diff --git a/0001-upstream-correctly-restore-sigprocmask-around-ppoll.patch b/0001-upstream-correctly-restore-sigprocmask-around-ppoll.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..25a13fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0001-upstream-correctly-restore-sigprocmask-around-ppoll.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From 66aaa678dbe59aa21d0d9d89a3596ecedde0254b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2024 02:14:10 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: correctly restore sigprocmask around ppoll()
+ reported
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+by Tõivo Leedjärv; ok deraadt@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c0c0f89de5294a166578f071eade2501929c4686
+---
+ clientloop.c | 4 ++--
+ serverloop.c | 4 ++--
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+index be8bb5fc1f2..8ea2ada4216 100644
+--- a/clientloop.c
++++ b/clientloop.c
+#@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+#-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.404 2024/04/30 02:10:49 djm Exp $ */
+#+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.405 2024/04/30 02:14:10 djm Exp $ */
+# /*
+#  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+#  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+@@ -1585,7 +1585,7 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
+ 		client_wait_until_can_do_something(ssh, &pfd, &npfd_alloc,
+ 		    &npfd_active, channel_did_enqueue, &osigset,
+ 		    &conn_in_ready, &conn_out_ready);
+-		if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &bsigset, &osigset) == -1)
++		if (sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &osigset, NULL) == -1)
+ 			error_f("osigset sigprocmask: %s", strerror(errno));
+ 
+ 		if (quit_pending)
+diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
+index f3683c2e4a6..94c8943a616 100644
+--- a/serverloop.c
++++ b/serverloop.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.237 2023/08/21 04:59:54 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.238 2024/04/30 02:14:10 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ server_loop2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		wait_until_can_do_something(ssh, connection_in, connection_out,
+ 		    &pfd, &npfd_alloc, &npfd_active, &osigset,
+ 		    &conn_in_ready, &conn_out_ready);
+-		if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &bsigset, &osigset) == -1)
++		if (sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &osigset, NULL) == -1)
+ 			error_f("osigset sigprocmask: %s", strerror(errno));
+ 
+ 		if (received_sigterm) {
diff --git a/0001-upstream-fix-proxy-multiplexing-mode_-broken-when-keystroke.patch b/0001-upstream-fix-proxy-multiplexing-mode_-broken-when-keystroke.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..feffd9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0001-upstream-fix-proxy-multiplexing-mode_-broken-when-keystroke.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 9844aa2521ccfb1a2d73745680327b79e0574445 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2024 05:57:34 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: fix proxy multiplexing mode, broken when keystroke
+ timing
+
+obfuscation was added. GHPR#463 from montag451
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4e412d59b3f557d431f1d81c715a3bc0491cc677
+---
+ clientloop.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+index eb4902905fb..8ec36af94b3 100644
+--- a/clientloop.c
++++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.402 2023/11/24 00:31:30 dtucker Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.403 2024/02/21 05:57:34 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ send_chaff(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_HAS_PING) == 0)
++	if (ssh->kex == NULL || (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_HAS_PING) == 0)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	/* XXX probabilistically send chaff? */
+ 	/*
diff --git a/0001-upstream-when-sending-ObscureKeystrokeTiming-chaff-packets_.patch b/0001-upstream-when-sending-ObscureKeystrokeTiming-chaff-packets_.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6229cba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0001-upstream-when-sending-ObscureKeystrokeTiming-chaff-packets_.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 146c420d29d055cc75c8606327a1cf8439fe3a08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2024 04:31:17 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: when sending ObscureKeystrokeTiming chaff packets,
+ we
+
+can't rely on channel_did_enqueue to tell that there is data to send. This
+flag indicates that the channels code enqueued a packet on _this_ ppoll()
+iteration, not that data was enqueued in _any_ ppoll() iteration in the
+timeslice. ok markus@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 009b74fd2769b36b5284a0188ade182f00564136
+---
+ clientloop.c | 7 ++++---
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+index 0b6f3c9be02..8ed8b1c3449 100644
+--- a/clientloop.c
++++ b/clientloop.c
+#@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+#-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.407 2024/05/17 06:42:04 jsg Exp $ */
+#+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.408 2024/07/01 04:31:17 djm Exp $ */
+# /*
+#  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+#  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+@@ -607,8 +607,9 @@ obfuscate_keystroke_timing(struct ssh *ssh, struct timespec *timeout,
+ 		if (timespeccmp(&now, &chaff_until, >=)) {
+ 			/* Stop if there have been no keystrokes for a while */
+ 			stop_reason = "chaff time expired";
+-		} else if (timespeccmp(&now, &next_interval, >=)) {
+-			/* Otherwise if we were due to send, then send chaff */
++		} else if (timespeccmp(&now, &next_interval, >=) &&
++		    !ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) {
++			/* If due to send but have no data, then send chaff */
+ 			if (send_chaff(ssh))
+ 				nchaff++;
+ 		}
diff --git a/fix-CVE-2024-6387.patch b/fix-CVE-2024-6387.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba9d506
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fix-CVE-2024-6387.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/log.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/log.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/log.c
+@@ -451,12 +451,14 @@ void
+ sshsigdie(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc,
+     LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...)
+ {
++#if 0
+ 	va_list args;
+ 
+ 	va_start(args, fmt);
+ 	sshlogv(file, func, line, showfunc, SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ 	    suffix, fmt, args);
+ 	va_end(args);
++#endif
+ 	_exit(1);
+ }
+ 
diff --git a/fix-memleak-in-process_server_config_line_depth.patch b/fix-memleak-in-process_server_config_line_depth.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 330be2e..0000000
--- a/fix-memleak-in-process_server_config_line_depth.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From fcc66557503124ab98491a598b706a24eb3cf0e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Antonio Larrosa <alarrosa@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2024 11:32:42 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix a small memory leak in process_server_config_line_depth
-
-The return value of argv_assemble is owned by the caller and should be
-free'd. When processing the sSubsystem case there are two calls to
-argv_assemble but only one of them is freed. This patch fixes the small
-(29 bytes according to valgrind) memory leak.
-
-The output from valgrind:
-==115369== 29 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 573 of 913
-==115369==    at 0x4845794: malloc (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
-==115369==    by 0x124A22: argv_assemble (misc.c:2165)
-==115369==    by 0x1385E5: process_server_config_line_depth.constprop.0 (servconf.c:2004)
-==115369==    by 0x13984D: parse_server_config_depth.constprop.0 (servconf.c:3032)
-==115369==    by 0x139986: parse_server_config.constprop.0 (servconf.c:3049)
-==115369==    by 0x111C6E: main (sshd.c:1445)
-
-Submitted to upstream at https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/515
----
- servconf.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index 5a20d6f8..0b989b95 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -2006,6 +2006,7 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- 		xasprintf(&options->subsystem_args[options->num_subsystems],
- 		    "%s%s%s", arg, *arg2 == '\0' ? "" : " ", arg2);
- 		free(arg2);
-+		free(arg);
- 		argv_consume(&ac);
- 		options->num_subsystems++;
- 		break;
--- 
-2.45.2
-
diff --git a/fix-missing-lz.patch b/fix-missing-lz.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc82afa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fix-missing-lz.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+Index: openssh-9.3p1/Makefile.in
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.3p1.orig/Makefile.in
++++ openssh-9.3p1/Makefile.in
+@@ -250,17 +250,17 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) l
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ 
+ sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS)
+-	$(LD) -o $@ $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS) ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2)
++	$(LD) -o $@ $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS) ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) -lz
+ 
+ sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SFTP_OBJS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SFTP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
+ 
+ # FIPS tests
+ cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o cavstest-ctr.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-ctr.o ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2)
++	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-ctr.o ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) -lz
+ 
+ cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o cavstest-kdf.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-kdf.o ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2)
++	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-kdf.o ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) -lz
+ 
+ # test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
+ logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
diff --git a/logind_set_tty.patch b/logind_set_tty.patch
index 4e744f9..5d3e37c 100644
--- a/logind_set_tty.patch
+++ b/logind_set_tty.patch
@@ -14,11 +14,11 @@ index f0ea07e7b..35dcf45f1 100644
  	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
  
  sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a	$(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
--	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) $(LIBWTMPDB)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) $(LIBWTMPDB) $(LIBSYSTEMD)
+-	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) $(LIBWTMPDB)
++	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) $(LIBWTMPDB) $(LIBSYSTEMD)
  
- sshd-session$(EXEEXT): libssh.a	$(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHD_SESSION_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHD_SESSION_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) $(LIBWTMPDB)
+ scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SCP_OBJS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SCP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
 diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
 index a12c6f7ad..860df3379 100644
 --- a/configure.ac
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ index 86caf83b2..8b413190b 100644
  #ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN
  	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN &&
  	    !sys_auth_record_login(li->username,li->hostname,li->line,
-@@ -1476,6 +1486,91 @@ wtmpdb_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+@@ -1476,6 +1486,88 @@ wtmpdb_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
  }
  #endif
  
@@ -171,12 +171,9 @@ index 86caf83b2..8b413190b 100644
 +
 +  free(dbus_path);
 +
-+  if (sd_bus_flush(bus) < 0) {
-+    sd_bus_unref(bus);
++  if (sd_bus_flush(bus) < 0)
 +    return (0);
-+  }
 +
-+  sd_bus_unref(bus);
 +  return (1);
 +}
 +
diff --git a/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch b/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
index af7730b..42e43d1 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
@@ -104,10 +104,10 @@ Index: openssh-9.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
  #endif
  
  #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-Index: openssh-9.6p1/sshd-session.c
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/sshd.c
 ===================================================================
---- openssh-9.6p1.orig/sshd-session.c
-+++ openssh-9.6p1/sshd-session.c
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/sshd.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/sshd.c
 @@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(struct ssh *ssh)
  	demote_sensitive_data(ssh);
  
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch b/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
index 1301374..f61bb4c 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
@@ -37,14 +37,14 @@ Index: openssh-9.3p2/Makefile.in
 ===================================================================
 --- openssh-9.3p2.orig/Makefile.in
 +++ openssh-9.3p2/Makefile.in
-@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
  ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
  SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
  SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
 +SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
- SSHD_SESSION=$(libexecdir)/sshd-session
  SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
  SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
+ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
 @@ -57,6 +58,7 @@ CHANNELLIBS=@CHANNELLIBS@
  K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
  GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
@@ -53,12 +53,12 @@ Index: openssh-9.3p2/Makefile.in
  LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
  LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@
  LIBWTMPDB=@LIBWTMPDB@
-@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+@@ -75,7 +77,7 @@ MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
  
  .SUFFIXES: .lo
  
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
  
  TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT)
  
@@ -99,9 +99,9 @@ Index: openssh-9.3p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
 ===================================================================
 --- openssh-9.3p2.orig/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
 +++ openssh-9.3p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-@@ -54,6 +54,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
- extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+@@ -53,6 +53,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
  extern int inetd_flag;
+ extern int rexeced_flag;
  
 +/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
 +int
@@ -129,14 +129,14 @@ Index: openssh-9.3p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
  {
  	const char *reqlvl;
  	char *role;
-@@ -319,16 +333,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+@@ -329,16 +343,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
  
  	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
  
 -	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
  
- 	if (inetd_flag) {
+ 	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
  		use_current = "1";
  	} else {
  		use_current = "";
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch b/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
index 0330f72..805a0f8 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ Index: openssh-9.3p2/session.c
  	platform_setusercontext(pw);
  
 -	if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
-+	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && !is_child) {
++	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && (!is_child || !use_privsep)) {
  #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
  		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
  		    (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
@@ -98,11 +98,11 @@ Index: openssh-9.3p2/session.c
  		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
  	}
  
-Index: openssh-9.3p2/sshd-session.c
+Index: openssh-9.3p2/sshd.c
 ===================================================================
---- openssh-9.3p2.orig/sshd-session.c
-+++ openssh-9.3p2/sshd-session.c
-@@ -342,6 +342,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(struct ssh *ssh)
+--- openssh-9.3p2.orig/sshd.c
++++ openssh-9.3p2/sshd.c
+@@ -510,6 +510,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(struct ssh *ssh)
  	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
  	demote_sensitive_data(ssh);
  
@@ -113,12 +113,13 @@ Index: openssh-9.3p2/sshd-session.c
  	/* Demote the child */
  	if (privsep_chroot) {
  		/* Change our root directory */
-@@ -444,7 +448,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
- 	 * fd passing, as AFAIK PTY allocation on this platform doesn't require
- 	 * special privileges to begin with.
- 	 */
--#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN)
-+#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) && !defined(WITH_SELINUX)
- 	skip_privdrop = 1;
- #endif
+@@ -602,6 +606,9 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
  
+ #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
+ 	if (1) {
++#elif defined(WITH_SELINUX)
++	if (0) {
++		/* even root user can be confined by SELinux */
+ #else
+ 	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
+ #endif
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch b/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
index 04159e1..5cf0e8f 100644
--- a/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
@@ -9,16 +9,16 @@ Index: openssh-9.3p2/auth2-pubkey.c
 +extern int inetd_flag;
 +extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
- extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_pubkey;
  
  static char *
+ format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
 @@ -459,7 +462,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *
  	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command,
  	    ac, av, &f,
  	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
 -	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
 +	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
-+	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
++	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
  		goto out;
  
  	uid_swapped = 1;
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Index: openssh-9.3p2/auth2-pubkey.c
  	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
 -	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
 +	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
-+	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
++	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
  		goto out;
  
  	uid_swapped = 1;
@@ -87,13 +87,14 @@ Index: openssh-9.3p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
 ===================================================================
 --- openssh-9.3p2.orig/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
 +++ openssh-9.3p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-@@ -49,10 +49,6 @@
+@@ -49,11 +49,6 @@
  #include <unistd.h>
  #endif
  
 -extern ServerOptions options;
 -extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 -extern int inetd_flag;
+-extern int rexeced_flag;
 -
  /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
  int
@@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ Index: openssh-9.3p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
  
  	if (r == 0) {
  		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
--		if (inetd_flag) {
+-		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
 +		if (inetd) {
  			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
  
@@ -156,7 +157,7 @@ Index: openssh-9.3p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
  
  	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
  
--	if (inetd_flag) {
+-	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
 +	if (inetd) {
  		use_current = "1";
  	} else {
@@ -221,46 +222,56 @@ Index: openssh-9.3p2/platform.c
 ===================================================================
 --- openssh-9.3p2.orig/platform.c
 +++ openssh-9.3p2/platform.c
-@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
- #include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
+@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
  
+ extern int use_privsep;
  extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
++extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
  
- /* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */
- int
-@@ -185,7 +187,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
+ void
+ platform_pre_listen(void)
+@@ -185,7 +188,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
  	}
  #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
 +	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name,
-+	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
++	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
 +	    options.use_pam);
  #endif
  }
  
-Index: openssh-9.3p2/sshd-session.c
+Index: openssh-9.3p2/sshd.c
 ===================================================================
---- openssh-9.3p2.orig/sshd-session.c
-+++ openssh-9.3p2/sshd-session.c
+--- openssh-9.3p2.orig/sshd.c
++++ openssh-9.3p2/sshd.c
 @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ int debug_flag = 0;
- int debug_flag = 0;
+ static int test_flag = 0;
  
  /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
 -static int inetd_flag = 0;
 +int inetd_flag = 0;
  
- /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
- static int log_stderr = 0;
+ /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
+ static int no_daemon_flag = 0;
+@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static char **saved_argv;
+ static int saved_argc;
+ 
+ /* re-exec */
+-static int rexeced_flag = 0;
++int rexeced_flag = 0;
+ static int rexec_flag = 1;
+ static int rexec_argc = 0;
+ static char **rexec_argv;
 @@ -2396,7 +2396,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	}
  #endif
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
 +	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
-+	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
++	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
 +	    options.use_pam);
  #endif
  #ifdef USE_PAM
diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-ctr.patch b/openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-ctr.patch
index 0498b75..17b6672 100644
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-ctr.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-ctr.patch
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.8p1/Makefile.in
 --- openssh-8.8p1.orig/Makefile.in
 +++ openssh-8.8p1/Makefile.in
 @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
- SSHD_SESSION=$(libexecdir)/sshd-session
+ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
  SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
  SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
 +CAVSTEST_CTR=$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.8p1/Makefile.in
  STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
 @@ -69,6 +70,8 @@ MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
  
- TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
+ TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
  
 +TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
 +
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.8p1/Makefile.in
  
 +# FIPS tests
 +cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o cavstest-ctr.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-ctr.o ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) -lz
++	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-ctr.o ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2)
 +
  # test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
  logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch b/openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch
index 864be49..bc5763e 100644
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.8p1/Makefile.in
  STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
 @@ -70,7 +71,7 @@ MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
  
- TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
+ TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
  
 -TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT)
 +TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT)
@@ -25,10 +25,10 @@ Index: openssh-8.8p1/Makefile.in
  	ssh-xmss.o \
 @@ -252,6 +253,9 @@ sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(S
  cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o cavstest-ctr.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-ctr.o ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) -lz
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-ctr.o ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2)
  
 +cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o cavstest-kdf.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-kdf.o ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) -lz
++	$(LD) -o $@ cavstest-kdf.o ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2)
 +
  # test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
  logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch b/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
index 5a75ca7..08b9d30 100644
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
@@ -389,17 +389,17 @@ Index: openssh-9.6p1/hmac.c
  	    ssh_hmac_update(ctx, m, mlen) < 0 ||
 Index: openssh-9.6p1/kex.c
 ===================================================================
---- openssh-9.6p1.orig/kex-names.c
-+++ openssh-9.6p1/kex-names.c
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/kex.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/kex.c
 @@ -64,6 +64,8 @@
- #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
  #include "xmalloc.h"
  
 +#include "fips.h"
 +
- struct kexalg {
- 	char *name;
- 	u_int type;
+ /* prototype */
+ static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
+ static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
 @@ -87,7 +89,7 @@ struct kexalg {
  	int ec_nid;
  	int hash_alg;
@@ -647,8 +647,8 @@ Index: openssh-9.6p1/servconf.c
  #include "digest.h"
 +#include "fips.h"
  
- #if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE)
- # define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE		"sshd"
+ static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
+     const char *, int);
 @@ -207,6 +208,23 @@ option_clear_or_none(const char *o)
  	return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0;
  }
@@ -785,8 +785,8 @@ Index: openssh-9.6p1/sshd.c
 --- openssh-9.6p1.orig/sshd.c
 +++ openssh-9.6p1/sshd.c
 @@ -128,6 +128,8 @@
- #include "addr.h"
  #include "srclimit.h"
+ #include "dh.h"
  
 +#include "fips.h"
 +
diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch b/openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch
index 921c1bf..ebbf1ab 100644
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch
@@ -459,13 +459,13 @@ Index: openssh-8.8p1/sshd.c
 --- openssh-8.8p1.orig/sshd.c
 +++ openssh-8.8p1/sshd.c
 @@ -1547,6 +1547,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	struct connection_info connection_info;
+ 	struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL;
  	sigset_t sigmask;
  
 +	/* initialize fips - can go before ssh_malloc_init(), since that is a
 +	 * OpenBSD-only thing (as of OpenSSH 7.6p1) */
 +	fips_ssh_init();
 +
- 	memset(&connection_info, 0, sizeof(connection_info));
  #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
  	(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
+ #endif
diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch b/openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch
index 3df2a64..cfa9249 100644
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/Makefile.in
 --- openssh-8.9p1.orig/Makefile.in
 +++ openssh-8.9p1/Makefile.in
 @@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
- SSHD_SESSION=$(libexecdir)/sshd-session
+ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
  SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
  SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
 +SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/Makefile.in
  	$(LD) -o $@ $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
  
 @@ -421,6 +429,10 @@ install-files:
-	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSHD_SESSION)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
 +	if test ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER)" ; then \
diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch b/openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch
index 42c847d..4186015 100644
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch
@@ -32,17 +32,17 @@ Index: openssh-8.8p1/servconf.c
 --- openssh-8.8p1.orig/servconf.c
 +++ openssh-8.8p1/servconf.c
 @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 
  	/* Portable-specific options */
  	options->use_pam = -1;
- 	options->pam_service_name = NULL;
 +	options->use_pam_check_locks = -1;
  
  	/* Standard Options */
  	options->num_ports = 0;
 @@ -278,6 +279,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 	/* Portable-specific options */
+ 	if (options->use_pam == -1)
  		options->use_pam = 0;
- 	if (options->pam_service_name == NULL)
- 		options->pam_service_name = xstrdup(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE);
 +	if (options->use_pam_check_locks == -1)
 +		options->use_pam_check_locks = 0;
  
@@ -52,27 +52,26 @@ Index: openssh-8.8p1/servconf.c
  typedef enum {
  	sBadOption,		/* == unknown option */
  	/* Portable-specific options */
--	sUsePAM, sPAMServiceName,
-+	sUsePAM, sPAMServiceName, sUsePAMChecklocks,
+-	sUsePAM,
++	sUsePAM, sUsePAMChecklocks,
  	/* Standard Options */
  	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
  	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
-@@ -535,9 +538,11 @@ static struct {
+@@ -535,8 +538,10 @@ static struct {
+ 	/* Portable-specific options */
  #ifdef USE_PAM
  	{ "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "pamservicename", sPAMServiceName, SSHCFG_ALL },
 +	{ "usepamchecklocks", sUsePAMChecklocks, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  #else
  	{ "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "pamservicename", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
 +	{ "usepamchecklocks", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  #endif
  	{ "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	/* Standard Options */
 @@ -1331,6 +1336,9 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
- 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
- 			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
- 		break;
+ 	case sUsePAM:
+ 		intptr = &options->use_pam;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
 +	case sUsePAMChecklocks:
 +		intptr = &options->use_pam_check_locks;
 +		goto parse_flag;
@@ -84,9 +83,9 @@ Index: openssh-8.8p1/servconf.h
 --- openssh-8.8p1.orig/servconf.h
 +++ openssh-8.8p1/servconf.h
 @@ -200,6 +200,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	char   *adm_forced_command;
  
  	int	use_pam;		/* Enable auth via PAM */
-	char   *pam_service_name;
 +	int	use_pam_check_locks;	/* internally check for locked accounts even when using PAM */
  
  	int	permit_tun;
diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch b/openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch
index bb69a3b..ae55aae 100644
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.8p1/sshd.c
 +
  #include "xmalloc.h"
  #include "ssh.h"
- #include "sshpty.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
 @@ -308,6 +312,10 @@ sighup_handler(int sig)
  static void
  sighup_restart(void)
@@ -84,4 +84,4 @@ Index: openssh-8.8p1/sshd.c
 +
  		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
  		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
- 		    &newsock, config_s, log_stderr);
+ 		    &newsock, config_s);
diff --git a/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch b/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
index a07128e..a73ca13 100644
--- a/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
-diff -up openssh/auth2.c.role-mls openssh/auth2.c
---- openssh/auth2.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.815430916 +0200
-@@ -256,6 +256,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/auth2.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/auth2.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/auth2.c
+@@ -273,6 +273,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
  	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
  	Authmethod *m = NULL;
  	char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL;
@@ -11,7 +12,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2.c.role-mls openssh/auth2.c
  	int r, authenticated = 0;
  	double tstart = monotime_double();
  
-@@ -268,6 +271,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+@@ -286,6 +289,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
  	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
  	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
  
@@ -23,32 +24,36 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2.c.role-mls openssh/auth2.c
  	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
  		*style++ = 0;
  
-@@ -314,7 +314,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 		setproctitle("%s [net]", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown");
+@@ -313,8 +321,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
  		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
  		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+-		if (use_privsep)
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
 +#endif
- 		mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
++		if (use_privsep) {
+ 			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+         	mm_inform_authrole(role);
++			mm_inform_authrole(role);
 +#endif
++		}
  		userauth_banner(ssh);
  		if ((r = kex_server_update_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
  			fatal_fr(r, "kex_server_update_ext_info failed");
-diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
---- openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-gss.c	2018-08-22 11:15:42.459799171 +0200
-@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/auth2-gss.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/auth2-gss.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/auth2-gss.c
+@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
  	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
  	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
  	int r, authenticated = 0;
 +	char *micuser;
  	struct sshbuf *b;
  	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
- 	u_char *p;
-@@ -298,7 +299,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 	const char *displayname;
+@@ -348,7 +349,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
  		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
  	mic.value = p;
  	mic.length = len;
@@ -63,7 +68,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
  	    "gssapi-with-mic", ssh->kex->session_id);
  
  	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
-@@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+@@ -362,6 +369,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
  		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
  
  	sshbuf_free(b);
@@ -71,11 +76,12 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 +		free(micuser);
  	free(mic.value);
  
- 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
-diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
---- openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-hostbased.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-@@ -123,7 +123,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/auth2-hostbased.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
+@@ -128,7 +128,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, cons
  	/* reconstruct packet */
  	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
@@ -92,10 +98,11 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, method)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
-diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
---- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2018-08-22 11:17:07.331483958 +0200
-@@ -169,9 +169,16 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/auth2-pubkey.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -200,9 +200,16 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const c
  			goto done;
  		}
  		/* reconstruct packet */
@@ -114,9 +121,10 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
  		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
  		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 ||
  		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
-diff -up openssh/auth.h.role-mls openssh/auth.h
---- openssh/auth.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/auth.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/auth.h
++++ openssh-9.6p1/auth.h
 @@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
  	char		*service;
  	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
@@ -127,10 +135,11 @@ diff -up openssh/auth.h.role-mls openssh/auth.h
  
  	/* Method lists for multiple authentication */
  	char		**auth_methods;	/* modified from server config */
-diff -up openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.c
---- openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth-pam.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-@@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/auth-pam.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/auth-pam.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/auth-pam.c
+@@ -1242,7 +1242,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
   * during the ssh authentication process.
   */
  int
@@ -139,22 +148,24 @@ diff -up openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.c
  {
  	int ret = 1;
  	char *compound;
-diff -up openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.h
---- openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth-pam.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/auth-pam.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/auth-pam.h
++++ openssh-9.6p1/auth-pam.h
 @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
  void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
- void do_pam_setcred(void);
+ void do_pam_setcred(int );
  void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
 -int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
 +int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
  char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
  char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
  void free_pam_environment(char **);
-diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
---- openssh/misc.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/misc.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
-@@ -542,6 +542,7 @@ char *
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/misc.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/misc.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/misc.c
+@@ -771,6 +771,7 @@ char *
  colon(char *cp)
  {
  	int flag = 0;
@@ -162,7 +173,7 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
  
  	if (*cp == ':')		/* Leading colon is part of file name. */
  		return NULL;
-@@ -557,6 +558,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
+@@ -786,6 +787,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
  			return (cp);
  		if (*cp == '/')
  			return NULL;
@@ -176,10 +187,11 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
  	}
  	return NULL;
  }
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-05-21 14:21:56.719414087 +0200
-@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, st
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/monitor.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/monitor.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/monitor.c
+@@ -120,6 +120,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, st
  int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
@@ -189,7 +201,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-@@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+@@ -200,6 +203,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
      {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
      {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
@@ -199,7 +211,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -803,6 +809,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, in
+@@ -834,6 +840,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, in
  
  	/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
@@ -209,7 +221,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
  
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -877,6 +886,26 @@ key_base_type_match(const char *method,
+@@ -908,6 +917,26 @@ key_base_type_match(const char *method,
  	return found;
  }
  
@@ -236,16 +248,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  int
  mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  {
-@@ -1251,7 +1280,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
+@@ -1280,7 +1309,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
  	struct sshbuf *b;
-	struct sshkey *hostkey = NULL;
+ 	struct sshkey *hostkey = NULL;
  	const u_char *p;
 -	char *userstyle, *cp;
 +	char *userstyle, *s, *cp;
  	size_t len;
  	u_char type;
  	int hostbound = 0, r, fail = 0;
-@@ -1282,6 +1311,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
+@@ -1311,6 +1340,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
@@ -254,7 +266,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
  	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
  	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-@@ -1317,7 +1348,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
+@@ -1361,7 +1392,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
  {
  	struct sshbuf *b;
  	const u_char *p;
@@ -263,7 +275,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	size_t len;
  	int r, fail = 0;
  	u_char type;
-@@ -1338,6 +1370,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
+@@ -1382,6 +1413,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
@@ -272,9 +284,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
  	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
  	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-diff -up openssh/monitor.h.role-mls openssh/monitor.h
---- openssh/monitor.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/monitor.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/monitor.h
++++ openssh-9.6p1/monitor.h
 @@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
  	MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
  	MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
@@ -286,10 +299,11 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.h.role-mls openssh/monitor.h
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
-diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor_wrap.c	2018-08-22 11:21:47.938747968 +0200
-@@ -390,6 +390,27 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -396,6 +396,27 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *
  	sshbuf_free(m);
  }
  
@@ -317,10 +331,11 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c
  /* Do the password authentication */
  int
  mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password)
-diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor_wrap.h	2018-08-22 11:22:10.439929513 +0200
-@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/monitor_wrap.h
++++ openssh-9.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ int mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct
      const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *,
      const char *, u_int compat);
  void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
@@ -330,10 +345,11 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.h
  struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *);
  char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
  int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *);
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ PORTS=	port-aix.o \
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
++++ openssh-9.6p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ PORTS=	port-aix.o \
  	port-prngd.o \
  	port-solaris.o \
  	port-net.o \
@@ -343,10 +359,11 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Make
  
  .c.o:
  	$(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -100,37 +100,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+@@ -101,37 +101,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
  	return sc;
  }
  
@@ -384,7 +401,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
  /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
  void
  ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
-@@ -145,7 +114,11 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons
+@@ -144,7 +113,11 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons
  
  	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
  
@@ -397,9 +414,10 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
  
  	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
  
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
++++ openssh-9.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
 @@ -20,9 +20,10 @@
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
  int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
@@ -412,10 +430,11 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
  #endif
  
  #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
++++ openssh-9.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
 + * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
@@ -469,6 +488,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
++extern int rexeced_flag;
 +
 +/* Send audit message */
 +static int
@@ -674,7 +694,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +
 +	if (r == 0) {
 +		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
-+		if (inetd_flag) {
++		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
 +			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
 +
 +			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
@@ -748,7 +768,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +
 +	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +
-+	if (inetd_flag) {
++	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
 +		use_current = "1";
 +	} else {
 +		use_current = "";
@@ -836,10 +856,11 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +#endif
 +#endif
 +
-diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c
---- openssh/platform.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/platform.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/platform.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/platform.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/platform.c
+@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
  	}
  #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
@@ -848,10 +869,11 @@ diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c
  #endif
  }
  
-diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
---- openssh/sshd-session.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd-session.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
-@@ -2186,6 +2186,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/sshd.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/sshd.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/sshd.c
+@@ -2387,6 +2387,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  		restore_uid();
  	}
  #endif
@@ -860,4 +882,4 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
 +#endif
  #ifdef USE_PAM
  	if (options.use_pam) {
- 		do_pam_setcred();
+ 		do_pam_setcred(1);
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch b/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
index 5bce9b5..2f949b1 100644
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
@@ -1,37 +1,29 @@
-diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
-index e7549470..b68c1710 100644
---- a/Makefile.in
-+++ b/Makefile.in
-@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
- 	kex.o kex-names.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/Makefile.in
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/Makefile.in
++++ openssh-9.6p1/Makefile.in
+@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+ 	kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
  	kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \
  	kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
 +	kexgssc.o \
  	sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
  	sshbuf-io.o
  
-@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
- 	auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \
+@@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw
  	auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
  	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-pubkeyfile.o \
--	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
-+	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
- 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
+ 	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
+-	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
++	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
  	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o \
- 	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
-@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ regress-prep:
- 	    ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
- 
- REGRESSLIBS=libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT)
--TESTLIBS=$(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
-+TESTLIBS=$(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
- 
- regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
- 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c \
-diff -up a/auth.c.gsskex b/auth.c
---- a/auth.c.gsskex	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/auth.c	2021-08-27 12:41:51.262788953 +0200
-@@ -402,7 +402,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const
+ 	srclimit.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ 	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/auth.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/auth.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/auth.c
+@@ -357,7 +357,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const
  	case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
  		if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
  		    strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
@@ -41,15 +33,121 @@ diff -up a/auth.c.gsskex b/auth.c
  			return 1;
  		break;
  	case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
-diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
-index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
---- a/auth2-gss.c
-+++ b/auth2-gss.c
-@@ -54,6 +54,48 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
- static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
+@@ -638,97 +639,6 @@ fakepw(void)
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
+- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
+- * called.
+- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
+- * attacks on based on conflation of hostnames and IP addresses.
+- */
+-
+-static char *
+-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
+-{
+-	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+-	socklen_t fromlen;
+-	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+-	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
+-	const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+-
+-	/* Get IP address of client. */
+-	fromlen = sizeof(from);
+-	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+-	if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+-	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
+-		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+-		return xstrdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+-	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+-		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+-
+-	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+-	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+-	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
+-	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
+-		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
+-		return xstrdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
+-	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
+-	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
+-	 */
+-	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+-	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
+-	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+-	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+-		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
+-		    name, ntop);
+-		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+-		return xstrdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
+-	lowercase(name);
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+-	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
+-	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
+-	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
+-	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
+-	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
+-	 * the domain).
+-	 */
+-	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+-	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
+-	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+-	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
+-		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+-		    "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
+-		return xstrdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+-	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+-		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
+-		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
+-		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
+-				break;
+-	}
+-	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+-	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
+-	if (ai == NULL) {
+-		/* Address not found for the host name. */
+-		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+-		    "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
+-		return xstrdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-	return xstrdup(name);
+-}
+-
+-/*
+  * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
+  * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
+  * several times.
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/auth2-gss.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/auth2-gss.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/auth2-gss.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.34 2023/03/31 04:22:27 djm Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -58,6 +58,48 @@ static int input_gssapi_exchange_complet
  static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
  
-+/*
+ /*
 + * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
 + */
 +static int
@@ -64,10 +162,10 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
 +
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "parsing");
++		fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +
 +	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 +
 +	mic.value = p;
 +	mic.length = len;
@@ -76,14 +174,14 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
 +	    "gssapi-keyex", ssh->kex->session_id);
 +
 +	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
-+		fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
++		fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__);
 +	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
 +
 +	/* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
-+	if (!GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
-+	    &gssbuf, &mic)))
-+		authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+		    authctxt->pw, 1);
++	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
++	    &gssbuf, &mic))))
++		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++		    authctxt->pw, 1));
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(b);
 +	free(mic.value);
@@ -91,50 +189,49 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
 +	return (authenticated);
 +}
 +
- /*
++/*
   * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
   * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
-@@ -260,7 +302,7 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+  */
+@@ -267,7 +309,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type,
  	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
  
--	authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
-+ 	authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, 1);
+-	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++	    authctxt->pw, 1));
  
- 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
- 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
-@@ -306,7 +349,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
+ 	    (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
+@@ -313,7 +356,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
  	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
  
- 	if (!GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))
--		authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
-+		authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, 0);
+ 	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
+-		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++		    authctxt->pw, 0));
  	else
  		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
  
-@@ -326,6 +370,17 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -333,6 +377,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
  	return 0;
  }
  
-+struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gsskeyex = {
++Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
 +	"gssapi-keyex",
-+	NULL,
++	"NULL",
++	userauth_gsskeyex,
 +	&options.gss_authentication
 +};
-+
-+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
-+	&methodcfg_gsskeyex,
-+	userauth_gsskeyex,
-+};
 +
  Authmethod method_gssapi = {
- 	&methodcfg_gssapi,
- 	userauth_gssapi,
-diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
-index 0e776224..1c217268 100644
---- a/auth2.c
-+++ b/auth2.c
-@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
+ 	"gssapi-with-mic",
+ 	NULL,
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/auth2.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/auth2.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/auth2.c
+@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
  extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
  extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
  #ifdef GSSAPI
@@ -142,7 +239,7 @@ index 0e776224..1c217268 100644
  extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
  #endif
  
-@@ -80,6 +81,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
+@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
  	&method_none,
  	&method_pubkey,
  #ifdef GSSAPI
@@ -150,10 +247,10 @@ index 0e776224..1c217268 100644
  	&method_gssapi,
  #endif
  	&method_passwd,
-diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
-index abea9c6e..8e81b519 100644
---- a/canohost.c
-+++ b/canohost.c
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/canohost.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/canohost.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/canohost.c
 @@ -35,6 +35,99 @@
  #include "canohost.h"
  #include "misc.h"
@@ -254,10 +351,10 @@ index abea9c6e..8e81b519 100644
  void
  ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
  {
-diff --git a/canohost.h b/canohost.h
-index 26d62855..0cadc9f1 100644
---- a/canohost.h
-+++ b/canohost.h
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/canohost.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/canohost.h
++++ openssh-9.6p1/canohost.h
 @@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
  #ifndef _CANOHOST_H
  #define _CANOHOST_H
@@ -268,41 +365,41 @@ index 26d62855..0cadc9f1 100644
  char		*get_peer_ipaddr(int);
  int		 get_peer_port(int);
  char		*get_local_ipaddr(int);
-diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
-index ebd0dbca..1bdac6a4 100644
---- a/clientloop.c
-+++ b/clientloop.c
-@@ -112,6 +112,10 @@
- #include "ssherr.h"
- #include "hostfile.h"
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/clientloop.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/clientloop.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/clientloop.c
+@@ -121,6 +121,10 @@
+ /* Uncertainty (in percent) of keystroke timing intervals */
+ #define SSH_KEYSTROKE_TIMING_FUZZ 10
  
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +#include "ssh-gss.h"
 +#endif
 +
- /* Permitted RSA signature algorithms for UpdateHostkeys proofs */
- #define HOSTKEY_PROOF_RSA_ALGS	"rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256"
+ /* import options */
+ extern Options options;
  
-@@ -1379,6 +1383,14 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
+@@ -1594,6 +1598,14 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pt
  		/* Do channel operations. */
  		channel_after_poll(ssh, pfd, npfd_active);
  
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
-+			if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
-+			    ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(NULL)) {
-+				debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
-+				need_rekeying = 1;
-+			}
++		if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
++		    ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(NULL)) {
++			debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
++			need_rekeying = 1;
++		}
 +#endif
 +
  		/* Buffer input from the connection.  */
  		if (conn_in_ready)
  			client_process_net_input(ssh);
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index b689db4b..efafb6bd 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -674,6 +674,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/configure.ac
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/configure.ac
++++ openssh-9.6p1/configure.ac
+@@ -766,6 +766,30 @@ int main(void) { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeL
  	    [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
  	AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
  	    [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
@@ -333,20 +430,29 @@ index b689db4b..efafb6bd 100644
  	m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
  	AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
  	    AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
-diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
-index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
---- a/gss-genr.c
-+++ b/gss-genr.c
-@@ -41,9 +41,33 @@
- #include "sshbuf.h"
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/gss-genr.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/gss-genr.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/gss-genr.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.28 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -43,8 +43,34 @@
  #include "log.h"
  #include "ssh2.h"
+ 
 +#include "cipher.h"
 +#include "sshkey.h"
 +#include "kex.h"
 +#include "digest.h"
 +#include "packet.h"
- 
++
  #include "ssh-gss.h"
  
 +typedef struct {
@@ -364,14 +470,15 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
 +
 +int
-+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void) {
++ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void)
++{
 +	return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
 +}
 +
  /* sshbuf_get for gss_buffer_desc */
  int
  ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
-@@ -62,6 +86,159 @@ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
+@@ -60,6 +86,161 @@ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf
  	return 0;
  }
  
@@ -415,8 +522,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +    const char *host, const char *client, const char *kex) {
 +	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
 +	size_t i;
-+	int r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	int oidpos, enclen;
++	int r, oidpos, enclen;
 +	char *mechs, *encoded;
 +	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
 +	char deroid[2];
@@ -433,7 +539,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +	    (gss_supported->count + 1));
 +
 +	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 +
 +	oidpos = 0;
 +	s = cp = xstrdup(kex);
@@ -450,7 +556,8 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +			        gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
 +			        gss_supported->elements[i].length)) != 0 ||
 +			    (r = ssh_digest_final(md, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+				fatal_fr(r, "digest failed");
++				fatal("%s: digest failed: %s", __func__,
++				    ssh_err(r));
 +			ssh_digest_free(md);
 +			md = NULL;
 +
@@ -465,10 +572,12 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
 +				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
 +				    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ',')) != 0)
-+					fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8 error");
++					fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8 error: %s",
++					    __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +				if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, p, strlen(p))) != 0 ||
 +				    (r = sshbuf_put(buf, encoded, enclen)) != 0)
-+					fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put error");
++					fatal("%s: sshbuf_put error: %s",
++					    __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +			}
 +
 +			gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
@@ -481,7 +590,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +	gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
 +
 +	if ((mechs = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL)
-+		fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
++		fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(buf);
 +
@@ -531,7 +640,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
  int
  ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
-@@ -218,7 +398,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
+@@ -216,7 +397,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int de
  	}
  
  	ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
@@ -540,11 +649,10 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  	    GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
  	    0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
  
-@@ -247,9 +427,43 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
- 	return (ctx->major);
+@@ -246,8 +427,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, con
  }
  
-+OM_uint32
+ OM_uint32
 +ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
 +{
 +	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
@@ -575,7 +683,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +	return(ctx->major);
 +}
 +
- OM_uint32
++OM_uint32
  ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
  {
 +	if (ctx == NULL)
@@ -584,7 +692,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  	if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
  	    GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
  		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -257,6 +471,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+@@ -255,6 +470,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer
  	return (ctx->major);
  }
  
@@ -604,7 +712,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  void
  ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
      const char *context, const struct sshbuf *session_id)
-@@ -273,11 +500,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+@@ -271,11 +499,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, co
  }
  
  int
@@ -621,8 +729,8 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +		ctx = &intctx;
  
  	/* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
- 	if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
-@@ -500,6 +500,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+ 	if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && 
+@@ -285,6 +518,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx
  	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
  	ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
  	major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
@@ -631,13 +739,13 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +		major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
 +
  	if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
- 		major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
+ 		major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, 
  		    NULL);
-@@ -527,10 +527,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx
+@@ -294,10 +531,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx
  			    GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
  	}
  
--	if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+-	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) 
 +	if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
  		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
  
@@ -701,10 +809,10 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +}
 +
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
-diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index a151bc1e..8d2b677f 100644
---- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
  /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.9 2018/07/09 21:37:55 markus Exp $ */
  
@@ -714,7 +822,7 @@ index a151bc1e..8d2b677f 100644
   *
   * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
  	krb5_error_code problem;
  	krb5_principal princ;
  	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
@@ -723,7 +831,7 @@ index a151bc1e..8d2b677f 100644
  	const char *errmsg;
  
  	if (client->creds == NULL) {
-@@ -180,11 +180,26 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -180,11 +180,26 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
  		return;
  	}
  
@@ -754,7 +862,7 @@ index a151bc1e..8d2b677f 100644
  
  #ifdef USE_PAM
  	if (options.use_pam)
-@@ -193,9 +208,76 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -193,9 +208,76 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
  
  	krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
  
@@ -841,10 +949,10 @@ index a151bc1e..8d2b677f 100644
  };
  
  #endif /* KRB5 */
-diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
-index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
---- a/gss-serv.c
-+++ b/gss-serv.c
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/gss-serv.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/gss-serv.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/gss-serv.c
 @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
  /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.32 2020/03/13 03:17:07 djm Exp $ */
  
@@ -877,11 +985,10 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  
  #ifdef KRB5
  extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
-@@ -140,6 +142,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
- 	return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
+@@ -141,6 +143,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss
  }
  
-+/* Unprivileged */
+ /* Unprivileged */
 +char *
 +ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void) {
 +	if (supported_oids == NULL)
@@ -898,16 +1005,17 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 +	Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
 +	int res;
 +
-+	res = !GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid));
++	res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
 +	ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
 +
 +	return (res);
 +}
 +
- /* Unprivileged */
++/* Unprivileged */
  void
  ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
-@@ -150,7 +175,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+ {
+@@ -150,7 +175,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *o
  	gss_OID_set supported;
  
  	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
@@ -940,8 +1048,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 +			ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
 +			return (ctx->major);
 +		}
- 
--	gss_buffer_desc ename;
++
 +		ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
 +		    new_name, &equal);
 +
@@ -954,7 +1061,8 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 +			debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
 +			return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
 +		}
-+
+ 
+-	gss_buffer_desc ename;
 +		debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
 +
 +		gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
@@ -968,7 +1076,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  
  	client->mech = NULL;
  
-@@ -292,6 +359,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -292,6 +359,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
  	if (client->mech == NULL)
  		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
  
@@ -982,7 +1090,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  	if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
  	    &client->displayname, NULL))) {
  		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -309,6 +383,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -309,6 +383,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
  		return (ctx->major);
  	}
  
@@ -991,7 +1099,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  	/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
  	client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
  	ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-@@ -319,11 +395,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -319,11 +395,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
  void
  ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
  {
@@ -1005,10 +1113,10 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 +
 +	if (gssapi_client.store.data != NULL) {
 +		if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_client.store.data, gssapi_client.store.envval, &ccache))) {
-+			debug_f("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
++			debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__,
 +				krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
 +		} else if ((problem = krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_client.store.data, ccache))) {
-+			debug_f("krb5_cc_destroy(): %.100s",
++			debug("%s: krb5_cc_destroy(): %.100s", __func__,
 +				krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
 +		} else {
 +			krb5_free_context(gssapi_client.store.data);
@@ -1017,7 +1125,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  	}
  }
  
-@@ -356,19 +441,23 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
+@@ -356,19 +441,23 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int
  
  /* Privileged */
  int
@@ -1044,7 +1152,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  			/* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
  			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
  			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
-@@ -382,14 +471,85 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+@@ -382,14 +471,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
  	return (0);
  }
  
@@ -1087,7 +1195,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 +	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
 +		return;
 +
-+	ok = mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store);
++	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
 +
 +	if (!ok)
 +		return;
@@ -1099,6 +1207,11 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 +	 * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
 +	 */
 +#ifdef USE_PAM	
++	if (!use_privsep) {
++		debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
++		return;
++	}
++
 +	ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
 + 	    &pamconv, &pamh);
 +	if (ret)
@@ -1136,40 +1249,26 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  }
  
  /* Privileged */
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
---- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -698,6 +755,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
- 	sshbuf_free(kex->server_version);
- 	sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
- 	sshbuf_free(kex->session_id);
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+	free(kex->gss_host);
-+#endif /* GSSAPI */
- 	sshbuf_free(kex->initial_sig);
- 	sshkey_free(kex->initial_hostkey);
- 	free(kex->failed_choice);
-diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
-index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
---- a/kex-names.c
-+++ b/kex-names.c
-@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@
- 
- #include "fips.h"
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/kex.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/kex.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/kex.c
+@@ -64,6 +64,10 @@
+ #include "digest.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
  
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +#include "ssh-gss.h"
 +#endif
 +
- struct kexalg {
- 	char *name;
- 	u_int type;
-@@ -110,6 +113,30 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- 	{ NULL, -1, -1, -1},
+ #include "fips.h"
+ 
+ /* prototype */
+@@ -121,6 +125,19 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs_all[]
+ #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
+ 	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
  };
-+static const struct kexalg gss_kexalgs_all[] = {
++static const struct kexalg gss_kexalgs[] = {
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +	{ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
 +	{ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
@@ -1180,46 +1279,31 @@ index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
 +	    NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
 +	{ KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
 +#endif
-+	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
-+};
-+
-+static const struct kexalg gss_kexalgs_fips140_2[] = {
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+	{ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
-+	{ KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
-+	{ KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256,
-+	    NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
-+	{ KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
-+#endif
-+	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
++	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1 },
 +};
  
+ static const struct kexalg kexalgs_fips140_2[] = {
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+@@ -148,12 +165,12 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs_fips1
+ 
  /* Returns array of macs available depending on selected FIPS mode */
  static const struct kexalg *
-@@ -120,14 +140,31 @@ fips_select_kexalgs(void)
- 	}
+-fips_select_kexalgs(void)
++fips_select_kexalgs(const struct kexalg *algs)
+ {
+ 	int fips = fips_mode();
+ 	switch (fips) {
+ 		case 0:
+-			return kexalgs_all;
++			return algs;
+ 		case 1:
+ 			return kexalgs_fips140_2;
+ 		default:
+@@ -164,13 +181,13 @@ fips_select_kexalgs(void)
  }
  
-+/* Returns array of macs available depending on selected FIPS mode */
-+static const struct kexalg *
-+fips_select_gss_kexalgs(void)
-+{
-+       int fips = fips_mode();
-+       switch (fips) {
-+               case 0:
-+                       return gss_kexalgs_all;
-+               case 1:                         
-+                       return gss_kexalgs_fips140_2;
-+               default:
-+                       /* should not be reached */
-+                       fatal("Fatal error: incorrect FIPS mode '%i' at %s:%u",
-+                           fips, __FILE__, __LINE__);
-+       }
-+}
-+
--char *
+ char *
 -kex_alg_list(char sep)
-+static char *
 +kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
  {
  	char *ret = NULL, *tmp;
@@ -1227,45 +1311,47 @@ index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
  	const struct kexalg *k;
  
 -	for (k = fips_select_kexalgs(); k->name != NULL; k++) {
-+	for (k = algs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
++	for (k = fips_select_kexalgs(algs); k->name != NULL; k++) {
  		if (ret != NULL)
  			ret[rlen++] = sep;
  		nlen = strlen(k->name);
-@@ -138,6 +156,18 @@ kex_alg_list(char sep)
+@@ -185,15 +202,31 @@ kex_alg_list(char sep)
  	return ret;
  }
  
 +char *
 +kex_alg_list(char sep)
 +{
-+	return kex_alg_list_internal(sep, fips_select_kexalgs());
++	return kex_alg_list_internal(sep, kexalgs_all);
 +}
 +
 +char *
 +kex_gss_alg_list(char sep)
 +{
-+	return kex_alg_list_internal(sep, fips_select_gss_kexalgs());
++	return kex_alg_list_internal(sep, gss_kexalgs);
 +}
 +
  static const struct kexalg *
  kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
  {
-@@ -147,6 +177,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+ 	const struct kexalg *k;
+ 
+-	for (k = fips_select_kexalgs(); k->name != NULL; k++) {
++	for (k = fips_select_kexalgs(kexalgs_all); k->name != NULL; k++) {
  		if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
  			return k;
  	}
-+	for (k = gss_kexalgs_all; k->name != NULL; k++) {
++	for (k = gss_kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
 +		if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0)
 +			return k;
 +	}
  	return NULL;
  }
  
-@@ -315,3 +349,26 @@ kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all)
- 	free(ret);
+@@ -375,6 +408,29 @@ kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const c
  	return r;
  }
-+ 
+ 
 +/* Validate GSS KEX method name list */
 +int
 +kex_gss_names_valid(const char *names)
@@ -1288,10 +1374,24 @@ index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
 +	free(s);
 +	return 1;
 +}
-diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
-index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
---- a/kex.h
-+++ b/kex.h
++
+ /*
+  * Fill out a proposal array with dynamically allocated values, which may
+  * be modified as required for compatibility reasons.
+@@ -1010,6 +1066,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
+ 	sshbuf_free(kex->session_id);
+ 	sshbuf_free(kex->initial_sig);
+ 	sshkey_free(kex->initial_hostkey);
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	free(kex->gss_host);
++#endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 	free(kex->failed_choice);
+ 	free(kex->hostkey_alg);
+ 	free(kex->name);
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/kex.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/kex.h
++++ openssh-9.6p1/kex.h
 @@ -102,6 +102,15 @@ enum kex_exchange {
  	KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
  	KEX_C25519_SHA256,
@@ -1308,7 +1408,7 @@ index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
  	KEX_MAX
  };
  
-@@ -153,6 +162,12 @@ struct kex {
+@@ -164,6 +173,12 @@ struct kex {
  	u_int	flags;
  	int	hash_alg;
  	int	ec_nid;
@@ -1321,22 +1421,22 @@ index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
  	char	*failed_choice;
  	int	(*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *);
  	struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *);
-@@ -174,8 +189,10 @@ struct kex {
- int	 kex_nid_from_name(const char *);
+@@ -185,8 +200,10 @@ struct kex {
+ 
  int	 kex_names_valid(const char *);
  char	*kex_alg_list(char);
 +char	*kex_gss_alg_list(char);
  char	*kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *);
- int	 kex_has_any_alg(const char *, const char *);
-+int	 kex_gss_names_valid(const char *);
  int	 kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *);
++int	 kex_gss_names_valid(const char *);
  void	 kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX],
      const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
-@@ -202,6 +219,12 @@ int	 kexgex_client(struct ssh *);
+ void	 kex_proposal_free_entries(char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
+@@ -219,6 +236,12 @@ int	 kexgex_client(struct ssh *);
  int	 kexgex_server(struct ssh *);
  int	 kex_gen_client(struct ssh *);
  int	 kex_gen_server(struct ssh *);
-+#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
++#ifdef GSSAPI
 +int	 kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *);
 +int	 kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *);
 +int	 kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
@@ -1345,7 +1445,7 @@ index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
  
  int	 kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *);
  int	 kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **,
-@@ -234,6 +257,12 @@ int	 kexgex_hash(int, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *,
+@@ -251,6 +274,12 @@ int	 kexgex_hash(int, const struct sshbu
      const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, size_t,
      u_char *, size_t *);
  
@@ -1358,11 +1458,11 @@ index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
  void	kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE])
  	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
  	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
-diff --git a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c
-index 67133e33..edaa4676 100644
---- a/kexdh.c
-+++ b/kexdh.c
-@@ -48,13 +48,23 @@ kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *kex)
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/kexdh.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/kexdh.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/kexdh.c
+@@ -49,13 +49,23 @@ kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *kex)
  {
  	switch (kex->kex_type) {
  	case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
@@ -1386,10 +1486,10 @@ index 67133e33..edaa4676 100644
  		kex->dh = dh_new_group16();
  		break;
  	case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
-diff --git a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c
-index 69348b96..c0e8c2f4 100644
---- a/kexgen.c
-+++ b/kexgen.c
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/kexgen.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/kexgen.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/kexgen.c
 @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
  static int input_kex_gen_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
  static int input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh);
@@ -1399,12 +1499,11 @@ index 69348b96..c0e8c2f4 100644
  kex_gen_hash(
      int hash_alg,
      const struct sshbuf *client_version,
-diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..f6e1405e
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/kexgssc.c
+===================================================================
 --- /dev/null
-+++ b/kexgssc.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,612 @@
++++ openssh-9.6p1/kexgssc.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,595 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
 + *
@@ -1466,7 +1565,7 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
 +	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
 +	struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new();
 +	u_char *msg;
 +	int type = 0;
 +	int first = 1;
@@ -1503,12 +1602,10 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +		r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
 +		break;
 +	default:
-+		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
++		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
 +	}
-+	if (r != 0) {
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++	if (r != 0)
 +		return r;
-+	}
 +
 +	token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
 +
@@ -1571,16 +1668,11 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +			do {
 +				type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
 +				if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
-+					u_char *tmp = NULL;
-+					size_t tmp_len = 0;
-+
 +					debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
 +					if (server_host_key_blob)
 +						fatal("Server host key received more than once");
-+					if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
++					if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
 +						fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+					if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
-+						fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
 +				}
 +			} while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
 +
@@ -1681,11 +1773,6 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +	if (r != 0)
 +		goto out;
 +
-+	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
 +	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
 +	if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
 +	    kex->hash_alg,
@@ -1698,7 +1785,7 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +	    server_blob,
 +	    shared_secret,
 +	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
-+		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
++		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
 +
 +	gssbuf.value = hash;
 +	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
@@ -1755,7 +1842,7 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +	size_t hashlen;
 +	const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
 +	int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
-+	struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new();
 +	u_char c;
 +	int r;
 +
@@ -1867,16 +1954,11 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +			do {
 +				type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
 +				if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
-+					u_char *tmp = NULL;
-+					size_t tmp_len = 0;
-+
 +					debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
 +					if (server_host_key_blob)
 +						fatal("Server host key received more than once");
-+					if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
++					if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
 +						fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+					if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
-+						fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
 +				}
 +			} while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
 +
@@ -1952,7 +2034,6 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_server_pub)) != 0)
 +		goto out;
 +	sshbuf_free(buf);
-+	buf = NULL;
 +
 +	if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
@@ -1961,10 +2042,6 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +
 +	if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0)
 +		goto out;
-+	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
 +
 +	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
 +	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
@@ -1992,6 +2069,13 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +
 +	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
 +
++	/* save session id */
++	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
++		kex->session_id = sshbuf_new ();
++		if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->session_id, hash, hashlen)) != 0)
++			goto out;
++	}
++
 +	if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
 +		ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
 +
@@ -2004,7 +2088,6 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
 +		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
 +out:
-+	sshbuf_free(buf);
 +	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
 +	sshbuf_free(empty);
 +	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
@@ -2015,14 +2098,12 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +	sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
 +	return r;
 +}
-+
 +#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */
-diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..60bc02de
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/kexgsss.c
+===================================================================
 --- /dev/null
-+++ b/kexgsss.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@
++++ openssh-9.6p1/kexgsss.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,474 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
 + *
@@ -2089,7 +2170,7 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	 */
 +
 +	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
-+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf = {0, NULL}, recv_tok, msg_tok;
++	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
 +	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
 +	Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
 +	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
@@ -2114,14 +2195,14 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +		free(mechs);
 +	}
 +
-+	debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name);
++	debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
 +	oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
 +	if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
 +	   fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
 +
-+	debug2_f("Acquiring credentials");
++	debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
 +
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))
++	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
 +		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
 +
 +	do {
@@ -2129,7 +2210,7 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +		type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
 +		switch(type) {
 +		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
-+			if (gssbuf.value != NULL)
++			if (client_pubkey != NULL)
 +				fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
 +			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
 +			        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
@@ -2154,37 +2235,12 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +				    &shared_secret);
 +				break;
 +			default:
-+				fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
++				fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
 +			}
 +			if (r != 0)
 +				goto out;
 +
 +			/* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
-+
-+			/* Calculate the hash early so we can free the
-+			* client_pubkey, which has reference to the parent
-+			* buffer state->incoming_packet
-+			*/
-+			hashlen = sizeof(hash);
-+			if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
-+			    kex->hash_alg,
-+			    kex->client_version,
-+			    kex->server_version,
-+			    kex->peer,
-+			    kex->my,
-+			    empty,
-+			    client_pubkey,
-+			    server_pubkey,
-+			    shared_secret,
-+			    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
-+				goto out;
-+
-+			gssbuf.value = hash;
-+			gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+			sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
-+			client_pubkey = NULL;
-+
 +			break;
 +		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
 +			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
@@ -2198,15 +2254,15 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +			    type);
 +		}
 +
-+		maj_status = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
-+		    &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++		maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
++		    &send_tok, &ret_flags));
 +
 +		gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok);
 +
 +		if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
 +			fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
 +
-+		if (gssbuf.value == NULL)
++		if (client_pubkey == NULL)
 +			fatal("No client public key");
 +
 +		if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
@@ -2235,7 +2291,24 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
 +		fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
 +
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
++	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
++	if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
++	    kex->hash_alg,
++	    kex->client_version,
++	    kex->server_version,
++	    kex->peer,
++	    kex->my,
++	    empty,
++	    client_pubkey,
++	    server_pubkey,
++	    shared_secret,
++	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++
++	gssbuf.value = hash;
++	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))))
 +		fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
 +
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
@@ -2318,14 +2391,14 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +		if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
 +			free(mechs);
 +
-+	debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name);
++	debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
 +	oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
 +	if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
 +	   fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
 +
-+	debug2_f("Acquiring credentials");
++	debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
 +
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))
++	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
 +		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
 +
 +	/* 5. S generates an ephemeral key pair (do the allocations early) */
@@ -2347,7 +2420,7 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
 +		fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
 +		    min, nbits, max);
-+	kex->dh = mm_choose_dh(min, nbits, max);
++	kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
 +	if (kex->dh == NULL) {
 +		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: no matching group found");
 +		fatal("Protocol error: no matching group found");
@@ -2394,8 +2467,8 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +			    type);
 +		}
 +
-+		maj_status = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
-+		    &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++		maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
++		    &send_tok, &ret_flags));
 +
 +		gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok);
 +
@@ -2460,7 +2533,7 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	gssbuf.value = hash;
 +	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
 +
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
++	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))))
 +		fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
 +
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
@@ -2505,20 +2578,20 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	return r;
 +}
 +#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */
-diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
---- a/monitor.c
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/monitor.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/monitor.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/monitor.c
+@@ -142,6 +142,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *
  int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-+int mm_answer_gss_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
++int mm_answer_gss_sign(struct ssh*, int, struct sshbuf *);
++int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh*, int, struct sshbuf *);
  #endif
  
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-@@ -220,11 +222,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+@@ -214,11 +216,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
@@ -2537,7 +2610,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
      {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
  #endif
-@@ -293,6 +302,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+@@ -287,6 +296,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
  	/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
@@ -2548,24 +2621,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
  	while (!authenticated) {
-@@ -376,8 +376,15 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
- 		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
- 			auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial,
- 			    auth_method, auth_submethod);
--			if (!partial && !authenticated)
-+			if (!partial && !authenticated) {
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+				/* If gssapi-with-mic failed, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC is disabled.
-+				 * We have to reenable it to try again for gssapi-keyex */
-+				if (strcmp(auth_method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 && options.gss_keyex)
-+					monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
-+#endif
- 				authctxt->failures++;
-+			}
- 			if (authenticated || partial) {
- 				auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
- 				    auth_method, auth_submethod);
-@@ -406,6 +419,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+@@ -403,6 +416,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh,
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
@@ -2576,25 +2632,25 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
-@@ -1713,6 +1730,17 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+@@ -1745,6 +1762,17 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh,
  # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
  	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
  # endif
 +# ifdef GSSAPI
-+	if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server;
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_server;
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
-+	}
++		if (options.gss_keyex) {
++			kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++			kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++			kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
++			kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server;
++			kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_server;
++			kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
++			kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
++		}
 +# endif
  #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
  	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
  	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
-@@ -1806,8 +1834,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -1837,8 +1865,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh,
  	u_char *p;
  	int r;
  
@@ -2605,7 +2661,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
-@@ -1839,8 +1867,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -1870,8 +1898,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh
  	OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
  	int r;
  
@@ -2616,7 +2672,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
-@@ -1860,6 +1888,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -1891,6 +1919,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
@@ -2624,7 +2680,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  	}
  	return (0);
  }
-@@ -1871,8 +1900,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -1902,8 +1931,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh,
  	OM_uint32 ret;
  	int r;
  
@@ -2635,7 +2691,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
-@@ -1898,13 +1927,17 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -1929,13 +1958,17 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh,
  int
  mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  {
@@ -2650,14 +2706,14 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
 -	authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +
 +	authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
 +	    ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, kex);
  
  	sshbuf_reset(m);
  	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
-@@ -1913,7 +1946,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -1944,7 +1977,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, in
  	debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
  	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
  
@@ -2670,7 +2726,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
  		auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
-@@ -1921,5 +1958,84 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -1952,5 +1989,85 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, in
  	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
  	return (authenticated);
  }
@@ -2686,15 +2742,16 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 +	int r;
 +
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
++		fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +	data.value = p;
 +	data.length = len;
 +	/* Lengths of SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 hashes that are used */
 +	if (data.length != 20 && data.length != 32 && data.length != 64)
-+		fatal_f("data length incorrect: %d", (int) data.length);
++		fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
++		    (int) data.length);
 +
 +	/* Save the session ID on the first time around */
 +	if (session_id2_len == 0) {
@@ -2710,7 +2767,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +
 +	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
 +
@@ -2731,12 +2788,12 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 +	int r, ok;
 +
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
++		fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.envvar, NULL)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.envval, NULL)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +
 +	ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
 +
@@ -2746,7 +2803,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 +
 +	sshbuf_reset(m);
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ok)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +
 +	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
 +
@@ -2755,10 +2812,10 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 +
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
  
-diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
-index 683e5e07..2b1a2d59 100644
---- a/monitor.h
-+++ b/monitor.h
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/monitor.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/monitor.h
++++ openssh-9.6p1/monitor.h
 @@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
  	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
@@ -2768,11 +2825,11 @@ index 683e5e07..2b1a2d59 100644
  };
  
  struct ssh;
-diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
-index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
---- a/monitor_wrap.c
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
-@@ -993,13 +993,15 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -998,13 +998,15 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss
  }
  
  int
@@ -2785,11 +2842,11 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
  	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
  		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
  
  	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, m);
  	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
-@@ -1012,6 +1014,59 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+@@ -1017,4 +1019,57 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
  	debug3_f("user %sauthenticated", authenticated ? "" : "not ");
  	return (authenticated);
  }
@@ -2802,16 +2859,16 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
 +	int r;
 +
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data->value, data->length)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, m);
 +	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, hash)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(m);
 +
@@ -2825,7 +2882,7 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
 +	int r, ok;
 +
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
 +	    store->filename ? store->filename : "")) != 0 ||
@@ -2833,13 +2890,13 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
 +	    store->envvar ? store->envvar : "")) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
 +	    store->envval ? store->envval : "")) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, m);
 +	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ok)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(m);
 +
@@ -2847,13 +2904,11 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
 +}
 +
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
- 
- /*
-diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
-index 23ab096a..485590c1 100644
---- a/monitor_wrap.h
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
-@@ -64,8 +64,10 @@ int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/monitor_wrap.h
++++ openssh-9.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -65,8 +65,10 @@ int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey
  OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
  OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
     gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
@@ -2865,10 +2920,11 @@ index 23ab096a..485590c1 100644
  #endif
  
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
---- a/readconf.c.gsskex	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/readconf.c	2021-08-27 12:25:42.556421509 +0200
-@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/readconf.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/readconf.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/readconf.c
+@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
  #include "uidswap.h"
  #include "myproposal.h"
  #include "digest.h"
@@ -2876,7 +2932,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  
  #include "fips.h"
  
-@@ -161,6 +162,8 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -166,6 +167,8 @@ typedef enum {
  	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
  	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
  	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
@@ -2885,7 +2941,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
  	oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
  	oHashKnownHosts,
-@@ -206,10 +209,22 @@ static struct {
+@@ -212,10 +215,22 @@ static struct {
  	/* Sometimes-unsupported options */
  #if defined(GSSAPI)
  	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
@@ -2908,7 +2964,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  #endif
  #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
  	{ "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
-@@ -1113,10 +1128,42 @@ parse_time:
+@@ -1212,10 +1227,42 @@ parse_time:
  		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -2951,7 +3007,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  	case oBatchMode:
  		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2306,7 +2353,13 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+@@ -2524,7 +2571,13 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
  	options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1;
  	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
  	options->gss_authentication = -1;
@@ -2965,7 +3021,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
-@@ -2463,8 +2516,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+@@ -2687,8 +2740,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
  		options->pubkey_authentication = SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_ALL;
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
@@ -2984,7 +3040,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -3246,7 +3309,14 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const cha
+@@ -3518,7 +3581,14 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const cha
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
@@ -2999,10 +3055,11 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
-diff -up a/readconf.h.gsskex b/readconf.h
---- a/readconf.h.gsskex	2021-08-27 12:05:29.248142431 +0200
-+++ b/readconf.h	2021-08-27 12:22:19.270679852 +0200
-@@ -39,7 +39,13 @@ typedef struct {
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/readconf.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/readconf.h
++++ openssh-9.6p1/readconf.h
+@@ -40,7 +40,13 @@ typedef struct {
  	int     pubkey_authentication;	/* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
  	int     hostbased_authentication;	/* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* Try GSS authentication */
@@ -3016,17 +3073,18 @@ diff -up a/readconf.h.gsskex b/readconf.h
  	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
  						 * authentication. */
  	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
-diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
---- a/servconf.c.gsskex	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/servconf.c	2021-08-27 12:28:15.887735189 +0200
-@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/servconf.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/servconf.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/servconf.c
+@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
  #include "auth.h"
  #include "myproposal.h"
  #include "digest.h"
 +#include "ssh-gss.h"
  #include "fips.h"
  
- #if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE)
+ static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
 @@ -136,8 +137,11 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
  	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
  	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
@@ -3039,7 +3097,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
  	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
-@@ -356,10 +360,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+@@ -381,10 +385,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
@@ -3058,15 +3116,15 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -506,6 +518,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
+@@ -543,6 +555,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
  	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
  	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 +	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
  	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
  	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
  	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
-@@ -587,12 +600,22 @@ static struct {
+@@ -627,12 +640,22 @@ static struct {
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -3089,7 +3147,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  	{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
-@@ -1576,6 +1599,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
+@@ -1646,6 +1669,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
  		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -3100,7 +3158,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  	case sGssCleanupCreds:
  		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1584,6 +1611,22 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
+@@ -1654,6 +1681,22 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
  		intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -3123,7 +3181,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  	case sPasswordAuthentication:
  		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2892,6 +2935,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -3088,6 +3131,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
@@ -3134,11 +3192,11 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  #endif
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index 4202a2d0..3f47ea25 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -132,8 +132,11 @@ typedef struct {
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/servconf.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/servconf.h
++++ openssh-9.6p1/servconf.h
+@@ -139,8 +139,11 @@ typedef struct {
  	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
  						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
@@ -3150,11 +3208,11 @@ index 4202a2d0..3f47ea25 100644
  	int     password_authentication;	/* If true, permit password
  						 * authentication. */
  	int     kbd_interactive_authentication;	/* If true, permit */
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 8c0e54f7..06a33442 100644
---- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -2678,13 +2678,19 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/session.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/session.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/session.c
+@@ -2726,13 +2726,19 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *au
  
  #ifdef KRB5
  	if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup &&
@@ -3176,11 +3234,19 @@ index 8c0e54f7..06a33442 100644
  #endif
  
  	/* remove agent socket */
-diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
---- a/ssh-gss.h
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -61,10 +61,34 @@
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/ssh-gss.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/ssh-gss.h
++++ openssh-9.6p1/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.15 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -61,10 +61,30 @@
  
  #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
  
@@ -3200,12 +3266,8 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
 +#define KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID			"gss-curve25519-sha256-"
 +
 +#define        GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \
-+	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "," \
-+	KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID	"," \
-+	KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID "," \
-+	KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID "," \
-+	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "," \
-+	KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID
++	KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "," \
++	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID
 +
  typedef struct {
  	char *filename;
@@ -3248,7 +3310,7 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
  
  int  ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
  void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
-@@ -109,6 +134,7 @@ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *, gss_OID, int *);
+@@ -109,6 +134,7 @@ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(
  
  struct sshbuf;
  int ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *, gss_buffer_desc *);
@@ -3276,7 +3338,7 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
 +    const char *);
  OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
 -int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
-+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *, int kex);
++int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *, struct passwd *, int kex);
  OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
  void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
  void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
@@ -3292,11 +3354,11 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
  
  #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
-diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
-index 60de6087..db5c65bc 100644
---- a/ssh.1
-+++ b/ssh.1
-@@ -503,7 +503,13 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/ssh.1
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/ssh.1
++++ openssh-9.6p1/ssh.1
+@@ -536,7 +536,13 @@ For full details of the options listed b
  .It GatewayPorts
  .It GlobalKnownHostsFile
  .It GSSAPIAuthentication
@@ -3310,7 +3372,7 @@ index 60de6087..db5c65bc 100644
  .It HashKnownHosts
  .It Host
  .It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
-@@ -624,6 +624,8 @@
+@@ -624,6 +630,8 @@ flag),
  (supported message integrity codes),
  .Ar kex
  (key exchange algorithms),
@@ -3319,11 +3381,11 @@ index 60de6087..db5c65bc 100644
  .Ar key
  (key types),
  .Ar key-ca-sign
-diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index 15aee569..110cf9c1 100644
---- a/ssh.c
-+++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -747,6 +747,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/ssh.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/ssh.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/ssh.c
+@@ -833,6 +833,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  			else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0 ||
  			    strcasecmp(optarg, "KexAlgorithms") == 0)
  				cp = kex_alg_list('\n');
@@ -3332,22 +3394,20 @@ index 15aee569..110cf9c1 100644
  			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0)
  				cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 0, '\n');
  			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0)
-@@ -772,8 +774,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -862,7 +864,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 						cp[n] = '\n';
  			} else if (strcmp(optarg, "help") == 0) {
  				cp = xstrdup(
- 				    "cipher\ncipher-auth\ncompression\nkex\n"
--				    "key\nkey-cert\nkey-plain\nkey-sig\nmac\n"
--				    "protocol-version\nsig");
-+				    "kex-gss\nkey\nkey-cert\nkey-plain\n"
-+				    "key-sig\nmac\nprotocol-version\nsig");
+-				    "cipher\ncipher-auth\ncompression\nkex\n"
++				    "cipher\ncipher-auth\ncompression\nkex\nkex-gss\n"
+ 				    "key\nkey-cert\nkey-plain\nkey-sig\nmac\n"
+ 				    "protocol-version\nsig");
  			}
- 			if (cp == NULL)
- 				fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg);
-diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
-index 5e8ef548..1ff999b6 100644
---- a/ssh_config
-+++ b/ssh_config
-@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/ssh_config
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/ssh_config
++++ openssh-9.6p1/ssh_config
+@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ Host *
  #   HostbasedAuthentication no
  #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
  #   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
@@ -3356,11 +3416,11 @@ index 5e8ef548..1ff999b6 100644
  #   BatchMode no
  #   CheckHostIP no
  #   AddressFamily any
-diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
-index 06a32d31..3f490697 100644
---- a/ssh_config.5
-+++ b/ssh_config.5
-@@ -766,10 +766,68 @@ The default is
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/ssh_config.5
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/ssh_config.5
++++ openssh-9.6p1/ssh_config.5
+@@ -930,10 +930,67 @@ The default is
  Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
  The default is
  .Cm no .
@@ -3423,18 +3483,26 @@ index 06a32d31..3f490697 100644
 +.Ed
 +.Pp
 +The default is
-+.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
-+gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
-+This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
++.Dq gss-gex-sha1-,gss-group14-sha1- .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
  .It Cm HashKnownHosts
  Indicates that
  .Xr ssh 1
-diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
---- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -163,6 +161,11 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- 	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/sshconnect2.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/sshconnect2.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -80,8 +80,6 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* import */
+-extern char *client_version_string;
+-extern char *server_version_string;
+ extern Options options;
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -224,10 +222,44 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 	char *s, *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
  	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
  
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
@@ -3445,30 +3513,19 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  	xxx_host = host;
  	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
  	xxx_conn_info = cinfo;
-@@ -206,6 +209,42 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- 	    options.kex_algorithms, options.ciphers, options.macs,
- 	    compression_alg_list(options.compression),
- 	    hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms);
-+
+ 
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 +	if (options.gss_keyex) {
 +		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
 +		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
 +		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
 +
-+		if (options.gss_server_identity) {
++		if (options.gss_server_identity)
 +			gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
-+		} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
++		else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
 +			gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
-+			/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
-+			 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
-+			if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
-+				free(gss_host);
-+				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
-+			}
-+		} else {
++		else
 +			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
-+		}
 +
 +		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
 +		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
@@ -3485,10 +3542,11 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +		}
 +	}
 +#endif
- 
- 	free(hkalgs);
- 
-@@ -224,14 +256,44 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
++
+ 	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
+ 		ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
+ 		    options.rekey_interval);
+@@ -275,17 +307,47 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
  # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
  	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client;
  # endif
@@ -3519,8 +3577,11 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +#endif
 +
  	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &ssh->kex->done);
- 	kex_proposal_free_entries(myproposal);
  
+ 	/* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
+ 	free(myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
+ 	    compat_kex_proposal(ssh, options.kex_algorithms);
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 +	/* repair myproposal after it was crumpled by the */
 +	/* ext-info removal above */
@@ -3531,10 +3592,10 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +		free(gss);
 +	}
 +#endif
- #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- 	/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
- 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
-@@ -330,6 +392,7 @@ static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ 	if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_r(r, "kex_prop2buf");
+ 
+@@ -379,6 +441,7 @@ static int input_gssapi_response(int typ
  static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
  static int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
  static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
@@ -3542,7 +3603,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  #endif
  
  void	userauth(struct ssh *, char *);
-@@ -346,6 +409,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
+@@ -395,6 +458,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
  
  Authmethod authmethods[] = {
  #ifdef GSSAPI
@@ -3554,41 +3615,32 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  	{"gssapi-with-mic",
  		userauth_gssapi,
  		userauth_gssapi_cleanup,
-@@ -716,12 +784,32 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -766,12 +834,23 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
  	OM_uint32 min;
  	int r, ok = 0;
  	gss_OID mech = NULL;
-+	char *gss_host = NULL;
++	char *gss_host;
 +
-+	if (options.gss_server_identity) {
++	if (options.gss_server_identity)
 +		gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
-+	} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
++	else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
 +		gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
-+		/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
-+		 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
-+		if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
-+			free(gss_host);
-+			gss_host = xstrdup(authctxt->host);
-+		}
-+	} else {
++	else
 +		gss_host = xstrdup(authctxt->host);
-+	}
  
  	/* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
  	 * once. */
  
  	if (authctxt->gss_supported_mechs == NULL)
 -		gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs);
-+		if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min,
-+		    &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs))) {
-+			authctxt->gss_supported_mechs = NULL;
++		if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs))) {
 +			free(gss_host);
 +			return 0;
 +		}
  
  	/* Check to see whether the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
  	while (authctxt->mech_tried < authctxt->gss_supported_mechs->count &&
-@@ -730,13 +811,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -780,13 +859,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
  		    elements[authctxt->mech_tried];
  		/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
  		if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
@@ -3605,7 +3657,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  	if (!ok || mech == NULL)
  		return 0;
  
-@@ -976,6 +1059,55 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -1020,6 +1101,55 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t p
  	free(lang);
  	return r;
  }
@@ -3630,13 +3682,13 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +	}
 +
 +	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 +
 +	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
 +	    "gssapi-keyex", ssh->kex->session_id);
 +
 +	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
-+		fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
++		fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__);
 +	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
 +
 +	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
@@ -3650,7 +3702,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, mic.value, mic.length)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "parsing");
++		fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(b);
 +	gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
@@ -3661,11 +3713,22 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
  
  static int
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -1852,7 +1852,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/sshd.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/sshd.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/sshd.c
+@@ -808,8 +808,8 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	}
+ 	debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys);
+ 	if (nkeys == 0)
+-		fatal_f("no hostkeys");
+-	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++		debug3("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
++	else if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ 		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ }
+@@ -1944,7 +1944,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  		free(fp);
  	}
  	accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL);
@@ -3675,22 +3738,7 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
  		logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
  		exit(1);
  	}
-diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
-index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
---- a/sshd-session.c
-+++ b/sshd-session.c
-@@ -817,8 +817,8 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	}
- 	debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys);
- 	if (nkeys == 0)
--		fatal_f("no hostkeys");
--	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+		debug3_f("no hostkeys");
-+	else if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- 		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__);
- 	sshbuf_free(buf);
- }
-@@ -2347,6 +2348,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -2421,6 +2422,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
  
  	free(hkalgs);
  
@@ -3739,10 +3787,10 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
  	/* start key exchange */
  	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
  		fatal_r(r, "kex_setup");
-@@ -2362,7 +2405,18 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
-  #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+@@ -2438,7 +2481,18 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
  	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
-  #endif
+ # endif
 -#endif
 +# ifdef GSSAPI
 +	if (options.gss_keyex) {
@@ -3759,10 +3807,10 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
  	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
  	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
  	kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
-diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
-index 19b7c91a..2c48105f 100644
---- a/sshd_config
-+++ b/sshd_config
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/sshd_config
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/sshd_config
++++ openssh-9.6p1/sshd_config
 @@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
  # GSSAPI options
  #GSSAPIAuthentication no
@@ -3772,11 +3820,11 @@ index 19b7c91a..2c48105f 100644
  
  # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
  # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 70ccea44..f6b41a2f 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -646,6 +646,11 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/sshd_config.5
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/sshd_config.5
++++ openssh-9.6p1/sshd_config.5
+@@ -733,6 +733,11 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
  on logout.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
@@ -3788,7 +3836,7 @@ index 70ccea44..f6b41a2f 100644
  .It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
  Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
  a client authenticates against.
-@@ -660,6 +665,32 @@ machine's default store.
+@@ -747,6 +752,31 @@ machine's default store.
  This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
@@ -3815,79 +3863,20 @@ index 70ccea44..f6b41a2f 100644
 +.Ed
 +.Pp
 +The default is
-+.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
-+gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
-+This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
++.Dq gss-gex-sha1-,gss-group14-sha1- .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
  .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
  Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
  authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
-diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index 57995ee6..fd5b7724 100644
---- a/sshkey.c
-+++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -127,6 +127,75 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/sshkey.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/sshkey.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/sshkey.c
+@@ -128,6 +128,17 @@ extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_d
  extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_xmss_impl;
  extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_xmss_cert_impl;
  #endif
-+
-+static int ssh_gss_equal(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *)
-+{
-+	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
-+}
-+
-+static int ssh_gss_serialize_public(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
-+	enum sshkey_serialize_rep)
-+{
-+	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
-+}
-+
-+static int ssh_gss_deserialize_public(const char *, struct sshbuf *,
-+	     struct sshkey *)
-+{
-+	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
-+}
-+
-+static int ssh_gss_serialize_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
-+	     enum sshkey_serialize_rep)
-+{
-+	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
-+}
-+
-+static int ssh_gss_deserialize_private(const char *, struct sshbuf *,
-+	     struct sshkey *)
-+{
-+	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
-+}
-+
-+static int ssh_gss_copy_public(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *)
-+{
-+	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
-+}
-+
-+static int ssh_gss_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
-+	    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int,
-+	    struct sshkey_sig_details **)
-+{
-+	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
-+}
-+
-+static const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_gss_funcs = {
-+	/* .size = */		NULL,
-+	/* .alloc = */		NULL,
-+	/* .cleanup = */	NULL,
-+	/* .equal = */		ssh_gss_equal,
-+	/* .ssh_serialize_public = */ ssh_gss_serialize_public,
-+	/* .ssh_deserialize_public = */ ssh_gss_deserialize_public,
-+	/* .ssh_serialize_private = */ ssh_gss_serialize_private,
-+	/* .ssh_deserialize_private = */ ssh_gss_deserialize_private,
-+	/* .generate = */	NULL,
-+	/* .copy_public = */	ssh_gss_copy_public,
-+	/* .sign = */		NULL,
-+	/* .verify = */		ssh_gss_verify,
-+};
-+
-+/* The struct is intentionally dummy and has no gss calls */
-+static const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_gss_kex_impl = {
++const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_null_impl = {
 +	/* .name = */		"null",
 +	/* .shortname = */	"null",
 +	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
@@ -3895,21 +3884,21 @@ index 57995ee6..fd5b7724 100644
 +	/* .nid = */		0,
 +	/* .cert = */		0,
 +	/* .sigonly = */	0,
-+	/* .keybits = */	0, /* FIXME */
-+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_gss_funcs,
++	/* .keybits = */	0,
++	/* .funcs = */		NULL,
 +};
  
  const struct sshkey_impl * const keyimpls[] = {
  	&sshkey_ed25519_impl,
-@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
+@@ -165,6 +176,7 @@ const struct sshkey_impl * const keyimpl
  	&sshkey_xmss_impl,
  	&sshkey_xmss_cert_impl,
  #endif
-+	&sshkey_gss_kex_impl,
++        &sshkey_null_impl,
  	NULL
  };
  
-@@ -255,7 +256,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
+@@ -320,7 +332,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plai
  
  	for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
  		impl = keyimpls[i];
@@ -3918,11 +3907,11 @@ index 57995ee6..fd5b7724 100644
  			continue;
  		if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly)
  			continue;
-diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
-index 71a3fddc..37a43a67 100644
---- a/sshkey.h
-+++ b/sshkey.h
-@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/sshkey.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/sshkey.h
++++ openssh-9.6p1/sshkey.h
+@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
  	KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT,
  	KEY_ED25519_SK,
  	KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT,
@@ -3930,24 +3919,14 @@ index 71a3fddc..37a43a67 100644
  	KEY_UNSPEC
  };
  
-diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h
---- a/packet.h	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
-+++ b/packet.h	(date 1703172586447)
-@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@
- int	 ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *);
-
- int      ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *);
-+int	 ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *, u_int type);
- int ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p);
- int	 ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *, const char *buf, u_int len);
- int	 ssh_packet_process_read(struct ssh *, int);
-diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
---- a/packet.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
-+++ b/packet.c	(date 1703172586447)
-@@ -1425,6 +1416,29 @@
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/packet.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/packet.c
++++ openssh-9.6p1/packet.c
+@@ -1425,6 +1425,29 @@ ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *ssh)
  	return type;
  }
-
+ 
 +/*
 + * Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches
 + * that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch.
@@ -3974,3 +3953,15 @@ diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
  static int
  ssh_packet_read_poll2_mux(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
  {
+Index: openssh-9.6p1/packet.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-9.6p1.orig/packet.h
++++ openssh-9.6p1/packet.h
+@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ int	 ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh
+ int	 ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *);
+ 
+ int      ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *);
++int	 ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *, u_int type);
+ int      ssh_packet_read_poll(struct ssh *);
+ int ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p);
+ int	 ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *, const char *buf, u_int len);
diff --git a/openssh-8.1p1-audit.patch b/openssh-8.1p1-audit.patch
index 04c8026..6479633 100644
--- a/openssh-8.1p1-audit.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.1p1-audit.patch
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/audit-linux.c
  /* Below is the sshd audit API code */
  
  void
-@@ -76,49 +176,211 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
+@@ -76,49 +176,210 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
  	/* not implemented */
  }
  
@@ -315,7 +315,6 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/audit-linux.c
  	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
 +		if (options.use_pam)
 +			break;
-+	/* Fallthrough */
 +	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
  	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
  	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
@@ -452,7 +451,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/audit-linux.c
 +	}
 +	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
 +			buf, NULL,
-+			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), /*FIXME listening_for_clients() ? NULL : ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh) */
++			listening_for_clients() ? NULL : ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 +			NULL, 1);
 +	audit_close(audit_fd);
 +	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
@@ -519,19 +518,19 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/audit.c
 +void
 +audit_unsupported(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
 +{
-+	mm_audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what);
++	PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what));
 +}
 +
 +void
 +audit_kex(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs)
 +{
-+	mm_audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid());
++	PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid()));
 +}
 +
 +void
 +audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos)
 +{
-+	mm_audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, getpid(), getuid());
++	PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, getpid(), getuid()));
 +}
 +
  # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
@@ -779,18 +778,18 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/auth.h
 +    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
  
  /* Key / cert options linkage to auth layer */
- int	 auth_activate_options(struct ssh *, struct sshauthopt *);
+ const struct sshauthopt *auth_options(struct ssh *);
 Index: openssh-8.9p1/auth2-hostbased.c
 ===================================================================
 --- openssh-8.9p1.orig/auth2-hostbased.c
 +++ openssh-8.9p1/auth2-hostbased.c
 @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, cons
  	authenticated = 0;
- 	if (mm_hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser,
- 	    chost, key) &&
--	    mm_sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
-+	    mm_hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
- 	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL) == 0)
+ 	if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser,
+ 	    chost, key)) &&
+-	    PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
++	    PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
+ 	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL)) == 0)
  		authenticated = 1;
  
 @@ -166,6 +166,19 @@ done:
@@ -820,12 +819,12 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/auth2-pubkey.c
 @@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const c
  		/* test for correct signature */
  		authenticated = 0;
- 		if (mm_user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts) &&
--		    mm_sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
-+		    mm_user_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
+ 		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) &&
+-		    PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
++		    PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
  		    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b),
  		    (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL,
- 		    ssh->compat, &sig_details) == 0) {
+ 		    ssh->compat, &sig_details)) == 0) {
 @@ -316,6 +316,19 @@ done:
  	return authenticated;
  }
@@ -855,7 +854,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/auth2.c
  			/* Invalid user, fake password information */
  			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
 -#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
--			mm_audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER);
+-			PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER));
 -#endif
  		}
  #ifdef USE_PAM
@@ -940,8 +939,8 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/kex.c
  #include "xmalloc.h"
 +#include "audit.h"
  
- /* prototype */
- static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
 @@ -879,12 +880,16 @@ kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh)
  }
  
@@ -1125,7 +1124,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/monitor.c
  extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
  extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
  
-+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
 +
  /* State exported from the child */
  static struct sshbuf *child_state;
@@ -1258,7 +1257,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/monitor.c
  		sshpam_cleanup();
  #endif
  
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
++	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0);
 +
  	while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
  		if (errno != EINTR)
@@ -1302,12 +1301,12 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/monitor.c
 +	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &handle)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cmd, &len)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +
 +	s = session_by_id(handle);
 +	if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL ||
 +	    strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0)
-+		fatal_f("invalid handle");
++		fatal("%s: invalid handle", __func__);
 +	mm_session_close(ssh, s);
  	free(cmd);
  	return (0);
@@ -1350,7 +1349,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/monitor.c
 +	int what, r;
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &what)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +
 +	audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what);
 +
@@ -1375,10 +1374,10 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/monitor.c
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &compress, NULL)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pfs, NULL)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +	pid = (pid_t) tmp;
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +	uid = (pid_t) tmp;
 +
 +	audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pfs, pid, uid);
@@ -1403,10 +1402,10 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/monitor.c
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ctos)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +	pid = (pid_t) tmp;
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +	uid = (uid_t) tmp;
 +
 +	audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, pid, uid);
@@ -1428,10 +1427,10 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/monitor.c
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &fp, &len)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +	pid = (pid_t) tmp;
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +	uid = (uid_t) tmp;
 +
 +	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, pid, uid);
@@ -1527,7 +1526,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/monitor_wrap.c
 +	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &handle)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +	sshbuf_free(m);
 +
 +	return (handle);
@@ -1542,19 +1541,19 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/monitor_wrap.c
 +	debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
 +
 + 	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, handle)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, command)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, m);
  	sshbuf_free(m);
  }
  #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-@@ -1217,3 +1257,83 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_cc
- 	return &ci;
+@@ -1074,3 +1114,130 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_cc
  }
  
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 +void
 +mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
@@ -1563,9 +1562,9 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/monitor_wrap.c
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
 +
 + 	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, what)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m);
 +	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED,
@@ -1582,7 +1581,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/monitor_wrap.c
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
 +
 + 	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ctos)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, cipher)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, (mac ? mac : "<implicit>"))) != 0 ||
@@ -1590,7 +1589,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/monitor_wrap.c
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, fps)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, pid)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, uid)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, m);
 +	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
@@ -1606,11 +1605,11 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/monitor_wrap.c
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
 +
 + 	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ctos)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, pid)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, uid)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
 +	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
@@ -1625,15 +1624,62 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/monitor_wrap.c
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
 +
 + 	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, fp)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, pid)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, uid)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
 +	sshbuf_free(m);
 +}
++
++int mm_forward_audit_messages(int fdin)
++{
++	u_char buf[4];
++	u_int blen, msg_len;
++	struct sshbuf *m;
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
++	m = sshbuf_new();
++	do {
++		int r;
++
++		blen = atomicio(read, fdin, buf, sizeof(buf));
++		if (blen == 0) /* closed pipe */
++			break;
++		if (blen != sizeof(buf)) {
++			error("%s: Failed to read the buffer from child", __func__);
++			ret = -1;
++			break;
++		}
++
++		msg_len = get_u32(buf);
++		if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
++			fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
++		sshbuf_reset(m);
++		if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, NULL)) != 0)
++			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		if (atomicio(read, fdin, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
++			error("%s: Failed to read the the buffer conent from the child", __func__);
++			ret = -1;
++			break;
++		}
++		if (atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buf, blen) != blen || 
++		    atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
++			error("%s: Failed to write the messag to the monitor", __func__);
++			ret = -1;
++			break;
++		}
++	} while (1);
++	sshbuf_free(m);
++	return ret;
++}
++void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int fd)
++{
++	pmonitor->m_recvfd = fd;
++}
 +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
 Index: openssh-8.9p1/monitor_wrap.h
 ===================================================================
@@ -1649,8 +1695,8 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/monitor_wrap.h
 +int mm_user_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
      const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
  
- void mm_decode_activate_server_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m);
-@@ -83,7 +85,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+@@ -83,7 +85,14 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
  #include "audit.h"
  void mm_audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t);
@@ -1661,6 +1707,8 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/monitor_wrap.h
 +void mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
 +void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, pid_t, uid_t);
 +void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
++int mm_forward_audit_messages(int);
++void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int);
  #endif
  
  struct Session;
@@ -1690,7 +1738,12 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/packet.c
  /*
   * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string.  The returned
   * string must not be freed.
-@@ -579,22 +587,19 @@ ssh_packet_rdomain_in(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -579,26 +587,23 @@ ssh_packet_rdomain_in(struct ssh *ssh)
+ /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
+ 
+ static void
+-ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ssh, int do_close)
++ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ssh, int do_close, int do_audit)
  {
  	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
  	u_int mode;
@@ -1722,7 +1775,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/packet.c
  #endif	/* WITH_ZLIB */
  	cipher_free(state->send_context);
  	cipher_free(state->receive_context);
-+	if (had_keys && state->server_side) {
++	if (do_audit && had_keys && state->server_side) {
 +		/* Assuming this is called only from privsep child */
 +		audit_session_key_free(ssh, MODE_MAX);
 +	}
@@ -1737,6 +1790,28 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/packet.c
  		free(ssh->local_ipaddr);
  		ssh->local_ipaddr = NULL;
  		free(ssh->remote_ipaddr);
+@@ -650,13 +665,19 @@ ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ss
+ void
+ ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+-	ssh_packet_close_internal(ssh, 1);
++	ssh_packet_close_internal(ssh, 1, 1);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ ssh_packet_clear_keys(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+-	ssh_packet_close_internal(ssh, 0);
++	ssh_packet_close_internal(ssh, 0, 1);
++}
++
++void
++ssh_packet_clear_keys_noaudit(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	ssh_packet_close_internal(ssh, 0, 0);
+ }
+ 
+ /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
 @@ -892,6 +913,7 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mod
  		    (unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes,
  		    (unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks);
@@ -1745,7 +1820,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/packet.c
  		state->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
  	}
  	/* note that both bytes and the seqnr are not reset */
-@@ -2183,6 +2205,72 @@ ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -2183,6 +2205,73 @@ ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh)
  	return (void *)ssh->state->output;
  }
  
@@ -1775,8 +1850,9 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/packet.c
 +		return;
 +
 +	cipher_free(state->receive_context);
++	state->receive_context = NULL;
 +	cipher_free(state->send_context);
-+	state->send_context = state->receive_context = NULL;
++	state->send_context = NULL;
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(state->input);
 +	state->input = NULL;
@@ -1822,6 +1898,14 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/packet.h
 ===================================================================
 --- openssh-8.9p1.orig/packet.h
 +++ openssh-8.9p1/packet.h
+@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ int      ssh_packet_get_connection_out(s
+ void     ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *);
+ void	 ssh_packet_set_input_hook(struct ssh *, ssh_packet_hook_fn *, void *);
+ void	 ssh_packet_clear_keys(struct ssh *);
++void     ssh_packet_clear_keys_noaudit(struct ssh *);
+ void	 ssh_clear_newkeys(struct ssh *, int);
+ 
+ int	 ssh_packet_is_rekeying(struct ssh *);
 @@ -220,4 +221,5 @@ const u_char	*sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, s
  # undef EC_POINT
  #endif
@@ -1837,11 +1921,22 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/session.c
  extern u_int utmp_len;
  extern int startup_pipe;
 -extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
-+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
  extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
  extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
  extern char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */
-@@ -644,6 +644,14 @@ do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s,
+@@ -157,6 +157,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL;
+ login_cap_t *lc;
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++int paudit[2];
++#endif
++
+ static int is_child = 0;
+ static int in_chroot = 0;
+ 
+@@ -642,6 +646,14 @@ do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s,
  	/* Parent.  Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
  	close(ttyfd);
  
@@ -1856,42 +1951,85 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/session.c
  	/* Enter interactive session. */
  	s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
  	ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, 1,
-@@ -736,15 +744,19 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
+@@ -706,15 +718,21 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
  	    s->self);
  
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 +	if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
 +		fatal("do_exec: command already set");
  	if (command != NULL)
--		mm_audit_run_command(command);
+-		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
 +		s->command = xstrdup(command);
  	else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
  		char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
  
  		if (shell[0] == '\0')	/* empty shell means /bin/sh */
  			shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
--		mm_audit_run_command(shell);
+-		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
 +		s->command = xstrdup(shell);
  	}
 +	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
-+		s->command_handle = mm_audit_run_command(ssh, s->command);
++		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
++	if (pipe(paudit) < 0)
++		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
  #endif
  	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
  		ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
-@@ -1550,8 +1562,11 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
+@@ -730,6 +748,20 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
+ 	 */
+ 	sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
+ 
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	close(paudit[1]);
++	if (use_privsep && ret == 0) {
++		/*
++		 * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them
++		 * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly,
++		 * because the messages might get mixed up.
++		 * Continue after the pipe gets closed (all messages sent).
++		 */
++		ret = mm_forward_audit_messages(paudit[0]);
++	}
++	close(paudit[0]);
++#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
++
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1530,11 +1562,30 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
+ 	int env_size;
+ 	int r = 0;
+ 
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	int pparent = paudit[1];
++	close(paudit[0]);
++	/* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */
++	if (use_privsep)
++		mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
++#endif
++
  	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
  
  	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
 -	destroy_sensitive_data();
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
- 	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
-+	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
-+	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
+-	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
++	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, use_privsep);
++	ssh_packet_clear_keys_noaudit(ssh);
++	/*
++	 * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the
++	 * messages over postauth child. But this message requires an answer
++	 * which we can't do using a one-way pipe.
++	 */
 +	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1);
++
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	/* Notify parent that we are done */
++	close(pparent);
++#endif
  
  	/* Force a password change */
  	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
-@@ -1763,6 +1778,9 @@ session_unused(int id)
+@@ -1743,6 +1794,9 @@ session_unused(int id)
  	sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
  	sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
  	sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
@@ -1901,7 +2039,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/session.c
  	sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
  	sessions_first_unused = id;
  }
-@@ -1843,6 +1861,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha
+@@ -1822,6 +1876,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha
  }
  
  Session *
@@ -1912,7 +2050,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/session.c
 +		if (s->used)
 +			return s;
 +	}
-+	debug_f("unknown id %d", id);
++	debug("%s: unknown id %d", __func__, id);
 +	session_dump();
 +	return NULL;
 +}
@@ -1921,7 +2059,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/session.c
  session_by_tty(char *tty)
  {
  	int i;
-@@ -2450,6 +2481,32 @@ session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Se
+@@ -2429,6 +2496,32 @@ session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Se
  		chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
  }
  
@@ -1943,7 +2081,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/session.c
 +{
 +	if (s->command != NULL) {
 +		if (s->command_handle != -1)
-+			mm_audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command);
++			PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command));
 +		free(s->command);
 +		s->command = NULL;
 +		s->command_handle = -1;
@@ -1954,7 +2092,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/session.c
  void
  session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
  {
-@@ -2463,6 +2520,10 @@ session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *
+@@ -2470,6 +2563,10 @@ session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *
  
  	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
  		session_pty_cleanup(s);
@@ -1965,7 +2103,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/session.c
  	free(s->term);
  	free(s->display);
  	free(s->x11_chanids);
-@@ -2537,14 +2598,14 @@ session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *ssh
+@@ -2544,14 +2641,14 @@ session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *ssh
  }
  
  void
@@ -1982,7 +2120,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/session.c
  			else
  				session_close(ssh, s);
  		}
-@@ -2671,6 +2732,15 @@ do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authc
+@@ -2677,6 +2774,15 @@ do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authc
  	server_loop2(ssh, authctxt);
  }
  
@@ -1998,10 +2136,10 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/session.c
  void
  do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
  {
-@@ -2734,7 +2804,7 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *au
+@@ -2740,7 +2846,7 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *au
  	 * or if running in monitor.
  	 */
- 	if (mm_is_monitor())
+ 	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
 -		session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2);
 +		session_destroy_all(ssh, do_cleanup_one_session);
  }
@@ -2042,34 +2180,6 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/sshd.c
 ===================================================================
 --- openssh-8.9p1.orig/sshd.c
 +++ openssh-8.9p1/sshd.c
-@@ -219,6 +219,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void)
- 	num_listen_socks = 0;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific
-+ * client connection?)
-+ */
-+int listening_for_clients(void)
-+{
-+	return num_listen_socks > 0;
-+}
-+
- /* Allocate and initialise the children array */
- static void
- child_alloc(void)
-@@ -897,6 +906,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
- 		if (received_sigterm) {
- 			logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
- 			    (int) received_sigterm);
-+                       /* destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0); FIXME */
- 			close_listen_socks();
- 			if (options.pid_file != NULL)
- 				unlink(options.pid_file);
-Index: openssh-8.9p1/sshd-session.c
-===================================================================
---- openssh-8.9p1.orig/sshd-session.c
-+++ openssh-8.9p1/sshd-session.c
 @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@
  #include "ssh-gss.h"
  #endif
@@ -2079,18 +2189,34 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/sshd-session.c
  #include "auth-options.h"
  #include "version.h"
 @@ -265,8 +266,8 @@ struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
- struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+ struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
  
  /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
 -void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
 -void demote_sensitive_data(void);
-+void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
++void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
 +void demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
  static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
  
- /*
-@@ -382,18 +383,40 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
- 	_exit(EXIT_LOGIN_GRACE);
+ static char *listener_proctitle;
+@@ -284,6 +285,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void)
+ 	num_listen_socks = 0;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific
++ * client connection?)
++ */
++int listening_for_clients(void)
++{
++	return num_listen_socks >= 0;
++}
++
+ static void
+ close_startup_pipes(void)
+ {
+@@ -382,18 +392,45 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
+ 	    ssh_remote_port(the_active_state));
  }
  
 -/* Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed. */
@@ -2100,7 +2226,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/sshd-session.c
 + */
  void
 -destroy_sensitive_data(void)
-+destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh)
++destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, int privsep)
  {
  	u_int i;
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
@@ -2122,7 +2248,12 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/sshd-session.c
  			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
 +			if (fp != NULL) {
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+				audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, pid, uid);
++				if (privsep)
++					PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp,
++						pid, uid));
++				else
++					audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp,
++						pid, uid);
 +#endif
 +				free(fp);
 +			}
@@ -2133,7 +2264,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/sshd-session.c
  			sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
  			sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
  		}
-@@ -402,20 +430,38 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void)
+@@ -402,20 +439,38 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void)
  
  /* Demote private to public keys for network child */
  void
@@ -2173,7 +2304,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/sshd-session.c
  		}
  		/* Certs do not need demotion */
  	}
-@@ -443,7 +489,7 @@ reseed_prngs(void)
+@@ -443,7 +498,7 @@ reseed_prngs(void)
  }
  
  static void
@@ -2182,7 +2313,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/sshd-session.c
  {
  	gid_t gidset[1];
  
-@@ -458,7 +504,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
+@@ -458,7 +513,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
  	reseed_prngs();
  
  	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
@@ -2191,16 +2322,16 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/sshd-session.c
  
  	/* Demote the child */
  	if (privsep_chroot) {
-@@ -493,7 +539,7 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	pmonitor->m_pkex = &ssh->kex;
+@@ -493,7 +548,7 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
  
- 	box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
+ 	if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON)
+ 		box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
 -	pid = fork();
 +	pmonitor->m_pid = pid = fork();
  	if (pid == -1) {
  		fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
  	} else if (pid != 0) {
-@@ -538,7 +584,7 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -538,7 +593,7 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
  		/* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */
  		set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
  
@@ -2209,7 +2340,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/sshd-session.c
  		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
  		if (box != NULL)
  			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
-@@ -582,7 +628,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
+@@ -582,7 +637,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
  	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
  
  	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
@@ -2218,17 +2349,43 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/sshd-session.c
  
  	reseed_prngs();
  
-@@ -2311,6 +2358,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1136,7 +1191,7 @@ server_listen(void)
+  * from this function are in a forked subprocess.
+  */
+ static void
+-server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
++server_accept_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
+ {
+ 	struct pollfd *pfd = NULL;
+ 	int i, j, ret, npfd;
+@@ -1179,6 +1234,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
+ 		if (received_sigterm) {
+ 			logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
+ 			    (int) received_sigterm);
++			destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0);
+ 			close_listen_socks();
+ 			if (options.pid_file != NULL)
+ 				unlink(options.pid_file);
+@@ -2088,7 +2144,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #endif
+ 
+ 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
+-		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
++		server_accept_loop(ssh, &sock_in, &sock_out,
+ 		    &newsock, config_s);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -2311,6 +2367,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt);
  
  	/* The connection has been terminated. */
 +	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 1, 1);
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
++	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
 +
  	ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes);
  	verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
  	    (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
-@@ -2491,6 +2541,15 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -2491,6 +2550,15 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
  void
  cleanup_exit(int i)
  {
@@ -2241,17 +2398,24 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/sshd-session.c
 +	if (in_cleanup)
 +		_exit(i);
 +	in_cleanup = 1;
- 	extern int auth_attempted; /* monitor.c */
- 
  	if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) {
-@@ -2525,7 +2593,9 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
- 		_exit(EXIT_AUTH_ATTEMPTED);
+ 		do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt);
+ 		if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth &&
+@@ -2503,9 +2571,16 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid == 0;
++	if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL && the_active_state != NULL)
++		destroy_sensitive_data(the_active_state, is_privsep_child);
++	if (the_active_state != NULL)
++		packet_destroy_all(the_active_state, 1, is_privsep_child);
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
  	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
--	if (the_active_state != NULL && mm_is_monitor())
-+       if (the_active_state != NULL &&
-+           (the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
-+           mm_is_monitor())
+-	if (the_active_state != NULL && (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
++	if (the_active_state != NULL &&
++	    (the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
++	    (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
  		audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
  #endif
  	_exit(i);
diff --git a/openssh-8.4p1-vendordir.patch b/openssh-8.4p1-vendordir.patch
index 60644db..3b38457 100644
--- a/openssh-8.4p1-vendordir.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.4p1-vendordir.patch
@@ -123,21 +123,28 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/sshd.c
 ===================================================================
 --- openssh-8.9p1.orig/sshd.c
 +++ openssh-8.9p1/sshd.c
-@@ -1201,7 +1201,8 @@ prepare_proctitle(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ extern char *__progname;
+ ServerOptions options;
+ 
+ /* Name of the server configuration file. */
+-char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
++char *config_file_name = NULL;
+ 
+ /*
+  * Debug mode flag.  This can be set on the command line.  If debug
+@@ -1591,6 +1591,7 @@ prepare_proctitle(int ac, char **av)
+ int
+ main(int ac, char **av)
+ {
++	struct stat st;
+ 	struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
  	extern char *optarg;
  	extern int optind;
- 	int log_stderr = 0, inetd_flag = 0, test_flag = 0, no_daemon_flag = 0;
--	char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
-+	char *config_file_name = NULL;
-+	struct stat st;
- 	int r, opt, do_dump_cfg = 0, keytype, already_daemon, have_agent = 0;
- 	int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1, rexec_argc = 0;
- 	int devnull, config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 }, have_connection_info = 0;
 @@ -1806,7 +1807,21 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	/* Fetch our configuration */
- 	if ((cfg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- 		fatal("sshbuf_new config failed");
-+	if (config_file_name == NULL) {
+ 			 */
+ 			(void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe, "\0", 1);
+ 		}
++	} else if (config_file_name == NULL) {
 +	        /* If only the vendor configuration file exists, use that.
 +		 * Else use the standard configuration file.
 +		 */
@@ -150,12 +157,11 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/sshd.c
 +			config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
 +		}
 +		load_server_config(config_file_name, cfg);
--	if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
-+ 	} else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
+ 	} else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
 +	        /* load config specified on commandline */
  		load_server_config(config_file_name, cfg);
  
- 	parse_server_config(&options, config_file_name, cfg,
+ 	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
 Index: openssh-8.9p1/sshd_config.5
 ===================================================================
 --- openssh-8.9p1.orig/sshd_config.5
diff --git a/openssh-9.6p1-crypto-policies-man.patch b/openssh-9.6p1-crypto-policies-man.patch
index 9e8ace8..5c386f0 100644
--- a/openssh-9.6p1-crypto-policies-man.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.6p1-crypto-policies-man.patch
@@ -84,14 +84,13 @@ Index: openssh-9.6p1/ssh_config.5
  The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
  key exchange. Possible values are
  .Bd -literal -offset 3n
-@@ -991,10 +993,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+@@ -991,9 +993,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
  gss-curve25519-sha256-
  .Ed
  .Pp
 -The default is
--.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
--gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
- This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
+-.Dq gss-gex-sha1-,gss-group14-sha1- .
+ This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
 +.Pp
  .It Cm HashKnownHosts
  Indicates that
@@ -160,7 +159,7 @@ Index: openssh-9.6p1/ssh_config.5
  .It Cm HostKeyAlias
  Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
  real host name when looking up or saving the host key
-@@ -1311,36 +1313,30 @@ it may be zero or more of:
+@@ -1311,31 +1313,26 @@ it may be zero or more of:
  and
  .Cm pam .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
@@ -170,12 +169,8 @@ Index: openssh-9.6p1/ssh_config.5
 +existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that will be used and
- their preference order.
- The selected algorithm will the the first algorithm in this list that
- the server also supports.
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
  Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- .Pp
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
 -character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
@@ -191,7 +186,6 @@ Index: openssh-9.6p1/ssh_config.5
  .Sq ^
  character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
--.Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
@@ -205,7 +199,7 @@ Index: openssh-9.6p1/ssh_config.5
 -.Ed
 +built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
- The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q kex .
 @@ -1445,37 +1442,34 @@ function, and all code in the
  file.
@@ -392,7 +386,7 @@ Index: openssh-9.6p1/sshd_config.5
  The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
  .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-@@ -764,53 +760,45 @@ For this to work
+@@ -764,52 +760,45 @@ For this to work
  .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
  needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
  .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
@@ -421,9 +415,8 @@ Index: openssh-9.6p1/sshd_config.5
  .Ed
 -.Pp
 -The default is
--.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
--gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
- This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
+-.Dq gss-gex-sha1-,gss-group14-sha1- .
+ This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
  .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
@@ -499,7 +492,7 @@ Index: openssh-9.6p1/sshd_config.5
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
  .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
-@@ -1027,24 +1006,30 @@ file on logout.
+@@ -1027,20 +1006,26 @@ file on logout.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
@@ -509,13 +502,9 @@ Index: openssh-9.6p1/sshd_config.5
 +existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
- offer to clients.
- The ordering of this list is not important, as the client specifies the
- preference order.
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
  Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- .Pp
- If the specified list begins with a
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
 -character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 -instead of replacing them.
@@ -531,9 +520,9 @@ Index: openssh-9.6p1/sshd_config.5
  character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
 +built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
  The supported algorithms are:
  .Pp
+ .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
 @@ -1072,16 +1057,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
  sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
  .El
@@ -548,7 +537,7 @@ Index: openssh-9.6p1/sshd_config.5
 -diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
- The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
  .It Cm ListenAddress
 @@ -1167,21 +1142,27 @@ function, and all code in the
diff --git a/openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz b/openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d753ff2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:910211c07255a8c5ad654391b40ee59800710dd8119dd5362de09385aa7a777c
+size 1857862
diff --git a/openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz.asc b/openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1b20242
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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+=G9YA
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz b/openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz
deleted file mode 100644
index 01ee7b2..0000000
--- a/openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
-oid sha256:dd8bd002a379b5d499dfb050dd1fa9af8029e80461f4bb6c523c49973f5a39f3
-size 1910393
diff --git a/openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz.asc b/openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz.asc
deleted file mode 100644
index c55f019..0000000
--- a/openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz.asc
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
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-
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diff --git a/openssh-askpass-gnome.changes b/openssh-askpass-gnome.changes
index 93e63a2..edbc3d4 100644
--- a/openssh-askpass-gnome.changes
+++ b/openssh-askpass-gnome.changes
@@ -1,10 +1,3 @@
--------------------------------------------------------------------
-Thu Aug  1 09:17:11 UTC 2024 - Antonio Larrosa <alarrosa@suse.com>
-
-- Update to openssh 9.8p1:
-  * No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
-    details.
-
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Sun Feb 25 18:26:23 UTC 2024 - Hans Petter Jansson <hpj@suse.com>
 
diff --git a/openssh-askpass-gnome.spec b/openssh-askpass-gnome.spec
index 83f4beb..bf91659 100644
--- a/openssh-askpass-gnome.spec
+++ b/openssh-askpass-gnome.spec
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #
 # spec file for package openssh-askpass-gnome
 #
-# Copyright (c) 2024 SUSE LLC
+# Copyright (c) 2020 SUSE LLC
 #
 # All modifications and additions to the file contributed by third parties
 # remain the property of their copyright owners, unless otherwise agreed
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 
 %define _name openssh
 Name:           openssh-askpass-gnome
-Version:        9.8p1
+Version:        9.6p1
 Release:        0
 Summary:        A GNOME-Based Passphrase Dialog for OpenSSH
 License:        BSD-2-Clause
diff --git a/openssh-mitigate-lingering-secrets.patch b/openssh-mitigate-lingering-secrets.patch
index 44af87e..9422abd 100644
--- a/openssh-mitigate-lingering-secrets.patch
+++ b/openssh-mitigate-lingering-secrets.patch
@@ -207,9 +207,9 @@ Index: openssh-9.3p2/packet.h
 --- openssh-9.3p2.orig/packet.h
 +++ openssh-9.3p2/packet.h
 @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ void     ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *);
- void     ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *);
  void	 ssh_packet_set_input_hook(struct ssh *, ssh_packet_hook_fn *, void *);
  void	 ssh_packet_clear_keys(struct ssh *);
+ void     ssh_packet_clear_keys_noaudit(struct ssh *);
 +void	 ssh_clear_curkeys(struct ssh *, int);
  void	 ssh_clear_newkeys(struct ssh *, int);
  
@@ -264,12 +264,12 @@ Index: openssh-9.3p2/sshbuf.h
  /* Macros for decoding/encoding integers */
  #define PEEK_U64(p) \
  	(((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 56) | \
-Index: openssh-9.3p2/sshd-session.c
+Index: openssh-9.3p2/sshd.c
 ===================================================================
---- openssh-9.3p2.orig/sshd-session.c
-+++ openssh-9.3p2/sshd-session.c
-@@ -197,6 +197,19 @@ static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
- static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
+--- openssh-9.3p2.orig/sshd.c
++++ openssh-9.3p2/sshd.c
+@@ -272,6 +272,19 @@ static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
+ static char *listener_proctitle;
  
  /*
 + * Clear some stack space. This is a bit naive, but hopefully helps mitigate
@@ -285,10 +285,10 @@ Index: openssh-9.3p2/sshd-session.c
 +}
 +
 +/*
-  * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
-  * As usual, this may only take signal-safe actions, even though it is
-  * terminal.
-@@ -260,6 +260,8 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh,
+  * Close all listening sockets
+  */
+ static void
+@@ -430,6 +443,8 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh,
  			sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
  		}
  	}
@@ -297,32 +297,32 @@ Index: openssh-9.3p2/sshd-session.c
  }
  
  /* Demote private to public keys for network child */
-@@ -431,6 +432,8 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -600,6 +615,8 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
+ static void
+ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
  {
- 	int skip_privdrop = 0;
- 
 +	clobber_stack();
 +
- 	/*
- 	 * Hack for systems that don't support FD passing: retain privileges
- 	 * in the post-auth privsep process so it can allocate PTYs directly.
-@@ -1354,6 +1356,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	 */
- 	mm_send_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
- 	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
-+	clobber_stack();
- 	exit(0);
+ #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
+ 	if (1) {
+ #else
+@@ -2360,6 +2377,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	if (use_privsep) {
+ 		mm_send_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
+ 		ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
++		clobber_stack();
+ 		exit(0);
+ 	}
  
-  authenticated:
-@@ -1431,6 +1434,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 
- 	mm_terminate();
+@@ -2436,6 +2454,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	if (use_privsep)
+ 		mm_terminate();
  
 +	clobber_stack();
  	exit(0);
  }
  
-@@ -1577,8 +1581,10 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
+@@ -2596,8 +2615,10 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
  	/* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep
  	   wrappers used for auditing.  Make sure we don't recurse
  	   indefinitely. */
@@ -332,10 +332,10 @@ Index: openssh-9.3p2/sshd-session.c
  		_exit(i);
 +	}
  	in_cleanup = 1;
- 	extern int auth_attempted; /* monitor.c */
- 
-@@ -1604,5 +1610,7 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
-            mm_is_monitor())
+ 	if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) {
+ 		do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt);
+@@ -2623,5 +2644,7 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
+ 	    (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
  		audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
  #endif
 +
diff --git a/openssh-reenable-dh-group14-sha1-default.patch b/openssh-reenable-dh-group14-sha1-default.patch
index ac01baa..8a2293a 100644
--- a/openssh-reenable-dh-group14-sha1-default.patch
+++ b/openssh-reenable-dh-group14-sha1-default.patch
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/ssh_config.5
 +diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
  .Ed
  .Pp
- The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
 Index: openssh-8.9p1/sshd_config.5
 ===================================================================
 --- openssh-8.9p1.orig/sshd_config.5
@@ -38,4 +38,4 @@ Index: openssh-8.9p1/sshd_config.5
 +diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
  .Ed
  .Pp
- The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
diff --git a/openssh.changes b/openssh.changes
index 9920ce7..db6ea98 100644
--- a/openssh.changes
+++ b/openssh.changes
@@ -1,299 +1,3 @@
--------------------------------------------------------------------
-Mon Aug 12 08:55:38 UTC 2024 - Antonio Larrosa <alarrosa@suse.com>
-
-- Fix a dbus connection leaked in the logind patch that was
-  missing a sd_bus_unref call (found by Matthias Gerstner):
-  * logind_set_tty.patch
-- Add a patch that fixes a small memory leak when parsing the
-  subsystem configuration option:
-  * fix-memleak-in-process_server_config_line_depth.patch
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------
-Thu Aug  1 09:17:11 UTC 2024 - Antonio Larrosa <alarrosa@suse.com>
-
-- Update to openssh 9.8p1:
-  = Security
-  * 1) Race condition in sshd(8) (bsc#1226642, CVE-2024-6387).
-    A critical vulnerability in sshd(8) was present in Portable
-    OpenSSH versions between 8.5p1 and 9.7p1 (inclusive) that may
-    allow arbitrary code execution with root privileges.
-    Successful exploitation has been demonstrated on 32-bit
-    Linux/glibc systems with ASLR. Under lab conditions, the attack
-    requires on average 6-8 hours of continuous connections up to
-    the maximum the server will accept. Exploitation on 64-bit
-    systems is believed to be possible but has not been
-    demonstrated at this time. It's likely that these attacks will
-    be improved upon.
-    Exploitation on non-glibc systems is conceivable but has not
-    been examined. Systems that lack ASLR or users of downstream
-    Linux distributions that have modified OpenSSH to disable
-    per-connection ASLR re-randomisation (yes - this is a thing, no
-    - we don't understand why) may potentially have an easier path
-    to exploitation. OpenBSD is not vulnerable.
-    We thank the Qualys Security Advisory Team for discovering,
-    reporting and demonstrating exploitability of this problem, and
-    for providing detailed feedback on additional mitigation
-    measures.
-  * 2) Logic error in ssh(1) ObscureKeystrokeTiming (bsc#1227318,
-    CVE-2024-39894).
-    In OpenSSH version 9.5 through 9.7 (inclusive), when connected
-    to an OpenSSH server version 9.5 or later, a logic error in the
-    ssh(1) ObscureKeystrokeTiming feature (on by default) rendered
-    this feature ineffective - a passive observer could still
-    detect which network packets contained real keystrokes when the
-    countermeasure was active because both fake and real keystroke
-    packets were being sent unconditionally.
-    This bug was found by Philippos Giavridis and also
-    independently by Jacky Wei En Kung, Daniel Hugenroth and
-    Alastair Beresford of the University of Cambridge Computer Lab.
-    Worse, the unconditional sending of both fake and real
-    keystroke packets broke another long-standing timing attack
-    mitigation. Since OpenSSH 2.9.9 sshd(8) has sent fake keystoke
-    echo packets for traffic received on TTYs in echo-off mode,
-    such as when entering a password into su(8) or sudo(8). This
-    bug rendered these fake keystroke echoes ineffective and could
-    allow a passive observer of a SSH session to once again detect
-    when echo was off and obtain fairly limited timing information
-    about keystrokes in this situation (20ms granularity by
-    default).
-    This additional implication of the bug was identified by
-    Jacky Wei En Kung, Daniel Hugenroth and Alastair Beresford and
-    we thank them for their detailed analysis.
-    This bug does not affect connections when
-    ObscureKeystrokeTiming was disabled or sessions where no TTY
-    was requested.
-
-  = Future deprecation notice
-  * OpenSSH plans to remove support for the DSA signature algorithm
-    in early 2025. This release disables DSA by default at compile
-    time.
-    DSA, as specified in the SSHv2 protocol, is inherently weak -
-    being limited to a 160 bit private key and use of the SHA1
-    digest. Its estimated security level is only 80 bits symmetric
-    equivalent.
-    OpenSSH has disabled DSA keys by default since 2015 but has
-    retained run-time optional support for them. DSA was the only
-    mandatory-to-implement algorithm in the SSHv2 RFCs, mostly
-    because alternative algorithms were encumbered by patents when
-    the SSHv2 protocol was specified.
-    This has not been the case for decades at this point and better
-    algorithms are well supported by all actively-maintained SSH
-    implementations. We do not consider the costs of maintaining
-    DSA in OpenSSH to be justified and hope that removing it from
-    OpenSSH can accelerate its wider deprecation in supporting
-    cryptography libraries.
-    This release, and its deactivation of DSA by default at
-    compile-time, marks the second step in our timeline to finally
-    deprecate DSA. The final step of removing DSA support entirely
-    is planned for the first OpenSSH release of 2025.
-    DSA support may be re-enabled in OpenBSD by setting
-    "DSAKEY=yes" in Makefile.inc. To enable DSA support in
-    portable OpenSSH, pass the "--enable-dsa-keys" option to
-    configure.
-
-  = Potentially-incompatible changes
-  * all: as mentioned above, the DSA signature algorithm is now
-    disabled at compile time.
-  * sshd(8): the server will now block client addresses that
-    repeatedly fail authentication, repeatedly connect without ever
-    completing authentication or that crash the server. See the
-    discussion of PerSourcePenalties below for more information.
-    Operators of servers that accept connections from many users,
-    or servers that accept connections from addresses behind NAT or
-    proxies may need to consider these settings.
-  * sshd(8): the server has been split into a listener binary,
-    sshd(8), and a per-session binary "sshd-session". This allows
-    for a much smaller listener binary, as it no longer needs to
-    support the SSH protocol. As part of this work, support for
-    disabling privilege separation (which previously required code
-    changes to disable) and disabling re-execution of sshd(8) has
-    been removed. Further separation of sshd-session into
-    additional, minimal binaries is planned for the future.
-  * sshd(8): several log messages have changed. In particular, some
-    log messages will be tagged with as originating from a process
-    named "sshd-session" rather than "sshd".
-  * ssh-keyscan(1): this tool previously emitted comment lines
-    containing the hostname and SSH protocol banner to standard
-    error. This release now emits them to standard output, but adds
-    a new "-q" flag to silence them altogether.
-  * sshd(8): (portable OpenSSH only) sshd will no longer use
-    argv[0] as the PAM service name. A new "PAMServiceName"
-    sshd_config(5) directive allows selecting the service name at
-    runtime. This defaults to "sshd". bz2101
-  * (portable OpenSSH only) Automatically-generated files, such as
-    configure, config.h.in, etc will now be checked in to the
-    portable OpenSSH git release branch (e.g. V_9_8). This should
-    ensure that the contents of the signed release branch exactly
-    match the contents of the signed release tarball.
-
-  = New features
-  * sshd(8): as described above, sshd(8) will now penalise client
-    addresses that, for various reasons, do not successfully
-    complete authentication. This feature is controlled by a new
-    sshd_config(5) PerSourcePenalties option and is on by default.
-    sshd(8) will now identify situations where the session did not
-    authenticate as expected. These conditions include when the
-    client repeatedly attempted authentication unsucessfully
-    (possibly indicating an attack against one or more accounts,
-    e.g. password guessing), or when client behaviour caused sshd
-    to crash (possibly indicating attempts to exploit bugs in
-    sshd).
-    When such a condition is observed, sshd will record a penalty
-    of some duration (e.g. 30 seconds) against the client's
-    address. If this time is above a minimum configurable
-    threshold, then all connections from the client address will be
-    refused (along with any others in the same
-    PerSourceNetBlockSize CIDR range) until the penalty expire.
-    Repeated offenses by the same client address will accrue
-    greater penalties, up to a configurable maximum. Address ranges
-    may be fully exempted from penalties, e.g. to guarantee access
-    from a set of trusted management addresses, using the new
-    sshd_config(5) PerSourcePenaltyExemptList option.
-    We hope these options will make it significantly more difficult
-    for attackers to find accounts with weak/guessable passwords or
-    exploit bugs in sshd(8) itself. This option is enabled by
-    default.
-  * ssh(8): allow the HostkeyAlgorithms directive to disable the
-    implicit fallback from certificate host key to plain host keys.
-
-  = Bugfixes
-  * misc: fix a number of inaccuracies in the PROTOCOL.*
-    documentation files. GHPR430 GHPR487
-  * all: switch to strtonum(3) for more robust integer parsing in
-    most places.
-  * ssh(1), sshd(8): correctly restore sigprocmask around ppoll()
-  * ssh-keysign(8): stricter validation of messaging socket fd
-    GHPR492
-  * sftp(1): flush stdout after writing "sftp>" prompt when not
-    using editline. GHPR480
-  * sftp-server(8): fix home-directory extension implementation,
-    it previously always returned the current user's home directory
-    contrary to the spec. GHPR477
-  * ssh-keyscan(1): do not close stdin to prevent error messages
-    when stdin is read multiple times. E.g.
-    echo localhost | ssh-keyscan -f - -f -
-  * regression tests: fix rekey test that was testing the same KEX
-    algorithm repeatedly instead of testing all of them. bz3692
-  * ssh_config(5), sshd_config(5): clarify the KEXAlgorithms
-    directive documentation, especially around what is supported
-    vs available. bz3701.
-
-  = Portability
-  * sshd(8): expose SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 always to PAM auth modules
-    unconditionally. The previous behaviour was to expose it only
-    when particular authentication methods were in use.
-  * build: fix OpenSSL ED25519 support detection. An incorrect
-    function signature in configure.ac previously prevented
-    enabling the recently added support for ED25519 private keys in
-    PEM PKCS8 format.
-  * ssh(1), ssh-agent(8): allow the presence of the WAYLAND_DISPLAY
-    environment variable to enable SSH_ASKPASS, similarly to the
-    X11 DISPLAY environment variable. GHPR479
-  * build: improve detection of the -fzero-call-used-regs compiler
-    flag. bz3673.
-  * build: relax OpenSSL version check to accept all OpenSSL 3.x
-    versions.
-  * sshd(8): add support for notifying systemd on server listen and
-    reload, using a standalone implementation that doesn't depend
-    on libsystemd. bz2641
-
-- Update to openssh 9.7p1:
-
-  = New features
-  * ssh(1), sshd(8): add a "global" ChannelTimeout type that
-    watches all open channels and will close all open channels if
-    there is no traffic on any of them for the specified interval.
-    This is in addition to the existing per-channel timeouts added
-    recently.
-    This supports situations like having both session and x11
-    forwarding channels open where one may be idle for an extended
-    period but the other is actively used. The global timeout could
-    close both channels when both have been idle for too long.
-  * All: make DSA key support compile-time optional, defaulting to
-    on.
-
-  = Bugfixes
-  * sshd(8): don't append an unnecessary space to the end of
-    subsystem arguments (bz3667)
-  * ssh(1): fix the multiplexing "channel proxy" mode, broken when
-    keystroke timing obfuscation was added. (GHPR#463)
-  * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix spurious configuration parsing errors when
-    options that accept array arguments are overridden (bz3657).
-  * ssh-agent(1): fix potential spin in signal handler (bz3670)
-  * Many fixes to manual pages and other documentation, including
-    GHPR#462, GHPR#454, GHPR#442 and GHPR#441.
-  * Greatly improve interop testing against PuTTY.
-
-  = Portability
-  * Improve the error message when the autoconf OpenSSL header
-    check fails (bz#3668)
-  * Improve detection of broken toolchain -fzero-call-used-regs
-    support (bz3645).
-  * Fix regress/misc/fuzz-harness fuzzers and make them compile
-    without warnings when using clang16
-- Use gcc-11 in SLE to avoid a "parameter name omitted" error
-- Rebase patches:
-  * logind_set_tty.patch
-  * openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
-  * openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
-  * openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
-  * openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
-  * openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-ctr.patch
-  * openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch
-  * openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
-  * openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch
-  * openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch
-  * openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch
-  * openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch
-  * openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
-  * openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
-  * openssh-8.1p1-audit.patch
-  * openssh-8.4p1-vendordir.patch
-  * openssh-9.6p1-crypto-policies-man.patch
-  * openssh-mitigate-lingering-secrets.patch
-  * openssh-reenable-dh-group14-sha1-default.patch
-  * wtmpdb.patch
-- Thanks to Fedora developers for an initial version of the
-  rebase of the following patches:
-  * openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
-  * openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
-  * openssh-8.1p1-audit.patch
-- Remove patches that are already included in 9.8p1:
-  * fix-CVE-2024-6387.patch
-  * 0001-upstream-fix-proxy-multiplexing-mode_-broken-when-keystroke.patch
-  * 0001-upstream-correctly-restore-sigprocmask-around-ppoll.patch
-  * 0001-upstream-when-sending-ObscureKeystrokeTiming-chaff-packets_.patch
-- Remove patch that is now merged into
-  openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-ctr.patch and
-  openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch where it belongs:
-  * fix-missing-lz.patch
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------
-Mon Jul 15 17:49:06 UTC 2024 - Antonio Larrosa <alarrosa@suse.com>
-
-- Add sshd.socket and sshd@.service units as alternative to the
-  sshd.service that makes systemd listen to the ssh port
-  and run sshd per incoming connection. To enable this,
-  disable sshd.service and enable sshd.socket . If you want to
-  use a non standard sshd port with sshd.socket you can do
-  "systemctl edit sshd.socket" and add something like:
-  
-  [Socket] 
-  ListenStream=8022
-  
-  which listens on port 8022 as well as on port 22. If you want
-  to reset the list of listened ports and just use 8022, use:
-
-  [Socket] 
-  ListenStream=
-  ListenStream=8022
-- To enable a vsock listener in sshd (which allows to connect to
-  libvirt VMs), the systemd-experimental package needs to be
-  installed in the guest system, the libvirt-ssh-proxy package
-  needs to be installed in the host and the vm needs to have
-  vsock support (in virt-manager, click in "Add hardware" and
-  add "VSOCK VirtIO").
-
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Fri Jul  5 17:49:06 UTC 2024 - Antonio Larrosa <alarrosa@suse.com>
 
diff --git a/openssh.spec b/openssh.spec
index f52a2a9..e1f899b 100644
--- a/openssh.spec
+++ b/openssh.spec
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #
 # spec file for package openssh
 #
-# Copyright (c) 2024 SUSE LLC
+# Copyright (c) 2020 SUSE LLC
 #
 # All modifications and additions to the file contributed by third parties
 # remain the property of their copyright owners, unless otherwise agreed
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
   %define _fillupdir %{_localstatedir}/adm/fillup-templates
 %endif
 Name:           openssh
-Version:        9.8p1
+Version:        9.6p1
 Release:        0
 Summary:        Secure Shell Client and Server (Remote Login Program)
 License:        BSD-2-Clause AND MIT
@@ -61,8 +61,6 @@ Source12:       cavs_driver-ssh.pl
 Source13:       https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc#/openssh.keyring
 Source14:       sysusers-sshd.conf
 Source15:       sshd-sle.pamd
-Source16:       sshd@.service
-Source17:       sshd.socket
 Patch1:         openssh-7.7p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
 Patch3:         openssh-7.7p1-enable_PAM_by_default.patch
 Patch4:         openssh-7.7p1-eal3.patch
@@ -121,6 +119,7 @@ Patch50:        openssh-openssl-3.patch
 Patch51:        wtmpdb.patch
 Patch52:        logind_set_tty.patch
 Patch54:        openssh-mitigate-lingering-secrets.patch
+Patch100:       fix-missing-lz.patch
 Patch102:       openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
 Patch103:       openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
 Patch104:       openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
@@ -129,15 +128,19 @@ Patch106:       openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
 # PATCH-FIX-OPENSUSE bsc#1211301 Add crypto-policies support
 Patch107:       openssh-9.6p1-crypto-policies.patch
 Patch108:       openssh-9.6p1-crypto-policies-man.patch
-Patch109:       fix-memleak-in-process_server_config_line_depth.patch
+# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM bsc#1226642 fix CVE-2024-6387
+Patch109:       fix-CVE-2024-6387.patch
+# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM 
+Patch110:       0001-upstream-fix-proxy-multiplexing-mode_-broken-when-keystroke.patch
+# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM 
+Patch111:       0001-upstream-correctly-restore-sigprocmask-around-ppoll.patch
+# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM bsc#1227318 CVE-2024-39894
+Patch112:       0001-upstream-when-sending-ObscureKeystrokeTiming-chaff-packets_.patch
 %if 0%{with allow_root_password_login_by_default}
 Patch1000:      openssh-7.7p1-allow_root_password_login.patch
 %endif
 BuildRequires:  audit-devel
 BuildRequires:  automake
-%if 0%{?sle_version} >= 150500
-BuildRequires:  gcc11
-%endif
 BuildRequires:  groff
 BuildRequires:  libedit-devel
 BuildRequires:  libselinux-devel
@@ -325,9 +328,6 @@ sed -i.libexec 's,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir}/ssh,' \
     )
 
 %build
-%if 0%{?sle_version} >= 150500
-export CC=gcc-11
-%endif
 autoreconf -fiv
 %ifarch s390 s390x %{sparc}
 PIEFLAGS="-fPIE"
@@ -392,8 +392,6 @@ install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d/
 install -m 644 %{SOURCE5} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d/
 %endif
 install -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE10} %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/sshd.service
-install -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE16} %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/sshd@.service
-install -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE17} %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/sshd.socket
 ln -s service %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/rcsshd
 install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_fillupdir}
 install -m 644 %{SOURCE8} %{buildroot}%{_fillupdir}
@@ -473,11 +471,11 @@ test -f /etc/pam.d/sshd.rpmsave && mv -v /etc/pam.d/sshd.rpmsave /etc/pam.d/sshd
 test -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config.rpmsave && mv -v /etc/ssh/sshd_config.rpmsave /etc/ssh/sshd_config.rpmsave.old ||:
 %endif
 
-%service_add_pre sshd.service sshd.socket
+%service_add_pre sshd.service
 
 %post server
 %{fillup_only -n ssh}
-%service_add_post sshd.service sshd.socket
+%service_add_post sshd.service
 
 %if ! %{defined _distconfdir}
 test -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config && (grep -q "^Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config\.d/\*\.conf" /etc/ssh/sshd_config || ( \
@@ -489,16 +487,16 @@ test -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config && (grep -q "^Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config\.d/\*\.c
 %endif
 
 %preun server
-%service_del_preun sshd.service sshd.socket
+%service_del_preun sshd.service
 
 %postun server
 # The openssh-fips trigger script for openssh will normally restart sshd once
 # it gets installed, so only restart the service here if openssh-fips is not
 # present.
 if rpm -q openssh-fips >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then
-%service_del_postun_without_restart sshd.service sshd.socket
+%service_del_postun_without_restart sshd.service
 else
-%service_del_postun sshd.service sshd.socket
+%service_del_postun sshd.service
 fi
 
 %if ! %{defined _distconfdir}
@@ -586,14 +584,11 @@ test -f /etc/ssh/ssh_config.rpmsave && mv -v /etc/ssh/ssh_config.rpmsave /etc/ss
 %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config.d/40-suse-crypto-policies.conf
 %endif
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd.service
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd@.service
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd.socket
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_sysusersdir}/sshd.conf
 %attr(0444,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config*
 %attr(0444,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8*
 %attr(0444,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/sftp-server
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/sshd-session
 %if 0%{?suse_version} < 1600
 %dir %{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d
 %config %{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d/ssh.reg
diff --git a/sshd.socket b/sshd.socket
deleted file mode 100644
index 302de42..0000000
--- a/sshd.socket
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=OpenSSH Server Socket
-Conflicts=sshd.service
-
-[Socket]
-ListenStream=22
-Accept=yes
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=sockets.target
-
diff --git a/sshd@.service b/sshd@.service
deleted file mode 100644
index 9f8d816..0000000
--- a/sshd@.service
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=OpenSSH Per-Connection Server Daemon
-Documentation=man:systemd-ssh-generator(8) man:sshd(8)
-After=network.target
-	
-[Service]
-EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/ssh
-ExecStartPre=/usr/sbin/sshd-gen-keys-start
-ExecStartPre=/usr/sbin/sshd -t $SSHD_OPTS
-ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/sshd -i $SSHD_OPTS
-StandardInput=socket
diff --git a/wtmpdb.patch b/wtmpdb.patch
index de6f80c..bf5bca9 100644
--- a/wtmpdb.patch
+++ b/wtmpdb.patch
@@ -174,16 +174,12 @@ diff -ur openssh-8.9p1.old/Makefile.in openssh-8.9p1/Makefile.in
  AR=@AR@
  AWK=@AWK@
  RANLIB=@RANLIB@
-@@ -212,10 +213,10 @@
+@@ -212,7 +213,7 @@
  	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
  
  sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a	$(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
--	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) $(LIBWTMPDB)
- 
- sshd-session$(EXEEXT): libssh.a	$(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHD_SESSION_OBJS)
--	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHD_SESSION_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHD_SESSION_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) $(LIBWTMPDB)
+-	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) $(LIBWTMPDB)
  
  scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SCP_OBJS)
  	$(LD) -o $@ $(SCP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)