{ "OpenSSH_4*",		0 },
- 		{ "OpenSSH_5*",		SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT},
-+		{ "OpenSSH_6.6.1*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH},
-+		{ "OpenSSH_6.5*,"
-+		  "OpenSSH_6.6*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD},
- 		{ "OpenSSH*",		SSH_NEW_OPENSSH },
- 		{ "*MindTerm*",		0 },
- 		{ "2.1.0*",		SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
- 					SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
- 					SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE|
- 					SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
- 		{ "2.1 *",		SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
- 					SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
-@@ -246,22 +249,34 @@ compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop
- 	debug2("%s: original cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop);
- 	cipher_prop = filter_proposal(cipher_prop, "aes*");
- 	debug2("%s: compat cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop);
- 	if (*cipher_prop == '\0')
- 		fatal("No supported ciphers found");
- 	return cipher_prop;
- }
- 
--
- char *
- compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop)
- {
- 	if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5))
- 		return pkalg_prop;
- 	debug2("%s: original public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop);
- 	pkalg_prop = filter_proposal(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa");
- 	debug2("%s: compat public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop);
- 	if (*pkalg_prop == '\0')
- 		fatal("No supported PK algorithms found");
- 	return pkalg_prop;
- }
- 
-+char *
-+compat_kex_proposal(char *kex_prop)
-+{
-+	if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD))
-+		return kex_prop;
-+	debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop);
-+	kex_prop = filter_proposal(kex_prop, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org");
-+	debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop);
-+	if (*kex_prop == '\0')
-+		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found");
-+	return kex_prop;
-+}
-+
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/compat.h b/openssh-6.6p1/compat.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/compat.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/compat.h
-@@ -54,20 +54,22 @@
- #define SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN	0x00100000
- #define SSH_BUG_EXTEOF		0x00200000
- #define SSH_BUG_PROBE		0x00400000
- #define SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX	0x00800000
- #define SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR	0x01000000
- #define SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR	0x02000000
- #define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH		0x04000000
- #define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT	0x08000000
-+#define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD	0x10000000
- 
- void     enable_compat13(void);
- void     enable_compat20(void);
- void     compat_datafellows(const char *);
- int	 proto_spec(const char *);
- char	*compat_cipher_proposal(char *);
- char	*compat_pkalg_proposal(char *);
-+char	*compat_kex_proposal(char *);
- 
- extern int compat13;
- extern int compat20;
- extern int datafellows;
- #endif
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -190,16 +190,18 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
- 	else {
- 		/* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
- 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(
- 		    order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
- 	}
- 	if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
-+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
-+	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
- 
- 	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
- 		packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
- 		    (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
- 
- 	/* start key exchange */
- 	kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
- 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
-@@ -2457,16 +2457,19 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
- 	} else if (options.compression == COMP_DELAYED) {
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com";
- 	}
- 	if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
- 
-+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
-+	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
-+
- 	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
- 		packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
- 		    (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
- 
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
- 	    list_hostkey_types());
- 
- 	/* start key exchange */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/version.h b/openssh-6.6p1/version.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/version.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/version.h
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.70 2014/02/27 22:57:40 djm Exp $ */
- 
--#define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_6.6"
-+#define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_6.6.1"
- 
- #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
- #define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE

openssh-6.6p1-default-protocol.patch

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-# only enable SSHv2 protocol by default (upstream default is fallback to v1)
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
-@@ -41,17 +41,17 @@ ForwardX11Trusted yes
- #   CheckHostIP yes
- #   AddressFamily any
- #   ConnectTimeout 0
- #   StrictHostKeyChecking ask
- #   IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity
- #   IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa
- #   IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa
- #   Port 22
--#   Protocol 2,1
-+Protocol 2
- #   Cipher 3des
- #   Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc
- #   MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160
- #   EscapeChar ~
- #   Tunnel no
- #   TunnelDevice any:any
- #   PermitLocalCommand no
- #   VisualHostKey no

openssh-6.6p1-disable-openssl-abi-check.patch

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-# disable run-time check for OpenSSL ABI by version number as that is not a
-# reliable indicator of ABI changes and doesn't make much sense in a
-# distribution package
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c b/openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c
-@@ -212,22 +212,23 @@ seed_rng(void)
- #endif
- 	/*
- 	 * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
- 	 * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
- 	 * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
- 	 * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
- 	 * within a patch series.
- 	 */
-+#if 0
- 	u_long version_mask = SSLeay() >= 0x1000000f ?  ~0xffff0L : ~0xff0L;
- 	if (((SSLeay() ^ OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) & version_mask) ||
- 	    (SSLeay() >> 12) < (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >> 12))
- 		fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
- 		    "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
--
-+#endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
- 	if (RAND_status() == 1) {
- 		debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
- 		return;
- 	}
- 
- 	if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
- 		fatal("Could not obtain seed from PRNGd");

openssh-6.6p1-fingerprint_hash.patch

@@ -1,730 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent 8b2615db484b7061edd15f3bee36958f790f790e
-
-# select fingerprint hash algorithms based on the environment variable
-# SSH_FP_TYPE_ENVVAR and append it to hex and randomart fingerprints
-# Petr Cerny <pcerny@suse.cz>
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c
-@@ -230,17 +230,17 @@ rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *p
- 
- 		/* check the real bits  */
- 		keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
- 		if (keybits < 0 || bits != keybits)
- 			logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: "
- 			    "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
- 			    file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
- 
--		fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+		fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
- 		debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
- 		    file, linenum, key_type(key), fp);
- 		free(fp);
- 
- 		/* Never accept a revoked key */
- 		if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
- 			break;
- 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c
-@@ -680,17 +680,17 @@ auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
- 	case -1:
- 		/* Error opening revoked_keys_file: refuse all keys */
- 		error("Revoked keys file is unreadable: refusing public key "
- 		    "authentication");
- 		return 1;
- 	case 1:
-  revoked:
- 		/* Key revoked */
--		key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+		key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
- 		error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "
- 		    "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);
- 		free(key_fp);
- 		return 1;
- 	}
- 	fatal("key_in_file returned junk");
- }
- 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
-@@ -202,23 +202,23 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw,
- 		    _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2,
- 		    options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL :
- 		    _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
- 	}
- 
- 	if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
- 		if (key_is_cert(key)) {
- 			fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
--			    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			    key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
- 			verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "
- 			    "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
- 			    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
- 			    cuser, lookup);
- 		} else {
--			fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
- 			verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",
- 			    key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);
- 		}
- 		free(fp);
- 	}
- 
- 	return (host_status == HOST_OK);
- }
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
-@@ -208,25 +208,25 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con
- 		i = vasprintf(&extra, fmt, ap);
- 		va_end(ap);
- 		if (i < 0 || extra == NULL)
- 			fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);	
- 	}
- 
- 	if (key_is_cert(key)) {
- 		fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
--		    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+		    key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
- 		auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", 
- 		    key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
- 		    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
- 		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
- 		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
- 		free(fp);
- 	} else {
--		fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+		fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
- 		auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key), fp,
- 		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
- 		free(fp);
- 	}
- 	free(extra);
- }
- 
- static int
-@@ -360,17 +360,17 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file,
- 		if (key_is_cert(key)) {
- 			if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key))
- 				continue;
- 			if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
- 			    linenum) != 1)
- 				continue;
- 			if (!key_is_cert_authority)
- 				continue;
--			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5,
-+			fp = key_fingerprint(found, key_fp_type_select(),
- 			    SSH_FP_HEX);
- 			debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
- 			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
- 			/*
- 			 * If the user has specified a list of principals as
- 			 * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
- 			 * their username in the certificate principals list.
- 			 */
-@@ -401,17 +401,17 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file,
- 			break;
- 		} else if (key_equal(found, key)) {
- 			if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
- 			    linenum) != 1)
- 				continue;
- 			if (key_is_cert_authority)
- 				continue;
- 			found_key = 1;
--			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			fp = key_fingerprint(found, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
- 			debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
- 			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
- 			free(fp);
- 			break;
- 		}
- 	}
- 	if (found != NULL)
- 		key_free(found);
-@@ -427,17 +427,17 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, 
- 	char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
- 	const char *reason;
- 	int ret = 0;
- 
- 	if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
- 		return 0;
- 
- 	ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
--	    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	    key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
- 
- 	if (key_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
- 	    options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1) != 1) {
- 		debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
- 		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
- 		    options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/key.c b/openssh-6.6p1/key.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/key.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/key.c
-@@ -420,30 +420,39 @@ key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *k, enum f
- 		*dgst_raw_length = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
- 	} else {
- 		fatal("%s: blob is null", __func__);
- 	}
- 	return retval;
- }
- 
- static char *
--key_fingerprint_hex(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len)
-+key_fingerprint_hex(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len, enum fp_type dgst_type)
- {
- 	char *retval;
- 	u_int i;
- 
--	retval = xcalloc(1, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1);
-+	/* reserve space for both the key hash and the string for the hash type */
-+	retval = xcalloc(1, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1 + SSH_FP_TYPE_STRLEN + 2);
- 	for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
- 		char hex[4];
- 		snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%02x:", dgst_raw[i]);
- 		strlcat(retval, hex, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1);
- 	}
- 
- 	/* Remove the trailing ':' character */
--	retval[(dgst_raw_len * 3) - 1] = '\0';
-+	retval[(dgst_raw_len * 3) - 1] = ' ';
-+
-+	/* Append hash type */
-+	{
-+		char hash[SSH_FP_TYPE_STRLEN + 2 + 1];
-+	    snprintf(hash, sizeof(hash), "[%s]", key_fp_type_str(dgst_type));
-+		strlcat(retval, hash, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1 + SSH_FP_TYPE_STRLEN + 2);
-+	}
-+
- 	return retval;
- }
- 
- static char *
- key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len)
- {
- 	char vowels[] = { 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o', 'u', 'y' };
- 	char consonants[] = { 'b', 'c', 'd', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'k', 'l', 'm',
-@@ -518,17 +527,18 @@ key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgs
-  * can be in the exact middle of the picture, and FLDBASE should be >=8 .
-  * Else pictures would be too dense, and drawing the frame would
-  * fail, too, because the key type would not fit in anymore.
-  */
- #define	FLDBASE		8
- #define	FLDSIZE_Y	(FLDBASE + 1)
- #define	FLDSIZE_X	(FLDBASE * 2 + 1)
- static char *
--key_fingerprint_randomart(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len, const Key *k)
-+key_fingerprint_randomart(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len, const Key *k,
-+    enum fp_type dgst_type)
- {
- 	/*
- 	 * Chars to be used after each other every time the worm
- 	 * intersects with itself.  Matter of taste.
- 	 */
- 	char	*augmentation_string = " .o+=*BOX@%&#/^SE";
- 	char	*retval, *p;
- 	u_char	 field[FLDSIZE_X][FLDSIZE_Y];
-@@ -585,18 +595,19 @@ key_fingerprint_randomart(u_char *dgst_r
- 		*p++ = '|';
- 		for (x = 0; x < FLDSIZE_X; x++)
- 			*p++ = augmentation_string[MIN(field[x][y], len)];
- 		*p++ = '|';
- 		*p++ = '\n';
- 	}
- 
- 	/* output lower border */
--	*p++ = '+';
--	for (i = 0; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
-+	i = snprintf(p, FLDSIZE_X, "+--[%s]", key_fp_type_str(dgst_type));
-+	p += i;
-+	for (i--; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
- 		*p++ = '-';
- 	*p++ = '+';
- 
- 	return retval;
- }
- 
- char *
- key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, enum fp_rep dgst_rep)
-@@ -605,34 +616,91 @@ key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_ty
- 	u_char *dgst_raw;
- 	u_int dgst_raw_len;
- 
- 	dgst_raw = key_fingerprint_raw(k, dgst_type, &dgst_raw_len);
- 	if (!dgst_raw)
- 		fatal("key_fingerprint: null from key_fingerprint_raw()");
- 	switch (dgst_rep) {
- 	case SSH_FP_HEX:
--		retval = key_fingerprint_hex(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
-+		retval = key_fingerprint_hex(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, dgst_type);
- 		break;
- 	case SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE:
- 		retval = key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
- 		break;
- 	case SSH_FP_RANDOMART:
--		retval = key_fingerprint_randomart(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, k);
-+		retval = key_fingerprint_randomart(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, k, dgst_type);
- 		break;
- 	default:
- 		fatal("key_fingerprint: bad digest representation %d",
- 		    dgst_rep);
- 		break;
- 	}
- 	explicit_bzero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
- 	free(dgst_raw);
- 	return retval;
- }
- 
-+enum fp_type
-+key_fp_type_select(void)
-+{
-+	static enum fp_type fp;
-+	static char fp_defined = 0;
-+	char *env;
-+
-+	if (!fp_defined) {
-+		env = getenv(SSH_FP_TYPE_ENVVAR);
-+		if (env) {
-+			if (!strcasecmp(env, "md5") ||
-+			    !strcasecmp(env, "md-5"))
-+				fp = SSH_FP_MD5;
-+			else if (!strcasecmp(env, "sha1") ||
-+			    !strcasecmp(env, "sha-1"))
-+				fp = SSH_FP_SHA1;
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-+			else if (!strcasecmp(env, "sha256") ||
-+			    !strcasecmp(env, "sha-256"))
-+				fp = SSH_FP_SHA256;
-+#endif
-+			else {
-+				error("invalid key type in environment variable "
-+				    SSH_FP_TYPE_ENVVAR ": '%s' - falling back to MD5.",
-+				    env);
-+				fp = SSH_FP_MD5;
-+			}
-+		} else
-+			fp = SSH_FP_MD5;
-+
-+		fp_defined = 1;
-+   }
-+   return fp;
-+}
-+
-+/* 
-+ * string lengths must be less or equal to SSH_FP_TYPE_STRLEN (defined in
-+ * key.h) as to fit into the fingerprint string buffer
-+ */
-+char *
-+key_fp_type_str(enum fp_type dgst_type)
-+{
-+	switch (dgst_type) {
-+	case SSH_FP_MD5:
-+		return "MD5";
-+	case SSH_FP_SHA1:
-+		return "SHA-1";
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-+	case SSH_FP_SHA256:
-+		return "SHA-256";
-+#endif
-+	default:
-+		fatal("%s: unknown key fingerprint hash algorithm requested", __func__);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+
- /*
-  * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances
-  * the pointer.  The integer must already be initialized.  This function is
-  * permitted to modify the buffer.  This leaves *cpp to point just beyond the
-  * last processed (and maybe modified) character.  Note that this may modify
-  * the buffer containing the number.
-  */
- static int
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/key.h b/openssh-6.6p1/key.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/key.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/key.h
-@@ -53,16 +53,18 @@ enum fp_type {
- 	SSH_FP_MD5,
- 	SSH_FP_SHA256
- };
- enum fp_rep {
- 	SSH_FP_HEX,
- 	SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE,
- 	SSH_FP_RANDOMART
- };
-+#define SSH_FP_TYPE_ENVVAR  "SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE"
-+#define SSH_FP_TYPE_STRLEN  8
- 
- /* key is stored in external hardware */
- #define KEY_FLAG_EXT		0x0001
- 
- #define CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS	256
- struct KeyCert {
- 	Buffer		 certblob; /* Kept around for use on wire */
- 	u_int		 type; /* SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER or SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST */
-@@ -104,16 +106,18 @@ int		 key_equal_public(const Key *, cons
- int		 key_equal(const Key *, const Key *);
- char		*key_fingerprint(const Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep);
- u_char		*key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *);
- const char	*key_type(const Key *);
- const char	*key_cert_type(const Key *);
- int		 key_write(const Key *, FILE *);
- int		 key_read(Key *, char **);
- u_int		 key_size(const Key *);
-+enum fp_type	 key_fp_type_select(void);
-+char		*key_fp_type_str(enum fp_type);
- 
- Key	*key_generate(int, u_int);
- Key	*key_from_private(const Key *);
- int	 key_type_from_name(char *);
- int	 key_is_cert(const Key *);
- int	 key_type_is_cert(int);
- int	 key_type_plain(int);
- int	 key_to_certified(Key *, int);
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-add.c b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-add.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-add.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-add.c
-@@ -325,17 +325,17 @@ list_identities(AuthenticationConnection
- 	int version;
- 
- 	for (version = 1; version <= 2; version++) {
- 		for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, version);
- 		    key != NULL;
- 		    key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) {
- 			had_identities = 1;
- 			if (do_fp) {
--				fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5,
-+				fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(),
- 				    SSH_FP_HEX);
- 				printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n",
- 				    key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key));
- 				free(fp);
- 			} else {
- 				if (!key_write(key, stdout))
- 					fprintf(stderr, "key_write failed");
- 				fprintf(stdout, " %s\n", comment);
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.c b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.c
-@@ -193,17 +193,17 @@ lookup_identity(Key *key, int version)
- 
- /* Check confirmation of keysign request */
- static int
- confirm_key(Identity *id)
- {
- 	char *p;
- 	int ret = -1;
- 
--	p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	p = key_fingerprint(id->key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
- 	if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.",
- 	    id->comment, p))
- 		ret = 0;
- 	free(p);
- 
- 	return (ret);
- }
- 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.c b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
-@@ -741,27 +741,27 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw)
- {
- #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- 	Key **keys = NULL;
- 	int i, nkeys;
- 	enum fp_rep rep;
- 	enum fp_type fptype;
- 	char *fp, *ra;
- 
--	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fp_type_select();
- 	rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
- 
- 	pkcs11_init(0);
- 	nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys);
- 	if (nkeys <= 0)
- 		fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11");
- 	for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
- 		if (print_fingerprint) {
- 			fp = key_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep);
--			ra = key_fingerprint(keys[i], SSH_FP_MD5,
-+			ra = key_fingerprint(keys[i], key_fp_type_select(),
- 			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- 			printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", key_size(keys[i]),
- 			    fp, key_type(keys[i]));
- 			if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
- 				printf("%s\n", ra);
- 			free(ra);
- 			free(fp);
- 		} else {
-@@ -784,29 +784,29 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
- 	FILE *f;
- 	Key *public;
- 	char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra;
- 	int i, skip = 0, num = 0, invalid = 1;
- 	enum fp_rep rep;
- 	enum fp_type fptype;
- 	struct stat st;
- 
--	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fp_type_select();
- 	rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
- 
- 	if (!have_identity)
- 		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
- 	if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
- 		perror(identity_file);
- 		exit(1);
- 	}
- 	public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment);
- 	if (public != NULL) {
- 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
--		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+		ra = key_fingerprint(public, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- 		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, comment,
- 		    key_type(public));
- 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
- 			printf("%s\n", ra);
- 		key_free(public);
- 		free(comment);
- 		free(ra);
- 		free(fp);
-@@ -862,17 +862,17 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
- 			public = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
- 			if (key_read(public, &cp) != 1) {
- 				key_free(public);
- 				continue;
- 			}
- 		}
- 		comment = *cp ? cp : comment;
- 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
--		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+		ra = key_fingerprint(public, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- 		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp,
- 		    comment ? comment : "no comment", key_type(public));
- 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
- 			printf("%s\n", ra);
- 		free(ra);
- 		free(fp);
- 		key_free(public);
- 		invalid = 0;
-@@ -983,20 +983,20 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
- static void
- printhost(FILE *f, const char *name, Key *public, int ca, int hash)
- {
- 	if (print_fingerprint) {
- 		enum fp_rep rep;
- 		enum fp_type fptype;
- 		char *fp, *ra;
- 
--		fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+		fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fp_type_select();
- 		rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
- 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
--		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+		ra = key_fingerprint(public, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- 		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, name,
- 		    key_type(public));
- 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
- 			printf("%s\n", ra);
- 		free(ra);
- 		free(fp);
- 	} else {
- 		if (hash && (name = host_hash(name, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
-@@ -1873,19 +1873,19 @@ do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
- 	if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
- 		fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
- 	if ((key = key_load_public(identity_file, NULL)) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s is not a public key", identity_file);
- 	if (!key_is_cert(key))
- 		fatal("%s is not a certificate", identity_file);
- 	v00 = key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 || key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00;
- 
--	key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
- 	ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
--	    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	    key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
- 
- 	printf("%s:\n", identity_file);
- 	printf("        Type: %s %s certificate\n", key_ssh_name(key),
- 	    key_cert_type(key));
- 	printf("        Public key: %s %s\n", key_type(key), key_fp);
- 	printf("        Signing CA: %s %s\n",
- 	    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp);
- 	printf("        Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id);
-@@ -2681,18 +2681,18 @@ passphrase_again:
- 		exit(1);
- 	}
- 	if (!key_write(public, f))
- 		fprintf(stderr, "write key failed\n");
- 	fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
- 	fclose(f);
- 
- 	if (!quiet) {
--		char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--		char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5,
-+		char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
-+		char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, key_fp_type_select(),
- 		    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- 		printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n",
- 		    identity_file);
- 		printf("The key fingerprint is:\n");
- 		printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment);
- 		printf("The key's randomart image is:\n");
- 		printf("%s\n", ra);
- 		free(ra);
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect.c
-@@ -909,18 +909,18 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
- 				    "address '%.128s' to the list of known "
- 				    "hosts (%.30s).", type, ip,
- 				    user_hostfiles[0]);
- 			else
- 				logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host "
- 				    "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
- 				    "of known hosts.", type, ip);
- 		} else if (options.visual_host_key) {
--			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
-+			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, key_fp_type_select(),
- 			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- 			logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s\n", fp, ra);
- 			free(ra);
- 			free(fp);
- 		}
- 		break;
- 	case HOST_NEW:
- 		if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 &&
-@@ -950,18 +950,18 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
- 
- 			if (show_other_keys(host_hostkeys, host_key))
- 				snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1),
- 				    "\nbut keys of different type are already"
- 				    " known for this host.");
- 			else
- 				snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
- 			/* The default */
--			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
-+			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, key_fp_type_select(),
- 			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- 			msg2[0] = '\0';
- 			if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
- 				if (matching_host_key_dns)
- 					snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
- 					    "Matching host key fingerprint"
- 					    " found in DNS.\n");
- 				else
-@@ -1215,17 +1215,17 @@ fail:
- 
- /* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */
- int
- verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
- {
- 	int flags = 0;
- 	char *fp;
- 
--	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
- 	debug("Server host key: %s %s", key_type(host_key), fp);
- 	free(fp);
- 
- 	/* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */
- 	if (!key_is_cert(host_key) && options.verify_host_key_dns &&
- 	    verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key, &flags) == 0) {
- 		if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) {
- 
-@@ -1322,18 +1322,18 @@ show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkey
- 	char *fp, *ra;
- 	const struct hostkey_entry *found;
- 
- 	for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) {
- 		if (type[i] == key->type)
- 			continue;
- 		if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found))
- 			continue;
--		fp = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--		ra = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+		fp = key_fingerprint(found->key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
-+		ra = key_fingerprint(found->key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- 		logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
- 		    "in %s:%lu\n"
- 		    "%s key fingerprint %s.",
- 		    key_type(found->key),
- 		    found->host, found->file, found->line,
- 		    key_type(found->key), fp);
- 		if (options.visual_host_key)
- 			logit("%s", ra);
-@@ -1344,17 +1344,17 @@ show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkey
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
- static void
- warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
- {
- 	char *fp;
- 
--	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
- 
- 	error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- 	error("@    WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED!     @");
- 	error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- 	error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
- 	error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
- 	error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.");
- 	error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -579,17 +579,17 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t
- 		goto done;
- 	}
- 	if (key->type != pktype) {
- 		error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch "
- 		    "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)",
- 		    key->type, pktype);
- 		goto done;
- 	}
--	fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
- 	debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
- 	free(fp);
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * search keys in the reverse order, because last candidate has been
- 	 * moved to the end of the queue.  this also avoids confusion by
- 	 * duplicate keys
- 	 */
-@@ -990,17 +990,17 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt,
- 	Buffer b;
- 	u_char *blob, *signature;
- 	u_int bloblen, slen;
- 	u_int skip = 0;
- 	int ret = -1;
- 	int have_sig = 1;
- 	char *fp;
- 
--	fp = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	fp = key_fingerprint(id->key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
- 	debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp);
- 	free(fp);
- 
- 	if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
- 		/* we cannot handle this key */
- 		debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: cannot handle key");
- 		return 0;
- 	}

openssh-6.6p1-fips-checks.patch

@@ -1,529 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent 717873621cf4991164c61caafd9ac07473231f10
-# Simple implementation of FIPS 140-2 selfchecks. Use OpenSSL to generate and
-# verify checksums of binaries. Any hash iused in OpenSSH can be used (MD5 would
-# obviously be a poor choice, since OpenSSL would barf and abort immediately in
-# FIPS mode). SHA-2 seems to be a reasonable choice.
-#
-# The logic of the checks is as follows: decide whether FIPS mode is mandated
-# (either by checking /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled or envoroinment variable
-# SSH_FORCE_FIPS. In FIPS mode, checksums are required to match (inability to
-# retrieve pre-calculated hash is a fatal error). In non-FIPS mode the checks
-# still must be performed, unless the hashes are not installed. Thus if the hash
-# file is not found (or the hash matches), proceed in non-FIPS mode and abort
-# otherwise.
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/fips-check.c b/openssh-6.6p1/fips-check.c
-new file mode 100644
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/fips-check.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
-+#include "includes.h"
-+#include <fcntl.h>
-+#include <limits.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/stat.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+
-+#include "digest.h"
-+#include "fips.h"
-+
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+
-+#define PROC_NAME_LEN	64
-+
-+static const char *argv0;
-+
-+void
-+print_help_exit(int ev)
-+{
-+	fprintf(stderr, "%s <-c|-w> <file> <checksum_file>\n", argv0);
-+	fprintf(stderr, "	-c  verify hash of 'file' against hash in 'checksum_file'\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "	-w  write hash of 'file' into 'checksum_file'\n");
-+	exit(ev);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+main(int argc, char **argv)
-+{
-+
-+    fips_ssh_init();
-+//    printf("SSL Error: %lx: %s", ERR_get_error(), ERR_get_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/fips.c b/openssh-6.6p1/fips.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/fips.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/fips.c
-@@ -24,21 +24,342 @@
- 
- #include "includes.h"
- 
- #include "fips.h"
- 
- #include "digest.h"
- #include "key.h"
- #include "log.h"
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include <openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h>
-+
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <fcntl.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/mman.h>
-+#include <sys/stat.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+
-+enum fips_checksum_status {
-+	CHECK_OK = 0,
-+	CHECK_FAIL,
-+	CHECK_MISSING
-+};
- 
- static int fips_state = -1;
- 
-+static char *
-+hex_fingerprint(u_int raw_len, u_char *raw)
-+{
-+	char *retval;
-+	u_int i;
-+
-+	/* reserve space for both the key hash and the string for the hash type */
-+	retval = malloc(3 * raw_len);
-+	for (i = 0; i < raw_len; i++) {
-+		char hex[4];
-+		snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%02x:", raw[i]);
-+		strlcat(retval, hex, raw_len * 3);
-+	}
-+
-+	return retval;
-+}
-+
-+/* calculates hash of contents of file given by filename using algorithm alg
-+ * and placing the resukt into newly allacated memory - remember to free it
-+ * when not needed anymore */
-+static int
-+hash_file(const char *filename, int alg, u_char **hash_out)
-+{
-+	int check = -1;
-+	int hash_len;
-+	int fd;
-+	struct stat fs;
-+	void *hmap;
-+	char *hash;
-+
-+	hash_len = ssh_digest_bytes(alg);
-+	hash = xmalloc(hash_len);
-+
-+	fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
-+	if (-1 == fd)
-+		goto bail_out;
-+
-+	if (-1 == fstat(fd, &fs))
-+		goto bail_out;
-+
-+	hmap = mmap(NULL, fs.st_size, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
-+
-+	if ((void *)(-1) != hmap) {
-+		check = ssh_digest_memory(alg, hmap, fs.st_size, hash, hash_len);
-+		munmap(hmap, fs.st_size);
-+	}
-+	close(fd);
-+
-+bail_out:
-+	if (0 == check) {
-+		check = CHECK_OK;
-+		*hash_out = hash;
-+	} else {
-+		check = CHECK_FAIL;
-+		*hash_out = NULL;
-+		free(hash);
-+	}
-+	return check;
-+}
-+
-+/* find pathname of binary of process with PID pid. exe is buffer expected to
-+ * be capable of holding at least max_pathlen characters 
-+ */
-+static int
-+get_executable_path(pid_t pid, char *exe, int max_pathlen)
-+{
-+	char exe_sl[PROC_EXE_PATH_LEN];
-+	int n;
-+
-+	n = snprintf(exe_sl, sizeof(exe_sl), "/proc/%u/exe", pid);
-+	if ((n <= 10) || (n >= max_pathlen)) {
-+		fatal("error compiling filename of link to executable");
-+	}
-+	
-+	n = readlink(exe_sl, exe, max_pathlen);
-+	if (n < max_pathlen) {
-+		exe[n] = 0;
-+	} else {
-+		fatal("error getting executable pathname");
-+	}
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/* Read checksum file chk, storing the algorithm used for generating it into
-+ * *alg; allocate enough memory to hold the hash and return it in *hash.
-+ * Remember to free() it when not needed anymore.
-+ */
-+static int
-+read_hash(const char *chk, int *alg, u_char **hash)
-+{
-+	int check = -1;
-+	int hash_len;
-+	int fdh, n;
-+	char alg_c;
-+	char *hash_in;
-+
-+	*hash = NULL;
-+
-+	fdh = open(chk, O_RDONLY);
-+	if (-1 == fdh) {
-+		switch (errno) {
-+			case ENOENT:
-+				check = CHECK_MISSING;
-+				debug("fips: checksum file %s is missing\n", chk);
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				check = CHECK_FAIL;
-+				debug("fips: ckecksum file %s not accessible\n", chk);
-+				break;
-+
-+		}
-+		goto bail_out;
-+	}
-+
-+	n = read(fdh, &alg_c, 1);
-+	if (1 != n) {
-+		check = CHECK_FAIL;
-+		goto bail_out;
-+	}
-+
-+	*alg = (int)alg_c;
-+	hash_len = ssh_digest_bytes(*alg);
-+	hash_in = xmalloc(hash_len);
-+
-+	n = read(fdh, (void *)hash_in, hash_len);
-+	if (hash_len != n) {
-+		debug("fips: unable to read whole checksum from checksum file\n");
-+		free (hash_in);
-+		check = CHECK_FAIL;
-+	} else {
-+		check = CHECK_OK;
-+		*hash = hash_in;
-+	}
-+bail_out:
-+	return check;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+fips_hash_self(void)
-+{
-+	int check = -1;
-+	int alg;
-+	u_char *hash, *hash_chk;
-+	char *exe, *chk;
-+	
-+	exe = xmalloc(PATH_MAX);
-+	chk = xmalloc(PATH_MAX);
-+
-+	/* we will need to add the ".chk" suffix and the null terminator */
-+	check = get_executable_path(getpid(), exe
-+	    , PATH_MAX - strlen(CHECKSUM_SUFFIX) - 1);
-+
-+	strncpy(chk, exe, PATH_MAX);
-+	strlcat(chk, CHECKSUM_SUFFIX, PATH_MAX);
-+
-+	check = read_hash(chk, &alg, &hash_chk);
-+	if (CHECK_OK != check)
-+		goto cleanup_chk;
-+
-+	check = hash_file(exe, alg, &hash);
-+	if (CHECK_OK != check)
-+		goto cleanup;
-+
-+	check = memcmp(hash, hash_chk, ssh_digest_bytes(alg));
-+	if (0 == check) {
-+		check = CHECK_OK;
-+		debug("fips: checksum matches\n");
-+	} else {
-+		check = CHECK_FAIL;
-+		debug("fips: checksum mismatch!\n");
-+	}
-+
-+cleanup:
-+	free(hash);
-+cleanup_chk:
-+	free(hash_chk);
-+	free(chk);
-+	free(exe);
-+
-+	return check;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+fips_check_required_proc(void)
-+{
-+	int fips_required = 0;
-+	int fips_fd;
-+	char fips_sys = 0;
-+
-+	struct stat dummy;
-+	if (-1 == stat(FIPS_PROC_PATH, &dummy)) {
-+		switch (errno) {
-+			case ENOENT:
-+			case ENOTDIR:
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				fatal("Check for system-wide FIPS mode is required and %s cannot"
-+				    " be accessed for reason other than non-existence - aborting"
-+				    , FIPS_PROC_PATH);
-+				break;
-+		}
-+	} else {
-+		if (-1 == (fips_fd = open(FIPS_PROC_PATH, O_RDONLY)))
-+			fatal("Check for system-wide FIPS mode is required and %s cannot"
-+			    " be opened for reading - aborting"
-+			    , FIPS_PROC_PATH);
-+		if (1 > read(fips_fd, &fips_sys, 1))
-+			fatal("Check for system-wide FIPS mode is required and %s doesn't"
-+			    " return at least one character - aborting"
-+			    , FIPS_PROC_PATH);
-+		close(fips_sys);
-+		switch (fips_sys) {
-+			case '0':
-+			case '1':
-+				fips_required = fips_sys - '0';
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				fatal("Bogus character %c found in %s - aborting"
-+				    , fips_sys, FIPS_PROC_PATH);
-+		}
-+	}
-+	return fips_required;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+fips_check_required_env(void)
-+{
-+	int fips_required = 0;
-+	char *env = getenv(SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV);
-+
-+	if (env) {
-+		errno = 0;
-+		fips_required = strtol(env, NULL, 10);
-+		if (errno) {
-+			debug("bogus value in the %s environment variable, ignoring\n"
-+			    , SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV);
-+			fips_required = 0;
-+		} else
-+			fips_required = 1;
-+	}
-+	return fips_required;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+fips_required(void)
-+{
-+	int fips_requests = 0;
-+	fips_requests += fips_check_required_proc();
-+	fips_requests += fips_check_required_env();
-+	return fips_requests;
-+}
-+
-+/* check whether FIPS mode is required and perform selfchecksum/selftest */
-+void
-+fips_ssh_init(void)
-+{
-+	int checksum;
-+
-+	checksum = fips_hash_self();
-+
-+	if (fips_required()) {
-+		switch (checksum) {
-+			case CHECK_OK:
-+				debug("fips: mandatory checksum ok");
-+				break;
-+			case CHECK_FAIL:
-+				fatal("fips: mandatory checksum failed - aborting");
-+				break;
-+			case CHECK_MISSING:
-+				fatal("fips: mandatory checksum data missing - aborting");
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				fatal("Fatal error: internal error at %s:%u"
-+				    , __FILE__, __LINE__);
-+				break;
-+		}
-+		fips_state = FIPS_mode_set(1);
-+		if (1 != fips_state) {
-+			ERR_load_crypto_strings();
-+			u_long err = ERR_get_error();
-+			error("fips: OpenSSL error %lx: %s", err, ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
-+			fatal("fips: unable to set OpenSSL into FIPS mode - aborting"
-+			    , fips_state);
-+		}
-+	} else {
-+		switch (checksum) {
-+			case CHECK_OK:
-+				debug("fips: checksum ok");
-+				break;
-+			case CHECK_FAIL:
-+				fatal("fips: checksum failed - aborting");
-+				break;
-+			case CHECK_MISSING:
-+				debug("fips: mandatory checksum data missing, but not required - continuing non-FIPS");
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				fatal("Fatal error: internal error at %s:%u",
-+				    __FILE__, __LINE__);
-+				break;
-+		}
-+	}
-+	return;
-+}
-+
- int
- fips_mode()
- {
- 	if (-1 == fips_state) {
- 		fips_state = FIPS_mode();
- 		if (fips_state)
- 			debug("FIPS mode initialized");
- 	}
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/fips.h b/openssh-6.6p1/fips.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/fips.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/fips.h
-@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2012 Petr Cerny.  All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2012-2014 Petr Cerny.  All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-  * are met:
-  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-@@ -19,15 +19,22 @@
-  * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-  */
- #ifndef FIPS_H
- #define FIPS_H
- 
-+#define SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV  "SSH_FORCE_FIPS"
-+#define FIPS_PROC_PATH      "/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled"
-+
-+#define PROC_EXE_PATH_LEN   64
-+#define CHECKSUM_SUFFIX     ".chk"
-+
-+void	 fips_ssh_init(void);
- int	 fips_mode(void);
- int	 fips_correct_dgst(int);
- int	 fips_dgst_min(void);
- enum fp_type	 fips_correct_fp_type(enum fp_type);
- 
- #endif
- 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c
-@@ -47,16 +47,18 @@
- #include "log.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "match.h"
- #include "uidswap.h"
- 
- #include "sftp.h"
- #include "sftp-common.h"
- 
-+#include "fips.h"
-+
- /* helper */
- #define get_int64()			buffer_get_int64(&iqueue);
- #define get_int()			buffer_get_int(&iqueue);
- #define get_string(lenp)		buffer_get_string(&iqueue, lenp);
- 
- /* Our verbosity */
- static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
- 
-@@ -1453,16 +1455,19 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, 
- 	ssize_t len, olen, set_size;
- 	SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
- 	char *cp, *homedir = NULL, buf[4*4096];
- 	long mask;
- 
- 	extern char *optarg;
- 	extern char *__progname;
- 
-+	/* initialize fips */
-+	fips_ssh_init();
-+
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
- 	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
- 
- 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
- 
- 	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
- 	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:m:cehR")) != -1) {
- 		switch (ch) {
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh.c b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh.c
-@@ -420,16 +420,19 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	struct stat st;
- 	struct passwd *pw;
- 	int timeout_ms;
- 	extern int optind, optreset;
- 	extern char *optarg;
- 	Forward fwd;
- 	struct addrinfo *addrs = NULL;
- 
-+	/* initialize fips */
-+	fips_ssh_init();
-+
- 	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
- 	sanitise_stdfd();
- 
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
- 
- #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
- 	/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
- 	/* Save argv so it isn't clobbered by setproctitle() emulation */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
-@@ -1466,16 +1466,19 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
- 	mode_t new_umask;
- 	Key *key;
- 	Key *pubkey;
- 	int keytype;
- 	Authctxt *authctxt;
- 	struct connection_info *connection_info = get_connection_info(0, 0);
- 
-+	/* initialize fips */
-+	fips_ssh_init();
-+
- #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
- 	(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
- #endif
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
- 
- 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
- 	saved_argc = ac;
- 	rexec_argc = ac;

openssh-6.6p1-gssapimitm.patch

@@ -1,428 +0,0 @@
-# The patch below adds support for the deprecated 'gssapi' authentication
-# mechanism to OpenSSH 3.8p1. The newer 'gssapi-with-mic' mechanism is included
-# in this release. The use of 'gssapi' is deprecated due to the presence of
-# potential man-in-the-middle attacks, which 'gssapi-with-mic' is not
-# susceptible to.
-#
-# To use the patch apply it to a OpenSSH 3.8p1 source tree. After compiling,
-# backwards compatibility may be obtained by supplying the
-# 'GssapiEnableMitmAttack yes' option to either the client or server.
-#
-# It should be noted that this patch is being made available purely as a means
-# of easing the process of moving to OpenSSH 3.8p1. Any new installations are
-# recommended to use the 'gssapi-with-mic' mechanism. Existing installations
-# are encouraged to upgrade as soon as possible.
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-gss.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-gss.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-gss.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2-gss.c
-@@ -168,16 +168,25 @@ input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t p
- 			dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
- 			if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)
- 				dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC,
- 				    &input_gssapi_mic);
- 			else
- 				dispatch_set(
- 				    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,
- 				    &input_gssapi_exchange_complete);
-+
-+			/* 
-+			 * Old style 'gssapi' didn't have the GSSAPI_MIC 
-+			 * and went straight to sending exchange_complete 
-+			 */
-+			if (options.gss_enable_mitm)
-+				dispatch_set(
-+				    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,
-+				    &input_gssapi_exchange_complete);
- 		}
- 	}
- 
- 	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
- }
- 
- static void
- input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
-@@ -286,9 +295,15 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
- }
- 
- Authmethod method_gssapi = {
- 	"gssapi-with-mic",
- 	userauth_gssapi,
- 	&options.gss_authentication
- };
- 
-+Authmethod method_gssapi_old = {
-+	"gssapi",
-+	userauth_gssapi,
-+	&options.gss_enable_mitm
-+};
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c
-@@ -65,23 +65,25 @@ extern Buffer loginmsg;
- 
- extern Authmethod method_none;
- extern Authmethod method_pubkey;
- extern Authmethod method_passwd;
- extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
- extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
-+extern Authmethod method_gssapi_old;
- #endif
- 
- Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
- 	&method_none,
- 	&method_pubkey,
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- 	&method_gssapi,
-+	&method_gssapi_old,
- #endif
- 	&method_passwd,
- 	&method_kbdint,
- 	&method_hostbased,
- 	NULL
- };
- 
- /* protocol */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c b/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c
-@@ -135,17 +135,17 @@ typedef enum {
- 	oCompressionLevel, oTCPKeepAlive, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts,
- 	oUsePrivilegedPort, oLogLevel, oCiphers, oProtocol, oMacs,
- 	oGlobalKnownHostsFile2, oUserKnownHostsFile2, oPubkeyAuthentication,
- 	oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias,
- 	oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication,
- 	oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oPKCS11Provider,
- 	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
- 	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
--	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
-+	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, oGssEnableMITM,
- 	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
- 	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
- 	oHashKnownHosts,
- 	oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
- 	oVisualHostKey, oUseRoaming,
- 	oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
- 	oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots,
- 	oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs,
-@@ -179,19 +179,21 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "skeyauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
- 	{ "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication },  /* alias */
- 	{ "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported },
- 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported },
- 	{ "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
- #if defined(GSSAPI)
- 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
- 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
-+	{ "gssapienablemitmattack", oGssEnableMITM },
- #else
- 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
- 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
-+	{ "gssapienablemitmattack", oUnsupported },
- #endif
- 	{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
- 	{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
- 	{ "identityfile", oIdentityFile },
- 	{ "identityfile2", oIdentityFile },			/* obsolete */
- 	{ "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly },
- 	{ "hostname", oHostName },
- 	{ "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias },
-@@ -839,16 +841,20 @@ parse_time:
- 
- 	case oGssAuthentication:
- 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
- 	case oGssDelegateCreds:
- 		intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
- 		goto parse_flag;
-+		
-+	case oGssEnableMITM:
-+		intptr = &options->gss_enable_mitm;
-+		goto parse_flag;
- 
- 	case oBatchMode:
- 		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
- 	case oCheckHostIP:
- 		intptr = &options->check_host_ip;
- 		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1493,16 +1499,17 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
- 	options->xauth_location = NULL;
- 	options->gateway_ports = -1;
- 	options->use_privileged_port = -1;
- 	options->rsa_authentication = -1;
- 	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
- 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
- 	options->gss_authentication = -1;
- 	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
-+	options->gss_enable_mitm = -1;
- 	options->password_authentication = -1;
- 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
- 	options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1;
- 	options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
- 	options->batch_mode = -1;
- 	options->check_host_ip = -1;
- 	options->strict_host_key_checking = -1;
-@@ -1613,16 +1620,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- 	if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
- 		options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
- 	if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
- 		options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
- 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
- 	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
- 		options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
-+	if (options->gss_enable_mitm == -1)
-+		options->gss_enable_mitm = 0;
- 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- 		options->password_authentication = 1;
- 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
- 		options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
- 	if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1)
- 		options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0;
- 	if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
- 		options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.h b/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/readconf.h
-@@ -50,16 +50,17 @@ typedef struct {
- 						 * authentication. */
- 	int     rsa_authentication;	/* Try RSA authentication. */
- 	int     pubkey_authentication;	/* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
- 	int     hostbased_authentication;	/* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */
- 	int     challenge_response_authentication;
- 					/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
- 	int     gss_authentication;	/* Try GSS authentication */
- 	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* Delegate GSS credentials */
-+	int 	gss_enable_mitm;	/* Enable old style gssapi auth */
- 	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
- 						 * authentication. */
- 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
- 	char	*kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */
- 	int     batch_mode;	/* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */
- 	int     check_host_ip;	/* Also keep track of keys for IP address */
- 	int     strict_host_key_checking;	/* Strict host key checking. */
- 	int     compression;	/* Compress packets in both directions. */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
-@@ -104,16 +104,17 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions 
- 	options->rsa_authentication = -1;
- 	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
- 	options->kerberos_authentication = -1;
- 	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
- 	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
- 	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
- 	options->gss_authentication=-1;
- 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-+	options->gss_enable_mitm = -1;
- 	options->password_authentication = -1;
- 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
- 	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
- 	options->permit_user_env = -1;
- 	options->use_login = -1;
- 	options->compression = -1;
- 	options->rekey_limit = -1;
-@@ -241,16 +242,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- 	if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1)
- 		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
- 	if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
- 		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
- 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
- 	if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
- 		options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
-+	if (options->gss_enable_mitm == -1)
-+		options->gss_enable_mitm = 0;
- 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- 		options->password_authentication = 1;
- 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
- 		options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
- 	if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
- 		options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
- 	if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1)
- 		options->permit_empty_passwd = 0;
-@@ -335,17 +338,17 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitUserEnvironment, sUseLogin, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
- 	sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
- 	sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile,
- 	sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem,
- 	sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions,
- 	sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
- 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
- 	sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
--	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
-+	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, sGssEnableMITM,
- 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
- 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
- 	sHostCertificate,
- 	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
- 	sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
- 	sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
- 	sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent,
- 	sDeprecated, sUnsupported
-@@ -402,19 +405,21 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
- 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "gssapienablemitmattack", sGssEnableMITM },
- #else
- 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "gssapienablemitmattack", sUnsupported },
- #endif
- 	{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "skeyauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
- 	{ "checkmail", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "listenaddress", sListenAddress, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "addressfamily", sAddressFamily, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1085,16 +1090,20 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 	case sGssAuthentication:
- 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
- 	case sGssCleanupCreds:
- 		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
-+	case sGssEnableMITM:
-+		intptr = &options->gss_enable_mitm;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sPasswordAuthentication:
- 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
- 	case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
- 		intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h
-@@ -108,16 +108,17 @@ typedef struct {
- 						 * such as SecurID or
- 						 * /etc/passwd */
- 	int     kerberos_ticket_cleanup;	/* If true, destroy ticket
- 						 * file on logout. */
- 	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
- 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
- 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
- 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-+	int	    gss_enable_mitm;	/* If true, enable old style GSSAPI */
- 	int     password_authentication;	/* If true, permit password
- 						 * authentication. */
- 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication;	/* If true, permit */
- 	int     challenge_response_authentication;
- 	int     permit_empty_passwd;	/* If false, do not permit empty
- 					 * passwords. */
- 	int     permit_user_env;	/* If true, read ~/.ssh/environment */
- 	int     use_login;	/* If true, login(1) is used */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
-@@ -51,9 +51,16 @@ ForwardX11Trusted yes
- #   Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc
- #   MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160
- #   EscapeChar ~
- #   Tunnel no
- #   TunnelDevice any:any
- #   PermitLocalCommand no
- #   VisualHostKey no
- #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
-+
-+# Set this to 'yes' to enable support for the deprecated 'gssapi' authentication
-+# mechanism to OpenSSH 3.8p1. The newer 'gssapi-with-mic' mechanism is included
-+# in this release. The use of 'gssapi' is deprecated due to the presence of 
-+# potential man-in-the-middle attacks, which 'gssapi-with-mic' is not susceptible to.
-+#   GSSAPIEnableMITMAttack no
-+
- #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -318,16 +318,21 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
- 
- Authmethod authmethods[] = {
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- 	{"gssapi-with-mic",
- 		userauth_gssapi,
- 		NULL,
- 		&options.gss_authentication,
- 		NULL},
-+	{"gssapi",
-+		userauth_gssapi,
-+		NULL,
-+		&options.gss_enable_mitm,
-+		NULL},
- #endif
- 	{"hostbased",
- 		userauth_hostbased,
- 		NULL,
- 		&options.hostbased_authentication,
- 		NULL},
- 	{"publickey",
- 		userauth_pubkey,
-@@ -685,17 +690,19 @@ process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buf
- 
- 		packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
- 		packet_send();
- 		gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
- 	}
- 
- 	if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- 		/* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */
--		if (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
-+		
-+		if (strcmp(authctxt->method->name,"gssapi") == 0 ||
-+		    (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) {
- 			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE);
- 			packet_send();
- 		} else {
- 			ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user,
- 			    authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic");
- 
- 			gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
- 			gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config
-@@ -80,16 +80,23 @@ PasswordAuthentication no
- #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
- #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
- #KerberosGetAFSToken no
- 
- # GSSAPI options
- #GSSAPIAuthentication no
- #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
- 
-+# Set this to 'yes' to enable support for the deprecated 'gssapi' authentication
-+# mechanism to OpenSSH 3.8p1. The newer 'gssapi-with-mic' mechanism is included
-+# in this release. The use of 'gssapi' is deprecated due to the presence of 
-+# potential man-in-the-middle attacks, which 'gssapi-with-mic' is not susceptible to.
-+#GSSAPIEnableMITMAttack no
-+ 
-+
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
- # be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and
- # PasswordAuthentication.  Depending on your PAM configuration,
- # PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass
- # the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password".
- # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
- # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication

openssh-6.6p1-host_ident.patch

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# identify hashed hosts in known_hosts and suggest command line for their
-# removal
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect.c
-@@ -1070,16 +1070,21 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
- 				    ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
- 		}
- 		/* The host key has changed. */
- 		warn_changed_key(host_key);
- 		error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.",
- 		    user_hostfiles[0]);
- 		error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key),
- 		    host_found->file, host_found->line);
-+		error("You can use following command to remove all keys for this IP:");
-+		if (host_found->file)
-+			error("ssh-keygen -R %s -f %s", hostname, host_found->file);
-+		else
-+			error("ssh-keygen -R %s", hostname);
- 
- 		/*
- 		 * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
- 		 * to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
- 		 */
- 		if (options.strict_host_key_checking) {
- 			error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have "
- 			    "requested strict checking.", type, host);

openssh-6.6p1-key-converter.patch

@@ -1,534 +0,0 @@
-# SSHv1 to SSHv2 RSA keys converter
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/converter/Makefile b/openssh-6.6p1/converter/Makefile
-new file mode 100644
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/converter/Makefile
-@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
-+
-+bindir=/usr/bin
-+mandir=/usr/share/man
-+
-+all :	ssh-keyconverter
-+
-+ssh-keyconverter.o: ssh-keyconverter.c ../key.h ../authfile.h ../misc.h ../xmalloc.h
-+	gcc $(RPM_OPT_FLAGS) -c -I../ $< -o $@
-+
-+ssh-keyconverter: ssh-keyconverter.o ../libssh.a ../openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
-+	gcc $< -Wl,--no-as-needed $(RPM_OPT_FLAGS) -L../ -L../openbsd-compat/ -lcrypto -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lpam -ldl -lwrap -lutil -lz -lnsl -lcrypt -lssl -o $@
-+
-+install: ssh-keyconverter ssh-keyconverter.1
-+	if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(bindir) ]; then install -d -m 755 $(DESTDIR)$(bindir); fi
-+	install -m 755 ssh-keyconverter $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
-+	if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1 ]; then install -d -m 755 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1; fi
-+	install -m 644 ssh-keyconverter.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/converter/ssh-keyconverter.1 b/openssh-6.6p1/converter/ssh-keyconverter.1
-new file mode 100644
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/converter/ssh-keyconverter.1
-@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
-+.\" Manpage for ssh-keyconverter
-+.\"
-+.Dd February 2, 2002
-+.Dt SSH-KEYCONVER 1
-+.Os
-+.Sh NAME
-+.Nm ssh-keyconvert
-+.Nd convert ssh v1 keys and authorization files
-+.Sh SYNOPSIS
-+.Nm ssh-keyconvert
-+.Op Fl k
-+.Op Fl o Ar output_file
-+.Ar identity_file ...
-+.Nm ssh-keyconvert
-+.Op Fl a
-+.Op Fl o Ar output_file
-+.Ar authorization_file ...
-+.Sh DESCRIPTION
-+.Nm
-+converts RSA public and private keys used for public key based
-+user authentication with protocol version 1 to the format
-+used with protocol version 2.
-+.Pp
-+When using RSA user authentication with SSH protocol version 1,
-+the client uses the private key from
-+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
-+to provide its identity to the server. The server grants or denies
-+access based on whether the public part of this key is listed in
-+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys .
-+.Pp
-+SSH protocol version 2 supports both DSA and RSA keys, but the
-+way RSA keys are stored are differently. On the client, the default
-+file name is
-+.Pa .ssh/id_rsa
-+rather than
-+.Pa .ssh/identity ,
-+and the file's format is different as well. On the server, the
-+public porting of the key can still be stored in
-+.Pa .ssh/authorized_keys ,
-+but the key notation has changed as well.
-+Therefore, when switching from protocol version 1
-+to version 2, you either have to create a new identity key using
-+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
-+and add that key to the server's
-+.Pa authorized_keys
-+file, or you need to convert your keys using
-+.Nm ssh-keyconvert .
-+.Pp
-+By default,
-+.Nm
-+will try to guess the type of file that is to be converted.
-+If it fails to guess correctly, you can tell if what type of
-+conversion to perform by specifying the
-+.Fl k
-+option to convert the private key, or the
-+.Fl a
-+option to convert an authorisation file.
-+.Pp
-+When converting your private keys stored in
-+.Pa .ssh/identity ,
-+.Nm
-+will read the private key, prompting you for the pass phrase
-+if the key is protected by a pass phrase. If the
-+.Fl o
-+option is given, it will write the private key to the specified
-+file, using version 2 syntax. If the key was protected by a
-+pass phrase, it will use the same pass phrase to protect the new
-+file.
-+It will also write the public portion of the key to a second file,
-+using the specified file name with
-+.Dq .pub
-+appended.
-+If the 
-+.Fl o
-+option was not given, private and public key will be written to
-+.Pa id_rsa
-+and
-+.Pa id_rsa.pub ,
-+respectively, relative to the directory of the input key file.
-+.Pp
-+If the destination file already exists,
-+.Nm
-+will prompt the user for confirmation before overwriting the
-+file, unless the
-+.Fl f
-+option is given.
-+.Pp
-+When converting your
-+.Pa authorized_keys
-+file,
-+.Nm
-+will ignore any keys in SSH version 2 format. Any public keys
-+in version 1 format will be converted and appended to the output file
-+using the new syntax. If the
-+.Fl o
-+option is given, keys are appended to the specified file. If it
-+is not given,
-+.Nm
-+will append all keys to the input file.
-+.Pp
-+Note that
-+.Nm
-+does not check for duplicate keys, so if you run it on
-+.Pa .ssh/authorized_keys
-+more several times, the converted keys will show up several times.
-+.Sh OPTIONS
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds
-+.It Fl k
-+Convert private key file(s). The default is to guess the
-+type of file that should be converted.
-+.It Fl a
-+Convert 
-+.Pa authorized_keys
-+file(s). The default is to guess the
-+type of file that should be converted.
-+.It Fl o Ar outfile
-+Specify the name of the output file.
-+When converting an authorization file, all public keys will
-+be appended to this file.
-+For private key conversion, the private and public components of
-+the key will be stored in
-+.Pa outfile
-+and
-+.Pa outfile.pub ,
-+respectively.
-+Note that since every key must be stored in a separate file, you
-+cannot use this option when you specify several input files.
-+.It Fl f
-+When converting a key file, and the output file already exists,
-+.Nm
-+will ask the user whether to overwrite the file. Using this option
-+forces overwriting.
-+.El
-+.Sh AUTHORS
-+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
-+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
-+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
-+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
-+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
-+created OpenSSH.
-+.Nm
-+was contributed by Olaf Kirch.
-+.Sh SEE ALSO
-+.Xr ssh 1 ,
-+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
-+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
-+.Xr sshd 8
-+.Rs
-+.%A J. Galbraith
-+.%A R. Thayer
-+.%T "SECSH Public Key File Format"
-+.%N draft-ietf-secsh-publickeyfile-01.txt
-+.%D March 2001
-+.%O work in progress material
-+.Re
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/converter/ssh-keyconverter.c b/openssh-6.6p1/converter/ssh-keyconverter.c
-new file mode 100644
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/converter/ssh-keyconverter.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
-+/*
-+ * SSH v1 to v2 RSA key converter.
-+ *
-+ * Instead of a manpage:
-+ *
-+ *	ssh-keyconverter ~/.ssh/identity
-+ *		will put the old RSA key in ~/.ssh/id_rsa and id_rsa.pub
-+ *		If a "-o foofah" is given, the keys will be written to
-+ *		foofah and foofah.pub, respectively.
-+ *
-+ *	ssh-keyconverter ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-+ *		will convert all old RSA keys and add them to the
-+ *		input file. The -o foofah option will direct
-+ *		output to a different file.
-+ *		(Note that it's harmless to specify the same file
-+ *		as input and output, as ssh-keyconverter will ignore
-+ *		any v2 keys, and output is always appended, never
-+ *		replacing the original file).
-+ *
-+ * To compile:
-+ *
-+ *  gcc -g -Wall -o ssh-keyconverter converter.c \
-+ *		-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/  -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh \
-+ *		-lpam -ldl -lwrap -lutil -lz -lnsl \
-+ *		-Wl,-Bstatic -lcrypto -Wl,-dy
-+ *
-+ * Enjoy. --okir
-+ */
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <getopt.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/param.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "authfile.h"
-+#include "misc.h"
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+
-+#define TYPE_KEY		0
-+#define TYPE_AUTHKEYS		1
-+
-+#define PASSPHRASE_ATTEMPTS	3
-+
-+static int	opt_verbose = 0;
-+static int	opt_force = 0;
-+
-+static void	convert(int, const char *, const char *);
-+static void	convert_private_key(const char *, const char *);
-+static void	convert_authorized_keys(const char *, const char *);
-+static int	fileok(const char *, char *, size_t);
-+static int	guess_type(const char *);
-+
-+int
-+main(int argc, char **argv)
-+{
-+	int	opt_type = -1;
-+	char	*opt_outfile = NULL;
-+	int	c;
-+
-+	while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "afko:")) != -1) {
-+		switch (c) {
-+		case 'a':
-+			opt_type = TYPE_AUTHKEYS;
-+			break;
-+		case 'f':
-+			opt_force = 1;
-+			break;
-+		case 'k':
-+			opt_type = TYPE_KEY;
-+			break;
-+		case 'o':
-+			opt_outfile = optarg;
-+			break;
-+		case 'v':
-+			opt_verbose++;
-+			break;
-+		default:
-+			fprintf(stderr,
-+				"usage: ssh-keyconvert [-a | -k] "
-+				"[-o filename] [-v] ...\n");
-+			exit(1);
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Warning, nanny code follows */
-+#if 0
-+	if (opt_outfile && (argc - optind) > 1 && opt_type != TYPE_AUTHKEY) {
-+		fprintf(stderr,
-+			"Output file ambiguous: more than two "
-+			"input files given. Abort.\n");
-+		exit(1);
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
-+	if (optind == argc) {
-+		fprintf(stderr,
-+			"Missing input file(s).\n");
-+		exit(1);
-+	}
-+
-+	for (; optind < argc; optind++) {
-+		char	*name = argv[optind];
-+		int	type;
-+
-+		if ((type = opt_type) < 0)
-+			type = guess_type(name);
-+		convert(type, name, opt_outfile);
-+	}
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+convert(int type, const char *iname, const char *oname)
-+{
-+	if (type == TYPE_KEY) {
-+		convert_private_key(iname, oname);
-+	} else if (type == TYPE_AUTHKEYS) {
-+		convert_authorized_keys(iname, oname);
-+	} else {
-+		fprintf(stderr,
-+			"Conversion type not yet implemented.\n");
-+		exit(1);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+convert_private_key(const char *iname, const char *oname)
-+{
-+	char	prompt[1024], privname[PATH_MAX], pubname[PATH_MAX];
-+	char	*comment = NULL, *passphrase;
-+	Key	*key = NULL, *pk = NULL;
-+	int	i;
-+	FILE	*pf = NULL;
-+
-+	passphrase = xstrdup("");
-+	snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
-+		"Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ",iname);
-+	for (i = 0; !key && i < PASSPHRASE_ATTEMPTS; i++) {
-+		if (i) {
-+			/* Zap old pass phrase */
-+			memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
-+			free(passphrase);
-+
-+			/* Get a pass phrase from the user */
-+			passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
-+		}
-+		key = key_load_private(iname, passphrase, &comment);
-+		if (!key && i)
-+			printf("Bad passphrase, please try again.\n");
-+	}
-+
-+	if (oname != NULL) {
-+		strcpy(privname, oname);
-+	} else {
-+		const char	*s;
-+
-+		if ((s = strrchr(iname, '/')) != NULL) {
-+			int	n = s + 1 - iname;
-+
-+			strncpy(privname, iname, n);
-+			privname[n++] = '\0';
-+		}
-+		strcat(privname, "id_rsa");
-+	}
-+
-+	if (!fileok("private", privname, sizeof(privname)))
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	sprintf(pubname, "%s.pub", privname);
-+	if (!fileok("public",  pubname, sizeof(pubname)))
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	/* "convert" from RSA1 to RSA */
-+	key->type = KEY_RSA;
-+	pk = key_from_private(key);
-+
-+	/* Now write the key in earnest */
-+	if (!key_save_private(key, privname, passphrase, comment)) {
-+		fprintf(stderr,
-+			"Failed to save private key to %s: %m.\n", privname);
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (!(pf = fopen(pubname, "w"))) {
-+		fprintf(stderr,
-+			"Failed to save public key to %s: %m.\n", pubname);
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (!key_write(pk, pf)) {
-+		fprintf(stderr,
-+			"Failed to save public key to %s: %m.\n", pubname);
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (comment)
-+		fprintf(pf, " %s\n", comment);
-+
-+out:
-+	memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
-+	free(passphrase);
-+	if (key)
-+		key_free(key);
-+	if (pk)
-+		key_free(pk);
-+	if (pf)
-+		fclose(pf);
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+convert_authorized_keys(const char *iname, const char *oname)
-+{
-+	char	line[1024];
-+	FILE	*ifp, *ofp;
-+	Key	*key;
-+
-+	if (!(ifp = fopen(iname, "r"))) {
-+		perror(iname);
-+		exit(1);
-+	}
-+
-+	if (oname == NULL)
-+		oname = iname;
-+
-+	if (!strcmp(oname, "-")) {
-+		ofp = stdout;
-+	} else {
-+		if ((ofp = fopen(oname, "a")) == NULL) {
-+			perror(oname);
-+			exit(1);
-+		}
-+	}
-+	setlinebuf(ofp);
-+
-+#define whitespace(c)	((c) == ' ' || (c) == '\t')
-+	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), ifp) != NULL) {
-+		char	*cp = line, *options = NULL;
-+
-+		while (whitespace(*cp))
-+			cp++;
-+		if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
-+			continue;
-+
-+		key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
-+		if (key_read(key, &cp) != 1) {
-+			/* Skip options, if any */
-+			int	quoted = 0;
-+
-+			options = cp;
-+			for (; *cp && (quoted || !whitespace(*cp)); cp++) {
-+				if (cp[0] == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
-+					++cp;
-+				else if (*cp == '"')
-+					quoted = !quoted;
-+			}
-+			if (quoted)
-+				goto next;
-+			*cp++ = '\0';
-+			while (whitespace(*cp))
-+				cp++;
-+			if (key_read(key, &cp) != 1) 
-+				goto next;
-+		}
-+
-+		if (options)
-+			fprintf(ofp, "%s ", options);
-+		/* "convert" from RSA1 to RSA */
-+		key->type = KEY_RSA;
-+		key_write(key, ofp);
-+		fputs(cp, ofp);
-+		key_free(key);
-+
-+	next:
-+		;
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/* if file exists, ask user whether to overwrite it */
-+static int
-+fileok(const char *what, char *filename, size_t size)
-+{
-+	char	buffer[PATH_MAX];
-+	int	n;
-+
-+checkagain:
-+	if (access(filename, F_OK) < 0)
-+		return 1;
-+	printf("%s key file %s already exists.\n", what, filename);
-+	if (opt_force) {
-+		printf("Overwriting because of -f option...\n");
-+		return 1;
-+	}
-+
-+tryagain:
-+	printf("Please enter a different filename, "
-+		"or return to overwrite: ");
-+	fflush(stdout);
-+
-+	n = read(0, buffer, sizeof(buffer)-1);
-+	if (n <= 0)
-+		printf("\n");
-+	if (n < 0) {
-+		perror("read failed");
-+		exit(1);
-+	}
-+	if (n == 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "EOF from standard input. Bye.\n");
-+		exit(1);
-+	}
-+	buffer[n] = '\0';
-+	while (n && buffer[n-1] == '\n')
-+		buffer[--n] = '\0';
-+	if (n == 0)
-+		return 1;
-+	if (n >= size) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Filename too long.\n");
-+		goto tryagain;
-+	}
-+	strcpy(filename, buffer);
-+	goto checkagain;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Guess the type of file to be converted.
-+ * XXX: should look at the file; v1 key files
-+ * start with "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE"
-+ */
-+static int
-+guess_type(const char *name)
-+{
-+	printf("%s... ", name);
-+	if (strstr(name, "identity")) {
-+		printf("looks like a key file\n");
-+		return TYPE_KEY;
-+	}
-+	if (strstr(name, "authorized_keys")) {
-+		printf("looks like an authorized_keys file\n");
-+		return TYPE_AUTHKEYS;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (opt_verbose)
-+		printf("unable to identify.");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "Please specify the file type for %s. Abort.\n", name);
-+	exit(1);
-+}

openssh-6.6p1-login_options.patch

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# login-pam cannot handle the option terminator "--" as login from util-linux
-# (this is correct behaviour considering its man-page), hence use option which
-# selects the compile-time branch in the code which doesn't use the terminator
-#
-# bnc#833605
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/configure.ac b/openssh-6.6p1/configure.ac
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/configure.ac
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/configure.ac
-@@ -719,16 +719,18 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("
- 	AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts])
- 	AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins])
- 	;;
- *-*-linux*)
- 	no_dev_ptmx=1
- 	use_pie=auto
- 	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
- 	check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
-+	AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT], [1],
-+	    [Define if your login program cannot handle end of options ("--")])
- 	AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1],
- 		[Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY])
- 	AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"],
- 		[String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
- 	AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV])
- 	AC_DEFINE([LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO], [EPERM],
- 		[Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported"
- 		if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP.])

openssh-6.6p1-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-# Do not write a PID file when not daemonizing (e.g. when running from systemd)
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
-@@ -1994,17 +1994,17 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
- 		signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
- 		signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
- 
- 		/*
- 		 * Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler
- 		 * is setup and the listen sockets are bound
- 		 */
--		if (!debug_flag) {
-+		if (!(debug_flag || no_daemon_flag)) {
- 			FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w");
- 
- 			if (f == NULL) {
- 				error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
- 				    options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
- 			} else {
- 				fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
- 				fclose(f);

openssh-6.6p1-saveargv-fix.patch

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# related to bnc#49845, upstream bug #529
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
-@@ -1405,17 +1405,21 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv));
- 	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
- 		saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
- 	saved_argv[i] = NULL;
- 
- #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
- 	/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
- 	compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
--	av = saved_argv;
-+
-+	av = xmalloc(sizeof(*saved_argv) * (saved_argc + 1));
-+	for (i = 0; i < saved_argc; i++)
-+		av[i] = xstrdup(saved_argv[i]);
-+	av[i] = NULL;
- #endif
- 
- 	if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
- 		debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno));
- 
- 	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
- 	sanitise_stdfd();
- 

openssh-6.6p1-seccomp_getuid.patch

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent bde6f1a808f345e141a976ebc3e37903c81a09cb
-add 'getuid' syscall to list of allowed ones to prevent the sanboxed thread
-from being killed by the seccomp filter
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -85,16 +85,20 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- 		offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)),
- 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH, 1, 0),
- 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
- 	/* Load the syscall number for checking. */
- 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
- 		offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
- 	SC_DENY(open, EACCES),
- 	SC_ALLOW(getpid),
-+	SC_ALLOW(getuid),
-+#ifdef __NR_getuid32
-+	SC_ALLOW(getuid32),
-+#endif
- 	SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
- 	SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime),
- #ifdef __NR_time /* not defined on EABI ARM */
- 	SC_ALLOW(time),
- #endif
- 	SC_ALLOW(read),
- 	SC_ALLOW(write),
- 	SC_ALLOW(close),

openssh-6.6p1-seccomp_stat.patch

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# HG changeset patch
-# Parent  8c8249d4e830ade9dfa1d2294c6218bbe439cb4a
-Allow the stat() syscall for OpenSSL re-seed patch
-(which causes OpenSSL use stat() on some file)
-
-bnc#912436
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -97,16 +97,17 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- 	SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
- 	SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime),
- #ifdef __NR_time /* not defined on EABI ARM */
- 	SC_ALLOW(time),
- #endif
- 	SC_ALLOW(read),
- 	SC_ALLOW(write),
- 	SC_ALLOW(close),
-+	SC_ALLOW(stat),
- #ifdef __NR_shutdown /* not defined on archs that go via socketcall(2) */
- 	SC_ALLOW(shutdown),
- #endif
- 	SC_ALLOW(brk),
- 	SC_ALLOW(poll),
- #ifdef __NR__newselect
- 	SC_ALLOW(_newselect),
- #else

openssh-6.6p1-seed-prng.patch

@@ -1,542 +0,0 @@
-# extended support for (re-)seeding the OpenSSL PRNG from /dev/random
-# bnc#703221, FATE#312172
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-bsm.c
-@@ -504,9 +504,15 @@ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char 
- 	/* not implemented */
- }
- 
- void
- audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
- {
- 	/* not implemented */
- }
-+
-+void
-+audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
- #endif /* BSM */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit-linux.c
-@@ -398,9 +398,31 @@ audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(cons
- 	}
- 	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
- 			buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
- 	audit_close(audit_fd);
- 	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
- 	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
- 		error("cannot write into audit");
- }
-+
-+void
-+audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
-+{
-+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
-+
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=prng_seed kind=server bytes=%li source=%s ", bytes, rf);
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
-+					 errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+			error("cannot open audit");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_PARAM_CHANGE_USER,
-+			buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
-+	audit_close(audit_fd);
-+	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
-+	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+		error("cannot write into audit");
-+}
- #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.c
-@@ -304,10 +304,16 @@ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char 
- /*
-  * This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key
-  */
- void
- audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *)
- {
- 	debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp);
- }
-+
-+void
-+audit_linux_prng_seed(long bytes, const char *rf)
-+{
-+	debug("audit PRNG seed euid %d bytes %li source %s", geteuid(), bytes, rf);
-+}
- # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/audit.h
-@@ -63,10 +63,11 @@ void	audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
- void	audit_unsupported(int);
- void	audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
- void	audit_unsupported_body(int);
- void	audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- void	audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
- void	audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
- void	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- void	audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *);
-+void	audit_linux_prng_seed(long, const char *);
- 
- #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c b/openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c
-@@ -45,16 +45,17 @@
- 
- #include "ssh.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "atomicio.h"
- #include "pathnames.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "buffer.h"
-+#include "openbsd-compat/port-linux.h"
- 
- /*
-  * Portable OpenSSH PRNG seeding:
-  * If OpenSSL has not "internally seeded" itself (e.g. pulled data from
-  * /dev/random), then collect RANDOM_SEED_SIZE bytes of randomness from
-  * PRNGd.
-  */
- #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
-@@ -229,11 +230,14 @@ seed_rng(void)
- 	}
- 
- 	if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
- 		fatal("Could not obtain seed from PRNGd");
- 	RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
- 	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
- 
- #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
-+
-+	linux_seed();
-+
- 	if (RAND_status() != 1)
- 		fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
- }
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
-@@ -15,17 +15,17 @@ AR=@AR@
- RANLIB=@RANLIB@
- INSTALL=@INSTALL@
- LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@
- 
- OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt_long.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha2.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strnlen.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o strtoull.o timingsafe_bcmp.o vis.o blowfish.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o explicit_bzero.o
- 
- COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
- 
--PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
-+PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux-prng.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
- 
- .c.o:
- 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
- 
- all: libopenbsd-compat.a
- 
- $(COMPAT): ../config.h
- $(OPENBSD): ../config.h
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c b/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
-new file mode 100644
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
-+ *           (c) 2011 Petr Cerny <pcerny@suse.cz>
-+ *
-+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
-+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-+ *
-+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
-+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
-+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Linux-specific portability code - prng support
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+#include "defines.h"
-+
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "port-linux.h"
-+#include "audit.h"
-+
-+#define RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT	6L
-+#define RNG_ENV_VAR			"SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG"
-+
-+long rand_bytes = 0;
-+char *rand_file = NULL;
-+
-+static void
-+linux_seed_init(void)
-+{
-+	long elen = 0;
-+	char *env = getenv(RNG_ENV_VAR);
-+
-+	if (env) {
-+		errno = 0;
-+		elen = strtol(env, NULL, 10);
-+		if (errno) {
-+			debug("bogus value in the %s environment variable, using default %li\n",
-+				RNG_ENV_VAR, RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT);
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	if (elen)
-+		rand_file = "/dev/random";
-+	else
-+		rand_file = "/dev/urandom";
-+
-+	rand_bytes = MAX(elen, RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+linux_seed(void)
-+{
-+	long len;
-+	if (!rand_file)
-+		linux_seed_init();
-+
-+	errno = 0;
-+	len = RAND_load_file(rand_file, rand_bytes);
-+	if (len != rand_bytes) {
-+		if (errno)
-+			fatal ("cannot read from %s, %s", random, strerror(errno));
-+		else
-+			fatal ("EOF reading %s", random);
-+	}
-+}
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-@@ -14,16 +14,20 @@
-  * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-  * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-  */
- 
- #ifndef _PORT_LINUX_H
- #define _PORT_LINUX_H
- 
-+extern long rand_bytes;
-+extern char *rand_file;
-+void linux_seed(void);
-+
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
- void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
- #endif
- 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-add.1 b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-add.1
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-add.1
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-add.1
-@@ -156,16 +156,30 @@ or related script.
- (Note that on some machines it
- may be necessary to redirect the input from
- .Pa /dev/null
- to make this work.)
- .It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
- Identifies the path of a
- .Ux Ns -domain
- socket used to communicate with the agent.
-+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 6 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
- .El
- .Sh FILES
- .Bl -tag -width Ds
- .It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
- Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
- .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
- Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
- .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.1 b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.1
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.1
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.1
-@@ -196,16 +196,33 @@ Contains the protocol version 2 ED25519 
- .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
- Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user.
- .It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt
- .Ux Ns -domain
- sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent.
- These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
- The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 6 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
- .Xr sshd 8
- .Sh AUTHORS
- OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
- ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.1 b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.1
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.1
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.1
-@@ -827,16 +827,33 @@ on all machines
- where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
- There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
- .Pp
- .It Pa /etc/moduli
- Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
- The file format is described in
- .Xr moduli 5 .
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 6 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
- .Xr moduli 5 ,
- .Xr sshd 8
- .Rs
- .%R RFC 4716
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keysign.8 b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keysign.8
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keysign.8
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keysign.8
-@@ -75,16 +75,33 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authe
- .Pp
- .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub
- .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub
- .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub
- .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub
- If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
- information corresponding with the private keys above.
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 6 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
- .Xr ssh_config 5 ,
- .Xr sshd 8
- .Sh HISTORY
- .Nm
- first appeared in
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh.1 b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh.1
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh.1
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh.1
-@@ -1304,16 +1304,30 @@ reads
- and adds lines of the format
- .Dq VARNAME=value
- to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to
- change their environment.
- For more information, see the
- .Cm PermitUserEnvironment
- option in
- .Xr sshd_config 5 .
-+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 6 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
- .Sh FILES
- .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
- .It Pa ~/.rhosts
- This file is used for host-based authentication (see above).
- On some machines this file may need to be
- world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
- because
- .Xr sshd 8
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8
-@@ -946,16 +946,33 @@ and not group or world-writable.
- .It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid
- Contains the process ID of the
- .Nm
- listening for connections (if there are several daemons running
- concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
- started last).
- The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 6 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr scp 1 ,
- .Xr sftp 1 ,
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
-@@ -50,16 +50,18 @@
- #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
- # include <sys/stat.h>
- #endif
- #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
- # include <sys/time.h>
- #endif
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-+#include "openbsd-compat/port-linux.h"
-+
- #include <sys/wait.h>
- 
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
- #include <netdb.h>
- #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
- #include <paths.h>
- #endif
-@@ -218,16 +220,23 @@ struct {
- 	Key	**host_pubkeys;		/* all public host keys */
- 	Key	**host_certificates;	/* all public host certificates */
- 	int	have_ssh1_key;
- 	int	have_ssh2_key;
- 	u_char	ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
- } sensitive_data;
- 
- /*
-+ * Every RESEED_AFTERth connection triggers call to linux_seed() to re-seed the
-+ * random pool.
-+ */
-+#define RESEED_AFTER    100
-+static int re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER;
-+
-+/*
-  * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
-  * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
-  */
- static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
- 
- /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
- static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
- static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
-@@ -1322,16 +1331,21 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
- 			for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
- 				if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
- 					startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
- 					if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
- 						maxfd = startup_p[0];
- 					startups++;
- 					break;
- 				}
-+			if(!(--re_seeding_counter)) {
-+				re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER;
-+				linux_seed();
-+				audit_linux_prng_seed(rand_bytes, rand_file);
-+			}
- 
- 			/*
- 			 * Got connection.  Fork a child to handle it, unless
- 			 * we are in debugging mode.
- 			 */
- 			if (debug_flag) {
- 				/*
- 				 * In debugging mode.  Close the listening

openssh-6.6p1-send_locale.patch

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-# send locales in default configuration
-# bnc#65747
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
-@@ -58,9 +58,14 @@ ForwardX11Trusted yes
- #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
- 
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable support for the deprecated 'gssapi' authentication
- # mechanism to OpenSSH 3.8p1. The newer 'gssapi-with-mic' mechanism is included
- # in this release. The use of 'gssapi' is deprecated due to the presence of 
- # potential man-in-the-middle attacks, which 'gssapi-with-mic' is not susceptible to.
- #   GSSAPIEnableMITMAttack no
- 
-+# This enables sending locale enviroment variables LC_* LANG, see ssh_config(5).
-+SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
-+SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
-+SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL
-+
- #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config
-@@ -127,14 +127,19 @@ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox		# Defaul
- #VersionAddendum none
- 
- # no default banner path
- #Banner none
- 
- # override default of no subsystems
- Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
- 
-+# This enables accepting locale enviroment variables LC_* LANG, see sshd_config(5).
-+AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
-+AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
-+AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL
-+
- # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
- #Match User anoncvs
- #	X11Forwarding no
- #	AllowTcpForwarding no
- #	PermitTTY no
- #	ForceCommand cvs server

openssh-6.6p1-sftp_force_permissions.patch

@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
-# additional option for sftp-server to force file mode for new files
-# FATE#312774
-# http://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2010-November/029044.html
-# http://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=128896838930893
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.8 b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.8
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.8
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.8
-@@ -33,16 +33,17 @@
- .Bk -words
- .Op Fl ehR
- .Op Fl d Ar start_directory
- .Op Fl f Ar log_facility
- .Op Fl l Ar log_level
- .Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
- .Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
- .Op Fl u Ar umask
-+.Op Fl m Ar force_file_permissions
- .Ek
- .Nm
- .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
- .Sh DESCRIPTION
- .Nm
- is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol
- to stdout and expects client requests from stdin.
- .Nm
-@@ -133,16 +134,20 @@ Places this instance of
- into a read-only mode.
- Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations that change
- the state of the filesystem, will be denied.
- .It Fl u Ar umask
- Sets an explicit
- .Xr umask 2
- to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
- user's default mask.
-+.It Fl m Ar force_file_permissions
-+Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead
-+of the default or client requested mode.  Numeric values include:
-+777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc.  Option -u is ineffective if -m is set.
- .El
- .Pp
- For logging to work,
- .Nm
- must be able to access
- .Pa /dev/log .
- Use of
- .Nm
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c
-@@ -75,16 +75,20 @@ static u_int version;
- static int init_done;
- 
- /* Disable writes */
- static int readonly;
- 
- /* Requests that are allowed/denied */
- static char *request_whitelist, *request_blacklist;
- 
-+/* Force file permissions */
-+int permforce = 0;
-+long permforcemode;
-+
- /* portable attributes, etc. */
- typedef struct Stat Stat;
- 
- struct Stat {
- 	char *name;
- 	char *long_name;
- 	Attrib attrib;
- };
-@@ -670,16 +674,20 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
- 	int handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
- 
- 	name = get_string(NULL);
- 	pflags = get_int();		/* portable flags */
- 	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
- 	a = get_attrib();
- 	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
- 	mode = (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a->perm : 0666;
-+    if (permforce == 1) {
-+        mode = permforcemode;
-+        (void)umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */
-+    }
- 	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
- 	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
- 	if (readonly &&
- 	    ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY ||
- 	    (flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDWR)) {
- 		verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode");
- 	  	status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
- 	} else {
-@@ -1425,17 +1433,18 @@ sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int i)
- static void
- sftp_server_usage(void)
- {
- 	extern char *__progname;
- 
- 	fprintf(stderr,
- 	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
- 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] "
--	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n"
-+	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n\t"
-+	    "[-m force_file_permissions]\n",
- 	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
- 	    __progname, __progname);
- 	exit(1);
- }
- 
- int
- sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
- {
-@@ -1450,17 +1459,17 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, 
- 	extern char *__progname;
- 
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
- 	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
- 
- 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
- 
- 	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
--	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
-+	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:m:cehR")) != -1) {
- 		switch (ch) {
- 		case 'Q':
- 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
- 				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid query type\n");
- 				exit(1);
- 			}
- 			for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++)
- 				printf("%s\n", handlers[i].name);
-@@ -1510,16 +1519,23 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, 
- 		case 'u':
- 			errno = 0;
- 			mask = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
- 			if (mask < 0 || mask > 0777 || *cp != '\0' ||
- 			    cp == optarg || (mask == 0 && errno != 0))
- 				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
- 			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
- 			break;
-+        case 'm':
-+            permforce = 1;
-+            permforcemode = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
-+            if (permforcemode < 0 || permforcemode > 0777 || *cp != '\0' ||
-+                cp == optarg || (permforcemode == 0 && errno != 0))
-+                fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
-+            break;
- 		case 'h':
- 		default:
- 			sftp_server_usage();
- 		}
- 	}
- 
- 	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
- 

openssh-6.6p1-sftp_homechroot.patch

@@ -1,373 +0,0 @@
-# run sftp sessions inside a chroot
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
-@@ -120,16 +120,18 @@ int	do_exec(Session *, const char *);
- void	do_login(Session *, const char *);
- #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
- static void	do_pre_login(Session *s);
- #endif
- void	do_child(Session *, const char *);
- void	do_motd(void);
- int	check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
- 
-+int	chroot_no_tree = 0;
-+
- static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *);
- static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *);
- 
- static int session_pty_req(Session *);
- 
- /* import */
- extern ServerOptions options;
- extern char *__progname;
-@@ -827,16 +829,21 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
- 		    "subsystem '%.900s'", s->subsys);
- 	} else if (command == NULL) {
- 		snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "shell");
- 	} else {
- 		/* NB. we don't log unforced commands to preserve privacy */
- 		snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "command");
- 	}
- 
-+	if ((s->is_subsystem != SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) && chroot_no_tree) {
-+		logit("You aren't welcomed, go away!");
-+		exit (1);
-+	}
-+
- 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
- 		tty = s->tty;
- 		if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
- 			tty += 5;
- 	}
- 
- 	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d",
- 	    session_type,
-@@ -1463,67 +1470,132 @@ do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
-  		while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
-  			fputs(buf, stderr);
-  		fclose(f);
-  	}
- 	exit(254);
- }
- 
- /*
-+ * Test if filesystem is mounted nosuid and nodev
-+ */
-+
-+static void
-+test_nosuid (char * path, dev_t fs)
-+{
-+	FILE *f;
-+	struct stat st;
-+	char buf[4096], *s, *on, *mountpoint, *opt;
-+	int nodev, nosuid;
-+
-+	if (!(f = popen ("/bin/mount", "r")))
-+		fatal ("%s: popen(\"/bin/mount\", \"r\"): %s",
-+		    __func__, strerror (errno));
-+	for (;;) {
-+		s = fgets (buf, sizeof (buf), f);
-+		if (ferror (f))
-+			fatal ("%s: read from popen: %s", __func__,
-+			    strerror (errno));
-+		if (!s) {
-+			pclose (f);
-+			fatal ("cannot find filesystem with the chroot directory");
-+		}
-+		(void) strtok (buf, " ");
-+		on = strtok (NULL, " ");
-+		if (strcmp (on, "on")) {
-+			pclose (f);
-+			fatal ("bad format of mount output");
-+		}
-+		mountpoint = strtok (NULL, " ");
-+		if (memcmp (path, mountpoint, strlen (mountpoint)))
-+			continue;
-+		if (stat(mountpoint, &st) != 0) {
-+			pclose (f);
-+			fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
-+			    mountpoint, strerror(errno));
-+		}
-+		if (fs != st.st_dev)
-+			continue;
-+		nodev = nosuid = 0;
-+		for (opt = strtok (NULL, "("); opt; opt = strtok (NULL, " ,)")) {
-+			if (!strcmp (opt, "nodev"))
-+				nodev = 1;
-+			else if (!strcmp (opt, "nosuid"))
-+				nosuid = 1;
-+			else if (!strcmp (opt, "noexec"))
-+				nosuid = 1;
-+			if (nodev && nosuid) {
-+				pclose (f);
-+				return;
-+			}
-+		}
-+		fatal ("chroot into directory without nodev and either noexec or nosuid");
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/*
-  * Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components
-  * must be root-owned directories with strict permissions.
-  */
- static void
- safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
- {
- 	const char *cp;
- 	char component[MAXPATHLEN];
- 	struct stat st;
-+	int last;
- 
- 	if (*path != '/')
- 		fatal("chroot path does not begin at root");
- 	if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component))
- 		fatal("chroot path too long");
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * Descend the path, checking that each component is a
- 	 * root-owned directory with strict permissions.
- 	 */
- 	for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) {
--		if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL)
-+		if (((last = ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL))))
- 			strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component));
- 		else {
- 			cp++;
- 			memcpy(component, path, cp - path);
- 			component[cp - path] = '\0';
- 		}
- 	
- 		debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component);
- 
- 		if (stat(component, &st) != 0)
- 			fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
- 			    component, strerror(errno));
--		if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)
-+		if ((st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) && !(last && st.st_uid == uid))
- 			fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot "
- 			    "directory %s\"%s\"", 
- 			    cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
- 		if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
- 			fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory",
- 			    cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
--
-+	}
-+	setenv ("TZ", "/etc/localtime", 0);
-+	tzset();
-+
-+	if (st.st_uid) {
-+		test_nosuid(path, st.st_dev);
-+		++chroot_no_tree;
- 	}
- 
- 	if (chdir(path) == -1)
- 		fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": "
- 		    "%s", path, strerror(errno));
- 	if (chroot(path) == -1)
- 		fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno));
- 	if (chdir("/") == -1)
- 		fatal("%s: chdir(/) after chroot: %s",
- 		    __func__, strerror(errno));
-+
- 	verbose("Changed root directory to \"%s\"", path);
- }
- 
- /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
- void
- do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- {
- 	char *chroot_path, *tmp;
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-chrootenv.h b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-chrootenv.h
-new file mode 100644
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-chrootenv.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F Chadima.  All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+#ifndef CHROOTENV_H
-+#define CHROOTENV_H
-+
-+extern int	chroot_no_tree;
-+
-+#endif
-+
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-common.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-common.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-common.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-common.c
-@@ -42,16 +42,17 @@
- #endif
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "buffer.h"
- #include "log.h"
- 
- #include "sftp.h"
- #include "sftp-common.h"
-+#include "sftp-chrootenv.h"
- 
- /* Clear contents of attributes structure */
- void
- attrib_clear(Attrib *a)
- {
- 	a->flags = 0;
- 	a->size = 0;
- 	a->uid = 0;
-@@ -193,23 +194,23 @@ ls_file(const char *name, const struct s
- 	int ulen, glen, sz = 0;
- 	struct tm *ltime = localtime(&st->st_mtime);
- 	char *user, *group;
- 	char buf[1024], mode[11+1], tbuf[12+1], ubuf[11+1], gbuf[11+1];
- 	char sbuf[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
- 	time_t now;
- 
- 	strmode(st->st_mode, mode);
--	if (!remote) {
-+	if (!remote && !chroot_no_tree) {
- 		user = user_from_uid(st->st_uid, 0);
- 	} else {
- 		snprintf(ubuf, sizeof ubuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_uid);
- 		user = ubuf;
- 	}
--	if (!remote) {
-+	if (!remote && !chroot_no_tree) {
- 		group = group_from_gid(st->st_gid, 0);
- 	} else {
- 		snprintf(gbuf, sizeof gbuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_gid);
- 		group = gbuf;
- 	}
- 	if (ltime != NULL) {
- 		now = time(NULL);
- 		if (now - (365*24*60*60)/2 < st->st_mtime &&
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server-main.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server-main.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server-main.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server-main.c
-@@ -17,21 +17,24 @@
- 
- #include "includes.h"
- 
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
-+#include <time.h>
- 
- #include "log.h"
- #include "sftp.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- 
-+int chroot_no_tree = 0;
-+
- void
- cleanup_exit(int i)
- {
- 	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(i);
- }
- 
- int
- main(int argc, char **argv)
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sftp.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sftp.c
-@@ -109,16 +109,18 @@ struct complete_ctx {
- 	char **remote_pathp;
- };
- 
- int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
-     int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */
- 
- extern char *__progname;
- 
-+int chroot_no_tree = 0;
-+
- /* Separators for interactive commands */
- #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
- 
- /* ls flags */
- #define LS_LONG_VIEW	0x0001	/* Full view ala ls -l */
- #define LS_SHORT_VIEW	0x0002	/* Single row view ala ls -1 */
- #define LS_NUMERIC_VIEW	0x0004	/* Long view with numeric uid/gid */
- #define LS_NAME_SORT	0x0008	/* Sort by name (default) */
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.0
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.0
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.0
-@@ -189,16 +189,24 @@ DESCRIPTION
-              session this requires at least a shell, typically sh(1), and
-              basic /dev nodes such as null(4), zero(4), stdin(4), stdout(4),
-              stderr(4), arandom(4) and tty(4) devices.  For file transfer
-              sessions using ``sftp'', no additional configuration of the
-              environment is necessary if the in-process sftp server is used,
-              though sessions which use logging do require /dev/log inside the
-              chroot directory (see sftp-server(8) for details).
- 
-+             In the special case when only sftp is used, not ssh nor scp, it
-+             is possible to use ChrootDirectory %h or ChrootDirectory
-+             /some/path/%u. The file system containing this directory must be
-+             mounted with options nodev and either nosuid or noexec. The owner
-+             of the directory should be the user. The ownership of the other
-+             components of the path must fulfill the usual conditions. No adi-
-+             tional files are required to be present in the directory.
-+
-              The default is not to chroot(2).
- 
-      Ciphers
-              Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2.  Multiple
-              ciphers must be comma-separated.  The supported ciphers are:
- 
-              ``3des-cbc'', ``aes128-cbc'', ``aes192-cbc'', ``aes256-cbc'',
-              ``aes128-ctr'', ``aes192-ctr'', ``aes256-ctr'',
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5
-@@ -324,16 +324,27 @@ For file transfer sessions using
- no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the
- in-process sftp server is used,
- though sessions which use logging do require
- .Pa /dev/log
- inside the chroot directory (see
- .Xr sftp-server 8
- for details).
- .Pp
-+In the special case when only sftp is used, not ssh nor scp,
-+it is possible to use
-+.Cm ChrootDirectory
-+%h or
-+.Cm ChrootDirectory
-+/some/path/%u. The file system containing this directory must be
-+mounted with options nodev and either nosuid or noexec. The owner of the
-+directory should be the user. The ownership of the other components of the path
-+must fulfill the usual conditions. No aditional files are required to be present
-+in the directory.
-+.Pp
- The default is not to
- .Xr chroot 2 .
- .It Cm Ciphers
- Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2.
- Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
- The supported ciphers are:
- .Pp
- .Dq 3des-cbc ,

openssh-6.6p1-xauth.patch

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-# try to remove xauth cookies on logout
-# bnc#98815
-
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
-@@ -2510,18 +2510,50 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int sta
- 	if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
- 		chan_write_failed(c);
- }
- 
- void
- session_close(Session *s)
- {
- 	u_int i;
-+	int do_xauth;
- 
- 	debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
-+
-+	do_xauth = (s->display != NULL) && (s->auth_proto != NULL) && (s->auth_data != NULL);
-+	if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) {
-+		pid_t pid;
-+		FILE *f;
-+		char cmd[1024];
-+		struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
-+
-+		if (!(pid = fork())) {
-+			permanently_set_uid(pw);
-+
-+			/* Remove authority data from .Xauthority if appropriate. */
-+			debug("Running %.500s remove %.100s\n",
-+				options.xauth_location, s->auth_display);
-+
-+			snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "unset XAUTHORITY && HOME=\"%.200s\" %s -q -",
-+                     		s->pw->pw_dir, options.xauth_location);
-+            		f = popen(cmd, "w");
-+			if (f) {
-+				fprintf(f, "remove %s\n", s->auth_display);
-+				pclose(f);
-+			} else
-+				error("Could not run %s\n", cmd);
-+			exit(0);
-+		} else if (pid > 0) {
-+			int status;
-+
-+			waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
-+		}
-+	}
-+
- 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
- 		session_pty_cleanup(s);
- 	free(s->term);
- 	free(s->display);
- 	free(s->x11_chanids);
- 	free(s->auth_display);
- 	free(s->auth_data);
- 	free(s->auth_proto);

openssh-6.6p1.tar.gz

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
-oid sha256:48c1f0664b4534875038004cc4f3555b8329c2a81c1df48db5c517800de203bb
-size 1282502

openssh-6.6p1.tar.gz.asc

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
------BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
-Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (OpenBSD)
-
-iQGlAwUAUyEVxtPl9Wttkg0wAQr39wx/SkCPbWVsEG2Do7IXKg1FudhKIt8QGQZC
-4bNvnwFbFZ/RNEv+BZRKH7AmgNLXn6/VTlRkifF3osrvJ6gh8EfQMkNPB5WcRz5h
-c4KdAcL6u/KFxku0x/hjqUaAV980HlUFvAmGv3/YTL8n14uRBRlrVCnG5q1LmIv7
-piBnb+FrAivrNV+PUMkkrC6XKrfR2ns+ZtfgwBQGQ/VuJTQZPOUMp/GLViHBxz4l
-G0H52bolzAIunzBxXF9fWwFU8JFtCEharFr7jYuLQzViUPCaf3L9w3yPb2S24wnU
-772CEyGbdCJVLmtD9ObaNKk0We6hdc6Dz+mx/JbHkoWSw0LYdHFbjFR75vjNENYh
-evRgqLCP91micfhZDQqX6tOLnMfBjxCjHsCYvMlDACiEvxb1Ct6Fm9m1lXIGUsh3
-ssScaCvQItMAvQdjQOdCXS7Zcucfzzx3Fd8Q2X/h2R81yYv6JjYQy7aBV/DaFDzP
-/BhCwnq5sP6XW6rHRZGYXhMaAEjZml8ySRFEzW+esnGf9vSJgnQ+Kw==
-=H2K/
------END PGP SIGNATURE-----

openssh-7.2p2-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch

@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  48bbbfeff186061b7fd4795bff15f15f571e2c8f
 # enable trusted X11 forwarding by default in both sshd and sshsystem-wide
 # configuration
 # bnc#50836 (was suse #35836)
+Enable Trusted X11 forwarding by default, since the security benefits of
+having it disabled are negligible these days with XI2 being widely used.
 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
 @@ -12,19 +12,30 @@
  # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
  # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
@@ -26,8 +30,8 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
 +# keystrokes as you type, just like any other X11 client could do.
 +# Set this to "no" here for global effect or in your own ~/.ssh/config
 +# file if you want to have the remote X11 authentification data to 
-+# expire after two minutes after remote login.
++# expire after twenty minutes after remote login.
-+ForwardX11Trusted yes
++    ForwardX11Trusted yes
 +
  #   RhostsRSAAuthentication no
  #   RSAAuthentication yes
@@ -37,9 +41,9 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config b/openssh-6.6p1/ssh_config
  #   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
  #   BatchMode no
  #   CheckHostIP yes
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
 @@ -94,17 +94,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
  # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
  # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
@@ -58,4 +62,4 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config
  #PrintLastLog yes
  #TCPKeepAlive yes
  #UseLogin no
- UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox		# Default for new installations.
+ #UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox

openssh-7.2p2-allow_DSS_by_default.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  2730f36bee0d6e141d8391b414a702e1add5a853
+Enable DSS authentication by default to maintain compatibility with older
+versions.
+
+bsc#983784
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/myproposal.h b/openssh-7.2p2/myproposal.h
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/myproposal.h
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/myproposal.h
+@@ -94,21 +94,23 @@
+ #define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \
+ 	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
+ 	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
+ 
+ #define	KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG	\
+ 	HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
+ 	"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ 	"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ 	HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
+ 	"ssh-ed25519," \
+ 	"rsa-sha2-512," \
+ 	"rsa-sha2-256," \
+-	"ssh-rsa"
++	"ssh-rsa," \
++	"ssh-dss"
+ 
+ /* the actual algorithms */
+ 
+ #define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
+ 	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
+ 	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" \
+ 	AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
+ 
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
+@@ -887,19 +887,19 @@ Alternately if the specified value begin
+ character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
+ instead of replacing them.
+ The default for this option is:
+ .Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
++ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
++ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified
+ to prefer their algorithms.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key types may also be obtained using the
+ .Fl Q
+ option of
+@@ -1325,19 +1325,19 @@ Alternately if the specified value begin
+ character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
+ instead of replacing it.
+ The default for this option is:
+ .Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
++ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
++ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The
+ .Fl Q
+ option of
+ .Xr ssh 1
+ may be used to list supported key types.
+ .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+@@ -651,19 +651,19 @@ Alternately if the specified value begin
+ character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
+ instead of replacing them.
+ The default for this option is:
+ .Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
++ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
++ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The
+ .Fl Q
+ option of
+ .Xr ssh 1
+ may be used to list supported key types.
+ .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+@@ -743,19 +743,19 @@ environment variable.
+ Specifies the host key algorithms
+ that the server offers.
+ The default for this option is:
+ .Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
++ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
++ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key types may also be obtained using the
+ .Fl Q
+ option of
+ .Xr ssh 1
+ with an argument of
+ .Dq key .

openssh-7.2p2-allow_root_password_login.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  8cf6984812ab2211ce60c0a9156892b3a7ee3aaf
+Allow root login with password by default. While less secure than upstream
+default of forbidding access to the root account with a password, we are
+temporarily introducing this change to keep the default used in older OpenSSH
+versions shipped with SLE.
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
+@@ -233,17 +233,17 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 		options->pid_file = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE);
+ 	if (options->server_key_bits == -1)
+ 		options->server_key_bits = 1024;
+ 	if (options->login_grace_time == -1)
+ 		options->login_grace_time = 120;
+ 	if (options->key_regeneration_time == -1)
+ 		options->key_regeneration_time = 3600;
+ 	if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET)
+-		options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD;
++		options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_YES;
+ 	if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1)
+ 		options->ignore_rhosts = 1;
+ 	if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1)
+ 		options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0;
+ 	if (options->print_motd == -1)
+ 		options->print_motd = 1;
+ 	if (options->print_lastlog == -1)
+ 		options->print_lastlog = 1;
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
+@@ -36,17 +36,17 @@
+ # Logging
+ # obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
+ #SyslogFacility AUTH
+ #LogLevel INFO
+ 
+ # Authentication:
+ 
+ #LoginGraceTime 2m
+-#PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
++#PermitRootLogin yes
+ #StrictModes yes
+ #MaxAuthTries 6
+ #MaxSessions 10
+ 
+ #RSAAuthentication yes
+ #PubkeyAuthentication yes
+ 
+ # The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
+@@ -710,17 +710,17 @@ DESCRIPTION
+              restrictions and permit any forwarding requests.  An argument of
+              M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests.  By
+              default all port forwarding requests are permitted.
+ 
+      PermitRootLogin
+              Specifies whether root can log in using ssh(1).  The argument
+              must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\prohibit-passwordM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\without-passwordM-bM-^@M-^],
+              M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].  The default is
+-             M-bM-^@M-^\prohibit-passwordM-bM-^@M-^].
++             M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+ 
+              If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\prohibit-passwordM-bM-^@M-^] or
+              M-bM-^@M-^\without-passwordM-bM-^@M-^], password and keyboard-interactive
+              authentication are disabled for root.
+ 
+              If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^], root login with
+              public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the
+              command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1213,17 +1213,17 @@ Specifies whether root can log in using
+ The argument must be
+ .Dq yes ,
+ .Dq prohibit-password ,
+ .Dq without-password ,
+ .Dq forced-commands-only ,
+ or
+ .Dq no .
+ The default is
+-.Dq prohibit-password .
++.Dq yes .
+ .Pp
+ If this option is set to
+ .Dq prohibit-password
+ or
+ .Dq without-password ,
+ password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for root.
+ .Pp
+ If this option is set to

openssh-7.2p2-blocksigalrm.patch

@@ -1,18 +1,21 @@
-# block SIGALRM while logging through syslog to prevent deadlocks (through
+# HG changeset patch
-# grace_alarm_handler)
+# Parent  5469eb754184144e42c341ccc038309e2880cadc
-# bnc#57354
+block SIGALRM while logging through syslog to prevent deadlocks
+(through grace_alarm_handler())
 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/log.c b/openssh-6.6p1/log.c
+bnc#57354
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/log.c
+
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/log.c
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/log.c b/openssh-7.2p2/log.c
-@@ -47,16 +47,17 @@
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/log.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/log.c
+@@ -46,16 +46,17 @@
+ #include <syslog.h>
  #include <unistd.h>
  #include <errno.h>
  #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
  # include <vis.h>
  #endif
  
- #include "xmalloc.h"
  #include "log.h"
 +#include <signal.h>
  
@@ -23,7 +26,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/log.c b/openssh-6.6p1/log.c
  static char *argv0;
  static log_handler_fn *log_handler;
  static void *log_handler_ctx;
-@@ -384,16 +385,17 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, 
+@@ -383,16 +384,17 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, 
  {
  #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
  	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
@@ -41,7 +44,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/log.c b/openssh-6.6p1/log.c
  
  	switch (level) {
  	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
-@@ -442,20 +444,29 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, 
+@@ -441,20 +443,29 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, 
  		tmp_handler = log_handler;
  		log_handler = NULL;
  		tmp_handler(level, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx);

openssh-7.2p2-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  c924f46e3639b3646e42dd7505c206d43d7180fa
+
+Raise minimal size of DH group parameters to 2048 bits like upstream did in
+7.2. 1024b values are believed to be in breaking range for state adversaries
+and the default moduli shipped with openssh have been around long enough to
+make it more likely for them to be broken.
+
+Also provide an option that allows the client to accept shorter (RFC4419
+compliant) parameters.
+
+CVE-2015-4000 (LOGJAM)
+bsc#932483
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.c
+@@ -37,16 +37,18 @@
+ #include <limits.h>
+ 
+ #include "dh.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ 
++int dh_grp_min = DH_GRP_MIN;
++
+ static int
+ parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg)
+ {
+ 	char *cp, *arg;
+ 	char *strsize, *gen, *prime;
+ 	const char *errstr = NULL;
+ 	long long n;
+ 
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/dh.h
+@@ -43,16 +43,17 @@ int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
+ int	 dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *);
+ 
+ u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Max value from RFC4419.
+  * Miniumum increased in light of DH precomputation attacks.
+  */
++#define DH_GRP_MIN_RFC	1024
+ #define DH_GRP_MIN	2048
+ #define DH_GRP_MAX	8192
+ 
+ /*
+  * Values for "type" field of moduli(5)
+  * Specifies the internal structure of the prime modulus.
+  */
+ #define MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN		(0)
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/kexgexc.c
+@@ -46,29 +46,32 @@
+ #include "packet.h"
+ #include "dh.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+ #include "compat.h"
+ #include "dispatch.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ 
++/* import from dh.c */
++extern int dh_grp_min;
++
+ static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ 
+ int
+ kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ 	int r;
+ 	u_int nbits;
+ 
+ 	nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8);
+ 
+-	kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN;
++	kex->min = dh_grp_min;
+ 	kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+ 	kex->nbits = nbits;
+ 	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE)
+ 		kex->nbits = MIN(kex->nbits, 4096);
+ 	/* New GEX request */
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 ||
+@@ -104,16 +107,22 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, p)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, g)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	if ((bits = BN_num_bits(p)) < 0 ||
+ 	    (u_int)bits < kex->min || (u_int)bits > kex->max) {
++		if (bits < kex->min && bits >= DH_GRP_MIN_RFC)
++			logit("DH parameter offered by the server (%d bits) "
++			    "is considered insecure. "
++			    "You can lower the accepted the minimum "
++			    "via the KexDHMin option.",
++			    bits);
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 	if ((kex->dh = dh_new_group(g, p)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.c
+@@ -56,16 +56,17 @@
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "readconf.h"
+ #include "match.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+ #include "mac.h"
+ #include "uidswap.h"
+ #include "myproposal.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
++#include "dh.h"
+ 
+ /* Format of the configuration file:
+ 
+    # Configuration data is parsed as follows:
+    #  1. command line options
+    #  2. user-specific file
+    #  3. system-wide file
+    # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
+@@ -148,17 +149,18 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+ 	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+ 	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
+ 	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+ 	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+ 	oHashKnownHosts,
+ 	oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
+ 	oVisualHostKey,
+-	oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
++	oKexAlgorithms, oKexDHMin,
++    oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
+ 	oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots,
+ 	oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs,
+ 	oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
+ 	oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes,
+ 	oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes,
+ 	oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
+ } OpCodes;
+ 
+@@ -260,16 +262,17 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "hashknownhosts", oHashKnownHosts },
+ 	{ "tunnel", oTunnel },
+ 	{ "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice },
+ 	{ "localcommand", oLocalCommand },
+ 	{ "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand },
+ 	{ "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey },
+ 	{ "useroaming", oDeprecated },
+ 	{ "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
++	{ "kexdhmin", oKexDHMin },
+ 	{ "ipqos", oIPQoS },
+ 	{ "requesttty", oRequestTTY },
+ 	{ "proxyusefdpass", oProxyUseFdpass },
+ 	{ "canonicaldomains", oCanonicalDomains },
+ 	{ "canonicalizefallbacklocal", oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal },
+ 	{ "canonicalizehostname", oCanonicalizeHostname },
+ 	{ "canonicalizemaxdots", oCanonicalizeMaxDots },
+ 	{ "canonicalizepermittedcnames", oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs },
+@@ -280,16 +283,19 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "updatehostkeys", oUpdateHostkeys },
+ 	{ "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedKeyTypes },
+ 	{ "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes },
+ 	{ "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
+ 
+ 	{ NULL, oBadOption }
+ };
+ 
++/* import from dh.c */
++extern int dh_grp_min;
++
+ /*
+  * Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options.  Never returns if there is an
+  * error.
+  */
+ 
+ void
+ add_local_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd)
+ {
+@@ -1157,16 +1163,20 @@ parse_int:
+ 			    filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
+ 			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ 		if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
+ 			options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case oKexDHMin:
++		intptr = &options->kex_dhmin;
++		goto parse_int;
++
+ 	case oHostKeyAlgorithms:
+ 		charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms;
+ parse_keytypes:
+ 		arg = strdelim(&s);
+ 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ 			    filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
+@@ -1664,16 +1674,17 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ 	options->address_family = -1;
+ 	options->connection_attempts = -1;
+ 	options->connection_timeout = -1;
+ 	options->number_of_password_prompts = -1;
+ 	options->cipher = -1;
+ 	options->ciphers = NULL;
+ 	options->macs = NULL;
+ 	options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
++	options->kex_dhmin = -1;
+ 	options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL;
+ 	options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
+ 	options->num_identity_files = 0;
+ 	options->num_certificate_files = 0;
+ 	options->hostname = NULL;
+ 	options->host_key_alias = NULL;
+ 	options->proxy_command = NULL;
+ 	options->user = NULL;
+@@ -1805,16 +1816,23 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 		options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+ 	if (options->connection_attempts == -1)
+ 		options->connection_attempts = 1;
+ 	if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1)
+ 		options->number_of_password_prompts = 3;
+ 	/* Selected in ssh_login(). */
+ 	if (options->cipher == -1)
+ 		options->cipher = SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET;
++	if (options->kex_dhmin == -1)
++		options->kex_dhmin = DH_GRP_MIN;
++	else {
++		options->kex_dhmin = MAX(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MIN_RFC);
++		options->kex_dhmin = MIN(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MAX);
++	}
++	dh_grp_min = options->kex_dhmin;
+ 	/* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */
+ 	if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ 		options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
+ 	if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1)
+ 		options->add_keys_to_agent = 0;
+ 	if (options->num_identity_files == 0) {
+ 		if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
+ 			add_identity_file(options, "~/",
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/readconf.h
+@@ -69,16 +69,17 @@ typedef struct {
+ 					 * aborting connection attempt */
+ 	int     number_of_password_prompts;	/* Max number of password
+ 						 * prompts. */
+ 	int     cipher;		/* Cipher to use. */
+ 	char   *ciphers;	/* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */
+ 	char   *macs;		/* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */
+ 	char   *hostkeyalgorithms;	/* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */
+ 	char   *kex_algorithms;	/* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
++	int     kex_dhmin;	/* minimum bit length of the DH group parameter */
+ 	int	protocol;	/* Protocol in order of preference. */
+ 	char   *hostname;	/* Real host to connect. */
+ 	char   *host_key_alias;	/* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */
+ 	char   *proxy_command;	/* Proxy command for connecting the host. */
+ 	char   *user;		/* User to log in as. */
+ 	int     escape_char;	/* Escape character; -2 = none */
+ 
+ 	u_int	num_system_hostfiles;	/* Paths for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts */
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.0
+@@ -606,16 +606,29 @@ DESCRIPTION
+                    ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+                    diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+                    diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,
+                    diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
+ 
+              The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be
+              obtained using the -Q option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\kexM-bM-^@M-^].
+ 
++     KexDHMin
++             Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group parameter p.
++             As per RFC4419, this is 1024 bits however, this has increasingly
++             been seen as insecure, which prompted the change to 2048 bits.
++             Setting this option allows the client to accept parameters shorter
++             than the current minimum, down to the RFC specified 1024 bits.
++             Using this option may be needed when connecting to servers that
++             only know short DH group parameters.
++             
++             Note that using this option can severly impact security and thus
++             should be viewed as a temporary fix of last resort and all efforts
++             should be made to fix the server.
++
+      LocalCommand
+              Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after
+              successfully connecting to the server.  The command string
+              extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's
+              shell.  The following escape character substitutions will be
+              performed: M-bM-^@M-^X%dM-bM-^@M-^Y (local user's home directory), M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote host
+              name), M-bM-^@M-^X%lM-bM-^@M-^Y (local host name), M-bM-^@M-^X%nM-bM-^@M-^Y (host name as provided on the
+              command line), M-bM-^@M-^X%pM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote port), M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote user name) or
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config.5
+@@ -1092,16 +1092,28 @@ diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using the
+ .Fl Q
+ option of
+ .Xr ssh 1
+ with an argument of
+ .Dq kex .
++.It Cm KexDHMin
++Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group parameter p.
++As per RFC4419, this is 1024 bits however, this has increasingly
++been seen as insecure, which prompted the change to 2048 bits.
++Setting this option allows the client to accept parameters shorter
++than the current minimum, down to the RFC specified 1024 bits.
++Using this option may be needed when connecting to servers that
++only know short DH group parameters.
++
++Note that using this option can severly impact security and thus
++should be viewed as a temporary fix of last resort and all efforts
++should be made to fix the server.
+ .It Cm LocalCommand
+ Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully
+ connecting to the server.
+ The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with
+ the user's shell.
+ The following escape character substitutions will be performed:
+ .Ql %d
+ (local user's home directory),

openssh-7.2p2-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM.patch

@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  2aa634b7522f34ddbd380c96df4e750df0608604
 # posix threads are generally not supported nor safe
 # (see upstream log from 2005-05-24)
+# --used to be called '-pam-fix3'
 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth-pam.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth-pam.c
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth-pam.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth-pam.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth-pam.c
-@@ -781,17 +781,19 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
+@@ -782,17 +782,19 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
  			}
  			if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) {
  				if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid ||

openssh-7.2p2-eal3.patch

@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-# fix paths and references in sshd man pages
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  bbb49b3f344cf24e9bbd7eb7a7c40fea21be77eb
+fix paths and references in sshd man pages
 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd.8
-@@ -875,17 +875,17 @@ See
+@@ -901,17 +901,17 @@ See
  If this file exists,
  .Nm
  refuses to let anyone except root log in.
@@ -22,7 +24,8 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8
  .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
  .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
  .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
-@@ -956,17 +956,17 @@ The content of this file is not sensitiv
+@@ -981,17 +981,17 @@ The content of this file is not sensitiv
+ .Xr scp 1 ,
  .Xr sftp 1 ,
  .Xr ssh 1 ,
  .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
@@ -30,7 +33,6 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8
  .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
  .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
  .Xr chroot 2 ,
- .Xr hosts_access 5 ,
 -.Xr login.conf 5 ,
 +.Xr login.defs 5 ,
  .Xr moduli 5 ,
@@ -41,19 +43,19 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.8
  OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
  ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
  Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
-@@ -278,18 +278,17 @@ The contents of the specified file are s
+@@ -370,18 +370,17 @@ for details).
+ The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before
  authentication is allowed.
  If the argument is
  .Dq none
  then no banner is displayed.
- This option is only available for protocol version 2.
  By default, no banner is displayed.
  .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
  Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
--PAM or though authentication styles supported in
+-PAM or through authentication styles supported in
 -.Xr login.conf 5 )
 +PAM)
  The default is
@@ -62,9 +64,9 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5
  Specifies the pathname of a directory to
  .Xr chroot 2
  to after authentication.
- All components of the pathname must be root-owned directories that are
+ At session startup
- not writable by any other user or group.
+ .Xr sshd 8
-@@ -576,17 +575,17 @@ and
+@@ -766,17 +765,17 @@ and
  .Pa .shosts
  files will not be used in
  .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication

openssh-7.2p2-enable_PAM_by_default.patch

@@ -1,9 +1,12 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  477d43e9a3889d36b58ff19cf3cb9583e1abf9ce
 # force PAM in defaullt install (this was removed from upstream in 3.8p1)
 # bnc#46749
+# --used to be called '-pam-fix2'
 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
 @@ -64,17 +64,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
  #HostbasedAuthentication no
  # Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for

openssh-7.2p2-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch

@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@
-# handle hostname changes when forwarding X
+# HG changeset patch
-# bnc#98627
+# Parent  b5245fb016a3b83611d4b4ae0c1fe3423cadd6fe
+# -- uset do be called '-xauthlocalhostname'
+handle hostname changes when forwarding X
 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
+bnc#98627
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
+
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
-@@ -1146,17 +1146,17 @@ copy_environment(char **source, char ***
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
+@@ -1154,17 +1154,17 @@ copy_environment(char **source, char ***
  		debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val);
  		child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val);
  
@@ -23,7 +27,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
  #if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
  	char *path = NULL;
  #endif
-@@ -1333,25 +1333,27 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
+@@ -1341,25 +1341,27 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
  		read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf);
  	}
  	if (debug_flag) {
@@ -52,7 +56,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
  
  	do_xauth =
  	    s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL;
-@@ -1395,22 +1397,30 @@ do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shel
+@@ -1404,22 +1406,30 @@ do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shel
  			    "%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
  			    options.xauth_location, s->auth_display,
  			    s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
@@ -83,7 +87,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
  }
  
  static void
-@@ -1664,16 +1674,17 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+@@ -1681,16 +1691,17 @@ child_close_fds(void)
   * ids, and executing the command or shell.
   */
  #define ARGV_MAX 10
@@ -101,7 +105,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
  	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
  	destroy_sensitive_data();
  
-@@ -1730,17 +1741,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+@@ -1747,17 +1758,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
  	 * legal, and means /bin/sh.
  	 */
  	shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
@@ -120,8 +124,8 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
  	/* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */
  	if (options.use_login)
  		hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len,
-@@ -1799,17 +1810,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+@@ -1816,17 +1827,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 			    strerror(errno));
+ 		}
  		if (r)
  			exit(1);
  	}

openssh-7.2p2-lastlog.patch

@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  2ee086fa64dd40d0d50b13fa3a784717bfdd7e4b
 # set uid for functions that use it to seek in lastlog and wtmp files
 # bnc#18024 (was suse #3024)
 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshlogin.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshlogin.c
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshlogin.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sshlogin.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshlogin.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshlogin.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshlogin.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshlogin.c
-@@ -128,16 +128,17 @@ record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty,
+@@ -129,16 +129,17 @@ record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty,
  {
  	struct logininfo *li;
  

openssh-7.2p2-pam_check_locks.patch

@@ -1,11 +1,14 @@
-# new option UsePAMCheckLocks to enforce checking for locked accounts while
+# HG changeset patch
-# UsePAM is used
+# Parent  5b217a9abc32fa963a125ae29c766c015db53bde
-# bnc#708678, FATE#312033
+new option UsePAMCheckLocks to enforce checking for locked accounts while
+UsePAM is used
 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c
+bnc#708678, FATE#312033
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c
+
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
-@@ -103,17 +103,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/auth.c
+@@ -104,17 +104,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
  	struct spwd *spw = NULL;
  #endif
  
@@ -24,7 +27,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c
  #endif /* USE_SHADOW */
  
  	/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
-@@ -123,17 +123,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
+@@ -124,17 +124,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
  #ifdef USE_LIBIAF
  		passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
  #else
@@ -43,10 +46,10 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth.c
  #endif
  #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
  		if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.c
-@@ -66,16 +66,17 @@ extern Buffer cfg;
+@@ -69,16 +69,17 @@ extern Buffer cfg;
  
  void
  initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
@@ -60,16 +63,16 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
  	/* Standard Options */
  	options->num_ports = 0;
  	options->ports_from_cmdline = 0;
+ 	options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL;
+ 	options->num_queued_listens = 0;
  	options->listen_addrs = NULL;
  	options->address_family = -1;
- 	options->num_host_key_files = 0;
+@@ -195,16 +196,18 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
- 	options->num_host_cert_files = 0;
-@@ -157,16 +158,18 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions 
- }
- 
  void
  fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  {
+ 	int i;
+ 
  	/* Portable-specific options */
  	if (options->use_pam == -1)
  		options->use_pam = 0;
@@ -83,7 +86,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
  		/* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
  		if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
  			options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
-@@ -317,17 +320,17 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+@@ -391,17 +394,17 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  #endif
  
  }
@@ -95,14 +98,14 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
 -	sUsePAM,
 +	sUsePAM, sUsePAMChecklocks,
  	/* Standard Options */
- 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sServerKeyBits, sLoginGraceTime, sKeyRegenerationTime,
+ 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sServerKeyBits, sLoginGraceTime,
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+ 	sKeyRegenerationTime, sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
  	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
  	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
  	sKerberosGetAFSToken,
  	sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
  	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
-@@ -362,18 +365,20 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -441,18 +444,20 @@ typedef enum {
  static struct {
  	const char *name;
  	ServerOpCodes opcode;
@@ -123,7 +126,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
  	{ "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },		/* alias */
  	{ "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -870,16 +875,19 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+@@ -1005,16 +1010,19 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
  		}
  	}
  
@@ -143,10 +146,10 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
  		/* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */
  		if (options->ports_from_cmdline)
  			return 0;
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/servconf.h
-@@ -160,16 +160,17 @@ typedef struct {
+@@ -167,16 +167,17 @@ typedef struct {
  					 */
  
  	u_int num_authkeys_files;	/* Files containing public keys */
@@ -164,17 +167,17 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h b/openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h
  	char   *chroot_directory;
  	char   *revoked_keys_file;
  	char   *trusted_user_ca_keys;
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.0
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.0
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.0
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.0
-@@ -728,16 +728,24 @@ DESCRIPTION
+@@ -946,16 +946,24 @@ DESCRIPTION
  
               Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an
               equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable
               either PasswordAuthentication or ChallengeResponseAuthentication.
  
               If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a
-              non-root user.  The default is ``no''.
+              non-root user.  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
  
 +     UsePAMCheckLocks
 +             When set to ``yes'', the checks whether the account has been
@@ -191,11 +194,11 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.0
               that has the privilege of the authenticated user.  The goal of
               privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by
               containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes.  The
-              default is ``yes''.  If UsePrivilegeSeparation is set to
+              argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\sandboxM-bM-^@M-^].  If
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config.5
-@@ -1214,16 +1214,28 @@ or
+@@ -1578,16 +1578,28 @@ or
  .Pp
  If
  .Cm UsePAM

openssh-7.2p2-pts_names_formatting.patch

@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  870f97b01b9ed00bac9ff0b8014a998434a6161b
 # use same lines naming as utempter (prevents problems with using different
 # formats in ?tmp? files)
+# --used to be called '-pts'
 
-diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/loginrec.c b/openssh-6.6p1/loginrec.c
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/loginrec.c b/openssh-7.2p2/loginrec.c
---- a/openssh-6.6p1/loginrec.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/loginrec.c
-+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/loginrec.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/loginrec.c
-@@ -538,17 +538,17 @@ getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+@@ -541,17 +541,17 @@ getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li)
  /*
   * 'line' string utility functions
   *
@@ -23,7 +26,7 @@ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/loginrec.c b/openssh-6.6p1/loginrec.c
   */
  
  
-@@ -599,16 +599,20 @@ line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *s
+@@ -602,16 +602,20 @@ line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *s
  	/* Always skip prefix if present */
  	if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
  		src += 5;

openssh-7.2p2-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  07998e381c9867b8b6f7b9205261811934bef40f
+# --used to be called '-xauth'
+try to remove xauth cookies on logout
+
+bnc#98815
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/session.c
+@@ -2540,16 +2540,44 @@ session_close(Session *s)
+ 	u_int i;
+ 
+ 	verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
+ 	    s->pw->pw_name,
+ 	    get_remote_ipaddr(),
+ 	    get_remote_port(),
+ 	    s->self);
+ 
++	if ((s->display != NULL) && (s->auth_proto != NULL) &&
++	    (s->auth_data != NULL) && (options.xauth_location != NULL)) {
++		pid_t pid;
++		FILE *f;
++		char cmd[1024];
++		struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
++
++		if (!(pid = fork())) {
++			permanently_set_uid(pw);
++
++			/* Remove authority data from .Xauthority if appropriate. */
++			debug("Running %.500s remove %.100s\n",
++			    options.xauth_location, s->auth_display);
++
++			snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "unset XAUTHORITY && HOME=\"%.200s\" %s -q -",
++                     	    s->pw->pw_dir, options.xauth_location);
++            		f = popen(cmd, "w");
++			if (f) {
++				fprintf(f, "remove %s\n", s->auth_display);
++				pclose(f);
++			} else
++				error("Could not run %s\n", cmd);
++			exit(0);
++		} else if (pid > 0) {
++			waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
++		}
++	}
++
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ 		session_pty_cleanup(s);
+ 	free(s->term);
+ 	free(s->display);
+ 	free(s->x11_chanids);
+ 	free(s->auth_display);
+ 	free(s->auth_data);
+ 	free(s->auth_proto);

openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_getuid.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  3582dd949a01d8eca2816986ca4bc0c87c96bed3
+add 'getuid' syscall to list of allowed ones to prevent the sanboxed thread
+from being killed by the seccomp filter
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -142,16 +142,22 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ 	SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getpgid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getpgid),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getpid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getpid),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid
++	SC_ALLOW(getuid),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid32
++	SC_ALLOW(getuid32),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getrandom
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getrandom),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
+ 	SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_madvise
+ 	SC_ALLOW(madvise),

openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_stat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  d3afe6b01f8769713bde6c175e29a50412799e27
+Allow the stat() syscall for OpenSSL re-seed patch
+(which causes OpenSSL use stat() on some file)
+
+bnc#912436
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -130,16 +130,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ 	SC_ALLOW(brk),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime
+ 	SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_close
+ 	SC_ALLOW(close),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_stat
++	SC_ALLOW(stat),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_exit
+ 	SC_ALLOW(exit),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_exit_group
+ 	SC_ALLOW(exit_group),
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getpgid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(getpgid),

openssh-7.2p2-send_locale.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# Parent  505927e61d1a7848f0003adb3619cc726b8e5d15
+send locales in default configuration
+bnc#65747
+
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/ssh_config
+@@ -26,16 +26,21 @@ Host *
+ # security reasons: Someone stealing the authentification data on the
+ # remote side (the "spoofed" X-server by the remote sshd) can read your
+ # keystrokes as you type, just like any other X11 client could do.
+ # Set this to "no" here for global effect or in your own ~/.ssh/config
+ # file if you want to have the remote X11 authentification data to 
+ # expire after twenty minutes after remote login.
+     ForwardX11Trusted yes
+ 
++# This enables sending locale enviroment variables LC_* LANG, see ssh_config(5).
++    SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
++    SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
++    SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL
++
+ #   RhostsRSAAuthentication no
+ #   RSAAuthentication yes
+ #   PasswordAuthentication yes
+ #   HostbasedAuthentication no
+ #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ #   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
+ #   BatchMode no
+ #   CheckHostIP yes
+diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
+--- a/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
++++ b/openssh-7.2p2/sshd_config
+@@ -120,14 +120,19 @@ X11Forwarding yes
+ #VersionAddendum none
+ 
+ # no default banner path
+ #Banner none
+ 
+ # override default of no subsystems
+ Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
+ 
++# This enables accepting locale enviroment variables LC_* LANG, see sshd_config(5).
++AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
++AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
++AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL
++
+ # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
+ #Match User anoncvs
+ #	X11Forwarding no
+ #	AllowTcpForwarding no
+ #	PermitTTY no
+ #	ForceCommand cvs server

openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:a72781d1a043876a224ff1b0032daa4094d87565a68528759c1c2cab5482548c
+size 1499808

openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz.asc

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+Version: GnuPG v2
+
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+=yfYj
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

openssh-askpass-gnome.changes

@@ -1,3 +1,18 @@
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Mon Jul 25 13:45:53 UTC 2016 - meissner@suse.com
+
+- fixed url
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Sun Apr 17 23:27:51 UTC 2016 - pcerny@suse.com
+
+- upgrade to 7.2p2
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Tue Feb 10 13:28:56 UTC 2015 - pcerny@suse.com
+
+- changing license to 2-clause BSD to match source
+
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Fri Apr 11 21:50:51 UTC 2014 - pcerny@suse.com
 

openssh-askpass-gnome.spec

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #
 # spec file for package openssh-askpass-gnome
 #
-# Copyright (c) 2016 SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
+# Copyright (c) 2016 SUSE LINUX GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
 #
 # All modifications and additions to the file contributed by third parties
 # remain the property of their copyright owners, unless otherwise agreed
@@ -26,15 +26,16 @@ BuildRequires:  openssl-devel
 BuildRequires:  pam-devel
 BuildRequires:  tcpd-devel
 BuildRequires:  update-desktop-files
-Version:        6.6p1
+Version:        7.2p2
 Release:        0
 Requires:       openssh = %{version}
 Summary:        A GNOME-Based Passphrase Dialog for OpenSSH
-License:        BSD-3-Clause
+License:        BSD-2-Clause
 Group:          Productivity/Networking/SSH
 Url:            http://www.openssh.com/
 %define _name openssh
-Source:         ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
+Source:         http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
+Source42:       http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
 BuildRoot:      %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
 
 %description

openssh.changes

@@ -1,3 +1,597 @@
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Mon Jul 25 13:46:06 UTC 2016 - meissner@suse.com
+
+- added gpg signature 
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Tue Jun  7 16:52:45 UTC 2016 - pcerny@suse.com
+
+- enable support for SSHv1 protocol and discourage its usage
+  (bsc#983307)
+- enable DSA by default for backward compatibility and discourage
+  its usage (bsc#983784)
+  [openssh-7.2p2-allow_DSS_by_default.patch]
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Mon May 30 00:30:16 UTC 2016 - pcerny@suse.com
+
+- enable trusted X11 forwarding by default
+  [openssh-7.2p2-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch]
+- set UID for lastlog properly 
+  [openssh-7.2p2-lastlog.patch]
+- enable use of PAM by default 
+  [openssh-7.2p2-enable_PAM_by_default.patch]
+- copy command line arguments properly 
+  [openssh-7.2p2-saveargv-fix.patch]
+- do not use pthreads in PAM code 
+  [openssh-7.2p2-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM.patch]
+- fix paths in documentation 
+  [openssh-7.2p2-eal3.patch]
+- prevent race consitions triggered by SIGALRM 
+  [openssh-7.2p2-blocksigalrm.patch]
+- do send and accept locale environment variables by default
+  [openssh-7.2p2-send_locale.patch]
+- handle hostnames changes during X forwarding
+  [openssh-7.2p2-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch]
+- try to remove xauth cookies on exit
+  [openssh-7.2p2-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch]
+- properly format pts names for ?tmp? log files
+  [openssh-7.2p2-pts_names_formatting.patch]
+- check locked accounts when using PAM 
+  [openssh-7.2p2-pam_check_locks.patch]
+- chenge default PermitRootLogin to 'yes' to prevent unwanted
+  surprises on updates from older versions.
+  See README.SUSE for details
+  [openssh-7.2p2-allow_root_password_login.patch]
+- Disable DH parameters under 2048 bits by default and allow
+  lowering the limit back to the RFC 4419 specified minimum
+  through an option (bsc#932483, bsc#948902)
+  [openssh-7.2p2-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch]
+- Add getuid() and stat() syscalls to the seccomp filter
+  (bsc#912436)
+  [openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_getuid.patch,
+   openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_stat.patch]
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Fri May 27 23:27:51 UTC 2016 - pcerny@suse.com
+
+- upgrade to 7.2p2
+  upstream package without any SUSE patches
+  Distilled upstream log:
+- OpenSSH 6.7
+  Potentially-incompatible changes:
+  * sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been
+    altered to remove unsafe algorithms. In particular, CBC
+    ciphers and arcfour* are disabled by default.
+    The full set of algorithms remains available if configured
+    explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options.
+  * sshd(8): Support for tcpwrappers/libwrap has been removed.
+  * OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 have a bug that causes ~0.2% of
+    connections using the curve25519-sha256@libssh.org KEX
+    exchange method to fail when connecting with something that
+    implements the specification correctly. OpenSSH 6.7 disables
+    this KEX method when speaking to one of the affected
+    versions.
+  New Features:
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket
+    forwarding. A remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local
+    Unix domain socket and vice versa or both ends may be a Unix
+    domain socket.
+  * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for
+    ED25519 key types.
+  * sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads.
+  * ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey
+    if it is the same as the one sent during initial key exchange
+  * sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind
+    addresses when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose
+    address family
+  * sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control
+    whether ~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc
+    authorized_keys option
+  * ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and
+    ControlPath that expands to a unique identifer based on a
+    hash of the tuple of (local host, remote user, hostname,
+    port). Helps avoid exceeding miserly pathname limits for Unix
+    domain sockets in multiplexing control paths
+  * sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message
+    include the user, source address, port and protocol in a
+    format similar to the authentication success / failure
+    messages
+  Bugfixes:
+  * sshd(8): Fix remote forwarding with the same listen port but
+    different listen address.
+  * ssh(1): Fix inverted test that caused PKCS#11 keys that were
+    explicitly listed in ssh_config or on the commandline not to
+    be preferred.
+  * ssh-keygen(1): Fix bug in KRL generation: multiple
+    consecutive revoked certificate serial number ranges could be
+    serialised to an invalid format. Readers of a broken KRL
+    caused by this bug will fail closed, so no
+    should-have-been-revoked key will be accepted.
+  * ssh(1): Reflect stdio-forward ("ssh -W host:port ...")
+    failures in exit status. Previously we were always returning 0
+  * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Make Ed25519 keys' title fit properly
+    in the randomart border
+  * ssh-agent(1): Only cleanup agent socket in the main agent
+    process and not in any subprocesses it may have started (e.g.
+    forked askpass). Fixes agent sockets being zapped when
+    askpass processes fatal()
+  * ssh-add(1): Make stdout line-buffered; saves partial output
+    getting lost when ssh-add fatal()s part-way through (e.g.
+    when listing keys from an agent that supports key types that
+    ssh-add doesn't)
+  * ssh-keygen(1): When hashing or removing hosts, don't choke on
+    @revoked markers and don't remove @cert-authority markers
+  * ssh(1): Don't fatal when hostname canonicalisation fails and
+    a ProxyCommand is in use; continue and allow the ProxyCommand
+    to connect anyway (e.g. to a host with a name outside the DNS
+    behind a bastion)
+  * scp(1): When copying local->remote fails during read, don't
+    send uninitialised heap to the remote end.
+  * sftp(1): Fix fatal "el_insertstr failed" errors when
+    tab-completing filenames with  a single quote char somewhere
+    in the string
+  * ssh-keyscan(1): Scan for Ed25519 keys by default.
+  * ssh(1): When using VerifyHostKeyDNS with a DNSSEC resolver,
+    down-convert any certificate keys to plain keys and attempt
+    SSHFP resolution.  Prevents a server from skipping SSHFP
+    lookup and forcing a new-hostkey dialog by offering only
+    certificate keys.
+- OpenSSH 6.8
+  Potentially-incompatible changes:
+  * sshd(8): UseDNS now defaults to 'no'. Configurations that
+    match against the client host name (via sshd_config or
+    authorized_keys) may need to re-enable it or convert to
+    matching against addresses.
+  New Features:
+  * Add FingerprintHash option to ssh(1) and sshd(8), and
+    equivalent command-line flags to the other tools to control
+    algorithm used for key fingerprints. The default changes from
+    MD5 to SHA256 and format from hex to base64.
+    Fingerprints now have the hash algorithm prepended. An
+    example of the new format:
+    SHA256:mVPwvezndPv/ARoIadVY98vAC0g+P/5633yTC4d/wXE Please
+    note that visual host keys will also be different.
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): Experimental host key rotation support. Add
+    a protocol extension for a server to inform a client of all
+    its available host keys after authentication has completed.
+    The client may record the keys in known_hosts, allowing it to
+    upgrade to better host key algorithms and a server to
+    gracefully rotate its keys.
+    The client side of this is controlled by a UpdateHostkeys
+    config option (default off).
+  * ssh(1): Add a ssh_config HostbasedKeyType option to control
+    which host public key types are tried during host-based
+    authentication.
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix connection-killing host key mismatch
+    errors when sshd offers multiple ECDSA keys of different
+    lengths.
+  * ssh(1): when host name canonicalisation is enabled, try to
+    parse host names as addresses before looking them up for
+    canonicalisation. fixes bz#2074 and avoiding needless DNS
+    lookups in some cases.
+  * ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): Key Revocation Lists (KRLs) no longer
+    require OpenSSH to be compiled with OpenSSL support.
+  * ssh(1), ssh-keysign(8): Make ed25519 keys work for host based
+    authentication.
+  * sshd(8): SSH protocol v.1 workaround for the Meyer, et al,
+    Bleichenbacher Side Channel Attack. Fake up a bignum key
+    before RSA decryption.
+  * sshd(8): Remember which public keys have been used for
+    authentication and refuse to accept previously-used keys.
+    This allows AuthenticationMethods=publickey,publickey to
+    require that users authenticate using two _different_ public
+    keys.
+  * sshd(8): add sshd_config HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes and
+    PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes options to allow sshd to control what
+    public key types will be accepted. Currently defaults to all.
+  * sshd(8): Don't count partial authentication success as a
+    failure against MaxAuthTries.
+  * ssh(1): Add RevokedHostKeys option for the client to allow
+    text-file or KRL-based revocation of host keys.
+  * ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): Permit KRLs that revoke certificates
+    by serial number or key ID without scoping to a particular
+    CA.
+  * ssh(1): Add a "Match canonical" criteria that allows
+    ssh_config Match blocks to trigger only in the second config
+    pass.
+  * ssh(1): Add a -G option to ssh that causes it to parse its
+    configuration and dump the result to stdout, similar to
+    "sshd -T".
+  * ssh(1): Allow Match criteria to be negated.
+    E.g. "Match !host".
+  * The regression test suite has been extended to cover more
+    OpenSSH features. The unit tests have been expanded and now
+    cover key exchange.
+  Bugfixes:
+  * ssh-keyscan(1): ssh-keyscan has been made much more robust
+    again servers that hang or violate the SSH protocol.
+  * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Fix regression: Key path names were
+    being lost as comment fields.
+  * ssh(1): Allow ssh_config Port options set in the second
+    config parse phase to be applied (they were being ignored).
+  * ssh(1): Tweak config re-parsing with host canonicalisation - make
+    the second pass through the config files always run when host name
+    canonicalisation is enabled (and not whenever the host name
+    changes)
+  * ssh(1): Fix passing of wildcard forward bind addresses when
+    connection multiplexing is in use
+  * ssh-keygen(1): Fix broken private key conversion from
+    non-OpenSSH formats.
+  * ssh-keygen(1): Fix KRL generation bug when multiple CAs are
+    in use.
+  * Various fixes to manual pages
+- OpenSSH 6.9
+  Security:
+  * ssh(1): when forwarding X11 connections with
+    ForwardX11Trusted=no, connections made after
+    ForwardX11Timeout expired could be permitted and no longer
+    subject to XSECURITY restrictions because of an ineffective
+    timeout check in ssh(1) coupled with "fail open" behaviour in
+    the X11 server when clients attempted connections with
+    expired credentials. This problem was reported by Jann Horn.
+  * ssh-agent(1): fix weakness of agent locking (ssh-add -x) to
+    password guessing by implementing an increasing failure
+    delay, storing a salted hash of the password rather than the
+    password itself and using a timing-safe comparison function
+    for verifying unlock attempts. This problem was reported by
+    Ryan Castellucci.
+  New Features:
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): promote chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com to be
+    the default cipher
+  * sshd(8): support admin-specified arguments to
+    AuthorizedKeysCommand
+  * sshd(8): add AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand that allows
+    retrieving authorized principals information from a
+    subprocess rather than a file.
+  * ssh(1), ssh-add(1): support PKCS#11 devices with external PIN
+    entry devices
+  * sshd(8): allow GSSAPI host credential check to be relaxed for
+    multihomed hosts via GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option
+  * ssh-keygen(1): support "ssh-keygen -lF hostname" to search
+    known_hosts and print key hashes rather than full keys.
+  * ssh-agent(1): add -D flag to leave ssh-agent in foreground
+    without enabling debug mode
+  Bugfixes:
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): deprecate legacy
+    SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD message and do not try to use
+    it against some 3rd-party SSH implementations that use it
+    (older PuTTY, WinSCP).
+  * Many fixes for problems caused by compile-time deactivation
+    of SSH1 support (including bz#2369)
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): cap DH-GEX group size at 4Kbits for Cisco
+    implementations as some would fail when attempting to use
+    group sizes >4K
+  * ssh(1): fix out-of-bound read in EscapeChar configuration
+    option parsing
+  * sshd(8): fix application of PermitTunnel, LoginGraceTime,
+    AuthenticationMethods and StreamLocalBindMask options in
+    Match blocks
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): improve disconnection message on TCP reset;
+    bz#2257
+  * ssh(1): remove failed remote forwards established by
+    muliplexing from the list of active forwards
+  * sshd(8): make parsing of authorized_keys "environment="
+    options independent of PermitUserEnv being enabled
+  * sshd(8): fix post-auth crash with permitopen=none
+  * ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1): allow new-format private
+    keys to be encrypted with AEAD ciphers
+  * ssh(1): allow ListenAddress, Port and AddressFamily
+    configuration options to appear in any order
+  * sshd(8): check for and reject missing arguments for
+    VersionAddendum and ForceCommand
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): don't treat unknown certificate extensions
+    as fatal
+  * ssh-keygen(1): make stdout and stderr output consistent
+  * ssh(1): mention missing DISPLAY environment in debug log when
+    X11 forwarding requested
+  * sshd(8): correctly record login when UseLogin is set
+  * sshd(8): Add some missing options to sshd -T output and fix
+    output of VersionAddendum and HostCertificate. bz#2346
+  * Document and improve consistency of options that accept a
+    "none" argument" TrustedUserCAKeys, RevokedKeys (bz#2382),
+    AuthorizedPrincipalsFile (bz#2288)
+  * ssh(1): include remote username in debug output
+  * sshd(8): avoid compatibility problem with some versions of
+    Tera Term, which would crash when they received the hostkeys
+    notification message (hostkeys-00@openssh.com)
+  * sshd(8): mention ssh-keygen -E as useful when comparing
+    legacy MD5 host key fingerprints
+  * ssh(1): clarify pseudo-terminal request behaviour and use
+    make manual language consistent
+  * ssh(1): document that the TERM environment variable is not
+    subject to SendEnv and AcceptEnv
+- OpenSSH 7.0:
+  This focuses primarily on deprecating weak, legacy and/or
+  unsafe cryptography.
+  Security:
+  * sshd(8): OpenSSH 6.8 and 6.9 incorrectly set TTYs to be
+    world- writable. Local attackers may be able to write
+    arbitrary messages to logged-in users, including terminal
+    escape sequences.  Reported by Nikolay Edigaryev.
+  * sshd(8): Portable OpenSSH only: Fixed a privilege separation
+    weakness related to PAM support. Attackers who could
+    successfully compromise the pre-authentication process for
+    remote code execution and who had valid credentials on the
+    host could impersonate other users.  Reported by Moritz
+    Jodeit.
+  * sshd(8): Portable OpenSSH only: Fixed a use-after-free bug
+    related to PAM support that was reachable by attackers who
+    could compromise the pre-authentication process for remote
+    code execution. Also reported by Moritz Jodeit.
+  * sshd(8): fix circumvention of MaxAuthTries using keyboard-
+    interactive authentication. By specifying a long, repeating
+    keyboard-interactive "devices" string, an attacker could
+    request the same authentication method be tried thousands of
+    times in a single pass. The LoginGraceTime timeout in sshd(8)
+    and any authentication failure delays implemented by the
+    authentication mechanism itself were still applied. Found by
+    Kingcope.
+  Potentially-incompatible Changes:
+  * Support for the legacy SSH version 1 protocol is disabled by
+    default at compile time.
+  * Support for the 1024-bit diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key
+    exchange is disabled by default at run-time. It may be
+    re-enabled using the instructions in README.legacy or
+    http://www.openssh.com/legacy.html
+  * Support for ssh-dss, ssh-dss-cert-* host and user keys is
+    disabled by default at run-time. These may be re-enabled
+    using the instructions at http://www.openssh.com/legacy.html
+  * Support for the legacy v00 cert format has been removed.
+  * The default for the sshd_config(5) PermitRootLogin option has
+    changed from "yes" to "prohibit-password".
+  * PermitRootLogin=without-password/prohibit-password now bans
+    all interactive authentication methods, allowing only
+    public-key, hostbased and GSSAPI authentication (previously
+    it permitted keyboard-interactive and password-less
+    authentication if those were enabled).
+  New Features:
+  * ssh_config(5): add PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes option to control
+    which public key types are available for user authentication.
+  * sshd_config(5): add HostKeyAlgorithms option to control which
+    public key types are offered for host authentications.
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): extend Ciphers, MACs, KexAlgorithms,
+    HostKeyAlgorithms, PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and
+    HostbasedKeyTypes options to allow appending to the default
+    set of algorithms instead of replacing it. Options may now be
+    prefixed with a '+' to append to the default, e.g.
+    "HostKeyAlgorithms=+ssh-dss".
+  * sshd_config(5): PermitRootLogin now accepts an argument of
+    'prohibit-password' as a less-ambiguous synonym of 'without-
+    password'.
+  Bugfixes:
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): add compatability workarounds for Cisco and
+    more PuTTY versions.
+  * Fix some omissions and errors in the PROTOCOL and
+    PROTOCOL.mux documentation relating to Unix domain socket
+    forwarding
+  * ssh(1): Improve the ssh(1) manual page to include a better
+    description of Unix domain socket forwarding
+  * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): skip uninitialised PKCS#11 slots,
+    fixing failures to load keys when they are present.
+  * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): do not ignore PKCS#11 hosted keys that
+    wth empty CKA_ID
+  * sshd(8): clarify documentation for UseDNS option
+- OpenSSH 7.1:
+  Security:
+  * sshd(8): OpenSSH 7.0 contained a logic error in
+    PermitRootLogin= prohibit-password/without-password that
+    could, depending on compile-time configuration, permit
+    password authentication to root while preventing other forms
+    of authentication. This problem was reported by Mantas
+    Mikulenas.
+  Bugfixes:
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): add compatability workarounds for FuTTY
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): refine compatability workarounds for WinSCP
+  * Fix a number of memory faults (double-free, free of
+    uninitialised memory, etc) in ssh(1) and ssh-keygen(1).
+    Reported by Mateusz Kocielski.
+- OpenSSH 7.1p2:
+  * SECURITY: ssh(1): The OpenSSH client code between 5.4 and 7.1
+    contains experimential support for resuming SSH-connections
+    (roaming).
+    The matching server code has never been shipped, but the
+    client code was enabled by default and could be tricked by a
+    malicious server into leaking client memory to the server,
+    including private client user keys.
+    The authentication of the server host key prevents
+    exploitation by a man-in-the-middle, so this information leak
+    is restricted to connections to malicious or compromised
+    servers.
+    MITIGATION: For OpenSSH >= 5.4 the vulnerable code in the
+    client can be completely disabled by adding 'UseRoaming no'
+    to the gobal ssh_config(5) file, or to user configuration in
+    ~/.ssh/config, or by passing -oUseRoaming=no on the command
+    line.
+    PATCH: See below for a patch to disable this feature
+    (Disabling Roaming in the Source Code).
+    This problem was reported by the Qualys Security Advisory
+    team.
+  * SECURITY: Eliminate the fallback from untrusted
+    X11-forwarding to trusted forwarding for cases when the X
+    server disables the SECURITY extension. Reported by Thomas
+    Hoger.
+  * SECURITY: Fix an out of-bound read access in the packet
+    handling code. Reported by Ben Hawkes.
+  * PROTOCOL: Correctly interpret the 'first_kex_follows' option
+    during the intial key exchange. Reported by Matt Johnston.
+  * Further use of explicit_bzero has been added in various
+    buffer handling code paths to guard against compilers
+    aggressively doing dead-store removal.
+  Potentially-incompatible changes:
+  * This release disables a number of legacy cryptographic
+    algorithms by default in ssh:
+    + Several ciphers blowfish-cbc, cast128-cbc, all arcfour
+      variants and the rijndael-cbc aliases for AES.
+    + MD5-based and truncated HMAC algorithms.
+- OpenSSH 7.2:
+  Security:
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): remove unfinished and unused roaming code
+    (was already forcibly disabled in OpenSSH 7.1p2).
+  * ssh(1): eliminate fallback from untrusted X11 forwarding to
+    trusted forwarding when the X server disables the SECURITY
+    extension.
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): increase the minimum modulus size supported
+    for diffie-hellman-group-exchange to 2048 bits.
+  * sshd(8): pre-auth sandboxing is now enabled by default
+    (previous releases enabled it for new installations via
+    sshd_config).
+  New Features:
+  * all: add support for RSA signatures using SHA-256/512 hash
+    algorithms based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and
+    draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt.
+  * ssh(1): Add an AddKeysToAgent client option which can be set
+    to 'yes', 'no', 'ask', or 'confirm', and defaults to 'no'.
+    When enabled, a private key that is used during
+    authentication will be added to ssh-agent if it is running
+    (with confirmation enabled if set to 'confirm').
+  * sshd(8): add a new authorized_keys option "restrict" that
+    includes all current and future key restrictions
+    (no-*-forwarding, etc.).  Also add permissive versions of the
+    existing restrictions, e.g.  "no-pty" -> "pty". This
+    simplifies the task of setting up restricted keys and ensures
+    they are maximally-restricted, regardless of any permissions
+    we might implement in the future.
+  * ssh(1): add ssh_config CertificateFile option to explicitly
+    list certificates. bz#2436
+  * ssh-keygen(1): allow ssh-keygen to change the key comment for
+    all supported formats.
+  * ssh-keygen(1): allow fingerprinting from standard input, e.g.
+    "ssh-keygen -lf -"
+  * ssh-keygen(1): allow fingerprinting multiple public keys in a
+    file, e.g. "ssh-keygen -lf ~/.ssh/authorized_keys" bz#1319
+  * sshd(8): support "none" as an argument for sshd_config
+    Foreground and ChrootDirectory. Useful inside Match blocks to
+    override a global default. bz#2486
+  * ssh-keygen(1): support multiple certificates (one per line)
+    and reading from standard input (using "-f -") for
+    "ssh-keygen -L"
+  * ssh-keyscan(1): add "ssh-keyscan -c ..." flag to allow
+    fetching certificates instead of plain keys.
+  * ssh(1): better handle anchored FQDNs (e.g. 'cvs.openbsd.org')
+    in hostname canonicalisation - treat them as already
+    canonical and remove the trailing '.' before matching
+    ssh_config.
+  Bugfixes:
+  * sftp(1): existing destination directories should not
+    terminate recursive uploads (regression in openssh 6.8)
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): correctly send back SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
+    replies to unexpected messages during key exchange.
+  * ssh(1): refuse attempts to set ConnectionAttempts=0, which
+    does not make sense and would cause ssh to print an
+    uninitialised stack variable.
+  * ssh(1): fix errors when attempting to connect to scoped IPv6
+    addresses with hostname canonicalisation enabled.
+  * sshd_config(5): list a couple more options usable in Match
+    blocks.
+  * sshd(8): fix "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +..." inside a Match
+    block.
+  * ssh(1): expand tilde characters in filenames passed to -i
+    options before checking whether or not the identity file
+    exists. Avoids confusion for cases where shell doesn't expand
+    (e.g. "-i ~/file" vs. "-i~/file").
+  * ssh(1): do not prepend "exec" to the shell command run by
+    "Match exec" in a config file, which could cause some
+    commands to fail in certain environments.
+  * ssh-keyscan(1): fix output for multiple hosts/addrs on one
+    line when host hashing or a non standard port is in use
+  * sshd(8): skip "Could not chdir to home directory" message
+    when ChrootDirectory is active.
+  * ssh(1): include PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes in ssh -G config dump.
+  * sshd(8): avoid changing TunnelForwarding device flags if they
+    are already what is needed; makes it possible to use tun/tap
+    networking as non-root user if device permissions and
+    interface flags are pre-established
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): RekeyLimits could be exceeded by one packet.
+  * ssh(1): fix multiplexing master failure to notice client
+    exit.
+  * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): avoid fatal() for PKCS11 tokens that
+    present empty key IDs.
+  * sshd(8): avoid printf of NULL argument.
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): allow RekeyLimits larger than 4GB.
+  * ssh-keygen(1): sshd(8): fix several bugs in (unused) KRL
+    signature support.
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix connections with peers that use the key
+    exchange guess feature of the protocol.
+  * sshd(8): include remote port number in log messages.
+  * ssh(1): don't try to load SSHv1 private key when compiled
+    without SSHv1 support.
+  * ssh-agent(1), ssh(1): fix incorrect error messages during key
+    loading and signing errors.
+  * ssh-keygen(1): don't leave empty temporary files when
+    performing known_hosts file edits when known_hosts doesn't
+    exist.
+  * sshd(8): correct packet format for tcpip-forward replies for
+    requests that don't allocate a port
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix possible hang on closed output.
+  * ssh(1): expand %i in ControlPath to UID.
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix return type of openssh_RSA_verify.
+  * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix some option parsing memory leaks.
+  * ssh(1): add a some debug output before DNS resolution; it's a
+    place where ssh could previously silently stall in cases of
+    unresponsive DNS servers.
+  * ssh(1): remove spurious newline in visual hostkey.
+  * ssh(1): fix printing (ssh -G ...) of HostKeyAlgorithms=+...
+  * ssh(1): fix expansion of HostkeyAlgorithms=+...
+  Documentation:
+  * ssh_config(5), sshd_config(5): update default algorithm lists
+    to match current reality.
+  * ssh(1): mention -Q key-plain and -Q key-cert query options.
+  * sshd_config(8): more clearly describe what
+    AuthorizedKeysFile=none does.
+  * ssh_config(5): better document ExitOnForwardFailure.
+  * sshd(5): mention internal DH-GEX fallback groups in manual.
+  * sshd_config(5): better description for MaxSessions option.
+  Portability:
+  * sshd(8): fix multiple authentication using S/Key.
+- OpenSSH 7.2p2:
+  Security:
+  * sshd(8): sanitise X11 authentication credentials to avoid
+    xauth command injection when X11Forwarding is enabled.
+  (removing patches from previous version:
+  * CVE-2016-0777_CVE-2016-0778.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-X11-forwarding.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-audit1-remove_duplicit_audit.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-audit2-better_audit_of_user_actions.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-audit3-key_auth_usage-fips.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-audit3-key_auth_usage.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-audit4-kex_results-fips.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-audit4-kex_results.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-audit5-session_key_destruction.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-audit6-server_key_destruction.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-audit7-libaudit_compat.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-audit8-libaudit_dns_timeouts.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-blocksigalrm.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-curve25519-6.6.1p1.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-default-protocol.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-disable-openssl-abi-check.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-eal3.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-fingerprint_hash.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-fips-checks.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-fips.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-gssapimitm.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-host_ident.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-key-converter.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-lastlog.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-ldap.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-login_options.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-pam-check-locks.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-pam-fix2.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-pam-fix3.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-pts.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-saveargv-fix.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-seccomp_getuid.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-seccomp_stat.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-seed-prng.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-send_locale.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-sftp_force_permissions.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-sftp_homechroot.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-xauth.patch
+  * openssh-6.6p1-xauthlocalhostname.patch)
+
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Fri Apr 29 15:56:38 UTC 2016 - pcerny@suse.com
 

openssh.keyring

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openssh.spec

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #
 # spec file for package openssh
 #
-# Copyright (c) 2016 SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
+# Copyright (c) 2016 SUSE LINUX GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
 #
 # All modifications and additions to the file contributed by third parties
 # remain the property of their copyright owners, unless otherwise agreed
@@ -86,25 +86,20 @@ BuildRequires:  pam-devel
 %if %{uses_systemd}
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(systemd)
 %{?systemd_requires}
-%else
-PreReq:         %{insserv_prereq} 
 %endif
-PreReq:         pwdutils %{fillup_prereq} coreutils
+BuildRequires:  tcpd-devel
-Conflicts:      nonfreessh
+PreReq:         pwdutils %{insserv_prereq} %{fillup_prereq} coreutils
-Recommends:     xauth
+Version:        7.2p2
-Recommends:     %{name}-helpers
-Version:        6.6p1
 Release:        0
 Summary:        Secure Shell Client and Server (Remote Login Program)
-License:        BSD-3-Clause and MIT
+License:        BSD-2-Clause and MIT
 Group:          Productivity/Networking/SSH
 Url:            http://www.openssh.com/
-Source:         ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
+Source:         http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
-Source42:       ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
+Source42:       http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
-Source43:       openssh.keyring
 Source1:        sshd.init
 Source2:        sshd.pamd
-Source3:        README.SuSE
+Source3:        README.SUSE
 Source4:        README.kerberos
 Source5:        ssh.reg
 Source6:        ssh-askpass
@@ -112,49 +107,32 @@ Source7:        sshd.fw
 Source8:        sysconfig.ssh
 Source9:        sshd-gen-keys-start
 Source10:       sshd.service
-Patch0:         openssh-6.6p1-curve25519-6.6.1p1.patch
+Source11:       README.FIPS
-Patch1:         openssh-6.6p1-key-converter.patch
+Source12:       cavs_driver-ssh.pl
-Patch2:         openssh-6.6p1-X11-forwarding.patch
+Patch00:        openssh-7.2p2-allow_root_password_login.patch
-Patch3:         openssh-6.6p1-lastlog.patch
+Patch01:        openssh-7.2p2-allow_DSS_by_default.patch
-Patch4:         openssh-6.6p1-pam-fix2.patch
+Patch02:        openssh-7.2p2-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
-Patch5:         openssh-6.6p1-saveargv-fix.patch
+Patch03:        openssh-7.2p2-lastlog.patch
-Patch6:         openssh-6.6p1-pam-fix3.patch
+Patch04:        openssh-7.2p2-enable_PAM_by_default.patch
-Patch7:         openssh-6.6p1-gssapimitm.patch
+Patch05:        openssh-7.2p2-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM.patch
-Patch8:         openssh-6.6p1-eal3.patch
+Patch06:        openssh-7.2p2-eal3.patch
-Patch9:         openssh-6.6p1-blocksigalrm.patch
+Patch07:        openssh-7.2p2-blocksigalrm.patch
-Patch10:        openssh-6.6p1-send_locale.patch
+Patch08:        openssh-7.2p2-send_locale.patch
-Patch11:        openssh-6.6p1-xauthlocalhostname.patch
+Patch09:        openssh-7.2p2-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
-Patch12:        openssh-6.6p1-xauth.patch
+Patch10:        openssh-7.2p2-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch
-Patch13:        openssh-6.6p1-default-protocol.patch
+Patch11:        openssh-7.2p2-pts_names_formatting.patch
-Patch14:        openssh-6.6p1-pts.patch
+Patch12:        openssh-7.2p2-pam_check_locks.patch
-Patch15:        openssh-6.6p1-pam-check-locks.patch
+Patch13:        openssh-7.2p2-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch
-Patch16:        openssh-6.6p1-fingerprint_hash.patch
+Patch14:        openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_getuid.patch
-Patch17:        openssh-6.6p1-fips.patch
+Patch15:        openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_stat.patch
-Patch18:        openssh-6.6p1-audit1-remove_duplicit_audit.patch
-Patch19:        openssh-6.6p1-audit2-better_audit_of_user_actions.patch
-Patch20:        openssh-6.6p1-audit3-key_auth_usage.patch
-Patch21:        openssh-6.6p1-audit3-key_auth_usage-fips.patch
-Patch22:        openssh-6.6p1-audit4-kex_results.patch
-Patch23:        openssh-6.6p1-audit4-kex_results-fips.patch
-Patch24:        openssh-6.6p1-audit5-session_key_destruction.patch
-Patch25:        openssh-6.6p1-audit6-server_key_destruction.patch
-Patch26:        openssh-6.6p1-audit7-libaudit_compat.patch
-Patch27:        openssh-6.6p1-audit8-libaudit_dns_timeouts.patch
-Patch28:        openssh-6.6p1-seed-prng.patch
-Patch29:        openssh-6.6p1-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
-Patch30:        openssh-6.6p1-login_options.patch
-Patch31:        openssh-6.6p1-disable-openssl-abi-check.patch
-Patch32:        openssh-6.6p1-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
-Patch33:        openssh-6.6p1-host_ident.patch
-Patch34:        openssh-6.6p1-sftp_homechroot.patch
-Patch35:        openssh-6.6p1-sftp_force_permissions.patch
-Patch36:        openssh-6.6p1-seccomp_getuid.patch
-Patch37:        openssh-6.6p1-seccomp_stat.patch
-Patch38:        openssh-6.6p1-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
-Patch39:        openssh-6.6p1-fips-checks.patch
-Patch40:        openssh-6.6p1-ldap.patch
-Patch41:        CVE-2016-0777_CVE-2016-0778.patch
 BuildRoot:      %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
+Conflicts:      nonfreessh
+Recommends:     audit
+Recommends:     xauth
+Recommends:     %{name}-helpers = %{version}-%{release}
+Conflicts:      %{name}-fips < %{version}-%{release} , %{name}-fips > %{version}-%{release}
+%define CHECKSUM_SUFFIX .hmac
+%define CHECKSUM_HMAC_KEY "HMAC_KEY:OpenSSH-FIPS@SLE"
 
 %description
 SSH (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into and executing commands
@@ -169,76 +147,59 @@ also be forwarded over the secure channel.
 %package helpers
 Summary:        OpenSSH AuthorizedKeysCommand helpers
 Group:          Productivity/Networking/SSH
-Requires:       openssh
+Requires:       %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
 
 %description helpers
 Helper applications for OpenSSH which retrieve keys from various sources.
 
 
 %package fips
-Summary:        OpenSSH FIPS cryptomodule hashes
+Summary:        OpenSSH FIPS cryptomodule HMACs
 Group:          Productivity/Networking/SSH
-Requires:       openssh
+Requires:       %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
+Conflicts:      %{name} < %{version}-%{release} , %{name} > %{version}-%{release}
+Obsoletes:      %{name}-hmac
 
 %description fips
 Hashes that together with the main package form the FIPS certifiable
 cryptomodule.
 
 
+%package cavs
+Summary:        OpenSSH FIPS cryptomodule CAVS tests
+Group:          Productivity/Networking/SSH
+Requires:       %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
+
+%description cavs
+FIPS140 CAVS tests related parts of the OpenSSH package
+
+
 %prep
 %setup -q
-%patch0 -p2
+%patch00 -p2
-#patch1 -p2
+%patch01 -p2
-%patch2 -p2
+%patch02 -p2
-%patch3 -p2
+%patch03 -p2
-%patch4 -p2
+%patch04 -p2
-%patch5 -p2
+%patch05 -p2
-%patch6 -p2
+%patch06 -p2
-%patch7 -p2
+%patch07 -p2
-%patch8 -p2
+%patch08 -p2
-%patch9 -p2
+%patch09 -p2
 %patch10 -p2
 %patch11 -p2
 %patch12 -p2
 %patch13 -p2
 %patch14 -p2
 %patch15 -p2
-%patch16 -p2
+cp %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE4} %{SOURCE11} .
-%patch17 -p2
-%patch18 -p2
-%patch19 -p2
-%patch20 -p2
-%patch21 -p2
-%patch22 -p2
-%patch23 -p2
-%patch24 -p2
-%patch25 -p2
-%patch26 -p2
-%if 0%{?suse_version} > 1310
-%patch27 -p2
-%endif
-%patch28 -p2
-%patch29 -p2
-%patch30 -p2
-%patch31 -p2
-%patch32 -p2
-%patch33 -p2
-%patch34 -p2
-%patch35 -p2
-%patch36 -p2
-%patch37 -p2
-%patch38 -p2
-%patch39 -p2
-%patch40 -p2
-%patch41 -p0
-cp %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE4} .
 
 %build
-# set libexec dir in the LDAP patch
+#### set libexec dir in the LDAP patch
-sed -i.libexec 's,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir}/ssh,' \
+###sed -i.libexec 's,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir}/ssh,' \
-    $( grep -Rl @LIBEXECDIR@ \
+###    $( grep -Rl @LIBEXECDIR@ \
-        $( grep "^+++" %{PATCH40} | sed -r 's@^.+/([^/\t ]+).*$@\1@' )
+###        $( grep "^+++" %{PATCH40} | sed -r 's@^.+/([^/\t ]+).*$@\1@' )
-    )
+###    )
 
 autoreconf -fiv
 %ifarch s390 s390x %sparc
@@ -247,22 +208,17 @@ PIEFLAGS="-fPIE"
 PIEFLAGS="-fpie"
 %endif
 CFLAGS="%{optflags} $PIEFLAGS -fstack-protector"
-#%if 0%{?suse_version} < 1230
-#CFLAGS="-lrt $CFLAGS"
-#%endif
 CXXFLAGS="%{optflags} $PIEFLAGS -fstack-protector"
 LDFLAGS="-pie -Wl,--as-needed"
-#%if 0%{?suse_version} < 1230
-#LDFLAGS="-lrt $LDFLAGS"
-#%endif
 #CPPFLAGS="%{optflags} -DUSE_INTERNAL_B64"
 export LDFLAGS CFLAGS CXXFLAGS CPPFLAGS
-./configure \
+%configure \
     --prefix=%{_prefix} \
     --mandir=%{_mandir} \
     --infodir=%{_infodir} \
     --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
     --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/ssh \
+    --with-tcp-wrappers \
 %if %{has_libselinux}
     --with-selinux \
 %endif
@@ -288,6 +244,7 @@ export LDFLAGS CFLAGS CXXFLAGS CPPFLAGS
 %if %{needs_libedit}
     --with-libedit \
 %endif
+    --with-ssh1 \
     --target=%{_target_cpu}-suse-linux \
 
 ### configure end
@@ -330,6 +287,7 @@ install -m 644 %{SOURCE7} %{buildroot}%{_fwdefdir}/sshd
 
 # askpass wrapper
 sed -e "s,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir},g" < %{SOURCE6} > %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass
+sed -e "s,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir},g" < %{SOURCE12} > %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/ssh/cavs_driver-ssh.pl
 rm -f %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/Ssh.bin
 # sshd keys generator wrapper
 install -D -m 0755 %{SOURCE9} %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/sshd-gen-keys-start
@@ -342,13 +300,12 @@ install -D -m 0755 %{SOURCE9} %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/sshd-gen-keys-start
 # this shows up earlier because otherwise the %expand of
 # the macro is too late.
 %{expand:%%global __os_install_post {%__os_install_post
-
 for b in \
         %{_bindir}/ssh \
         %{_sbindir}/sshd \
         %{_libexecdir}/ssh/sftp-server \
         ; do
-    ( printf "\03"; openssl dgst -sha256 -binary < %{buildroot}$b ) > %{buildroot}$b.chk
+    openssl dgst -sha256 -binary -hmac %{CHECKSUM_HMAC_KEY} < %{buildroot}$b > %{buildroot}$b%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}
 done
 
 }}
@@ -376,6 +333,10 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || %{_sbindir}/useradd -r -g sshd -d /var/lib/sshd
 %endif
 
 %postun
+# The openssh-fips trigger script for openssh will normally restart sshd once
+# it gets installed, so only restart the service here is openssh-fips is not
+# present
+rpm -q openssh-fips >& /dev/null && DISABLE_RESTART_ON_UPDATE=yes
 %if %{uses_systemd}
 %service_del_postun sshd.service
 %else
@@ -383,13 +344,17 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || %{_sbindir}/useradd -r -g sshd -d /var/lib/sshd
 %{insserv_cleanup}
 %endif
 
+%triggerin -n openssh-fips -- %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
+%restart_on_update sshd
+
 %files
 %defattr(-,root,root)
-%exclude %{_bindir}/*.chk
+%exclude %{_bindir}/ssh%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}
-%exclude %{_sbindir}/*.chk
+%exclude %{_sbindir}/sshd%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}
-%exclude %{_libexecdir}/ssh/sftp-server.chk
+%exclude %{_libexecdir}/ssh/sftp-server%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}
+%exclude %{_libexecdir}/ssh/cavs*
 %dir %attr(755,root,root) /var/lib/sshd
-%doc README.SuSE README.kerberos ChangeLog OVERVIEW README TODO LICENCE CREDITS
+%doc README.SUSE README.kerberos README.FIPS ChangeLog OVERVIEW README TODO LICENCE CREDITS
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
 %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli
 %verify(not mode) %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config
@@ -405,7 +370,7 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || %{_sbindir}/useradd -r -g sshd -d /var/lib/sshd
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/ssh
-%exclude %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap*
+###%exclude %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/*
 %attr(0444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/*
 %attr(0444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/*
@@ -424,15 +389,19 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || %{_sbindir}/useradd -r -g sshd -d /var/lib/sshd
 %files helpers
 %defattr(-,root,root)
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
-%verify(not mode) %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ldap.conf
+###%verify(not mode) %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ldap.conf
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/ssh
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap*
+###%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap*
-%doc HOWTO.ldap-keys openssh-lpk-openldap.schema openssh-lpk-sun.schema
+###%doc HOWTO.ldap-keys openssh-lpk-openldap.schema openssh-lpk-sun.schema
 
 %files fips
 %defattr(-,root,root)
-%attr(0444,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh.chk
+%attr(0444,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}
-%attr(0444,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd.chk
+%attr(0444,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}
-%attr(0444,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/sftp-server.chk
+%attr(0444,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/sftp-server%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX}
+
+%files cavs
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/cavs*
 
 %changelog

ssh-askpass

@@ -24,13 +24,6 @@ if [ -z "$SESSION" ] ; then
   fi
 fi
 
-if [ -n "$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" ] ; then
-  # Ensure that ssh can use the ssh support of the gpg-agent 
-  case "$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" in
-  */S.gpg-agent.ssh) gpg-connect-agent /bye < /dev/null ;;
-  esac
-fi
-
 GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS="@LIBEXECDIR@/ssh/gnome-ssh-askpass"
 KDE_SSH_ASKPASS="@LIBEXECDIR@/ssh/ksshaskpass"
 X11_SSH_ASKPASS="@LIBEXECDIR@/ssh/x11-ssh-askpass"

sshd.init

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 #! /bin/sh
-# Copyright (c) 1995-2013 SuSE GmbH Nuernberg, Germany.
+# Copyright (c) 1995-2013 SUSE
 #
 # Author: Jiri Smid <feedback@suse.de>
 #
@@ -39,12 +39,12 @@ SSHD_PIDFILE=/var/run/sshd.init.pid
 #      rc_reset         clear local rc status (overall remains)
 #      rc_exit          exit appropriate to overall rc status
 
-soft_stop() {
+function soft_stop () {
     echo -n "Shutting down the listening SSH daemon"
     killproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE -TERM $SSHD_BIN
 }
 
-force_stop() {
+function force_stop () {
     echo -n "Shutting down SSH daemon *with all active connections*"
     trap '' TERM
     killall sshd 2>/dev/null