forked from pool/openssh
efb05e6527
- Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1
- update to 6.6p1
Security:
* sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5)
AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could
be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that
contains the characters before the wildcard character.
Features since 6.5p1:
* ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code,
which was experimental, never enabled and has been
unmaintained for some time.
* ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed
to match while processing Match blocks.
* ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results
in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse
ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This
gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded
hostname a chance to be applied.
Bugfixes:
* ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file
descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692
* sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and
systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection
is terminated during the pre-auth phase.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1
bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug
unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions.
* sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears
in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
74 lines
2.1 KiB
Diff
74 lines
2.1 KiB
Diff
# block SIGALRM while logging through syslog to prevent deadlocks (through
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# grace_alarm_handler)
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# bnc#57354
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diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/log.c b/openssh-6.6p1/log.c
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--- a/openssh-6.6p1/log.c
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+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/log.c
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@@ -47,16 +47,17 @@
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
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# include <vis.h>
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#endif
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#include "xmalloc.h"
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#include "log.h"
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+#include <signal.h>
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static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
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static int log_on_stderr = 1;
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static int log_stderr_fd = STDERR_FILENO;
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static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
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static char *argv0;
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static log_handler_fn *log_handler;
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static void *log_handler_ctx;
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@@ -384,16 +385,17 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt,
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{
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#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
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struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
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#endif
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char msgbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
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char fmtbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
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char *txt = NULL;
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int pri = LOG_INFO;
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+ sigset_t nset, oset;
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int saved_errno = errno;
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log_handler_fn *tmp_handler;
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if (level > log_level)
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return;
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switch (level) {
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case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
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@@ -442,20 +444,29 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt,
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tmp_handler = log_handler;
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log_handler = NULL;
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tmp_handler(level, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx);
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log_handler = tmp_handler;
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} else if (log_on_stderr) {
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snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%s\r\n", fmtbuf);
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(void)write(log_stderr_fd, msgbuf, strlen(msgbuf));
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} else {
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+ /* Prevent a race between the grace_alarm
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+ * which writes a log message and terminates
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+ * and main sshd code that leads to deadlock
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+ * as syslog is not async safe.
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+ */
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+ sigemptyset(&nset);
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+ sigaddset(&nset, SIGALRM);
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+ sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset);
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#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
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openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata);
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syslog_r(pri, &sdata, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
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closelog_r(&sdata);
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#else
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openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
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syslog(pri, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
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closelog();
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#endif
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+ sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
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}
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errno = saved_errno;
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}
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