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openssh/openssh-6.5p1-pam-check-locks.patch
Petr Cerny 08f9072513 Accepting request 222365 from home:pcerny:factory 
- Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.5p1

- Update to 6.5p1
  Features since 6.4p1:
  * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for key exchange using ECDH in
    Daniel Bernstein's Curve25519; default when both the client
    and server support it.
  * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for Ed25519 as a public key type fo
    rboth server and client.  Ed25519 is an EC signature offering
    better security than ECDSA and DSA and good performance.
  * Add a new private key format that uses a bcrypt KDF to better
    protect keys at rest. Used unconditionally for Ed25519 keys,
    on demand for other key types via the -o ssh-keygen(1)
    option.  Intended to become default in the near future.
    Details documented in PROTOCOL.key.
  * ssh(1), sshd(8): new transport cipher
    "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" combining Daniel Bernstein's
    ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an
    authenticated encryption mode. Details documented
    PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305.
  * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients
    and servers that use the obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme.
    It will still be possible to connect with these
    clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and
    OpenSSH will refuse connection entirely in a future release.
  * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse old proprietary clients and servers
    that use a weaker key exchange hash calculation.
  * ssh(1): increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups
    requested for each symmetric key size. New values from NIST
    Special Publication 800-57 with the upper limit specified by

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/222365
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=63
2014-02-14 14:54:10 +00:00

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# new option UsePAMCheckLocks to enforce checking for locked accounts while
# UsePAM is used
# bnc#708678, FATE#312033
diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/auth.c b/openssh-6.5p1/auth.c
--- a/openssh-6.5p1/auth.c
+++ b/openssh-6.5p1/auth.c
@@ -103,17 +103,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
struct spwd *spw = NULL;
#endif
/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
return 0;
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
- if (!options.use_pam)
+ if (!options.use_pam || options.use_pam_check_locks)
spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
return 0;
#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
#endif /* USE_SHADOW */
/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
@@ -123,17 +123,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
#else
passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
#endif
/* check for locked account */
- if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
+ if ((!options.use_pam || options.use_pam_check_locks) && passwd && *passwd) {
int locked = 0;
#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
locked = 1;
#endif
#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.c b/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.c
--- a/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.c
+++ b/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.c
@@ -66,16 +66,17 @@ extern Buffer cfg;
void
initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
{
memset(options, 0, sizeof(*options));
/* Portable-specific options */
options->use_pam = -1;
+ options->use_pam_check_locks = -1;
/* Standard Options */
options->num_ports = 0;
options->ports_from_cmdline = 0;
options->listen_addrs = NULL;
options->address_family = -1;
options->num_host_key_files = 0;
options->num_host_cert_files = 0;
@@ -158,16 +159,18 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
}
void
fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
{
/* Portable-specific options */
if (options->use_pam == -1)
options->use_pam = 0;
+ if (options->use_pam_check_locks == -1)
+ options->use_pam_check_locks = 0;
/* Standard Options */
if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
/* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] =
@@ -320,17 +323,17 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
#endif
}
/* Keyword tokens. */
typedef enum {
sBadOption, /* == unknown option */
/* Portable-specific options */
- sUsePAM,
+ sUsePAM, sUsePAMChecklocks,
/* Standard Options */
sPort, sHostKeyFile, sServerKeyBits, sLoginGraceTime, sKeyRegenerationTime,
sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
sKerberosGetAFSToken,
sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
@@ -365,18 +368,20 @@ typedef enum {
static struct {
const char *name;
ServerOpCodes opcode;
u_int flags;
} keywords[] = {
/* Portable-specific options */
#ifdef USE_PAM
{ "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "usepamchecklocks", sUsePAMChecklocks, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#else
{ "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "usepamchecklocks", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
{ "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
/* Standard Options */
{ "port", sPort, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "hostkey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
{ "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -878,16 +883,19 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
}
}
switch (opcode) {
/* Portable-specific options */
case sUsePAM:
intptr = &options->use_pam;
goto parse_flag;
+ case sUsePAMChecklocks:
+ intptr = &options->use_pam_check_locks;
+ goto parse_flag;
/* Standard Options */
case sBadOption:
return -1;
case sPort:
/* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */
if (options->ports_from_cmdline)
return 0;
diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.h b/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.h
--- a/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.h
+++ b/openssh-6.5p1/servconf.h
@@ -162,16 +162,17 @@ typedef struct {
*/
u_int num_authkeys_files; /* Files containing public keys */
char *authorized_keys_files[MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES];
char *adm_forced_command;
int use_pam; /* Enable auth via PAM */
+ int use_pam_check_locks; /* internally check for locked accounts even when using PAM */
int permit_tun;
int num_permitted_opens;
char *chroot_directory;
char *revoked_keys_file;
char *trusted_user_ca_keys;
diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.0
--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.0
+++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.0
@@ -720,16 +720,24 @@ DESCRIPTION
Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an
equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable
either PasswordAuthentication or ChallengeResponseAuthentication.
If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a
non-root user. The default is ``no''.
+ UsePAMCheckLocks
+ When set to ``yes'', the checks whether the account has been
+ locked with `passwd -l' are performed even when PAM authentication
+ is enabled via UsePAM. This is to ensure that it is not possible
+ to log in with e.g. a public key (in such a case PAM is used only
+ to set up the session and some PAM modules will not check whether
+ the account is locked in this scenario). The default is ``no''.
+
UsePrivilegeSeparation
Specifies whether sshd(8) separates privileges by creating an
unprivileged child process to deal with incoming network traffic.
After successful authentication, another process will be created
that has the privilege of the authenticated user. The goal of
privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by
containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes. The
default is ``yes''. If UsePrivilegeSeparation is set to
diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.5
--- a/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.5
+++ b/openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.5
@@ -1199,16 +1199,28 @@ or
.Pp
If
.Cm UsePAM
is enabled, you will not be able to run
.Xr sshd 8
as a non-root user.
The default is
.Dq no .
+.It Cm UsePAMCheckLocks
+When set to
+.Dq yes
+, the checks whether the account has been locked with
+.Pa passwd -l
+are performed even when PAM authentication is enabled via
+.Cm UsePAM .
+This is to ensure that it is not possible to log in with e.g. a
+public key (in such a case PAM is used only to set up the session and some PAM
+modules will not check whether the account is locked in this scenario). The
+default is
+.Dq no .
.It Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process
to deal with incoming network traffic.
After successful authentication, another process will be created that has
the privilege of the authenticated user.
The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege
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