forked from pool/openssh
74e20db9ed
- Enhanced SELinux functionality. Added Fedora patches:
* openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
Proper handling of MLS systems and basis for other SELinux
improvements
* openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
Properly set contexts during privilege separation
* openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
Add ssh-keycat command to allow retrival of authorized_keys
on MLS setups with polyinstantiation
* openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
Additional changes to set the proper context during privilege
separation
* openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
Various changes and putting the pieces together
For now we don't ship the ssh-keycat command, but we need the patch
for the other SELinux infrastructure
This change fixes issues like bsc#1214788, where the ssh daemon
needs to act on behalf of a user and needs a proper context for this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1123220
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=252
126 lines
3.7 KiB
Diff
126 lines
3.7 KiB
Diff
Index: openssh-9.3p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
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===================================================================
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--- openssh-9.3p2.orig/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
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+++ openssh-9.3p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
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@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
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void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
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void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
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+void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
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void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
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#endif
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Index: openssh-9.3p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
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===================================================================
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--- openssh-9.3p2.orig/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
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+++ openssh-9.3p2/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
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@@ -416,6 +416,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
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debug3_f("done");
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}
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+void
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+sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
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+{
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+ security_context_t *ctx;
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+
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+ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
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+ return;
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+
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+ if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
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+ logit_f("getexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
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+ return;
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+ }
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+ if (ctx != NULL) {
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+ /* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */
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+ if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0)
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+ fatal_f("setexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
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+ if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
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+ fatal_f("setcon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
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+ freecon(ctx);
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+ }
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+}
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+
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#endif
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#endif
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Index: openssh-9.3p2/session.c
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===================================================================
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--- openssh-9.3p2.orig/session.c
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+++ openssh-9.3p2/session.c
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@@ -1403,7 +1403,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
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platform_setusercontext(pw);
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- if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
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+ if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && (!is_child || !use_privsep)) {
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#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
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if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
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(LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
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@@ -1435,6 +1435,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
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(unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
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chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
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"u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
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+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
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+ sshd_selinux_copy_context();
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+#endif
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safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
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free(tmp);
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free(chroot_path);
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@@ -1470,6 +1473,11 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
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/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
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permanently_set_uid(pw);
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#endif
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+
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+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
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+ if (in_chroot == 0)
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+ sshd_selinux_copy_context();
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+#endif
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} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
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strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
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fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
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@@ -1487,9 +1495,6 @@ do_pwchange(Session *s)
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if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
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fprintf(stderr,
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"You must change your password now and login again!\n");
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-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
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- setexeccon(NULL);
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-#endif
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#ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
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execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
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(char *)NULL);
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@@ -1723,9 +1728,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
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argv[i] = NULL;
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optind = optreset = 1;
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__progname = argv[0];
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-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
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- ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
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-#endif
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exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
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}
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Index: openssh-9.3p2/sshd.c
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===================================================================
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--- openssh-9.3p2.orig/sshd.c
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+++ openssh-9.3p2/sshd.c
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@@ -510,6 +510,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(struct ssh *ssh)
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/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
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demote_sensitive_data(ssh);
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+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
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+ ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
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+#endif
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+
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/* Demote the child */
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if (privsep_chroot) {
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/* Change our root directory */
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@@ -602,6 +606,9 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
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{
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#ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
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if (1) {
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+#elif defined(WITH_SELINUX)
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+ if (0) {
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+ /* even root user can be confined by SELinux */
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#else
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if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
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#endif
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