forked from pool/openssh
efb05e6527
- Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1
- update to 6.6p1
Security:
* sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5)
AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could
be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that
contains the characters before the wildcard character.
Features since 6.5p1:
* ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code,
which was experimental, never enabled and has been
unmaintained for some time.
* ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed
to match while processing Match blocks.
* ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results
in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse
ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This
gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded
hostname a chance to be applied.
Bugfixes:
* ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file
descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692
* sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and
systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection
is terminated during the pre-auth phase.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1
bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug
unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions.
* sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears
in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
142 lines
3.6 KiB
Diff
142 lines
3.6 KiB
Diff
# handle hostname changes when forwarding X
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# bnc#98627
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diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
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--- a/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
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+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/session.c
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@@ -1146,17 +1146,17 @@ copy_environment(char **source, char ***
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debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val);
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child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val);
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free(var_name);
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}
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}
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static char **
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-do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
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+do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell, int *env_size)
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{
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char buf[256];
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u_int i, envsize;
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char **env, *laddr;
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struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
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#if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
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char *path = NULL;
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#endif
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@@ -1333,25 +1333,27 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
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read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf);
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}
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if (debug_flag) {
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/* dump the environment */
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fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n");
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for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
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fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]);
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}
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+
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+ *env_size = envsize;
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return env;
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}
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/*
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* Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/ssh/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found
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* first in this order).
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*/
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static void
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-do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell)
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+do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell, char **env, int *env_size)
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{
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FILE *f = NULL;
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char cmd[1024];
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int do_xauth;
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struct stat st;
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do_xauth =
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s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL;
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@@ -1395,22 +1397,30 @@ do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shel
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"%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
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options.xauth_location, s->auth_display,
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s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
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}
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snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -",
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options.xauth_location);
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f = popen(cmd, "w");
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if (f) {
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+ char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
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+
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fprintf(f, "remove %s\n",
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s->auth_display);
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fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n",
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s->auth_display, s->auth_proto,
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s->auth_data);
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pclose(f);
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+ if (gethostname(hostname,sizeof(hostname)) >= 0)
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+ child_set_env(&env,env_size,"XAUTHLOCALHOSTNAME",
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+ hostname);
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+ else
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+ debug("Cannot set up XAUTHLOCALHOSTNAME %s\n",
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+ strerror(errno));
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} else {
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fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
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cmd);
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}
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}
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}
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static void
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@@ -1664,16 +1674,17 @@ child_close_fds(void)
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* ids, and executing the command or shell.
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*/
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#define ARGV_MAX 10
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void
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do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
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{
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extern char **environ;
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char **env;
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+ int env_size;
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char *argv[ARGV_MAX];
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const char *shell, *shell0, *hostname = NULL;
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struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
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int r = 0;
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/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
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destroy_sensitive_data();
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@@ -1730,17 +1741,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
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* legal, and means /bin/sh.
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*/
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shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
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/*
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* Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file,
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* even if shell is overridden from login.conf
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*/
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- env = do_setup_env(s, shell);
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+ env = do_setup_env(s, shell, &env_size);
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#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
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shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell);
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#endif
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/* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */
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if (options.use_login)
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hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len,
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@@ -1799,17 +1810,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
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strerror(errno));
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if (r)
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exit(1);
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}
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closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
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if (!options.use_login)
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- do_rc_files(s, shell);
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+ do_rc_files(s, shell, env, &env_size);
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/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
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signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
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if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR) {
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printf("This service allows sftp connections only.\n");
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fflush(NULL);
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exit(1);
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