forked from pool/openssh
efb05e6527
- Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1
- update to 6.6p1
Security:
* sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5)
AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could
be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that
contains the characters before the wildcard character.
Features since 6.5p1:
* ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code,
which was experimental, never enabled and has been
unmaintained for some time.
* ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed
to match while processing Match blocks.
* ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results
in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse
ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This
gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded
hostname a chance to be applied.
Bugfixes:
* ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file
descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692
* sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and
systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection
is terminated during the pre-auth phase.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1
bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug
unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions.
* sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears
in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
29 lines
1.1 KiB
Diff
29 lines
1.1 KiB
Diff
# identify hashed hosts in known_hosts and suggest command line for their
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# removal
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diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect.c
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--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect.c
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+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect.c
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@@ -1070,16 +1070,21 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
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ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
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}
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/* The host key has changed. */
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warn_changed_key(host_key);
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error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.",
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user_hostfiles[0]);
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error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key),
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host_found->file, host_found->line);
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+ error("You can use following command to remove all keys for this IP:");
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+ if (host_found->file)
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+ error("ssh-keygen -R %s -f %s", hostname, host_found->file);
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+ else
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+ error("ssh-keygen -R %s", hostname);
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/*
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* If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
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* to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
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*/
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if (options.strict_host_key_checking) {
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error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have "
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"requested strict checking.", type, host);
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